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Generational Dynamics Web Log for 26-Jun-2009
Iran's Khamenei appears desperate, as reports of Tehran massacres grow

Web Log - June, 2009

Iran's Khamenei appears desperate, as reports of Tehran massacres grow

An amazing generational battle is proceeding in Iran.

As I wrote a couple of days ago (see "A generational explanation of Iran's political crisis"), 80-year-old Khameni is in the Nomad generational archetype, an older version of America's Gen-Xers.

And what we're seeing in Iran can only be described as the same nihilistic, destructive, self-destructive behavior that characterizes many people of the Nomad generational archetype.

Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has vowed that the government will not yield to the demonstrators.

Khamenei could be looking for a way to defuse the situation with a compromise, such as committing to give Mir Hussein Moussavi, the reformist candidate who lost to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the recent election, a high-ranking position in the government.

Or, Khamenei could buy some time by launching an investigation on the election, and keep it going for 2-3 months, to allow passions to cool.

Instead, Khamenei has adopted the harshest possible policy at every step along the way, starting with his declaration, long before the ballots could have been counted, that Ahmadinejad the winner of the election, and authorizing increasing violence against even peaceful protestors.

The policies adopted by the Khamenei government appear to be increasingly desperate. The sheer size of the anti-government demonstrations has decreased, but public opinion seems to be turning increasingly against Khamenei.

Khamenei has shut down mainstream media reporting out of Tehran, but news organizations have been receiving a steady stream of reports in the form of e-mail and twitter messages.

A good way to follow these messages is to read one of the "live blogs," such as the New York Times live blog or the Guardian live blog. (Unfortunately, in each case you have to find the new URL every day.) These blogs contain the text of messages, translations of statements on Iranian web sites, and YouTube videos.

As the blogs themselves mention, many of these messages cannot be confirmed, and some people are complaining that the western media may be exaggerating the violence. The problem with that complaint is that Khamanei himself is encouraging the perception of increasing violence by his hardline statements. At this point, the perception is so pervasive that Khamenei's government is massacring its own citizens, that it really doesn't matter whether hundreds of people have been killed by gunfire, or only dozens.

What Khamenei's nihilistic policies have accomplished is to destroy the government's credibility at home and abroad, and turn many Iranians against the government. Many of the live blog reports indicate that splits within the government and even within the militia. For example, a number of Mousavi allies have been arrested.

There's one particular angle worth noting. A number of reports indicate that the government has augmented its militia with Arabs from other countries, acting as mercenaries. If this is widespread, it would indicate that the Iranian soldiers do not want to beat and fire on their own people, which would not be surprising during a generational Awakening era. It's reminiscent of al-Qaeda in Iraq, which was never able to recruit Iraqis to serve as suicide bombers, and had to import them from Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

Many analysts are expecting the demonstrations and protests to fizzle now, just as they fizzled in China, after the Chinese army slaughtered hundreds or thousands of unarmed protestors in Tiananmen Square in 1989. But the Tiananmen Square massacre occurred 40 years after the end of the previous crisis war (the Communist Rebellion, climaxing in 1949), and so the Tiananmen Square demonstrations would have fizzled within a few days if the Chinese authorities had done nothing.

These political protests and demonstrations reach their maximum power roughly 20-25 years after the end of the preceding crisis war. That was the time of America's 1967 Summer of Love and the 1968 riots and police riots at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. And that's where Iran is today, 21 years after the climax of the Iran/Iraq war.

So the comparison which many analysts are making to the Tiananmen Square massacre is not valid.

Because of his nihilistic willingness to adopt the very harshest possible policies, there appears to be no way that Khamenei can survive this crisis politically. If he were capable of finding a compromise or buying time, then he might survive. But this is how Greek tragedy works -- the final tragedy comes about because it has to, because the participants can't stop themselves from bringing it about.

As I understand it, Iranian students across the country are taking standardized exams on Thursday and Friday of this week. Thus, Saturday and Sunday may provide the next major test of the Khamenei administration.

Whatever happens, I hope that readers of this web site realize what an exceptional opportunity we have to be able to watch this Awakening era drama in Iran in real time. This is an amazing time in Iran, and there will be many more amazing days to come this summer.

(Comments: For reader comments, questions and discussion, see the Iran thread of the Generational Dynamics forum.) (26-Jun-2009) Permanent Link
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Generational Dynamics Web Log for 26-Jun-2009 Iran's Khamenei appears desperate, as reports of Tehran massacres grow

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Generational Dynamics Web Log for 26-Jun-2009
Iran's Khamenei appears desperate, as reports of Tehran massacres grow