Dear Sean,

Originally Posted by William Jennings Bryan

> I know he's not saying that because John has pointed out that
> though (from his POV) the Boer War was a crisis war for the
> Afrikaaners, it decidedly was not one for Britain.

> BTW, John, why didn't the fall of Apartheid not result in a big,
> bloody mess since it was about one long lifetime after the Boer
> War?

I believe that the southern Africa was embroiled in a regional crisis
war, running from South Africa up to Angola and southern Zaire
(Congo), in the 1960s, so the fall of Apartheid in 1990 would be an
awakening event.

Incidentally, this is something fascinating that I've seen so many
times that it can't be a coincidence.

When we're studying a crisis war, we can always identify something
that ends it -- a peace conference, an unconditional surrender, or
something like that. And it seems that there's always a winner and a
loser.

But when does an awakening's "generational war" end? Is there a
winner and a loser?

I think there is a lot of the time, and maybe all or almost all of
the time. The awakening climaxes with some event -- an "internal
revolution" -- a "velvet revolution" -- or a harsh suppression.

For example, when Nixon resigned, that signaled a victory for the
kids, and ended the awakening.

On the other hand, the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 were
brutally suppressed, which was a "victory" for the old folks.

However -- and this is relevant to the previous discussion with Mike
-- the Tiananmen Square supression spurred the "Wild Lily rebellion"
in Taiwan. So one awakening event spurred another one.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Sean, have you come up with a mechanism for the multimodal saeculum?

I will try to post what I have this week.

I tried to answer these questions for WW I and WW II from the German POV.

Did the country plan and prepare for the war in advance (+),
or was the war a surprise that they didn't prepare for (-)?

Plans were made for both wars, although the outbreak of WW I was a surprise for the Germans. So I score CM for WW I and CC for WW II.

Did the country start the war or respond to it energetically (+)?

Both wars yes, so I score C for both.

Or was there an exogenous factor pulling the country into the war
-- a treaty with another country under attack, or an unexpected
invasion, for example (-)?

WW I scores a M for this.

Was the war top-down (-) or bottom-up (+) -- that is, did the
energy for the war come from the leaders (-) or from the people (+)?

No way to assess this.

Was there a financial crisis that caused enough poverty to cause
being a soldier to be the only way to feed his family (+)?

No for both. Score M for both.

Did the people blame their war opponents for their financial crisis (+)?

No for both. Score M for both

Was the antiwar/pacifist movement a major part of the political landscape (-), or was it just a footnote to the history of the war (+)?

No for both. Score M for both.

Were civilians targeted for attack (+),
or did political considerations force civilians to be protected (-)?

Civilians were targeted in both wars, C for both.

Was the war particularly violent, bloody or genocidal (+)?

Yes for both, C for both.

Or was the war a stalemate (even if people got killed) (-)?

No, both wars ended in defeat for the Germans, C for both.

Was the military strategy primarily offensive (+)
or defensive (-)?

Offensive for both, C for both.

Did the war result in a major transformation -- major
governmental changes, major national boundary changes, for example(+)?

Yes for both, C for both.

Was the country occupied and controlled by enemy forces (+)?

After WW I very much so, less so after WW I so I score an M for WW I and a C for WW II.

Was the war so horrible that the parties were forced into
unpleasant compromises just to end the war -- compromises that
created fault lines that led to the next crisis war 80 years later (+)?[/list]

No compromises made with the Germans, so M for both.

Toting them up I have 7C and 7 M for WWI and 9C and 4 M for WW II. WW II is more "crisis like" for Germany than WW I, but WW I is more crisis-like than the Franco-Prussian war.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

I tried to answer these questions for WW I and WW II from the German POV.

Or was the war a stalemate (even if people got killed) (-)?

No, both wars ended in utter defeat for the Germans, C for both.

WWI was not an utter defeat for Germany. It was a qualified defeat and ended in an Armistice. That the German Empire collapsed was not in total a result of French or Allied Arms. And, France was never the same again either after its qualified victory.

Originally Posted by Virgil K. Saari

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

I tried to answer these questions for WW I and WW II from the German POV.

Or was the war a stalemate (even if people got killed) (-)?

No, both wars ended in utter defeat for the Germans, C for both.

WWI was not an utter defeat for Germany. It was a qualified defeat and ended in an Armistice. That the German Empire collapsed was not in total a result of French or Allied Arms. And, France was never the same again either after its qualified victory.

I stand corrected, I removed the word utter.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Dear Sean,

Originally Posted by William Jennings Bryan

> I know he's not saying that because John has pointed out that
> though (from his POV) the Boer War was a crisis war for the
> Afrikaaners, it decidedly was not one for Britain.

> BTW, John, why didn't the fall of Apartheid not result in a big,
> bloody mess since it was about one long lifetime after the Boer
> War?

I believe that the southern Africa was embroiled in a regional crisis
war, running from South Africa up to Angola and southern Zaire
(Congo), in the 1960s, so the fall of Apartheid in 1990 would be an
awakening event.

Incidentally, this is something fascinating that I've seen so many
times that it can't be a coincidence.

When we're studying a crisis war, we can always identify something
that ends it -- a peace conference, an unconditional surrender, or
something like that. And it seems that there's always a winner and a
loser.

But when does an awakening's "generational war" end? Is there a
winner and a loser?

I think there is a lot of the time, and maybe all or almost all of
the time. The awakening climaxes with some event -- an "internal
revolution" -- a "velvet revolution" -- or a harsh suppression.

For example, when Nixon resigned, that signaled a victory for the
kids, and ended the awakening.

On the other hand, the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 were
brutally suppressed, which was a "victory" for the old folks.

However -- and this is relevant to the previous discussion with Mike
-- the Tiananmen Square supression spurred the "Wild Lily rebellion"
in Taiwan. So one awakening event spurred another one.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Recently there was discussion concerning Malaise, and the idea that the Boom Awakening went bust. But instead of a warped saeculum, the Awakening was followed by a 90s decade that was typical Unraveling.

Strauss & Howe have determined a modern turning length of approximately 20 years. If the Awakening ended with the Nixon resignation, that implies that the Awakening ended about a decade early. If so, would that imply a sort of blank period until the generational constellation triggered the Unraveling?

Without wishing to launch a political discussion in this thread, I
wish to take note of the fact that in a speech today to the Air Force
Academy, President Bush compared the war on terror to World War II.
Although we make such comparisons all the time in this forum, this is
the first time I've seen it done in a larger political context.

Two quotes worth noting:

(*) "Like the murderous ideologies of the last century, the ideology
of murderers reaches across borders"

(*) In those calls we hear echoes of other enemies in other times, the
same swagger."

This is an extremely emotional comparison, and will further polarize
(if that's even possible) the division between Republicans and
Democrats in this election year.

See: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3771401.stm

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Mike,

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> I tried to answer these questions for WW I and WW II from the
> German POV.

I get different results than you did. Obviously the problem is that
the criteria in my list are not clearly enough defined.

Generally speaking, I've applied these criteria hundreds of times
now, and I didn't have any trouble with them, but that may be because
I'm applying criteria in ways that I haven't yet figured out how to
formulate in writing.

Perhaps you or others in this forum can suggest ways to make the
criteria clearer.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> (*) Did the country plan and prepare for the war in advance (+),
> or was the war a surprise that they didn't prepare for (-)?

> Plans were made for both wars, although the outbreak of WW I was a
> surprise for the Germans. So I score CM for WW I and CC for WW
> II.

I believe you're contradicting yourself here -- if WW I was a
surprise for the Germans, then how could they have prepared for it?

However, I think this whole criterion is completely screwed up. I
might actually have it completely backwards, since some countries are
caught by surprise by crisis wars, and countries almost ALWAYS
prepare for a mid-cycle war.

It occurs to me that in preparations for crisis wars there's an
element of secrecy and deception that's missing for mid-cycle wars.
I'm thinking of examples like these:

(*) Japan and Hitler both prepared for WW II in secret. America was
surprised by Pearl Harbor, except insofar as Roosevelt foresaw a
possible war and prepared the public.

(*) America prepared a long time for the 1991 Gulf War. America got
into the Vietnam war so gradually that all preparations were
completely public.

(*) In the 1994 Rwanda war, the Hutus prepared in secret, while the
Tutsuis were caught completely by surprise.

(*) America was completely surprised by 9/11, and got into
Afghanistan as quickly as possible, with little advance preparation.

Do you think that there's a criterion related to secrecy and surprise
that can be used to distinguish crisis wars from mid-cycle wars?

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> (*) Did the country start the war or respond to it energetically
> (+)?

> Both wars yes, so I score C for both.

I don't see that at all for WW I. Germany clearly started the
Franco-Prussian war and WW II -- both Bismarck and Hitler secretly
prepared for war well in advance -- but Germany did not start WW I,
nor did it respond energetically. Germany started out with a plan to
defeat France, but it quickly degenerated into a stalemate.

And don't forget the Christmas truce: During the Christmas season of
1914, the German high command shipped thousands of Christmas trees to
the front lines, cutting into its ammunition shipments. This led to a
widely publicized Christmas truce between the British and German
troops, where soldiers and officers on both sides all got together
and sang Christmas carols. Can you imagine that happening in WW II?

However, this criterion still has problems with the word
"energetically." I know what that means, but it's a bit too
subjective. Can you think of a way to capture this quality of
energy?

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> (*) Or was there an exogenous factor pulling the country into the
> war -- a treaty with another country under attack, or an
> unexpected invasion, for example (-)?

> WW I scores a M for this.

This criterion seems to me to be a good one.

It might also be possible to expand it in a negative direction: If
the country went to war, but there was no exogenous factor - no good
reasons - to go to war, then that counts as (+).

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> (*) Was the war top-down (-) or bottom-up (+) -- that is, did the
> energy for the war come from the leaders (-) or from the people
> (+)?

> No way to assess this.

I agree that this can't easily be assessed, but I actually think this
is the heart of the matter. If you look at America's wars -- the
Revolutionary war, the Civil War, WW II -- in all of these cases, the
"greatest generations" went to war energetically. The people
supported the war. This was also true of Afghanistan and even Iraq.

But in the Spanish-American war, WW I, the Korean War, the Vietnam
War, the Gulf War -- in these cases, Americans went to war because
our leaders asked/demanded it.

With regard to Germany, the German people fully supported the FP war
and WW II, but that couldn't have been true for WW I - I point again
to the stalemate and the Christmas truce.

Sometimes you can "read between the lines" in historical situations
to infer that a war came from the leaders rather than from the
people. Here's a description of the Roman civil war in 49 BC:

Originally Posted by Peter N. Stearns

> 49 Negotiations with Caesar broke down, and the senate passed the
> SCU, declaring Caesar a public enemy unless he disbanded his
> army. Caesar initiated CIVIL WAR by leading his army over the
> Rubicon River, the boundary between Cisalpine Gaul and Italy.
> Caesar's swift march forced Pompey and the optimates to abandon
> Italy for Greece, leaving Caesar between Pompeian forces in the
> east and in Spain. Caesar averted the danger with a lightning-fast
> campaign in Spain, defeating Pompey's commanders and securing the
> two provinces.

In this example, it's pretty clear that there's no energy coming from
the people for a civil war, but they're doing what Caesar tells them
to do. This is clearly a mid-cycle civil war.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> (*) Was there a financial crisis that caused enough poverty to
> cause being a soldier to be the only way to feed his family (+)?

> No for both. Score M for both.

I'm still trying to figure out this financial crisis thing. However,
there was a financial crisis for Germany in the 1930s, because of the
depression and reparations, so I think that this is a C for WW II.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> (*) Did the people blame their war opponents for their financial
> crisis (+)?

> No for both. Score M for both

I would say definitely "C" for Germany in WW II. The German people
blamed the French for imposing reparations, blamed America for
hurting Germany with the Smoot-Hawley tariff act, and blamed the
German Jews for the premature capitulation that led to the reparations
and for becoming rich at the people's expense. These factors were
all important not only for the war, but also for the Holocaust.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> (*) Was the antiwar/pacifist movement a major part of the
> political landscape (-), or was it just a footnote to the history
> of the war (+)?

> No for both. Score M for both.

Actually, there was significant popular opposition to the war within
Germany. The German High Command called for a temporary cease-fire on
Oct 4, 1918, expecting the people to rise up and demand victory. But,
writing after the war, Prince Max von Baden of the high command
concluded, "The masses would likely have risen, but not against the
enemy. Instead, they would have attacked the war itself and the
'military oppressors' and 'monarchic aristocrats,' on whose behalf,
in their opinion, it had been waged."

So there was definitely an anti-war feeling in the German population
in WW I.

I actually believe that this criterion is a very important one, but
once again the problem is how to measure it for historical wars.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> (*) Were civilians targeted for attack (+), or did political
> considerations force civilians to be protected (-)?

> Civilians were targeted in both wars, C for both.

I can't agree with this. In the FP war, German forces overran and
occupied France for months, killing tens of thousands of civilians.
The same happened in WW II, and of course civilians were targeted in
the London bombings.

But none of that stuff happened in WW I. Obviously a few civilians
are targeted in any war, but the massive civilian targeting of
civilians in the FP war and WW II doesn't compare to what happened in
WW I.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> (*) Was the war particularly violent, bloody or genocidal (+)?

> Yes for both, C for both.

I would have to agree with you here. I believe that WW I was
exceptionally violent for a mid-cycle war.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> (*) Or was the war a stalemate (even if people got killed) (-)?

> No, both wars ended in defeat for the Germans, C for both.

WW I was clearly stalemated for years, until the Americans entered
the war, so I would definitely count that as an "M".

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> (*) Was the military strategy primarily offensive (+) or defensive
> (-)?

> Offensive for both, C for both.

Yes, I have to agree, although I still think that the criterion is a
good one.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> (*) Did the war result in a major transformation -- major
> governmental changes, major national boundary changes, for
> example(+)?

> Yes for both, C for both.

Well, I would have to disagree on this one. The FP war resulted in
the creation of Germany as a nation, and WW II resulted in the
partitioning of Germany. Losing Alsace and Lorraine were more like
paying reparations than the kinds of boundary changes that occur in
crisis wars -- the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire, the
partitioning of Palestine, Kashmir, Korea and Germany for example.

As for Germany's change of government after WW I, once again there's
a judgment issue, but I consider it quite minor, comparable to
Nixon's resignation, and not a major change like the Russian
Revolution, or the American constitutional changes following the Civil
War.

I realize I'm being very subjective here, but I do believe that this
analysis is the right way to go. In fact, I believe that this is the
major criterion that S&H use to distinguish a crisis war from a
mid-cycle war.

Can you think of any way to make this criterion less subjective?

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> (*) Was the country occupied and controlled by enemy forces (+)?

> After WW I [sic-should be WW II] very much so, less so after WW I
> so I score an M for WW I and a C for WW II.

I agree, and I think this is a good criterion, at least for modern
wars.

However, it may not be a good criterion for imperialist times.
Japan's occupation of Korea was a mid-cycle imperialist war, the
purpose of which was, well, to occupy Korea. I would also assume
that Caesar, the Ottomans, and other empire builders had mid-cycle
wars whose purpose was to add to the empire, so this is probably an
irrelevant criterion.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> (*) Was the war so horrible that the parties were forced into
> unpleasant compromises just to end the war -- compromises that
> created fault lines that led to the next crisis war 80 years later
> (+)?[/list]

> No compromises made with the Germans, so M for both.

Maybe compromise is the wrong word. Germany was forced into
unconditional surrender, and that's a pretty big compromise.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> Toting them up I have 7C and 7 M for WWI and 9C and 4 M for WW II.
> WW II is more "crisis like" for Germany than WW I, but WW I is
> more crisis-like than the Franco-Prussian war.

I believe that with my interpretations, FP and WW II are clearly
crisis wars, and WW I is clearly not.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Virgil,

Originally Posted by Virgil K. Saari

> WWI was not an utter defeat for Germany. It was a qualified defeat
> and ended in an Armistice. That the German Empire collapsed was
> not in total a result of French or Allied Arms. And, France was
> never the same again either after its qualified victory.

Actually, it's even more drastic than that. Germany wasn't even
defeated; it capitulated prematurely, while it was still deep into
French territory. If it had kept on fighting, it could have
inflicted many more casualties. According to Winston Churchill,
writing in 1931, if Germany hadn't capitulated, the Allies would have
backed down and agreed to an armistice with no reparations.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Tim,

Originally Posted by Tim Walker

> Recently there was discussion concerning Malaise, and the idea
> that the Boom Awakening went bust. But instead of a warped
> saeculum, the Awakening was followed by a 90s decade that was
> typical Unraveling.

> Strauss & Howe have determined a modern turning length of
> approximately 20 years. If the Awakening ended with the Nixon
> resignation, that implies that the Awakening ended about a decade
> early. If so, would that imply a sort of blank period until the
> generational constellation triggered the Unraveling?

The 20-year divisions work great when the seculum is precisely 80
years long, but when it's 65 years long or 120 years long, then how
long are the individual divisions? Do the austerity (high),
awakening and unraveling periods shrink or grow proportionately?

Note that if, as I and others believe, the current crisis period
began in 2000 or 2001, then S&H's unraveling period is only 16-17
years long, rather than 20.

Another issue is that there's a wide variation in length of crisis
war. They seem mostly to run from 5 to 15 years, with a 20 year
crisis war appearing to be an exception.

I do believe that there's some sort of event, like Nixon's
resignation, that signals the end of the active awakening period, and
I think that should factor into the question of the boundary between
these periods.

Also, I see the entire mid-cycle period as a continuum: During the
austerity (high) period, society imposes rules for the protection of
society as a whole. As time goes on, these austere rules unravel,
leading to the next crisis war. That unraveling process goes on
continually, and doesn't start suddenly when the awakening period
begins.

Finally, I see two generation types -- the prophets and the heroes --
as being the most clearly defined, and the others -- the artists and
nomads -- as being less clearly defined.

I have to say that when I was first studying S&H, it's problems like
the above that initially made me question the credibility of the
generational theory. The only way I was able to resolve it was by
focusing solely on the hero/prophet generation gap, and leaving the
rest to the side. That's not because I consider the rest to be
unimportant, but only because I couldn't come up with clear
theoretical definitions.

The following are some thoughts about more general definitions of the
mid-cycle periods and generations, to take secular variations into
account. Perhaps we might discuss these, and come up with a better
defined mid-cycle timeline.

(*) The crisis period begins with a financial crisis, or with the
first "surprise" event, and ends with resolution of the crisis war.
This is typically 5-15 years long, but sometimes runs to 20 years.

(*) The hero generation is the one that fought in the crisis war.
The birth years of the hero generation do not necessarily coincide
with the previous unraveling period (see below).

(*) The artist generation is the one that grows up during the crisis
period, but didn't fight in it. They are a risk-aversive generation,
which makes society risk-aversive during the unraveling period leading
up to the next crisis war.

(*) It's worth pointing out here that in the financial crisis /
crisis war model, there may be a division within the artist generation.
This is important in our current situation, because it's the
retirement of the depression artists that led to the stock market
bubble of the 90s, and the retirement of the WW II artists that's
leading to the current crisis war.

(*) The awakening period begins about 17 years after the end of the
crisis war. This is a fairly fixed period, because it's the time
that the prophets begin to reach college age.

(*) The prophets have no memory of the crisis war, but grow up during
the austerity (high) period following the war. The nomads grow up
during the awakening period. The prophets always eventually win the
awakening generational war, since the prophets always outlive the
heroes who imposed the rules. The nomads are sick of all the
bickering.

(*) The awakening period ends with some defining event - an internal
revolution that signals a prophet victory, or a crackdown that
signals a (temporary) hero victory. Like the crisis period, the
awakening period seems to last 5-15 years, though it may run to 20.

(*) So at this point we have a 5-15 year crisis period, a 17 year
austerity (high) period, and a 5-15 year awakening period. That adds
up to 27-47 years out of 80. I would resolve this by extending the
unraveling period backwards. However, it might be better to add
another period, a "post-awakening" period.

(*) However the unraveling period is defined, the next hero
generation starts about 20 years before the beginning of the next
crisis war. That means that we won't know who the next hero
generation is until the war actually starts.

As I said, the above are thoughts for making the generational
definitions more precise. S&H themselves may have some thoughts
about this, though I gather they've gone off and are just doing
generational marketing consulting on millennials these days, and
staying away from crisis war talk.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Dear Mike,
I get different results than you did. Obviously the problem is that the criteria in my list are not clearly enough defined.

I expected that you did, this was my point.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

(*) Did the country plan and prepare for the war in advance (+),
or was the war a surprise that they didn't prepare for (-)?

Plans were made for both wars, although the outbreak of WW I was a surprise for the Germans. So I score CM for WW I and CC for WW II.

I believe you're contradicting yourself here -- if WW I was a surprise for the Germans, then how could they have prepared for it?

Both sides in WW I prepared for the next war by building coalitions. The exact time when war would start was not known, but it was coming. Hence they get a C for being prepared (unlike the Americans in 1812) but also a M for the almost accidental way it began.

I don't see that at all for WW I. Germany clearly started the Franco-Prussian war and WW II -- both Bismarck and Hitler secretly prepared for war well in advance -- but Germany did not start WW I, nor did it respond energetically.

Overrunning Belgium and invading France was not energetic enough? The fact that the German forces got bogged down simply reflects technological developments since the last war. In WW II the Germans took the easy way out, seizing the Suedenland and Czechslovakia without firing a shot and then invading Poland, whose army was no match for the Wehrmacht.

If you look at America's wars -- the Revolutionary war, the Civil War, WW II -- in all of these cases, the "greatest generations" went to war energetically. The people supported the war. This was also true of Afghanistan and even Iraq.

The American people were much more reluctant to get inolved in WW II than WW I. It took a deliberate attack to do it in WW II. I also don't think the Civil War was engaged energetically. The South aimed for stalemate and the North didn't even have a strategy initially. I would not describe Union war efforts for the first three years as energetic.

With regard to Germany, the German people fully supported the FP war and WW II, but that couldn't have been true for WW I - I point again to the stalemate and the Christmas truce.

You already used the Christmas truce and the stalemate as arguments for another point. You are countin twice here. Besides I am not sure what "support" means here.

Sometimes you can "read between the lines" in historical situations to infer that a war came from the leaders rather than from the people. Here's a description of the Roman civil war in 49 BC:

Originally Posted by Peter N. Stearns

> 49 Negotiations with Caesar broke down, and the senate passed the
> SCU, declaring Caesar a public enemy unless he disbanded his
> army. Caesar initiated CIVIL WAR by leading his army over the
> Rubicon River, the boundary between Cisalpine Gaul and Italy.
> Caesar's swift march forced Pompey and the optimates to abandon
> Italy for Greece, leaving Caesar between Pompeian forces in the
> east and in Spain. Caesar averted the danger with a lightning-fast
> campaign in Spain, defeating Pompey's commanders and securing the
> two provinces.

In this example, it's pretty clear that there's no energy coming from the people for a civil war, but they're doing what Caesar tells them to do. This is clearly a mid-cycle civil war.

Its not clear at all to me. Ken Horner, David McGuinness and I all have this as a crisis-type event, not an awakening.

I'm still trying to figure out this financial crisis thing. However, there was a financial crisis for Germany in the 1930s, because of the depression and reparations, so I think that this is a C for WW II.

No, the Depression had ended in Germany due to the economic stimulation provided by Hiter's rearmament program.

I would say definitely "C" for Germany in WW II. The German people blamed the French for imposing reparations, blamed America for hurting Germany with the Smoot-Hawley tariff act, and blamed the German Jews for the premature capitulation that led to the reparations and for becoming rich at the people's expense. These factors were all important not only for the war, but also for the Holocaust.

The reparations issue was big in the 1920's, it no longer was an issue in the 1930's.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Were civilians targeted for attack (+), or did political considerations force civilians to be protected (-)?

Civilians were targeted in both wars, C for both.

I can't agree with this. In the FP war, German forces overran and occupied France for months, killing tens of thousands of civilians. The same happened in WW II, and of course civilians were targeted in the London bombings.

But none of that stuff happened in WW I.

I was thinking of the shelling of Paris by Big Bertha. Germany did overrun Belgium, what wss the impact on the Flemings as compared to the French in the FP war?

I'll get to the rest later.

Dear Mike,

Before I respond to your entire message, I'd like to ask you about
this:

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> Its not clear at all to me. Ken Horner, David McGuinness and I all
> have this as a crisis-type event, not an awakening.

How did you arrive at the conclusion that Rome's 49 BC civil war was
a crisis event? What criteria or logic flow did you use to arrive at
that conclusion?

(To state the obvious, once you answer that question, then I'll start
applying your answer to other wars in other periods in history. It's
not so easy to come up with rules that work for all places and all
times.)

One more question: What's your interpretation of the violent civil
war that ended some 30+ years earlier in the 80s?

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

The continuum of unraveling is a simple concept and therefore accords with Occam's Razor. I would point out that though Awakenings are on this continuum they are also distinctive because they are social moments.

Interesting point about Adaptive waves. Regarding the '90s-I would point out that not only had the early wave Adaptives been retiring, but that many of the young adults were Nomads. They are pragmatists who trust only themselves and money (a comment from Gen X as I recall) and for whom survival is paramount. Therefore, they are inclined towards entrenuership, the stock market, etc... Also, according to Dent's theory there would have been an entrepreneurial boom.

As for when an Awakening starts, there may be a bit of variation. The last Crisis ended in 1945; S & H listed 1964 as the first year of the Awakening.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

How did you arrive at the conclusion that Rome's 49 BC civil war was a crisis event? What criteria or logic flow did you use to arrive at that conclusion?

I cannot answer for Dave or Ken, but I will tell you how I do it. I don't identify Crises directly, I look for social moments and Awakenings. A social moment is an era of generational length that is particularly rich in what I call unrest events compared to adjacent periods. For me, the 49 BC civil war is an unrest event (as are all civil wars, slave uprisings, peasant revolts, labor strikes, riots, insurrections, barbarian raids/invasions, etc.). The period from 49 BC to 27 BC is richer in unrest events than the 25 years before 49 BC or the 25 years after 27 BC. (see my post of 21 Feb).

This makes 49-27 BC the approximate location for a social moment. I also identify Awakenings using a similar analysis using religious and spiritual events. The 49-27 BC period doesn't show up as an Awakening. A social moment that is not an Awakening is, by definition, a Crisis.

I use other indicators, when possible, to help define social moments and Awakenings. For example, before 1850 rising rates of crime and recreational drug use imply a social moment. After 1850 they signify an Awakening. Politically, social moments tend to be liberal eras (after 1787).

This methodology successfully identifies all but one of the S&H Awakenings and all of the the S&H Crises. It dates the 3rd great Awakening later than the 1886-1908 dates S&H give. Since I don't agree with the Civil War anomaly I believe S&H got that Awakening wrong.

It also identifies turnings for three centuries before 1435 that S&H claim don't exist. These turnings so identified match up with Dave McGuiness's turnings. Application of the method identifies the same turnings Ken Horner finds between 115 BC and 200 AD. It also identifies the same social moments over the AD 300-500 period (he and I have our Crises and Awakenings inverted over this period).

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

One more question: What's your interpretation of the violent civil war that ended some 30+ years earlier in the 80s?

An Awakening.

Ken Horner identifies this period as an Awakening. His social moments are consistent with my methods at this time. I lack the data to do a direct Awakening assessment for this period. However the closest Awakening I can do with my methods agrees with Ken's assignment. Since he and I generally agree on social moments and I can confirm his AD 75-95 Awakening, I simply extrapolate with his labels before then. Ken can probably give you his reasoning for why he chose the way he did.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> (*) Did the war result in a major transformation -- major
> governmental changes, major national boundary changes, for
> example(+)?

> Yes for both, C for both.

Well, I would have to disagree on this one. The FP war resulted in the creation of Germany as a nation, and WW II resulted in the partitioning of Germany. Losing Alsace and Lorraine were more like paying reparations than the kinds of boundary changes that occur in crisis wars -- the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire, the partitioning of Palestine, Kashmir, Korea and Germany for example.

WW I saw the collapse of the German, Austrian, Russian and Ottoman monarchies and their replacement by a different form of government. I consider this to be a major governmental change.

As for Germany's change of government after WW I, once again there's a judgment issue, but I consider it quite minor, comparable to Nixon's resignation, and not a major change like the Russian Revolution, or the American constitutional changes following the Civil War.

I don't see how this is minor. I also view it in the larger context of the war. All three of the Central powers saw their monarchies replaced by representative government. This is a HUGE change for Europe. Germany lost West Prussia and Upper Silesia to Poland, North Schleswig to Denmark, Eupen-Malmedy to Belgium, Memel to Lithuania and Alsace-Lorraine to France under the Versailles Treaty. I consider this to be fairly major national boundary changes.

Old Toby wrote:

"In a High, offensive wars are often fought in the name of the hegemonic worldview, and attract much token support but little enthusiasm. Defensive wars tend to get a little more response, but will not inspire much resistence if the war is lost. Civil war in a High is virtually a contradiction in terms, perhaps a counterinsurgency operation against Hero diehards of an old faction, or a secession attempt by a region which has either resolved the crisis differently, or is on a different cycle (which would probably work like an offensive war). Another possibility is a lightning coup within the ruling elite, but this is hardly even a war.

"Offensive Awakening wars tend to fall into two catagories: popular crusades (like the Spanish-American War) and unpopular quagmires (like the war in the Philipines), sometimes they are both (like the Mexican-American war). Either way, they tend to be hotbutton political issues at home. Defensively, Awakening nations are in bad shape, the leadership will come under constant criticism, and many will advocate peace at all costs. If conquered, some groups may hail the conquerers as liberators, while others declare them the Great Satan and set up a resistance movement. Awakening civil wars tend to be bloody affairs with multiple factions. The anti-disciplinarian nature of Prophets makes them naturals for small unit guerilla situations, and they might tend toward independent bands prone to internal conflict and sudden changes of side.

"Unraveling wars tend to have much in common with Awakening ones, both being essentially Prophet driven eras. The key difference is that Unraveling wars are fought by Nomads, who bring a brutal 'survival is everything' mentality to the war, along with a tendency toward disloyalty. Often Unraveling conflicts are inherited from the Awakening, and can continue into the Crisis. In offensive wars, Nomads tend to be efficient, but dirty. When an Unraveling nation is conquered, the Prophets want to form a resistance, but the Nomads are equally likely to collaborate. Unraveling civil wars are often the most brutal, showing a tendency to degenerate into banditry and vendettas.

"Finally, we come to the most dramatic turning of all, the Crisis. Offensive wars are often used to shore up domestic support, and ususally work (at least if they are victorious). Defensive wars are fought hard, and can unite the country, but will ususally stop when the leadership surrenders. Civil wars are fought between several organized armies. In all cases, Crises tend to produce large, organized armies, and usually are fought 'conventionally.'"

From print-out derived from paleo 4T site, Beyond America forum, Identifying Turnings topic, Jan. 30 '99.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Another issue is that there's a wide variation in length of crisis war. They seem mostly to run from 5 to 15 years, with a 20 year crisis war appearing to be an exception.

Crisis wars are your own concept, they are not part of S&H's saeculum. The saeculum is sort of a social or cultural cycle, not a purely political cycle like Toynbee's hundred year cycle of war and peace or your own 80 year cycle of crisis wars.

You can talk of how the S&H cycle is related or aligned with yours, but it isn't accurate to equate the two. For example, in my discussion of the War Cycle I introduce what I call the "national will cycle", which is really the saeculum, I simply plot it as a sinusoid with maximum value in the midpoint of the High and minimum value in the midpoint of the unraveling. I use this construct to compare the War Cycle with the saeculum.

(*) The crisis period begins with a financial crisis, or with the
first "surprise" event, and ends with resolution of the crisis war.
This is typically 5-15 years long, but sometimes runs to 20 years.

(*) The hero generation is the one that fought in the crisis war.
The birth years of the hero generation do not necessarily coincide
with the previous unraveling period (see below).

(*) The artist generation is the one that grows up during the crisis
period, but didn't fight in it. They are a risk-aversive generation,
which makes society risk-aversive during the unraveling period leading
up to the next crisis war.

(*) It's worth pointing out here that in the financial crisis /
crisis war model, there may be a division within the artist generation.
This is important in our current situation, because it's the
retirement of the depression artists that led to the stock market
bubble of the 90s, and the retirement of the WW II artists that's
leading to the current crisis war.

(*) The awakening period begins about 17 years after the end of the
crisis war. This is a fairly fixed period, because it's the time
that the prophets begin to reach college age.

(*) The prophets have no memory of the crisis war, but grow up during
the austerity (high) period following the war. The nomads grow up
during the awakening period. The prophets always eventually win the
awakening generational war, since the prophets always outlive the
heroes who imposed the rules. The nomads are sick of all the
bickering.

(*) The awakening period ends with some defining event - an internal
revolution that signals a prophet victory, or a crackdown that
signals a (temporary) hero victory. Like the crisis period, the
awakening period seems to last 5-15 years, though it may run to 20.

(*) So at this point we have a 5-15 year crisis period, a 17 year
austerity (high) period, and a 5-15 year awakening period. That adds
up to 27-47 years out of 80. I would resolve this by extending the
unraveling period backwards. However, it might be better to add
another period, a "post-awakening" period.

(*) However the unraveling period is defined, the next hero
generation starts about 20 years before the beginning of the next
crisis war. That means that we won't know who the next hero
generation is until the war actually starts.

As I said, the above are thoughts for making the generational definitions more precise. S&H themselves may have some thoughts about this, though I gather they've gone off and are just doing generational marketing consulting on millennials these days, and staying away from crisis war talk.

This is very interesting, but you should not think that you are describing the same cycle as described by S&H, even though you use the same terminology.

Your cycle is structurally similar to Toynbee's cycle of alternating periods of "general war" and "supplementary war". You add in the S&H structure as an overlay (something that was not avaialbe to Toynbee). Thus you equate the idea of a crisis turning with a general war and an awakening turning with a supplementary war. You also weave economics into the mix with the idea of financial crises playing some role.

A major financial crisis often follows about 7-10 years after a major war: e.g. War of Spanish Succession ends in 1713 and the South Sea bubble collpases in 1720; the Seven Years War ends in 1763 and is followed by a crisis in 1772; the War of 1812 ends in 1814 and is followed by the Panic of 1819, the American Civil War ends in 1865 and is followed by the Panic of 1873, WW I ends in 1918 and is followed by the Crash of 1929. These crises are sometimes called the "fall from plateau" event in the Kondratiev cycle.

Another class (in Kondratiev terminology) of financial crises occurs near the end of a long deflationary era (a Kondratiev downwave) and ushers in a depression that puts in the bottom in prices (the Kondratiev trough). Examples include the Panic of 1837 in the US and the British Railway bubble in 1847, which precede Kondratiev toughs in 1843 (US) and 1849 (UK); and the Panic of 1893 leading to the Kondratiev trough in 1896.

A third class (once again in Kondratiev terminology) of crises are mid-upwave corrections. Enjolras (a sporadic poster here with his own financial cycle ideas) features these and is of the opinion that the Internet bubble crash is one of them. The Panics of 1857 & 1907 and the 1973-74 meltdown would be examples of these. Enjolras and I disagree on this last one, he uses the 1958-1962 corrective period as his third example.

Then there are just sporadic crises like the Gold Room panic (1869), Panic of 1884, Crash of 1987 etc.

Unforetunately, the Xenakis Crisis wars and the Strauss & Howe Crisis wars bear a remarkable resemblance in both timing and ruthlessness.

Originally Posted by Tim Walker

Unfortunately, the Xenakis Crisis wars and the Strauss & Howe Crisis wars bear a remarkable resemblance in both timing and ruthlessness.

In the Xenakis scheme, warfare plays a central role in defining the Crisis period. In S&H's scheme a Crisis war is simply a war that happens to take place during a secular crisis. There doesn't HAVE to be a war during the secular crisis. Indeed, the Glorious Revolution secular crisis (1675-1692) did not prominently feature a major war. The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713), which is a Crisis War in the Xenakis scheme, occurred well outside of the Glorious Revolution secular crisis and long after the "main event" in 1688.

Dear Mike,

The first thing to note is that there's nothing preventing your
methodology and mine from being merged, since we look at different
elements.

Coming up with a set of clearly defined criteria for identifying
turnings / seculae / crisis wars / awakenings would be of benefit to
all of us, including Strauss and Howe, because it would add
credibility to the generational paradigm as a whole. Historians
generally accept some sort of 40 year historical cycle, but are
shocked and surprised at the idea of alternating awakenings with
crises. If we can clearly define the criteria, and show that they
provide consistent believable results for a reasonably large
collection of historical places and times, then it would benefit all
of us.

So if we can combine useful parts of your methodology and mine and
other's, and test the results, then we might have something useful
and valuable for all of us. However, since our methodologies sometimes
produce different results, then the differences have to be resolved.

Your criticisms have exposed some problems in the crisis war criteria
that I've developed. A couple of things have to be changed (such as
the role of "preparation"), a couple of things have to be clarified
(such as the meaning of "energy"), but basically I think they
identify the right things, as I'll discuss when I come to the item by
item response to your previous postings.

But now, since you've posted some of your own criteria, I think it's
safe to say that "the worm has turned," since now I can examine
whether your criteria apply to historical places and times.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> I don't identify Crises directly, I look for social moments and
> Awakenings. A social moment is an era of generational length that
> is particularly rich in what I call unrest events compared to
> adjacent periods. For me the 49 BC civil war is an unrest event
> (as are all civil wars, slave uprsings, peasant revolts, labor
> strikes, riots, insurrections, barbarian raids or invasions,
> etc.). The period from 49 BC to 27 BC is richer in unrest events
> that the 25 years before 49 BC or the 25 years after 27 BC. (see
> my post of 21 Feb).

The first problem is that using this paragraph I'm unable to
distinguish between WW I and WW II for America. There was 23 years
(1918-1941) separating them, which is a generational length period
separating them. I actually don't know which of your unrest events
applies to either of them - invasions, I suppose. So how does your
methodology distinguish between WW I and WW II?

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> This makes it a social moment. I also identify Awakeings using a
> similar analysis using religious and spiritual events. The 49-27
> BC period doesn't show up as an Awakening. A social moment that is
> not an Awakening is, by definition, a Crisis.

If you're going to use religious and spiritual events to identify
awakenings, then there are other issues to be addressed. Using these
criteria, I'm unable to distinguish between the Civil War and WW I
(or WW II, for that matter). All of these wars, from the American
point of view, were fights against evil. All of America's wars,
whether mid-cycle or crisis, are steeped in religious language.
Indeed, the original Declaration of Independence justified the
Revolutionary War on religion: "That [men] are endowed by their
creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these rights are
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." So religion plays a part
in all American wars. So how does your methodology use religion to
distinguish between awakening wars and crisis wars?

I would be very interested in seeing how you use religion and
spirituality to provide clear turning identifications. How do you
handle religious empire-building periods, like the Catholic crusades
or the Muslim conquests? Or what about the Taiping Rebellion, whose
roots were very clearly religious and spiritual? Religion and
spirituality were the defining features of all events in these periods
-- crisis wars, mid-cycle wars and awakenings. What are your criteria
for deciding how to apply religious and spiritual events?

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> I use other indicators, when possible, to help define social
> moments and Awakenings. For example, before 1850 rising rates of
> crime and recreational drug use imply a social moment. After 1850
> they signify an Awakening. Politically, social moments tend to be
> liberal eras (after 1787).

I don't understand what you're saying here about crime rates and drug
use. Could you clarify it?

S&H mention criteria like this, especially the mysterious "protection
of children" criterion. Do you have any clear definitions of how
things like these can be applied?

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> It also identifies the same social moments over the AD 300-500
> period (he and I have our Crises and Awakenings inverted over this
> period).

This sounds interesting because it appears to go to the heart of what
we're discussing here. What was the nature of the disagreement?

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> The period from 49 BC to 27 BC is richer in unrest events that
> the 25 years before 49 BC or the 25 years after 27 BC. (see my
> post of 21 Feb). ... Since he and I generally agree on social
> moments and I can confirm his AD 75-95 Awakening,

There were civil wars in Rome in the 80s and 40s BC. I think we both
agree that one of them must be a crisis period war and one of them is
not -- presumably an awakening period war.

For me, the crucial factor is where the energy for the wars comes
from. Now, I will concede that I've made my assessment based on just
three or four paragraphs from one source, and that my experience is
that I really need to examine two or three sources to get what I
need, so I should probably plan on a trip to the bookstore to do a
little more research.

However, let's take a look at what Stearns says:

Originally Posted by Peter N. Stearns

> 91-87 THE SOCIAL WAR (War of the Allies). Italian allied states
> formed their own republic, Italia, and declared war on Rome.
> Latin communities, together with Etruscans and Umbrians, remained
> loyal.

> 90 The lex Iulia extended Roman citizenship to all Italians, thus
> undermining Italian solidarity. The new citizens, however, were
> enrolled in only eight tribes, severely limiting their voting
> power.

> 89-88 Roman victories effectively ended the war, though it
> dragged into 87. Before it was over, 50,000 had died on each side
> and Italy was devastated.

First, why would you even think that this is awakening? I guess
because it had to do with extended voting rights. But that's like
saying that the American Civil War was an awakening event because it
had to do with ending slavery.

Stearns' text portrays a great deal of genocidal energy. If it were
an awakening war, there would have been a period of negotiation and a
gradual buildup, but these guys formed a new republic, and then
declared war that killed hundreds of thousands of people and
devastated Italy.

Unless I read something in other sources that contradicts Stearns,
then there is no way that this can possibly be an awakening
war. This is unambiguously a crisis war.

Now, repeating what Stearns says about the 40s:

Originally Posted by Peter N. Stearns

> 49 Negotiations with Caesar broke down, and the senate passed the
> SCU, declaring Caesar a public enemy unless he disbanded his
> army. Caesar initiated CIVIL WAR by leading his army over the
> Rubicon River, the boundary between Cisalpine Gaul and Italy.
> Caesar's swift march forced Pompey and the optimates to abandon
> Italy for Greece, leaving Caesar between Pompeian forces in the
> east and in Spain. Caesar averted the danger with a lightning-fast
> campaign in Spain, defeating Pompey's commanders and securing the
> two provinces.

Once again, I have very limited information, but this clearly says,
"Caesar initiated CIVIL WAR" by crossing the Rubicon. There's no
hint here of genocidal energy; there's just a quick war to benefit
the politicians. Without more information from other sources, this
is clearly NOT a crisis war, but is a political war.

Now, I'm willing to be dissuaded by further research, which I will
do, but I make note of the fact that the criteria you presented, as I
understand them, don't clearly distinguish between WW I and WW II for
me, so I need more information from you as well before I can be
convinced to change my analysis.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> (From http://csf.colorado.edu/authors/Alex.../Framework.htm
> ) In this webpage I attempt to construct an oscillator for the
> saeculum as I have already done for the Kondratiev cycle, using
> detrended prices. The first goal is to develop a religious
> oscillator which we can use to identify potential spiritual
> awakening candidates. I can think of two approaches to this. One
> approach is to look for clusters of births of "spiritual people".
> Such clusters presumably would be prophet generations. As examples
> of spiritual people I chose the founders of religious groups and
> saints. I found birth dates for 130 saints from the year 1002 to
> 1916. I also found birthdates for 69 founders of religious groups
> from the year 1483 to 1957. Together this gives 199 birthdates. I
> then summed the numbers of birthdates that fell within consecutive
> 26 year periods, smoothed the result with a moving average and
> plotted this smoothed value versus the end of the period. The
> results are shown in Figure 1.

This is a remarkable piece of analysis and discovery, but I just don't
see how you can go so quickly to your conclusion. One concern has to
do with regionalization. What was the regional distribution of these
births? If they were uniform throughout Europe, could there be some
other explanation - such as an oscillation within the Catholic
Church, rather than the general populace? Do your spiritual people
include Muslims, Greek Orthodox, Russian Orthodox, Jews, Hindus,
Buddhists, Confucians, and if so, what was the contribution of each
religion?

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Mike,

I'll now go back and respond to some of the other issues you raised
with respect to my criteria for crisis wars. Along the way, this
will give me an opportunity to sharpen and clarify my criteria.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> Both sides in WW I prepared for the next war by building
> coalitions. The exact time when war would start was not known, but
> it was coming. Hence they get a C for being prepared (unlike the
> Americans in 1812) but also a M for the almost accidental way it
> began.

Well, this kind of preparation goes on all the time. Many times in
mid-cycle periods, some preparation goes on as a strategy to
discourage another side from taking hostile acts. How many times did
America do something between 1945=2000 - like redeploy forces, or
conduct military exercises or issue an ultimatum - to force someone
to back down.

What I need to do is clarify what I mean by "advance preparation,"
because not all kinds of preparation are important.

It seems to me that preparation conducted in secrecy is usually a
factor. I'm thinking of the secret German military buildup in the
1930s, for example. On the other hand, slow, careful, open
preparations are usually done as a deterrent to prevent war.

I remember England's almost cartoon-like response when Argentina
invaded the Falklands (Malvinas) islands in the early 1980s. England
took its time gathering together a seemingly motley collection of
ocean liners, freighters, and other vessels, took its time to put
together a military force, and transport it carefully down to the
Falklands. All of this had the purpose, according to commentators at
the time, of trying to give Argentina a chance to change its mind.

So this criterion should be changed to:

(*) For attacking countries, how did the country mobilze for war?
Did the country mobilize for war deceptively and in secret, in order
to maximize the effectiveness of the surprise attack(+)? Or was the
war mobilization done openly and deliberately, with the intent to
discourage the opponent's hostile activities (-)?

(*) For countries under attack: Did the entire country -- all
military, business, educational, and governmental organizations at
all levels -- mobilize for war as quickly as possible (+)? Or did
the country get caught by surprise and stumble and mobilize slowly
(-)?

As my mind runs through some of the major wars -- 9/11 attack, Afghan
war, Iraq War, Gulf War, Vietnam, WW II, WW I -- it seems to work.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> Overrunning Belgium and invading France was not energetic enough?
> The fact that the German forces got bogged down simply reflects
> technological developments since the last war. In WW II the
> Germans took the easy way out, seizing the Suedenland and
> Czechslovakia without firing a shot and then invading Poland,
> whose army was no match for the Wehrmacht.

If two weeks of overrunning Belgium and entering France were the kind
of energy I was talking about, then the Boston Marathon would be a
crisis war.

When I talk about "energy," I'm not talking about a cross-country
jog. I'm talking about genocidal energy, bloodthirsty revenge, a
willingness or even desire to see one's enemy torn limb from limb,
massacred, raped, destroyed. On Saturday morning (6/5), I was
watching some of the D-Day remembrances, and one of them on CNN was
how the Nazis overran the town of Oradour-sur-Glane and gratuitously
killed everyone, including all the women and children. That's the
kind of energy I'm talking about. Or the allies' intensive
firebombing of Dresden to destroy the city and its inhabitants, or
nuking cities in Japan.

The reason I say "two weeks of overrunning Belgium and entering
France" is because that's all it took for the German high command to
shift fully 1/4 of its forces away from the Western front. If
Germany had maintained all those forces in the west, used them to
destroy one French town after another, and then encircle and destroy
Paris, then THAT would have been a crisis war. But that's nothing
like what happened.

You say, "In WW II the Germans took the easy way out," and I have to
laugh at the concept of Hitler taking the easy way out, but at any
rate that's part of the point related to what I said above about the
deception and secrecy in preparing for war making it a crisis war.
Germans took the "easy way out," seizing the Suedenland and
Czechslovakia without firing a shot, because that way they could hide
their true intentions and mobilize for war in secrecy, deceiving
their enemies.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> The American people were much more reluctant to get inolved in WW
> II than WW I. It took a deliberate attack to do it in WW II. I
> also don't think the Civil War was engaged energetically. The
> South aimed for stalemate and the North didn't even have a
> strategy initially. I would not describe Union war efforts for the
> first three years as energetic.

I really don't understand where you're going with this. The Germans
sank the Lusitania, killing hundreds of Americans. This infuriated
America, but America remained officially neutral, and continued to do
business with both sides. WWI was much like the Vietnam war for
America. Both WWI and the Vietnam War caused very deep political
divisions within America, divisions which continue to this day. Last
year I was speaking to a friend who was born around 1930 and fought
in WW II. He was still furious, to this day, that President Wilson
ever got us involved in WW I at all. He believes that if America had
stayed out of WW I, then WW II would never have happened (though of
course that belief really makes no sense). But his comments show how
deeply divided Americans were and still are over WWI, just as they
were over Vietnam. But if there's anyone around today who thinks we
made a mistake getting involved in WW II, I have yet to meet him.

The bloodiest war in American history was not energetic enough for
you? Undoubtedly many hoped in the early days that the Civil War
could be resolved peacefully. Who knows? Maybe it's even arguable
that the Civil War had some mid-cycle aspects to it at the beginning.
At any rate, by the time of Gettysburg and Sherman's march, the
genocidal energy was pretty high.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> You already used the Christmas truce and the stalemate as
> arguments for another point. You are countin twice here. Besides I
> am not sure what "support" means here.

I'm not allowed to use the same argument twice? In that case I might
as well just pull the plug, because I don't have an unending supply
of new, different arguments.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> No, the Depression had ended in Germany due to the economic
> stimulation provided by Hiter's rearmament program.

The financial crisis in Germany was in the early 1930s, because of
the Depression and protectionism, but was blamed on France, England,
America and the Jews, This fueled the genocidal energy that led to
both WW II and the holocaust.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> The reparations issue was big in the 1920's, it no longer was an
> issue in the 1930's.

Hah! Reparations was a boiling issue until they were lifted in 1932.
They weren't lifted until 1932 because France did everything it could
to prevent them from being lifted, and deeply humiliated Germany in
the process. There's no way that reparations was no longer an issue.
This is the stuff of crisis wars.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Tim,

Originally Posted by Tim Walker

> As for when an Awakening starts, there may be a bit of variation.
> The last Crisis ended in 1945; S & H listed 1964 as the first year
> of the Awakening.

My feeling is that the awakening was well under way before then.

Civil rights protests began in the late 1950s, by 1963 there were
already massive civil rights protests and demonstrations, and those
have to be counted as awakening events.

This is what I mean about the mid-cycle being a continuum. You can't
really say that the 1950s were part of the awakening, but there were
a few awakening events. The number of awakening events increased
each year, reaching a climax in the late 60s and early 70s. Once
Nixon resigned, they dropped off.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Mike,

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> WW I saw the collapse of the German, Austrian, Russian and
> Ottoman monarchies and their replacement by a different form of
> government. I consider this to be a major governmental change.

Once again, I have to wonder where you're going with this. You know
every well -- or at least I've said it a million times in this forum
-- that WW I was an East European crisis war, one of a series of
secular crisis wars between Orthodox Christianity and Islam launched
by the Fall of Constantinople in 1453. So of course there were major
changes in Eastern Europe.

In preparing for this posting, I reread some sections of A History
of Modern Germany 1840-1945 by Hajo Holborn. What I love about
this book is that it's completely German-centric, which I love,
because I can read about what the Germans were thinking and
doing, rather than what the Americans were telling each other
what the Germans were thinking and doing.

So last night I scanned in Holborn's map of World War I. Here it is:




(Click on the above image to get a full-sized image.)

When you look at this map, you get an idea of the German view
of World War I -- that there was a little bulge of activity east of
Germany, but vast empires of activity east and southeast of Germany.
And that's the way you have to think of WW I for it to make any
sense. WW I was a East European war, not a West European war.

As for Germany itself, when you read the account of how Germany
pursued the war, it's almost a comedy of errors. There was constant
vacillation. First they were going to encircle Paris, but then they
moved forces from the east to the western front, so they stalemated
in France. Then in the west they fought well, but they didn't bother
to fully coordinate with their Austrian allies -- and you can be sure
when individual egos are placed above national survival, not just
once but over and over, then you're not talking about a crisis war.
And finally, there was the premature capitulation -- something that
neither Bismarck nor Hitler would ever have tolerated.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Tim,

I find this material very interesting, but in the spirit that Mike
and I are using of testing things, some of this material would need
further justification.

Originally Posted by Old Toby

> "In a High, offensive wars are often fought in the name of the
> hegemonic worldview, and attract much token support but little
> enthusiasm. Defensive wars tend to get a little more response, but
> will not inspire much resistence if the war is lost. Civil war in
> a High is virtually a contradiction in terms, perhaps a
> counterinsurgency operation against Hero diehards of an old
> faction, or a secession attempt by a region which has either
> resolved the crisis differently, or is on a different cycle (which
> would probably work like an offensive war). Another possibility is
> a lightning coup within the ruling elite, but this is hardly even
> a war.

I agree with this spirit of this, but I look at it a little
differently.

During the High period (what I call the "austerity" period), the
nation has just gone through a bloody, violent, genocidal war that
may have killed 1-10% or more of their population. The entire
population is traumatized by the war (think of 9/11 trauma times a
thousand), and they're trying to put their lives back together. One
thing they know for sure: They don't ever want another war like the
last one, and they're willing to do anything reasonable to avoid. So
if there's an austerity-period war, it could only happen because of
some overwhelming appeal to national unity and necessity.

Originally Posted by Old Toby

> "Offensive Awakening wars tend to fall into two catagories:
> popular crusades (like the Spanish-American War) and unpopular
> quagmires (like the war in the Philipines), sometimes they are
> both (like the Mexican-American war). Either way, they tend to be
> hotbutton political issues at home. Defensively, Awakening nations
> are in bad shape, the leadership will come under constant
> criticism, and many will advocate peace at all costs. If
> conquered, some groups may hail the conquerers as liberators,
> while others declare them the Great Satan and set up a resistance
> movement. Awakening civil wars tend to be bloody affairs with
> multiple factions. The anti-disciplinarian nature of Prophets
> makes them naturals for small unit guerilla situations, and they
> might tend toward independent bands prone to internal conflict and
> sudden changes of side.

> "Unraveling wars tend to have much in common with Awakening ones,
> both being essentially Prophet driven eras. The key difference is
> that Unraveling wars are fought by Nomads, who bring a brutal
> 'survival is everything' mentality to the war, along with a
> tendency toward disloyalty. Often Unraveling conflicts are
> inherited from the Awakening, and can continue into the Crisis. In
> offensive wars, Nomads tend to be efficient, but dirty. When an
> Unraveling nation is conquered, the Prophets want to form a
> resistance, but the Nomads are equally likely to collaborate.
> Unraveling civil wars are often the most brutal, showing a
> tendency to degenerate into banditry and vendettas.

Here I get the feeling that the writer is being too America-centric
(pretty obviously, since all his examples are American wars, and he
refers to the "Great Satan.") Wars in this period tend to be
politically wrenching, divisive and indecisive. I can't imagine why
he characterized awakening civil wars as "bloody affairs with
multiple factions." I know of no example of that. Bloody civil
wars are always crisis wars, as far as I know.

Originally Posted by Old Toby

> "Finally, we come to the most dramatic turning of all, the Crisis.
> Offensive wars are often used to shore up domestic support, and
> ususally work (at least if they are victorious). Defensive wars
> are fought hard, and can unite the country, but will ususally stop
> when the leadership surrenders. Civil wars are fought between
> several organized armies. In all cases, Crises tend to produce
> large, organized armies, and usually are fought
> 'conventionally.'"

> From print-out derived from paleo 4T site, Beyond America forum,
> Identifying Turnings topic, Jan. 30 '99.

It's hard to see where this is coming from. Almost all wars are
fought "conventionally." And what does "will usually stop when the
leadership surrenders" mean???

With regard to the last point, I have to quote an extremely dramatic
passage in Tolstoy's War and Peace, where it describes
Napoleon's invasion of Russia as a ball of invasion whose momentum
could not have been stopped, even if Napoleon had wanted it to stop:

Originally Posted by Leo Tolstoy in War and Peace

> The forces of a dozen European nations burst into Russia. The
> Russian army and people avoided a collision till Smolensk was
> reached, and again from Smolensk to Borodino. The French army
> pushed on to Moscow, its goal and its impetus ever increasing as
> it neared its aim, just as the velocity of a falling body
> increases as it approaches the earth. Behind it were seven hundred
> miles of hunger-stricken, hostile country; ahead were a few dozen
> miles separating it from its goal. Every soldier in Napoleon's
> army felt this and the invasion moved on by its own momentum.

> The more the Russian army retreated the more fiercely a spirit of
> hatred of the enemy flared up, and while it retreated the army
> increased and consolidated. At Borodino, a collision took place.
> Neither army was broken up, but the Russian army retreated
> immediately after the collision as inevitably as a ball recoils
> after colliding with another having a greater momentum, and with
> equal inevitability the ball of invasion that had advanced with
> such momentum rolled on for some distance, though the collision
> had deprived it of all its force.

> It was impossible to give battle before information had been
> collected, the wounded gathered in, the supplies of ammunition
> replenished, the slain reckoned up, new officers appointed to
> replace those who had been killed, and before the men had had food
> and sleep. And meanwhile, the very next morning after the battle,
> the French army advanced of itself upon the Russians, carried
> forward by the force of its own momentum now seemingly increased
> in inverse proportion to the square of the distance from its aim.
> [Russian General] Kutuzov's wish was to attack next day, and the
> whole army desired to do so. But to make an attack the wish to do
> so is not sufficient, there must also be a possibility of doing
> it, and that possibility did not exist. It was impossible not to
> retreat a day's march, and then in the same way it was impossible
> not to retreat another and a third day's march, and at last, on
> the first of September when the army drew near Moscow - despite
> the strength of the feeling that had arisen in all ranks - the
> force of circumstances compelled it to retire beyond Moscow. And
> the troops retired one more, last, day's march, and abandoned
> Moscow to the enemy. ...

> Many historians say that the French did not win the battle of
> Borodino because Napoleon had a cold, and that if he had not had
> a cold the orders he gave before and during the battle would have
> been still more full of genius and Russia would have been lost and
> the face of the world have been changed. To historians who believe
> that Russia was shaped by the will of one man - Peter the Great -
> and that France from a republic became an empire and French armies
> went to Russia at the will of one man - Napoleon - to say that
> Russia remained a power because Napoleon had a bad cold on the
> twenty-fourth of August may seem logical and convincing.

> If it had depended on Napoleon's will to fight or not to fight
> the battle of Borodino, and if this or that other arrangement
> depended on his will, then evidently a cold affecting the
> manifestation of his will might have saved Russia, and
> consequently the valet who omitted to bring Napoleon his
> waterproof boots on the twenty-fourth would have been the savior
> of Russia. Along that line of thought such a deduction is
> indubitable, as indubitable as the deduction Voltaire made in jest
> (without knowing what he was jesting at) when he saw that the
> Massacre of St. Bartholomew was due to Charles IX's stomach being
> deranged. But to men who do not admit that Russia was formed by
> the will of one man, Peter I, or that the French Empire was formed
> and the war with Russia begun by the will of one man, Napoleon,
> that argument seems not merely untrue and irrational, but contrary
> to all human reality. To the question of what causes historic
> events another answer presents itself, namely, that the course of
> human events is predetermined from on high - depends on the
> coincidence of the wills of all who take part in the events, and
> that a Napoleon's influence on the course of these events is
> purely external and fictitious.

> Strange as at first glance it may seem to suppose that the
> Massacre of St. Bartholomew was not due to Charles IX's will,
> though he gave the order for it and thought it was done as a
> result of that order; and strange as it may seem to suppose that
> the slaughter of eighty thousand men at Borodino was not due to
> Napoleon's will, though he ordered the commencement and conduct of
> the battle and thought it was done because he ordered it; strange
> as these suppositions appear, yet human dignity - which tells me
> that each of us is, if not more at least not less a man than the
> great Napoleon - demands the acceptance of that solution of the
> question, and historic investigation abundantly confirms it.

> At the battle of Borodino, Napoleon shot at no one and killed no
> one. That was all done by the soldiers. Therefore, it was not he
> who killed people.

> The French soldiers went to kill and be killed at the battle of
> Borodino, not because of Napoleon's orders but by their own
> volition. The whole army - French, Italian, German, Polish, and
> Dutch - hungry, ragged, and weary of the campaign, felt at the
> sight of an army blocking their road to Moscow that the wine was
> drawn and must be drunk. Had Napoleon then forbidden them to fight
> the Russians, they would have killed him and have proceeded to
> fight the Russians because it was inevitable.

> When they heard Napoleon's proclamation offering them, as
> compensation for mutilation and death, the words of posterity
> about their having been in the battle before Moscow, they cried
> "Vive l'Empereur!" just as they had cried "Vive
> l'Empereur!" at the sight of the portrait of the boy piercing
> the terrestrial globe with a toy stick, and just as they would
> have cried "Vive l'Empereur!" at any nonsense that might be
> told them. There was nothing left for them to do but cry "Vive
> l'Empereur!" and go to fight, in order to get food and rest as
> conquerors in Moscow. So it was not because of Napoleon's commands
> that they killed their fellow men.

> And it was not Napoleon who directed the course of the battle,
> for none of his orders was executed and during the battle, he did
> not know what was going on before him. So the way in which these
> people killed one another was not decided by Napoleon's will but
> occurred independently of him, in accord with the will of hundreds
> of thousands of people who took part in the common action. It
> only seemed to Napoleon that it all took place by his will. And so
> the question whether he had or had not a cold has no more
> historic interest than the cold of the least of the transport
> soldiers.

As Tolstoy so vividly portrays, there's a huge amount of energy
propelling a crisis war, and that's the big difference between crisis
and mid-cycle wars.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com