I would like to submit that much of the discrepancy noted on this board between how the saeculum operated in the past and how it operates now can be solved by viewing essentially two different modes of saeculum at work, one morphing under stress into the other during the early modern period. I call these modes Saeculum I and Saeculum II.

Some of the discrepancies/issues that have been noted are:

A) 27-year versus 22 (or even 17) year generations with subsequent generational/turning compaction.

B) The enormous age of ?fourth phase? elderhood generations in earlier saeculae and the resulting breakdown in Strauss & Howe?s tetralogical explanation of generational dynamics as one goes further back in time.

C) Nomad generation constituents playing Gray Champion roles as little as three saeculae ago.

A few weeks ago my mind was trying to wrap itself around a conundrum: I found myself to be an orthodox Strauss & Howe Saecularist but I could not square the problems delineated by Mike Alexander and others with said orthodoxy. The mechanism laid out in Generations and The Fourth Turning that works so well for the 20th century seems to wane in explanatory efficacy the further back one goes into history. Even Strauss & Howe do not recognize a consistent functioning of the saeculum prior to late 15th century (why that may be will explained later).

Statistically, it is as if the authors took a sizeable, yet decidedly partial, subset of history, found a pattern (and even then one that only performed excellently in yet a smaller subset), and declared the discovery of a fundamental historiographical paradigm. As a result, one could argue (and some critics have stated) that what Strauss & Howe discovered was not much more than (what statisticians would call) an ?accidental correlation?, at least before the last century is concerned. Yet their paradigm does seem to apply to patterns in pre-modernity. How does one rectify this?

I would like to offer an explanation: I call it informally ?Mike Alexander meets the Three-Phase Solution?, or more formally ?Saeculum I?.

Saeculum I

Mike has noted a 27-year generational pattern operating in (at least) pre-modern Europe. This is 5-10 years longer than more current generational lengths (depending upon who you read and how ?currently? you look in history). He also notes a pendular effect of demographically smaller and larger generations due to a directly related alteration between periods of famine and plenty. Going one step further, he also notes that the periods of high stress (famines) oscillate between types of critical stress (i.e., Social Moments), one secular and institutional, usually involving great wars, the other spiritual and personal, involving emotive awakenings, monastic enthusiasm, and rashes of heretical fervor.

If I understand Mike correctly (and I may not) he dismisses the possibility of a 27-year phase solution to harmonize his observations with Strauss & Howe?s basic mechanism. At first glance this makes sense since a 27-year ?pueritia? or childhood phase and an 81-107 year old elderhood phase are nonsensical.

But what if the saecular mechanism operating through most of history was not a four phase, tetralogical dynamic, but rather a three phase, trilogical one? --- an interaction of three archetypes at a time instead of four, yet still operating in four turnings/constellations?

What if a 27-year ?youth? phase could actually make sense? I propose that in pre-modern society this actually did work, if we define ?youth? as pre-autonomy. As Mr. Alexander points out, biological/demographic realities created a perfect format for generational division, and this division was a 27-year delineation. And in an average demographic snapshot one could easily see the biologically-familiar three generation scenario of a 13 year old child (mid-youth), two 40 year old parents (mid-maturity), and one or two 67 year old grandparents (mid-elderhood). And by the time the youth in this example hits 27, chances are all the grandparents are gone and he or she is in the middle of raising a new crop of youngsters. What?s more the youth?s parents are now biologically old (by pre-modern standards) and ready to pass the baton of fully-realized social maturity, what I will call ?Primacy?, to a new group.

In premodernity the extended family was the rule, not the nuclear family of today. One could easily see the mature fortysomething father still holding strong functional authority over physically mature but still socially inferior sons in their early-to-mid twenties. Furthermore there was little impetus to have the young men strike out on their own at physical maturity like today. Extended family-members relied closely on one another in pre-industrial times, often in the same household, especially in the more common non-urban setting.

If one takes a look at pre-modern and early modern societies, one sees that, though there were rites-of-passage marking physical maturation, these societies? young men did not share in full societal responsibility until much after puberty.

Jesus, for example, did not begin his ministry until he was 30. This has been attributed to ancient Hebrew society?s recognition of 30 years of age as when a man reached full social maturity. Jesus might have not been taken seriously if he tried much earlier. One can note that he began showing other aspects of maturity as early as 12, and the Hebrews, then and now, held a rite-of-passage about that age denoting the beginnings of physical maturity. Ancient Hebrews also considered a male to be of military age at 20. So, as now, there were stages of maturation, but full social acceptance as an autonomous adult came considerably later than today.

Strong vestiges of this higher pre-modern limit to recognized social maturity can also be seen in the Founding Fathers not allowing any one younger than 25 to enter the House of Representatives, and younger than 30 to enter the Senate.

Perhaps further research should be done on Strauss & Howe?s interpretation of the Romans? fourfold biological divisions. I would contend that in the saeculum as it often manifested in premodernity, the Romans? ?pueritia? and ?iuventus? are actually subsets of the same phase: Pre-autonomy (Youth).

If one accepts 27 year phases of life for pre-modern society and accepts that the four generational archetypes are a constant (and I believe they are) then the four turnings looked much like they do today except that one archetype is completely missing per turning.


Saeculum I and Phases of Life

Code:

Phase           Ages
Elderhood	   54-80
Primacy	     27-53
Youth	        0-26

Saeculum I and Turnings

Code:

Phase	         1T	        2T	       3T	       4T
Elderhood	     Hero       Artist      Prophet     Nomad
Primacy	      Artist      Prophet      Nomad      Hero
Youth	        Prophet     Nomad        Hero       Artist

This new mechanism goes far in explaining much that is incongruent with the four phase model. Gone is the problem of 100 year old fourth phasers presumably affecting history. And in this arrangement, the tragic fall and passing of an elderly, hubristic Odyssean Hero-figure signals the beginning of an Awakening, not the peak or ending of one; likewise, the passing of an elderly, reproving, Jeremiadic Prophet-figure signals the beginning of a Crisis, not it?s climax or resolution.

What about the ?Shadow? mechanism described by Strauss & Howe? How do the generational archetypes affect one another and produce their archetypal shadow in a trilogical dynamic? Mike Alexander explains this in several posts. He posits a slightly different mechanism.

Mike Alexander in February 13, 2004 wrote:

During the social moment, the generation being born and growing up rebels against their elders by adopting the other outlook. Hence in a crisis spiritual Artists are born to secular Heros. Artists retain the communitarian ethic of their parents because this style is favored by the conditions of the Crisis, but Artists rebel during the High against the spirit-dead world created by their Hero parents and Nomad grandparents. On the other hand, secular Nomads are born to spiritual Prophets during the Awakening. Nomads retain the individualistic ethic of their parents as this style is favored by the conditions of the Awakening During the unraveling, Nomads rebel against their (too) spirit-filled elders by adopting a pragmatic, secular worldview. In my scheme, the "gray champions" of the crisis are Nomads.

This mechanism explains how Saeculum I manages to foster the four archetypes with three phases instead of four.

And indeed, as stated above one could argue that in the Early Modern period the Gray Champions were Nomads: Margaret of Anjou, Elizabeth I, Benjamin Church, George Washington. Using Michael Alexander?s mechanism this was probably the case in most Crises before modernity. But what of Strauss and Howe?s convincing argument of a mythic resonance through the ages of an elder Prophet- young Hero bond? What is more, what of the enduring images elder Hero-young Prophet conflict?

Saeculum II

This all begs the question, Why is Saeculum I no longer operating? First, it may actually still be operating in certain societies today (or at least until very recently) that still retain many pre-modern aspects (e.g., agricultural-based economy, poor nutrition, poor education, cyclical worldview, opposition to change). Indeed, it was the waning of these aspects and the advent of modern, and especially industrial, society that led to the shift to Saeculum II.

Part of my thesis is that under certain stress, saecular structures change mode, either temporarily, as possibly on occasion in the distant past, --- or structurally, as in modern times.

In pre-modernity the saeculum usually involved a 27-year generation due to the first phase of life being that length (as explained from Mike Alexander?s observations of the data). But around the 16th and 17th centuries forces came into play that began to alter the demarcation point between Youth and Primacy. First, with the Gutenberg Revolution, the Renaissance, Protestant Reformation, and other massive paradigm shifts (socio-cultural and techno-economic) of the early modern period, the pace of change increased to an unprecedented degree. Changes from generation to generation acted as a stressor on the 27-year-based mechanism that theretofore worked well for the relatively slow pace of change of pre-modernity. The quickened pace of life was more easily absorbed in a shorter cohort groupings therefore putting downward pressure on phase length.

Furthermore, by the 17th and 18th centuries the Famine Cycle had been (largely) allayed, further loosening the Youth phase from it?s solid 27-year mooring. From some of Mike Alexander?s other writings, one could speculate that the now less stable and pressured phases interacted in some way with the War/Debt Cycle of the time period.

Saeculum I was under stress. As the length of generations dropped by a couple of years, the permutational demarcation points between phases dropped. Soon the Youth-Primacy transition was below 25 years, Primacy to Elderhood below 50 years, and the vanguard age for Post-Elderhood was closing in on 70, allowing a ?Post-Elder? cohort group to begin affecting the saecular dynamic.

But it is with the Industrial Revolution that Saeculum I finally broke under the strain. At least four factors affected the final transition.

1. An evidentially exponential rate of change.

One could argue that the rate of change in human society has always been exponential. Only at this point, i.e., the advent of industrialization, it became much more obvious and relevant. As in the early modern period, this put additional pressure on the saecular mechanism to process change.

2. The beginning of ontogenic compaction (earlier pubescence) due to improved nutrition.

With agricultural production and variety increasing, with better transportation systems for delivery, and with higher average real purchasing power, improved nutrition in the 18th and 19th centuries (depending upon the Western country in question) began a trend continuing to this day of a younger and younger onset of physical maturity.

3. The beginning of psychogenic compaction (accelerated mental development) due to better and more comprehensive education.

This is the most controversial of the postulations. However, one could argue that improved childhood education stimulated certain mental capacities earlier and more profoundly. It is possible that the commencement of Piagetian ?concrete operations? and ?formal operations? may occur earlier (and more comprehensively) today on average than two or three centuries ago.

4. The earlier acquisition of social autonomy due to the above items, but especially because of the nuclearization of the family.

Migration to the cities, migration cross-country, less emphasis on acquired vocational skill and therefore parental mentoring in familial occupations, among other things led to the gradual breakdown in the cohesiveness and functionality overall of the traditional extended family and ushered in a new emphasis on the nuclear family. This transition largely weakened the firm hold middle-aged parents (read: father) had on young adult children. For this and other reasons stated above, full social autonomy would arrive years earlier than under the conditions Saeculum I evolved in.

Modal Shift

It is quite clear, at least in American history, that a great saecular upset occurred in the 19th century. For Strauss & Howe, this means the Civil War Anomaly. For Mike Alexander, this means a dramatic shortening of generation length. Within the context of the Multi-Modal Saeculum concept, both occurred. The combination created a Saecular hiccup, a shift from dissonance to a new equilibrium. What brought it to a climax was the vagaries of fate creating a Prophet generation (The Transcendentals) of regular length by the standards of the first saecular mode proper, but of dysfunctional length within the context of the saecular discord then occurring.

The result was the omission of an Hero archetype generation, truncated turnings and persistent saecular settling: No testaments to communitarian Olympian rationalizers, shortened fourth and first turnings, dilatory spiritualism extending into the following third turning, Nomads with Hero qualities (Gilded), Artists with Hero qualities (Progressive), and a subsequently somewhat archetypally-attenuated Prophet archetype (Missionary).

If we go by Mike Alexander?s observations, we can surmise that modal pressure became extreme around 1820. The following collapse of Saeculum I occurred in the 1860?s. And one could argue that it would not be until the following fourth turning that the saecular dynamic fully stabilized into its new mode.

What of other societies? In regards to the European saeculum, could this help explain the catastrophe of World War One? And what of industrializing societies today? This is especially germane when one considers China and the Middle East. Developing societies today are modernizing at a pace far greater than what the West experienced. What implications does this have for their modal transitions? What ?hiccups? may occur with them?

Finally, back to antiquity: How is it that Strauss and Howe found compelling evidence of a tetralogical interaction in such diverse sources as Exodus and Homer? And what of the profound Prophet-Hero interactions mentioned earlier? One explanation is that archetypal forms were mythographically distilled into a four part story since the generational archetypes, of which there are unavoidably four, are easier to convey that way.

Another explanation is that in times of profound stress or some other X factor, Saeculum I societies metamorphosed into a Saeculum II mode presaging the structural shift of recent times. However, whenever the stress or X factor passed, the saecular dynamic ?de-excited? and shifted back to the original mode (akin to an electron descending an atomic orbit after expending energy). Strauss and Howe attributed the fading of their tetralogical dynamic to when ?the inertia of tradition dampened this cycle and pushed society back to a prescribed and changeless role for each phase of life.?[The Fourth Turning, p.90]. Since the authors do not recognize a three phase alternative, and also since the trilogical saeculum (Saeculum I) is arguably not as intense as its successor, they mistake the recession of the tetralogical form as the discontinuation of the saecular mechanism altogether.

Other Modes?

If we accept the thesis of this post, that the saeculum is disposed to different modes under different conditions, and we see that the lowering of the age of social autonomy completely rearranged the phasic structure of the system, what of the new pressures being created by the extension of the human life being made possible via modern medicine?

If we accept 20 as the current age of the advent of social autonomy (compromising between Alexander?s 18 and Strauss & Howe?s 22) then the permutational effect calls for a current Elderhood phase of 60 to 79. What of the millions of Post-Elders in their 80?s and 90?s? Has the longevity of the GI generation already betrayed an effect? Will the Silent, or the Boomers, bring on a dysfunctional fifth wheel to the saecular vehicle?

Both three and four phases work well mathematically with four archetypes and turnings. The transition from a trilogical to a tetralogical dynamic, though difficult, worked. A pentalogical set-up will be highly distorting to the four archetypes. A period of profound dissonance could be in the offing once again. My belief is that, if this does come to pass, and barring other factors, we will need to wait for modern medicine to even further extend life span so we can fit in at least six phases. Six phases can fit four archetypes, if awkwardly. Eight is even better, for obvious reasons. But how would a hexalogical or octological Saeculum III dynamic work? We can only speculate.

Besides, due to factors such as eschatological calamity, an evolutionary ?singularity?, or the categorical arrest of old age due medicinal breakthroughs, such speculation may not only be highly fanciful, but moot as well.

I ask that those who, like me, ponder these issues to digest this Multi-Modal Saeculum idea and provide feedback: What?s wrong with its premises? What changes would you make? What would you add? Do you agree categorically?

Just food for thought.

I would like to submit that much of the discrepancy noted on this board between how the saeculum operated in the past and how it operates now can be solved by viewing essentially two different modes of saeculum at work, one morphing under stress into the other during the early modern period. I call these modes Saeculum I and Saeculum II.

Some of the discrepancies/issues that have been noted are:

A) 27-year versus 22 (or even 17) year generations with subsequent generational/turning compaction.

B) The enormous age of ?fourth phase? elderhood generations in earlier saeculae and the resulting breakdown in Strauss & Howe?s tetralogical explanation of generational dynamics as one goes further back in time.

C) Nomad generation constituents playing Gray Champion roles as little as three saeculae ago.

A few weeks ago my mind was trying to wrap itself around a conundrum: I found myself to be an orthodox Strauss & Howe Saecularist but I could not square the problems delineated by Mike Alexander and others with said orthodoxy. The mechanism laid out in Generations and The Fourth Turning that works so well for the 20th century seems to wane in explanatory efficacy the further back one goes into history. Even Strauss & Howe do not recognize a consistent functioning of the saeculum prior to late 15th century (why that may be will explained later).

Statistically, it is as if the authors took a sizeable, yet decidedly partial, subset of history, found a pattern (and even then one that only performed excellently in yet a smaller subset), and declared the discovery of a fundamental historiographical paradigm. As a result, one could argue (and some critics have stated) that what Strauss & Howe discovered was not much more than (what statisticians would call) an ?accidental correlation?, at least before the last century is concerned. Yet their paradigm does seem to apply to patterns in pre-modernity. How does one rectify this?

I would like to offer an explanation: I call it informally ?Mike Alexander meets the Three-Phase Solution?, or more formally ?Saeculum I?.

Saeculum I

Mike has noted a 27-year generational pattern operating in (at least) pre-modern Europe. This is 5-10 years longer than more current generational lengths (depending upon who you read and how ?currently? you look in history). He also notes a pendular effect of demographically smaller and larger generations due to a directly related alteration between periods of famine and plenty. Going one step further, he also notes that the periods of high stress (famines) oscillate between types of critical stress (i.e., Social Moments), one secular and institutional, usually involving great wars, the other spiritual and personal, involving emotive awakenings, monastic enthusiasm, and rashes of heretical fervor.

If I understand Mike correctly (and I may not) he dismisses the possibility of a 27-year phase solution to harmonize his observations with Strauss & Howe?s basic mechanism. At first glance this makes sense since a 27-year ?pueritia? or childhood phase and an 81-107 year old elderhood phase are nonsensical.

But what if the saecular mechanism operating through most of history was not a four phase, tetralogical dynamic, but rather a three phase, trilogical one? --- an interaction of three archetypes at a time instead of four, yet still operating in four turnings/constellations?

What if a 27-year ?youth? phase could actually make sense? I propose that in pre-modern society this actually did work, if we define ?youth? as pre-autonomy. As Mr. Alexander points out, biological/demographic realities created a perfect format for generational division, and this division was a 27-year delineation. And in an average demographic snapshot one could easily see the biologically-familiar three generation scenario of a 13 year old child (mid-youth), two 40 year old parents (mid-maturity), and one or two 67 year old grandparents (mid-elderhood). And by the time the youth in this example hits 27, chances are all the grandparents are gone and he or she is in the middle of raising a new crop of youngsters. What?s more the youth?s parents are now biologically old (by pre-modern standards) and ready to pass the baton of fully-realized social maturity, what I will call ?Primacy?, to a new group.

In premodernity the extended family was the rule, not the nuclear family of today. One could easily see the mature fortysomething father still holding strong functional authority over physically mature but still socially inferior sons in their early-to-mid twenties. Furthermore there was little impetus to have the young men strike out on their own at physical maturity like today. Extended family-members relied closely on one another in pre-industrial times, often in the same household, especially in the more common non-urban setting.

If one takes a look at pre-modern and early modern societies, one sees that, though there were rites-of-passage marking physical maturation, these societies? young men did not share in full societal responsibility until much after puberty.

Jesus, for example, did not begin his ministry until he was 30. This has been attributed to ancient Hebrew society?s recognition of 30 years of age as when a man reached full social maturity. Jesus might have not been taken seriously if he tried much earlier. One can note that he began showing other aspects of maturity as early as 12, and the Hebrews, then and now, held a rite-of-passage about that age denoting the beginnings of physical maturity. Ancient Hebrews also considered a male to be of military age at 20. So, as now, there were stages of maturation, but full social acceptance as an autonomous adult came considerably later than today.

Strong vestiges of this higher pre-modern limit to recognized social maturity can also be seen in the Founding Fathers not allowing any one younger than 25 to enter the House of Representatives, and younger than 30 to enter the Senate.

Perhaps further research should be done on Strauss & Howe?s interpretation of the Romans? fourfold biological divisions. I would contend that in the saeculum as it often manifested in premodernity, the Romans? ?pueritia? and ?iuventus? are actually subsets of the same phase: Pre-autonomy (Youth).

If one accepts 27 year phases of life for pre-modern society and accepts that the four generational archetypes are a constant (and I believe they are) then the four turnings looked much like they do today except that one archetype is completely missing per turning.


Saeculum I and Phases of Life

Code:

Phase           Ages
Elderhood	   54-80
Primacy	     27-53
Youth	        0-26

Saeculum I and Turnings

Code:

Phase	         1T	        2T	       3T	       4T
Elderhood	     Hero       Artist      Prophet     Nomad
Primacy	      Artist      Prophet      Nomad      Hero
Youth	        Prophet     Nomad        Hero       Artist

This new mechanism goes far in explaining much that is incongruent with the four phase model. Gone is the problem of 100 year old fourth phasers presumably affecting history. And in this arrangement, the tragic fall and passing of an elderly, hubristic Odyssean Hero-figure signals the beginning of an Awakening, not the peak or ending of one; likewise, the passing of an elderly, reproving, Jeremiadic Prophet-figure signals the beginning of a Crisis, not it?s climax or resolution.

What about the ?Shadow? mechanism described by Strauss & Howe? How do the generational archetypes affect one another and produce their archetypal shadow in a trilogical dynamic? Mike Alexander explains this in several posts. He posits a slightly different mechanism.

Mike Alexander in February 13, 2004 wrote:

During the social moment, the generation being born and growing up rebels against their elders by adopting the other outlook. Hence in a crisis spiritual Artists are born to secular Heros. Artists retain the communitarian ethic of their parents because this style is favored by the conditions of the Crisis, but Artists rebel during the High against the spirit-dead world created by their Hero parents and Nomad grandparents. On the other hand, secular Nomads are born to spiritual Prophets during the Awakening. Nomads retain the individualistic ethic of their parents as this style is favored by the conditions of the Awakening During the unraveling, Nomads rebel against their (too) spirit-filled elders by adopting a pragmatic, secular worldview. In my scheme, the "gray champions" of the crisis are Nomads.

This mechanism explains how Saeculum I manages to foster the four archetypes with three phases instead of four.

And indeed, as stated above one could argue that in the Early Modern period the Gray Champions were Nomads: Margaret of Anjou, Elizabeth I, Benjamin Church, George Washington. Using Michael Alexander?s mechanism this was probably the case in most Crises before modernity. But what of Strauss and Howe?s convincing argument of a mythic resonance through the ages of an elder Prophet- young Hero bond? What is more, what of the enduring images elder Hero-young Prophet conflict?

Saeculum II

This all begs the question, Why is Saeculum I no longer operating? First, it may actually still be operating in certain societies today (or at least until very recently) that still retain many pre-modern aspects (e.g., agricultural-based economy, poor nutrition, poor education, cyclical worldview, opposition to change). Indeed, it was the waning of these aspects and the advent of modern, and especially industrial, society that led to the shift to Saeculum II.

Part of my thesis is that under certain stress, saecular structures change mode, either temporarily, as possibly on occasion in the distant past, --- or structurally, as in modern times.

In pre-modernity the saeculum usually involved a 27-year generation due to the first phase of life being that length (as explained from Mike Alexander?s observations of the data). But around the 16th and 17th centuries forces came into play that began to alter the demarcation point between Youth and Primacy. First, with the Gutenberg Revolution, the Renaissance, Protestant Reformation, and other massive paradigm shifts (socio-cultural and techno-economic) of the early modern period, the pace of change increased to an unprecedented degree. Changes from generation to generation acted as a stressor on the 27-year-based mechanism that theretofore worked well for the relatively slow pace of change of pre-modernity. The quickened pace of life was more easily absorbed in a shorter cohort groupings therefore putting downward pressure on phase length.

Furthermore, by the 17th and 18th centuries the Famine Cycle had been (largely) allayed, further loosening the Youth phase from it?s solid 27-year mooring. From some of Mike Alexander?s other writings, one could speculate that the now less stable and pressured phases interacted in some way with the War/Debt Cycle of the time period.

Saeculum I was under stress. As the length of generations dropped by a couple of years, the permutational demarcation points between phases dropped. Soon the Youth-Primacy transition was below 25 years, Primacy to Elderhood below 50 years, and the vanguard age for Post-Elderhood was closing in on 70, allowing a ?Post-Elder? cohort group to begin affecting the saecular dynamic.

But it is with the Industrial Revolution that Saeculum I finally broke under the strain. At least four factors affected the final transition.

1. An evidentially exponential rate of change.

One could argue that the rate of change in human society has always been exponential. Only at this point, i.e., the advent of industrialization, it became much more obvious and relevant. As in the early modern period, this put additional pressure on the saecular mechanism to process change.

2. The beginning of ontogenic compaction (earlier pubescence) due to improved nutrition.

With agricultural production and variety increasing, with better transportation systems for delivery, and with higher average real purchasing power, improved nutrition in the 18th and 19th centuries (depending upon the Western country in question) began a trend continuing to this day of a younger and younger onset of physical maturity.

3. The beginning of psychogenic compaction (accelerated mental development) due to better and more comprehensive education.

This is the most controversial of the postulations. However, one could argue that improved childhood education stimulated certain mental capacities earlier and more profoundly. It is possible that the commencement of Piagetian ?concrete operations? and ?formal operations? may occur earlier (and more comprehensively) today on average than two or three centuries ago.

4. The earlier acquisition of social autonomy due to the above items, but especially because of the nuclearization of the family.

Migration to the cities, migration cross-country, less emphasis on acquired vocational skill and therefore parental mentoring in familial occupations, among other things led to the gradual breakdown in the cohesiveness and functionality overall of the traditional extended family and ushered in a new emphasis on the nuclear family. This transition largely weakened the firm hold middle-aged parents (read: father) had on young adult children. For this and other reasons stated above, full social autonomy would arrive years earlier than under the conditions Saeculum I evolved in.

Modal Shift

It is quite clear, at least in American history, that a great saecular upset occurred in the 19th century. For Strauss & Howe, this means the Civil War Anomaly. For Mike Alexander, this means a dramatic shortening of generation length. Within the context of the Multi-Modal Saeculum concept, both occurred. The combination created a Saecular hiccup, a shift from dissonance to a new equilibrium. What brought it to a climax was the vagaries of fate creating a Prophet generation (The Transcendentals) of regular length by the standards of the first saecular mode proper, but of dysfunctional length within the context of the saecular discord then occurring.

The result was the omission of an Hero archetype generation, truncated turnings and persistent saecular settling: No testaments to communitarian Olympian rationalizers, shortened fourth and first turnings, dilatory spiritualism extending into the following third turning, Nomads with Hero qualities (Gilded), Artists with Hero qualities (Progressive), and a subsequently somewhat archetypally-attenuated Prophet archetype (Missionary).

If we go by Mike Alexander?s observations, we can surmise that modal pressure became extreme around 1820. The following collapse of Saeculum I occurred in the 1860?s. And one could argue that it would not be until the following fourth turning that the saecular dynamic fully stabilized into its new mode.

What of other societies? In regards to the European saeculum, could this help explain the catastrophe of World War One? And what of industrializing societies today? This is especially germane when one considers China and the Middle East. Developing societies today are modernizing at a pace far greater than what the West experienced. What implications does this have for their modal transitions? What ?hiccups? may occur with them?

Finally, back to antiquity: How is it that Strauss and Howe found compelling evidence of a tetralogical interaction in such diverse sources as Exodus and Homer? And what of the profound Prophet-Hero interactions mentioned earlier? One explanation is that archetypal forms were mythographically distilled into a four part story since the generational archetypes, of which there are unavoidably four, are easier to convey that way.

Another explanation is that in times of profound stress or some other X factor, Saeculum I societies metamorphosed into a Saeculum II mode presaging the structural shift of recent times. However, whenever the stress or X factor passed, the saecular dynamic ?de-excited? and shifted back to the original mode (akin to an electron descending an atomic orbit after expending energy). Strauss and Howe attributed the fading of their tetralogical dynamic to when ?the inertia of tradition dampened this cycle and pushed society back to a prescribed and changeless role for each phase of life.?[The Fourth Turning, p.90]. Since the authors do not recognize a three phase alternative, and also since the trilogical saeculum (Saeculum I) is arguably not as intense as its successor, they mistake the recession of the tetralogical form as the discontinuation of the saecular mechanism altogether.

Other Modes?

If we accept the thesis of this post, that the saeculum is disposed to different modes under different conditions, and we see that the lowering of the age of social autonomy completely rearranged the phasic structure of the system, what of the new pressures being created by the extension of the human life being made possible via modern medicine?

If we accept 20 as the current age of the advent of social autonomy (compromising between Alexander?s 18 and Strauss & Howe?s 22) then the permutational effect calls for a current Elderhood phase of 60 to 79. What of the millions of Post-Elders in their 80?s and 90?s? Has the longevity of the GI generation already betrayed an effect? Will the Silent, or the Boomers, bring on a dysfunctional fifth wheel to the saecular vehicle?

Both three and four phases work well mathematically with four archetypes and turnings. The transition from a trilogical to a tetralogical dynamic, though difficult, worked. A pentalogical set-up will be highly distorting to the four archetypes. A period of profound dissonance could be in the offing once again. My belief is that, if this does come to pass, and barring other factors, we will need to wait for modern medicine to even further extend life span so we can fit in at least six phases. Six phases can fit four archetypes, if awkwardly. Eight is even better, for obvious reasons. But how would a hexalogical or octological Saeculum III dynamic work? We can only speculate.

Besides, due to factors such as eschatological calamity, an evolutionary ?singularity?, or the categorical arrest of old age due medicinal breakthroughs, such speculation may not only be highly fanciful, but moot as well.

I ask that those who, like me, ponder these issues to digest this Multi-Modal Saeculum idea and provide feedback: What?s wrong with its premises? What changes would you make? What would you add? Do you agree categorically?

Just food for thought.

A couple of questions. First what sort of mechanism are you suggesting? S&H posit that generations create turnings and turnings create generations. Generations are created and reinforced by the interaction of a turning with a phase of life. Since there are four phases of life, there are four kinds of turnings and four kinds of generations.

If something like S&H's mechanism were operative, but there were only three phases of life (because the phases are too long) then one would expect three kinds of generations and three kinds of turnings.
************************************************** ***********
My solution to the 27 year length is to rule out the idea that generations by themselves create the saeculum. Instead, I introduce a two-stroke cycle that runs indepedently of generational type. It is caused by a lagged negative feedback loop involving population and food supply. The same sort of cycle would be observed in temperature in a room whose thermostat produced a lagged response from the furnace.

Given this two stroke cycle that exists externally to the saeculum it creates two kinds of generations, recessive and dominant. The cause is different parental styles caused by the social moment or non-social moment environment.

There is also the observational fact of alternating types of social moment environments. One kind is spirtual and the other is not. This implies a two-stroke cycle that affects spirituality. This cycle is caused by the tendency for a younger generation not to be the same as their parents. During social moments spiritual parents produce non-spiritual offspring and vice versa. Hence, there are two nested two-stroke cycles, giving 2 x 2 = 4 generations.
************************************************** **********
What sort of model do you suggest for Saeculum 2?

A couple of questions. First what sort of mechanism are you suggesting? S&H posit that generations create turnings and turnings create generations. Generations are created and reinforced by the interaction of a turning with a phase of life. Since there are four phases of life, there are four kinds of turnings and four kinds of generations.

If something like S&H's mechanism were operative, but there were only three phases of life (because the phases are too long) then one would expect three kinds of generations and three kinds of turnings.
************************************************** ***********
My solution to the 27 year length is to rule out the idea that generations by themselves create the saeculum. Instead, I introduce a two-stroke cycle that runs indepedently of generational type. It is caused by a lagged negative feedback loop involving population and food supply. The same sort of cycle would be observed in temperature in a room whose thermostat produced a lagged response from the furnace.

Given this two stroke cycle that exists externally to the saeculum it creates two kinds of generations, recessive and dominant. The cause is different parental styles caused by the social moment or non-social moment environment.

There is also the observational fact of alternating types of social moment environments. One kind is spirtual and the other is not. This implies a two-stroke cycle that affects spirituality. This cycle is caused by the tendency for a younger generation not to be the same as their parents. During social moments spiritual parents produce non-spiritual offspring and vice versa. Hence, there are two nested two-stroke cycles, giving 2 x 2 = 4 generations.
************************************************** **********
What sort of model do you suggest for Saeculum 2?

It will take us a while to choke down all of this, Sean, but I certainly admire your efforts. I have one immediate reaction: you may be trying to resolve more here than such a macro-historical theory will allow. From my perspective, the beauty of S&H's generational theory is its seasonality. My need to bring Princess Summerfall Winterspring to the table is nicely satisfied by their theory. The affairs of all living things (with the possible exception of Gold's "deep hot biosphere") are fundamentally influenced by macro-associations among the sun, the moon, and of course planet Earth. Together, they impose a four-part seasonality. Cycles of a three-part kind, to me, leave the sine curve longing to complete itself. But that might even be consistent with your proposed modifications. More later.

--Croaker

It will take us a while to choke down all of this, Sean, but I certainly admire your efforts. I have one immediate reaction: you may be trying to resolve more here than such a macro-historical theory will allow. From my perspective, the beauty of S&H's generational theory is its seasonality. My need to bring Princess Summerfall Winterspring to the table is nicely satisfied by their theory. The affairs of all living things (with the possible exception of Gold's "deep hot biosphere") are fundamentally influenced by macro-associations among the sun, the moon, and of course planet Earth. Together, they impose a four-part seasonality. Cycles of a three-part kind, to me, leave the sine curve longing to complete itself. But that might even be consistent with your proposed modifications. More later.

--Croaker

I'm not going to be able to compete with William Jennings Bryan and Mike Alexander as to the details of periods and mechanism. I'd just like to raise an issue that has been bugging me since Mike made some data available. The following is a 19 year rolling sum of wartime deaths.



I am seeing distinct breaks around the years 1600 and 1900. Between those years there is as pretty a signal as I'd expect to find. Mike says the signal is there before 1600. I'd like to see more data, but it looks like the signal is significantly smaller.

Why the breaks at 1600 and 1900?

I would guess that feudal economies could not sustain large war efforts. After 1600, princes could borrow funds from bankers and capitalists, allowing the creation of larger armed forces.

Between 1600 and 1900, excepting Napoleon's time, each period of conflict seems a little less than the one before. Signal or noise?

After 1900, the nice regular pattern is clearly broken. By that time, the population migration from rural to urban sectors was complete. The weapons of war were deadly. Central banks were real. Keynes and his followers were about to start manipulating the business cycles. In short, whatever mechanisms were stable and cyclical between 1600 and 1900 are seriously disrupted.

To me, it seems likely that the European and American cycles with regards to war at least ought to be different. The Europeans would have two major conflicts a century, while the Americans go on a Four Score and Seven year cycle. I like Alexander's economic theory of war cycles in Europe. I like S&H's generational psychology in North America. In short, the Europeans would start wars whenever they could afford them, at least until World War II discouraged them from continuing the practice. Americans would fight minor Imperialistic wars such as those with natives, Mexico, and Spain, but their big ones are political and cultural.

Shuffling in a little Toffler, with regard to war fighting at least, might one want to draw the borders between First, Second and Third Wave patterns at 1600 and 1900? Yes, this is in many ways an abuse. I generally say the Third Wave pattern ought to be driven by computers and weapons of mass destruction. These were barely dreamed of in 1900. By any standard other than war casualties, 1900 is way early to declare a Third Wave border. The wars of the 20th century were primarily conflicts between autocratic First Wave remnants contesting Second Wave democracies.

But something happened in 1900. The Second Wave pattern broke down. If a Third Wave pattern is to develop, it isn't clear yet.

I would think the obvious lesson, learned in Europe at least, is that imperialistic wars of aggression aren't worth it. It seems possible that the Americans haven't learned this lesson, or at least the Neocons haven't. Perhaps the European economic cycle has broken, but the American generational cycle hasn't?

Anyway, beware one size fits all. Lessons learned in one era, or on one continent, might not necessarily fit all times and places. In a simple physical system, say if one hangs a weight by a spring, one gets to see a fairly clean cyclical effect. In more complex systems -- many weights suspended and interconnected with many springs and strings -- the effects can be messier. As our theories of history grow, we might want to drop an assumption of cyclical effects, and start looking for the equivalent of Newton's Laws of motion. Cycles are good evidence that forces are moving cultures. Examining the forces driving the cycles is a good thing. Applying lessons learned from the fairly simple situations where the cycles are stable and regular to more complex times in history when things are a mess might be a long term goal.

Anyway, interesting conjectures, WJB. I'll meditate upon them, and may comment further.

I'm not going to be able to compete with William Jennings Bryan and Mike Alexander as to the details of periods and mechanism. I'd just like to raise an issue that has been bugging me since Mike made some data available. The following is a 19 year rolling sum of wartime deaths.



I am seeing distinct breaks around the years 1600 and 1900. Between those years there is as pretty a signal as I'd expect to find. Mike says the signal is there before 1600. I'd like to see more data, but it looks like the signal is significantly smaller.

Why the breaks at 1600 and 1900?

I would guess that feudal economies could not sustain large war efforts. After 1600, princes could borrow funds from bankers and capitalists, allowing the creation of larger armed forces.

Between 1600 and 1900, excepting Napoleon's time, each period of conflict seems a little less than the one before. Signal or noise?

After 1900, the nice regular pattern is clearly broken. By that time, the population migration from rural to urban sectors was complete. The weapons of war were deadly. Central banks were real. Keynes and his followers were about to start manipulating the business cycles. In short, whatever mechanisms were stable and cyclical between 1600 and 1900 are seriously disrupted.

To me, it seems likely that the European and American cycles with regards to war at least ought to be different. The Europeans would have two major conflicts a century, while the Americans go on a Four Score and Seven year cycle. I like Alexander's economic theory of war cycles in Europe. I like S&H's generational psychology in North America. In short, the Europeans would start wars whenever they could afford them, at least until World War II discouraged them from continuing the practice. Americans would fight minor Imperialistic wars such as those with natives, Mexico, and Spain, but their big ones are political and cultural.

Shuffling in a little Toffler, with regard to war fighting at least, might one want to draw the borders between First, Second and Third Wave patterns at 1600 and 1900? Yes, this is in many ways an abuse. I generally say the Third Wave pattern ought to be driven by computers and weapons of mass destruction. These were barely dreamed of in 1900. By any standard other than war casualties, 1900 is way early to declare a Third Wave border. The wars of the 20th century were primarily conflicts between autocratic First Wave remnants contesting Second Wave democracies.

But something happened in 1900. The Second Wave pattern broke down. If a Third Wave pattern is to develop, it isn't clear yet.

I would think the obvious lesson, learned in Europe at least, is that imperialistic wars of aggression aren't worth it. It seems possible that the Americans haven't learned this lesson, or at least the Neocons haven't. Perhaps the European economic cycle has broken, but the American generational cycle hasn't?

Anyway, beware one size fits all. Lessons learned in one era, or on one continent, might not necessarily fit all times and places. In a simple physical system, say if one hangs a weight by a spring, one gets to see a fairly clean cyclical effect. In more complex systems -- many weights suspended and interconnected with many springs and strings -- the effects can be messier. As our theories of history grow, we might want to drop an assumption of cyclical effects, and start looking for the equivalent of Newton's Laws of motion. Cycles are good evidence that forces are moving cultures. Examining the forces driving the cycles is a good thing. Applying lessons learned from the fairly simple situations where the cycles are stable and regular to more complex times in history when things are a mess might be a long term goal.

Anyway, interesting conjectures, WJB. I'll meditate upon them, and may comment further.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

I would think the obvious lesson, learned in Europe at least, is that imperialistic wars of aggression aren't worth it. It seems possible that the Americans haven't learned this lesson, or at least the Neocons haven't.

There are many Americans (including your average neocon) who maintain that the United States has never been tangled up in a war of aggression. Never mind that we conquered half of Mexico.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

I would think the obvious lesson, learned in Europe at least, is that imperialistic wars of aggression aren't worth it. It seems possible that the Americans haven't learned this lesson, or at least the Neocons haven't.

There are many Americans (including your average neocon) who maintain that the United States has never been tangled up in a war of aggression. Never mind that we conquered half of Mexico.

I remember reading that a few years before WWI that the people of Europe were basically checking their watches waiting for the next big war to come. They knew that another war was coming and it was like they expected that these wars came at that rate. I think I read this is Tuchman. Don't know if Europeans talked about previous wars like this or not.

I remember reading that a few years before WWI that the people of Europe were basically checking their watches waiting for the next big war to come. They knew that another war was coming and it was like they expected that these wars came at that rate. I think I read this is Tuchman. Don't know if Europeans talked about previous wars like this or not.

Interesting way of making the pre-modern saeculums work.

About the rate of progress being exponential.

While progress is going at leaps and bounds right now, I do not think this will continue indefinitely. Sometime later whether it be 50 or 500 years, there would be some stasis reached where the progress will be nominal but more a less a refinement of past progress.

And this might help keep those generations in check with the turnings.

Interesting way of making the pre-modern saeculums work.

About the rate of progress being exponential.

While progress is going at leaps and bounds right now, I do not think this will continue indefinitely. Sometime later whether it be 50 or 500 years, there would be some stasis reached where the progress will be nominal but more a less a refinement of past progress.

And this might help keep those generations in check with the turnings.

Originally Posted by John Taber

There are many Americans (including your average neocon) who maintain that the United States has never been tangled up in a war of aggression. Never mind that we conquered half of Mexico.

There are too many such Americans. I would of course recommend Smedley Butler's War Is a Racket to any such individuals, but I sense I'd be preaching to the converted in your case.

Originally Posted by Acton Ellis

I remember reading that a few years before WWI that the people of Europe were basically checking their watches waiting for the next big war to come. They knew that another war was coming and it was like they expected that these wars came at that rate. I think I read this is Tuchman. Don't know if Europeans talked about previous wars like this or not.

Agreed. I vaguely recall Tuchman in The Guns of August mentioning how the French were looking for pay back after the humiliation of the Franco - Prussian War. I don't know that there were formal theories of cyclical warfare, but, yes, I gather the ticking time bomb feeling was there.

Originally Posted by Andy '85

While progress is going at leaps and bounds right now, I do not think this will continue indefinitely. Sometime later whether it be 50 or 500 years, there would be some stasis reached where the progress will be nominal but more a less a refinement of past progress.

I tend to agree, but with nanotechnology and genetic engineering just starting up, I'm not worried about civilization stagnating in my life time. :wink:

Originally Posted by John Taber

There are many Americans (including your average neocon) who maintain that the United States has never been tangled up in a war of aggression. Never mind that we conquered half of Mexico.

There are too many such Americans. I would of course recommend Smedley Butler's War Is a Racket to any such individuals, but I sense I'd be preaching to the converted in your case.

Originally Posted by Acton Ellis

I remember reading that a few years before WWI that the people of Europe were basically checking their watches waiting for the next big war to come. They knew that another war was coming and it was like they expected that these wars came at that rate. I think I read this is Tuchman. Don't know if Europeans talked about previous wars like this or not.

Agreed. I vaguely recall Tuchman in The Guns of August mentioning how the French were looking for pay back after the humiliation of the Franco - Prussian War. I don't know that there were formal theories of cyclical warfare, but, yes, I gather the ticking time bomb feeling was there.

Originally Posted by Andy '85

While progress is going at leaps and bounds right now, I do not think this will continue indefinitely. Sometime later whether it be 50 or 500 years, there would be some stasis reached where the progress will be nominal but more a less a refinement of past progress.

I tend to agree, but with nanotechnology and genetic engineering just starting up, I'm not worried about civilization stagnating in my life time. :wink:

Originally Posted by William Jennings Bryan

Statistically, it is as if the authors took a sizeable, yet decidedly partial, subset of history, found a pattern (and even then one that only performed excellently in yet a smaller subset), and declared the discovery of a fundamental historiographical paradigm. As a result, one could argue (and some critics have stated) that what Strauss & Howe discovered was not much more than (what statisticians would call) an ?accidental correlation?, at least before the last century is concerned.

I don't think this is quite accurate. In exactly what, did S&H discover a pattern? The pattern they describe is a series of four repeated generational archetypes. But generational archetypes themselves have no objective existence. They are an interpretive tool or model. What is it that they are interpreting?

As a concrete example, consider the list of wars and casualties I provided to Bob Butler. Now this is simply a list of millions of events (soliders dying in war). Using this date Bob (and I) have constructed frequency profiles of "death events" as a function of time and shown that a repeating pattern is observable. This apparent cycle is just part of the data that underlies Modelski and Thompson's "saeculum" for foreign policy. The "M&T" saeculum is given below the *** line at the bottom of the post.

When you are thinking about the S&H saeculum and use the turning dates to concretize your thinking, you must keep in mind that the S&H turning dates are not data, or historical facts, they are an idealization of underlying facts. The M&T saeculum is another such idealization. Both are descriptive models of some underlying reality. Bob Butler has shown one piece of the reality that the M&T saeculum is trying to describe.

What underlying reality does the S&H saeculum attempt to describe?

************************************************** ************************************************** ****
Modeski and Thomson's "saeculum":

A 1430-1460 1540-1560 1640-1660 1740-1763 1850-1873 1973-2000
U 1460-1494 1560-1580 1660-1688 1763-1792 1873-1914 2000-
C 1494-1516 1580-1609 1688-1714 1792-1815 1914-1945
H 1516-1540 1609-1640 1714-1740 1815-1850 1945-1973
sec. length 110 . . . 100 . . . . 100 . . . . 110 . . . . 123

M&T's cycle is similar to S&H's in that they have a "Crisis" turning that they call "Global War where the great powers slug it out and a "hegemon" arises. They have a "High" that they call "World Power" in which that hegemon is at maximum power and influence. They have an "Awakening" in which the hegemon's orderly world is first challenged by others that is called "Delegitimation" (from the pov of the hegemon) or "Agenda Setting" (from the pov of the other powers). Finally they have an "Unraveling" call "Deconcentration" or "Coalition Building", depending on the pov. This time shows the decline of the old hegemon and the alliance-building of the other powers in preparation for the next Global War. I have labeled each of M&T's "turnings" using the S&H terminology (H, A, U, C) because it is more familar to T4T enthusiasts.

The lengths of M&T's turnings are much like those of S&H. Up to 1850, M&T turnings average 26.0 years and range from 20 to 35 years. Up to 1844 S&H turnings average 25.6 years and range from 18 to 30 years. After 1844, S&H turnings fall to an average length of 18.3 years, and range from 5 to 22 years. After 1850, M&T turnings average 30.2 years and ranged from 23 to 41 years. Both show "anomalies" in the mid-19th century that lead to a change in turning length.

Originally Posted by William Jennings Bryan

Statistically, it is as if the authors took a sizeable, yet decidedly partial, subset of history, found a pattern (and even then one that only performed excellently in yet a smaller subset), and declared the discovery of a fundamental historiographical paradigm. As a result, one could argue (and some critics have stated) that what Strauss & Howe discovered was not much more than (what statisticians would call) an ?accidental correlation?, at least before the last century is concerned.

I don't think this is quite accurate. In exactly what, did S&H discover a pattern? The pattern they describe is a series of four repeated generational archetypes. But generational archetypes themselves have no objective existence. They are an interpretive tool or model. What is it that they are interpreting?

As a concrete example, consider the list of wars and casualties I provided to Bob Butler. Now this is simply a list of millions of events (soliders dying in war). Using this date Bob (and I) have constructed frequency profiles of "death events" as a function of time and shown that a repeating pattern is observable. This apparent cycle is just part of the data that underlies Modelski and Thompson's "saeculum" for foreign policy. The "M&T" saeculum is given below the *** line at the bottom of the post.

When you are thinking about the S&H saeculum and use the turning dates to concretize your thinking, you must keep in mind that the S&H turning dates are not data, or historical facts, they are an idealization of underlying facts. The M&T saeculum is another such idealization. Both are descriptive models of some underlying reality. Bob Butler has shown one piece of the reality that the M&T saeculum is trying to describe.

What underlying reality does the S&H saeculum attempt to describe?

************************************************** ************************************************** ****
Modeski and Thomson's "saeculum":

A 1430-1460 1540-1560 1640-1660 1740-1763 1850-1873 1973-2000
U 1460-1494 1560-1580 1660-1688 1763-1792 1873-1914 2000-
C 1494-1516 1580-1609 1688-1714 1792-1815 1914-1945
H 1516-1540 1609-1640 1714-1740 1815-1850 1945-1973
sec. length 110 . . . 100 . . . . 100 . . . . 110 . . . . 123

M&T's cycle is similar to S&H's in that they have a "Crisis" turning that they call "Global War where the great powers slug it out and a "hegemon" arises. They have a "High" that they call "World Power" in which that hegemon is at maximum power and influence. They have an "Awakening" in which the hegemon's orderly world is first challenged by others that is called "Delegitimation" (from the pov of the hegemon) or "Agenda Setting" (from the pov of the other powers). Finally they have an "Unraveling" call "Deconcentration" or "Coalition Building", depending on the pov. This time shows the decline of the old hegemon and the alliance-building of the other powers in preparation for the next Global War. I have labeled each of M&T's "turnings" using the S&H terminology (H, A, U, C) because it is more familar to T4T enthusiasts.

The lengths of M&T's turnings are much like those of S&H. Up to 1850, M&T turnings average 26.0 years and range from 20 to 35 years. Up to 1844 S&H turnings average 25.6 years and range from 18 to 30 years. After 1844, S&H turnings fall to an average length of 18.3 years, and range from 5 to 22 years. After 1850, M&T turnings average 30.2 years and ranged from 23 to 41 years. Both show "anomalies" in the mid-19th century that lead to a change in turning length.

Originally Posted by William Jennings Bryan

What if a 27-year ?youth? phase could
actually make sense? I propose that in pre-modern society this actually
did work, if we define ?youth? as pre-autonomy.

Child nuture, I submit, is the most important feature of the
S&H model. It is precisely the reason why S&H were tempted to
use 1964 (a mere 3 years following a shortened Boom's coming of age)
vs. 1929 (a long ten years following a "24 year monster" GI generation).

Forget going back to the Roman era, or even 1860 for that matter. The
apparent contradiction in a very long (post Civil War anomaly) generation
waiting ten years for the spark vs the very shortened Boom's NOW!
spark is enough to give me intellectual hives.

Still, the premise of the child nuturing pendulum swinging between
tightening and loosening, between over-protection and kinderfeindlichkeit
is too obvious to be ignored.

Originally Posted by William Jennings Bryan

What if a 27-year ?youth? phase could
actually make sense? I propose that in pre-modern society this actually
did work, if we define ?youth? as pre-autonomy.

Child nuture, I submit, is the most important feature of the
S&H model. It is precisely the reason why S&H were tempted to
use 1964 (a mere 3 years following a shortened Boom's coming of age)
vs. 1929 (a long ten years following a "24 year monster" GI generation).

Forget going back to the Roman era, or even 1860 for that matter. The
apparent contradiction in a very long (post Civil War anomaly) generation
waiting ten years for the spark vs the very shortened Boom's NOW!
spark is enough to give me intellectual hives.

Still, the premise of the child nuturing pendulum swinging between
tightening and loosening, between over-protection and kinderfeindlichkeit
is too obvious to be ignored.

As for extension of the human lifespan, I will assume that this is due to the extension of relatively (compared to what the calender says) healthy, fairly active years. For the sake of argument I will ignore those with an old-old physiologic age.

Consider the presence of four potentially active adult archetypes. The pattern has been for the younger three generations to tire of the archetypal contributions of a fourth, eldest generation.

Strauss & Howe wrote that at Crises end the younger generations turn to the friendly & practical, that is, un-Prophet-like aspects of life. The old Prophets notice the younger generations turn to the worldly. These old Prophets are tempted to take their church with them.

At the tail end of the High the Nomads are pushed aside by the next junior Civics, and then settle into a reclusive life. Now the Awakening. The Nomads' archetypal contribution, pragmatism, is deemed stodgy and old fashioned. Still, it is somewhat easier to imagine Nomads trying to stay involved than alienated Prophets or Civics, though what sort of role they might play I don't know. At least the Nomads tend to get along better with the young Prophets than do the Civics.

Being the target of Awakening fury, Civic elders are tempted to take their community with them. Though some of their politicians were in the White House, the G.I.s did. Recall that Strauss & Howe speculated about the G.I.s helping to raise the Millenials-this appears not to have come to pass.

The Adaptive archetype is the one most likely to try to stay involved. These are relatively small, recessive generations. When society is gripped by Crisis urgency I would expect the next junior Prophets to shove them aside.

As for interactions with child generations of the same archetype-to-be, will the older generation recognize a budding like archetype? Even if the older generation did recognize this, the interaction would have the limitations of interactions between adults and children.

As for extension of the human lifespan, I will assume that this is due to the extension of relatively (compared to what the calender says) healthy, fairly active years. For the sake of argument I will ignore those with an old-old physiologic age.

Consider the presence of four potentially active adult archetypes. The pattern has been for the younger three generations to tire of the archetypal contributions of a fourth, eldest generation.

Strauss & Howe wrote that at Crises end the younger generations turn to the friendly & practical, that is, un-Prophet-like aspects of life. The old Prophets notice the younger generations turn to the worldly. These old Prophets are tempted to take their church with them.

At the tail end of the High the Nomads are pushed aside by the next junior Civics, and then settle into a reclusive life. Now the Awakening. The Nomads' archetypal contribution, pragmatism, is deemed stodgy and old fashioned. Still, it is somewhat easier to imagine Nomads trying to stay involved than alienated Prophets or Civics, though what sort of role they might play I don't know. At least the Nomads tend to get along better with the young Prophets than do the Civics.

Being the target of Awakening fury, Civic elders are tempted to take their community with them. Though some of their politicians were in the White House, the G.I.s did. Recall that Strauss & Howe speculated about the G.I.s helping to raise the Millenials-this appears not to have come to pass.

The Adaptive archetype is the one most likely to try to stay involved. These are relatively small, recessive generations. When society is gripped by Crisis urgency I would expect the next junior Prophets to shove them aside.

As for interactions with child generations of the same archetype-to-be, will the older generation recognize a budding like archetype? Even if the older generation did recognize this, the interaction would have the limitations of interactions between adults and children.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

A couple of questions. First what sort of mechanism are you suggesting? S&H posit that generations create turnings and turnings create generations. Generations are created and reinforced by the interaction of a turning with a phase of life. Since there are four phases of life, there are four kinds of turnings and four kinds of generations.

If something like S&H's mechanism were operative, but there were only three phases of life (because the phases are too long) then one would expect three kinds of generations and three kinds of turnings.

Not necessarily. First, I need to make clear that I do have one admittedly HUGE assumption inherent to my thesis: The four archetypes on non-negotiable. This is because I believe that they represent four very, very fundamental aspects of the human holon -- the individual, the objective/material, the collective, and the subjective/spiritual.

Beyond that, I still see a trilogical dynamic as being able to produce four archetypes and four turnings. I thought that my quoting of your mechanism would suffice but I was clearly wrong, and I apologize. Let me try to rectify this.

In Strauss & Howe's tetralogical mechanism (Saeculum II), both the generations in the Midlife phase and in the Rising Adulthood phase biologically and familially raise the generation in the Youth phase. Yet it is exclusively the generation in Midlife that sociologically "raises" the Youth cohort. This Midllife group creates it's archetypal opposite. This is the essence of the "Shadow" phenomenon.

In the proposed trilogical dynamic (Saeculum I) I utilized (my understanding) of your pre-modern mechanism adapted for three phases. In this case, the generation in Primacy raises the generation in Youth sociologically. They are in paramount control of society and set the tone for their pre-autonomous next-juniors. But in this relationship they only partially instill a shadow aspect in the Youth cohort. An aspect that has been in existence for two generations is not seen as necessary by the parental cohort and not seen as desirable by the Youth cohort. However, an aspect that has only been around only one generation will be retained as it is still functionally necessary for the saecular conditions.

So for example in a fourth turning of Saeculum I, Heroes are "coming of age" and entering Primacy. They are both secularly (materialistically) minded and communitarian. They are the first generation to be of a communitarian mindset but the second to be secular. The generation in Elderhood, in this case Nomads, are also infused with secularism.

Therefore the Hero parents of the newly forming Artist generation does not find it necessary to instill, what would be by now, overbearing secular values on their children. Likewise as these Artists later mature they will rebel against the overly secular nature of society. However, since the society will be, by definition, in Crisis, and since the Nomad archetype in Elderhood is not adding to the communitarian load (if you will) it is considered necessary by the Heroes and acceptable and desirable by the Artists for the latter to be instilled with communitarian values. The result is an Artist archetype that is communitarian like it's Hero parents, but one that brings a new spiritual component to the mix, completely unlike it's parents.

In the following first turning these Artists come of age bringing a new subjectivism to the Primacy phase but also a (by now) well-worn communitarianism. They see no special need to inculcate young Prophets with collectivist values and when the Prophets later come of age they will wholeheartedly agree and rebel against the communitarianism of their Artist and (now passing) Hero elders. Yet the Prophets retain the spiritualism of their next-elders as they were taught and willingly accepted. The result is a Prophet archetype that is prone to the subjective and spiritual like it's parents, but one that brings a new individualistic component to the mix, completely unlike it's parents.

And so on . . .

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

My solution to the 27 year length is to rule out the idea that generations by themselves create the saeculum. Instead, I introduce a two-stroke cycle that runs indepedently of generational type. It is caused by a lagged negative feedback loop involving population and food supply. The same sort of cycle would be observed in temperature in a room whose thermostat produced a lagged response from the furnace.

Given this two stroke cycle that exists externally to the saeculum it creates two kinds of generations, recessive and dominant. The cause is different parental styles caused by the social moment or non-social moment environment.

I incorporate these aspects (at least in my mind) into the proposed triological model of the saeculum. If it is unclear how, please let me know.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

There is also the observational fact of alternating types of social moment environments. One kind is spirtual and the other is not. This implies a two-stroke cycle that affects spirituality. This cycle is caused by the tendency for a younger generation not to be the same as their parents. During social moments spiritual parents produce non-spiritual offspring and vice versa. Hence, there are two nested two-stroke cycles, giving 2 x 2 = 4 generations.

If one allows for the "Partial Shadowing" described by me above, there can be four archetypes, four turnings, yet only three phases.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

What sort of model do you suggest for Saeculum 2?

Saeculum II is exactly the same in every aspect as Strauss & Howe's "Standard Model".

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

A couple of questions. First what sort of mechanism are you suggesting? S&H posit that generations create turnings and turnings create generations. Generations are created and reinforced by the interaction of a turning with a phase of life. Since there are four phases of life, there are four kinds of turnings and four kinds of generations.

If something like S&H's mechanism were operative, but there were only three phases of life (because the phases are too long) then one would expect three kinds of generations and three kinds of turnings.

Not necessarily. First, I need to make clear that I do have one admittedly HUGE assumption inherent to my thesis: The four archetypes on non-negotiable. This is because I believe that they represent four very, very fundamental aspects of the human holon -- the individual, the objective/material, the collective, and the subjective/spiritual.

Beyond that, I still see a trilogical dynamic as being able to produce four archetypes and four turnings. I thought that my quoting of your mechanism would suffice but I was clearly wrong, and I apologize. Let me try to rectify this.

In Strauss & Howe's tetralogical mechanism (Saeculum II), both the generations in the Midlife phase and in the Rising Adulthood phase biologically and familially raise the generation in the Youth phase. Yet it is exclusively the generation in Midlife that sociologically "raises" the Youth cohort. This Midllife group creates it's archetypal opposite. This is the essence of the "Shadow" phenomenon.

In the proposed trilogical dynamic (Saeculum I) I utilized (my understanding) of your pre-modern mechanism adapted for three phases. In this case, the generation in Primacy raises the generation in Youth sociologically. They are in paramount control of society and set the tone for their pre-autonomous next-juniors. But in this relationship they only partially instill a shadow aspect in the Youth cohort. An aspect that has been in existence for two generations is not seen as necessary by the parental cohort and not seen as desirable by the Youth cohort. However, an aspect that has only been around only one generation will be retained as it is still functionally necessary for the saecular conditions.

So for example in a fourth turning of Saeculum I, Heroes are "coming of age" and entering Primacy. They are both secularly (materialistically) minded and communitarian. They are the first generation to be of a communitarian mindset but the second to be secular. The generation in Elderhood, in this case Nomads, are also infused with secularism.

Therefore the Hero parents of the newly forming Artist generation does not find it necessary to instill, what would be by now, overbearing secular values on their children. Likewise as these Artists later mature they will rebel against the overly secular nature of society. However, since the society will be, by definition, in Crisis, and since the Nomad archetype in Elderhood is not adding to the communitarian load (if you will) it is considered necessary by the Heroes and acceptable and desirable by the Artists for the latter to be instilled with communitarian values. The result is an Artist archetype that is communitarian like it's Hero parents, but one that brings a new spiritual component to the mix, completely unlike it's parents.

In the following first turning these Artists come of age bringing a new subjectivism to the Primacy phase but also a (by now) well-worn communitarianism. They see no special need to inculcate young Prophets with collectivist values and when the Prophets later come of age they will wholeheartedly agree and rebel against the communitarianism of their Artist and (now passing) Hero elders. Yet the Prophets retain the spiritualism of their next-elders as they were taught and willingly accepted. The result is a Prophet archetype that is prone to the subjective and spiritual like it's parents, but one that brings a new individualistic component to the mix, completely unlike it's parents.

And so on . . .

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

My solution to the 27 year length is to rule out the idea that generations by themselves create the saeculum. Instead, I introduce a two-stroke cycle that runs indepedently of generational type. It is caused by a lagged negative feedback loop involving population and food supply. The same sort of cycle would be observed in temperature in a room whose thermostat produced a lagged response from the furnace.

Given this two stroke cycle that exists externally to the saeculum it creates two kinds of generations, recessive and dominant. The cause is different parental styles caused by the social moment or non-social moment environment.

I incorporate these aspects (at least in my mind) into the proposed triological model of the saeculum. If it is unclear how, please let me know.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

There is also the observational fact of alternating types of social moment environments. One kind is spirtual and the other is not. This implies a two-stroke cycle that affects spirituality. This cycle is caused by the tendency for a younger generation not to be the same as their parents. During social moments spiritual parents produce non-spiritual offspring and vice versa. Hence, there are two nested two-stroke cycles, giving 2 x 2 = 4 generations.

If one allows for the "Partial Shadowing" described by me above, there can be four archetypes, four turnings, yet only three phases.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

What sort of model do you suggest for Saeculum 2?

Saeculum II is exactly the same in every aspect as Strauss & Howe's "Standard Model".

Originally Posted by Croakmore

It will take us a while to choke down all of this, Sean, but I certainly admire your efforts. I have one immediate reaction: you may be trying to resolve more here than such a macro-historical theory will allow. From my perspective, the beauty of S&H's generational theory is its seasonality. My need to bring Princess Summerfall Winterspring to the table is nicely satisfied by their theory. The affairs of all living things (with the possible exception of Gold's "deep hot biosphere") are fundamentally influenced by macro-associations among the sun, the moon, and of course planet Earth. Together, they impose a four-part seasonality. Cycles of a three-part kind, to me, leave the sine curve longing to complete itself. But that might even be consistent with your proposed modifications. More later.

--Croaker

Ah, my dear Batrachoid,

Seasonality is decidely not a casualty of my musings. There are still four turnings and four archetypes. It is only the number of life phases that drops to three. If this still bothers your tetralogical sensibilities, think of a
Mediterranean climate: Rainy Season, Dry Season, In-Between Season. In California this is easy to conceptualize.

Please elaborate on the forlorn sine curve and it's implications.