David Kaiser admitted to me that S&H told him (I know hearsay) that they admitted for putting the Missionary date earlier than they originally were going to (they were originally going to draw the line at 1863, like the Boomers' 1943), but because of a specific individual, they decided to go with an earlier date.Originally Posted by Mikebert
~Chas'88
"There have always been people who say: "The war will be over someday." I say there's no guarantee the war will ever be over. Naturally a brief intermission is conceivable. Maybe the war needs a breather, a war can even break its neck, so to speak. But the kings and emperors, not to mention the pope, will always come to its help in adversity. ON the whole, I'd say this war has very little to worry about, it'll live to a ripe old age."
I'm sort of skeptical to whether the American Civil War period should even is to described as a 4T. It's even more doubtful in regards to Europe and the nation building wars of the period, and as since Europe was the center of the world at this point, it might be safer to suggest a 100 year Saeculum, approximately from 1815 to 1914 (or 130 year Saeculum, if you include the Crisis period until 1945).
Last edited by Tussilago; 02-24-2013 at 12:49 PM.
INTP 1970 Core X
Why? It certainly fits the description of a social moment, I can't think of events that radically change the social and political environment to a greater extent than a civil war.
I wasn't aware that the saeculum structure required the nation experiencing it to be "the center of the world". In fact I'd say that saeculums happen in nations regardless of their political power internationally. And for the US its Civil War was extremely traumatic. So traumatic in fact it is still spoken about in hushed tones to this day.
Remember though, the run up to the civil war goes back all the way to 1820, and certainly the 1830s. That was not true of the Revolution; the downward spiral only started in 1763. So where do you draw the line between unravelling and crisis? That's the question. I think the Boston Tea Party is good. The start of a war, though, is not the start of a 4T. So 1860 is not necessarily the dividing line. 1850 is good because from then on the two sides were on the brink. Only the death of Taylor prevented it from actually breaking out in 1850; and more provocations quickly followed the temporary compromise. "events quickened" is the way the Ken Burns series put it.
Also, I think making the Missionaries start later is unnecessary. What is needed if possible is to make the Transcendentals shorter. 30 years is too long for a post-revolution generation. Maybe thinking of hybrids is better. But the civil war saeculum is where the changes need to be made. It was the first modern saeculum, unless you include the one that led up to the Revolution. So it was a transition from slower pre-modern saecula that involved a few upper-class people and were not driven by generational change, to the faster modern saecula driven by change between generations involving all the people.
Now we are at 1850 redux. There is no war now, but we may be heading toward the next civil war. It is still a 4T; the financial crash put us there. This year there may be a budget compromise that postpones the battle a little bit.
History rhymes, but it rarely repeats, and usually if it does it's for emphasis. There is a similarity with 1850, but it's superficial at best. There's no frontier for one thing. No just cause for war for another. Meanwhile all the potential troops are either exhausted from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq or haven't gone to War, but seeing the results from the last two I doubt they'll want to.
If there is a revolution, it will be a revolution of duct tape, not of scissors.
Well, yes, but did it actually change the United States to an enough extent? The idea is that cycle ending periods of war should be such that the entire culture and political landscape alters in profound ways. That's the theoretical basis at least that S&H picked up and elaborated on. One might hold the viewpoint perhaps that the Civil War, as well as the nation gathering wars in Europe around the same time, are rather more like "correcting wars" within a certain cycle, to a further extent fulfilling the potential or 'agenda' set by the American Revolution and French Revolution/Napoleonic wars, respectively.
I'm not saying such is the case. I'm merely presenting alternative viewpoints.
Last edited by Tussilago; 02-24-2013 at 09:17 PM.
INTP 1970 Core X
It's never a nation that experiences a Saeculum, it's always a civilization. That's the whole point if you look at 'Toynbean' cycle theory etc. The United States is part of European (or 'Western') Civilization, and in any event was even more so in the 19th century.
Last edited by Tussilago; 02-24-2013 at 08:33 PM.
INTP 1970 Core X
S&H would disagree with that assesment on the basis of their books. They don't seem to hold that non-anglophone nations even have a turnings or a saeculum. In fact that was one of the criticisms I've had for a while about both T4T and Generations. Nor does the saeculum seem to rely on Toynbean cycle theory.
It could be argued that in the main there is a civilizational cycle within which individual national saeculums exist, but that would require a great deal of study to demonstrate.
What does seem self-evident, however, is that each nation has its own saecular cycle that is more or less in alignment with other nations within the same civilizational structure.
I'd say that they are in 'general' alignment with the larger cycle, i.e there are regional variations within a larger civilization that more or less may conform to national boundaries. On the other hand, that the cycle is a phenomenon unique to Anglo-American culture and that it exists nowhere else might of course also be a possibility. However, then one is burdened by the problem of explaining the basis of this uniqueness. After all, Anglo-America does not exist in isolation. It is not located on Mars but within a larger cultural framework with deep ties to the rest of Europe/Christendom.
Last edited by Tussilago; 02-24-2013 at 08:53 PM.
INTP 1970 Core X
The war didn't start in 1860. The Republicans won the election, that was the trigger.
There were options short of war available after 1850. One was a Democratic president. As long as the South held the commander in chief, war was not necessary. Democrats gained the presidency in 1852 and their Whig rivals collapsed shortly after.1850 is good because from then on the two sides were on the brink.
Another option was adding another slave state tor restore the balance lost in the 1850 compromise. The Pierce adminstration looked into possiblity of purchasing Cuba form Spain and making it a slave state. A major push to bring Kansas in as a slave state also failed. Had Cuba been brought in as a territory, a compromise of 1860 in which Cuba was admitted as a slave state and Kansas as a free state might still have been achievable--neither side wanted war.
By the late 1850's the South had run out of options. All that prevented war now was holding the presideincy. So when they lost the presidency in 1860 war was inevtiable--making the election the trigger.
Last edited by Mikebert; 02-26-2013 at 12:09 PM.
I don't see why it is self-evident that the saeculum operates on a national scale. Yeah, for nations like the US, insulated from the rest of the ocean by oceans, the nation is a good analytical unit. But what about European countries with their more fluid borders? I think the more natrual unit of operation is the world system, a portion of the world joined by trade routes through which economic, cultural and political exchanges occur. For example, the Reformation first shows up in Germany as Lutheranism and spreads in that form to Scandanavia. In Swizerland it is re-interpreted as Calvinism and flows to France, the Netherlands and the British isles more or less in that form. The result is much of Catholic Europe goes though an Awakening at about the same time. Now accordng to the S&H concept, they all must have been fairly generally-aligned before the reformation, making them pretty much sharing a common saeculum.
I think we tend to think of a national saeculum because political history (the kind we learn in school and tend to know best) tends to be written from a national viewpoint. Economic history (e.g. Braudel) de-emphasizes nations and lets you see how the material nature of societies changes with time, independent of polity (except where politics impact economics). I suspect social and cultural histories might have similar properties.
I think Europe's borders have only been fluid in the years since World War II. Before then, those countries, as close together as they are, were staunchly nationalist. Of course, that's fierce nationalism among all of the major European powers is what led to WWII in the first place.
I think it depends upon whether the nation is in an outer-focused Advancement Saeculum, or in an inner-focused Atonement Saeculum. Because some Saeculums are about a nation (I'm using the term as standing for a collection of "people" who identify as being "similar" to one another, like a person recognizes themselves as belonging to the same "family") and their interaction with other nations. Other Saeculums are purely about a nation and their own inner issues. To say that EVERYTHING is ALWAYS about the COLLECTIVE CIVILIZATION is to ignore things like the Spanish Civil War happening before WWII, because Spain was more "inner focused" in that situation (though I'm sure Mikebert can probably pull something up to refute me on that point), but a better example would be Ireland and Russia, both of which aren't on the same timescale as the rest of Europe. I mean, Ireland had its own 4T during our 3T, so did Russia. Ireland got on this cycle because the Irish Potato Famine upset the balance of that Saeculum (thus far a natural disaster seems to be the only good argument for what can actually cause a Saeculum to become abnormal and produce an anomaly), and Russia, because Russia's always been "half-European" and "half-other" in the eyes of Europe. It's why we refer to the nations ruled by the Soviets in the Cold War as "Eastern Europe", though they think of themselves as "Central Europe"--because "Western Europe" (and their children, like you can consider the USA) has trouble considering Russia to be completely "European", and historically has for centuries. Nothing is always "internally" driven, nor is it always "externally" driven. And mother nature can fuck us over any time she pleases.
~Chas'88
Last edited by Chas'88; 02-26-2013 at 02:10 PM.
"There have always been people who say: "The war will be over someday." I say there's no guarantee the war will ever be over. Naturally a brief intermission is conceivable. Maybe the war needs a breather, a war can even break its neck, so to speak. But the kings and emperors, not to mention the pope, will always come to its help in adversity. ON the whole, I'd say this war has very little to worry about, it'll live to a ripe old age."
Perhaps our differences (I don't think we are actually in disagreement) is related to the definitions of the word "nation." I'm using the word nation to mean a group of people which may conform, but not necessarily conforms, to the boundaries of a political entity. That is to say a state.
Add that to much confusion as to the meaning of the term "civilization" and things get even murkier. What is a civilization? What are a civilization's objective traits? Are their traits that must not be omitted for a collection of nations or states to be in a civilization?
I've yet to see a sufficient answer to those questions by anyone. [Please note I'm not necessarily asking you specifically to provide those answers either.] So a clear definition of what a civilization is must be agreed upon before study of a civilizational cycle can even be discussed. This is not the case with nations in general, and nation-states in particular. What a nation is, what a state is and what a nation-state is are all clearly defined concepts. Well at least for me.
As to the implication by S&H in their books that the saecular cycle is limited to the anglo-phone countries, that was the basis of my criticisms on that front. I find it hard to believe that Anglo-America has a pattern that is not evident in other European states. And if this pattern exists in Europe, then it likely also exists in other places as well (provided a similar technological level).
Of course it is also possible that the implication I allude to is inferred due to the lack of study, by them, of non-anglo-phone countries. So far I've seen saecular models crop up in many different nations, and states, that are not even considered to be "Western". China in particular, as it has an extremely long history (and is viewed by the Chinese as a civilization unto itself).
It is self-evident because the evidence is very clear that the saeculum operates on the national scale. (Note I'm using nation here to refer to groups of people, rather than political entities) There simply isn't agreement as to what a "civilization" is, what its attributes are, does it have any attributes it must have or the entity in question cannot be a "civilization"? These questions must be answered before we go into the deeper water of construction of civilizational models.
In the case of nations, all of those things are easily answered, in fact more easily answered thanks to the nation-state system common to countries considered to be "Western".
Political boundries are more or less irrelevant when dealing with nations and cycles within nations. Some nations have a state (a nation-state) some nations do not have a state and some states are collections of two or more nations.Yeah, for nations like the US, insulated from the rest of the ocean by oceans, the nation is a good analytical unit. But what about European countries with their more fluid borders?
As to the fluidity of Europe's political boundaries that is a relatively recent phenomenon.
This runs into the same problems I've alluded to in reguard to civilizations.I think the more natrual unit of operation is the world system,[...]
According to S&H's books turnings and saeculums did not exist prior to the 1430s. If we accept that as true then why should the European countries be fairly aligned prior to the reformation?Now accordng to the S&H concept, they all must have been fairly generally-aligned before the reformation, making them pretty much sharing a common saeculum.
I would agree that there is a tendency to use political history, however, even if we simply just use economic history we still revert to national cycles. And that has to do with both the nature of nations.I think we tend to think of a national saeculum because political history (the kind we learn in school and tend to know best) tends to be written from a national viewpoint. Economic history (e.g. Braudel) de-emphasizes nations and lets you see how the material nature of societies changes with time, independent of polity (except where politics impact economics). I suspect social and cultural histories might have similar properties.
Namely: A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.
For a nation to be a nation it must have each of those four characteristics and the absence of any one of them makes group of people in question something other than a nation.
Last edited by Kinser79; 02-26-2013 at 07:30 PM. Reason: typos
I think you mean the 1430s, not the 1480s as S&H have:
http://www.lifecourse.com/about/meth...tml#definitionRetreat from France (Third Turning, 1435–1459) was an era of dynastic decline and civil disorder. In 1435, not long after Joan of Arc’s execution, the English withdrew from Paris for the last time. In the 1440s, they were pushed out of France on all fronts. Thus ended the Hundred Years War. Meanwhile, the weak rule of young Henry VI eroded central authority in England. By the 1450s, noble houses flouted the law, vied for power, and engaged in private wars with impunity.
~Chas'88
"There have always been people who say: "The war will be over someday." I say there's no guarantee the war will ever be over. Naturally a brief intermission is conceivable. Maybe the war needs a breather, a war can even break its neck, so to speak. But the kings and emperors, not to mention the pope, will always come to its help in adversity. ON the whole, I'd say this war has very little to worry about, it'll live to a ripe old age."
Agreed with this definition. Which is why I'd argue that the Saeculum in England began before the 1430s and stretch back to Edward I who began solidifying National Identity via war with Scotland. National Identity became completely solid by the time Edward III came to the throne as he began warring in France. The English language was being promoted, via the 1362 Statute of Pleading which said all courts had to be conducted in English, Parliament opened in English in 1363, and works by the like of Geoffrey Chaucer, William Langland, and John Gower were being written to fully embrace the language.
However while I say this, at the same time I do have to admit that Edward III did see himself as the rightful heir to both England and France and tried not to overdo English sentiment so as to isolate possible French possessions, the Statute of Pleading was written in French, and Parliament went back and forth between the languages until as late as the 1370s.
That's not to say that the Kings and such weren't part of a Saeculum, just that they were most likely a break-off of the French one. And to understand the Royal actions prior to Edward III, one would have to look at their interaction with France as well as the long and slow marriage between the Nobility and the English people.
~Chas'88
"There have always been people who say: "The war will be over someday." I say there's no guarantee the war will ever be over. Naturally a brief intermission is conceivable. Maybe the war needs a breather, a war can even break its neck, so to speak. But the kings and emperors, not to mention the pope, will always come to its help in adversity. ON the whole, I'd say this war has very little to worry about, it'll live to a ripe old age."
Indeed. I was writing from memory, will correct previous post
ETA: I think it should be noted that like you I think that the Saeculum Cycle started long before the dates S&H provided. I would venture to guess that the reason that they claim to not have found sufficent evidence has a great deal to do with massive illiteracy.
It is also possible that the "speed up" of saeculum cycles within more recent times is not the result of more people living to advanced age span but rather to increases in literacy and communication technology.
Last edited by Kinser79; 02-26-2013 at 07:35 PM.
Theoretically, increased longevity will slow down the cycles. But S&H made a good argument when they said our recent increase in longevity isn't so much an increase in the range of years people are living, but an increase in the number people living to see those late years in life. If anything comes of gerentology research and reversing the effects of aging to the point where we will start seeing people living healthy and youthful lives into their 100s then we probably will see a significant change in the length of cycles as discussed in the longevity research thread.
If memory serves the reason S&H stated that the cycles have "sped up" in recent centuries is due to the effects of increased globalization and world effecting events. While I'm sure this is a factor, I agree with you that it's more likely technology and its effect on society and our lifestyles that has had the greater effect on why the turnings have shortened since the Industrial Revolution.
Last edited by Gianthogweed; 02-26-2013 at 09:35 PM.
'79 Xer, INTP
There have always been people who lived to 100. So if there are more people living to 100 or more, then the turnings may change. It might not slow it down much, because the phase of life of younger generations still would have the same length. But there would be more older folks around who stretch our awareness beyond 84 years, the normal length of life on which the saeculum is based. There would be more perspective, and thus less likelihood of repeating the same mistakes. So, the same saeculum, but more real progress, because there is less backsliding.
I would put it that, since then, people grow up to see opportunities to be different from their parents, do different things, etc. Generational change causes the turnings. So, if there are generations gaps, generations change, and therefore there are turnings. Industry and technology are one big factor in this, but perhaps a bigger factor has been political changes, giving more people a voice in society. Together with cultural liberations that created romantic and mas culture, these three factors have speeded up change among generations, and thus "speeded up" turnings.If memory serves the reason S&H stated that the cycles have "sped up" in recent centuries is due to the effects of increased globalization and world effecting events. While I'm sure this is a factor, I agree with you that it's more likely technology and its effect on society and our lifestyles that has had the greater effect on why the turnings have shortened since the Industrial Revolution.
Before the Age of Revolution, very few people actually participated in society. Not only did people do what their fathers did, which allowed little opportunity, but most people had no voice in events. And whole groups were oppressed. And most people did not even survive middle age, IF that. So there really was no saeculum as we understand it, before modern times. In a saeculum that is 100+ years long, with four turnings almost 30 years long, many people of one generation go through almost two life phases within one turning, and there are at most only two active generations in society. So can a saeculum really happen in these medieval, pre-modern conditions?
This has not been well thought through. A pre-modern saeculum is something different. The turnings are plausible, as presented by the authors, but they can't be based on generations, unless you assume father and son are in the same generation. And fathers and sons don't change from each other anyway in pre-modern cultures (not to mention mothers and daughters). That's why I think pre-modern saecula are more-likely phases in a civilization cycle that is not generation based, but a cycle of growth and decay in civilizations and empires. These cycles are longer than a lifetime (a saeculum) or a supposed mega-saeculum (4 lifetimes). 500 years is a good rule of thumb, though not all civilizations follow that length exactly, and there are double cycles for longer-lasting civilizations.
One reason the 3T and 4T are slowing down in this saeculum, may be that people are waiting longer to have children. So generations are a bit longer. Of course, conservatives are against this trend, and want women to continue to be nothing but baby makers and get on with it. So those people tend to think that the 2T began in 1980 and the 3T in 2001.
Not to disagree or anything, butI think it depends upon whether the nation is in an outer-focused Advancement Saeculum, or in an inner-focused Atonement Saeculum. Because some Saeculums are about a nation (I'm using the term as standing for a collection of "people" who identify as being "similar" to one another, like a person recognizes themselves as belonging to the same "family") and their interaction with other nations. Other Saeculums are purely about a nation and their own inner issues. To say that EVERYTHING is ALWAYS about the COLLECTIVE CIVILIZATION is to ignore things like the Spanish Civil War happening before WWII, because Spain was more "inner focused" in that situation (though I'm sure Mikebert can probably pull something up to refute me on that point), but a better example would be Ireland and Russia, both of which aren't on the same timescale as the rest of Europe. I mean, Ireland had its own 4T during our 3T, so did Russia. Ireland got on this cycle because the Irish Potato Famine upset the balance of that Saeculum (thus far a natural disaster seems to be the only good argument for what can actually cause a Saeculum to become abnormal and produce an anomaly), and Russia, because Russia's always been "half-European" and "half-other" in the eyes of Europe. It's why we refer to the nations ruled by the Soviets in the Cold War as "Eastern Europe", though they think of themselves as "Central Europe"--because "Western Europe" (and their children, like you can consider the USA) has trouble considering Russia to be completely "European", and historically has for centuries. Nothing is always "internally" driven, nor is it always "externally" driven. And mother nature can fuck us over any time she pleases.
~Chas'88
Did you invent the terms Advancement and Atonement? It's rather too complimentary for an outward-focused saeculum and a rather backward-looking term for an inner-directed one. "Advancement" depends on both, and consists of both. Maybe if you changed atonement to at-onement, you get a little closer.
Maybe other examples work better, but I think the Irish Famine aligns with the general European and American mid-century 4T. It is considered the final crisis of the pre-industrial age. I think it all folds together pretty well. You could say 1845 was still 3T, but it was a catastrophe that led directly into the 4T, which you could date as 1848. That makes a short 3T in Europe (1834-1848), and a bit longer in America (1850 being the line), with a long period (like today's) that could be considered a "long train wreck," and a fairly mild 4T; which the next one more than made up for. But the mid-19th century crisis was all linked together. The famine led to the revolutions and nationalist movements in 1848, and both the famine and the revolutions led to extreme migration to the USA and elsewhere, which fueled the gold rush and the pressure of CA for statehood; and this set off the civil war crisis, which continued to build up to an explosion in 1861. Soon afterward, Europe exploded too, with the pent-up nationalist and democratic movements coming out, and the result was the same: wars of national unification in both places. One crisis of Western Civ. And in both places, racial theories and resentments were stirred up, which continued for the rest of the following saeculum in both Europe and America.
I'll have to read that thread. Off the top of my head though I don't think that gereontology will be able to accomplish extending life in a "youthful" state far past 75 or 80. The aging process is the cumulative result of cell damage. Without application of vast amounts of technology to the pursuit of immortality or near immortality one is very likely to be "oldful" by 81.
And I don't see what is so great about living a long time. My great uncles all lived into their 80s and 90s and by the time they died they were tired of life.
Yes well the view that economic base leads to politico-social superstructure which leads to a new economic base and a new politico-social superstructure, over the course of time is fundamentally sound. Even if the concept of liner 'progress' is not. Rather I view "progress" more as a spiral than a straight line, or a circle.If memory serves the reason S&H stated that the cycles have "sped up" in recent centuries is due to the effects of increased globalization and world effecting events. While I'm sure this is a factor, I agree with you that it's more likely technology and its effect on society and our lifestyles that has had the greater effect on why the turnings have shortened since the Industrial Revolution.
Agreed, every person I've met who's lived close to being 90 usually says that they're looking forward to death, because living just has become tiresome and more of a chore than anything else. There's also the feeling of living past one's own "time" that they feel. The 1906 Interbellum who babysat me expressed that to me once when I was a really little kid and had first grasped the whole idea of dying and being scared of it. She said I shouldn't worry about it at all for the moment, and to just focus on living, and even when I get to be her age, she said not to approach death as something to "beat" or be "afraid of" but simply look at it as the next step in life, and to be ready for it. That was the best advice on death I ever received from anyone.
~Chas'88
"There have always been people who say: "The war will be over someday." I say there's no guarantee the war will ever be over. Naturally a brief intermission is conceivable. Maybe the war needs a breather, a war can even break its neck, so to speak. But the kings and emperors, not to mention the pope, will always come to its help in adversity. ON the whole, I'd say this war has very little to worry about, it'll live to a ripe old age."
It could be the absenc eof biographical material from earlier times. How much do we know about the lives of people other than royalty (whose circumstance may them very atypical). If yu chose to identify turnings using non-biographical material, it has been done by a number of people. I have a saeculum scheme developed from these results that goes back a bit more than two millennia. I generally don't come up with my own date but rather choose which of other people's schemes fit the data best. Here's a piece of it: It's standard S&H for the more recent turnings.
McGuiness Turnings Barbarossan Crisis (1147-1176) Saladian High (1176-1204) Albigensian Awakening (1204-1231) Mongol Unraveling (1231-1258) Sicilian Crisis (1258-1282) Venetian High (1282-1305) Avignon Awakening (1305-1328) Valois Unraveling (1328-1348) Bubonic Crisis (1348-1378) Florentine High (1378-1415) Hussite Awakening (1415-1447) Bohemian Unraveling (1447-1471) Tudor Crisis (1471-1492) Habsburg High (1492-1517) Lutheran Awakening (1517-1542) Calvinist Unraveling (1542-1571) Huguenot Crisis (1571-1598) Bourbon High (1598-1625) Presbyterian Awakening (1625-1649) Puritan Unraveling (1649-1676) Salem Crisis (1676-1702) Hanoverian High (1702-1727) Methodist Awakening (1727-1752) Anglican Unraveling (1752-1776)
Last edited by Mikebert; 02-28-2013 at 03:54 PM.
