Financial topics

Investments, gold, currencies, surviving after a financial meltdown
freddyv
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Re: Financial topics

Post by freddyv »

mkrogh wrote: ...
There is only one certain law about future stock prices, namely that every stock eventually will go to zero. So, in the long run, it is a disaster to own stocks. Any buy and hold portfolio of stocks will go to zero. It is the exact opposite of what almost everybody believes, namely that in the long run stocks will go up. An index, e.g., DJIA, is always shown to prove this illusion of rising stock prices, but the problem is that an index is qualitatively different from a stock, or a basket of stocks. The difference is that the index has replacement. it sounds like a minor detail, but it is actually a difference so big, that it makes the difference between going to zero or going to infinity in the long run. Of course, infinity is not really infinity, and the long run is not the life of the universe.

An obvious objection is that one can track the index. I will claim that it is impossible to track the index in the long run. The reason is that the replacement requires infinity liquidity which is not present in the market. An index tracking fund will get caught with a declining position at the wrong time without liquidity to get out. The index, on the other hand, will just swap that company with another, using the closing price at the day of replacement.

There are companies going bankrupt every year, but the generational crisis must be a period of exceptionally many stocks going to zero.

If your law of mean reversion applies to an index, it might be true, but it is irrelevant because of the replacement. It doesn't matter to an investor that the p/e in 2030 of company A founded in 2020 will be equal to the p/e of company B in 2008. There is no way for the shareholders of B to get into A. The shares of A will be owned by the founders of A. The shareholders of B will be left with nothing.
The error of your statements is summed up in, "There is no way for the shareholders of B to get into A", because there is a way and in fact, that is what index funds do, they sell companies that are dropped out of the index and buy shares of companies added to the index.

All one has to do to disprove what you say is to track an actual S&P 500 index fund over time.

Even if every company that was part of the S&P 500 in 1950 was out of business by now, and many are, an investor would have done quite well being invested in an S&P 500 index fund, thus disproving your theory. The stock market, you see, is a living, breathing, dynamic thing, made up of people, and people are quite capable of changinmg and adjusting. Your statements suggest otherwise.

Your statement, "There is only one certain law about future stock prices, namely that every stock eventually will go to zero." is true but has nothing to do with the typical investor since it is really only when all stocks go to zero at once that we all lose, because we will probably all be living in caves or will be dead. Hopefully that is far in the future.

--Fred

freddyv
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Re: Financial topics

Post by freddyv »

mkrogh wrote:you keep talking about the law of mean reversion of p/e ratios. But such a law does not exist. You are not very precise about
how you define it, but I assume you mean something like this.
Her's how I see this:

Mean reversion can't be manipulated because it is based on the very data it is providing information about and nothing else. You can create a bubble to manipluate PE's higher but then PE's must eventually drop lower to compensate. If humans were capable of dramatically changing themselves then the chart would show that patterns do not repeat but humans tend to repeat patterns over and over and so the information provided can show those patterns and allow intelligent people to benefit from them.

Over time mean reversion data provides more accurate information because, as any source of wisdom will tell you, all that is old is new again and the more things change, the more they remain the same.

Given that, it is important to understand that mean reversion is a representation of a dynamic and that dynamic must be properly and wisely interpreted for it to be of benefit. One must understand the financial markets, human nature (including Generational Dynamics) and geopolitics to make proper use of it.

--Fred

mkrogh
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Re: Financial topics

Post by mkrogh »

freddyv, you are right that my statement would be disproved if there is an index fund that can track sp500 indefinitely, but there is not.
I challenge you to show us an index fund that has tracked an index 50-60-70 years or more, and if there is, my statement is that it will lose at some point in the future.

You ignore the point about liquidity. You cannot just sell one company and buy another one. The selling and buying make the price move, and you will not hit the replacement price exactly.
You will sell for less than the index and buy for more, and the larger a portfolio, the bigger a liquidity problem.

Find us an index fund. It will be behind the index unless it is very new.

I just made a search and it seems like all index tracking funds are quite new.

A bear market is a time of an increased number of replacements, and a time of fast moves down with few bids for the index investor to get out of the stock.
So it is in a massive bear market, that the divergence between the funds and the index will be most pronounced.

The liquidity problem is this. The fund owns a millions shares of A, say, and the index announces that A will be replaced with B. The index adjusts for that in a computer and (uses a multiplier to get continuity). The fund, on the other hand, has to sell a million shares of A, and buy a huge number of B shares. That requires a buyer of the 1 million A shares and a seller of the B shares. That cannot be done at the same price as the index did it in the computer. And it can especially not be done the larger the portfolio of the fund is, and it will be larger the longer it has tracked the index.

People might never realize this fundamental issue, because the divergence will be increased by expenses and taxes.

mkrogh
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Re: Financial topics

Post by mkrogh »

Fred, the fact will stocks will go to zero, a basically nothing, has a lot to do with real investors, and not much to do with caves.
A lot of people are up for some surprises. But the timing is always uncertain.

Actually, a lot of stocks have already gone to zero in the last few months.

John
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Auto bailout hearings

Post by John »

I was very saddened today watching the Congressional hearings on the
proposed bailout of the Detroit auto companies.

Although nobody said it explicitly, it was clear from the testimony
that (a) no bailout means a monumental disaster, putting huge numbers
of people out of work, and (b) any bailout will make no difference
whatsoever.

This morning's news was of massive interest cuts from all the central
banks in Europe. It was just the band-aid du jour.

Sincerely,

John

John
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Re: Financial topics

Post by John »

I'll just add some comments on P/E to what Fred has already said.
mkrogh wrote: > The average of p/e ratios in the future of a stock, or a basket of
> stocks, will be equal to the average p/e in the past.

> That is simply not true.
Actually, it IS true.

The reciprocal of P/E is the earnings returned for a given stock
price, and so P/E is roughly the reciprocal of an interest rate.

A P/E of 14 is roughly an interest rate of 7%.

Now, I can't prove this, but I do believe that there's a "natural
interest rate," to which interest rates return over time. And so,
the average interest rate in the past will equal the average interest
rate in the future.

And we're not talking about a single company. Any single company
might do much better or much worse than the average, but if you take
an average for all companies over a long period of time, then you'll
get the "natural interest rate."

Remember that Generational Dynamics does not attempt to predict or
explain the behavior of any individual, or any small group of
individuals, since every individual has free will can do anything.
The same is true for any business - it might do well for centuries or
do poorly. But when you're talking about large masses -- entire
generations of people or businesses -- then their aggregate behavior
is quite predictable in many ways.
mkrogh wrote: > I challenge you to show us an index fund that has tracked an index
> 50-60-70 years or more, and if there is, my statement is that it
> will lose at some point in the future.

> You ignore the point about liquidity. You cannot just sell one
> company and buy another one. The selling and buying make the price
> move, and you will not hit the replacement price exactly. You will
> sell for less than the index and buy for more, and the larger a
> portfolio, the bigger a liquidity problem. ...

> Actually, a lot of stocks have already gone to zero in the last
> few months.
If you want to determine people's political attitudes over the years,
you use polling -- take a sample of people each year, and ask those
people. It's true that some of the people that you polled in 1958 are
now dead in 2008 (which is the analogue of your statement that all
stocks are eventually worth zero), but if you have a good sampling
technique then the aggregate results are still valid.

You can argue one way or another whether the S&P 500 or the DJIA
samples are valid samples, but here's one very reassuring fact about
them: These two samples are very, very different, and yet they yield
almost exactly the same results in terms of P/E ratios and many other
measures. This provides a great deal of support to the belief that
they're both valid samples.

Sincerely,

John

mannfm11
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an answer to both challenges

Post by mannfm11 »

I did a lot of work on this very topic when I was considering writing a book back in 2003 warning people to stay out of the market. John mentions Shiller when discussing the trailing PE/10. Take a look, as here is 140 years of data that would track the SPX. http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.htm

Here is what I wrote. I think I wrote something simpler and better this morning, but it wouldn't post and I lost it.

Back in 2003, I was going to write a book, but I chickened out. The name of it was going to be, "Is it Safe to Get Back in the Water", meaning, is it safe to get back into stocks. During that period, I did my own personal study on long term data posted by Robert Shiller of the housing index fame, dealing with stocks. The famous return on stocks that is quoted uses 2 years, 1926 and 1950. 1926 was the last year prior to the great run up in stocks prior to the Great Depression and 1950 was the peak in dividends, so either would be a likely year to choose to mark stock returns from. 1926 because it would impress upon people that a depression couldn't stop the market and 1950 because dividends were at all time highs and it would clearly be a year to produce a great return.

In any case, Shiller had everything from earnings to dividends and the CPI number for every year from 1870 on and through this I was able to construct a model of how stocks were valued. I had been taught a formula in college about the value of a stock and the market would be valued in the same fashion. In fact, the data could actually verify what the simple model was. The formula, P=d/(k-g) is a simple discount formula where dividends are discounted the required rate of return minus the rate fo growth. Like all financial formulas, it is actually pretty simple, but finding the components was not. Through this, I made assumptions as to why the market itself was so absurdly high, as dividends were only in the 1.6% range after a sizable adjustment down from a price where dividends on the SPX were as low as 1.08%.
I decided I would use 1926 as a base year as well and what I found was that from 1926 to that time, which I believe was 2003, the long term rate of inflation was 3%, the starting dividend rate was 4.8% and the growth rate was in the 1% range, giving a long term return of about 9%. This would confirm a risk free rate of return plus 2.8% to 3% as being about normal for stocks, as treasuries would generally yield inflation plus 3% over the long haul and BBB long term debt about 5% above inflation. Bonds are safer than stocks because they at least recapture some of their value in what is certain eventual default and bankruptcy of a company.

Contrary to the bullish side of the equation, I didn't focus on the price of stocks, but rather the growth of dividends and the starting rate of dividends. A bull might say that 4.8% is too high of a dividend, but if I had used something like 3%, the rate of return would have been much slower. In fact, I could have moved to the 1929 peak and did just that.

This is where I can draw the parallel to reversion to the mean and what the return on a stock really is. If one is going to compare 1926 and 2003, they need to compare based on the dividend rate and not the price of the market, as they are 2 different things. Maybe 4.8% is too high, but then you have to adjust downward what stocks yield. I do know that 1% was too low and 2% was too low and likely 3% was too low because prior to the 1990's every time the yield hit 3%, the market failed to go higher. The best it could do was move higher with growth. There was 125 years of data lying there and suddenly history didn't apply. Anyone with a brain knows better.

To move forward, I must clarify something. This is something no one has ever mentioned in the public arena of buying stocks or an SPX fund, but there is no averaging in on the market. If you buy a stock and hold it forever, you get what you bought and nothing else. Thus, the mistake of buying a bond with too low of a yield can be made up by the end of the term of the bond, but that can't be done with stock. Thus if the historical yield of the stock market is inflation plus 5.8%, you can't pay inflation plus 4% and ever get back to inflation plus 5.8% without the market making a huge mistake. You can only make inflation plus 4% and that is if you hold the portfolio forever. You could hope for a bigger fool to come along and pay a price sufficient to produce a yield lower than 4% then you could make more than 4% by selling, but not holding. Thus the long term success of buy and hold for a market fund is predicated on whether the return in the future is lower or higher and the lower the acceptable return, the higher sales price that can be achieved. But, the forever return is always going to be where you bought in.

Why can't the growth be higher? There may be times when it is higher, but in truth there is only so much money in the system, so many resources and real growth is quite likely to not involve more money, but lower prices. Another thing is the differential in compound returns. If you take 3% for instance and compound it for 24 years, it doubles. 6% takes 12 years to double, but in 24 years it is 4 times its original size. In 48 years it is 16 times its original size while the 3% is only 4 times. Thus over the 48 years that the typical person would accumulate and live off stocks, the economy would have to support something that could be 4 times its size when it started. The factors don't work and the value of the stock market cannot grow at any appreciable pace greater than the economy as a whole. If you took the more extreme numbers of 9% and we were looking at 6% nominal in the economy, we would have a double in 12 years for the economy and 8 years for the stocks, meaning stocks would have to relatively double the economy over 24 years, as 9% produces an 8X while 6% produces a 4X. The compounds cannot be sustained on any real basis. This is actually true whether you pay dividends or buy back stock.

So, there is only 1 way that you can get an after inflation return on stocks of 6% and that is to price them that way. Stocks haven't been priced in that fashion for 25 years. The question is, why? Growth hasn't been that fantastic, actually pretty normal and below historical for a long period of prosperity. I can only offer 2 reasons, one being the natural, debt bubble that produces excessive money in search of a return and the other being an adoption of a fiction in investing. I believe today that the first reason is the primary reason, but the stock bubble couldn't be so persistent and defended without the fiction.

Here is the fiction. When I went to college, they were teaching something called portfolio theory. What portfolio theory actually meant was you could take several properly correllated risky assets and put them in a portfolio and the portfolio would over time produce the return expected out of the assets. To invest in any one of the assets would produce a return that ranged from either a total loss to a huge bonanza in excess of anything planned. Thus, you could take history and buy it and it would work as long as the assets themselves were priced reasonably going in. Nothing could be done if the assets were bought at yields much lower than necessary.

In seeing this, I wrote a paper years ago called "Who destroyed Portfolio Theory"? My contention was and still is that Wall Street took statistics and came up with this idea that stocks returned X% over time and that all you had to do was buy a portfolio and you would get the return. With the adoption of that attitude along with the credit bubble (money bubble)people started pouring money blindly into S&P funds. Over a period of 10 years or so they drove the yields down on stocks to near 1% before the bubble sprung a leak that was repaired 3 years later. Thus the assumption that all you had to do was pour money into a mutual fund and the fund would make you rich. There is really little chance that once this procedure started that Wall Street set out to take full advantage selling stocks at as high of prices as they could.

Which is the return for stocks? Is it inflation plus 2% or inflation plus 6%? I have seen about everything inbetween adopted in my lifetime. I believe that in 1982 the dividend yield on the SPX topped 6%. Thus from that time on, you could expect a real rate of return of almost 7% plus inflation. IN 2000, you could only expect a return of about 2% plus inflation. This is one reason the market could only make a double top in 2007 against its value 7 years earlier and have only dividends to show for it.

This is what mean reversion is all about. I don't know if the reader has been able to follow what I have written, but figure this one. There is a lot of talk about the 10 year bond being below the dividend rate. They talk about this like it has never happened when in fact the entire period between 1900 and 1950 the dividend rate on the broad market was higher than the yield on treasuries. I would venture that most of the following 15 years were also a period when bond yields were lower than stock dividends. This is in part because inflation wasn't certain and growth was even less certain.

If we return to normal money in a normal growth market, we will again see t-bills priced at inflation plus 3% over any given time frame. We will see long term growth on stocks of between 1/2% and 1% above inflation and we will see risk premiums above 4% again. In fact, the 1966 and 1929 tops were met with 3% dividend rates and the latest dividend I have on the SPX is 28.71 which gives a 957 price on the SPX for a historical top. As dividends fall and stocks fall out of favor and the bubble deflates, we have a long way to go down. We aren't talking about getting 10% on stocks when inflation might be zero and dividend and profit growth negative.

mannfm11
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Re: Financial topics

Post by mannfm11 »

mkrogh, I get your drift. If you are talking about the Dow, you could treat it as a fund over time because it always has the same money after adjustments it had before. What it doesn't provide is the cost of rebalancing the index, which would entail making 30 transactions every time there was a significant change. The SPX can also be mirrored but it takes much more work to do so. I believe what I did in the previous post is about the best you can do with the SPX.

Here is the trouble with the SPX. First of all, this is the third time I have written this because it failed to post once and I lost it on another page the second time. I'm having a hard time to say the least. But, the SPX is cap weighted and when a stock comes out and another comes in, it is the value of a point that is changed and an additional investment is required if the company going in is worth more than the one coming out and money back if the reverse is true. Also, the value of a point is adjusted downward for stock repurchases, which is probably responsible for a good portion of the dividend growth in the index over the past few years, the diminishing of the weight of the stocks not paying dividends like CSCO and to a lesser extent, MSFT and XOM.

Where the return gets screwed up is easy. If you take a look at the index the first time it passed 800 in February 1997, you find the value of a point in the SPX was $7.563968 billion. In October 2002 when it went back below 800, the value of a point was $9.222905 billion. All that extra money was put into the index in some form between these times. At the peak October 2007, the value of a point was $8.8073258 billion. In some fashion, the holders of the SPX received back about $415 million times 1565 between that peak and the 2002 low. But, they had put in $1.62 billion times 776 plus what they had left on the table at higher prices between February 1997 and October 2002. If we actually figured all of this, I get a sense that the losses would be amazing, because there was so much money put in at the top. If you put in $1.5 trillion at SPX 1500, you add $1 billion per point. If you take it out at SPX 750, you take out $2 billion per point. IN this sense, the entire game is nothing but a huge cloud of smoke. Because it is clear that all this money was put in between the swing in 1997 and 2002, an amount well in excess of $1.1 trillion, it is also clear that there was about $600 billion taken out on the way back up. But it is less clear where the adjustment was made, as the example of the $1.5 billion shows. The value of a point is always what was paid for a point cummulative. In a sense, the number on the SPX is a fiction.

John
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Market Summary, Friday morning, Dec 5, 2008

Post by John »

-- Market Summary, Friday morning, Dec 5, 2008

There's a huge pall hanging over the Congressional hearings and
financial analysts in general.

Car sales were down 40% last month.

The economy lost 533,000 jobs last month.

The auto execs rarely answer a question directly, especially
questions about future survival.

Pollyannish remarks I heard:
  • There'll be more unemployment, but this month's report will be
    the worst.
  • Car sales will remain low for a while, but the latest report will
    be the worst.
  • President Obama's stimulus package will turn the economy
    around.
There's a real "edge of the cliff" feeling.

John

Matt1989
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Re: Market Summary, Friday morning, Dec 5, 2008

Post by Matt1989 »

John wrote:-- Market Summary, Friday morning, Dec 5, 2008

There's a real "edge of the cliff" feeling.

John
Definitely. We've been transferring from a moderate to a severe recession in the last few months, but the slide is accelerating. I imagine we'll shoot past the Depression watershed in 2009.

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