Generational Crises and Methods for Evaluation

Awakening eras, crisis eras, crisis wars, generational financial crashes, as applied to historical and current events
Matt1989
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Joined: Sun Sep 21, 2008 12:30 am

Generational Crises and Methods for Evaluation

Post by Matt1989 »

Explanation: John Xenakis asked me to write a summary of my methodology for evaluation of Crisis Wars, since I am one of the few to have applied a generational analysis to dozens (now hundreds) of places and times. The following reflects my opinion alone. I usually agree with John on these things, but there are some areas of contention.

I suppose the best way to start this is with a discussion of how Generational Dynamics mechanism compares to that of Strauss and Howe:

William Strauss and Neil Howe, through years of hard work (studying diaries, reading histories, theorizing, etc.) slowly developed their conception of a generational cycle, a 20-year set of four generational archetypes recurring every 80 years, accompanied by equal-length societal eras, or turnings. This was first laid out in their 1991 book, Generations, and was more explicitly codified in their 1997 book, the Fourth Turning. The following diagram summarizes their conclusions about the saeculum (the generational cycle + the historical cycle) quite neatly:

Image

For example, in the United States, the 1929-1945 era is considered to be a Crisis/Fourth Turning, the 1945-1963 era is a High/First Turning (many use the term 'Recovery' today), the 1963-1984 era is an Awakening/Second Turning, and the 1984-2001/5/8 era (loads of disagreement on the end date here) is an Unraveling/Third Turning. Similarly, the G.I. Generation are 'Heroes,' the Silent Generation are 'Artists,' the Baby Boomers are 'Prophets,' Generation X are 'Nomads,' and the Millennial Generation are 'Heroes' again. Generational Dynamics was developed from Strauss and Howe's framework, and while it retains the basic generational paradigm, the methodology is a bit different. What John J. Xenakis did was apply the Strauss and Howe mechanism to regions and time periods throughout all of history with an open mind. He felt that some relatively minor revisions (most of the S&H structure is maintained) needed to be made, and together with his work on international generational analysis, predictions, and finance-related matters (among other things), Generational Dynamics was born.

The differences between the S&H and GD mechanisms are numerous (if mostly minor), but the main one probably relates to the treatment of the Crisis. Put simply, Generational Dynamics uses the Crisis as an anchor for the saeculum, with the Crisis climax launching the next generational cycle. What does the anchor metaphor show? Well, I suppose it means that it's impossible to 'generationally bypass' the Crisis, that the Crisis is the psychological culmination of the preceding saeculum and the defining moment for the first few decades of the next, and most importantly, the generations are unified so the following cycle arrives standardized (for example, if there were some generational hiccups due to immigration or a particularly long or short mid-cycle period). I have a quick quibble with John on this last point. He has previously asserted that only a Crisis War can unify; I think otherwise. I'll go into more detail on this toward the end.

A Crisis contains a few segments – I'll use America's most recent Crisis, The Great Depression and World War Two, as an example: The Catalyst begins the Crisis era with a bang, such as the 1929 Stock Market Crash; The Cascade Phase is an era of increasing misery and societal directionlessness (1929-1932ish); The Regeneracy unifies society (I see two Regeneracies—the era around FDR's first election and the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack); the Climax... well, duh, but I go into more detail below (1944-1945 campaign); and the Resolution wraps things up and ends the Crisis era (V-J Day).

It's critical to remember that both the Fourth Turning Theory and Generational Dynamics are social cycles, and the events that we associate with specific turnings are corollaries to the changing social dynamics. However, Generational Dynamics holds that certain events can actively alter the way generations interact, especially in the Crisis. We've already established, on a theoretical basis, that the Crisis is fundamentally different from the three other turnings. The same holds true for our empirical analysis: Unlike the first three turnings, which are relatively fixed in length (save for an intrusion of the Crisis), the crisis is highly variable, lasting as little as two years or as many as 25. As the generational constellation progresses in a Crisis era, there is an increasing propensity toward attitudes reminiscent of a climax, but this can be altered.

Contrary to as often characterized, the climax is not an event. Rather, in extensively and intensively studying various saeculums, we have found that the climax (and the Crisis) can be mapped or mirrored using events as our guideposts. A Crisis climax is the series of moments during which human suffering and the loss of life are treated as tolerable in the pursuit of a resolution to the Crisis. In the previous two American cycles, this reality was expressed in the post-Gettysburg environment during the Civil War, particularly during Grant's Overland Campaign and Sherman's March to the Sea; during World War Two, it spanned from the D-Day invasion of France until the dropping of two nuclear weapons upon Japanese civilians.

This 'climax sentiment' can be modified when conditions change. The most obvious example would be a time where a society was the victim of an unexpected invasion by a hostile enemy -- when a civilian populace is threated during a Crisis, the willingness for sacrifice should increase dramatically. Here is Strauss and Howe's description of the climax:
The Crisis climax is human history's equivalent to nature's raging typhoon, the kind that sucks all surrounding matter into a single swirl of ferocious energy. Anything not lashed down goes flying; anything standing in the way gets flattened. Normally occurring late in the Fourth Turning, the climax gathers energy from an accumulation of unmet needs, unpaid bills, and unresolved problems. It then spends that energy on an upheaval whose direction and dimension were beyond comprehension during the prior Unraveling era. The climax shakes a society to its roots, transforms its institutions, redirects its purposes, and marks its people (and its generations) for life. The climax can end in triumph, or tragedy, or some combination of both. Whatever the event and whatever the outcome, a society passes through a great gate of history, fundamentally altering the course of civilization.
Now that we've established some of the basics, we should be able to recognize the signposts that indicate the state of the generational cycle. It's virtually impossible to grasp the totality of an era without living through it, but fortunately for us, plenty of indicators are at our disposal. In brief:
  • A Recovery is characterized by the public's need for order and stability.
    An Awakening is characterized by a generational conflict and social upheaval.
    An Unraveling is characterized by institutional and societal decay.
    A Crisis is characterized by social unification, institutional renewal, and the climax tendencies described above.
(Note: In my experience, identifying generational archetypes is considerably more challenging and time-consuming than identifying individual turnings.)

Of these, the second and fourth turnings are the most prominent, like summer and winter. They are normally identified by what we see, so we try to make a case for them. (We'll show in more detail how Crises are identified later.) However, the first and third turnings are normally falsified by what we see. For example, I know the Egyptian Revolution doesn't take place during a Recovery because the societal reactions to the unfolding chaos weren't consistent with a Recovery Era. As the Crisis is both the most conspicuous and decisive of the four turnings, most analysis begins here, and the other three turnings are constructed from this point. There's enough information above and in the link provided to get a sense of the essence of a Crisis, so we'll show how to mirror this societal sentiment. First, some additional guidelines (not rules, these theories are constantly being revised) to assist in identification:

[*]For generational purposes, the climax is the end of the Crisis era. The S&H defined 'Resolution' is almost always political, not societal in nature, and may occur in the Recovery.

[*]The generational constellation does not always match its expression. For example, extremely authoritarian governments may often suppress Awakening events. Recall that the cycle continues unabated in such scenarios. However, if a generational fourth turning lacks a climax (a possibility if there is little to help increase the willingness for sacrifice), a generational fifth turning will emerge 20 years after the start of the fourth turning.

[*]The Recovery, Awakening, and Unraveling each last around 20 years, with very little variance. (There is a slim chance that a society may have different standards of life phases i.e. an adult is 25, not 20, in a society X). The Recovery tends to be a little shorter. An Unraveling may be cut short by a Crisis, since the fourth turning generational alignment is nearly in place. The Crisis lasts as long as it takes to reach the climax.

[Note: Most of this can probably be deduced a priori, but since there is so much reliance on the validity of our premises (which most likely have not been satisfactorily established to a skeptic's eye) studies have necessarily depended on empirical observation to be reasonably validated.]

I approach this final section with a little trepidation. As someone who has some experience studying this stuff, I can only say that any strict method one can choose will fall short. Human action is immensely complex, and while we simplify it by focusing on societal trends, it's not as neat and orderly as we might prefer. With experience, it really doesn't become that much easier to make these judgment calls, but your decisions will be more accurate. You get a feel for the whole process, and this is far more indispensable than any methods that can be taught to you.

The first thing I do when studying the generational history of a society is to create a list of all possible Crises. This is determined by the significance of an era, and Crises are always significant periods. However, not all Crises will stand out immediately. Some are downright hidden, such as Britain's mid-19th century one, where there was the potential for the nation to get involved in the American Civil War. Naturally, the most common type of Crisis is a Crisis War. Back on the TFT forums, I posted a pseudo-combination (there were some changes) of John's two algorithms – taking the objectivity of the first with the intuitiveness of the second. Combined, I believe they serve as a good starting point for beginners evaluating a Crisis War. I'll repost it here, with slight modifications:
I actually like the Crisis War Evaluation Algorithm. It serves to allow for ease of evaluating potential crises without a detailed generational analysis (which would look at certain individuals, a time consuming process). The algorithm goes like this:
  • If the war is very significant, it is probably a crisis war. If it is not significant than it cannot be a crisis war.
    If the war has high genocidal violence, it must be a crisis war. If the war does not have high genocidal violence, it probably isn't a crisis war.
    If the war is highly politicized, it cannot be a crisis war. If the war has non-political pursuits, it probably is a crisis war.
I think this is great since it gets to the core of the differences between a crisis war and non-crisis war. The problem lies in determining the significance, genocidal violence, and politicization. We have a pretty objective list, but getting there involves more subjective methods.

I think a combination of the old plus and minus method that would go into a certain category -- such as significance, would work very well. At the very least, it is worth a shot.

As it turns out, not all crises contain your standard definition of a crisis war. If the evaluation algorithm could be expanded to allow for the inclusion of all crises or nearly all crises (I doubt its possible to use an algorithm like this to determine if Iceland had a crisis in World War Two). This would mean civil wars and guerrilla wars, as well as times of high instability with radical change.

So, with that, I'll propose a first draft. Keep in mind that some of these questions may not be totally applicable to a situation. It's hard to commit genocide against a foreign power when you are on the defensive the whole time! Also, remember context. For America, World War One will certainly be remembered for centuries, but it will be remembered by name only.
A '+' and a '–' counts as 'one' and 'negative one' respectively; a '++' or '--' counts as 'two' and 'negative two' respectively.

What makes a time period significant?

+ sign indicates significance
  • Was the nation's foreign policy greatly changed for decades to come (+), or did the previous foreign policy remain (-)?
    Was the nation's economic policy greatly changed for decades to come (+), or did the previous policy remain (-)?
    Did the war have a decisive conclusion (+), or was there a stalemate (-)?
    Is/Will the war be remembered for centuries (+), or will it be forgotten (-)?
    Was there a major governmental change (+)?
    Was a historically important or major city captured (+)?
    Was there a major social change (I'm thinking of stuff like the end of slavery or serfdom) as a result of the time period (+)?
    Did the nation pursue punitive punishments against the opposition (-)?
[*]Dividing threshold is +1

How do we determine the intensity, willpower, and energy?

+ sign indicates high energy
  • Was there a pursued desire for ethnic cleansing without much national opposition (++)?
    Was there a sustained program of mass murders, mass rapes, massacres, torture, destruction of entire towns (with inhabitants), forced relocation of huge populations of people - sustained over a period of months (a single battle doesn't count) (++)?
    Were civilians targeted without much national opposition (++), or did the nation go out of its way to protect civilians (--)?
    Is there a well-defined a clear climax as described by Strauss and Howe (++), or not (-)?
    Was there a "D-Day" type mass assault, a willingness to sacrifice one's own forces for victory (+), or not (-)?
    Was there a refusal to capitulate, a willingness to fight to the death, even when defeat is almost certain (+), or was there an early capitulation (-)?
    Were the goals pursued very enthusiastically (+), or somewhat passively (-)?
    Was there a massive revolt that spiraled out of control (+)?
    Was there a massive surprise attack on the enemy (+)?
    Was there a scorched earth policy to be used on enemy territory (+)?
    Did the nation perpetuate devastation on the enemy (+)?
[*]Dividing threshold +3

How do we determine political considerations?

+ sign indicates high politicization
  • Did the war have sustained high public support when things went wrong (--), or was it unpopular (+)?
    If unpopular, was there simply political controversy (+), as opposed to violent conflict (--)?
    Were there political pauses (+), or were such pauses unthinkable (-)?
    Was the cause of the conflict based on old fault lines (-), or was it a relatively new issue (+)?
    If a civil war, was it between political parties (+), or was it between ethnic or religious groups (-)?
    Was the nation reluctant to go to war after it was triggered (+), or did they pursue it enthusiastically (-)?
    Was the cause of the war exogenous (+)?
    Was there a use of reasonable triggering political objectives for initial mobilization or termination (+)?
    Was initiation part of a power grab (+)?
[*]Dividing threshold +0

Now, once one has determined if the war was significant, pursued energetically, or politicized, plug it back into the algorithm at the top.

Let me know what you think! This is a first draft, and there is certainly more to add.
I've tested this theory out on several different scenarios. It doesn't work all the time: An honest evaluation of the Great Patriotic War for the Soviet Union shows an intensity well above the given threshold, but as long as it works *most* of the time, it's a useful tool. However, I would strongly recommend further study. In particular, determine whether your analysis of the war is consistent with what one might expect from a generational Crisis/Recovery/Awakening/Unraveling era. Here, context is paramount. There might have been an atypical reluctance on the part of the American people to get involved in the Second World War, but there was no real “fault line” present at the time. Furthermore, America pursued the war extremely enthusiastically after Pearl Harbor. Similarly, President Nixon may have dropped more explosives in Southeast Asia during the waning days of the Vietnam War (this was known as Operation Menu) than all those dropped during World War Two combined, but it was conducted in secret due to intense opposition to the war from the American people. Such contextual understanding requires more than a cursory analysis, and the ability to quickly and effectively make these subjective evaluations about what is important and what is not improves with experience.

Short of a Crisis War, one is most likely to see an era of high instability, with periods of intermittent chaos, coups and revolutions, etc. And short of that, there needs to be a significant period of time where there are a series of identifiable panics and shocks—something that can reasonably catapult society toward that climax sentiment. This may be the threat of 'genocidal warfare' or something else. After your Crisis has been identified to your liking, test it. Does a clear Recovery Era follow? Does an Awakening begin approximately 20 years after your climax? And an Unraveling after that? You are, in a sense, constructing a narrative in your mind. Gaps can be filled in time, but information that seemingly runs contrary to generational theory must be explained reasonably. Otherwise, you haven't got a thing.

HTH.

John
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Re: Generational Crises and Methods for Evaluation

Post by John »

The above description is really sensational, and it's extremely
valuable to have a different point of view from my own.

For those who don't know Matt, he did an enormous amount of extremely
valuable work in high school developing generational timelines for
numerous countries. Matt has a natural ability to understand
generational theory that exceeds anyone I've seen.

Here's a picture of Matt in high school a couple of years ago. He's
now in college, and probably looks even better today:

Image

Matt discussed some of the differences between his view, my view and
the Strauss and Howe (S&H) view. I want to emphasize that the
differences are details -- reflecting the fact that generational
theory is still evolving -- but 99% of the major concepts are all the
same.

The major theoretical difference is, as Matt noted, that S&H anchor
the saeculae at the Awakening, while Generational Dynamics anchors it
at the Crisis. However, even this is less important than the fact
that all societies must have both Crisis and Awakening eras, in
alternation.

This only becomes important with the "chicken and egg riddle" about
how the saeculum is originally launched. S&H speculated that
generational theory applies only to Anglo-American history, because
only those societies have provided the freedom necessary to allow the
spiritual energy necessary to launch an Awakening from scratch.
Thus, they defined six seculae, starting with the Awakening prior to
the War of the Roses in 1400s England.

See the following for more information about the evolution of
generational theory prior to S&H:

** William G. McLoughlin / Awakenings / Truman Doctrine
** http://www.generationaldynamics.com/cgi ... ning060919


When I became aware of S&H's theory after 9/11, I was fascinated and
intrigued, but I knew that it was useless to me unless I could be
sure it applied to all countries at all times in history. If it
didn't, then how could I be sure that it applied to the present day?

The easiest way to do that was to verify that crisis wars followed a
pattern that was consistent with S&H's theory, but at other places
and times. It's very difficult to identify Awakening eras throughout
history, since the social upheavals are not often recorded by
historians; but crisis wars are almost always recorded, since they
typically make dramatic changes that last for centuries.

But this also led to the discovery was that it is much easier to
understand how the Crisis era triggers the Awakening era than it is
to understand how an Awakening era triggers the Crisis era. The
former can be explained lucidly in a sentence or two, while the
latter requires many paragraphs to explain, and ultimately still
requires understanding how the Awakening came about from the
preceding Crisis.

However, this is a matter of choosing the easiest way to describe the
theory. Whichever way you describe it, the following is still true:
Each society MUST have alternating Awakening and Crisis eras, and
each Awakening era leads to a Crisis era, and each Crisis era leads
to an Awakening era. Thus, just as it's impossible to say which came
first, the chicken or the egg, it's also impossible to say which came
first, the Awakening or the Crisis.

I'll comment on two more of the differences that Matt identified.

First, I've come to see financial crises as independent of, though
related to, war crises. Thus, since the 1600s, western civilization
has had international financial crises (Tulipomania, South Sea
bubble, bankruptcy of French Monarchy, panic of / Hamburg crisis of
1857, and 1929 crash), and war crises (Thirty Years War / English
Civil War, War of the Spanish Succession, French Revolution /
Napoleonic wars, American Civil War, World War II). Although
international war crises and financial crises have increasingly
tended to coincide in western civilization, that relationship is far
more complicated for crisis wars in other regions (such as Taiping
rebellion and WW I) and financial crises in other regions (such as
Japanese stock market crashes of 1919 and 1990).

Second, Matt describes generational cycles as social cycles. That's
no doubt true, but from the point of view of explaining generational
theory it presents problems.

As I'm constantly faced with explaining generational theory to
people on a daily basis, on this web site and in person, and calling
these as "social cycles" would automatically cause a response about
how "social engineering" could change the generational cycles.

I've been dealing with this stuff now for seven years, and I've
discovered that there are many people who simply don't understand
generational concepts, and probably cannot, because the concepts of
system dynamics (as developed by Forrester in the 1960s) are too
abstract. I'm constantly complaining about this with respect to Ben
Bernanke and other mainstream economists, to whom even the simplest
and most obvious examples of generational changes are evidently beyond
their ability to understand.

** Brilliant Nobel Prize winners in Economics blame credit bubble on 'the news'
** http://www.generationaldynamics.com/cgi ... b#e080427b


There are two litmus tests for whether a person is able to understand
generational theory.

The first litmus test is ability to understand system dynamics, and
the easiest way to tell is from a quiz given near the beginning of
the following article:

** System Dynamics and the Failure of Macroeconomics Theory
** http://www.generationaldynamics.com/cgi ... acro061025


The quiz is conceptually very simple, and requires no math. Here's
the quiz:

Image

For discussion, hints and solution, see the article referenced above.

The second litmus test has to do with politics. Generational cycles
do affect politics, but politicians cannot affect generational cycles
in any predictable (non-chaotic) way. The great events that
generational theory predicts can be neither caused nor prevented by
politicians.

This always comes up in the context of the Iraq war. The litmus test
is this: If your certain view is that the Iraq war is President
Bush's fault, and you can't get your mind around the concept that
we'd be in the same place today if Al Gore had been President after
9/11, then you probably won't ever understand generational theory.

Which brings us back to social cycles. Generational cycles cause
political and social cycles, but not vice-versa. Politicians and
social scientists cannot do anything, by action or inaction, to cause
or prevent the events predicted by generational theory. That's why I
would be reluctant to refer to "social cycles" in any exposition.

But as I said, these are all details. Overwhelmingly, the concepts
presented by Matt, S&H, and myself, are the same concepts. And I
thank Matt again for his valuable work and for his posting.

Sincerely,

John

The Grey Badger
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Re: Generational Crises and Methods for Evaluation

Post by The Grey Badger »

Anyone who says you can't spot Great Awakenings in periods previous to our own has never read such things as medieval history. I just finished a library book called "Heloise and Abelard: a new biography" and if that wasn't a Great Awakening Period, I will eat a scroll containing their love letters. :lol:

Matt1989
Posts: 170
Joined: Sun Sep 21, 2008 12:30 am

Re: Generational Crises and Methods for Evaluation

Post by Matt1989 »

Thanks for the kind words, John.

I may be a little more filled out now, but my opinion on this stuff hasn't changed one iota. I'll respond to a couple of things here:
John wrote: Matt discussed some of the differences between his view, my view and
the Strauss and Howe (S&H) view. I want to emphasize that the
differences are details -- reflecting the fact that generational
theory is still evolving -- but 99% of the major concepts are all the
same.

The major theoretical difference is, as Matt noted, that S&H anchor
the saeculae at the Awakening, while Generational Dynamics anchors it
at the Crisis.
To clarify, my view is probably the Generational Dynamics view, but with a slightly different application that reflects my understanding of Generational Dynamics.

As far as I know, S&H used Awakenings as the starting point for their study, but not the saeculum. The Awakening is the second turning, not the first or the last. I would say that, as in their seasonal metaphor, there isn't an anchor for their saeculum. Perhaps the Generational Dynamics saeculum has a metaphor equally apt.
John wrote:Second, Matt describes generational cycles as social cycles. That's
no doubt true, but from the point of view of explaining generational
theory it presents problems.

As I'm constantly faced with explaining generational theory to
people on a daily basis, on this web site and in person, and calling
these as "social cycles" would automatically cause a response about
how "social engineering" could change the generational cycles.
The social engineering required to have such an effect would be the transformation of an entire generation of people. Can one honestly assert that as a whole, Baby Boomers might not act like, well, Baby Boomers?

The problem arises when such repeated simplification leads to a misunderstanding of important concepts. Such a person may come to the right conclusions via slightly wrong-headed methods. This may be better than most of the population, but there is still a lot to be desired. This can be pretty heavy stuff, but you do have a knack (not to mention a lot of practice) at making such concepts understandable. A lot of the theoretical backbone of Generational Dynamics is still boxed away on the Fourth Turning Forums, or is contained in plumbline S&H, and I think it would be a huge improvement to incorporate some of those ideas into your articles. I sure as hell incorporated them into my above essay.
The second litmus test has to do with politics. Generational cycles
do affect politics, but politicians cannot affect generational cycles
in any predictable (non-chaotic) way.
Absolutely. A generation is a massive group of people; only catastrophic events can actually uproot their tendencies. However, attitudes are constantly shifting, and I believe that certain events can alter these attitudes. As we near the regeneracy and climax, this will become all-too-obvious.
Last edited by Matt1989 on Sat Jan 10, 2009 10:16 pm, edited 1 time in total.

Matt1989
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Re: Generational Crises and Methods for Evaluation

Post by Matt1989 »

P.S. John, I've been meaning to ask this for a while, but how do you get your sentences to only extend half-way across the screen? A lot of these forums have too much width.

jgreenhall
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Re: Generational Crises and Methods for Evaluation

Post by jgreenhall »

Matt,

This methodology for evaluating a war to determine whether it is a crisis war seems thorough. I've run it against a few possibilities and it seems to do a reasonably effective job - avoiding what intuitively seem like false positives and catching those that seem obviously to be actual positives. But, as you say, on the margins it seems like softer nuances start to override the signal. Which is to say, I greatly like the move forward, but definitely see the distance to go.

I want, however, to focus on something a bit different for a moment. While the Crisis is the most significant turning (if only because it is the turning where the collapse of the system is by far the most likely), it is critical to understand both how the various turnings qualitatively build to (and therefore shape) the crisis and - even moreso - how the various turnings *create* the generational types (which then work together to generate the various turnings). The single most important innovation of the S&H model was the idea of a common generational type that is caused by the cultural consquences of a turnings and generational constellations and that causes cultural events as the generational constellations change with cultural movements. An awakening is an Awakening because of the specific predilections of the Prophet type - as they enter Young Adulthood and admix with Adult Artists, Elder Heroes and Child Nomads and as they enter into the context of a culture that has been "worn" by a High. A crisis becomes a Crisis when the social fabric has been subjected to a long Unraveling and the generational constellation undergoes a gravitational shift as Prohpets move into Elder mode, Nomads move into Adult mode, Heroes move into Young Adult mode (and young artists are born and imprinted with the Crisis psychological consequences).

This dynamic movement between mutually causing events (generational types and turnings) is what gives the theory depth and boundaries. In a sense, it is what gives the various Turnings their *meaning* rather than just their evidence. The meaning of an Awakening is that it breaks the materialist, groupist, sterile dominance of High culture; innovates a new individualistic, spiritual, introspective culture and, in so doing, simultaneously brings all of the "consensus values and institutions" of the High culture into question (leading to the Unraveling where this process is actually carried out in practice) and literally gives birth to the Nomads who will play an important role in the Turn from Unraveling to Crisis.

The meaning of a Crisis is that at long last (after an increasingly complete Unraveling and generally after some significant reactionary bloating) the old High "consensus values and institutions" are finally exhausted and collapse (as widely and generically accepted models for action). Forced universally to stare into the Abyss, the culture undergoes a rapid radicalization whereby it gropes for some new set of models that will "work". And, since it is led by the Prophets who alone of the surviving generations have a memory of what a High looks like at all and whose own Awakening values have begun to sink into a cultural unconscious (the provocative slogans of the Young Prophets were institutionalized for the Young Nomads and were unconscious background tautologies for Young Heroes), the emerging models (if there are any) are founded on the values of the Prophets. The meaning of the Crisis, then, is that it is a crisis of meaning itself: the struggle to define some collection of rules, models, values, institutions, that can "work". If this isn't found, then the civilization collapses completely and that is the end of its identity in history. If it is, then the consequence of the Crisis, is some form of new consensus values and institutions that are adequate, the "resolution" of the crisis (by means of these new values and insitutions) the turning towards a High and the imprinting of the emerging Artist generation with the psychological consequences of being born and raised into a Crisis.

I should be clear here that "meaning" doesn't mean "warm and fuzzy feeling on the inside". Meaning is simultaneously the direction to go and the way to effectively go there. If I am heading towards a tree in my car "don't crash" means "stop" and "stop" *means" "brakes". Two kinds of crisis: in one kind, my brakes don't work. This is the "institutions" side of the equation. I know what I want to do, but I can't effectively do it. This leads to panic, wildly stomping on the pedal, twisting the wheel and more or less trying everything I can to find a new method that "works". The second kind of crisis: suicide. This is the "values" side of the equation. What ever has made my live "worth living" is no longer working and (whether my brakes work or not) I lack the will to avoid the tree. If I am to survive, something inside me must rise up, take control of the controls and make the necessary adjustments. A generational crisis is analogous - although, of course, the analogy isn't quite as close.

In this context, we can see how and why a Crisis is so commonly characterized by a Crisis War (and why a Crisis War looks as you have described it). Its not that the Crisis War itself is the ultimate cause of the radical new institutions, foreign policy, etc. Its that the Unraveling corroded the old institutions, foreign policy, etc - presaging the Crisis. The successful resolution of the Crisis *requires* the innovation of some new institions which then become the tools that win the Crisis War and show up post facto as evidence of their having been a Crisis. Equally, once you understand the psychology of a Crisis (a crisis of meaning), you see how *anything* is possible - why and how genocide and massive self sacrifice become completely reasonable. This model also shows that it is at least plausible (although by no means does it assert that it is probable) that a Crisis can be resolved without a Crisis War.

None of this detracts from your efforts. Hopefully it adds dimensionality. Example - if it is the case that there can be a "fifth" Turning from an unresolved Crisis, there needs to be a complete explanation of what that fifth turning looks like from the perspective of generational typology and the creation of a generational psychology *and* from the perspective of the unwinding of institutions and values.

Jordan

Matt1989
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Re: Generational Crises and Methods for Evaluation

Post by Matt1989 »

jgreenhall wrote:Matt,

(snip)
Jordan, this has to be one of the best short explanations of the saeculum I've seen. Thanks so much!

Much of the theoretical exposition of the fifth turning is incomplete, simply because there hasn't been enough study. John and I have a few ideas about how the fifth turning operates, but a deep generational understanding would be required for a satisfactory analysis. We would need enough primary sources to compare how generations interacted and felt about their society in a bunch of different places and times. At the moment, I'm fine with the understanding that a fifth turning likely exists and there are certain common characteristics to be found among them.

John
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Re: Generational Crises and Methods for Evaluation

Post by John »

Dear Jordan,

That's a great description, from an interesting point of view.
Thanks for posting it.
jgreenhall wrote: > This dynamic movement between mutually causing events
> (generational types and turnings) is what gives the theory depth
> and boundaries. In a sense, it is what gives the various Turnings
> their *meaning* rather than just their evidence. The meaning of an
> Awakening is that it breaks the materialist, groupist, sterile
> dominance of High culture; innovates a new individualistic,
> spiritual, introspective culture and, in so doing, simultaneously
> brings all of the "consensus values and institutions" of the High
> culture into question (leading to the Unraveling where this
> process is actually carried out in practice) and literally gives
> birth to the Nomads who will play an important role in the Turn
> from Unraveling to Crisis.
I just want to add to it by contrasting what you've written to what
Matt wrote.

If you think of a crisis war as a disease, then you've described the
epidemiology -- how the disease occurs and how it spreads.

That was the focus of Strauss and Howe's original work -- using
thousands of examples to show how one generational era leads to the
next one.

As I mentioned in my earlier posting in this thread, when I started
studying this subject just after 9/11, my main initial objective was
to determine whether or not S&H's work was the equivalent of
astrology, or was actually valid. In order to prove the latter, I
actually had to study dozens of historical examples to try to
determine whether the theory applied to all countries at all times in
history.

That required a different kind of direction besides epidemiology. It
required developing techniques for differential diagnosis. That's
the kind of stuff they do on Fox TV's show House.

S&H did their analyses by reading hundreds of diaries and histories
along the Anglo-American timeline since the 1400s. There was
everything from war diaries to formal histories to the letters of
Héloïse and Abelard. There was plenty of material available, and
including plenty of material in English.

It's nice to have that much information, but many we have only sparse
information, not a full collection of detailed diaries and histories
for each country in each era. And sometimes there's almost nothing
available in English.

And when we have sparse information, we have to be like archeologists
who determine as much as they can from a few bones and broken urns.
We have to be like detectives, and say "These people are acting like
Prophets," or "Government spending in this era is profligate that it
appears to be an Unraveling era."

In fact, we might give it a name -- "generational archeology" is the
branch of generational theory that deals with differential diagnosis.

We have one advantage that S&H never had -- the internet. We can
usually find something out about any country in any era without
leaving our computers. England is the easiest, of course, since they
produced lots of writings, all in English. Other countries have
little or no literature, or what they have isn't in English.

This also points to the next technological advance useful to
generational research -- the advent of accurate automated language
translation. It should be available within a few years, and then
we'll have a wealth of additional literature available for all
countries on earth. Once that's available, then it will be possible
to achieve my own personal dream -- a "world model" that encodes
every country and ethnic group on earth, and the generational timeline
for each one. That will be the culmination of Strauss and Howe's
work.
jgreenhall wrote: > At a higher level, we know that a crisis event is not monopolar.
> It has at least *two* bifurcated and quite different solutions:
> success or failure. If you survive the crisis with your "youness"
> intact then you have been successful. If you don't survive the
> crisis then you have failed. The difference between these two
> states is highly contingent and only partially dependent on the
> crisis itself.
This is true for individuals and families and small groups of people.
Individuals have a chance of surviving the crisis if they prepare for
it. In fact, helping people do that has become one of the major
purposes of this web site and forum.

However, it's not true for the great masses of people. The
generational forces are enormously powerful, and it's not possible
for more than a few people to prepare.

After WW II, many people believed that if we'd found a way to kill
Hitler in 1935, then WW II could have been avoided. From the point
of view of Generational Dynamics, that belief is emphatically wrong.
Even without Hitler, there would have been WW II, and there even
would have been a holocaust, possibly in a different form.

Some people say, "If the Americans hadn't invaded Normandy beaches,
then the French would be speaking German today."

That's wrong on so many levels. First, some kind of Allied invasion
of France was certain to occur, and the Normandy invasion was one of
the few choices. And second, even if Germany had conquered France,
then by this time the Germans would have had to free France, just as
the Soviets finally had to free eastern Europe.

What I believe is that the coming war between America and China is
completely certain, and its outcome is predetermined, though I don't
know what that outcome is.

The Chinese have a huge advantage -- 5 times as many people, who are,
on the average, more intelligent than we are. Their big disadvantage
is that the population is unstable, and a massive Chinese rebellion
is certain. Furthermore, they've never fought an external war. So
they have big disadvantages too. But they've been preparing for war
with the United States for years, and they've been spending huge
amounts of money on the military. Whatever the outcome is going to
be, there is nothing that can prevent it.

Sincerely,

John

John
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Re: Generational Crises and Methods for Evaluation

Post by John »

Dear Matt,
Matt1989 wrote: > A lot of the theoretical backbone of Generational Dynamics is
> still boxed away on the Fourth Turning Forums, or is contained in
> plumbline S&H, and I think it would be a huge improvement to
> incorporate some of those ideas into your articles. I sure as hell
> incorporated them into my above essay.
I actually have been doing that for years. Everything from 2003-2005
was boiled down into the book "Generational Dynamics for Historians,"
which can be read for free on my web site, though I've never
published it.

And I always try to intermingle theoretical concepts into the web
site articles. Almost everything is in there somewhere.

There are still a couple of things that I posted on the FT forum that
I've never really used. I'll dig them out and post them here.
Matt1989 wrote: > P.S. John, I've been meaning to ask this for a while, but how do
> you get your sentences to only extend half-way across the screen?
> A lot of these forums have too much width.
You just put a <return> at the end of each line, breaking at the
point you want. I have an editor macro that will reformat a text
paragraph so that no line is longer than 72 characters.

You should be able to do the same thing in Microsoft Word by typing
your text in Courier New font, setting the right margin equal to 72
characters. Then when you've typed your message, save it as a "TXT"
file, telling Word to keep the CR/LF on each line.

Sincerely,

John

John
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Polya's Urn and Kismet

Post by John »

Pólya's Urn and Kismet

(This was first posted in 2006.)

Throughout generational studies, the question of inevitability or
"destiny" or "kismet" always comes up: If A and B have a crisis war,
are they destined to repeat that crisis war in every cycle from then
on?

This kind of question pops up all over the place. Why was there no
American civil war II? Why did England and France sometimes fight
with one another, and sometimes not? Why are we not close to war
again with Japan?

Polya's Urn is a mathematical model that's sometimes used in social
sciences to explain (or model) why groups sometimes act in certain
ways, and sometimes others.

Polya's Urn starts out with one red ball and one green ball.

(In more complex situations, there may be more than one ball of each
color, or they may be more than two colors.)

Image

A "move" consists of removing one ball at random, and then replacing
it with two balls of the same color. When the Urn contains 1000
balls, the game stops.

Example. Suppose the urn starts out with one ball of each
color. Suppose the first move selects a green ball and replaces it
with two green balls. At that point, the urn contains two green
balls and one red ball. On the next move, there is a 67% chance that
the ball selected will be green, and each time a green ball is
selected, the probability of a green ball on the next turn is even
higher.

Thus, if a green ball is chosen on the first move, then there may
quickly be so many green balls that a red ball is rarely selected.
Thus, the color of the ball selected on the FIRST move may well
determine the final outcome when the ball contains 1000 balls.

The analogy is that the "destiny" of two countries after a crisis war
may be determined by the first few acts that each side performs.

For example, after the Japanese surrender, we proceeded to provide
aid and help to the Japanese, much to their surprise. This was a lot
of "green balls," right at the beginning.

Suppose, instead, that a few renegade American soldiers had conducted
hate crimes and acts of terrorism. Or suppose that a renegade
Japanese soldier had shot and killed General Douglas MacArthur. Those
would have been "red balls," and they may have multiplied, and we
might be close to another war with Japan right now.

So Polya's Urn doesn't help you predict what's going to happen in
sixty years, but it does provide a model that helps you understand
it, and what you can do about it.

For example, in the case of the renegade soldiers just given, you
have to find a way to toss a whole bunch of green balls into the urn
to offset the red balls that the renegade soldiers provided. That
might mean extra aid or money or whatever.

Here's another example: Some Chinese claim that North America would
be Chinese if a Chinese sailors had "discovered" America, rather than
a Europeans.

That may or may not be true. If a Chinese sailors had landed in
America first (one red ball), China would have had to follow up with
aggressive program of exploitation (more red balls), in the same way
that Portugal and other European countries exploited North America
(green balls). Without that, there would still have been a
preponderance of "green balls," and North America would still have
been mostly ethnically European.

Another example: Ever since Yasser Arafat died, there was a brief
period when the "peace process" seemed to be working, especially when
Mahmoud Abbas was elected Palestinian President. Since that time,
things have gotten worse almost every day.

On my web site I've been explaining this in terms of chaotic
"attractors" (from Chaos Theory). Day to day political events are
chaotic events that fall like snowflakes in random ways. But just as
millions of snowflakes get "attracted" to large snow drifts, millions
of individual political events get attracted to the impending Mideast
war, since war is a "chaotic attractor" at this time, 57 years after
the end of the 1940s genocidal war between Arabs and Jews.

The theoretical concept of "attractor" come true on a day to day
basis. It's been happening every since Yasser Arafat died, and has
evidently accelerated ever since Ariel Sharon became incapacitated.

Look at the day to day political events as they've occurred in the
last year and a half. Pick almost any day and look at the headlines
for that day, and you'll see that it most likely moves the Mideast in
the direction of war. There are a few exceptions of course, like the
period when Mahmoud Abbas was elected and took office, and hopes were
raised at that time.

But those brief intervals are like a heat wave in New York City in
November -- just because the weather gets warm for a few days doesn't
mean that winter isn't coming. Once the heat wave is over, the
weather starts getting much colder again. Similarly, there are brief
periods when things seem to get better, but they pass quickly, and
then political events move back towards war.

That what "attractor" means in Chaos Theory. It doesn't mean that
every political event brings the Mideast closer to war; it means that
political events float around in all directions, at random, but most
of them, not necessarily all of them, are attracted to Mideast war.

So now, another way of looking at this whole phenomenon is with
Polya's Urn. After many years, the Urn is filled with "red balls"
(political events that move the Mideast toward war), with few "green
balls" (political events that move the Mideast away from war, such as
the 1994 Oslo treaty, or the 2003 Mideast Roadmap to Peace). Today
there are so many red balls in the Urn that almost everything turns
out badly, and the region moves closely to war.

I began this essay with the question of destiny or "kismet," and the
question of inevitability of crisis wars. The answer appears to be
that if a new crisis war is to be avoided, then it requires a
tremendous effort immediately after the end of the old crisis war,
because the first few political events can determine what happens
decades later. Once the time of the new crisis war approaches, then
it's way too late.

Sincerely,

John

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