Doonesbury
Did everyone see today's Doonesbury? It says that people my age are
invisible, "unless you're holding a gun or a pizza or something." I
think he's got it exactly right.
http://www.doonesbury.com/strip/dail..._date=20040607
Re: Doonesbury
I take it the father is a mid-to-late wave Boomer and the kid is an early wave Millenial?Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis
Americans have had enough of glitz and roar . . Foreboding has deepened, and spiritual currents have darkened . . .
THE FOURTH TURNING IS AT HAND.
See T4T, p. 253.
Re: Doonesbury
The kid (Jeffrey) was born in late 1982, right before Garry Trudeau went on sabbatical. So that would indeed make him an early wave Millie.I take it the father is a mid-to-late wave Boomer and the kid is an early wave Millenial?
The father (Rick) was born in 1948 (he turned 40 in 1988), making him an early- to mid-wave Boomer.
"My generation, we were the generation that was going to change the world: somehow we were going to make it a little less lonely, a little less hungry, a little more just place. But it seems that when that promise slipped through our hands we didn´t replace it with nothing but lost faith."
Bruce Springsteen, 1987
http://brucebase.wikispaces.com/1987...+YORK+CITY,+NY
Re: Objections to Generational Dynamics
You didn't say why The War of Spanish Succession was a crisis war for the West.
This is my point. It is obvious that you did not consider all the wars back then, because you are unaware of many of them. This means that you could not have used your list of criteria to rule out non-crisis wars.I'm not trying to belittle these wars, Mike, I'm just trying to
figure out what's going on, and why these wars are so important when
they're not in any of the sources I've checked.
I'm just trying to put these wars in perspective, Mike, and figure
out how to deal with them.
The casualty figures that you've listed are quite high, and if there
were any justice in the world, then these wars should be
super-important. But they're so unimportant, no one seems to care
much about them.
Instead, it seems that for most of the early wars, the criterion for a crisis wars is NOT the list of questions you supplied at all, but rather whether or not general hisotries have much to say about the war. You tacitly assume that if nobody writes about a war today, then it can't be a crisis war. But then you should put this in your definition of crisis war.
You could say that a crisis war is characterized by the following:
1. The war is considered to be important enough to be included in general histories of the period. You would then follow up with minimum requirments for what consitutes inclusion.
and the other criteria would follow...
But you have not included anything like point 1 in your discussion, yet you were (unconsciously) employing it.
Re: Objections to Generational Dynamics
Why does it matter what we in the future think? Shouldn't what matter is the opinion of those on the spot? Humans care plenty about the deaths of loved ones. Wars with lots of casualties do impact a lot of people simply because a lot of people know those who were killed.
The wars I mentioned didn't end the contest between the French and Spanish crowns, it went on for another century, so they aren't important from the point of view of modern eyes, regardless of the number of casualties. The wars were followed by peace between Spain and France so they were significant in the geopolitics of the day.
Now I agree with you that the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre was a crisis event. However I have it near the beginning of a crisis rather than at the end as you do. The Wars of Religion in France ran from 1562 to 1598, so they completely envelop the S&H Armada crisis turing. It was a full-scale civil war:
Re: Objections to Generational Dynamics
I gave a lengthy explanation yesterday. See message
http://fourthturning.com/forums/view...ghlight=#97891
I could say the same thing of you. The only reason you know of those
1530s wars is because Charles V publicized them. How many regional
wars occurred where there's absolutely no record of them? Then those
wars wouldn't be included in your casualties tallies.
Maybe Charles V exaggerated the casualties, sort of as a "my war was
bigger than your war" kind of braggadocio. Of maybe there wasn't
enough food at that time, so he wanted to kill off as many people as
he could in war so he wouldn't have to feed them, and that's why
there was a bump in the stats at that time.
Actually there is a question about your stats that needs to be
answered: Why did you have to change the scale factor by 10 in the
20th century? I would expect the number of casualties per capita to
be fairly constant across the centuries, and yet your figures take an
order of magnitude jump in the 1900s. How could that possibly be?
One possible reason is that it's only in the 1900s that we've been
keeping accurate records of births and deaths, and so we know the
actual number of casualties, where we didn't before. If this is
true, then it means that your graph misses some 90% of the casualties
prior to 1900, which would mean that the cycles couldn't really be
trusted.
As for Generational Dynamics, I have absolutely no problem whatsoever
adding the criterion you suggest: The war is considered to be
important enough to be included in general histories of the period.
This is clearly true, and it's clearly part of the generational
paradigm.
In my experience the crisis periods ends with some major
earth-shaking event, something that's remembered by history - a
massacre, a surrender, etc. Sometimes minor wars occur after that,
but they aren't part of the crisis period. For example, the Korean
War is not part of the World War II crisis.
In The Fourth Turning, pages 258-59, Strauss and Howe describe
what happens in a crisis:
I agree with this characterization, and this means that a crisis war
has to be, as you say, important enough to be included in general
histories of the period.
In fact, I've been thinking about this this evening, and it occurs to
me that the converse of this is also true: If a war is important
enough to be included in the general histories of the period, then it
must be a crisis war.
The reason I think this might be true is because I can't think of any
major (i.e., important) war that I've ever looked at that hasn't been
a crisis war.
In other words:
Hypothesis #1: A war is a crisis war if and only if the
war is important enough to be included in general histories of the
period.
I can think about some issues:
It would be nice to be able to replace that entire list of crisis war
criteria with this single rule, but we'd still need the criteria to
determine who it's a crisis war for.
The Korean war seems to be a problem, because it isn't a crisis war
for anyone, but we still talk about it, but maybe that's because it's
too recent. So maybe the above hypothesis only applies to older
wars, say wars before 1900.
If the above hypothesis, with at most minor changes, turns out to be
verifiable, then it's a very powerful endorsement of Generational
Dynamics, because it proves that I'm not cherry-picking wars. I'm
picking all and only wars that everyone else considers very
important.
I may regret asking this, but can you think of any wars that don't
fit this hypothesis?
What about the Iran/Iraq war? This is a crisis war, but it isn't
important to American history to be included in American history
books. However, it is important enough to be included in Iran
and Iraq history books.
That gives rise to:
Hypothesis #2: A war is a crisis war for a particular
nation or region if and only if the war is important enough to be
included in general histories of the period for that region or
nation.
This actually definitely isn't true. The Iran/Iraq war is important
enough to be included in the history of Turkey and Syria, but it
isn't a crisis war for them. WWI is an important war for Germany,
but not a crisis war. WWII is an important war for Russia, but not a
crisis war.
So I need to think a little bit more about the second hypothesis.
But I still think the first hypothesis may be right.
Sincerely,
John
John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
Re: Objections to Generational Dynamics
Dear Mike,
You're asking me a very philosophical question here.
Yesterday someone (a boomer) who's reading my book asked me whether
there's anything that she and other parents could say to other
children to hold off the next war.
My response was that we're going through a very sad time, and in fact
writing my book has brought me a great deal of sadness. My own son
Jason, who is a sophomore in college, has no fear whatsoever of the
clash of civilizations. He's majoring in biotechnology and of course
he wants to finish college and pursue a career, but if something
happens and he's called upon, then he will go to war bravely and
fearlessly, like all the other young people of today, as their parents
send them off tearfully, but knowing that we have no choice.
At least the American soldiers have people back home who care about
them.
In the play Man of La Mancha, Miguel de Cervantes is ridiculed
by his fellow prisoners for his foolish portrayal of Don Quixote de
La Mancha and "The Impossible Dream." He responds with a story: He's
fought in war, and he saw his close friend killed. As the friend lay
there just before death, the friend asked, "Why?" and then he died.
Cervantes says, "I don't think he was asking, 'Why did I die?' I
think he was asking me, 'Why did I ever live?'"
That's the question that comes forth in studying wars. When you
really try to answer that question, "Why did I ever live?", you
almost inevitably come back to the answer that for many people the
only reason you live is to die in the next war. There's no other
purpose to your life.
Now you're telling me that 70,000 people were killed in the Fourth
War of Charles V, a war that's so unimportant that evidently no one
has even devoted a web page to it.
How many people really cared about those 70,000 people? Of course,
their own families did. But who else?
Do you think Charles V cared about those 70,000 people? Wasn't that
the feudal era when landowners owned the people who lived on their
land? If you were able to assemble an army of trained cockroaches to
fight some sort of war for you, would you care if 70,000 cockroaches
die? Did Charles V care about those 70,000 people any more than you
would care about 70,000 cockroaches?
In one way those 70,000 people may be lucky. How many wars have been
fought where we have no record whatsoever? There have probably been
some 10,000 to 50,000 tribes in human history. Today there are about
200 nations and 9 civilizations. How many wars had to happen to
squeeze 10-50,000 tribes into 200 nations? How many millions, or
hundreds of millions, or billions of casualties do we have in wars
that no one has any record of whatsoever? So at least
somebody knows about the war you're talking about, where
70,000 people died.
When I was studying Mohammed's life for my book, I learned that for
the Bedouins on the Arabian peninsula, war is a way of life. Being a
casualty of war is just what's expected of them. And why not? You
and I will die of something -- cancer, stroke, heart attack, whatever
-- and someone else will die of war. What's the difference, really?
When you die, you die.
So you're right. Wars with lots of casualties should be crisis wars.
But they're not, or at least they're not always. So if you die in an
unimportant war, then your life is really useless. If you
want to have a life that means something, at least die in a war that
historians will consider important.
Sincerely,
John
John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
Re: Objections to Generational Dynamics
What you said about the War of Spinish Succession can also be said about WW I (see above). What I asked specifically was what features are possessed by War of the Spanish Succession but NOT by WW I, that makes the former a Crisis and not then latter. What I was looking for was a point-by-point comparison of the two wars like you did for WW I and WW II that shows one of the wars score more +'s than the other.World War I
With regard to World War I, I checked several sources at the time.
Other sources I read at the time weren't as long-winded, but they all
confirmed the importance of this war. This a very important war in the history of western Europe. The word "genocidal," isn't used, but the war was very expensive and afterward there was a "need felt by all statesmen to avoid for as long as possible another conflict such as that which had
just closed."
Whenever I've evaluated any war as crisis versus mid-cycle, I've
always pursued an honest evaluation of the war according a feeling of
"energy," as I've said, and get a feeling of truly huge impact
from this war. I have no misgivings whatsoever in saying that this
is unambiguously a crisis war.
I don't use your crisis war concept nor did I ever claim to have looked at all the wars. You did.I could say the same thing of you.
Why? The armies engaged in WW I and WW I were much larger than those of the past, even after adjustment for population. Industrialized nations can field much larger forces per capita than pre-industrialied ones. Not only that, but they build more powerful technologically advanced weapons (machine guns, poison gas in WW I, and mass bombing in WW II). The natural results is much larger casualties per capita.I would expect the number of casualties per capita to
be fairly constant across the centuries
You use 1555 Ausgberg aggreement as the end of a crisis war, because that's when the issue was settled. The corresponding date for France would be the Edict of Nantes in 1598.In my experience the crisis periods ends with some major
earth-shaking event, something that's remembered by history - a
massacre, a surrender, etc. Sometimes minor wars occur after that,
but they aren't part of the crisis period. For example, the Korean
War is not part of the World War II crisis.
This seems inconsistent to me. Yet there is a simple solution. You already identified a crisis in Spain from 1568-88. This is the same time as the religious war in France 1562-98. It is also the same time as the War of Dutch Independence 1567-1609. Finally its the same time as S&H's crisis 1569-1594.
It sure looks like all four countries were in crisis at about the same time.
And this is consistent with my model that calls for a correlation between social moments and inflationary Kondratiev upwaves. The 1570's through 1590's were Kondratiev upwaves for at least France, England and Germany (I don't have data for Spain or Holland). We have rising crime in England and increased general unrest over this period.
All in all, the late 16th century appears to be a European crisis turning.
Re: Objections to Generational Dynamics
Dear Mike,
The War of the Spanish Succession and WW I are BOTH BOTH BOTH crisis
wars. THEY ARE BOTH CRISIS WARS. Both of them. But they are crisis
wars for different regions, Western and Eastern Europe, respectively.
But they are BOTH crisis wars.
Proposed Rule: A war is a crisis war if and only if the
war is important enough to be included in general histories of the
period.
You did indeed claim (indirectly) to have looked at all wars - in the
sense that you've graphed the casualties of all wars. You've actually
made a bigger commitment than I have. All I claimed to have looked at
was all important wars. But you can't get total casualties from
looking at only important wars - you have to include all of them. So
in fact you've claimed to look at all wars and I haven't.
Dealing with central Europe prior to the Thirty Years War has always
been a major problem, and I've made no real attempt to do so, as I
said in my book. I was able to go back to 1390s Spain and 1066
England because those countries are relatively isolated. But France,
Germany and Italy are too centralized for me to have done that. That
doesn't mean it can't be done, and indeed I would agree that it has to
be done, but it's simply too much for me to attempt to deal with.
(Click on the above image to get a full-sized image.)
The above graphic shows the problem. Prior to the Thirty Years War,
many of those little regions were on their own timelines. A crisis
war in Brittany might not be a crisis war in Normandy, Burgundy or
Provence. All of this stuff has to be sorted out, with the same for
Germany, Italy and Eastern Europe, and I'd be looking at a good,
solid year's work there, and I don't have a year.
The West European timeline mainly starts with the Thirty Years War,
which merged many of the regional timeslines into a single one. So
if I identify any crisis wars in the 1500s, the only ones I'm really
interested in are those that are retrospectively important from the
point of view of the Thirty Years War.
Now, as far as I can tell, the Peace at Augsburg was considered very
significant. History books seem to say that the Peace at Augsburg
was a major development in keeping the peace in the German provinces
throughout the rest of the 1500s, and only broke down in 1618 with
the Thirty Years War. Thus, if the 30YW represents the complete
unraveling of Augsburg, then it fits very well into the generational
paradigm.
The reasoning is a little bit different with the St. Bartholomew's Day
Massacre. As you've pointed out, there were religious wars throughout
the last half of the 1500s. But it's misleading to suggest that this
was a single crisis period. As J. M. Roberts says,
So in France we're not talking about a single religious war, but in
fact we're talking about nine different religious wars.
Since Generational Dynamics is based on regional timelines, it's even
possible that each of those nine wars was itself a crisis war, but
NOT FOR MORE THAN THE SMALL REGION IN WHICH THE WAR TOOK PLACE.
Now, France entered the 30YW in 1635. From the retrospective of that
date, what was the most important of the nine religious wars? The
logical choice is the war that involved Paris, and of course
the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre occurred in Paris. Furthermore,
Bartholomew is the event that's still remembered even today in France
(recall the Pope's 1997 apology), so this is the obvious choice.
The rule is that crisis wars have the greatest historical
significance, and take a look again at S&H's description of the
climax of a crisis period:
Now, there's no doubt in my mind that the St. Bartholomew's Day
Massacre fits that description. Does the Edict at Nantes have
anything like that importance? Not as far as I can see.
This can't possibly work because these were all different regions
with different regional timelines. Their timelines didn't fully
merge until the War of the Spanish Succession. In the 1500s, you
can't look at a single generational crisis period for all of Europe.
That didn't come until later.
This is true in a sense, provided that "about the same time" is broad
enough. But they were not in a single crisis period together. Each
country -- in fact each region of each country -- was still on its
own generational timeline. It wasn't until the Thirty Years War and
the War of the Spanish Succession that all these tiny little regional
timelines got merged into a single generational timeline for Western
Europe.
This may be true, and I wish I understood your model better so that I
could say. There are certain things that are global for all of
Western Europe -- there was the monetary system, there was
technology, there was the influence of the Catholic Church. What
you're measuring is one of those or some combination of those. But
these things are global, and so cannot possibly be generational
trends, which are regional, based on a local cultural memory.
No, they aren't. In fact, it's impossible, since you're measuring
something global, and generational trends, which depend on local
cultural memories, are regional. Just as WW I and WW II were
crisis periods for different regions, the late 16th century had
multiple crisis periods for many different regions, and what you're
describing is impossible.
Sincerely,
John
John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
Re: Objections to Generational Dynamics
I was referring to wrt to the Western Europe. Why is the WSS a crisis war for the West and WW I not a crisis war for Western Europe?
No I haven't. I simply reproduced the results from other workers, who claimed that they look at all the wars between Great Powers in the 1494 to 1975 period.You did indeed claim (indirectly) to have looked at all wars - in the
sense that you've graphed the casualties of all wars.
No, you have only just recently made that claim. Before you said you applied your 10 point criterion to all the wars.You've actually made a bigger commitment than I have. All I claimed to have looked at was all important wars.
This is just an assumption. Why should political divisions matter? Why should a big country be on one timeline and a dozen little countries occupying a similar area be on a dozen timelines?Prior to the Thirty Years War, many of those little regions were on their own timelines.
You could save yourself a lot of work by assuming that large regions connected by dense trade routes (through which cultural exchanges flow) are all on the same timeline. Braudel has shown an example where a price shock in a prticularly French port city radiated outward like ripples in pond over a period of a couple of months. News spread this way too as did ideas. These exchanges serve to keep different regions interconnected and more or less on the same timeline.
The Edict of Nantes is also considered important and for the same reason. It normalized relations between French Catholics and Protestants for a century afterward.Now, as far as I can tell, the Peace at Augsburg was considered very significant. History books seem to say that the Peace at Augsburg
was a major development in keeping the peace in the German provinces
throughout the rest of the 1500s, and only broke down in 1618 with
the Thirty Years War.
Re: Objections to Generational Dynamics
How do you know that different areas are on different timelines? How do you know timelines even exist? How do you know they later merge? You haven't demonstrated this, so it's only a hypothesis right now.This can't possibly work because these were all different regions
with different regional timelines. In the 1500s, you can't look at a single generational crisis period for all of Europe. That didn't come until later.
But given the paucity of data about this time, about the same time might be about as good as can be expected. Consider, one can test the hypothesis. If different regions are on different timelines we should expect the mid points of any pair of crises to be randomly distributed between 0 and 1/2 a cycle apart. They can't be more than 1/2 a cycle apart because then they would be closer to the crisis on the other side.This is true in a sense, provided that "about the same time" is broad enough. But they were not in a single crisis period together. Each
country -- in fact each region of each country -- was still on its
own generational timeline.
. . . . . . . . Crisis . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . Crisis
Crisis . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Crisis . . .
. . . .<----> this distance will range from 0 to 1/2 of the crisis spacing
Since crises are spaced about 80 years apart, 1/2 cycle is 40 years. The four midpoints are Spain 1578, England 1582. France 1567 and Dutch 1588. Note I am using YOUR crisis dates for France.
I now note the differences
Spain-England 4
Spain-France 11
Spain-Dutch 10
England-France 15
England-Dutch 6
France-Dutch 21
We should expect that half will be more than 20 and half less than 20. What we see instead is 5 that are closer than 20 and 1 that is greater than 20. This is like flipping six coins and getting five heads. The probably of it happening by chance is 11%. I now note that you identifed 1492 as the end of another Spanish crisis, which is very close to the end of the English crisis in 1487. This pair is also closer than 20 years apart and gives us another head.
Now we have six heads and one tail. The probability of this happening by chance is only 6%. The hypothesis that timelines are separate before 30YW is not holding up. And this is using your 1562-72 dating for the French crisis--not mine.
Your own data is clustered, implying that they are not randomly placed as would be expected for independent timelines, but rather they are interdependent (crisis in one areas "spill over" to another) and thus correlated.
Did you carefully read the links I supplied?This may be true, and I wish I understood your model better so that I could say.
This dependence is a hypothesis, not an established fact. And as you point out it makes the job of proving it very very difficult because you have to separately construct dozens of timelines from an often sparse hisotrical record. Why not start with a more tractable hypothesis, and only revert to this one if the other one is shown not to work?No, they aren't. In fact, it's impossible, since you're measuring
something global, and generational trends, which depend on local
cultural memories, are regional.
Re: Objections to Generational Dynamics
Dear Mike,
How many times do I have to answer this question? I've answered it
at length over and over. I've explained at length why the War of the
Spanish Succession was a crisis war for Western Europe, and I've
explained at length why WW I was NOT a crisis war for Germany, but
WAS a crisis war for Eastern Europe. Do I really have to do it all
again? What's the point?
That doesn't diminish my point at all. My point is that your graph
is based on all wars, no matter who did the work, and you can't
possibly be sure of that, especially in medieval times, since there
were undoubtedly many regional wars for which there's no record.
Putting aside all this amusing banter, I really do question the
validity of that graph, given the disconnect in the 20th century.
You say it's because armies are bigger, but that wouldn't make any
difference on a per capita basis. You say that's it's because
of new weapons technology, but weapons technology improved
continually every century, and so the graph should show continual
increases century after century, rather than being flat (across
peaks) for centuries, and then suddenly jumping by a factor of 10.
I suggested it might be because of improved record-keeping, but that
doesn't make sense either, since presumably record-keeping also
improved continually over the centuries, and so doesn't explain that
big jump.
I really don't think that WW II figure can be correct, if all the
others are correct. Is it possible that, for example, you're
counting Russia's casualties, but you're not counting Russia's
population? There must be some error of that sort.
You're right. I made the assumption of "important war" without
explicitly stating it as a criterion.
It's not an assumption. It's you who are making the assumption. In
your previous posting you talk of "the religious war in France
1562-98," but there was no religious "war" in France from 1562-98.
There were NINE religious WARS. Historians like Roberts, whom I
quoted, do not look at these as a single war. Why should you? And
why should I? Those were clearly nine separate wars because
historians say so, and there's no reason, to assume as you do, that
they have any generational relationship.
For heavens sakes, Mike, there were wars going on all the time. You
want the crisis period to begin in the 1570s, but you're ignoring
your own claim of religious wars starting in 1562 -- not to mention
the Franco-Habsburg wars 1520s-1550s.
I'm sure I could save myself a lot of work by making any number of
ridiculous assumptions. There were also dense trade routes across
the Mediterranean to the Ottoman Empire, and from there, there were
trade routes to India and China. If you think trade routes are that
important, then why don't you include those in your own data? And
do you really want to say that because we have dense trade routes
today around the world, that the entire world is on the same
timeline? Where do you come up with these things.
A price shock has nothing to do with the generational timeline. I've
already said that there were several global measures -- the monetary
system, technology, and the influence of the Catholic Church.
Braudel's price shock is related to the monetary system. The data
that you're looking at is related to one or a combination of those
global factors, not to generational factors.
News and ideas have nothing to do with it, as I've explained dozens
of times. Did the Rwanda massacre in 1994 have an effect anywhere
else? There was certainly news in the newspapers, but no one cared.
News and ideas have zero to do with the visceral anger and fury that
trigger generational crisis wars. If what you're saying had any
relationship whatsoever to the truth, then we would have been as
affected by the Rwanda massacre as we were by 9/11, but in fact few
Americans cared the least about the Rwanda massacre.
I told you: People don't care about other people's massacres. The
only time they even get referred to is for political gain, and then
only by politicians who couldn't care less about people being raped
or slaughtered except insofar as they can use it to get votes or
money.
It doesn't look that way to me. The "Peace at Augsburg" was a peace
treaty. The Edict of Nantes is more of an awakening document. See my
next message.
Sincerely,
John
John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
Re: Objections to Generational Dynamics
Dear Mike,
The following is a lengthy description of the history of the French
religious wars from 1559- 98, obtained from the New Advent Catholic
Encyclopedia.
The following description breaks down clearly into an unraveling
period (prior to 1562), a crisis period (1562-1573), and an awakening
period (1573-1598), ending with the Edict of Nantes.
An analysis of this period, using my criteria or S&H's criteria,
makes it unambiguously clear that the crisis period ended in 1573,
and any subsequent "religious wars" were mainly motivated by
politics. The Edict of Nantes was clearly and unambiguously an
awakening document.
The notes enclosed in [[...]] are mine. Everything else below is
from the web site page.
Sincerely,
John
John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07527b.htm
...
HISTORY
The history of French Protestantism may be divided into four
well-defined periods: (1) A Militant Period, in which it is struggling
for freedom (1559- 98 ) ; (2) the Period of the Edict of Nantes
(1598-1685); (3) the Period from the Revocation to the Revolution
(1685-1800); (4) the Period from the Revolution to the Separation
(1801-1905).
(1) Militant Period
The organization of their discipline and worship gave the Huguenots a
new power of expansion. Little by little they penetrated into the
ranks of the nobility. One of the principal families of the kingdom,
the Coligny, allied to the Montmorency, furnished them their most
distinguished recruits in d'Andelot, Admiral Coligny, and Cardinal
Odet de Chatillon. Soon the Queen of Navarre, Jeanne d'Albret,
daughter of Margaret of Navarre, professed Calvinism and introduced it
into her dominions by force. Her husband, Antoine de Bourbon, the
first prince of the blood, appeared at times to have gone over to the
Huguenots with his brother the Prince de Cond?, who, for his part,
never wavered in his allegiance to the new sect. Even the Parliament
of Paris, which had so energetically carried on the struggle against
the heresy, allowed itself to become tainted, many of its members
embracing the new doctrine. It was necessary to deal severely with
these; many were imprisoned, Antoine du Bourg among others. But at
this point Henry II died, leaving the throne to a delicate child of
sixteen. Nothing could have been more advantageous for the Huguenots.
Just at that time they formed a numerous group in almost every
district of France. Certain provinces, such as Normandy, contained as
many as 5000 of them; one day 6000 persons at the Pr?-aux-clercs, in
Paris, sang the Psalms of Marot which the Huguenots had adopted;
Basse-Guyenne, it was said, had seventy-six organized churches. Two
years later, Bordeaux counted 7000 of the Reformed; Rouen, 10,000;
mention is made of 20,000 at Toulouse, and the Prince de Cond?
presented a list of 2050 churches --- which, it is true, cannot be
identified. The papal nuncio wrote to Rome that the kingdom was more
than half Huguenot; this was assuredly an exaggeration, for the
Venetian ambassador estimated the district contaminated with this
error at not the one-tenth part of France; nevertheless it is evident
that the Huguenots could no longer be regarded as a few scattered
handfuls of individuals, whose case could be satisfactorily dealt with
by a few judicial prosecutions. Organized into churches linked
together by synods, reinforced by the support of great lords of whom
some had access to the councils of the Crown, the Calvinists
thenceforward constituted a political power which exerted its activity
in national affairs and had a history of its own.
After the accession of Francis II, and through the influence of the
Guises, who were all-powerful with the king and strongly devoted to
Catholicism, the edicts against the Huguenots were rendered still more
severe. Antoine du Bourg was burned, and a royal edict (4 September,
1559) commanded that houses in which unlawful assemblies were held
should be razed and the organizers of such assemblies punished with
death. Embittered by these measures, the Huguenots took advantage of
every cause for discontent afforded by the government of the Guises.
After taking counsel with their theologians at Strasburg and Geneva,
they resolved to have recourse to arms. A plot was formed, the real
leader of which was the Prince de Conde, though its organization was
entrusted to the Sieur de la Renaudi?, a nobleman of P?rigord, who had
been convicted of forgery by the Parliament of Dijon, had fled to
Geneva, and had there become an ardent Calvinist. He visited Geneva
and England, and scoured the provinces of France to recruit soldiers
and bring them together about the Court --- for the plan was to capture
the Guises without, as the conspirators said, laying hands on the
king's person. While the Court in order to disarm Huguenot hostility
was ordering its agents to desist from prosecutions, and proclaiming a
general amnesty from which only preachers and conspirators were
excepted, the Guises were warned of the plot being hatched, and thus
enabled to stifle the revolt in the blood of the conspirators who were
assembling in bands about Amboise, where the king was lodged (19
March, 1560). The resentment aroused by the severity of this
repression and the appointment as chancellor of Michel de L'H?pital, a
magistrate of great moderation, soon led to the adoption of less
violent counsels; the Edict of Romorantin (May, 1560) softened the lot
of the Protestants, who had as their advocates before the "Assembly of
Notables" (August, 1560) the Prince de Conde, the chancellor
L'H?pital, and the Bishops of Valence and Vienne.
The accession of Charles IX, a minor (December, 1560), brought into
power, as queen regent, his mother Catharine de' Medici. This was
fortunate for the Huguenots. Almost indifferent to questions of
doctrine the ambitious regent made no scruple of granting any degree
of toleration, provided she might enjoy her power in peace. She
allowed the Conde and the Coligny to practice the reformed religion at
court, and even summoned to preach there Jean de Mouluc, Bishop of
Valence, a Calvinist scarcely concealed by his mitre. At the same time
she ordered the Parliament of Paris to suspend the prosecutions, and
authorized Huguenot worship outside of the cities until such time as a
national council should have pronounced on the matter. An edict
promulgated in the month of April, while prohibiting religious
manifestations, set at liberty those who had been imprisoned on
religious grounds. In vain did the Parliament of Paris try to suspend
the publication of this edict; a judiciary commission composed of
princes, high officers of the Crown, and members of the Royal Council,
granted the Huguenots amnesty on the sole condition that they should
in future live like Catholics. In the hope of bringing about a
reconciliation between the two religions Catharine assembled Catholic
prelates and Huguenot ministers at the Conference of Poissy. For the
latter Th?odore de B?ze spoke; for the former, the Cardinal of
Lorraine. Each party claimed victory. In conclusion the king forbade
the Huguenots to hold ecclesiastical property, and the Catholics to
interfere with Huguenot worship.
- [[ The above paragraphs represent the kinds of things I
expect to see in a generational unraveling period. A good
contemporary comparison is the Israelis and Palestinians, where we see
the level of violence increasing gradually as brinksmanship occurs on
both sides, but both sides also occasionaly back down in order to
prevent (or, if you prefer, to appear to wish to prevent) all
out war. Thus, the Palestinians have suicide bombers, but Yasser
Arafat calls for peace; the Israelis kill Hamas leaders, and also call
for peace.
These are the same kinds of things you're seeing in the pre-1562
case. However, in the next sentence below, we see that the level of
violence finally broke through to civil war. ]]
In January, 1562, the Huguenots were authorized to hold their
assemblies outside of the towns, but had to restore all property
taken from the clergy, and abstain from tumults and unlawful
gatherings. This edict, however, only exasperated the rival factions;
at Paris it occasioned disturbances which obliged Catharine and the
Court to flee. The Duke of Guise, on his way from Lorraine to rejoin
the queen, found at Vassy in Champagne some six or seven hundred
Huguenots holding religious worship (1 March, 1562), which according
to the Edict of January they had no right to do, Vassy being a
fortified town. Their singing soon interfered with the Mass at which
the Duke of Guise was assisting. Mutual provocations ensued, a
quarrel broke out, and blood was shed. Twenty-three Huguenots were
slain and more than a hundred wounded.
- [[ From this point on, "mutual animosities found vent in
acts of violence." This is in contrast to an unraveling period,
where mutual animosities find vent only in acts of brinkmanship. This
is the signal of the real beginning of a crisis period. ]]
Forthwith, at the call of the Prince de Conde, there began the first
of the civil wars called the "wars of religion". The Huguenots rose,
as they said, to enforce respect for the Edict of January, which the
Duke of Guise was trampling under foot. Everywhere the mutual
animosities found vent in acts of violence. Huguenots were massacred
in one place, monks and religious in another. Wherever the insurgents
gained the mastery, churches were sacked, statues and crosses
mutilated, sacred utensils profaned in sacrilegious burlesques, and
relics of saints cast into the flames. The most serious encounters
took place at Orl?ans, where the Duke of Guise was treacherously
assassinated by a Huguenot. The assassin Poltrot de M?r? declared that
he had been urged on by B?ze and Coligny. Finally, although Conde and
Coligny had not been ashamed to purchase support from Queen Elizabeth
of England by delivering Havre over to her, the victory remained with
the Catholics. Peace was established by the Edict of Amboise (19
March, 1563), which left the Huguenots freedom of worship in one town
out of each bailiwick (bailliage) and in the castles of lords who
exercised the power of life and death (haute justice). Four years
later there was another civil war which lasted six months and ended in
the Peace of Longjumeau (23 March, 1568), re-establishing the Edict of
Amboise. Five months later hostilities recommenced. Conde occupied La
Rochelle, but he was killed at Jarnac, and Coligny, who succeeded to
his command was defeated at Moncontour. Peace was made in the
following year, and the Edict of Saint-Germain (8 April, 1570) granted
the Huguenots freedom of worship wherever their worship had been
carried on before the war, besides leaving in their hands the four
following refuges --- La Rochelle, Montauban, La Charite, and Cognac.
On his return to Court, Coligny found great favour with the king and
laboured to win his support for the revolted Netherlands. The marriage
of Henry, King of Navarre, with the king's sister, Margaret of Valois,
soon after this brought all the Huguenots lords to Paris. Catharine
de' Medici, jealous of Coligny's influence with the king, and it may
be in collusion with the Duke of Guise who had his father's death to
avenge on the admiral, plotted the death of the latter. But the
attempt failed; Coligny was only wounded.
- [[ Now we come to St. Bartholomew's Massacre. This is the
kind of climax that occurs in a crisis period, where the full fury of
the visceral hatred and fury of a participant is directed at the
other side. This is comparable to America's use of nuclear weapons in
WW II. ]]
Catharine, fearing reprisals from the Huguenot's, suddenly won over
the king and his council to the idea of putting to death the Huguenot
leaders assembled in Paris. Thus occurred the odious Massacre of St.
Bartholomew, so called from the saint whose feast fell on the same day
(24 August, 1572), Admiral Coligny being slain with many of his
Huguenot followers. The massacre spread to many provincial towns. The
number of victims is estimated at 2000 for the capital, and 6000 to
8000 for the rest of France. The king explained to foreign courts that
Coligny and his partisans had organized a plot against his person and
authority, and that he (the king) had merely suppressed it. Thus it
was that Pope Gregory XIII at first believed in a conspiracy of the
Huguenots, and, persuaded that the king had but defended himself
against these heretics, held a service of thanksgiving for the
repression of the conspiracy, and commemorated it by having a medal
struck, which he sent with his felicitations to Charles IX. There is
no proof that the Catholic clergy were in the slightest degree
connected with the massacre.
- [[ The above paragraphs sentences are very interesting
(keeping in mind that this is a Catholic encyclopedia). Now that the
massacre is part of history, the Catholics are claiming innocence,
describing the Pope's congratulatory remarks and actions as a mere
misunderstanding. Whether it was or not, the Pope's deeds fueled
hatreds that have lasted for centuries, as the next sentence
describes. ]]
Cries of horror and malediction arose from the Huguenot ranks; their
writers made France and the countries beyond its borders echo with
those cries by means of pamphlets in which, for the first time, they
attacked the absolute power, or even the very institution of royalty.
After St. Bartholomew's the Huguenots, though bereft of their leaders,
rushed to arms. This was the fourth civil war, and centred about a few
fortified towns, such as La Rochelle, Montauban, and Nimes. The Edict
of Boulogne (25 June, 1573) put an end to it, granting to all
Huguenots amnesty for the past and liberty to worship in those three
towns.
- [[ This is the real climax of the war the 1573 Edict
of Boulogne, not the Edit of Nantes. ]]
It was felt that the rising power of the Huguenots was broken ---
that from this juncture forward they would never again be able to
sustain a conflict except by allying themselves with political
malcontents.
- [[ This sentence says that we're no longer in a crisis war -
we're in a mid-cycle war. The Huguenots had clearly been beaten, and
there was no "energy" left to fight. Below we see that the Huguenots
were mainly a political organization in a "a permanently organized
revolt." The crisis war is clearly over, even though low-level
violence continues in some places. ]]
They themselves were conscious of this; they gave themselves a
political organization which facilitated the mobilization of all their
forces. In their synods held from 1573 to 1588 they organized France
into g?n?ralit?s, placing at the head of each a general, with a
permanent council and periodical assemblies. The delegates of these
g?n?ralit?s were to form the States General of the Union, which were
to meet every three months. Special committees were created for the
recruiting of the army, the management of the finances, and the
administration of justice. Over the whole organization a "protector of
the churches" was appointed, who was the chief of the party. Conde
held this title from 1574; Henry of Navarre after 1576. It was, so to
say, a permanently organized revolt. In 1574 hostilities recommenced;
the Huguenots and the malcontents joined forces against impotent
royalty until they wrested from Henry, the successor of Charles IX (30
May, 1574), by the Edict of Beaulieu (May, 1576) the right of public
worship for the religion, thenceforth officially called the pr?tendue
reform?e, throughout France, except at Paris and the Court. There were
also to be established chambers composed of equal numbers of Catholics
and Huguenots in eight Parliaments; eight places de suret? were to be
given to the Huguenots; there was to be a disclaimer of the Massacre
of St. Bartholomew, and the families which had suffered from it were
to be reinstated. These large concessions to the Huguenots and the
approbation given to their political organization led to the
formation of the League, which was organized by Catholics anxious to
defend their religion. The States-General of Blois (December, 1576)
declared itself against the Edict of Beaulieu. Thereupon the
Protestants took up arms under the leadership of Henry of Navarre,
who, escaping from the Court, had returned to the Calvinism which he
had abjured at the time of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew. The
advantage was on the Catholic side, thanks to some successes achieved
by the Duke of Anjou, the king's brother. The Peace of Bergerac,
confirmed by the Edict of Poitiers (September, 1577), left the
Huguenots the free exercise of their religion only in the suburbs of
one town in each bailiwick (bailliage), and in those places where it
had been practised before the outbreak of hostilities and which they
occupied at the current date.
- [[ Note below: "The complaints made at their synods show
clearly that the fervour of their early days had disappeared." This
makes it clearer than ever that this is no longer a crisis war. ]]
The national synods, which served to fill up the intervals between
armed struggles, give us a glimpse into the forces at work in the
interior life of the Huguenot party. The complaints made at their
synods show clearly that the fervour of their early days had
disappeared; laxity and dissensions were finding their way into their
ranks, and at times pastors and their flocks were at variance. It was
necessary to forbid pastors to publish anything touching religious
controversies or political affairs without the express approval of
their conferences, and the consistories were asked (1581) to stem the
ever-widening wave of dissolution which threatened their church. A
Venetian ambassador writes at this period that the number of Huguenots
had decreased by seventy per cent. But the death of the Duke of Anjou
on 10 June, 1584, the sole surviving heir of the direct line of the
Valois, revived their hopes, since the King of Navarre thus became
heir presumptive to the throne. The prospect thus opened aroused the
League; it called upon Henry III to interdict Huguenot worship
everywhere, and to declare the heretics incapable of holding any
benefices or public offices --- and consequently the King of Navarre
incapable of succeeding to the throne. By the Convention of Nemours (7
July, 1585) the king accepted these conditions; he revoked all
previous edicts of pacification, ordered the ministers to leave the
kingdom immediately and the other Huguenots within six months, unless
they chose to be converted. This edict, it was said, sent more
Huguenots to Mass than St. Bartholomew's had, and resulted in the
disappearance of all their churches north of the Loire; it was
therefore impossible for them to profit by the hostilities which broke
out between the king and the Guises, and resulted in the assassination
of the Guises at the States-General of Blois (23 December, 1588) and
the death of Henry III at the siege of the revolted city of Paris (1
August, 1589). Henry of Navarre succeeded as Henry IV, after promising
the Royalist Catholics who had joined him that he would seek guidance
and instruction from a council to be held within six months, or sooner
if possible, and that in the meantime he would maintain the exclusive
practice of the Catholic religion in all those places where the
Huguenot religion was not actually being practised. Circumstances
prevented him from keeping his word. The League held Paris and the
principal towns of France, and he was forced into a long struggle
against it, in which he was enabled to secure victory only after his
conversion to Catholicism (July, 1593), and, above all, after his
reconciliation with the pope (September, 1595). The Huguenots had
meanwhile been able to obtain from him only the measure of tolerance
guaranteed by the Edict of Poitiers; they had profited by this to
reopen at Montauban (June, 1594) the synods which had been interrupted
for eleven years. They soon completed their political organization in
the Assemblies of Saumur and Loudun, they extended it to the whole of
France and claimed to treat with the king as equal with equal,
bargaining with him for their help against the Spaniards, refusing him
their contingents at the siege of Amiens, withdrawing them in the
midst of a campaign during the siege of La F?re. Thus they brought the
king, who was besides anxious to end the civil war, to grant them the
Edict of Nantes (April-May, 1598).
- [[ The last sentences make it absolutely clear that the
Edict of Nantes was a political document, not a war peace treaty.
When you look at some of the terms of the tree (see the web page for
the full description), it's clear that this is a generational
awakening document. ]]
(2) Under the Edict of Nantes
This edict, containing 93 public and 36 secret articles, provided in
the first place that the Catholic religion should be re-established
wherever it had been suppressed, together with all the property and
rights previously enjoyed by the clergy. The Huguenots obtained the
free exercise of their religious worship in all places where it
actually existed, as also in two localities in every bailiwick
(bailliage), in castles of lords possessing the right of life and
death, and even in those of the ordinary nobles in which the number of
the faithful did not exceed thirty. They were eligible for all public
offices, for admission to colleges and academies, could hold synods
and even political meetings; they received 45,000 crowns annually for
expenses of worship and support of schools; they were given in the
Parliament of Paris a tribunal in which their representatives
constituted one-third of the members, while in those of Grenoble,
Bordeaux, and Toulouse special chambers were created, half of whose
members were Huguenot.
...
Re: Objections to Generational Dynamics
Dear Mike,
How do we know anything? I wrote a 350 page book on the subject.
I've been providing forecasts / predictions on my web site since 2002
with a pretty good record for prescience. I've posted all kinds of
additional analysis on this web site. I think I've done a very good
job.
This is a very interesting hypothesis, but it's not required by the
theory that distinct timelines be randomly distributed, since
timelines can both merge and diverge.
Let me give an example.
When the Normans conquered the Saxons in 1066, their timelines
merged, and they remained on the same timeline through three more
crisis wars. Then they diverged, and didn't merge again until the
War of the Spanish Succession. During that in-between period, the
Normandy and England were on different timelines, but the timelines
were fairly close to one another.
Things like this could well have happened throughout Europe. It's
possible that the activities of the Roman Empire caused some
timelines to merge, and that these timelines diverged again later,
but remained relatively close.
Still, you may be on to something very interesting. You've found that
some timelines are clustered, and that may actually support
Generational Dynamics, since it might show that the 80-year cycle is
maintained even when timelines divorge. So this is something that's
worth exploring as support for Generational Dynamics and the 80-year
cycle.
I tried to dive in, but I always felt I was in the middle. Is there
is a clear exposition online anywhere?
The fact that generational timelines depend on local cultural
memories is the basis of entire generational paradigm developed by
S&H. If you throw out memories, then you throw out the flow of
generations and everything else that S&H did as well.
I'm a little taken aback that you would suggest that I should abandon
Generational Dynamics because it's too much work.
I rejected the "global approach" early on, because it doesn't make
sense. As far as I'm concerned, it was shown not to work in 2002.
The fact that it's difficult to construct different timelines is the
only thing that makes sense in the generational paradigm. To say
that a war in Ireland could somehow be related to a war in Italy
according to some cosmic connection never made any sense to me at
all. I've now analyzed hundreds of crisis periods, and I've found
that Generational Dynamics is simple, elegant and produces valid
results without exception, and that it also explains such things as
the Orthodox/Muslim timeline versus the Western timeline.
Furthermore, the new "proposed rule" that a war is a crisis war if
and only if it has a sufficiently great historical importance is a
very exciting potential breakthrough because it might forever
disprove dispel the accusations about cherry-picking wars.
Your suggestion that I abandon all this work and go back to a theory
that makes no sense whatsoever simply so that it won't be necessary
to do the admittedly humongous job of analyzing Europe's regional
medieval wars is, to say the least, absurd. I daresay that
neither you nor anybody else would have any respect for me if I did
that, and indeed I would have no respect for myself.
By the way, what are you really telling me? Are you telling me that
your entire analysis of Kondratiev cycles is based on whatever the
easiest path is, regardless of its validity? Is that why you're
insisting that 1562-1598 is a single crisis war -- because that's the
easiest way to make your theory come out right? Is that why you keep
saying many things that don't always make sense?
Sincerely,
John
John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
Re: Objections to Generational Dynamics
Dear Mike,
It suddenly occurs to me that we may have a solution here.
Since crisis periods converge and diverge over time, especially in
earlier times when regions were much smaller, crisis periods of
nearby regions tend to cluster.
Thus, we can define "crisis cluster periods," to indicate a period
of, say, 30 years or so that contains several different regional
crisis periods.
That would work for me. I could still talk about individual crisis
wars, and you could talk about larger crisis cluster periods. That
would be valid for both of us.
Would that work for you?
Sincerely,
John
John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
Re: Objections to Generational Dynamics
Dear Mike,
I'm getting really excited about this concept of clustered crisis
periods, because it makes a lot of sense, it provides an extra layer
of analysis of the generational paradigm, and it may well provide a
way to integrate Kondratiev cycles in with Generational Dynamics.
The idea would be to go back to the Roman Empire days, during which
many timelines were forced to merge because of Roman imperialism.
These timelines later diverged as the Roman Empire collapsed, but
they still remained on separate 80-year cycles, and so the crisis
periods clustered. So the idea would be to determine a "clustered
crisis period" timeline for all of Western Europe dating from the
Roman Empire to the present.
Maybe you've already done that.
That would really be fantastic, if it works, and would also be very
significant because it would validate and integrate your work and my
work on several different levels.
And it would be an elegant addition to the theory.
Sincerely,
John
John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
Re: Objections to Generational Dynamics
John,
There is a big difference between what you are doing and what I am doing with the cycle stuff. You are starting almost from scratch. I am relying heavily on the work of others who came before me. Now in my books I clearly identify whose war cycle it is. It would be unethical to claim that this casuality chart was the result of my work.
Suppose I used Generational Dynamics (GD) for something. I would of course cite you and I would expect those who have a problem with GD to bring it up with you. I provided you two key references that will allow to to find all the sources for the war-related stuff I present in my books. So I suggest that you read the literature instead of arguing with me. I don't have the raw data nor the knowledge that went into the war cycle, so I can't really address these issues. I simply use their results.
My cycle construction is not my own creative product like your is. I am not acting as a scientist (i.e. "seeking the truth") in this endeavor. My role is that of an engineer (which is what I am). I take other people's cycles and attempt to put them in a usable form or aesthetic form. For example you questioned me about how the 93-71 BC turning could be anything other than a crisis. I haven't a clue--I got the date from Ken Horner--you would have to deal with him. Why do believe him? His 75-95 AD turning agreed with my religious and unrest events and so I buy his assignment of that period as an Awakening. Given that, it makes the 93-71 BC turning another awakening.
Your cycle, or Ken's (like any other cycle work) is potential choice of raw material for me to work with. I used Dave McGuinesses cycle dates (with attribution) that I got from this site in my second book. Does GD offer anything to me?
It has the greatest potential value if I could understand how your cycle is constructed. I cannot. I have given up on trying to understand how cycles are determined in Generational Dynamics.
Nevertheless a list of explict dates for the various turnings for France, Germany, England, Spain etc. down through the years could still be valuable even if I don't know how they were obtained. After all, I don't know how Klingberg's or Namenwirth's or Schlesinger's cycles are constructed, but I have considered them. I would certainly write down the Zenakis cycles (with citation) for potential future application.
I have probably "busted your chops" too much. But the topic is "Objections to Generational Dynamics" and I was trying to show what the critic was getting at.
Re: Objections to Generational Dynamics
Dear Mike,
I hope you're not really apologizing to me, since this exchange has
been extremely valuable, has advanced the theory quite a bit. Most
valuable is this new proposed tenet that any "historically important"
war must be a crisis war for some region. This alone, if it can be
validated, will completely pierce the "cherry-picking" criticism.
However, it's also very clear that I haven't made the criteria for
crisis war for a region very understandable. I've had no difficulty
applying the criteria unambiguously, but evidently I've had a lot of
trouble explaining what I was doing.
So if it's OK with you, I'd like to spend a few days trying again to
describe the list of criteria, and ask you to take another shot at
it. Hopefully I can do better with the benefit of this last
discussion.
Thanks for your effort in working with me on this. It's made a big
difference.
Sincerely,
John
John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
Re: Objections to Generational Dynamics
By using this definition you are essentially letting another historian pick your crisis wars. Instead of looking at all the wars you are looking a a sample that you have not selected. This is how I find "unrest events". I think of a kind of unrest, like slave uprisings and I go to black history websites and such and record all the slave uprisings they mention. I keep at it until I keep seeing the same ones over and over again. Then I do the same for labor unrest by going to labor sites and recording all the strikes until everyone I encounter is one I've got. General histories often contain general uprisings and such. Over the years I've built up a big database of these sort of events.
For you its just wars. But you will have to consult a fair number of sources. And you will find that historians don't always agree on which wars should be included. You can come up with some sort of majority rule to get a consensus list.
Re: Objections to Generational Dynamics
Dear Mike,
I don't really look at it that way. My experience is that the most
"historically important" wars are also the most important crisis
wars, and this was something I concluded on an unconscious level
until you pointed out that I was making this assumption. I'm not sure
I fully agree that historians decide what wars are important. I
believe that wars are important because the people affected by them
think they're important, and that historians follow what the people
tell them. Therefore, I'm not letting historians pick the crisis
wars; I'm letting the people involved pick the crisis wars.
This concept is really at the heart of Generational Dynamics, as well
as The Fourth Turning. The Korean War is all but forgotten today,
because new generations of people don't know anything about it
(except during the week it's covered in high school history class).
On the other hand, WW II is a war that we can't stop talking about
(see last weekend's TV coverage), and that makes it an "important
war," not just for historians but for everybody. And that makes it a
Generational Dynamics crisis war because the WW II experience is
passed on from generation to generation.
On the other hand, it's true that it's not just crisis wars we
remember. We also remember important awakening events, like WW I and
the Vietnam War. Whether a historically important war is a crisis
war or an awakening event is determined by the criteria I've been
working on.
Here's an example that I've mentioned before: A few months ago I was
looking at African history, something about which I know little.
Almost immediately I came across The Mfecane, a well-remember 1820s
war. (For example, it's on BBC's history of Africa, at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/af...chapter1.shtml
) Now, the Mfecane must be a crisis war according to the GD
methodology for it to be so well-remembered. I then looked at
Stearns' Encyclopedia of World History, and found all the wars
listed there, starting with the Mfecane. I evaluated each of those
wars, using the "ten criteria," and decided whether each one was
crisis or mid-cycle (or a crisis war for a different region), and came
up with a timeline.
Now, what's my obligation here to look at other wars? What if there
were other non-remembered wars in the 1840s and 1850s, similar to the
Franco-Spanish wars we were discussing earlier. Do I really have an
obligation to dig those out?
My answer is "No," because the fact that they're not important enough
to be included in a book like Stearns' automatically means that they
can't be very well remembered, and therefore they can't be important
enough to be crisis wars. In fact, they can't even be important
awakening events, if no one remembers them.
But now, suppose someone accuses me of cherry-picking wars. My
response is: Tell me a war that I didn't consider. They dig up some
almost unknown war. I can then claim, rightly, that I didn't have to
consider that war because its anonymity automatically excludes it from
being a crisis war. I could then prove my point by doing some further
analysis of it, but the further analysis would just be icing on the
cake.
What I'm claiming is that I've transferred some (though not all) of
the burden of proof from my shoulders to the shoulders of an accuser.
To wit: If I've developed credible generational timelines from just
the set of wars listed in Stearns' Encyclopedia of History, then I've
proven something very significant: That the wars listed in Stearns
validate the GD methdology.
That fact alone is pretty significant. And this means that I'm NOT
"cherry-picking" wars, since I'm willing to consider all wars in
Stearns.
If someone points to another war, not listed in Stearns, then I can
evaluate it and show that it's not a crisis war. (I'm pretty
confident about this; if it's not in Stearns, it can't possibly be
important enough to be a crisis war. If somehow it turns out to
evaluate to a crisis war anyway, then I'll be in a total state of
shock.)
So I believe that the proposed rule that "A war is a crisis war if
and only if it's considered historically important and meets certain
other criteria" does indeed substantially decrease the amount of work
that I'm obligated to do.
Incidentally, slave uprisings and other "unrest events" can also be
crisis wars, so they're also important to me. Whether or not a slave
uprising is a crisis war can depend, for example, on whether the
uprising consisted of riots and demonstrations (analogous to the 1989
Tiananmen Square uprising), which means it's an awakening event, or
whether it becomes full scale war with massive violence. The 1994
Rwanda massacre wasn't a slave uprising, since the Hutus weren't
slaves, but the characteristics were the same as a crisis war. In
fact, any society with a "market-dominant minority" economy has
pretty much the same characteristics as a slave economy for the
purpose of determining crisis wars.
Sincerely,
John
John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
The Greatest Presidents
To all:
An article on the editorial page of today's Wall Street Journal is on
great presidents, and it ends with the following paragraph:
- Those who believe that history runs in cycles will be
interested to note that the three great presidents took office at
72-year intervals--Washington in 1789, Lincoln in 1861 and FDR in
1933--and that this November it will have been exactly 72 years since
the election of our last great president.
Do you think that they're on to something?
Sincerely,
John
John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
P.S.: The text of the article follows:
http://www.opinionjournal.com/pl/?id=110005196
PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP
What Makes a President Great?
Scholars finally begin giving Reagan his due.
BY JAMES TARANTO
Thursday, June 10, 2004 12:01 a.m. EDT
Ronald Reagan has had a hard time getting his due from scholars. In
1996 Arthur Schlesinger Jr. conducted a poll of historians asking them
to rank the presidents, and Mr. Reagan came in 25th out of 39, putting
him in the "low average" category. The Gipper had done only slightly
better in a Siena College survey two years earlier, finishing 20th out
of 41--below Bill Clinton (16th), who had been in office less than two
years, and well below Lyndon B. Johnson (13th). It's hard to agree
that the president who won the Cold War was less successful than the
one who escalated the Vietnam War.
The flaw in these studies is obvious. Because academics tend to be far
to the left of the general population, conservative presidents,
especially recent ones, usually get short shrift. (A C-Span survey in
1999, which included "professional presidential experts" as well as
historians, did rank Mr. Reagan 11th.)
Public opinion polls tell a different story. In February 2001 Gallup
asked Americans who was the greatest president in history. Mr. Reagan
finished first, with 18%. Yet while Gallup's results are ideologically
balanced, they also reflect a lack of historical perspective. When the
firm asked the same question in May 2003, 51% of respondents named a
post-1960 president. Among Democrats, 46% picked either John F.
Kennedy or Bill Clinton, while 41% of Republicans chose either Mr.
Reagan or George W. Bush. Whatever the merits of these four men, it
seems premature at best to declare them greater than the likes of
Washington and Lincoln.
In 2000 the Federalist Society came up with a way to remedy the flaws
in both types of surveys. It asked 78 scholars in history, law and
politics to rate the presidents on a five-point scale. "We tried to
choose approximately equal numbers of scholars who lean to the left
and to the right," explains Northwestern University's James Lindgren,
who analyzed the data. "Another way to express this is that we sought
to mirror what scholarly opinion might be on the counterfactual
assumption that the academy was politically representative of the
society in which we live and work."
Mr. Lindgren averaged the ratings for each of the 39 presidents
(George W. Bush was not yet elected, and William Henry Harrison and
James Garfield were omitted because they died shortly after taking
office) and divided them into six categories: great, near great, above
average, average, below average and failure. The results appeared in
November 2000 on OpinionJournal.com and have just been published as a
Wall Street Journal book, "Presidential Leadership: Rating the Best
and the Worst in the White House," which also includes an essay on
each president and several thematic chapters on presidential
leadership. (For excerpts, click here.) Some highlights:
(*) Three presidents made the cut as "great": George Washington,
Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt. They are the top three
finishers in most surveys of scholars.
(*) Eight presidents were judged "near great," including Mr. Reagan,
who finished eighth. Among them only James K. Polk (10th) served just
one term.
(*) Among recent presidents, only Mr. Reagan ranked as "near great."
JFK (18th) and LBJ (17th) were "above average," George H.W. Bush
(21st) and Bill Clinton (24th) "average," and Richard Nixon (33rd),
Gerald Ford (28th) and Jimmy Carter (30th) "below average."
(*) Mr. Clinton was the most controversial president--that is, the
scholars' rankings of him diverged more sharply than for anyone else.
Woodrow Wilson, who finished 11th overall, was the second most
controversial president, but the next three were all among the
post-1960 group: Mr. Reagan, Nixon and LBJ.
(*) Four presidents rated as failures: Andrew Johnson, Franklin
Pierce, Warren Harding and James Buchanan. Buchanan finished dead
last.
An obvious question is how the current President Bush would fare if
such a survey were conducted today. Arguably, it's too early to take
the measure of Mr. Bush's presidency, since its success or failure
will largely be determined by what happens in Iraq and whether he is
re-elected in November.
But if liberal and conservative scholars mirror the nation's partisan
divide, one may surmise that he would be very controversial--perhaps
even more so than his predecessor. His admirers and detractors would
perhaps cancel each other out, leaving him somewhere near the middle
of the pack. Yet partisan passions have a way of fading with time.
Lincoln and FDR both today rank as great, even though both, like Mr.
Bush, faced bitter partisan opposition while in office (and FDR still
has his critics).
George W. Bush could eventually end up joining the ranks of the
greats. The three great presidents have three things in common: All
faced unprecedented challenges, all responded to them boldly, and all
ultimately were successful. Mr. Bush so far meets two of these
criteria: History dealt him an unprecedented challenge in the form of
the 9/11 attacks, and no one can deny that he answered it with
boldness. If he is able to overcome the current troubles in Iraq, and
if he succeeds in his mission of combating Islamist terror by
promoting democracy in the Middle East, history will be far kinder to
him than are his contemporary critics.
Should this happen, the reputations of his predecessors are likely to
suffer, for they will come to be seen as having failed to address the
problems that came to a head on 9/11. Both Lincoln and FDR were
preceded by a series of presidents who today are held in low esteem:
Zachary Taylor (who ranks 31st), Millard Fillmore (35th), Franklin
Pierce (37th) and James Buchanan (39th); and Warren Harding (37th,
tied with Pierce), Calvin Coolidge (25th) and Herbert Hoover (29th).
The former group allowed the issue of slavery to fester until it
nearly destroyed the nation; the latter, fairly or not, are blamed for
the Depression.
George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton are likely to bear the brunt for not
dealing decisively with the gathering terrorist threat. Jimmy Carter
and Ronald Reagan can also be faulted here, but Mr. Reagan's
reputation is probably secure, since it rests on other
accomplishments, and Mr. Carter doesn't have much farther to fall.
Those who believe that history runs in cycles will be interested to
note that the three great presidents took office at 72-year
intervals--Washington in 1789, Lincoln in 1861 and FDR in 1933--and
that this November it will have been exactly 72 years since the
election of our last great president.
Mr. Taranto is editor of OpinionJournal.com, author of its Best of
the Web Today column, and co-editor, with Leonard Leo of the
Federalist Society, of "Presidential Leadership: Rating the Best and
the Worst in the White House," just out from Wall Street Journal Books
and available from the OpinionJournal bookstore.
I posted this very same article not even 30 minutes before you posted this copy, right here. Perhaps you actually should pay attention to the rest of the site (including the political topics, which you say you avoid) instead of just focusing on your own topics, which have a whiff of self-promotion. That said, good work on getting the editorial cartoon linked. I couldn't manage to do that. As for what you bolded, it looks like the author is paying attention. Whether it's to us, someone else, or just the data, I don't know yet.
"Dans cette epoque cybernetique
Pleine de gents informatique."
Re: The Greatest Presidents
I saw James Taranto on CNN this morning, talking about his
Presidential Leadership book, and he mentioned something that I
hadn't previously noticed: The second most controversial president in
history (behind Clinton) is Woodrow Wilson, according to the survey.
This bears on something that's come up several times in this topic:
The disagreement over World War I. Although few people
(acknowledging Marc's correction that it's not "no people") objected
to our fighting in WW II, entering WW I was very
controversial, and is still controversial to this day. This kind of
controvery is one of the factors that make WW I a non-crisis war for
America, while WW II was a crisis war.
Why is WW I still so controversial after so many years? One possible
reason to consider is that it took so many years for America to enter
the war that the antiwar movement had plenty of time to build up
steam before we got involved. If we had gotten involved right
away, then the antiwar movement would still have developed, but
getting involved would have been a fait accompli, and so less
controversial. Crisis wars gather energy as time goes on,
until they reach a final climax, but non-crisis wars are supposed to
lose energy with time, and fizzle out rather than end in a big
climax. By entering WW I near the end, America violated that rule.
Perhaps that's one explanation about why WW I and Woodrow Wilson are
still so controversial today.
Sincerely,
John
John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
Crisis War Criteria
Dear Mike,
When you wrote that you've given up trying to understand generational
dynamics stocks I almost went into a state of shock. I realize that
I don't always write as clearly as I should, but what you were
telling me was that I had been almost completely incoherent,
indicating that I must be totally out of touch with something.
I went back to square one to try to figure out how I got to this
point. When I read The Fourth Turning more than 2 1/2 years
ago, and reread several times in the following few months, the
generational changes didn't always make complete sense to me, but the
"Fourth Turning" concept was always crystal clear. What I did since
then is to take S&H's Fourth Turning concept, refine it so that it
applies to regions, and tested that against hundreds of regions, very
successfully.
I'm really sorry I screwed this up so badly in the past, but I would
be very grateful if you'd take a look at the following material, and
tell me whether you now understand what methodology I'm using and the
results I'm getting and, as a separate issue, whether you agree that
the results are useful.
I've revised the evaluation criteria for crisis wars, and I've
re-evaluated dozens of wars using these criteria, and provided
summaries in the following messages.
In each case, I evaluated the war on its own merits. I didn't use
any cycle information. I simply asked, "Does this war evaluate to a
crisis war or not, using the stated criteria."
I've included the following information:
(*) Revised evaluation criteria for a crisis war.
(*) Evaluations of American wars since 1776, including separate
evaluations of other participants.
(*) Evaluations of all French religious wars from 1491 to 1714. I
tried to include all wars, and I evaluated each war on its own
merits, according to the crisis war criteria.
(*) Evaluations of African wars. This is some work that I started a
couple of months ago. I decided to include this because this
evaluation is largely incomplete, but it shows the kinds of
information I look for in doing the evaluations.
(*) Evaluations of Roman wars based on buried coin hoards. This is a
summary of material I've previously posted.
I hope that this time what I've written makes enough sense so that at
least you can understand what I've been doing. And I hope that this
will make enough sense that you'll agree that it's a valid,
meaningful analysis of generational cycles.
Sincerely,
John
John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
Re: Crisis War Criteria
Revised Evaluation Criteria for Crisis Wars
(New section with Algorithmic Evaluation Criteria - added June 18,
2004)
Mike: The following are the revised criteria for crisis wars.
John
Americans don't understand crisis wars, even though they happen all
the time. Americans don't even really understand their own crisis
wars - the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, and World War II.
There are in fact two distinctly different kinds of wars that occur
in any society. The vast majority of wars are non-crisis wars (also
called mid-cycle wars). These are political wars, fought to achieve
some political goal. Frequently they're fought with little
enthusiasm from the general public, and there is usually a political
resolution that restores roughly the balance that existed before the
war. Some societies have wars of this type as a way of life.
Frequently these wars are forgotten within a generation. (For
example, the Korean War is almost forgotten today. Even the Vietnam
War per se is forgotten today, except for the politics
surrounding it.)
But crisis wars are different. They have political goals, but they
have an energy all their own, often genocidal in nature. The energy
increases until an extremely violent and historical climax is reached.
If there's a political resolution, it's almost always with the
intention of forcing compromises so that no such war will ever happen
again. Crisis wars are not forgotten by the nations participating in
them, even centuries later.
Any war might begin slowly, as the participants continue to hope for
a peaceful resolution. In non-crisis wars, there sometimes is a
peaceful resolution that ends the war quickly. But crisis wars do
not end peacefully. They continue to gather energy until they
explode in a final crisis climax.
In The Fourth Turning, Strauss and Howe describe what happens
during the climax of a crisis war: "The Crisis climax is human
history's equivalent to nature's raging typhoon, the kind that sucks
all surrounding matter into a single swirl of ferocious energy.
Anything not lashed down goes flying; anything standing in the way
gets flattened. Normally occurring late in the Fourth Turning, the
climax gathers energy from an accumulation of unmet needs, unpaid
bills, and unresolved problems. It then spends that energy on an
upheaval whose direction and dimension were beyond comprehension
during the prior Unraveling era. The climax shakes a society to its
roots, transforms its institutions, redirects its purposes, and marks
its people (and its generations) for life. The climax can end in
triumph, or tragedy, or some combination of both. Whatever the event
and whater the outcome, a society passes through a great gate of
history, fundamentally altering the course of civilization."
This kind of climax, occurring after the war has gathered energy
sometimes for years, is what defines a crisis war.
There are other secondary criteria that distinguish a crisis war, but
these other criteria are important only because they help us
determine historically whether the kind of climax just described
actually occurred. The secondary criteria indicate whether or not
the war is gathering energy or losing energy over time. For example,
the presence of an active antiwar (pacifist) movement is almost
always a sign that the public has little energy for the war, and that
it's not a crisis war.
Gauging Public Attitudes
The main factor that distinguishes a crisis war is the attitude of
the public toward the war and the enemy. In crisis wars, the public
feels a visceral anger and hatred at the enemy, a fear for the
country's survival or at least for its way of life, and a desire to
achieve total victory, no matter what the cost. In many crisis wars,
this rage becomes genocidal.
Americans today can understand this feeling. We can turn on the
television today and see news stories about the hatred of
Palestinians and Islamic extremists toward Israel and America,
towards Jews and Americans. For many, this hatred extends to Europe
and to the West in general. In return, Americans can probe their own
hatred toward Islamic extremists, especially in the months following
the 9/11 attacks.
Americans can also remember (or read) that they didn't have these
feelings during the Vietnam or Korean wars. Few if any people hated
the Vietnamese or Koreans, and most people didn't even know where
Vietnam and Korea were.
But Americans can also read news accounts of attitudes in World War
II. German and Japanese documents of the time show clearly how much
the Germans and Japanese hated the English and Americans. And the
feeling was returned, as shown by how the Americans firebombed and
destroyed Dresden and Tokyo, and then dropped two nuclear weapons on
Japanese cities. These are the kinds of attitudes that you have to
be able to gauge to assess whether a war is a crisis or non-crisis
war.
The difference between crisis and non-crisis American wars is as
plain as the nose on your face if you know just a little bit of
history. The Revolutionary War, Civil War and World War II were
fought with a great deal of energy and determination. The
Mexican-American war, the Spanish-American war, World War I, the
Korean war, the Vietnamese war and the Gulf War all caused huge
political debates and internal dissension in America. One
interesting fact is that a recent historical assessment of all
American Presidents found that the second most controversial President
(after Clinton) was Woodrow Wilson. Why? Because Wilson's decision
finally to enter World War I is still hotly debated and highly
controversial even today. By contrast, there is little or no
controversy over Franklin Roosevelt's decision to declare war on Japan
after the bombing of Pearl Harbor.
So it's possible to evaluate American wars simply because we have so
much information about them. Unfortunately, such information rarely
exists for historical wars. As a result, all we can do is look for
clues in the historical descriptions to indicate the public attitude
toward the enemy and the war.
That's the purpose of the criteria used for evaluating a given war.
These criteria do not directly tell us what the attitudes of the
people were, but they do provide indirect evidence of the public
attitudes.
Criteria indicating crisis war
A crisis war is like a ball rolling downhill. It may (or may not)
need a push to start, and it may be temporary stopped by obstacles on
the way down. But it keeps gathering energy, and at some point
its momentum becomes so great that it's unstoppable, until it reaches
the bottom of the hill in an explosive climax that forever changes
the landscape.
The criteria we're describing measure the rolling of this ball of
war. Since we can't measure public attitudes during historical wars,
we look for "clues" in the historical descriptions of the wars to see
if the criteria for a crisis war are met. If the clues are
ambiguous, then it's necessary to refer to additional sources to get
more information. In my experience, it's rare that an ambiguous
situation remains ambiguous for long. Whether a war is a crisis war
becomes abundantly clear very quickly.
There are two major criteria that identify crisis wars, and several
secondary criteria. The secondary criteria do not by themselves
necessarily indicate a crisis war, but they often point to way to
seeing how the major criteria should be evaluated.
There are two major criteria that identify crisis wars:
Violent, explosive climax. The clues for this in historical
descriptions are huge genocidal massacres, devastation or destruction
of a large part of a nation or society, or a "D-Day" type willingness
to sacrifice everything to win. A massacre occurring in just one or
two battles is not enough to make it a crisis war; it must be violent
over a period of at least months, and involve the killing or
displacement of large segments of the enemy population, and possibly
risking the nation's own population.
Large historical consequences. A crisis war is usually
remembered for centuries by the nation or society that took place in
it. It almost always ends in imposition of conditions and
compromises designed to ensure that no such war will ever happen
again. If the war contain atrocities, then the bitterness and hatred
gets regurgitated over and over, for centuries to come, in new fault
line wars. A war that's quickly forgotten cannot be a crisis war.
The following are secondary criteria that identify crisis
wars:
Secret mobilization. Example: Germany in 1930s. A country
that mobilizes for war in secret is usually preparing to strike first
in a crisis war. Why? Because secret mobilization requires the
cooperation of a great deal of the public, and indicates very broad
support for the impending war.
Surprise attack on enemy. Related to the previous point is
that a surprise attack on an adversary usually indicates a crisis
war.
"Spiraling out of control". Examples: Rwanda, 1994; French
Revolution, 1792. If a war, especially a civil war, seems to spring
from nowhere, it almost always indicates widespread public desire for
war and vengeance.
Refusal to surrender. Example: Germany 1944. If a nation
continues fighting even when defeat is clearly unavoidable, it's most
likely a crisis war.
Criteria indicating non-crisis war
A non-crisis (mid-cycle) war is like pushing a ball uphill. It has
to be constantly pushed, and if you stop pushing, then the ball
stops. Depending on the hill, the ball might roll by itself for a
little while, but it always comes to a stop without more pushing.
Finally, you get tired of pushing, and the war stops.
The main criterion for a non-crisis war are that it doesn't satisfy
the major criteria for a crisis war.
The following are secondary criteria that identify
non-crisis wars:
Open planning and mobilization. Examples: 1991 Gulf War,
1982(?) Falklands war. If a country openly plans for war and
mobilizes, and open states conditions under which war will or will
not occur, then the war, if it occurs, is almost always a non-crisis
war.
Exogenous cause of war. Example: Germany in WWI. If a country
is pulled into a war because of an exogenous factor, such as a treaty
with another country or an unexpected invasion, then a non-crisis war
is indicated. This situation is a weak indicator since it can also
arise in crisis wars, but in the absence of other factors it indicates
a non-crisis war.
"Top-down war." Example: Korean War. This refers to
situations where a politician leads a country to war with little
enthusiasm or support from the people.
Strong antiwar (pacifist) movement and political turmoil.
Example: Vietnam War, WW I. This indicates lack of public support
for the war.
Surprising capitulation or unclear conclusion. Example:
Vietnam war, Korean war. If there's no clear winner to the war, or
if a nation capitulates or withdraws before it's necessary to do so,
then it's most likely a non-crisis war.
Punishment of losers by winners. Example: Gulf War against
Iraq, WW I against Germany. This is a complex criterion and really
requires further study, but the overwhelming feeling after a crisis
war should be that there's plenty of blame to go around and to impose
conditions to guarantee that another such war won't occur. If
punitive conditions are imposed by the victor, then it means that the
crisis war has yet to be fought.
Mixed Wars
Some wars are more difficult to evaluate because it's a crisis war
for one participant and a non-crisis war for the other participant.
In these cases, there may be no final "violent explosion," since the
non-crisis participant may simply capitulate rather than face that
kind of vengeance. An example is the colonists (crisis) versus the
English in the Revolutionary War.
In these cases, it's necessary to use secondary factors to evaluate
the participant.
Algorithmic Evaluation Criteria
(New section - added June 18, 2004)
The above descriptive criteria are not specific enough to provide
historians with a specific algorithm for historians who are
attempting to evaluate historical wars.
The following is intended to provide such an algorithm.
To determine whether a given war is a crisis war for a particular
nation or society, apply the Evaluation Algorithm.
Sincerely,Code:The Evaluation Algorithm is in four steps, to be applied in order. Each step might produce three results: determines C or N This step determines a "crisis" or "non-crisis" result, respectively, and there is no need to perform any more steps (although in practice we often do so for illustrative purposes) supports N or C This step supports a determination of N or C, but it is not determinative, so more steps must be performed. can't be determined (usually because of lack of historical information) If different steps produce conflicting results, then the first step which produces the "determines x" result is the one that counts. Evaluation algorithm. **** Step 1: Evaluate Historical significance. Determine whether the general public in a nation or society remembers the war, remembers what the war was about, remembers why the war was important. In America today, the Korean War is all but forgotten, so it can't be a crisis war, but most people in the general public have some idea of the significance of the Revolutionary War, the Civil War and World War II. However, a large historically significant war must still be evaluated for each participant separately, since it might be a non-crisis war for some participants. Evaluation: Historically significant war -- supports C Forgotten war -- determines N **** Step 2: Determine intensity of genocidal violence A political war might be fought for a logical reason, but a crisis war is fought for visceral emotional reasons, for blood lust, for vengeance, to prove that you can make your enemy pay for his mistakes. Here are some of the factors that indicate that a war exhibits what I call "genocidal violence": highly secretive mobilization, with the intent to from other countries the war intention massive surprise attack on the enemy a pursued desire for "ethnic cleansing" a sustained program of mass murders, mass rapes, massacres, destruction of entire towns (with inhabitants), forced relocation of huge populations of people - sustained over a period of months (a single battle doesn't count) nation at end is "devastated" or perpetrates devastation a "D-Day" type mass assault, a willingness to sacrifice ones own forces for victory "spiraling out of control" a refusal to capitulate, a willingness to fight to the death, even when defeat is almost certain Note that a crisis war may begin slowly, with some political hesitation, and both participants may continue to hope that the war will be resolved peacefully. But a crisis war will gather energy as time goes on, leading to an extremely violent conclusion. It's the violence conclusion that's typical of a crisis war. Evaluation: High genocidal violence - determines C Intermittent, stalemated, low-level violence - supports N **** Step 3: Determine level of political considerations Some wars are pursued for political considerations, while others are pursued for visceral feelings of fury and hatred. A judgment must be made of the level that politics plays in the conduct of the war. Here are some factors that indicate that a war is highly politicized: use of reasonable triggering political objectives for initial mobilization or termination ("we won't invade if you withdraw from Kuwait" or "we've driven you from Kuwait so we'll stop now") exogenous cause of the war (peace treaty, invasion by someone else) "top-down war" - initiated by politicians with little sustained public support "revanche," rather than revenge open and non-secret mobilization, without exceptional speed strong antiwar or pacifist movement lots of political controversy, little political unity political pauses (such as "Christmas truces") stalemates willingness to capitulate before necessary desire to save lives rather than fight to the death A war may be somewhat politicized at the beginning, but whether it's a highly politicized war depends on whether the politicization continues to the end. Evaluation: Highly politicized war -- determines N Nonpolitical pursuite of war -- supports C **** Step 4: Determine resolution After a crisis war, it's everyone's desire to see that "nothing like that must ever happen again," and this should be the overriding feeling. As a result, the participants will impose painful compromises whose intention is to prevent another war for as long as possible. These compromises may be imposed by the victor on the loser, or they may be imposed by international conference or treaty. Usually these compromises lead to substantial changes in the nature of the nation itself (such as America's 1945 "decision" to change from an isolationist nation to "policemen of the world.") Probably the most common form of crisis war resolution or imposition is the adjustment and assignment of national boundaries to match populations on the ground, so that further war will be unnecessary, at least for a few decades. But the motivation must be to prevent another major war. In non-crisis wars, there is usually no such resolution. Sometimes there is an international conference or an imposed resolution, but either the resolution does nothing, or else its purpose is to punish or to exact reparations. If this is the motivation of the resolution, then it's likely to be a non-crisis war. (And incidentally it's also likely that the punitive impositions will lead to a crisis war in a decade or two.) Evaluation: Painful resolution to prevent future war: supports C Resolution imposes punishment or reparations: supports N
John
John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
