Schlesinger's Doctrine of Pre-emption

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

1940 C Alien Registration Act of 1940

Here's another case of was "L" is now "C"...

• "Let us recall for a moment the situation in 1938. Obviously Nazis, their conscious fellow-travelers and soft-headed Americans who conceived Germany to be a much misunderstood nation had no business in the State Department: and liberals were correct in demanding their dismissal in advance of overt acts. I cannot see why this same principle does not apply today to the fellow-travelers of a rival totalitarianism." -- Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. What is Loyalty?

Or would that be another case of liberals leading America into a conservative war? This is liberals leading America into writing conservative bills that violate the First Amendment.

Will the Campaign Finance Reform bill be considered a "conservative" event someday?

Originally Posted by Devil's Advocate

Another view...

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Originally Posted by Devil's Advocate

Herbert Hoover instituted The Marshall Plan, as he had the huge Belgium Relief effort in 1918. Taft coined the term "soft on Communism," and probably shared Hoover's view on the difference between using foreign relief as a weapon of national defense and goodwill (vs. not using it domestically as the "dole").

Taft and his allies, who represented an older, isolationist tradition in American diplomacy, also worried lest the Marshall Plan entangle the United States in the affairs of Europe at a time when tensions there could spark another world war.

• The most interesting confrontation broke out between Taft and Vandenberg. One of many remaining Senate isolationists, Taft attacked the Marshall program for "helping socialism." Rather than claiming that Europe did not need help, that the United States could not afford the assistance, or that Europe would take care of its own problems -- this last being the view I believed Taft really held -- he said he supported the program but only with reduced funding. Instead of $4 billion for the first full year, Taft suggested $3 billion. Again Vandenberg issued the effective riposte: "When a man is drowning 20 feet away, it's a mistake to throw him a 15-foot rope." Taft's motion to cut the first 12-month authorization lost 56 to 31, and the final Senate vote on the Marshall authorization bill passed 69 to 17. The margin of victory (in percentage terms) in the House was slightly higher, 329 to 71. -- Charles P. Kindleberger, Marshall Plan Commemorative Section: In the Halls of the Capitol: A Memoir (From Foreign Affairs, May/ June 1997)

Vandenberg's line about the "man is drowning 20 feet away, it's a mistake to throw him a 15-foot rope," later served as Arthur Schlesinger's take off point in his hit piece on the The New Isolationism during the 1952 presidential campaign. I had read the piece a few years back and thought that Schlesinger did a great job of exposing the wishy washy Taft isolationist position.

Well, as it turns out, twenty years later, in his thesis The Imperial Presidency, Schlesinger did an about face and decided that Taft had been right along. Garry Wills noted this in his review of Schlesinger's book:

• Nonetheless, he has done his homework for this book, in fresh circumstances, and has some new things to say. To get them said, he will gladly unsay what he must. Describing the "uncritical cult of the activist Presidency" that followed World War II, he puts his own name in the list of "uncritical" men. He admits that he (and Acheson and Commager) were wrong, and Taft was right, on Truman's commitment of troops to Korea. He admits his book on Kennedy understated the President's foreknowledge of the Diem coup. These are generous confessions. Since he here means to write like a scholar, he is not afraid to apologize forthrightly. It earns him the hearing he deserves.

Like I have always maintained, liberal Democrats repented of their sins in 1972 (and why they tried to impeach Nixon) and that was the real turning point on the American political scene (not 1964).

Both views are consistent with my assigning an L to the Marshall Plan. As for the about face in 1972, there is another interpretation. The about face was made in the 1950's by the conservatives who switched from Taft-style isolationism to supporting a muscular foreign policy.

Both parties cannot remain supporters of a muscular foreign policy. Why? Because what is the defintion of muscular? It is supporting more than the other guy. It is impossible to to send military spending above 100% of federal spending. Thus, the side who was willing to countenance a level of military spending closest to 100% gets to "own" the muscular foreign policy issue. The other side is left with the isolationist position by default.

Had the GOP retained Tafts views, the Democrats would have stayed cold warrirors right up to the present. THey would also have remained dominant to this day. But Republicans want to win elections too, and this was a way they could embrace big government (which they had concluded was going to be necessary) in a way that is at least partially consistent with their principles.

I believe Geroge Bush is attempting a similar strategy today. His "compassionate conservatism" is a new form of the welfare state that will divvy out goodies to middle Americans in accordance with socially conservative principles. It is a way to embrace big domestic government (which the GOP is concluding is necessary) in a way that is partially consistent with conservative principles.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Both views are consistent with my assigning an L to the Marshall Plan. As for the about face in 1972, there is another interpretation. The about face was made in the 1950's by the conservatives who switched from Taft-style isolationism to supporting a muscular foreign policy.

They say you can lead a horse to water but you can't make him drink. Just getting the horse named Alexander to the water has been difficult enough... but finally the doggone beast has plunged headlong into the trough and taken a long swallow. Ahhhh. Now, please allow me to connect the dots.

• "What makes the scientific method so powerful is the paradigm." -- Mike Alexander, The Kondratiev Cycle: A Generational Interpretation.

No political scientist would deny that FDR's New Deal established a new paradigm in American politics. Not only did it establish new rules to play by, it established a powerful political coalition comprised of various groups into the Democratic Party. FDR's New Deal was the New Liberalism.

• "Should any political party attempt to abolish social security, unemployment insurance, and eliminate labor laws and farm programs, you would not hear of that party again in our political history." -- President Eisenhower to Edgar Eisenhower, November 8, 1954

To view the 1952 election as anything other than a victory for this new liberal paradigm is to leave behind the "road map" that had got you there in the first place. While coming out of WWII, liberals faced some tough decisions, like what to do about Communist global expansionism and covert infiltration into the State Dept, and a resurgent GOP. But this in no way, as history later proves, meant that the New Deal had failed or was about to be overturned. The paradigm was theirs to lose, and the only question that remained was how much of it the GOP conservatives were going to embrace. Ergo, the back and forth tug of war that existed in the late forties and early fifties, that would eventually establish a "vital center." The Taft-wing of the GOP lost that battle completely in 1952, just as the Mario Cuomo-wing of the Democratic Party lost out to the "New Democrat" embrace of Reaganism:

• "I hope you're all aware we're all Eisenhower Republicans," he said, his voice dripping with sarcasm. "We're Eisenhower Republicans here, and we are fighting the Reagan Republicans. We stand for lower deficits and free trade and the bond market. Isn't that great?" - Bob Woodward, in The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House (1994)

As I have noted before, FDR and the Democrats returned this counrty to the era of 1917 during the election of 1932. They sought to go back, do it over and get it right this time. The whole post-war battle over foreign policy was an attempt to avoid the mistakes made in the post-WWI era. And this was the New Liberalism that Schlesinger so ardently argued for here, in 1948:

• The problem of United States policy is to make sure that the Center does hold; and this can be done only by supporting it against all blandishments and all threats, from whatever direction they may come. The best must recover a sense of principle; and, on the basis of principle, they may develop a passionate intensity. We cannot afford to loose the blood-dimmed tide ever again.

That the "Best and the Brightest" would in the end falter in a mass of hubris, does not change the facts of how they got there in the first place. That liberalism would later renounce this non-isolationist "foreign policy" paradigm they themselves were responsible for creating, does not absolve them to later wipe out that chapter from the American history book!

Yet this is what they wish to do.

• Yet, as liberals discovered in the 1960s, success can breed arrogance, blinding leaders to problems until it is too late. Back in 1969 Kevin Phillips famously predicted that a Republican majority was emerging on the heels of the growing backlash against a liberalism that had grown fat and arrogant, and that had come to be associated with grandiose policy initiatives that, in Vietnam as on the home front, came crashing up against reality. Today, at the very moment when Republicans seem more powerful than ever, Phillips sees the potential for history to repeat itself.
  
  "Any ideology that enjoys success first fulfills itself and then indulges in some hubris," he says. "I found this to apply very nicely to '60s liberalism, and now I think it's happening again. -- Eyal Press, The Nation (May 31, 2004 issue).

In short, that's a pretty "muscular" liberalism. :wink:

Ergo, the back and forth tug of war that existed in the late forties and early fifties, that would eventually establish a "vital center." The Taft-wing of the GOP lost that battle completely in 1952, just as the Mario Cuomo-wing of the Democratic Party lost out to the "New Democrat" embrace of Reaganism:

• "I hope you're all aware we're all Eisenhower Republicans," he said, his voice dripping with sarcasm. "We're Eisenhower Republicans here, and we are fighting the Reagan Republicans. We stand for lower deficits and free trade and the bond market. Isn't that great?" - Bob Woodward, in The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House (1994)

I think I might see what you are getting at here. In 1952, sick of losing, the GOP chose Eisenhower instead of Taft and adapted to a new liberal paradigm in order to stay relevant (and win elections). In 1992, sick of losing, the Democrats chose Clinton's New Democrats instead of another Dukkasis and so adapted to a new more conservative paradigm. The spacing between these events relfects the 40 year cycle you talk about. You are also suggesting that in 2004 the Democratic liberal old-guard is running one more old-time liberal, like the Republican conservative old guard ran Goldwater in 1964, and this is why you think Bush is going to win in a landslide this fall.

I can see why you like this analogy. There are all sorts of neat parallels. We even have a "Vietnam like war" with Bush to compare to Johnson, the very man who pasted Goldwater, just as Bush will paste Kerry. And the 1960 election was a photo finish, just like 2000. Very nice.

Is this more or less correct?

************************************************** ********
If 1992 is to be "like" 1952, then what we should see is something like what happened in 1992. Liberal Democrats, reflecting the pre-1972 liberal paradigm, lost to Republicans until a "new Democrat" (i.e. a non-Kennedy Democrat) won in 1992. This translates to conservative Republicans, reflecting the pre-1932 conservative paradigm, lost to Democrats until a "new Republican" (i.e. a non-Taft Republican) won in 1952.

The Republicans did not run Taft-like conservatives prior to 1952, however. Rather they ran a liberal Republican (Dewey) in 1944 and 1948, and a moderate Democrat (Willkie) in 1940. In other words, unlike the Democrats who continued to run liberals after 1972, the Republicans didn't run conservatives. The conservative defeat in 1932 and 1936 was so sweeping that such a move could not even be contemplated. The Democrats experienced nothing like this after 1972.

What happens to your cycle if the election this fall is another squeaker?

• "Leave Texas alone." -- George W. Bush, election night 1994

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

What happens to your cycle if the election this fall is another squeaker?

Life goes on... 8)

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

What happens to your cycle if the election this fall is another squeaker?

It is a tale of opposites that determine how I parallel the sixties to the present. Some opposites are obivous, liberal and Democrats v. conservative and GOP in asendency, loosening culture standards v. tightening, American innocence v. American guilt abroad, pro-US media v. anti-US media wrt to military matters and so on...

But perhaps the most important difference between the two eras is how people view the office of the President. Here generational differences are a key factor in how this cycle plays out. The Presidency was on the verge of the Great Disillusion that would later play out in the seventies and leave a lot of people forever cynical of even legit Constitutional power vested in that office again. Life goes on, but a funny thing begins to occur, a new generation of folks who never knew of the innocence, or the resultant disillusion, begins to replace those who did. Birth and death are the constant equalizers of the cycle.

Reagan, like the fall of Nixon, changed the ideological paradigm. There's no doubt about that. But unlike FDR he did not forge a political coalition of the middle classes. He didn't because he was a conservative, and conservatives hold the individual over the collective. Our Jesus does not call to the masses but rather to the one, the individual.

America can ill afford to enter another isolationist era. Yet, the true paradox at work is that America cannot continue to grow and mature without another isolationist era, anymore than spring can arrive after autumn.

Specifically how this should all play out I haven't yet applied my notion of the cycle to the present. My Bush landslide scenario is born more out of what I'm actually seeing than what the cycle suggests. Dean was the Goldwater "choice, not an echo" guy. But Democrats steered away from that choice. Perhaps that says something right there. I'm not impressed with Kerry, but he wouldn't be the first non-impressive guy to win.

I remember the 1964 election pretty well. It was "All the way with LBJ!" Goldwater was that "nut," who would nuke the world if elected. Funny, but that much hasn't changed at all. Kerry may very well run an ad of a little girl pulling flower petals as an H-bomb lights the sunny horizon.

And then Kerry will win, and do the *opposite* of what LBJ did. He will bring all the troops home from around the globe, he will call the UN together and craft a bill to outlaw war, he will fashion plowshares out of bombs and bullets, he will nationalize healthcare, and on the seventh day he will rest.

And then the fourth turn shall come. :wink:

Marc, you didn't answer my real questions from my previous post, just the joke at the end. How can I understand what you are writing about if you don't provide any feedback?

I'm sorry, I honestly thought you already understood all that and were sorta humorously mouthing it back at me. Well, yes, you got it right. Quite frankly I am not all that comfortable with the exactitude of the whole forty year deal. I don't quite know to make of that, but it sure does fit on the swing of the pendulum.

Here's a realtime, unsolicited example of how 1996 fit right into the 1956 election as a "reverse" image (I edited it down a bit and added the Schlesinger quote for effect). The last paragraph reflects the difference between a hard and soft realignment, that bodes ill for the furture:

The End of Ideology?

James Nuechterlein
First Things (November 1996)

• "Forty years ago, liberal Republicans who urged their fellows to accept the New Deal were charged by conservatives with the sin of ''me-tooism.'' Today me-tooism is an infection within the Democratic Party. It finds expression in quasi-Reaganite formations like the Democratic Leadership Council." -- Arthur Schlesinger, The New York Times (July, 1986)

If one were to judge from the current presidential campaign, one could only conclude that our current age marks a new end of ideology. Indeed, we sometimes seem to have arrived at the end of politics. Not since the 1950s-when the end of ideology was first proclaimed-have we witnessed a campaign so apparently devoid of substantive differences between the major parties.

It began with the conventions. The Republicans, spooked by the widespread assumption that the 1992 Houston convention had scared off moderates, constructed in San Diego a Potemkin village...
The Democrats alternated mommy politics with the politics of bathos. Thus we had the extraordinary spectacle of an opening session dominated by Jim and Sarah Brady demonstrating in Jim's continuing handicaps the evils of handguns, and Christopher Reeve, the crippled Superman, demonstrating in his wheelchair . . . At both conventions red-meat rhetoric-or ideological politics of any sort-was at a premium. Mario Cuomo and Jesse Jackson roused the faithful with recollections of liberal enthusiasms past, but did so safely outside prime time.

The President, meanwhile, continues the practice of minimalist politics he has followed so successfully since the Republicans swept to victory in the congressional elections of 1994. Under the shrewd guidance of the now-departed Dick Morris, he has taken one issue after another away from the GOP. He has announced the end of the era of big government, signed the welfare-reform bill, accepted the notion of a balanced budget, taken a tough line on crime, and decided that, on second thought, he raised taxes too high at the beginning of his presidency. In the wake of perceived Republican extremism, he has taken possession of the political center.

All in all, then, this campaign has so far offered the least substantive differences between the candidates since the races between Eisenhower and Stevenson in the 1950s. The fifties were widely hailed as an age of consensus and of the demise of ideological politics. Are we now, forty years later, restored to such a condition? It is most unlikely.

When commentators in the fifties spoke of the end of ideology, they did so in contrast to the 1930s, the most ideological period in American history. Because of the Great Depression, that decade skewed politics sharply to the left: Franklin Roosevelt was the most liberal of all our Presidents, and even so he was attacked as vehemently from the left as from the right. For the first time in our history, socialism seemed-if mainly among intellectuals-a genuine political option.

But postwar prosperity and the rise of the Cold War brought a quick end to the socialist flirtation. At the same time, Republicans made their peace with the New Deal reforms and entered on an extended "me-too" period: they would govern like the Democrats, only more efficiently.

Now we have me-tooism in reverse. After a lurch back to the left in the 1960s, American politics has moved steadily to the right, and Democrats today implicitly concede that Great Society liberalism is dead and conservative Republicanism has established the terms of political discourse. Clinton says in effect that he will govern like the Republicans, only (somewhat) more humanely.

But the nineties are not simply a mirror image of the fifties. A majority of Republicans in that earlier decade had genuinely come to terms with the changes wrought by the New Deal: the Eisenhower wing of the party held the upper hand over the Robert Taft conservatives. Today's Democrats, by contrast, go along with Clinton's concessions to the right because they have no real choice. He's the candidate, and besides his poll numbers are currently very high. But most party activists hate what he has done, especially on the welfare issue, and while they may for the moment suffer mostly in silence, they have not forsaken the true liberal faith.


Posted for discussion purposes only.

Originally Posted by Devil's Advocate

And then Kerry will win, and do the *opposite* of what LBJ did. He will bring all the troops home from around the globe, he will call the UN together and craft a bill to outlaw war, he will fashion plowshares out of bombs and bullets, he will nationalize healthcare, and on the seventh day he will rest.:

This shows the biggest difference between our world views. You seem to believe that a president can do whatever he wants to when elected (i.e. nationalize healthcare). Does this mean Bush wanted to extend Medicare welfare benefits? Does this mean Clinton wanted his health care bill to fail?

In my view, what a presdent wants is irrelevant. Bush wanted to fight a quick, inexpensive war in Iraq. He hasn't gotten it. Bush wanted to see jobs rebound in 2003, which postwar history suggested should happen for a recession that happened in 2001. He hasn't gotten it.

As a result he is faced a difficult election year instead of what should have been cakewalk. Bush could have been in Reagan's 1984 position had he made the right choices for the time, like Reagan did. He didn't.

Bush embraced "supply-side" tax cuts. So did Reagan, but when Reagan did it, it was fresh and innovative--and it fit the times. For Bush its an old, tired policy that doesn't fit the times.

Bush stood up to the axis of evil. Reagan stood up to the evil empire. When Reagan did it, it was innovative and it fit the times. For Bush its a tired old policy that doesn't fit the times.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

The Republicans did not run Taft-like conservatives prior to 1952, however. Rather they ran a liberal Republican (Dewey) in 1944 and 1948, and a moderate Democrat (Willkie) in 1940. In other words, unlike the Democrats who continued to run liberals after 1972, the Republicans didn't run conservatives. The conservative defeat in 1932 and 1936 was so sweeping that such a move could not even be contemplated. The Democrats experienced nothing like this after 1972.

This is the difference between what I call a hard and a soft realignment. FDR's coalition was less ideological based and more based in the pure economics. Reagan is more ideological and based more in cultural warfare. Furthermore, congress remained in Democrat control for another generation because of their turn in 1972. They kept all their groups save the south which they knew they were going to lose anyway (the writing was on the wall in 1948).

You might note also, the GOP was the Progressive Party previous to the Taft debacle in 1912. The "Father of the TVA," Senator Norris, was a Republican. Still, while they ran moderates as President, you ought to see the doom and gloom they wrote into their Party Platforms back in the thirties. Yes, America was coming to an end. :wink:

Finally, this is were you go wrong in your L/C interpretations: The conservative definition, first and foremost, ought to be simply defined on what was changed from 1929 to 1949. Ergo, SCOTUS holding on to the past, Taft/Hartley etc..., and the biggy, isolationism.

To simply note that infringement of Free Speech as a "C" is to stoop to pure partisanship. That issue was dealt with back in 1789, and is routinely debated by both L and C all the time.

Originally Posted by Devil's Advocate

Finally, this is were you go wrong in your L/C interpretations: The conservative definition, first and foremost, ought to be simply defined on what was changed from 1929 to 1949. Ergo, SCOTUS holding on to the past, Taft/Hartley etc..., and the biggy, isolationism.

This is very fuzzy. What does SCOTUS holding on to the past mean? What does isolationism mean in the context of 140 years of US history before 1929? How do you interpret the many wars of conquest fought by the US over this period?

To simply note that infringement of Free Speech as a "C" is to stoop to pure partisanship. That issue was dealt with back in 1789, and is routinely debated by both L and C all the time.

No it wasn't. What about the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798? These were Federalist policies, opposed by Jefferson.

Now my point here is to track cycles described by others. Schlesinger is the only one of whom I am aware who has a liberal/conservative cycle. He orignally defined the Federalists as C and Jefferson's party as L. This makes the Alien and Sedition Acts a C. I simply keep all such restrictions as C down the line.

You see it as partisan, but I see it as mechanical. Yes such a mechanical approach produces problems with things like anti "hate speech" policies on campuses which would rate a C, while most of the oppoenents of such policies are conservative. But campus speech policies aren't laws and so don't show up in the political event list.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Bush embraced "supply-side" tax cuts. So did Reagan, but when Reagan did it, it was fresh and innovative--and it fit the times. For Bush its an old, tired policy that doesn't fit the times.

Bush stood up to the axis of evil. Reagan stood up to the evil empire. When Reagan did it, it was innovative and it fit the times. For Bush its a tired old policy that doesn't fit the times.

EXACTLY!!!

Seasonal versus post-seasonal (or very close to "post").

But the nineties are not simply a mirror image of the fifties. A majority of Republicans in that earlier decade had genuinely come to terms with the changes wrought by the New Deal: the Eisenhower wing of the party held the upper hand over the Robert Taft conservatives. Today's Democrats, by contrast, go along with Clinton's concessions to the right because they have no real choice. He's the candidate, and besides his poll numbers are currently very high. But most party activists hate what he has done, especially on the welfare issue, and while they may for the moment suffer mostly in silence, they have not forsaken the true liberal faith.

What happened in the 1950's was the GOP finally came to term with the post 1932 reality that the 1920's were gone. The old policies/strategies which had worked so well would never work again. This perception was helped by the rise of a whole new generation of Republicans who had not cut their teeth in 1920's political campaigns, but rather had become successful in the new post-1932 reality.

But this didn't happened in the 1990's with the Democrats. And its not a one-off thing. It's general. When conservatives lose, they tend to acknowledge that thay have lost and come to terms with the new reality, like they did in the 1950's. Voting Rights is a good example. In 1800 only white, propertied men could vote. The liberal/conservative divide over this issue involved unpropertied white men. By mid-century the divide had changed, now unpropertied white men could vote. Conservatives came to terms with this reality and changed strategies (e.g. the "Log Cabin" campaign of 1840) and polices (they embraced national expansion in 1856). After the Civil War there was a new divide on voting rights: that involved black men and white women. By the 1920's conservatives had come to terms with political rights for women, and by the 1970's they had come to terms with political rights for blacks.

Liberals don't come to terms. Suffragettes, Prohibitionists, Black civil righters never came to terms with a conservative reality and gave up. Even when they were wrong (Prohibitionists).

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Originally Posted by Devil's Advocate

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Originally Posted by Devil's Advocate

It appears you consider the positions Jefferson held on foreign policy to be the liberal standard still today.

No. I keep the original definitions until a new issue comes a long that forces a redefinition. With the rise of progressism (a new movement that intended to rectify perceived problems that had arisen as a byproduct of industrialization in the late 19th century) there became, in some issues, two "liberal" positions that were opposed to each other. In that case, the older Jeffersonian concept now became labled as a C.

Finally, this is were you go wrong in your L/C interpretations: The conservative definition, first and foremost, ought to be simply defined on what was changed from 1929 to 1949... and the biggy, isolationism.

This is very fuzzy. What does isolationism mean in the context of 140 years of US history before 1929? How do you interpret the many wars of conquest fought by the US over this period?

Reading the progression of the debate here very closely, one can see that you seem to want your liberalism packaged nicely to fit the paradigm of the post-1972 Democratic Party. What I mean by that is that you acknowledge that liberalism adopted a new industrial era notion of foreign policy, but that whatever that notion was it was no different from the "140 years of US history before 1929."

Thus, post-WWI, when the new Globalist Power paradigm failed, and post-WWII, when the new paradigm succeeded, were both merely more of the same "older Jeffersonian concept... labled as a C," and this isolationist success and failure cannot be labeled "C" and "L" respectively. Moreover, it was the conservatives who immediately adopted WWII as their own war in 1941, and then basically forced the Cold War upon liberals. So, in 1972 when the Democratic Platform renounced the Cold War, liberals were in effect maintaining their ideological purity and purging their Party in the wake of Vietnam.

Is this really how you wish to argue your case, Michael?

Marc,

I think you do not understand what I am doing with the cycles. I am trying to characterize existing cycles so that I can actually see them in some sort of a valid fashion.

Most of the posters here buy the saeculum because it sounds plausible, and also because its the only cycle they know. I can't do this because the different cycles with which I am familiar give contradictory results when used directly to make predictions.

One solution to this problem is to just say they're all garbage and walk away. I may end up doing this. But like others here I to sense that S&H were on to something. But I also sense that the other cycle theorists were on to something, too. Yet I get contradictions when I try to apply the cycles "as is" so they can't all be right as given. So before I simply pitch them all, I have to ask whether all the cycles are equally valid (one can ignore an invalid cycle that contradicts a valid cycle). Or, if they are equally valid, I can ask if the cycle theorists got their cycles exactly correct.

Most cycle workers simply present their cycles. S&H did and so did Schlesinger. I don't know if any of them really exist. That is, I don't know if they are valid. To check for validity, I need to visualize the cycles so I can "see" them. If I can't see them, then I can't have much confidence that they are valid.

So the whole point of "L" and "C" events is an attempt to visualize Schlesinger's cycle, and to extend it forward beyond 1947 which is the last date given. Similarly, the purpose for collecting unrest and spiritual events is to visualize the S&H cycle.

In order to visualize a cycle, the first thing one has to detemine is what is the thing that is oscillating which makes the cycle a cycle? For example, for the Stock Cycle it's index valuation that oscillates (Jon Carson presented a plot showing this oscillation). For the K-cycle it's prices, interest rates, etc. and the Stock Cycle. For the War Cycle its war deaths. These are the easy ones because data series already exist that allow you to track them.

But what is oscillating in the saeculum? What oscillates in Schlesinger cycle? I have to pick something that is both reasonable and observable. I then go get that thing, present it in a visual form and see if I can see cycles that agree reasonbly well with what the cycle author presents.

Since the Schlesinger cycle is supposed to be about ideological shifts in domestic politics. To the extent that political parties represent ideologies, perhaps oscillating control of government by one party of the other will be related to the Schlesinger cycle. Oscillations in party control can be determined objectively from historical data (see fig). I call the Democrats and Democrat Republicans before them as the liberal party. The Republicans, the Whigs before them, the National Republicans before them and the Federalists before them are then called the conservative party:



I'm not sure what this is, but its certainly not the Schlesinger cycle. The Schlesinger cycle apparently does not involve party power.

The L and C stuff is another approach that does a better job. My definitions of L and C are selected using a defintion that is consistent with the sense of what L and C means to Schlesinger.

For example, Schlesinger labels the Jacksonian era as liberal. What do Jacksonians stand for? Well they hated tariffs, fought a war against a central bank, stole land from Indians, favored expanding the franchise and didn't like Henry Clay's American plan.

So to capture whatever it was that Schlesinger "saw" I have to labled tariffs as C, central bank as C, internal improvements, as C, stealing Indian land as L and expanding the franchise as L. But if expanding the franchise is L, then expanding it for black men is L too. And the folks who advocating this were the abolitionists, so the abolitionist position is L too.

Given that Schlesinger labels the period when Jacksonian Democrats controlled the government (1829-1841) is liberal this leads to a conclusion that abolition is L and thus opposition to abolition is C. Now the 1841-1861 period is labeled by Schlesinger as a conservative period, yet it too was dominanted by Democrats. What gives? If you look at a timeline from that period it is filled with issues relating to slavery in which the abolitionist viewpoint was rebuffed. That is C events.

So the C-L analysis supports the Schlesinger cycles, suggesting that I am capturing the dynamic he saw.

Originally Posted by Devil's Advocate

Reading the progression of the debate here very closely, one can see that you seem to want your liberalism packaged nicely to fit the paradigm of the post-1972 Democratic Party.

I am trying to fit it to the liberal and conservative concepts used by Schlesinger Sr, when he first came up with the cycle in around 1920. So most of your concerns are moot, as Schlesinger didn't deal with them because they hadn't happened yet.

What I mean by that is that you acknowledge that liberalism adopted a new industrial era notion of foreign policy, but that whatever that notion was it was no different from the "140 years of US history before 1929."

I don't know what you mean by a new industrial notion of foreign policy.

Thus, post-WWI, when the new Globalist Power paradigm failed, and post-WWII, when the new paradigm succeeded, were both merely more of the same "older Jeffersonian concept... labled as a C," and this isolationist success and failure cannot be labeled "C" and "L" respectively.

I am not sure what you mean by Globalist paradigm. Early in the 20th century, most military interventions involved small scale operations usually in support of business objectives. Conservatives generally supported these. After WW II there were many interventions, often using intelligence agencies instead of troops, for the same reasons. Conservatvies supported these. The nature of most interventions in the 1950's were no different than those in the 1900's. Conservatvies are still supporting small-scale interventions for pragmatic reasons like Panama in 1989 and Afghanistan in 2001. This hadn't changed in 100 years.

The vast majority of my C events are things like this and are perfectly consistent with standard interpretations of conservative.

Now two early 20th century interventions have not been small scale operations that conservatives support. These are WW I and WW II. Conservative didn't like them because they were large scale conflicts that expanded the government, raised taxes and had no practical benefit. They were idealistic interventions.

Now you claim that after WW II, conservatives changed their minds on this sort of conflict. I don't see this. Didn't they criticize idealistic interventions in Somalia and Kosovo?

Now when Democrats were in control of the government in the 1950's and 1960's, conservatives faced a choice. Their defeat in the New Deal meant they couldn't challenge the Democrats on domestic policy. That is, they couldn't stop the Democrats from "tax and spend" on socialistic programs. The best they could do was try to divert resources from promoting socialism at home to fighting socialism abroad. Hence it made political sense to support idealistic wars in Korea and Vietnam when Democrats were in power.

Did Republicans get involved in idealistic wars on their watch? If they had really bought into the spirit of WW I and WW II, as you claim, Eisenhower would have started the Vietnam War. Reagan would have gone to war in Lebanon. Lord knows he had a pretext. Bush I would have ousted Saddam in 1991 "in order to bring democracy to the Iraqi people." None of these things happened. There was no change after WW II.

There was a change after 911. Today, for the first time, a self-described conservative president is fighting an idealistic war of some scale. And self-described conservatives are foresquare behind him. And liberals, why they are sounding a lot like Robert A Taft. It's too early to tell if this shift is real.

Either way there was no new paradigm in terms of armed interventions after WW II.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

There was a change after 911. Today, for the first time, a self-described conservative president is fighting an idealistic war of some scale. And self-described conservatives are foresquare behind him. And liberals, why they are sounding a lot like Robert A Taft. It's too early to tell if this shift is real.

Dubya is arguable a special type of conservative, or has at least surrounded himself with this special type: Neoconservative.

If I were forced to concisely summarize Neoconservatism I'd say it's a fascinating synthesis of Post-New Deal Conservatism and a soft Trotskyism.

How would all of this square with Schlesinger's cycle? :? :shock:

Originally Posted by William J. Lemmiwinks

If I were forced to concisely summarize Neoconservatism I'd say it's a fascinating synthesis of Post-New Deal Conservatism and a soft Trotskyism.

Essentially what this jerk is saying, like the jerks he listens to, is that previous to Reagan, Amerkia was the land of Yosif Vissarionovich: We murdered millions essentailly no differently from the way Stalin murdered millions, and that Reagan merely represented a "softer side of Sears," a "kinder, gentler" way of doing the same blasted Stalinesque thing.

I have but one reply for Mr. Sean Love's softer side of Yosif Vissarionovich thesis... take it and shove it up your ass, fella.

Originally Posted by Devil's Advocate

Originally Posted by William J. Lemmiwinks

If I were forced to concisely summarize Neoconservatism I'd say it's a fascinating synthesis of Post-New Deal Conservatism and a soft Trotskyism.

Essentially what this jerk is saying, like the jerks he listens to, is that previous to Reagan, Amerkia was the land of Yosif Vissarionovich: We murdered millions essentailly no differently from the way Stalin murdered millions, and that Reagan merely represented a "softer side of Sears," a "kinder, gentler" way of doing the same blasted Stalinesque thing.

I have but one reply for Mr. Sean Love's softer side of Yosif Vissarionovich thesis... take it and shove it up your ass, fella.

Mr. Lamb,

It's common knowledge that Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, Richard Perle, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Nathan Glazer, and the one and only Paul Wolfowitz, were either followers of Max Shachtman or directly associated with his Social Democratic Party at one point or another.

Shachtman was a self-avowed Trotskyite who over time softened his view from one of a revolutionary perspective to one of an evolutionary perspective, but retained the proslytizing secular millennialism of the original. Thus the "soft Trotskyism".

On the planet I live on this is not in dispute. Perhaps you live on MeeceWorld? :lol:

And Mr. Fruit of the Christian Tree, I doubt your Master would have approved of your rectal fixation. :wink:

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Originally Posted by Devil's Advocate

Thus, post-WWI, when the new Globalist Power paradigm failed, and post-WWII, when the new paradigm succeeded, were both merely more of the same "older Jeffersonian concept... labled as a C," and this isolationist success and failure cannot be labeled "C" and "L" respectively.

I am not sure what you mean by Globalist paradigm. Early in the 20th century, most military interventions involved small scale operations usually in support of business objectives. Conservatives generally supported these. After WW II there were many interventions, often using intelligence agencies instead of troops, for the same reasons. Conservatvies supported these. The nature of most interventions in the 1950's were no different than those in the 1900's. Conservatvies are still supporting small-scale interventions for pragmatic reasons like Panama in 1989 and Afghanistan in 2001. This hadn't changed in 100 years.

The vast majority of my C events are things like this and are perfectly consistent with standard interpretations of conservative.

Either way there was no new paradigm in terms of armed interventions after WW II.

First off, I understand where you are coming from on your cycle approach and research.

Secondly, ok, let's assume you're correct, and thus WWII is a "C." Is it reasonable to then merely list it as *one* event like you would any other "intervention"? To do so is to lose all sense of proportion, and WWII is weighted the same as Panama in 1989. Surely this method defies all standards of logic. Would it not be better to list every important battle and event, and labeled as "C," of the four year conflict, so as to give WWII a proper weight? You did this for the New Deal in 1933, so I would think you would list all the war stuff the same way.

Originally Posted by William J. Lemmiwinks

On the planet I live on this is not in dispute. Perhaps you live on MeeceWorld? :lol:

Niether is the "planet" notion in dispute... fella.

Originally Posted by Devil's Advocate

Originally Posted by William J. Lemmiwinks

On the planet I live on this is not in dispute. Perhaps you live on MeeceWorld? :lol:

Niether is the "planet" notion in dispute... fella.

Non sequitur.

I ask you, Mr. Meeceworlder, to explain your apparent outrage at my description of Neoconservatism as a blend of Post-New-Deal Conservatism and a Soft Trotskyism. I have established that most major players in the Neoconservative movement have been associated with an attenutated Trotskyism. Is this in dispute?

Originally Posted by Devil's Advocate

Essentially what this jerk is saying, like the jerks he listens to, is that previous to Reagan, Amerkia was the land of Yosif Vissarionovich: We murdered millions essentailly no differently from the way Stalin murdered millions, and that Reagan merely represented a "softer side of Sears," a "kinder, gentler" way of doing the same blasted Stalinesque thing.

I have but one reply for Mr. Sean Love's softer side of Yosif Vissarionovich thesis... take it and shove it up your ass, fella.

How my (admittedly oversimple) summarization of Neoconservatism led to this response is beyond me. Is this type of response a well-thought-out, compassionate response from a person who has been touched by, and has a personal relationship with, Jesus Christ? Is this an example of the fruit we would expect from such a tree?

Oh, and just to brush you up on your history, Stalin and Trotsky hated each other. Don't conflate them.

Originally Posted by Devil's Advocate

Secondly, ok, let's assume you're correct, and thus WWII is a "C." Is it reasonable to then merely list it as *one* event like you would any other "intervention"? To do so is to lose all sense of proportion, and WWII is weighted the same as Panama in 1989. Surely this method defies all standards of logic. Would it not be better to list every important battle and event, and labeled as "C," of the four year conflict, so as to give WWII a proper weight? You did this for the New Deal in 1933, so I would think you would list all the war stuff the same way.

The decision to become involved in WW II was made once. Our representatives were were not able to pick and choose which parts of WW II they would support and which parts they would not. The New Deal was different, parts of it were rejected in a piecemeal fashion.

What I am trying to measure are changes in the political zeitgeist, the spirit of the times. The various decisions made to adopt or reject the New Deal legislation each provide a test of the zeitgiest. The various elements of the war do not reflect the zeitgeist. The people had decided once to turn over authority for the war to the Roosevelt adminstration and the military.

Vietnam was different. The people through their legislators gave the government the go ahead to make war on Vietnam just as they did for WW II. But then they elected Nixon who had promised to end the war, and did so. The election of Nixon was a second decision by the people to countermand their earlier decision to go to war. Had the zeitgiest not made this second decision necessary, Johnson would have run again and probably won.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Originally Posted by Devil's Advocate

Secondly, ok, let's assume you're correct, and thus WWII is a "C." Is it reasonable to then merely list it as *one* event like you would any other "intervention"? To do so is to lose all sense of proportion, and WWII is weighted the same as Panama in 1989. Surely this method defies all standards of logic. Would it not be better to list every important battle and event, and labeled as "C," of the four year conflict, so as to give WWII a proper weight? You did this for the New Deal in 1933, so I would think you would list all the war stuff the same way.

What I am trying to measure are changes in the political zeitgeist, the spirit of the times.

How would you know what that was until you listed all the L/C events out? And if the political zeitgeist shifted to conservatism in 1941, then why use the 1946 date?

Vietnam was different. But then they elected Nixon who had promised to end the war, and did so.

It took Nixon longer to end the war in Vietnam than for Roosevelt and Truman to end WWII. Furthermore, as Nixon faced tough questions as to how he was ending the war, he would have to argue back by pointing to specific events and moves that supported his case, unless you are willing to just accept Richard Nixon's word that he wasn't lying and being deceptive about it.

Seems the same rule ought to apply to the many assumptions you're making here. Your events list ought to convince me that indeed the American people were ready to shed a lot of blood and money in one war but not the other war.

"I have established that most major players in the Neoconservative movement have been associated with an attenutated Trotskyism. Is this in dispute?"

Uh, "associated with an attenutated Trotskyism"? Wanna talk english or just play games, jerk?

Oh, and just to brush you up on your history...

I don't belong to the Amish sect. When I'm insulted I insult back, fella.