Dear Tim,

I've never really looked at Ireland. There's a concise history of
Ireland at:
http://members.tripod.com/~JerryDesmond/index-2.html

Just glancing through this history, I get the impression that before
the 1600s, Ireland's and England's crisis wars were sometimes
separated by a few years, although they converged in the War of the
Roses and again in the English Civil War.

After that, things get very confusing. The plantation laws of the
1600s permanently inflamed the conflict between Catholics and
Protestants, and after then there were so many flareups that it would
really take looking at several more sources in detail to get it
straight.

There was clearly a huge awakening period in the 1840s, protesting
the 1799 Act of Union.

However, the Potato Famine or Great Hunger occurred in 1845-49. I
have a theory, as yet largely unexamined, that something like the
Potato Famine could have an effect on the generational timelines
because it killed so many people, and therefore has some of the
characteristics of a crisis war. The "purpose" of any crisis war is
to thin the population, so the potato famine might have delayed the
next crisis war. One thing is certain: the level of conflict between
Protestants and Catholics multiplied many times over, because of
bitterness and hatred over England's policies during the Potato
Famine.

The next crisis war appears to have occurred after World War I, when
Ireland was largely sympathetic to the German side. The Easter
Uprising was a brief rebellion in 1916, and the main Irish Civil War
was in 1920-23. If this analysis is right, then it would confirm the
view that the Potato Famine had the same effect as a major crisis war
that changed the Irish generational timeline. If this is true, then
it has a significant theoretical input to generational dynamics.

Starting with "Bloody Sunday II" in 1972, there were some 20-25 years
of terrorism and low-level violence. This does not appear to me to
be a crisis war, which would tend to indicate that Ireland is
currently in the same Fourth Turning crisis period as England.

Sorry for the vagueness, but I've found that when I try to put
something together based on a single internet source I come to grief.
But I would guess that the above outline is at least mostly correct.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Vince Lamb-interesting comments.

John Xenakis-from prints outs from the paleo web site I laboriously copied Steve Ryan's lists onto the Irish thread. It is only for the last 2-3 centuries that he listed the generations. Please scroll down till you find his description of the Potatoe Famine anomaly.

Originally Posted by Tim Walker

Vince Lamb-interesting comments.

John Xenakis-from prints outs from the paleo web site I laboriously copied Steve Ryan's lists onto the Irish thread. It is only for the last 2-3 centuries that he listed the generations. Please scroll down till you find his description of the Potatoe Famine anomaly.

OK, I need help with this. I've tried to search on "Ireland" and
"Irish" and "famine," but I can't find what you're referring to.
Am I looking in the wrong place?

John

What do we mean when a war is said to be remembered? It seems to me if a particular war is deemed very significant by the general public-one that is decisive, that makes a difference-it will become part of the...folk lore? folk memory? What is the best word?

If the war is deemed to have had an uplifting outcome it may become part of the national mystique-consider the American Revolution. If not, well, in Dixie the Civil War became the lost cause. (come to think of it, both wars were associated with new symbols, the stars & stripes and the Cofederate flag).

Oops! This web site, Beyond America forum, Ireland thread.

John:

Marc has shown a way to view posts on the old site (Thanks Marc!). Take a look at my August 21, 2000 post that provides an outline my thinking towards the saeculum at that time. It contains both the predictions of a secular bear market starting around 2000:

I identified a stock cycle in 1995 that projected the Dow would get to the 10-15K level and then start a long (~15 year) bear market. Since then, I refined the model and now believe that the bear market has already started, or will start very soon.

and a Crisis turning starting around the same time:

Assuming complete adoption of the Dentian pattern we should see a ~70 year K-cycle and ~70 year saeculum in operation today. This would imply that Kondratiev winter and the Crisis period should be starting now, most probably with a major market peak, which is what the stock cycle model predicted.

Consider that, quite apart from a fault line, a problem may appear that is too significant to ignore. Eric (Meece) the Green posted that our Crisis is not about terrorism. Well, the last Crisis was not about environmentlism yet the Dust Bowl appeared.

I have imagined that environmental problems and resource shortages would be big themes this time around. Unforetunately, there are multiple fault lines we could stumble over-say, nuclear war with North Korea or China.

Even if we avoid WWIII, even if we exercise a sort of triage in terms of international commitments, we may be stuck with some sort of problem-a sore or blister-that will be difficult to ignore. For example, due to geographic proximity we may have to divert resources to Haiti...

The question that comes to mind is...what term should we use for such a problem?

How did you gain access to the paleo web site?

Dear Tim,

Originally Posted by Tim Walker

> What do we mean when a war is said to be remembered? It seems to
> me if a particular war is deemed very significant by the general
> public-one that is decisive, that makes a difference-it will
> become part of the...folk lore? folk memory? What is the best
> word?

> If the war is deemed to have had an uplifting outcome it may
> become part of the national mystique-consider the American
> Revolution. If not, well, in Dixie the Civil War became the lost
> cause. (come to think of it, both wars were associated with new
> symbols, the stars & stripes and the Cofederate flag).

I started getting into this topic of "forgotten wars" when Mike
pointed out that I was making an unconscious assumption -- that all
crisis wars are wars that appear in all the history books. It's true
that I had made this assumption, but it also makes sense that for a
war to be a crisis war, it must have made a generational impact, so
it can't really be a forgotten war. As you say, if it's significant
enough to be a crisis war, then it has to be part of the cultural
memory, or the folk lore or the folk memory.

But what's a forgotten war? It was surprising to me to realize that
the Korean War is a forgotten war, but in fact it's true. Try to ask
any person under age 40 to tell you what issues the Korean War was
about, or even when it occurred, and few people will know.

The same is true of the Vietnam War for anyone under age 30, but here
it's a little different. Most people will at least have heard
of the Vietnam War, and will often associate antiwar
demonstrations with it, but they still won't know anything about what
caused it, or what is was about, and most people won't even be able
to find Vietnam on a globe.

The same is true of WW I, the Spanish-American War, the
Mexican-American War or the War of 1812. They'll know that WW I
involved Germany, that the Spanish-American war involved Spain, and
that the Mexican-American war involved Mexico, but that'll be it.

But now ask someone about WW II or the Civil War or the Revolutionary
War. Almost everybody knows something about those wars. They know
that WW II involved Hitler and D-Day and Pearl Harbor. They know
that the Civil War involved the North and the South and slavery. And
they know that the Revolutionary War involved independence of England
and George Washington.

That may not be much, but at least it's something. In the case of
the other wars, it's almost nothing.

For older wars, we have to look at historical accounts of the region.
For example, when I recently studied African history, I learned that
there was an 1820s war called the Mfecane that almost anyone in
Africa will know about, but I'd never heard of it and I doubt that
most Americans have.

Another issue is dull wars vs exciting wars, and this came up with
respect to the War of the Spanish Succession. WSS is historically
dull, because no one really won, but historians say that it's
incredibly important because of its impact in establishing the
political geography of Europe for 80 years. On the other hand, the
French Revolution is an exciting war because of its symbolic
importance and because of Napoleon.

The concept of a "forgotten war" is a troubling one, because it's so
subjective. Nonetheless, there seems to be something important about
the fact that the Korean War is forgotten but the Revolutionary War
is not, and the problem is to capture exactly what that means.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Tim,

Originally Posted by Tim Walker

> Consider that, quite apart from a fault line, a problem may appear
> that is too significant to ignore. Eric (Meece) the Green posted
> that our Crisis is not about terrorism. Well, the last Crisis was
> not about environmentlism yet the Dust Bowl appeared.

> I have imagined that environmental problems and resource shortages
> would be big themes this time around. Unfortunately, there are
> multiple fault lines we could stumble over-say, nuclear war with
> North Korea or China.

> Even if we avoid WWIII, even if we exercise a sort of triage in
> terms of international commitments, we may be stuck with some sort
> of problem-a sore or blister-that will be difficult to ignore. For
> example, due to geographic proximity we may have to divert
> resources to Haiti...

> The question that comes to mind is...what term should we use for
> such a problem?

I agree with you that environment and resource shortages will be big
themes in the "clash of civilizations." We had a foretaste of this
in the 1991 Gulf War, when Saddam exploded an oil drilling station in
order to fill the Persian Gulf with oil, and then set all the oil
wells in Kuwait on fire. I still remember the CNN reporter standing
in front of one of those oil wells, calling it a "theme park from
hell."

It's obviously the intent of the Islamic terrorists to do as much of
that as possible, so we can expect to see an enormous amount of
environmental damage, not even counting nuclear weapons.

That reminds me: I recently read that there's a serious polio
epidemic developing in forest west Africa. We'll have to add that to
AIDS, SARS and other epidemics that will increasingly engulf the
world.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Mike,

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> Take a look at my August 21, 2000 post
> http://web.archive.org/web/200012050...re/a.cgi/3--41
> that provides an outline my thinking towards the saeculum at that
> time. It contains both the predictions of a secular bear market
> starting around 2000:

> >>> Quote: I identified a stock cycle in 1995 that projected the
> Dow would get to the 10-15K level and then start a long (~15 year)
> bear market. Since then, I refined the model and now believe that
> the bear market has already started, or will start very soon.

> and a Crisis turning starting around the same time:

> >>> Quote: Assuming complete adoption of the Dentian pattern we
> should see a ~70 year K-cycle and ~70 year saeculum in operation
> today. This would imply that Kondratiev winter and the Crisis
> period should be starting now, most probably with a major market
> peak, which is what the stock cycle model predicted.

I've been looking through Modelski's book, and I have a different
interpretation of many of the things you're describing. I've posted
bits and pieces of this before, but Modelski's book has helped put it
all together into a more complete proposal.

When I read Modelski's book, or when I read the old web site page that
you referred me to, all I ever see is a lot of confusion. You get
different results than Dent, and Modelski identifies numerous wave
cycles, all of which appear to conflict with each other. I don't
come out of this literature with the feeling that anyone is sure of
anything.

For example, here are two tables from Modelski's book:





These two tables list numerous different conflicting models, none of
which appears to work very well.

Modelski himself seems to be saying this:

Originally Posted by Modelski pp. 49-50

> The argument that long economic waves do not exist has always had
> a number of supporters. This is hardly surprising because this
> argument has remained the majority opinion on the subject
> throughout the twentieth century. There are a number of empirical
> analyses that support this point of view. Conybeare (1990) is an
> example of such an analysis that also looked at the relationship
> between war, measured in terms of battle deaths and price cycles
> (spatiotemporal boundaries: world systems in the late fifteenth to
> twentieth centuries). Cycles with strict or regular periodicities
> were not found in either series. In addition, no statistically
> significant Granger causal relationship was found to work in
> either direction -- from war to prices or prices to war.

This kind of evidence against cycles sounds pretty convincing to me.

Modelski points out that many of the models fail even just for the
twentieth century:

Originally Posted by Modelski pp. 49-50

> Several of the models listed in table 2.1, along with a large
> number of other international relations theories, were based
> explicitly on the World War I experience. What would be more
> desirable is an argument that could handle World Wars I and II
> simultaneously without resorting to an ad hoc explanation (or
> simply writing off one of the wars as an exception to the gneeral
> pattern). The two world wars of the twentieth century are simply
> too important to dismiss as exceptioms, especially if the war /
> long-term growth linkage is limited to the past two centuries. If
> one of these wars appears to be an exception to the rule, it may
> be that either the rule is being misinterpreted or that the rule
> underwent some type of change during the twentieth century.

After working with crisis wars and non-crisis wars, this really
doesn't surprise me. I've been impressed over and over by the
tremendous difference between crisis and non-crisis wars. In
a word, crisis wars are genocidal and non-crisis wars are political.
This differences is so pervasive and so enormous that there's really
absolutely no reason to expect any other data series (like
prices) to correlate to both types of wars. We're simply talking
about two things that are almost completely unrelated (except, of
course, that they're both wars).

The same is true of ordinary recessions and what I would call
"generational bubbles." For example, the 1987 stock crash occurred
at a time when all the senior financial managers still personally
remembered the depression, and were very risk-aversive, but the late
90s stock bubble came about when senior managers were high
risk-seeking. Once again, it's not reasonable to believe that
ordinary cycles and generational bubbles are so completely different
that they shouldn't be related.

What are the generational bubbles? Here's my tentative list:

1560s Spanish gold bubble (??)
1637 Tulipomania bubble
1721 South Sea bubble
1789 French monarchy credit bubble (bankruptcy)
1857 Panic of 1857
1929 Great Depression
2000 Nasdaq bubble crash

My hypothesis is that the effects of these generational bubbles are
completely independent of any other factors in ordinary
economic cycles, and that they should not be compared.

I was quite startled when I first noticed the cycling that appeared
to occur in the stock market, if you ignore the generational bubbles.
I've posted the following graph several times:



I was startled by how smooth stock index graph is if you ignore the
bubbles. I labeled the upturns according my intuitive feeling that
they were caused by different technologies.

Modelski seems to confirm this intuition for the K-cycles, when he
says:

Originally Posted by Modelski p. 5

> K-waves arise from the bunching of basic innovations that set in
> motion technological revolutions that create lead industrial
> sectors; basic innovations respond to unmet needs and market
> demand and must therefore be regarded as activating growth
> processes that are in part endogenous.

and

Originally Posted by Modelski p. 130

> We now turn to the question: what shape did the global economy
> process assume over the past millennium. The short answer is:
> K-waves. K-waves do not just "nest" within the world economy,
> but they are driving forces behind global economic development.

This makes sense to me, and I would not be surprised if the economic
cycles correlate to the K-waves, provided that the generational
bubbles are ignored.

In other words, I can imagine that technology and global economic
development clearly should affect ordinary economic cycles, but why
would they ever affect generational bubbles?

Generational bubbles are not related to rational economic decisions.
You can read about the 1920s or 1990s and know that. So there's
absolutely no reason to expect K-waves to relate in any way to
generational bubbles.

This explains why all the different cycle models get different
results, and why they all fail. When a researcher tries to match up
the K-waves to the economic cycle, he starts with largest
perturbations, the generational bubbles, and immediately goes astray,
because there's no relationship between generational bubbles and
any other data.

Therefore we come to:

Hypothesis #1: K-waves correlate with economic cycles,
<u>but only when generational bubbles are ignored.</u>

Have you ever tested this hypothesis? If not, since you have all the
data would it be possible for you to easily run some correlation
tests to determine whether this makes sense?

(You may already have done this. I have a vague memory about a year
ago of you saying that you ignore some part of the 1930s because it's
an anomaly.)

The same problem occurs when trying to match long waves up to wars.

Technology and global economic development could certain drive
political mid-cycle wars. Technology naturally takes some time to
move from nation to nation, and the country that gets new technology
first may well be tempted to use it in an "unnecessary war."

But crisis wars are different. The people of Paris didn't initiate
the Reign of Terror because the guillotine was hi-tech. They would
have used ordinary hatchets if they'd needed to.

So this leads to:

Hypothesis #2: Long waves correlate with wars, <u>but
only when crisis wars are ignored.</u>

If this turns out to be true, it would be extremely valuable, since
it would help us understand mid-cycle wars, just as the generational
paradigm helps us understand crisis wars.

There's also something else that occurs to me. If I think back over
the last few weeks over the wars that you questioned me about the
most, I think I get the following list:

1530s Religious wars
1590s Religious wars
1688 Glorious revolution / War of League of Augsburg
1750s French and Indian Wars
1812 War of 1812

I'm inferring that these wars are of particular importance in what
you've been doing, but they seem to form a generational cycle of
their own.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Steve Ryan mentioned a circa 1100 Irish crisis that was little documented. Note-this was a century after Brian Boru broke Viking power, the last successful crisis in Ireland until the 20th century.

This was a struggle over who would rule, a fight over the High Kingship. Pestilence carried off a quarter of the population during this time (sapping the enthusiasm for war?). This was a muddled crisis, with no clear cut losers (except, obviously, those who lost their lives).

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

These two tables list numerous different conflicting models, none of which appears to work very well.

And you have added another one--welcome to the club!

This kind of evidence against cycles sounds pretty convincing to me.

Your cycle too?

I've been impressed over and over by the tremendous difference between crisis and non-crisis wars. In
a word, crisis wars are genocidal and non-crisis wars are political.

Tremendous difference in your eyes. These other workers clearly see their cycles too.

The same is true of ordinary recessions and what I would call
"generational bubbles." For example, the 1987 stock crash occurred
at a time when all the senior financial managers still personally
remembered the depression...

Now wait a minute. A 60ish manager in 1987 was not active in the 1930's this was more than 50 years earlier.

What are the generational bubbles? Here's my tentative list:
1560s Spanish gold bubble (??)
1637 Tulipomania bubble
1721 South Sea bubble
1789 French monarchy credit bubble (bankruptcy)
1857 Panic of 1857
1929 Great Depression
2000 Nasdaq bubble crash

This isn't a definition, just a list. I asked you before why you picked 1857 and ignored the bigger Panics in 1837, 1873 and 1893. And what is the "Spanish gold bubble"?

In other words, I can imagine that technology and global economic
development clearly should affect ordinary economic cycles, but why
would they ever affect generational bubbles?

Since you don't define what a generational bubble is, it is sort of difficult to talk about them.

Therefore we come to:

Hypothesis #1: K-waves correlate with economic cycles,
<u>but only when generational bubbles are ignored.</u>

The K-wave IS an economic cycle. Generational bubbles (if I knew what these were) would probably be one too.

Have you ever tested this hypothesis? If not, since you have all the data would it be possible for you to easily run some correlation
tests to determine whether this makes sense?

I can't really test it when I don't know what a generational bubble is.

But crisis wars are different.

Like generational bubbles this is an ill-defined category. "Genocidal energy" is a fuzzy thing. Most of the war stuff I have seen relate wars to the rise and fall of great powers. For example, the WSS is the Modelski scheme is part of a period of "Global War". Several of your "crisis wars" occur in Modelski's "global war" period, e.g. the Armada, the WSS, Napoleonic Wars, and WW II. Two of your crisis wars, the 30 years war and the FP war do not.

Immanual Wallerstein has an alternate war cycle in which the 30 years war, the Napoleonic wars and WW II figure prominently. These define a 150 year cycle of which your crisis war cycle in a binary harmonic.

In this cycle concept Spain's power is decisively broken after the 30YW (a crisis war). It cracks after the Armada (a crisis war), but Spain isn't finished until the 30YW. Now it's France's turn. France's power cracks in the WSS (a crisis war) but France isn't defeated until 1815 (a crisis war). Now its Britain's turn. The rise of a powerful unified Germany after the FP war (a crisis war) represents a "cracking" in British power. Britain's days as a power end with WW II (a crisis war). Now its America's turn. We experience "cracking" with the WOT (a crisis war) and so on.

Now this is what I think of when I consider your crisis wars. I am sure you have nothing like this in mind. But your idea of "genocidal energy" doesn't mean anything to me. I can't put the WOT and WW II into the same category--either "genocidal" or "energetic". We are going out of our way to minimize casualties so it's hardly genocidal. The WOT seems to me to be the very opposite of energetic. No sacrifices are being asked of the general populace. Taxes were cut, there is no draft, rationing or price controls. It's like a milder version of the Cold War, a "not war" as Saari calls them. And thank God for that--in this day of nuclear weapons a war with "genocidal energy" would likely kill most of us.

I'm inferring that these wars are of particular importance in what
you've been doing, but they seem to form a generational cycle of
their own.

Nah, they aren't important to what I am doing. Remember my saeculum thinking isn't based on wars.

-

Dear Mike,

First off, as you're very well aware, Generational Dynamics has
absolutely nothing to do with any of the cyclic claims in Modelski's
book. As far as I'm aware, the only people who have developed this
kind of generational analysis are Strauss and Howe in The Fourth
Turning, which is the subject of this forum.

If we're getting into the "which methodology is better" discussion, I
guess only time will tell, but yes, I am absolutely certain that
Generational Dynamics is far superior to anything in Modelski.

With regard to the specific prediction of stock prices for the next
few years, it might be worthwhile pointing out (again!) that my
prediction that stocks will fall to half their current prices is not
based on just one single methodology, but on several methodologies,
including those based on the P/E ratio, your own P/R ratio,
exponential growth analysis, and the Fourth Turning prophecies by
Strauss and Howe.

I've answered all your questions, and I've met all of your
challenges.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> This isn't a definition, just a list. I asked you before why you
> picked 1857 and ignored the bigger Panics in 1837, 1873 and 1893.
> And what is the "Spanish gold bubble"?

I put question marks after the "Spanish gold bubble" because I'm
guessing at that one.

As for the Panic of 1857, the following graph is from a book by a
famous author who's sold over 8,000 copies:



This famous author's graph clearly and dramatically shows that
the two greatest perturbations since 1820 are the Panic of 1857 and
the stock market crash of 1929. It also shows a substantial fall in
the period 1805-15, which I would guess is late effects from the
collapse of the French Monarchy.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> Now wait a minute. A 60ish manager in 1987 was not active in the
> 1930's this was more than 50 years earlier.

That's not the issue for the "Artist" psychology. The Silent
Generation grew up during the Depression, saw homelessness,
starvation and suffering all around them, and learned that it was
caused by greed and too much credit.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> Immanual Wallerstein has an alternate war cycle in which the 30
> years war, the Napoleonic wars and WW II figure prominently. These
> define a 150 year cycle of which your crisis war cycle in a binary
> harmonic.

> In this cycle concept Spain's power is decisively broken after the
> 30YW (a crisis war). It cracks after the Armada (a crisis war),
> but Spain isn't finished until the 30YW. Now it's France's turn.
> France's power cracks in the WSS (a crisis war) but France isn't
> defeated until 1815 (a crisis war). Now its Britain's turn. The
> rise of a powerful unified Germany after the FP war (a crisis war)
> represents a "cracking" in British power. Britain's days as a
> power end with WW II (a crisis war). Now its America's turn. We
> experience "cracking" with the WOT (a crisis war) and so on.

I'm not familiar with this, but I don't see how this contradicts the
crisis war concept. Doesn't it actually support a subset of the
crisis war concept?

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> But your idea of "genocidal energy" doesn't mean anything to me. I
> can't put the WOT and WW II into the same category--either
> "genocidal" or "energetic". We are going out of our way to
> minimize casualties so it's hardly genocidal. The WOT seems to me
> to be the very opposite of energetic. No sacrifices are being
> asked of the general populace. Taxes were cut, there is no draft,
> rationing or price controls. It's like a milder version of the
> Cold War, a "not war" as Saari calls them. And thank God for
> that--in this day of nuclear weapons a war with "genocidal energy"
> would likely kill most of us.

The War on Terror has only begun, Mike, and it wouldn't even have
gone this far by now if the 9/11 attacks had come in 2005, as S&H
suggested in the Fourth Turning.

In terms of a generational change, we're still still partly in an
unraveling period, lurching back and forth between trying to
compromise and contain problems on the one hand, and taking preemptory
actions on the other. Meanwhile, the Islamic terrorist groups through
the Mideast and Asia are joining together more and more tp cooperate
in actions against Israel and the West.

I've never thought that we were yet into a serious crisis war. The
original name on my book was going to be "WW2010," standing for
"world war in 2010." It's too early for the kind of "genocidal
energy" that I've been describing. But it's coming.

There's always a lot of hesitation at the beginning of a crisis war.
People don't turn into monsters overnight. (Well, maybe the Hutus
did.) The Revolutionary and Civil wars all began slowly. England
desperately tried to appease Hitler before it declared war on
Germany. The characteristic of crisis wars is that they gather
speed. Don't you remember how furious the country was right after
9/11? Can you imagine what we'll do if there are one or two more
spectacular terrorist attacks? Even the beheadings are infuriating
people and bringing out lots of visceral emotions.

You know, I keep having this emotional problem that I keep wishing
that things like what you're saying are right and I'll turn out
wrong, but all the trend lines are pointing in the same direction.

The level of conflict is growing throughout the Mideast (see
"Beheadings part of increasing conflict level throughout Mideast" on
my web site at
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/....mideast040623
). Taiwan's ruling Democratic Progressive Party is increasingly
moving towards independence from China, and this is infuriating
China, which is also having troubles with its western provinces; we
could be at war with China over Taiwan. Iran is openly defying
requests not to build technology for nuclear weapons; what do you
think will happen when it becomes clear that Iran is close to
actually having one? Egypt is moving forces into the Gaza strip to
provide security, bringing Israeli and Egyptians forces into closer
contact. What will an Israeli/Egyptian war trigger?

The Pentagon has been building up the armed forces furtively. Today
they announced that they're going to start calling up retired and
discharged soldiers for involuntary active service. What if there's
one more crisis somewhere? Where are we going to get 100,000 more
troops if we need them? I predicted to my son Jason in 2002 that we'd
have a draft by 2004 or 2005, and I think my prediction is going to
come true.

The difference between today and ten or twenty years ago is that
everything is too fragile. The economy is fragile and increasingly
unstable. The level of conflict is building up in the world. Can't
you feel it?

Remember that crisis periods always contain the element of surprise.
We know what these countries are SAYING, but we don't know what
they're doing. What if Armenia (Orthodox) is planning a military
action against Azerbaijan (Muslim) over the disputed
Nagorno-Karabakh, and we don't know about it. That could trigger a
war throughout the Caucasus region, bring in Turkey, Pakistan and
Russia, and spread throughout the Mideast.

Up until 10 years ago, we had leaders who had lived through World War
II, and were committed to not letting another World War happen.
Those people are gone today, and there are people around the world
who aren't afraid of war, and they're going to get their way.

The last thing I would say is that I think you have seen genocidal
energy -- not from Americans, but from the people who flew those
planes into the World Trade Center. That one act by our enemies had
more genocidal energy than anything we'd seen in a long time.

So, to close the point, I've never said that the WOT so far is at all
comparable to WW II. I'm afraid the WOT has only just begun, and by
the end of the decade, if both of us survive that long, then we can
have another conversation about genocidal energy and it will be a lot
clearer.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

If unraveling is a continuum that actually begins during a High, then we have been unraveling for...what, forty, fifty years or so? No wonder things have gotten too fragile!

Dear Tim,

Originally Posted by Tim Walker

> If unraveling is a continuum that actually begins during a High,
> then we have been unraveling for...what, forty, fifty years or
> so?

> We're back to the same simple, inexorable mechanism that
> guarantees generational turn over-the passage of time.

The only point I was making is that a generational change doesn't
take place overnight. The Silents started retiring in the early 90s,
and even today there are still some Silents around to influence
things. The boomers started taking charge in the early 90s, and are
more and more in charge as time goes on.

That's why the late unraveling period has some crisis elements, and
the early crisis period has some unraveling elements. Within three
or four years, I would guess we should be firmly into the crisis
period.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

As for the Panic of 1857, the following graph is from a book by a famous author who's sold over 8,000 copies:



This famous author's graph clearly and dramatically shows that
the two greatest perturbations since 1820 are the Panic of 1857 and
the stock market crash of 1929. It also shows a substantial fall in
the period 1805-15, which I would guess is late effects from the
collapse of the French Monarchy.

This is the problem. You are guessing, rather than understanding. The large dips have to do with price inflation from the Napoleonic Wars and the Civil War. Back in those days wages did not rise with inflation because there were no effective unions. Thus, when prices rose due to war time shortages the real value of wages and salaries and interest payments falls. With less income, demand falls and you have a recession in output (GDP). It doesn't feel like a recession because employment is high and people are making more money--its just that the money is falling in value faster than they can make it.

So yes people get poorer during war. They also get killed, and their wealth is destroyed. Considering what Sherman did to the South, is it any surprise that GDP fell strongly? But this has nothing to do with financial crises. To look at the impact of financial crisises you should look at the impact on financial markets.

Note, this dip in GDP due to war did not occur in the 20th century. By WW I, workers had organized to a point where they too could gain wage increases during war time and GDP didn't fall. Since then wars have been bad economically for those belligerents on whose soil fighting takes place, but not necessarily for other belligerents like the US.

Dear Mike,

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

>> As for the Panic of 1857, the following graph is from a book by a
>> famous author who's sold over 8,000 copies:



>> This famous author's graph clearly and dramatically shows
>> that the two greatest perturbations since 1820 are the Panic of
>> 1857 and the stock market crash of 1929. It also shows a
>> substantial fall in the period 1805-15, which I would guess is
>> late effects from the collapse of the French Monarchy.

> This is the problem. You are guessing, rather than
> understanding. The large dips have to do with price inflation
> from the Napoleonic Wars and the Civil War. Back in those days
> wages did not rise with inflation because there were no effective
> unions. Thus, when prices rose due to war time shortages the real
> value of wages and salaries and interest payments falls. With
> less income, demand falls and you have a recession in output
> (GDP). It doesn't feel like a recession because employment
> is high and people are making more money--its just that the money
> is falling in value faster than they can make it.

> So yes people get poorer during war. They also get killed, and
> their wealth is destroyed. Considering what Sherman did to the
> South, is it any surprise that GDP fell strongly? But this has
> nothing to do with financial crises. To look at the impact of
> financial crisises you should look at the impact on
> financial markets.

> Note, this dip in GDP due to war did not occur in the 20th
> century. By WW I, workers had organized to a point where they too
> could gain wage increases during war time and GDP didn't fall.
> Since then wars have been bad economically for those belligerents
> on whose soil fighting takes place, but not necessarily for other
> belligerents like the US.

This was a hypothesis, so yes, a little guessing was involved.

How could the Panic of 1857 been caused by Sherman's march (1864)?
(This reminds me that some politicians seem to be implying that Bush's
invasion of Iraq last year is the cause of all our problems in the
Mideast, including the 9/11 attacks.)

Why did wages fall during the 1930s if they didn't fall during WW I?
(Hint: WW I was a non-crisis war, and there were still risk-aversive
people around who remembered the bubble that led to the Panic of
1857.)

Sincerely,

John

Originally Posted by John Xenakis

How could the Panic of 1857 been caused by Sherman's march (1864)?

Who said that? You implied that the big drop in GDP was caused by the panic of 1857. I said it reflected the Civil War.

Why did wages fall during the 1930s

They did? Can you show any evidence? Or is this another guess?

Dear Mike,

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> >>> John Xenakis wrote: How could the Panic of 1857 been caused
> by Sherman's march (1864)?

> Who said that? You implied that the big drop in GDP was caused by
> the panic of 1857. I said it reflected the Civil War.

I guess that I must losing my mind (and a mind is a terrible thing to
lose, as Dan Quayle used to say), but YOU said something pretty close
to that.

You said that the big drop in GDP was caused by Sherman's 1864 march,
but if we look at the famous author's graph, we see that the bulk of
the big drop occurred long before then. So how could Sherman's march
have caused the GDP dip that came before it?

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> >>> Quote: Why did wages fall during the 1930s

> They did? Can you show any evidence? Or is this another guess?

Let's see if I can take this step by step:

1. You said that a GDP dip due to war did not occur in the 20th
century because by WW I workers had organized, and therefore they
gained wage increases.

2. I inferred that you attributed previous GDP dips to wage
decreases.

3. I inferred that you attributed previous wage decreases to lack of
worker organization.

4. I inferred that you believe that organized workers can gain wage
increases. (I feel like I'm taking the SATs.)

5. Therefore, since workers were still organized in the 1930s and
could therefore gain wage increases, which presumably cause GDP dips,
I wondered why the GDP dipped in the 1930s.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

You said that the big drop in GDP was caused by Sherman's 1864 march, but if we look at the famous author's graph, we see that the bulk of the big drop occurred long before then.

I didn't say it was caused by Sherman's march, but by the war. I used Sherman's march as an example of war devastation.

I looked up this figure. Here is the data:

Year GDP per cap Rel Lvl
1855 . 2673 . . . 100
1856 . 2674 . . . 100
1857 . 2396 . . . 90
1858 . 2536 . . . 95
1859 . 2557 . . . 96
1860 . 2428 . . . 91
1861 . 2212 . . . 83
1862 . 2083 . . . 78
1863 . 2093 . . . 78
1864 . 1865 . . . 70
1865 . 1928 . . . 72
1866 . 2095 . . . 78
1867 . 2175 . . . 81

There was a recession triggered by the Panic of 1857, from Jun 1857 to Dec 1858 followed by a short expansion from Dec 1858 to Oct 1860 during which the economy partially recovered. Then another recession hit from Oct 1860 to Jun 1861--and then the war. The total decline in the GDP after the panic was 10%. From the war it was 23%, and it did bottom in the same year as Sherman's march. So the bulk of the entire decline from 1856 to 1864 occurred during the war, not the panic.

Let's see if I can take this step by step:

1. You said that a GDP dip due to war did not occur in the 20th
century because by WW I workers had organized, and therefore they
gained wage increases.

2. I inferred that you attributed previous GDP dips to wage
decreases.

Previous GDP declines during wars. There was no war in the 1930's.

I wondered why the GDP dipped in the 1930s.

How about unemployment? Employment is high during wars, yet if real incomes fall due to inflation then real GDP will fall to, because of inflation.

Employment falls during depressions and prices fell (prior to 1940). Real wages (of those that still had jobs) then would rise because of deflation. GDP fell because fewer people are working and so total income falls.

The 1930's decline in GDP is panic-linked, caused by a deflationary depression. The 1860's decline is war-linked, caused by inflation without concomitant wage growth, resulting in falling real income.

John, you are skimming history and inferring what happened instead of actually digging into the subject and finding out the details. This showed when you were unfamiliar with Charles V's wars, when you had claimed to have applied your criteria to all wars. To do this work you should be intimately familar with all of these wars. You should know far, far more than I do about them (which is very little) yet I sense you do not.

And it shows here with the panics, when you were apparently unaware of these other panics. Showing a graph from my book doesn't help because you did not have that graph when you developed the panic model. Yet you had selected 1857 and not 1837, 1873 or 1893 as significant--apparently because it occurred at the right time to make the model work. And making eroneous claims that the bulk of the decline came from the 1857 panic rather than the Civil War, when the reverse is true doesn't help your case.

If you read histories of financial panics you will find that the one in 1857 isn't usually described as more severe than those in 1837, 1873 or 1893. I am not sure you have read any histories of panics like Kindleberger's book.

Now the Panic of 1857 did have effects and I agree with you that panics do factor into the cycles. But I do not see why 1857 is special compared to the other ones.

Dear Mike,

You always festoon your remarks with offensive attacks. Half the
time your attacks are full of crap, and the other half of the time
they're irrelevant. This time it's some of both.

FIRST, you haven't proven that the GDP fall following the Panic of
1857 isn't caused by the Panic of 1857. All you've done is provide
an alternate explanation for it, and then when your explanation
doesn't apply to WW I, you provide a convenient excuse having to do
with labor unions. I'm willing to agree that wars cause financial
problems, but you haven't at all sold me that the GDP fall wasn't
caused by the Panic of 1857, especially when I look at your GDP graph
and see there are no comparable GDP falls for ANY wars other than the
Civil War..

SECOND, I do have Kindleberger's book, and Kindleberger's book makes
it clear that the Panic of 1857 was centered around Hamburg, so your
GDP table, which is for America only, tells only a fraction of the
story. It's quite reasonable that the 1857 Ohio bank failure
triggered a "depression" in Europe that then spread back to America in
1860.

THIRD, your hypothesis that wars cause GDP falls doesn't really make
sense. It's quite reasonable to argue that wars increase business
activity, to manufacture war-related materials. As I said, the only
war where your hypothesis seems to apply, according to your graph, is
the Civil War, and I think that's because of the Panic of 1857.

FOURTH, this is still only a hypothesis, which makes your attacks
even more full of crap.

The fact is that when I look at your GDP graph, it tends to support
my hypothesis. In fact, I would consider my hypothesis more likely
than your explanation, because I don't believe that your explanation
of WW I is sufficiently credible.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Mike,

Could you help me resolve these GDP per capita figures?

I found a web site, eh.net, the Economic History Services, that lists
the historical GDP and GDP per capita values.

The EH figures are completely, unrecognizably different from yours.
I have no idea who's right. Is the EH web site a crock?

Your figures show a 30% decrease in GDP per capita by 1864, while
the EH figures show at most a 4% decrease (in 1862), and a 12%
net increase by 1864.

According to the EH figures, NEITHER the Panic of 1857 NOR the Civil
War had much negative impact on GDP.

Do you know what's going on?

The following table compares your figures to the EH figures for 1855
to 1867:

Code:

Mike Alexander           Economic History Svcs
figures (1996 dollars)   figures (2000 dollars)
---------------------    ----------------------
1855 . 2673 . . . 100    1855  $2,420   100
1856 . 2674 . . . 100    1856  $2,380    98
1857 . 2396 . . .  90    1857  $2,330    96
1858 . 2536 . . .  95    1858  $2,440   101
1859 . 2557 . . .  96    1859  $2,450   101
1860 . 2428 . . .  91    1860  $2,460   102
1861 . 2212 . . .  83    1861  $2,360    98
1862 . 2083 . . .  78    1862  $2,320    96
1863 . 2093 . . .  78    1863  $2,270    94
1864 . 1865 . . .  70    1864  $2,700   112
1865 . 1928 . . .  72    1865  $2,420   100
1866 . 2095 . . .  78    1866  $2,400    99
1867 . 2175 . . .  81    1867  $2,380    98

The following table is the entire dataset from the EH web site:

http://www.eh.net/hmit/gdp/

http://www.eh.net/hmit/gdp/gdp_answer.php

Code:

Year    Nominal    Real      GDP     Popu-     Nominal   Real GDP
        GDP        GDP       Defla-  lation    GDP per   per
        (billions  (billions tor     (in       Capita    Capita
        of         of 2000   (index  millions) (current  (2000
        dollars)   dollars)  2000 =            dollars)  dollars)
                             100)
------  ---------- --------- ------- --------- --------- --------
1789    $.210      $4.22     4.98    3.81      $55.10    $1,100
1790    $.240      $4.79     4.99    3.93      $60.80    $1,210
1791    $.250      $4.89     5.09    4.05      $61.40    $1,200
1792    $.270      $5.20     5.21    4.17      $64.90    $1,240
1793    $.300      $5.43     5.56    4.3       $70.20    $1,260
1794    $.350      $5.72     6.11    4.43      $78.80    $1,290
1795    $.420      $6.24     6.78    4.56      $92.70    $1,360
1796    $.470      $6.71     7.04    4.7       $100.00   $1,420
1797    $.450      $6.57     6.91    4.84      $93.80    $1,350
1798    $.460      $6.81     6.78    4.99      $92.50    $1,360
1799    $.500      $7.36     6.77    5.14      $96.80    $1,430
------  ---------- --------- ------- --------- --------- --------
1800    $.520      $7.57     6.86    5.31      $97.80    $1,420
1801    $.580      $8.62     6.76    5.49      $106.00   $1,560
1802    $.540      $7.94     6.76    5.68      $94.50    $1,390
1803    $.560      $8.43     6.64    5.87      $95.30    $1,430
1804    $.620      $8.86     6.96    6.07      $101.00   $1,460
1805    $.700      $9.55     7.28    6.26      $111.00   $1,520
1806    $.690      $9.38     7.40    6.45      $107.00   $1,450
1807    $.700      $9.87     7.05    6.64      $104.00   $1,480
1808    $.660      $9.30     7.09    6.84      $96.40    $1,350
1809    $.750      $10.37    7.21    7.03      $106.00   $1,470
------  ---------- --------- ------- --------- --------- --------
1810    $.810      $10.87    7.50    7.22      $112.00   $1,500
1811    $.810      $11.00    7.39    7.46      $109.00   $1,470
1812    $.830      $10.73    7.73    7.7       $107.00   $1,390
1813    $.970      $11.72    8.28    7.94      $122.00   $1,470
1814    $1.12      $12.60    8.87    8.18      $136.00   $1,540
1815    $1.15      $12.87    8.94    8.42      $136.00   $1,520
1816    $1.15      $13.26    8.67    8.66      $132.00   $1,530
1817    $1.15      $13.84    8.31    8.9       $129.00   $1,550
1818    $1.14      $15.07    7.60    9.1       $125.00   $1,650
1819    $1.00      $14.81    6.75    9.3       $107.00   $1,590
------  ---------- --------- ------- --------- --------- --------
1820    $.860      $14.86    5.77    9.6       $89.30    $1,540
1821    $.820      $15.05    5.47    9.9       $83.10    $1,520
1822    $.910      $17.09    5.32    10.27     $88.40    $1,660
1823    $.890      $16.66    5.36    10.6      $84.20    $1,570
1824    $.920      $16.90    5.42    10.92     $83.80    $1,540
1825    $1.04      $19.21    5.41    11.25     $92.40    $1,700
1826    $.990      $18.53    5.36    11.58     $85.70    $1,600
1827    $1.01      $19.39    5.19    11.91     $84.50    $1,620
1828    $1.05      $20.35    5.14    12.24     $85.40    $1,660
1829    $1.08      $21.00    5.13    12.57     $85.70    $1,670
------  ---------- --------- ------- --------- --------- --------
1830    $1.09      $21.41    5.07    12.9      $84.10    $1,660
1831    $1.16      $22.38    5.17    13.3      $87.00    $1,680
1832    $1.24      $23.80    5.23    13.7      $90.70    $1,730
1833    $1.34      $25.67    5.23    14.1      $95.10    $1,820
1834    $1.36      $27.39    4.96    14.5      $93.70    $1,880
1835    $1.60      $26.96    5.94    15        $106.00   $1,790
1836    $1.84      $26.88    6.85    15.42     $119.00   $1,740
1837    $1.80      $29.23    6.16    15.84     $113.00   $1,840
1838    $1.82      $29.41    6.17    16.26     $111.00   $1,800
1839    $1.95      $32.04    6.10    16.68     $117.00   $1,920
------  ---------- --------- ------- --------- --------- --------
1840    $1.73      $31.85    5.43    17.12     $101.00   $1,860
1841    $1.76      $32.92    5.35    17.73     $99.30    $1,850
1842    $1.64      $32.63    5.02    18.35     $89.20    $1,770
1843    $1.61      $36.18    4.46    18.96     $85.00    $1,900
1844    $1.73      $37.63    4.61    19.57     $88.60    $1,920
1845    $1.89      $39.07    4.84    20.18     $93.70    $1,930
1846    $2.01      $39.92    5.04    20.79     $96.80    $1,920
1847    $2.31      $43.82    5.27    21.41     $107.00   $2,040
1848    $2.13      $43.91    4.85    22.02     $96.60    $1,990
1849    $2.25      $44.07    5.10    22.63     $99.40    $1,940
------  ---------- --------- ------- --------- --------- --------
1850    $2.54      $47.33    5.36    23.26     $109.00   $2,030
1851    $2.61      $50.98    5.11    24.09     $108.00   $2,110
1852    $2.76      $57.01    4.85    24.91     $110.00   $2,280
1853    $3.15      $63.15    4.99    25.74     $122.00   $2,450
1854    $3.50      $61.03    5.74    26.56     $131.00   $2,290
1855    $3.87      $66.32    5.84    27.39     $141.00   $2,420
1856    $4.08      $67.35    6.06    28.21     $144.00   $2,380
1857    $4.47      $67.90    6.58    29.04     $153.00   $2,330
1858    $4.07      $72.91    5.58    29.86     $136.00   $2,440
1859    $4.40      $75.23    5.85    30.69     $143.00   $2,450
------  ---------- --------- ------- --------- --------- --------
1860    $4.49      $77.72    5.77    31.51     $142.00   $2,460
1861    $4.59      $76.52    6.00    32.35     $141.00   $2,360
1862    $5.24      $77.09    6.80    33.19     $157.00   $2,320
1863    $6.56      $77.53    8.46    34.03     $192.00   $2,270
1864    $9.27      $94.36    9.83    34.86     $266.00   $2,700
1865    $9.14      $86.57    10.50   35.7      $256.00   $2,420
1866    $8.88      $88.02    10.00   36.54     $243.00   $2,400
1867    $8.51      $89.02    9.56    37.38     $227.00   $2,380
1868    $8.49      $92.72    9.15    38.21     $222.00   $2,420
1869    $8.28      $96.93    8.54    39.5      $209.00   $2,450
------  ---------- --------- ------- --------- --------- --------
1870    $8.49      $104.40   8.13    39.91     $212.00   $2,610
1871    $8.77      $109.30   8.02    40.94     $214.00   $2,670
1872    $8.90      $113.80   7.82    41.97     $212.00   $2,710
1873    $9.27      $119.60   7.75    43.01     $215.00   $2,780
1874    $8.95      $118.90   7.52    44.04     $203.00   $2,700
1875    $9.02      $125.10   7.21    45.07     $200.00   $2,770
1876    $8.78      $126.60   6.93    46.11     $190.00   $2,740
1877    $8.91      $130.50   6.82    47.14     $189.00   $2,760
1878    $8.71      $135.90   6.41    48.17     $180.00   $2,820
1879    $9.49      $152.50   6.22    49.21     $192.00   $3,100
------  ---------- --------- ------- --------- --------- --------
1880    $11.14     $170.30   6.54    50.26     $221.00   $3,380
1881    $11.48     $176.50   6.50    51.54     $222.00   $3,420
1882    $12.45     $187.60   6.64    52.82     $235.00   $3,550
1883    $12.33     $192.20   6.41    54.1      $227.00   $3,550
1884    $12.01     $195.70   6.13    55.3      $217.00   $3,540
1885    $11.80     $197.20   5.98    56.6      $208.00   $3,480
1886    $12.15     $203.20   5.98    57.9      $209.00   $3,510
1887    $12.71     $212.40   5.98    59.2      $214.00   $3,580
1888    $12.86     $211.50   6.08    60.5      $212.00   $3,490
1889    $13.69     $224.70   6.09    61.7      $221.00   $3,640
------  ---------- --------- ------- --------- --------- --------
1890    $13.56     $228.10   5.94    63        $215.00   $3,620
1891    $13.99     $235.60   5.94    64.3      $217.00   $3,660
1892    $14.47     $246.70   5.86    65.6      $220.00   $3,760
1893    $14.51     $246.50   5.88    66.9      $216.00   $3,680
1894    $13.32     $239.10   5.57    68.2      $195.00   $3,500
1895    $14.66     $267.10   5.49    69.5      $210.00   $3,840
1896    $14.37     $261.00   5.50    70.8      $202.00   $3,680
1897    $15.31     $282.30   5.42    72.1      $212.00   $3,910
1898    $15.87     $289.00   5.49    73.4      $216.00   $3,930
1899    $17.97     $322.10   5.58    74.8      $240.00   $4,300
------  ---------- --------- ------- --------- --------- --------
1900    $18.68     $327.90   5.70    76.09     $245.00   $4,310
1901    $21.06     $367.70   5.73    77.58     $271.00   $4,730
1902    $21.73     $373.80   5.81    79.16     $274.00   $4,720
1903    $22.92     $384.30   5.96    80.63     $284.00   $4,760
1904    $24.00     $398.80   6.02    82.17     $292.00   $4,850
1905    $26.19     $435.20   6.02    83.82     $312.00   $5,190
1906    $28.16     $452.90   6.22    85.45     $329.00   $5,300
1907    $28.95     $445.90   6.49    87.01     $332.00   $5,120
1908    $26.79     $421.70   6.35    88.71     $302.00   $4,750
1909    $29.94     $470.60   6.36    90.49     $330.00   $5,200
------  ---------- --------- ------- --------- --------- --------
1910    $31.30     $472.70   6.62    92.41     $338.00   $5,110
1911    $32.24     $487.80   6.61    93.86     $343.00   $5,190
1912    $34.92     $515.90   6.77    95.34     $366.00   $5,410
1913    $36.63     $536.20   6.83    97.23     $376.00   $5,510
1914    $34.31     $495.40   6.93    99.11     $346.00   $4,990
1915    $36.30     $512.00   7.09    100.55    $361.00   $5,090
1916    $45.89     $594.40   7.72    101.96    $450.00   $5,820
1917    $54.85     $593.30   9.24    103.27    $531.00   $5,740
1918    $69.35     $638.60   10.80   103.21    $671.00   $6,180
1919    $76.63     $618.50   12.30   104.51    $733.00   $5,910
------  ---------- --------- ------- --------- --------- --------
1920    $86.76     $606.60   14.30   106.46    $814.00   $5,690
1921    $72.93     $585.70   12.40   108.54    $671.00   $5,390
1922    $72.43     $625.90   11.50   110.05    $658.00   $5,680
1923    $84.91     $713.00   11.90   111.95    $758.00   $6,360
1924    $87.29     $732.80   11.90   114.11    $764.00   $6,420
1925    $90.75     $748.60   12.10   115.83    $783.00   $6,460
1926    $96.77     $793.90   12.10   117.4     $824.00   $6,760
1927    $95.60     $798.40   11.90   119       $803.00   $6,700
1928    $96.52     $812.60   11.80   120.51    $800.00   $6,740
1929    $103.60    $865.20   11.97   121.77    $850.78   $7,105
------  ---------- --------- ------- --------- --------- --------
1930    $91.20     $790.70   11.53   123.08    $740.98   $6,424
1931    $76.50     $739.90   10.34   124.04    $616.74   $5,965
1932    $58.70     $643.70   9.12    124.84    $470.20   $5,156
1933    $56.40     $635.50   8.87    125.58    $449.12   $5,060
1934    $66.00     $704.20   9.37    126.37    $522.28   $5,572
1935    $73.30     $766.90   9.56    127.25    $576.03   $6,026
1936    $83.80     $866.60   9.67    128.05    $654.43   $6,767
1937    $91.90     $911.10   10.09   128.82    $713.40   $7,072
1938    $86.10     $879.70   9.79    129.82    $663.23   $6,776
1939    $92.20     $950.70   9.70    130.88    $704.46   $7,263
------  ---------- --------- ------- --------- --------- --------
1940    $101.40    $1,034    9.81    132.122   $767.47   $7,826
1941    $126.70    $1,211    10.46   133.402   $949.76   $9,078
1942    $161.90    $1,435    11.28   134.86    $1,200    $10,643
1943    $198.60    $1,670    11.89   136.739   $1,452    $12,219
1944    $219.80    $1,806    12.17   138.397   $1,588    $13,053
1945    $223.10    $1,786    12.49   139.928   $1,594    $12,765
1946    $222.30    $1,589    13.99   141.389   $1,572    $11,241
1947    $244.20    $1,574    15.51   144.126   $1,694    $10,924
1948    $269.20    $1,643    16.38   146.631   $1,835    $11,206
1949    $267.30    $1,634    16.35   149.188   $1,791    $10,956
------  ---------- --------- ------- --------- --------- --------
1950    $293.80    $1,777    16.53   152.271   $1,929    $11,671
1951    $339.30    $1,915    17.72   154.878   $2,190    $12,364
1952    $358.30    $1,988    18.02   157.553   $2,274    $12,619
1953    $379.40    $2,079    18.24   160.184   $2,368    $12,981
1954    $380.40    $2,065    18.42   163.026   $2,333    $12,669
1955    $414.80    $2,212    18.75   165.931   $2,499    $13,335
1956    $437.50    $2,255    19.39   168.903   $2,590    $13,355
1957    $461.10    $2,301    20.04   171.984   $2,681    $13,379
1958    $467.20    $2,279    20.50   174.882   $2,671    $13,032
1959    $506.60    $2,441    20.75   177.83    $2,848    $13,728
------  ---------- --------- ------- --------- --------- --------
1960    $526.40    $2,501    21.04   180.671   $2,913    $13,847
1961    $544.70    $2,560    21.28   183.691   $2,965    $13,936
1962    $585.60    $2,715    21.57   186.538   $3,139    $14,555
1963    $617.70    $2,834    21.80   189.242   $3,264    $14,975
1964    $663.60    $2,998    22.13   191.889   $3,458    $15,626
1965    $719.10    $3,191    22.53   194.303   $3,700    $16,423
1966    $787.80    $3,399    23.18   196.56    $4,007    $17,292
1967    $832.60    $3,484    23.89   198.712   $4,189    $17,535
1968    $910.00    $3,652    24.91   200.706   $4,533    $18,199
1969    $984.60    $3,765    26.15   202.677   $4,857    $18,578
------  ---------- --------- ------- --------- --------- --------
1970    $1,038     $3,771    27.53   205.052   $5,064    $18,394
1971    $1,127     $3,898    28.91   207.661   $5,427    $18,773
1972    $1,238     $4,105    30.17   209.896   $5,899    $19,557
1973    $1,382     $4,341    31.85   211.909   $6,524    $20,487
1974    $1,500     $4,319    34.73   213.854   $7,014    $20,198
1975    $1,638     $4,311    38.00   215.973   $7,585    $19,961
1976    $1,825     $4,540    40.20   218.035   $8,371    $20,826
1977    $2,030     $4,750    42.75   220.239   $9,221    $21,569
1978    $2,294     $5,015    45.76   222.585   $10,309   $22,530
1979    $2,563     $5,173    49.55   225.055   $11,389   $22,987
------  ---------- --------- ------- --------- --------- --------
1980    $2,789     $5,161    54.04   227.726   $12,249   $22,666
1981    $3,128     $5,291    59.12   229.966   $13,603   $23,010
1982    $3,255     $5,189    62.73   232.188   $14,018   $22,349
1983    $3,536     $5,423    65.21   234.307   $15,094   $23,148
1984    $3,933     $5,813    67.66   236.348   $16,641   $24,597
1985    $4,220     $6,053    69.71   238.466   $17,697   $25,386
1986    $4,462     $6,263    71.25   240.651   $18,544   $26,027
1987    $4,739     $6,475    73.20   242.804   $19,519   $26,668
1988    $5,103     $6,742    75.69   245.021   $20,830   $27,518
1989    $5,484     $6,981    78.56   247.342   $22,173   $28,225
------  ---------- --------- ------- --------- --------- --------
1990    $5,803     $7,112    81.59   250.132   $23,200   $28,434
1991    $5,995     $7,100    84.44   253.493   $23,653   $28,010
1992    $6,337     $7,336    86.38   256.894   $24,670   $28,558
1993    $6,657     $7,532    88.38   260.255   $25,580   $28,943
1994    $7,072     $7,835    90.26   263.436   $26,845   $29,743
1995    $7,397     $8,031    92.11   266.557   $27,752   $30,131
1996    $7,816     $8,328    93.85   269.667   $28,987   $30,885
1997    $8,304     $8,703    95.41   272.912   $30,428   $31,891
1998    $8,747     $9,066    96.47   276.115   $31,678   $32,837
1999    $9,268     $9,470    97.87   279.295   $33,184   $33,907
------  ---------- --------- ------- --------- --------- --------
2000    $9,817     $9,817    100.00  282.434   $34,758   $34,758
2001    $10,100    $9,866    102.37  285.545   $35,373   $34,553
2002    $10,480    $10,080   103.95  288.6     $36,316   $34,937
2003    $10,980    $10,390   105.64  290.5     $37,810   $35,790

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

I found a web site, eh.net, the Economic History Services, that lists the historical GDP and GDP per capita values.

The EH figures are completely, unrecognizably different from yours.
I have no idea who's right. Is the EH web site a crock?

I got GDP/GDP data from several sources:

Ohio State University, Fisher College of Business database

B. P. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750-1993, New York: Stockton Press, 1998.

John W. Kendrick, Productivity Trends in the United States, National Bureau of Economic Research No. 71, Princeton University Press 1961.

US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Accounts Data

All the sources agree pretty well with each other and with EH after 1870. Before 1870 there are differences. Of the four above, only Mitchell goes back before 1870.

These data are GDP and GNP in nominal dollars. Real data is obtained using a price deflator ad per capita by dividing by population.
But this data shows the issue clearly. The EH data shows GDP in current (nominal) dollars doubled from 1860 to 1865 while prices rose 82%. This means real growth of about 11%.

Mitchell shows growth of 70% in nomnal GDP over the same time and a 92% increase in prices. The means real growth of -12%.

Who is right? Both an neither. It is really hard to do national accounts during times of radical change like wars. You will note that my use of this data was to show the long-term trend. The two databases show similar results for this value: annualized growth over 1789-1869 is 4.0% (EH) or 4.3% (Mitchell).

The website has this to say about the pre-1869 data:

The annual GDP series before 1869 comes from the work of Thomas Senior Berry, and though we think it is useful to get a measure of the size of GDP, we do not think his techniques produced a meaningful time series and we do not recommend these nominal series be used for predicting the business cycle or regression analysis.

Year EH Mitchell
1789 . 0.21 . 0.16
1790 . 0.24 . 0.19
1791 . 0.25 . 0.2
1792 . 0.27 . 0.23
1793 . 0.30 . 0.24
1794 . 0.35 . 0.29
1795 . 0.42 . 0.35
1796 . 0.47 . 0.4
1797 . 0.45 . 0.4
1798 . 0.46 . 0.38
1799 . 0.50 . 0.42
1800 . 0.52 . 0.46
1801 . 0.58 . 0.53
1802 . 0.54 . 0.49
1803 . 0.56 . 0.49
1804 . 0.62 . 0.53
1805 . 0.70 . 0.59
1806 . 0.69 . 0.61
1807 . 0.70 . 0.56
1808 . 0.66 . 0.46
1809 . 0.75 . 0.5
1810 . 0.81 . 0.59
1811 . 0.81 . 0.58
1812 . 0.83 . 0.57
1813 . 0.97 . 0.62
1814 . 1.12 . 0.7
1815 . 1.15 . 0.81
1816 . 1.15 . 0.85
1817 . 1.15 . 0.85
1818 . 1.14 . 0.82
1819 . 1.00 . 0.75
1820 . 0.86 . 0.66
1821 . 0.82 . 0.61
1822 . 0.91 . 0.7
1823 . 0.89 . 0.7
1824 . 0.92 . 0.75
1825 . 1.04 . 0.85
1826 . 0.99 . 0.88
1827 . 1.01 . 0.87
1828 . 1.05 . 0.88
1829 . 1.08 . 0.91
1830 . 1.09 . 0.93
1831 . 1.16 . 1.07
1832 . 1.24 . 1.16
1833 . 1.34 . 1.3
1834 . 1.36 . 1.33
1835 . 1.60 . 1.63
1836 . 1.84 . 1.9
1837 . 1.80 . 1.83
1838 . 1.82 . 1.76
1839 . 1.95 . 1.93
1840 . 1.73 . 1.67
1841 . 1.76 . 1.66
1842 . 1.64 . 1.52
1843 . 1.61 . 1.47
1844 . 1.73 . 1.63
1845 . 1.89 . 1.79
1846 . 2.01 . 1.91
1847 . 2.31 . 2.18
1848 . 2.13 . 2.14
1849 . 2.25 . 2.21
1850 . 2.54 . 2.59
1851 . 2.61 . 2.67
1852 . 2.76 . 2.86
1853 . 3.15 . 3.36
1854 . 3.50 . 3.63
1855 . 3.87 . 3.89
1856 . 4.08 . 4.02
1857 . 4.47 . 3.98
1858 . 4.07 . 3.72
1859 . 4.40 . 3.97
1860 . 4.49 . 3.84
1861 . 4.59 . 3.68
1862 . 5.24 . 4.01
1863 . 6.56 . 5.1
1864 . 9.27 . 6.48
1865 . 9.14 . 6.56
1866 . 8.88 . 6.88
1867 . 8.51 . 6.84
1868 . 8.49 . 7.06
1869 . 8.28 . 7.41
1870 . 8.49 . 7.35