Mike:

Acton was referring to the urban population. Your graph referred to the founding of new towns, not the urban population. This has some bearing on the question, most likely, but it is not a direct response. Can you make a direct response to his speculation? I think the urban population as a percentage should be the focus, as total population declined temporarily after the Death.

Acton:

I sometimes wonder why it is that, every time I present the idea of technological progress colliding with human conservatism being the cause of the saeculum, it disappears beneath the surface of the pond with nary a response. Or else a response to something peripheral, as last time I mentioned it in conjunction with an idea that the Black Death might have been the first Crisis and started the ball rolling; Mike took issue with that and we got sidetracked. (Whether the Death was the first social moment is irrelevant to what I'm actually getting at. The idea would work as well if the Reformation was the first social moment. I do in fact think the Death was, but that's not the important point for me.)

Is this idea hard to understand? Have I failed to present it adequately?

Mass movements? True, there was slow communication in the Middle Ages, and widespread illiteracy to boot, but it seems to me that the lack of a Medieval saeculum (if there was such a lack) is adequately explained by the glacial pace of technological change, which failed to render values or institutions obsolete.

Mike:

Acton was referring to the urban population. Your graph referred to the founding of new towns, not the urban population. This has some bearing on the question, most likely, but it is not a direct response. Can you make a direct response to his speculation? I think the urban population as a percentage should be the focus, as total population declined temporarily after the Death.

Acton:

I sometimes wonder why it is that, every time I present the idea of technological progress colliding with human conservatism being the cause of the saeculum, it disappears beneath the surface of the pond with nary a response. Or else a response to something peripheral, as last time I mentioned it in conjunction with an idea that the Black Death might have been the first Crisis and started the ball rolling; Mike took issue with that and we got sidetracked. (Whether the Death was the first social moment is irrelevant to what I'm actually getting at. The idea would work as well if the Reformation was the first social moment. I do in fact think the Death was, but that's not the important point for me.)

Is this idea hard to understand? Have I failed to present it adequately?

Mass movements? True, there was slow communication in the Middle Ages, and widespread illiteracy to boot, but it seems to me that the lack of a Medieval saeculum (if there was such a lack) is adequately explained by the glacial pace of technological change, which failed to render values or institutions obsolete.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Mike:
Acton was referring to the urban population. Your graph referred to the founding of new towns, not the urban population. This has some bearing on the question, most likely, but it is not a direct response. Can you make a direct response to his speculation? I think the urban population as a percentage should be the focus, as total population declined temporarily after the Death.

There is a limit to what can be done. There are no census records for cities of which I am aware. Growth of towns does say something about urbanization, towns were centers of non-agricultural economic activity (trade and industry).

I sometimes wonder why it is that, every time I present the idea of technological progress colliding with human conservatism being the cause of the saeculum, it disappears beneath the surface of the pond with nary a response. Or else a response to something peripheral, as last time I mentioned it in conjunction with an idea that the Black Death might have been the first Crisis and started the ball rolling; Mike took issue with that and we got sidetracked. Is this idea hard to understand? Have I failed to present it adequately?

It's easy to understand, but difficult to use. You provide no mechanism. Do you believe archetypes exist or are relevant? How are they produced by your model? Is it generational? If so, in what way? What is the time constant for the cycle? How can you measure the "pace of technological development and the "resistance" of human conservatism

The idea is not a bad idea, but it needs much further development. For example, how can it be tested? And it has to be a feasible test, taking into consideration what can be done--or nobody will ever do it.

Many of the ideas expressed here I incorporate in my own thinking (which is one of the reasons I frequent this site). If I press hard, it's because in my experience, people won't give you their best thinking until you challenge them, and then sometimes they will surprise you with their insights

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Mike:
Acton was referring to the urban population. Your graph referred to the founding of new towns, not the urban population. This has some bearing on the question, most likely, but it is not a direct response. Can you make a direct response to his speculation? I think the urban population as a percentage should be the focus, as total population declined temporarily after the Death.

There is a limit to what can be done. There are no census records for cities of which I am aware. Growth of towns does say something about urbanization, towns were centers of non-agricultural economic activity (trade and industry).

I sometimes wonder why it is that, every time I present the idea of technological progress colliding with human conservatism being the cause of the saeculum, it disappears beneath the surface of the pond with nary a response. Or else a response to something peripheral, as last time I mentioned it in conjunction with an idea that the Black Death might have been the first Crisis and started the ball rolling; Mike took issue with that and we got sidetracked. Is this idea hard to understand? Have I failed to present it adequately?

It's easy to understand, but difficult to use. You provide no mechanism. Do you believe archetypes exist or are relevant? How are they produced by your model? Is it generational? If so, in what way? What is the time constant for the cycle? How can you measure the "pace of technological development and the "resistance" of human conservatism

The idea is not a bad idea, but it needs much further development. For example, how can it be tested? And it has to be a feasible test, taking into consideration what can be done--or nobody will ever do it.

Many of the ideas expressed here I incorporate in my own thinking (which is one of the reasons I frequent this site). If I press hard, it's because in my experience, people won't give you their best thinking until you challenge them, and then sometimes they will surprise you with their insights

First off, WJB, excellent thread.

Originally Posted by William Jennings Bryan

I would like to submit that much of the discrepancy noted on this board between how the saeculum operated in the past and how it operates now can be solved by viewing essentially two different modes of saeculum at work, one morphing under stress into the other during the early modern period. I call these modes Saeculum I and Saeculum II.

Some of the discrepancies/issues that have been noted are:

A) 27-year versus 22 (or even 17) year generations with subsequent generational/turning compaction.

B) The enormous age of ?fourth phase? elderhood generations in earlier saeculae and the resulting breakdown in Strauss & Howe?s tetralogical explanation of generational dynamics as one goes further back in time.

C) Nomad generation constituents playing Gray Champion roles as little as three saeculae ago.

This last seems like a problem mainly because so many, including S&H, seem to think Grey Champions are important. Really, they're not. The whole turning schema works just fine, regardless of whether it's three-phase or four-phase, so long as you recognize that the most important generation in all turnings is the one entering adulthood. It is the injection of new blood into the culture that causes the change.

Now, granted, there should be some structural differences between an 18 year Crisis and a 27 year Crisis but there is one thing that is the same -- Heroes entering positions of power.

Originally Posted by Eric the Green

If not, though, it seems to me the question still holds as you raised it. How would pre-modern turnings be what they are? That is, if you have an entirely different kind of youth generation involved rebelling against its elders, and an entirely different elder gen maintaining the status quo? What you have instead, in your line-up, is the mid-lifers entirely in charge of the direction of the turning, with younger and older gens having virtually no influence, and no rebellions going on. That may be the fact, and maybe that's how it worked. I'm not sure how generational dynamics could really be at work in such a one-generation dominant society, though.

To WJB's defense, and to clarify my comments above -- the other generations are still present and they modify the effect of the incoming generation. However, the incoming generation is, I think, the key.

Originally Posted by Eric the Green

My suspicion has been this: that pre-modern saecula only apply to upper classes.

Or rather, that since the saeculum is a cycle of social responses to perceived problems (which usually manifests as politics) all saecula are most strongly influenced by the classes that hold political power.

Originally Posted by Eric the Green

Saeculum II is what it is, a cycle of change and rebellion affecting all of society more swiftly, because the masses of people have been brought into the cycle.

Which is essentially the theory I floated on the "Saeculum in Ancient Rome" thread . . .

Originally Posted by Eric the Green

I don't know if there is any evidence that Saeculum I morphs into a faster II at times of stress. I doubt it; that would mean some shortened turnings in Greco-Roman and Renaissance periods. You'd need to demonstrate this.

Actually, it appears that shortened turnings did occur in Ancient Rome. On the aforementioned thread Mike Alexander and I came to a common hypothesis of 80 year saecula from the 1st century B.C. up to the 3rd century A.D. (although, admittedly, there was lots of disagreement everywhere else). In my opinion this is evidence for my theory that the degree of mass politics in a society is strongly linked to turning length.

Originally Posted by William Jennings Bryan

I was just musing. I was trying to explain how S&H so convincingly found a tetralogical dynamic at work in ancient stories/histories. The other posibility I explored was that archetypal forms were mythographically distilled into a four part story since the generational archetypes, of which there are unavoidably four, were easier to convey that way.

Well consider the prophet archetype in ancient stories. The "prophet" is usually an old man giving futile warnings to hubristic adults. Often the prophet doesn't live to see the real depths of the calamaties that follow (or they simply fade from the action). In a longer cycle (which should be common in agricultural societies) you would expect the last remaining members of a Prophet generation to die during the catalyst phase of the Crisis. And, those cranky old geezers would be recognized historically as "prophets" because their premonitions of doom turned out to be "right."

---

The basic structure seems to me to be the same regardless of turning length. You have alternating social moments and austerity periods triggered by swings in parenting styles. However, the older generations present in one social moment remember the previous one and react to new events through the lens of that earlier social moment. (The same would likely be true of alternating austerity periods as well.) The result is four turnings and four generation types.

Now, theoretically, if lifespans increased enough and/or turnings decreased enough so that it was likely for prophets from two awakenings back to have influence on a Crisis then a 6-part cycle might emerge. It also possible that in very primitive societies there are mere 2-part cycle. For right now though, a 4-part cycle is what we have.

First off, WJB, excellent thread.

Originally Posted by William Jennings Bryan

I would like to submit that much of the discrepancy noted on this board between how the saeculum operated in the past and how it operates now can be solved by viewing essentially two different modes of saeculum at work, one morphing under stress into the other during the early modern period. I call these modes Saeculum I and Saeculum II.

Some of the discrepancies/issues that have been noted are:

A) 27-year versus 22 (or even 17) year generations with subsequent generational/turning compaction.

B) The enormous age of ?fourth phase? elderhood generations in earlier saeculae and the resulting breakdown in Strauss & Howe?s tetralogical explanation of generational dynamics as one goes further back in time.

C) Nomad generation constituents playing Gray Champion roles as little as three saeculae ago.

This last seems like a problem mainly because so many, including S&H, seem to think Grey Champions are important. Really, they're not. The whole turning schema works just fine, regardless of whether it's three-phase or four-phase, so long as you recognize that the most important generation in all turnings is the one entering adulthood. It is the injection of new blood into the culture that causes the change.

Now, granted, there should be some structural differences between an 18 year Crisis and a 27 year Crisis but there is one thing that is the same -- Heroes entering positions of power.

Originally Posted by Eric the Green

If not, though, it seems to me the question still holds as you raised it. How would pre-modern turnings be what they are? That is, if you have an entirely different kind of youth generation involved rebelling against its elders, and an entirely different elder gen maintaining the status quo? What you have instead, in your line-up, is the mid-lifers entirely in charge of the direction of the turning, with younger and older gens having virtually no influence, and no rebellions going on. That may be the fact, and maybe that's how it worked. I'm not sure how generational dynamics could really be at work in such a one-generation dominant society, though.

To WJB's defense, and to clarify my comments above -- the other generations are still present and they modify the effect of the incoming generation. However, the incoming generation is, I think, the key.

Originally Posted by Eric the Green

My suspicion has been this: that pre-modern saecula only apply to upper classes.

Or rather, that since the saeculum is a cycle of social responses to perceived problems (which usually manifests as politics) all saecula are most strongly influenced by the classes that hold political power.

Originally Posted by Eric the Green

Saeculum II is what it is, a cycle of change and rebellion affecting all of society more swiftly, because the masses of people have been brought into the cycle.

Which is essentially the theory I floated on the "Saeculum in Ancient Rome" thread . . .

Originally Posted by Eric the Green

I don't know if there is any evidence that Saeculum I morphs into a faster II at times of stress. I doubt it; that would mean some shortened turnings in Greco-Roman and Renaissance periods. You'd need to demonstrate this.

Actually, it appears that shortened turnings did occur in Ancient Rome. On the aforementioned thread Mike Alexander and I came to a common hypothesis of 80 year saecula from the 1st century B.C. up to the 3rd century A.D. (although, admittedly, there was lots of disagreement everywhere else). In my opinion this is evidence for my theory that the degree of mass politics in a society is strongly linked to turning length.

Originally Posted by William Jennings Bryan

I was just musing. I was trying to explain how S&H so convincingly found a tetralogical dynamic at work in ancient stories/histories. The other posibility I explored was that archetypal forms were mythographically distilled into a four part story since the generational archetypes, of which there are unavoidably four, were easier to convey that way.

Well consider the prophet archetype in ancient stories. The "prophet" is usually an old man giving futile warnings to hubristic adults. Often the prophet doesn't live to see the real depths of the calamaties that follow (or they simply fade from the action). In a longer cycle (which should be common in agricultural societies) you would expect the last remaining members of a Prophet generation to die during the catalyst phase of the Crisis. And, those cranky old geezers would be recognized historically as "prophets" because their premonitions of doom turned out to be "right."

---

The basic structure seems to me to be the same regardless of turning length. You have alternating social moments and austerity periods triggered by swings in parenting styles. However, the older generations present in one social moment remember the previous one and react to new events through the lens of that earlier social moment. (The same would likely be true of alternating austerity periods as well.) The result is four turnings and four generation types.

Now, theoretically, if lifespans increased enough and/or turnings decreased enough so that it was likely for prophets from two awakenings back to have influence on a Crisis then a 6-part cycle might emerge. It also possible that in very primitive societies there are mere 2-part cycle. For right now though, a 4-part cycle is what we have.

Ok. So say there was a movement towards the towns and developing "remedial" saeculum in the high middle ages. ( I think, though that the % of population involved was somewhat small compared to what happened later.) In the early 14th c. There was a demographic crisis before the plague. climate change, overpopulation etc. That is why the Plague was so effective. People fled these new towns, leaving many ghost towns. The saeculum was thwarted for now. Not for long. Then the Plague hit and people emerged and hit the towns even harder. I still think the Printing Press made a difference.

Maybe what Brian's idea was missing was mine and what mine was missing was Brian's. I'm not sure what the technological examples Brian has given are, but its possible that these also facilitate communication and thus, collective mood. The internet is exciting/scary because of how it allows communication more than ever before. Sometimes I wonder if we're ready for that level of technology/communication.

Also, the Roman saeculum. Romans were renowned for their feats of engineering, especially their roads. (Which allowed communication)

A question: what technological/communication advances were made in the High Middle Ages?

Ok. So say there was a movement towards the towns and developing "remedial" saeculum in the high middle ages. ( I think, though that the % of population involved was somewhat small compared to what happened later.) In the early 14th c. There was a demographic crisis before the plague. climate change, overpopulation etc. That is why the Plague was so effective. People fled these new towns, leaving many ghost towns. The saeculum was thwarted for now. Not for long. Then the Plague hit and people emerged and hit the towns even harder. I still think the Printing Press made a difference.

Maybe what Brian's idea was missing was mine and what mine was missing was Brian's. I'm not sure what the technological examples Brian has given are, but its possible that these also facilitate communication and thus, collective mood. The internet is exciting/scary because of how it allows communication more than ever before. Sometimes I wonder if we're ready for that level of technology/communication.

Also, the Roman saeculum. Romans were renowned for their feats of engineering, especially their roads. (Which allowed communication)

A question: what technological/communication advances were made in the High Middle Ages?

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

It's easy to understand, but difficult to use. You provide no mechanism. Do you believe archetypes exist or are relevant? How are they produced by your model? Is it generational? If so, in what way?

Archetypes arise as a result of the alternation of Awakening and Crisis social moments. As noted earlier, a different type of collective behavior is necessary to deal with these two inadequacies. To challenge outmoded values, a society needs a decentralized approach, many-faceted experimentation, a relaxing of authority. To challenge outmoded institutions, on the other hand, a society needs a more centralized approach, with authoritative changes made on the basis of consensus.

Yes, it is generational, and for a very simple reason: older people have a greater vested interest and a greater emotional attachment to the old regime (values or government). A rising generation is necessary to drive the response to changes, even if an older generation guides and channels that response.

There is also an inverse reaction of a rising generation raised during a social moment, acting to slow things down and creating the non-social-moment turnings. All of this is straight out of S&H, of course. All I'm suggesting here is that the saeculum only happens when material change renders values and institutions obsolete, and technological progress is the only thing that does that consistently over time. Without this linear change, we would have what the authors call a "traditional" society, i.e. a pre-saecular society.

What is the time constant for the cycle? How can you measure the "pace of technological development and the "resistance" of human conservatism

There is no really precise measurement for the pace of technological progress, but we can get an idea of its relative pace by comparing the number of basic discoveries, the replacement of old energy sources by new ones, the investment in new industries, and the rate of replacement of old equipment by updated (as opposed to merely replacement) equipment. I am reasonably certain this will show an accelerating pace of change beginning in about the 15th century and proceeding to modern times. I have not done this research because the idea that the pace of technological progress has accelerated is universally held and I don't think it needs defending; if you are going to challenge it, though, I will do so with much eye-rolling. As for the resistance of human conservatism, I believe that might be treated as a constant, or as an oscillation around a constant, unless and until we see a reason to do otherwise. I do not propose that this has changed over time.

I'm not proposing a simple inverse correspondence between the length of the saeculum and the pace of technological progress, though. It looks to me more like a quantum jump effect, with at least three saecular lengths: no saeculum, an 80-100 year saeculum, and a 70-90 year saeculum. Where the pace of technological progress (or other material change) is glacial, so that values and institutions can reasonably be thought of as timeless, there is no saeculum; where the pace of change is more rapid, but not very rapid, the longer saeculum occurs; when the pace of change crosses a threshold, the shorter saeculum takes over. I do not know on what basis to predict whether there can be a further shortening of the saeculum, but if there is it will again be a quantum jump, not a graduated progression.

The idea is not a bad idea, but it needs much further development. For example, how can it be tested? And it has to be a feasible test, taking into consideration what can be done--or nobody will ever do it.

Well, we'd need first of all to have an objective definition of the two types of social moment, and then we'd need to observe whether a regular occurrence of social moments at saecular intervals occurs in a culture where technological change is very slow. If we find that it does, then we have a counter-indication, although it is possible that another form of material change could be responsible, and we should first look for that. It is material change produced by technology, not technology per se, that I'm suggesting is responsible for the saeculum.

You are making some progress towards an objective definition of social moments with your lists of related events; however, it seems to me that these go to commonly-accompanying peripherals, not the heart of the social moment. An Awakening is about a challenge to consensus values. It is usually accompanied by the founding of new religions, but the founding of new religions is in my view a side-effect, or sometimes an enabling mechanism, of the challenge to values. It is conceivable that an Awakening might occur without an explosion of new religions, although I do not know of one. The Reformation, for example, challenged the consensus belief in the authority of the Church, and in the privileges of the hereditary nobility; it asserted that all Christians ought to be able to read Scripture for themselves and make their own religious judgments; it challenged the idea that Christendom needed to be monolithic. It also saw the birth of a great many new versions of Christianity. I have a hard time imagining the values challenge without the birth of those new religions (considering the subject matter), but I still believe that the values challenge and not the new denominations were what the Reformation was about; the new denominations happened because the values were challenged and provided a vehicle for the challenge.

Similarly, a Crisis era happens when institutions are substantially revamped. This does not mean simply a change of monarch or even dynasty, nor is a war between states necessarily indicative of a saecular Crisis, even when one state is completely conquered by another. When the way in which social classes are defined, government is organized, prosperity is gained, or the economy regulated, substantially changes, that indicates a kind of institutional change appropriate to a 4T, and when we see this happening at saecular intervals then we have an indication of a saeculum. Where we see that, then we ought to see more or less rapid technological progress, at least comparable to the 15th-18th centuries. If we consistently find saeculae in historical periods where that is not the case, then I am wrong. If we find this once or twice, I might still be right, but we need to take a closer look.

Understand as well that we might see isolated instances of "Awakenings" and "Crises" without a saeculum. Material change sometimes happens stochastically and can render values or institutions obsolete on a one-time basis. What I'm saying here is that technology advance produces the modern saeculum because it keeps on changing things, so that values and institutions keep becoming obsolete. So it's the rhythmic repetition that makes the saeculum, not a single occurrence of a social moment.

If I press hard, it's because in my experience, people won't give you their best thinking until you challenge them, and then sometimes they will surprise you with their insights

You weren't pressing hard, Mike. Neither you nor anyone else was commenting at all, and I was a bit mystified.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

It's easy to understand, but difficult to use. You provide no mechanism. Do you believe archetypes exist or are relevant? How are they produced by your model? Is it generational? If so, in what way?

Archetypes arise as a result of the alternation of Awakening and Crisis social moments. As noted earlier, a different type of collective behavior is necessary to deal with these two inadequacies. To challenge outmoded values, a society needs a decentralized approach, many-faceted experimentation, a relaxing of authority. To challenge outmoded institutions, on the other hand, a society needs a more centralized approach, with authoritative changes made on the basis of consensus.

Yes, it is generational, and for a very simple reason: older people have a greater vested interest and a greater emotional attachment to the old regime (values or government). A rising generation is necessary to drive the response to changes, even if an older generation guides and channels that response.

There is also an inverse reaction of a rising generation raised during a social moment, acting to slow things down and creating the non-social-moment turnings. All of this is straight out of S&H, of course. All I'm suggesting here is that the saeculum only happens when material change renders values and institutions obsolete, and technological progress is the only thing that does that consistently over time. Without this linear change, we would have what the authors call a "traditional" society, i.e. a pre-saecular society.

What is the time constant for the cycle? How can you measure the "pace of technological development and the "resistance" of human conservatism

There is no really precise measurement for the pace of technological progress, but we can get an idea of its relative pace by comparing the number of basic discoveries, the replacement of old energy sources by new ones, the investment in new industries, and the rate of replacement of old equipment by updated (as opposed to merely replacement) equipment. I am reasonably certain this will show an accelerating pace of change beginning in about the 15th century and proceeding to modern times. I have not done this research because the idea that the pace of technological progress has accelerated is universally held and I don't think it needs defending; if you are going to challenge it, though, I will do so with much eye-rolling. As for the resistance of human conservatism, I believe that might be treated as a constant, or as an oscillation around a constant, unless and until we see a reason to do otherwise. I do not propose that this has changed over time.

I'm not proposing a simple inverse correspondence between the length of the saeculum and the pace of technological progress, though. It looks to me more like a quantum jump effect, with at least three saecular lengths: no saeculum, an 80-100 year saeculum, and a 70-90 year saeculum. Where the pace of technological progress (or other material change) is glacial, so that values and institutions can reasonably be thought of as timeless, there is no saeculum; where the pace of change is more rapid, but not very rapid, the longer saeculum occurs; when the pace of change crosses a threshold, the shorter saeculum takes over. I do not know on what basis to predict whether there can be a further shortening of the saeculum, but if there is it will again be a quantum jump, not a graduated progression.

The idea is not a bad idea, but it needs much further development. For example, how can it be tested? And it has to be a feasible test, taking into consideration what can be done--or nobody will ever do it.

Well, we'd need first of all to have an objective definition of the two types of social moment, and then we'd need to observe whether a regular occurrence of social moments at saecular intervals occurs in a culture where technological change is very slow. If we find that it does, then we have a counter-indication, although it is possible that another form of material change could be responsible, and we should first look for that. It is material change produced by technology, not technology per se, that I'm suggesting is responsible for the saeculum.

You are making some progress towards an objective definition of social moments with your lists of related events; however, it seems to me that these go to commonly-accompanying peripherals, not the heart of the social moment. An Awakening is about a challenge to consensus values. It is usually accompanied by the founding of new religions, but the founding of new religions is in my view a side-effect, or sometimes an enabling mechanism, of the challenge to values. It is conceivable that an Awakening might occur without an explosion of new religions, although I do not know of one. The Reformation, for example, challenged the consensus belief in the authority of the Church, and in the privileges of the hereditary nobility; it asserted that all Christians ought to be able to read Scripture for themselves and make their own religious judgments; it challenged the idea that Christendom needed to be monolithic. It also saw the birth of a great many new versions of Christianity. I have a hard time imagining the values challenge without the birth of those new religions (considering the subject matter), but I still believe that the values challenge and not the new denominations were what the Reformation was about; the new denominations happened because the values were challenged and provided a vehicle for the challenge.

Similarly, a Crisis era happens when institutions are substantially revamped. This does not mean simply a change of monarch or even dynasty, nor is a war between states necessarily indicative of a saecular Crisis, even when one state is completely conquered by another. When the way in which social classes are defined, government is organized, prosperity is gained, or the economy regulated, substantially changes, that indicates a kind of institutional change appropriate to a 4T, and when we see this happening at saecular intervals then we have an indication of a saeculum. Where we see that, then we ought to see more or less rapid technological progress, at least comparable to the 15th-18th centuries. If we consistently find saeculae in historical periods where that is not the case, then I am wrong. If we find this once or twice, I might still be right, but we need to take a closer look.

Understand as well that we might see isolated instances of "Awakenings" and "Crises" without a saeculum. Material change sometimes happens stochastically and can render values or institutions obsolete on a one-time basis. What I'm saying here is that technology advance produces the modern saeculum because it keeps on changing things, so that values and institutions keep becoming obsolete. So it's the rhythmic repetition that makes the saeculum, not a single occurrence of a social moment.

If I press hard, it's because in my experience, people won't give you their best thinking until you challenge them, and then sometimes they will surprise you with their insights

You weren't pressing hard, Mike. Neither you nor anyone else was commenting at all, and I was a bit mystified.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Archetypes arise as a result of the alternation of Awakening and Crisis social moments. As noted earlier, a different type of collective behavior is necessary to deal with these two inadequacies. To challenge outmoded values, a society needs a decentralized approach, many-faceted experimentation, a relaxing of authority. To challenge outmoded institutions, on the other hand, a society needs a more centralized approach, with authoritative changes made on the basis of consensus.

This seems to me to imply that society is an actor in your cycle. Is this what you mean?

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Archetypes arise as a result of the alternation of Awakening and Crisis social moments. As noted earlier, a different type of collective behavior is necessary to deal with these two inadequacies. To challenge outmoded values, a society needs a decentralized approach, many-faceted experimentation, a relaxing of authority. To challenge outmoded institutions, on the other hand, a society needs a more centralized approach, with authoritative changes made on the basis of consensus.

This seems to me to imply that society is an actor in your cycle. Is this what you mean?

Originally Posted by Acton Ellis

Maybe what Brian's idea was missing was mine and what mine was missing was Brian's. I'm not sure what the technological examples Brian has given are, but its possible that these also facilitate communication and thus, collective mood. . . .

A question: what technological/communication advances were made in the High Middle Ages?

I don't know about that, but a bit afterwards, in the 15th century, you got the printing press. This led to widespread literacy by making reading material affordable to the lower classes.

I do think that this was THE single technological change that led to the Reformation, and hence to the Armada Crisis, and it also contributed mightily to subsequent saeculae by speeding the spread of ideas, e.g. democracy (very important two saeculae down the road).

But I could cite cause-effect relationships involving technological developments that have nothing to do with communication, too. Take the invention of the steam engine and the discovery of coal, together with the development of the assembly line. These inventions greatly boosted industrial production and shifted the balance of power between the warrior/aristocrat and merchant prince elite, much to the advantage of the latter. These changes made it economically feasible, even desirable, to do without the forced labor of slaves or serfs, and thus led to the American Civil War (among other things). Here is an example of a material change propelling a change in values and institutions. Slavery had been a part of civilization since its inception. The industrial revolution rendered it first morally anathema, then illegal. Another example is the approach of population to (or actually, its overshoot beyond) ecological limits. It is no longer desirable to have high birthrates, so the subordination of women to men is no longer of value, and is being challenged or overthrown.

Originally Posted by Acton Ellis

Maybe what Brian's idea was missing was mine and what mine was missing was Brian's. I'm not sure what the technological examples Brian has given are, but its possible that these also facilitate communication and thus, collective mood. . . .

A question: what technological/communication advances were made in the High Middle Ages?

I don't know about that, but a bit afterwards, in the 15th century, you got the printing press. This led to widespread literacy by making reading material affordable to the lower classes.

I do think that this was THE single technological change that led to the Reformation, and hence to the Armada Crisis, and it also contributed mightily to subsequent saeculae by speeding the spread of ideas, e.g. democracy (very important two saeculae down the road).

But I could cite cause-effect relationships involving technological developments that have nothing to do with communication, too. Take the invention of the steam engine and the discovery of coal, together with the development of the assembly line. These inventions greatly boosted industrial production and shifted the balance of power between the warrior/aristocrat and merchant prince elite, much to the advantage of the latter. These changes made it economically feasible, even desirable, to do without the forced labor of slaves or serfs, and thus led to the American Civil War (among other things). Here is an example of a material change propelling a change in values and institutions. Slavery had been a part of civilization since its inception. The industrial revolution rendered it first morally anathema, then illegal. Another example is the approach of population to (or actually, its overshoot beyond) ecological limits. It is no longer desirable to have high birthrates, so the subordination of women to men is no longer of value, and is being challenged or overthrown.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Archetypes arise as a result of the alternation of Awakening and Crisis social moments. As noted earlier, a different type of collective behavior is necessary to deal with these two inadequacies. To challenge outmoded values, a society needs a decentralized approach, many-faceted experimentation, a relaxing of authority. To challenge outmoded institutions, on the other hand, a society needs a more centralized approach, with authoritative changes made on the basis of consensus.

This seems to me to imply that society is an actor in your cycle. Is this what you mean?

I'm not positive what you mean by that. Could you elaborate?

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Archetypes arise as a result of the alternation of Awakening and Crisis social moments. As noted earlier, a different type of collective behavior is necessary to deal with these two inadequacies. To challenge outmoded values, a society needs a decentralized approach, many-faceted experimentation, a relaxing of authority. To challenge outmoded institutions, on the other hand, a society needs a more centralized approach, with authoritative changes made on the basis of consensus.

This seems to me to imply that society is an actor in your cycle. Is this what you mean?

I'm not positive what you mean by that. Could you elaborate?

Brian wrote:

But I could cite cause-effect relationships involving technological developments that have nothing to do with communication, too. Take the invention of the steam engine and the discovery of coal, together with the development of the assembly line.

Ah, but the steam engine and coal led to transportation advances which made it easier to tavel and spread ideas. It' s not that the inventions themselves need to transfer information. The assembly line and industrialization led to urbanization and increased contact between people and ideas. I still think our ideas go well together

Brian wrote:

But I could cite cause-effect relationships involving technological developments that have nothing to do with communication, too. Take the invention of the steam engine and the discovery of coal, together with the development of the assembly line.

Ah, but the steam engine and coal led to transportation advances which made it easier to tavel and spread ideas. It' s not that the inventions themselves need to transfer information. The assembly line and industrialization led to urbanization and increased contact between people and ideas. I still think our ideas go well together

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Archetypes arise as a result of the alternation of Awakening and Crisis social moments. As noted earlier, a different type of collective behavior is necessary to deal with these two inadequacies. To challenge outmoded values, a society needs a decentralized approach, many-faceted experimentation, a relaxing of authority. To challenge outmoded institutions, on the other hand, a society needs a more centralized approach, with authoritative changes made on the basis of consensus.

This seems to me to imply that society is an actor in your cycle. Is this what you mean?

I'm not positive what you mean by that. Could you elaborate?

You refer to the society needing a decentralized approach to challenge outmoded values. This suggests to me that when society "senses" that a change is needed it produces the conditions for that change. That is, the society is the actor. Is this what you mean?

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Archetypes arise as a result of the alternation of Awakening and Crisis social moments. As noted earlier, a different type of collective behavior is necessary to deal with these two inadequacies. To challenge outmoded values, a society needs a decentralized approach, many-faceted experimentation, a relaxing of authority. To challenge outmoded institutions, on the other hand, a society needs a more centralized approach, with authoritative changes made on the basis of consensus.

This seems to me to imply that society is an actor in your cycle. Is this what you mean?

I'm not positive what you mean by that. Could you elaborate?

You refer to the society needing a decentralized approach to challenge outmoded values. This suggests to me that when society "senses" that a change is needed it produces the conditions for that change. That is, the society is the actor. Is this what you mean?

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Originally Posted by Acton Ellis

Maybe what Brian's idea was missing was mine and what mine was missing was Brian's. I'm not sure what the technological examples Brian has given are, but its possible that these also facilitate communication and thus, collective mood. . . .

A question: what technological/communication advances were made in the High Middle Ages?

I don't know about that, but a bit afterwards, in the 15th century, you got the printing press. This led to widespread literacy by making reading material affordable to the lower classes.

....

By 1000 A.D.

The advance of the mouldboard plow which turns the soil rather than just breaks which eliminated cross plowing; the horse collar which allowed greater application of the horses strength; the horse shoe which allowed greater traction; tandem harnesses to allow more than one animal to be used; the spread of legumes in the crop rotation that enhanced nitrogen-- allowed for a greater food production, surplus, and population growth.

My father employed these until he returned from WWII and replaced horse power and stationary engines with a tractor. A thousand year run is not bad. HTH

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Originally Posted by Acton Ellis

Maybe what Brian's idea was missing was mine and what mine was missing was Brian's. I'm not sure what the technological examples Brian has given are, but its possible that these also facilitate communication and thus, collective mood. . . .

A question: what technological/communication advances were made in the High Middle Ages?

I don't know about that, but a bit afterwards, in the 15th century, you got the printing press. This led to widespread literacy by making reading material affordable to the lower classes.

....

By 1000 A.D.

The advance of the mouldboard plow which turns the soil rather than just breaks which eliminated cross plowing; the horse collar which allowed greater application of the horses strength; the horse shoe which allowed greater traction; tandem harnesses to allow more than one animal to be used; the spread of legumes in the crop rotation that enhanced nitrogen-- allowed for a greater food production, surplus, and population growth.

My father employed these until he returned from WWII and replaced horse power and stationary engines with a tractor. A thousand year run is not bad. HTH

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

You refer to the society needing a decentralized approach to challenge outmoded values. This suggests to me that when society "senses" that a change is needed it produces the conditions for that change. That is, the society is the actor. Is this what you mean?

Not if you mean that society makes a conscious decision. It's just what happens when values are widely perceived as obsolete. People reject authority, go off into movements or new religions or experimental communities, and try various replacements. When institutions (meaning the government, economy, or international relations) break down, it's generally more obvious and immediately threatening, and the tendency is to congregate into a few factions to assert a solution -- much more centralized than an Awakening.

This serves as a kind of collective decision-making, but it's not conscious or self-aware. It's more of an emergent property.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

You refer to the society needing a decentralized approach to challenge outmoded values. This suggests to me that when society "senses" that a change is needed it produces the conditions for that change. That is, the society is the actor. Is this what you mean?

Not if you mean that society makes a conscious decision. It's just what happens when values are widely perceived as obsolete. People reject authority, go off into movements or new religions or experimental communities, and try various replacements. When institutions (meaning the government, economy, or international relations) break down, it's generally more obvious and immediately threatening, and the tendency is to congregate into a few factions to assert a solution -- much more centralized than an Awakening.

This serves as a kind of collective decision-making, but it's not conscious or self-aware. It's more of an emergent property.

This appeared in Which Way To The Future Selected Essays From Analog. Author Stanley Schmidt listed several characteristics of an old-timer:

1. People tend to specifically remember only the best of the old stuff, and to mistakenly think of it as typical of the entire period.

2. The more things you've experienced the harder it is to find new ones which are different enough from any of them to strike you as fresh and new.

3. On the other hand, many people, as they age, don't really want much novelty.

Quoting:

"....The older they get, the more they fear the new and unfamiliar, and crave the old and comfortable. Instead of something fresh and new (even if they say they want that), they may really want more of what they liked best from their own past-which may not satisfy many younger people who really are looking for something new and different. Thus it is that virtually every new form of art, literature, or music in history has been resisted by older generations (and frequently touted by younger ones to an extent completely out of proportion to posterity's eventual judgement of it).

"...there are exceptions. Some people are better than others at retaining a fresh outlook and finding new sources of satisfaction quite late in life. The composer Giuseppe Verdi did some of his most inventive and highly regarded work between the ages of seventy and eighty-five. 'Grandma Gatewood,' a legendary figure among Appalachian Trail hikers, walked the whole two-thousand mile trail (again!) in her eighties....

"...But I have also seen the Old-timer Effect in so many people that I must consider it almost an occupational hazard of being human...And while the prospect of very long life still sounds highly desirable to me, I must wonder how many people will really be able to enjoy how much of it."