Dear Virgil,

Originally Posted by Virgil K. Saari

> You say, A nuclear weapon would harm a small part of Iran, but
> that's all. Why should Israel be limited to a single weapon?
> Let them build or buy or steal as many as they need to exterminate
> every last enemy of Israel as long as they do it on their own
> coin. Would a thousand suffice? Two thousand? Would they attack
> the Mecca, Medina, the Dome of the Rock? Let Islam worry about
> Islamic behavior. Let Israel worry about Israeli behavior. Then we
> could start minding Canada's incursions into America.

I think that the following map might be worth at least a thousand
words:



How many nuclear weapons would Israel need to exterminate every last
enemy of Israel? And how minutes, hours, days, years would it take
to deliver all those weapons? And what would happen in this region
by the time that the Israeli air force even got off just one or two
nuclear weapons? And would American forces, stationed in Iraq and
Afghanistan, just sit there, twiddling their thumbs, doing nothing,
while all this "stuff" was going on?

And all this because President Miles didn't take action when he
could!

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Dear Virgil,


I think that the following map might be worth at least a thousand
words:



How many nuclear weapons would Israel need to exterminate every last
enemy of Israel? And how minutes, hours, days, years would it take
to deliver all those weapons? And what would happen in this region
by the time that the Israeli air force even got off just one or two
nuclear weapons? And would American forces, stationed in Iraq and
Afghanistan, just sit there, twiddling their thumbs, doing nothing,
while all this "stuff" was going on?

And all this because President Miles didn't take action when he
could!

Sincerely,

John

Dear Mr. Xenakis,
Israel can avail itself of submarines and submarine launched missiles. The destruction of its enemies could be done in hours. We bombed Baghdad from Missouri---the Indian Ocean is nearby; as is the Mediterranean.

Israel could dig holes in the Negev as we did in the Dakota plain for ICBMs. And they only need IntraContinentalBallisticMissiles in the main and only true ICBMs for Eqypt and Libya.

Yo. Cartographic Sv. Virgil K. Saari

Why would President Miles have American Forces stationed in Mesopotamia? Perhaps he could reply.

Dear Mike,

I sent a follow-up e-mail message to Neil Howe, and he fully
supported your position. His message is below.

Needless to say, it still makes no more sense to me at all that a
violent civil war can be an awakening event when he says it than when
you say it. Indeed, I'm absolutely certain that a lengthy civil war
could never be a mid-cycle war.

I don't wish to debate Neil Howe, especially since he said he doesn't
want to debate, and anyway I'd only be repeating what I've said
before.

But he did say something new that I need to respond to, namely: "Let
me add that, at this early stage, I don't think it would be possible
to make a large distinction between generations in England and
generations in the English colonies in America. In the case of
Puritan Generation, they were literally indistinguishable; they all
grew up in the same society and (mostly) came of age in the same
society. Even by the end of the 1600s, most colonists regarded
themselves as 'English' and saw themselves shaped and driven by the
same large events back 'home.'"

Actually, I've found that generational timelines almost always
diverge. This shouldn't be a surprise, since S&H found that
generational seculae can vary from 70-100 years, and with such a wide
variation in length, there's no reason to assume that two different
regions must remain on a parallel timeline. In the case of the
colonies, I would assume that the colonist population was much
younger than the English population, and that fact alone would have
had a generational effect. Also the fact that the colonists called
themselves "English" in the 1700s really isn't relevant.

An example of the principle is the countries that used to be part of
the Ottoman Empire. They all call themselves "Muslim," just as the
colonists called themselves "English," but their timelines diverged:
Turkey fought a civil war with the Kurds from 1984-2000, the
Iran-Iraq war was in the 1980s, and Jordan's timeline changed because
of the influx of Palestinians.

Mike, I have no particular desire to renew this argument with you,
unless there's something new to be said. You and Neil obviously have
views that are so tremendously at variance with my analysis, that
there's no hope at all of finding common ground that I can see. We'd
just be going over the same ground.

As for myself, I tend to be philosophical about times like this. The
bad news is that Neil's disagreeing with my analysis of the English
Civil War in England is that it reduces my credibility. The good
news is that I can claim that all my theoretical extensions, including
the Principle of Localization, merging timelines, and evaluating
crisis wars, is truly brand new, original work, that no one ever
thought of before, and not a rehash of TFT. As they say, every cloud
has a silver lining.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

> Dear Neil,

> We haven't had contact in some time. A lot has happened since
> then.

> I've taken the Anglo-American generational paradigm that you
> established and I've extended it to all places at all times in
> history. For a good summary of the American, Western and Eastern
> European timelines, check out the crisis war graphic at:
> http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...wh.crigraphic=

> In addition, I've transformed generational dynamics into a
> forecasting methodology that can be used to analyze countries
> around the world into the future. Thus, while the Fourth Turning
> made a general crisis prediction for the coming years, I'm able to
> provide a great deal more detail, on a country by country basis,
> on how things are likely to unfold.

> I've been posting a lot of this analyses and forecasts on my web
> site for almost two years, with a high level of accuracy. Take a
> look if you have some time. I think you'll enjoy it. I'm
> starting to get a lot of hits, and I'm going to start a publicity
> campaign, in the hope of establishing myself as some kind of
> international expert, with information that could be useful to
> both businesses and the government (state dept., dod).

> The reason all this works is because I've done a great deal of
> theoretical work that validates the generational paradigm with
> 100% success in the hundreds of cases I've examined. The
> methodology was to formalize your descriptions of 4T crises in
> such a way that it can be applied on a localized basis to any
> nation in any war at any time, to determine whether that war is a
> crisis (4T) war. Since that evaluation can be done irrespective
> of cycles, it proves that 4T crisis war cycles are valid, and not
> "cherry-picked" to make the cycles work out. This rigorously
> validates your work as well as mine.

> I've also established contact with the History Dept. at MIT (where
> I used to be a student in Mathematical Logic and Computer
> Science). I believe that I can prove to them that this is a valid
> methodology for analyzing history, and I hope to convince the MIT
> History Dept. is the perfect place to take this up as a serious
> subject of study and development, because of the school's strength
> in both History and engineering.

> That brings me to the reason that I'm writing to you: I can't see
> any way, using the criteria that you described in "The Fourth
> Turning," that the English Civil War could possibly be an
> awakening event in England, as you said in your e-mail message to
> Mike.

> Your books say that it was an awakening in the colonies, and
> that's certainly true. The colonists treated the ECW as a
> generational event, where the crazy old men they'd left behind
> fought for 20 years and just restored the King again.

> But in England, this war was possibly even more violent than our
> own Civil War, ending with the beheading of the king, then ten
> years of military dictatorship under Oliver Cromwell. Then, when
> Cromwell died and England sank into anarchy, the desperate Nomads
> and Heroes pulled together and united behind a compromise: A new
> King, but with vastly reduced powers. This was a vastly weakened
> King: the Star Chamber was abolished; the King's power of taxation
> was abolished; the King's power to dissolve Parliament was
> abolished; forced loans, imprisonment without trial and martial
> law were also all abolished.

> This is exactly how you described a 4T in your e-mail message,
> "the era is characterized by large-scale group cohesion, and the
> outcome is an enduring political and social 'settlement' that
> everyone has to abide by." Both sides united under Cromwell's
> powerful military dictatorship, and then united again to restore
> the King, but with vastly reduced powers. It's this compromise
> that settled things and laid the foundation for what was to come.

> The Glorious Revolution, which was a late awakening event,
> actually settled little except for a change of administration on
> the level of Nixon's resignation. By 1701, the war between
> England and Scotland would have been renewed and the Empire
> dissolved, if it hadn't been for England's miraculous victory
> against France at the Battle of Blenheim, within the War of the
> Spanish Succession, which settled Europe's boundaries until the
> French Revolution.

> So the 4T crisis war periods for England were Armada (1560s to
> 1588), English Civil War (1640-49), War of the Spanish Succession
> (1701-09 or 14), and then Napoleonic wars.

> Based on the hundreds of situations that I've evaluated, it's
> rare for two country's Turning schedules to remain synchronized,
> unless of course they fight in the same war. Even then care must
> be taken: A war may be a crisis war for one side, and a mid-cycle
> war for the other side (such as Vietnam War, Russia v Germany in
> WW I, Revolutionary War, War of 1812 -- see the graphic referenced
> above for other examples). In the case of the ECV, the
> generational relationship between the colonists and England means
> that the schedules were most likely not synchronized.

> So I'm writing to ask you about how firm you are on your view
> that the English Civil War was an awakening event in England, and
> whether there's something in your research that I'm overlooking,
> or whether there's any more information that I can provide to you.
> If I evaluate the ECV according to the criteria in your book, I
> get an overwhelming 4T, not a 2T.

> I'd appreciate your giving this some thought, and also giving me
> your permission to post whatever answer you send me in the online
> forum.=20 If you're inclined to read the discussions or
> participate, the name of the thread is "Objections to Generational
> Dynamics."

> Thanks for your help. I hope that you and your family are doing
> well, and I hope we get a chance to meet some day.

> Sincerely,

> John

Originally Posted by Neil Howe

> John:

> Unfortunately, I don't have time to debate the issue at the
> moment--which is what I indicated to Jim. But to re-summarize my
> two main reasons for regarding the English Civil War as the climax
> of an Awakening rather than a Crisis, let me say the following:

> (1) The dominant proximate drivers of Awakenings are
> religious/culture conflicts; of Crises they are secular/political
> conflicts. By this criterion, the English Civil War culminated
> an Awakening. I'm not saying that they were no purely political
> issues involves; I'm saying that the *dominant* motives of the
> main players were religious/cultural. The entire era of 1620-40s
> has been called the "Puritan Awakening" by many scholars before us
> (McLoughlin, e.g., in his famous book)--and not just for America
> and England but for much of the Continent.

> (2) Crises, at least when not ending in catastrophe, must end in
> a long-term "settlement" of outstanding political and
> institutional disagreements. The Civil War settled nothing long
> term. The Glorious Revolution (at home) and the Wars of Spanish
> Succession (abroad) settled everything long term. Needless to say,
> I disagree (and I'm sure most English would disagree) with your
> comparison to Nixon's resignation. No ruler even approaching
> James II's autocratic pretensions ever again came to the throne.

> Let me add that, at this early stage, I don't think it would be
> possible to make a large distinction between generations in
> England and generations in the English colonies in America. In
> the case of Puritan Generation, they were literally
> indistinguishable; they all grew up in the same society and
> (mostly) came of age in the same society. Even by the end of the
> 1600s, most colonists regarded themselves as "English" and saw
> themselves shaped and driven by the same large events back
> "home."

> --Neil

[End of message]

Dear Virgil,

Originally Posted by Virgil K. Saari

> Israel can avail itself of submarines and submarine launched
> missiles. The destruction of its enemies could be done in hours.
> We bombed Baghdad from Missouri---the Indian Ocean is nearby; as
> is the Mediterranean.

> Israel could dig holes in the Negev as we did in the Dakota plain
> for ICBMs. And they only need IntraContinentalBallisticMissiles in
> the main and only true ICBMs for Eqypt and Libya.

I know little about the military logistics, or what it would take for
the campaign you suggest, but I do know that it took several days of
bombing to soften up Baghdad, though of course those were
conventional weapons. Still I find it hard to believe that one or
two nuclear weapons wouldn't start a major war almost immediately.
Do you doubt that?

But really, this brings us back to the original question. Shouldn't
President Miles have done something different in order to avoid all
this?

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

The good news is that I can claim that all my theoretical extensions, including the Principle of Localization, merging timelines, and evaluating crisis wars, is truly brand new, original work, that no one ever thought of before, and not a rehash of TFT.

This is what I have maintained all along. The crisis war cycle you are studying is not the same thing as the S&H saeculum. It is your original work.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

The good news is that I can claim that all my theoretical extensions, including the Principle of Localization, merging timelines, and evaluating crisis wars, is truly brand new, original work, that no one ever thought of before, and not a rehash of TFT.

This is what I have maintained all along. The crisis war cycle you are studying is not the same thing as the S&H saeculum. It is your original work.

Well, you could have knocked me over with a feather.

John

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Actually, I've found that generational timelines almost always diverge. This shouldn't be a surprise, since S&H found that generational seculae can vary from 70-100 years, and with such a wide variation in length, there's no reason to assume that two different regions must remain on a parallel timeline.

There is likewise no reason to assume that they would immediately diverge.

In the case of the colonies, I would assume that the colonist population was much younger than the English population, and that fact alone would have had a generational effect.

David Hackett Fischer in Albion's Seed presents these age breakdowns for New England settlers compared to England:

Age . Settler England (1636)
00-14 11.6% 12.4%
05-14 19.6% 19.7%
15-24 26.1% 17.7%
25-59 41.6% 42%
60+ . . 1.0% 8.1%

He notes that with the except of elders, the age distribution of the Puritan settlers was remarkably similar to England's population in general.

Dear Mike,

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> There is likewise no reason to assume that they would immediately
> diverge.

I didn't assume that they diverged; Howe assumed they didn't. I was
simply making the general point. There's also the issue that came up
before following the Roman Empire: That once countries are on the
same timelines, then their crisis wars may clump together.

As for the colonies, as I've said before, I think something quite
different happened: King Philip's War occurred on the Indians'
timeline, not on the English timeline.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> David Hackett Fischer in Albion's Seed presents these age
> breakdowns for New England settlers compared to England:

> Age . Settler England (1636)
> 00-14 11.6% 12.4%
> 05-14 19.6% 19.7%
> 15-24 26.1% 17.7%
> 25-59 41.6% 42%
> 60+ . . 1.0% 8.1%

> He notes that with the except of elders, the age distribution of
> the Puritan settlers was remarkably similar to England's
> population in general.

That's interesting. It doesn't affect what I said, but it is
surprising to me that there were so many elder people in the colonies
at the time. I would have thought that taking a long trip like that
would be a "young man's game."

It does however raise the question of why the English Civil War
wasn't reflected in the colonies. My guess is that there weren't
enough people yet to have a major civil war like that.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Indeed; however, the colonists' generational constellation was sufficiently in synch with the Indians' schedule to fight this as a Crisis war.

The main influence of the English Civil War on the Massachusetts Bay Colony was that Puritans felt that they needed to stay in England and fight which stopped emigration to New England. I think the colonies were self-selective in that people who supported opposite sides of the Civil War did not live in the same colonies.
Also, Fischer found age distributions a bit closer to what John expects in colonies other than Massachusetts; in Virginia, for example, 70% of newcomers were between 15 and 24 years of age and 0% was over 60.

Dear John,

I think your response to my last post demonstrates that the cut-and-paste approach to Internet communication invites argument by the fragmentation of the other person?s post without seeing the whole?missing the forest for the trees.

Let?s look at two fragments that you lifted from my last post along with your accompanying critique:

miles51 wrote:
> 2) I generally do not consider the U.S. to be the world?s > policeman, but I am willing to make an exception if nuclear > weapons are used;


What ever does this mean? Do you mean that if Iran drops a nuclear
weapon on Israel, then you'll drop a nuclear weapon on Iran? That's
what this sounds like.

Later you quote and comment as follows:

miles51 wrote:
> I would try to underline as diplomatically but clearly as possible > that the US and/or other members of the nuclear club might > retaliate on behalf of the victim of an unprovoked attack if > nuclear weapons are used.


Once again, wouldn't it be better to prevent the unprovoked attack in
the first place?

I cannot help noticing that
1) Following the first fragment of my post you asked, ?What ever does this mean?? but immediately you proceeded to guess quite correctly what I meant.
2) Even though the subsequent quotation contains the word ?retaliate? and makes my meaning even clearer, you let your earlier critique stand, as if the two fragments were not part of a whole and one did not clarify the other?the second fragment making much of your critique of the first fragment moot.

Your critique of the second fragment raises yet a new issue, which I will address below, but let me continue to deal with your method of criticism. Again and again, you critique one fragment of my post, only to quote, later on, another fragment that answers your previous critique, which fact you ignore.

miles51 wrote:
> Having done these things, and being assured that this intelligence > is true,

Well, I would hope that you would be more skeptical than this.
Intelligence can never be absolutely "true." Let's assume, for this
exercise, that the intelligence is true with 80% probability, and
false with 20% probability.

Now to assume that I do not realize that nothing in life is 100 percent certain just because I did not use such a caveat at this juncture seems wearisome, especially when, in my final paragraph, I write ?? ultimately, it is all a matter of calculated risk.? Throughout your critique of my post, you pick at the details of my deliberation, but here, in effect, you find fault with me for leaving out a detail of my process that seems rather obvious and to which I allude later.

You keep implying that I made no decision at all, and you conclude that my response to your scenario merely ?involves talking, schmoozing, evaluating, wondering, chattering, proclaiming, discussing, estimating, appraising, studying, or procrastinating? because you don't have to make a decision.?
Incredibly, this comes after you all but explicitly acknowledge what I have told Iran: ?If you bomb Israel, we will bomb you.? How is that not a decision?
And in light of that, what should we make of your critique of the following fragment of my post:

miles51 wrote:
> 3) I would hope to be able to further convey that I have consulted > with other nuclear powers that feel much the same way.


"Certainement, mon ami," says Jacques Chirac. We all feel the same
way. It makes all of us feel good to reach this agreement. Let's
just tell Iran that we'll all be real unhappy if they destroy Israel
with a nuclear weapon, and that we may even scold them.

Of course, I said nothing about consulting Jacque Chirac: he belongs solely in your fantasy. In this connection, however, one of my quotations that you selected (see above) bears looking at again: ?I would try to underline as diplomatically but clearly as possible that the US and/or other members of the nuclear club might retaliate on behalf of the victim of an unprovoked attack if nuclear weapons are used.? I would admit that the use of the word ?might? is perhaps an ill-advised attempt to suggest diplomatic grace; in this instance I meant to convey ?will? and I should have said so. Note, however, that I say ?and/or? and just as this implies, I do not care whether other world leaders I consult agree with me or not; I am prepared to act unilaterally (however, unlike President Bush, I would not pretend that I was the instrument of U.N. policy at the same time*). You go on to suggest that Chirac would be happy to agree with my decision which the whole of my post shows to be promising reprisal up to and including nuclear attack on Iran. Do you believe that Chirac is customarily heavily medicated? Because that is the only way that I can imagine him agreeing with me. Similarly, you suggest?or perhaps imagine Chirac suggesting?that dropping nuclear weapons on Iran could be characterized as expressing unhappiness and scolding. (I?ll bet those that barely survived Hiroshima would have been glad to know that Harry Truman merely scolded them.)

To touch on other issues you raise in your reply:

John wrote:

The case I described is specific for two reasons:

(1) It parallels very closely the decision that the President had to
make with respect to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.


(2) It's a scenario that the President may well be faced with next
year, not only in Iran but also in North Korea.

I deny categorically that your Iran scenario is parallel to Iraq. Your hypothetical Iran scenario specifies nuclear arms, and a possible, plausible imminent threat to Israel is alleged. Iraq, on the other hand, last attacked Israel during the 1991 Gulf War. In 2003 there was no imminent threat to Israel (at least none that was trumpeted as justification for the invasion). Rather, President Bush implied that Iraq was a threat to the United States as well as Iraq?s neighbors (Eve of War on Iraq speech, March 17, 2003: ?Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised. This regime has already used weapons of mass destruction against Iraq's neighbors and against Iraq's people. The regime has a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East. It has a deep hatred of America and our friends. And it has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of al Qaeda. The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country, or any other.?), which was just as unsubstantiated in 2003 as it remains in 2004.

John wrote:
Every day on TV news interview programs, I hear the question asked,
"Would we have invaded Iraq, knowing what we know today?" This is an
extremely bizarre question. If we had some sort of magic screen that
allowed us to see the future, we could have prevented the 9/11
attack, the Pearl Harbor attack, etc., and we could win any war with
ease.

So I think that anyone who passes judgment on whether we should have
invaded Iraq should not be allowed to get off so easily by taking
advantage of knowledge that was not available at the time the
decision was made.

I agree that the news program question is bizarre, but not because of any problem of what we know today versus then; rather the problem with the question is that it presumes that knowing whether or not to make an unprovoked attack upon a sovereign nation is a matter of knowing some set of facts, when it is really a matter of knowing right from wrong which, evidently, no one does: not President Bush or P.M. Blair or the U.N. Security Council or the armies of TV & radio pundits or, sadly, the average American?including those on the left who implicitly seem to think that it would have been just fine to have invaded Iraq if only the U.N. had backed it.

Throughout the past two and a half years, I have been continually reminded of that famous scene in Robert Bolt?s ?A Man for All Seasons? in which Thomas More?who as Lord Chancellor of England and Wales was essentially his country?s minister of justice?is told that he should arrest someone simply because he is a bad man. More replies that if he used his power against those who had committed no crime, simply because he believed them to be evil, there would remain no laws at all. International law, while more dodgily enforced than most national laws, must embody the same principle or it is nothing. Since Iraq did not pose an imminent danger to any other country?and since it posed no danger at all to the United States?the United States violated international law by invading and conquering that country. Indeed, the U.S. and U.K. had been acting lawlessly by waging undeclared air war on Iraq from 1991 to 2003; while the United Nations did object from time to time to this U.S./U.K. no-fly zone business, it has no power to do anything about such things, which is admittedly usually a blessing. (But the U.N. also violated international law and its own charter by sanctioning Iraq and trying to disarm her.)

So, while you may have to wait ten years or so to find out whether the Iraq War has done good or ill, I know that thanks to the invasion of Iraq, the U.S. in particular and the world in general are in greater danger than we were a year and a half ago because illegal acts always set the precedent for future illegal acts, and the shoe is likely to be on the other foot next time: what will happen one day when the present generation of leaders is gone and the U.N. has the military power to back up a resolution that the U.S. has too many WMDs and must surrender or be invaded and conquered? President Bush has prepared the way for them to do this; all they need is the might to back it up. (Nice going President Bush!!!)

miles51 wrote:
> I would contact the Iranians and let them know very politely that > 1) I have no objection to their having nuclear weapons, on > principle, but I do object to their using them in unprovoked > attacks on any of their neighbors;


Once you give Iran the green light to develop nuclear weapons, then
you can never take it back. They will say, "Thanks, President Miles.
We're just going to build a dozen or two nuclear weapons, but we
promise, cross our heart and hope to die, that we'll never actually
use them on anybody. We'll just keep them around for decorative
purposes."

This is like saying that I have given them a green light to breathe: according to international law, a sovereign nation has a right to defend itself and its right to do so is not to be interfered with. (The U.N.?s charter even recognizes this, although it is obviously honored in the breach.) Weapons are not supposed to be decorative, BTW; they can be used either defensively or offensively. Defensive use is legitimate; offensive use is wrong. (Should I have presumed that you knew this already? Were you just being wearisome? It?s catching, I?m afraid.)

John wrote:
Once again, wouldn't it be better to prevent the unprovoked attack in
the first place?

You mean prevent by attacking a country for what they might do rather than what they do? Should I kill my neighbor because I believe that he might harm me even though he never has? I would be rightly locked up if I did that, but you seem to think that an unprovoked attack to prevent an unprovoked attack is wise in foreign policy.

John wrote:
So basically your solution is to do nothing and to allow, with 80%
probability, the destruction of Israel with a nuclear weapon, and
thereby trigger a nuclear war in the region. Good going, President
Miles!!!!

Well, aside from the fact that I actually decided to do something, I also have abided by international law in not counter-attacking until there is an actual attack to counter. More importantly, I have given the Iranians a real choice: They can keep their weapons to themselves and live in peace or use them on Israel and see Teheran and Qum, say, vaporized. The decision to trigger a nuclear war is theirs to make, not mine.

I am reminded of the late Ronald Reagan?s on-air jest about momentarily starting the bombing of the then Soviet Union. Many people were up in arms because they were afraid that Reagan would trigger a nuclear war, but the fact was that for eight years, the Soviets knew that if they used nuclear weapons Reagan would not hesitate to retaliate. That healthy fear may have kept the peace; that same fear would be likely to check the Iranians. Correct me if I?m wrong, but aren?t you yourself claiming that they don?t want a major war? Are you wrong about that?

--Miles

*?We believe in the mission of the United Nations. ?
Under Resolutions 678 and 687 ? both still in effect ? the United States and our allies are authorized to use force in ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. This is not a question of authority, it is a question of will.?
This passage from President Bush?s Eve of War on Iraq speech (3/17/03) makes some false claims including that Resolution 678 was still in effect when it was not; even more egregiously Bush implies that the U.S. was authorized by the U.N. to enforce 687, which it was not. Again, I have nothing against the U.S. acting unilaterally, but let us not simultaneous pretend that we do act under the color of Security Council resolutions. And talk about ?whatever does this mean??: Is Bush here saying that he has U.N. authorization but doesn?t need. It must be nice to have it both ways.

************************************************** **************

Originally Posted by Virgil K. Saari

Originally Posted by Vince Lamb '59

Originally Posted by Virgil K. Saari

Let Islam worry about Islamic behavior. Let Israel worry about Israeli behavior. Then we could start minding Canada's incursions into America.

As the honorary Canadian here (and the real Canadians seem to have departed from these forums), as I spend every other weekend there, what ever are you talking about?

My dear other Mr. Lamb, just how is your last word posted pronounced? Does it evoke high-topped footwear--which is what I hear on Minnesota Public Radio more and more often? I fear the invasion is right on " 'shed jul" (shedule). :shock: :shock: :shock:

:lol:

Oh, that's what you're bothering about (abOWt, not abOOt)? The Yoopers have been talking like that for decades!

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Dear Mike,

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> There is likewise no reason to assume that they would immediately
> diverge.

I didn't assume that they diverged;

Yes you did. You assert that the English Civil War was a crisis for the English but not for the English colonists in America. Since both the English and the English colonists were members of the same society at the beginning of the Awakening (before the colonists left) the two groups of people were necessarily on the same cycle then. Thus, the only way for the ECW period to be different turnings for the two groups is if the colonists diverged after arriving in America.

You speculated that this divergence could reflect a different age distribution for the colonists than the English. I pointed out that wasn't the case to which you responded:

That's interesting. It doesn't affect what I said, but it is surprising to me that there were so many elder people in the colonies at the time. I would have thought that taking a long trip like that would be a "young man's game."

Yes it does affect what you said.

It does however raise the question of why the English Civil War wasn't reflected in the colonies. My guess is that there weren't enough people yet to have a major civil war like that.

The enemy of the Puritans was back in England, only one side of the conflict was present in New England. So of course there was no civil war in New England; you need two sides to have a war.

As for the colonies, as I've said before, I think something quite different happened: King Philip's War occurred on the Indians' timeline, not on the English timeline.

Now this point makes your cycle scheme fundamentally different than S&H's. They claim that their cycle is a product of modernity and does not exist in pre-modern peoples like the Native Americans. According to S&H there can be no Indian timeline.

The fact that you apply the crisis war concept to the Indians means that your cycle cannot be the same as the one S&H describe. Since I was aware that you talked about Indian cycles, I thought it was apparent that your cycle was not the same as theirs. But later you started insisting that your cycle was the same as theirs. It's not. Theirs doesn't apply to Indians, yours does. Theirs involves interaction between generational peer personalities, yours revolves around crisis wars. Your cycle necessarily denotes any period of intense (you use the term genocidal) conflict as a crisis. Theirs does not.

Dear President Miles,

Originally Posted by miles51

> I think your response to my last post demonstrates that the
> cut-and-paste approach to Internet communication invites argument
> by the fragmentation of the other person's post without seeing the
> whole---missing the forest for the trees.

I try to write coherently, although I'm not always successful. I'll
try to do better.

Having said that, you do seem to have a tendency to analyze words and
phrases without addressing the underlying issues for a long time.
What IS the meaning of "is" anyway?

Originally Posted by miles51

> You keep implying that I made no decision at all, and you
> conclude that my response to your scenario merely "involves
> talking, schmoozing, evaluating, wondering, chattering,
> proclaiming, discussing, estimating, appraising, studying, or
> procrastinating... because you don't have to make a decision."

> Incredibly, this comes after you all but explicitly acknowledge
> what I have told Iran: "If you bomb Israel, we will bomb you." How
> is that not a decision?

Of course it's not a decision. It's mere words. It's a threat. And
it's a dumb threat because of course they know they're likely to be
bombed if they nuked Israel. You really had to tell them that? The
mere fact that you told them makes you sound desperate, which is
another reason why it's a dumb thing to do. Another reason it's a
dumb threat is because it commits us to a course of action if our
bluff is called.

So yeah, if you wanna call a dumb threat a decision, then you made a
decision. But I would call it no decision at all.

Originally Posted by miles51

> Of course, I said nothing about consulting Jacque Chirac: he
> belongs solely in your fantasy. In this connection, however, one
> of my quotations that you selected (see above) bears looking at
> again: "I would try to underline as diplomatically but clearly as
> possible that the US and/or other members of the nuclear club
> might retaliate on behalf of the victim of an unprovoked attack if
> nuclear weapons are used."

I'm sorry, I should have spelled things out more clearly, step by
step. I'm comparing the hypothetical Iran scenario to what happened
in Iraq. Chirac would lead the way in mocking you for your silly
"other nuclear powers feel the same way" statement.

Originally Posted by miles51

> You go on to suggest that Chirac would be happy to agree with my
> decision which the whole of my post shows to be promising reprisal
> up to and including nuclear attack on Iran. Do you believe that
> Chirac is customarily heavily medicated? Because that is the only
> way that I can imagine him agreeing with me. Similarly, you
> suggest---or perhaps imagine Chirac suggesting---that dropping nuclear
> weapons on Iran could be characterized as expressing unhappiness
> and scolding. (I'll bet those that barely survived Hiroshima would
> have been glad to know that Harry Truman merely scolded them.)

No. I'm saying that Chirac's foreign minister Dominique de Villepin
would no more hesitate to stick a knife in your back than he did to
Colin Powell. I'm saying that Chirac would mock you and humiliate
you and make a fool of you and your silly threats. I'm also saying
that your plan to build a "coalition of the willing" would have even
less success than Bush's did because the threats you're making make
you sound wild and irrational.

Originally Posted by miles51

> I deny categorically that your Iran scenario is parallel to Iraq.
> Your hypothetical Iran scenario specifies nuclear arms, and a
> possible, plausible imminent threat to Israel is alleged. Iraq,
> on the other hand, last attacked Israel during the 1991 Gulf War.
> In 2003 there was no imminent threat to Israel (at least none
> that was trumpeted as justification for the invasion). Rather,
> President Bush implied that Iraq was a threat to the United
> States as well as Iraq's neighbors (Eve of War on Iraq speech,
> March 17, 2003: "Intelligence gathered by this and other
> governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to
> possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised.
> ... ), which was just as unsubstantiated in 2003 as it remains in
> 2004.

Since you're so into parsing words, I believe you made a diction
error. You can "categorically disagree with" an opinion, but not
"categorically deny" it.

Even worse, you've completely immersed yourself deeply in the tar pit
of politics. You hate Bush. I get it. Many of your arguments are
covered with black sticky political stuff that gets all over your
hands and clothes when you touch it, so much so that it's difficult to
discern what your arguments are and what your emotions are. Now I'm
sure that whoever wins this November will be a fine, fine President,
though it has no bearing at all on this discussion. So I'll make an
attempt to thread my way through the tar pit, getting as little sticky
stuff on myself as possible, and at the same time trying to construct
a coherent response.

America has been following a fairly straight line trend policy
towards Iraq since the 1991 Gulf War. In 1998, President Clinton
signed the "Iraq Liberation Act", which states that the U.S. wants to
remove Saddam Hussein from power and replace the government with a
democratic institution. Clinton ordered a period of airstrikes on
Iraq in retaliation for Iraq's policy on the weapons inspectors.
Clintons actions differ only in degree, but not in principle, from
what Bush did in 2003.

After 9/11, the public pressure to remove Saddam from power grew
enormously. Conservatives pressured Bush to invade Iraq in Spring
2002, then Summer, then Fall, and then finally early in 2003. Bush
held off for a year because of pressure from liberals, and the
moderate views of Colin Powell. Eventually, Bush had no choice
because everyone in the world was telling him that Iraq had WMDs, and
he would use them against US interests.

If Al Gore were President, then he would have been under the same
pressure to continue Clinton's policy. He would have had the same
intelligence telling him that about the WMDs and their danger to
America. But the difference is that while Bush's natural opponents,
the Democrats, were pressuring him to slow down, Gore's natural
opponents, the Republicans, would be pressuring him to go faster, as
Blair's opponents did in England. They would have called him weak on
defense after 9/11, and so Gore probably would have invaded Iraq
earlier than Bush did.

Bush's invasion of Iraq was almost universally supported, by both
Republicans and Democrats. John Kerry has criticized Bush for not
sending enough troops into Iraq for the invasion. This morning I
heard John Edwards say that he supports the invasion of Iraq, though
he added that Kerry would have done it better.

There is no significant difference that I can discern between Kerry's
position on Iraq and Bush's. Kerry seems to have implied that he'd
be sending in more troops, but that's not clear. He claims he'd be
forming some other international coalition, but that's even less
clear. Meanwhile, Kerry has moved significantly to the conservative
side in foreign policy in the last week when he strongly endorsed
Israel's need to defend itself. Kerry was forced to do that because
Jewish voters have been defecting in droves from the Democratic Party
and moving to the Republican Party.

Now you can analyze that on a word-by-word and sentence-by-sentence
detail and perhaps identify a detail or two that you disagree with,
but as a whole, America's Iraqi policy has been on an unvarying trend
line since 1990, through three Presidential administrations, through
a fourth if Kerry wins.

So ranting and raving about Bush is irrelevant. What America is
doing is following America's policy, not Bush's policy, and that
policy will continue irrespective of the results of the November
election.

Originally Posted by miles51

> I agree that the news program question is bizarre, but not because
> of any problem of what we know today versus then; rather the
> problem with the question is that it presumes that knowing whether
> or not to make an unprovoked attack upon a sovereign nation is a
> matter of knowing some set of facts, when it is really a matter of
> knowing right from wrong which, evidently, no one does: not
> President Bush or P.M. Blair or the U.N. Security Council or the
> armies of TV & radio pundits or, sadly, the average
> American---including those on the left who implicitly seem to think
> that it would have been just fine to have invaded Iraq if only the
> U.N. had backed it.

Here you're agreeing with my point. It's not Bush's policy, it's
America's policy, and even those on the left basically support it.

Originally Posted by miles51

> Throughout the past two and a half years, I have been continually
> reminded of that famous scene in Robert Bolt's "A Man for All
> Seasons" in which Thomas More---who as Lord Chancellor of England
> and Wales was essentially his country's minister of justice---is
> told that he should arrest someone simply because he is a bad man.
> More replies that if he used his power against those who had
> committed no crime, simply because he believed them to be evil,
> there would remain no laws at all. International law, while more
> dodgily enforced than most national laws, must embody the same
> principle or it is nothing. Since Iraq did not pose an imminent
> danger to any other country---and since it posed no danger at all to
> the United States---the United States violated international law by
> invading and conquering that country. Indeed, the U.S. and U.K.
> had been acting lawlessly by waging undeclared air war on Iraq
> from 1991 to 2003; while the United Nations did object from time
> to time to this U.S./U.K. no-fly zone business, it has no power to
> do anything about such things, which is admittedly usually a
> blessing. (But the U.N. also violated international law and its
> own charter by sanctioning Iraq and trying to disarm her.)

This is an important issue, and it's the heart of the question, not
the political stuff. And this is the reason why the Iran scenario I
laid out is precisely analogous to the Iraq issue.

If you really believe that American's actions in Iraq have been wrong
since 1991, then you shouldn't be arguing political stuff like what
Bush did, because that's completely irrelevant to your own argument.
You need to argue why three Presidents' policies have been wrong, and
you haven't really done that.

Arguing now purely legalistically, I believe that a clear legal case
can be made for the invasion of Iraq, based on Iraq's actions in
Kuwait, and their refusal to comply with the weapons inspections. The
legal case would be analogous to an individual on probation after
committing a crime. When an individual is on probation, then the
state has the right to impose various restrictions on him, and can
incarcerate him at will for even minor infractions. Iraq was
basically "on probation" after being expelled from Kuwait, and the
world has a right, through the U.N., to impose restrictions in Iraq,
and to punish Iraq if those restrictions are violated.

However, that same argument would not work for Iran, and that's the
interesting point about the Iran/Iraq comparison. If intelligence
indicated that Iran was close to developing a nuclear weapon for use
on Israel, then use of American military force to prevent that strike
would not have the legal support that the Iraq invasion had. Another
legal reason would have to be found.

By the way, what's your opinion of the Afghan war?

Originally Posted by miles51

> So, while you may have to wait ten years or so to find out whether
> the Iraq War has done good or ill, I know that thanks to the
> invasion of Iraq, the U.S. in particular and the world in general
> are in greater danger than we were a year and a half ago because
> illegal acts always set the precedent for future illegal acts, and
> the shoe is likely to be on the other foot next time: what will
> happen one day when the present generation of leaders is gone and
> the U.N. has the military power to back up a resolution that the
> U.S. has too many WMDs and must surrender or be invaded and
> conquered? President Bush has prepared the way for them to do
> this; all they need is the might to back it up. (Nice going
> President Bush!!!)

You know nothing of the sort. Remember that 9/11 occurred before,
not after, the Iraq war.

However, this is what The Fourth Turning and Generational Dynamics is
all about. You're absolutely right that the Iraqi war will energize
the other side to look for ways to attack us, just as 9/11 energized
us. What you're describing is the cascade of events that will lead
to the "clash of civilizations" world war that will occur within the
next few years. And WMDs and nuclear weapons will be used.

What's going on in the Mideast has almost nothing to do with what
America does in Iraq or anywhere else. If you want to understand
what's going on in the Mideast, take another look at this map:



Take special note of that teeny, tiny red dot in the middle of that
huge sea of green. Practically every person in that vast sea of
green, whether moderate or radical, would be very happy to see that
teeny, tiny little red dot turn green. That's the driving issue, and
nothing that President Miles or President Bush or President Kerry
could do would change that at all.

Originally Posted by miles51

> This is like saying that I have given them a green light to
> breathe: according to international law, a sovereign nation has a
> right to defend itself and its right to do so is not to be
> interfered with. (The U.N.'s charter even recognizes this,
> although it is obviously honored in the breach.) Weapons are not
> supposed to be decorative, BTW; they can be used either
> defensively or offensively. Defensive use is legitimate; offensive
> use is wrong. (Should I have presumed that you knew this already?
> Were you just being wearisome? It's catching, I'm afraid.)

You're saying that giving Iran the right to develop nuclear weapons
is like giving them the right to breathe? Oh, how droll. I won't
comment further, since that would be wearisome.

Originally Posted by miles51

> You mean prevent by attacking a country for what they might do
> rather than what they do? Should I kill my neighbor because I
> believe that he might harm me even though he never has? I would be
> rightly locked up if I did that, but you seem to think that an
> unprovoked attack to prevent an unprovoked attack is wise in
> foreign policy.

We do this kind of thing all the time, and it's well established in
the law. For example, if you merely utter the word "bomb" in an
airport, you can be detained and searched, and even be arrested if
you're carrying something that might be used as a weapon. Why should
uttering "bomb" get someone arrested?

Beyond that, it's against the law for ordinary people to own certain
kinds of weapons. Heck, you can't even own a July 4 firecracker any
more. If your neighbor were building a bomb in his basement, you'd
be the first to have him arrested, even if he insisted that it was
only for peaceful purposes. So comparing your neighbor to Iran
actually conflicts with your view, and doesn't support it.

Originally Posted by miles51

> Well, aside from the fact that I actually decided to do something,
> I also have abided by international law in not counter-attacking
> until there is an actual attack to counter. More importantly, I
> have given the Iranians a real choice: They can keep their weapons
> to themselves and live in peace or use them on Israel and see
> Teheran and Qum, say, vaporized. The decision to trigger a nuclear
> war is theirs to make, not mine.

We're dealing with a world that praises suicide bombers. I think
that the Iranian Mullahs would make that tradeoff, if it meant
getting rid of Israel once and for all. And with President Miles
acting so weak, the Mullahs might decide that he wouldn't even have
the guts to follow through with that threat. What's the point of
vaporizing Teheran? President Miles would say: the bombing of Israel
is already a fait accompli, so why should we vaporize another
city? That would be compounding sin. Let the love flow instead.

Originally Posted by miles51

> I am reminded of the late Ronald Reagan's on-air jest about
> momentarily starting the bombing of the then Soviet Union. Many
> people were up in arms because they were afraid that Reagan would
> trigger a nuclear war, but the fact was that for eight years, the
> Soviets knew that if they used nuclear weapons Reagan would not
> hesitate to retaliate. That healthy fear may have kept the peace;
> that same fear would be likely to check the Iranians. Correct me
> if I'm wrong, but aren't you yourself claiming that they don't
> want a major war? Are you wrong about that?

The Iranian people do not want another war. But remember that
Generational Dynamics applies to large masses of people, not to the
actions of individuals or small groups of politicians. The actions
that I've described with respect to Iran are by the Mullahs.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Mike,

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> >>> John J. Xenakis wrote: I didn't assume that they diverged;

> Yes you did. You assert that the English Civil War was a crisis
> for the English but not for the English colonists in America.
> Since both the English and the English colonists were members of
> the same society at the beginning of the Awakening (before the
> colonists left) the two groups of people were necessarily on the
> same cycle then. Thus, the only way for the ECW period to be
> different turnings for the two groups is if the colonists
> diverged after arriving in America.

When I said that "I didn't assume that they diverged," I was
addressing the general point, in response to Howe's evident
assumption that they would not diverge. Obviously I think the
colonists and English diverged on the ECW. Duh.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> Yes it does affect what you said.

I said in the very next paragraph that it raises the question of why
the ECW wasn't reflected in the colonies. Miles has commented on
this, talking about different age distributions in different
colonies, and also "self-selection," where those on opposite sides of
the ECW lived in different colonies.

The concept I was struggling to identify has to do with whether the
movement of a large population from England to the colonies has an
affect on the generational splits. It certainly has to be considered
as a possibility that a mass migration of that type would merge the
generational differences to some extent, since everyone would have to
cooperate to survive in a new, hostile environment far from home.
That's what I was thinking of when I said it doesn't affect what I
said.

However, the main point is that, irrespective of what the colonists
did, King Philip's War was on the Indians' timeline.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> The enemy of the Puritans was back in England, only one side of
> the conflict was present in New England. So of course there was no
> civil war in New England; you need two sides to have a war.

OK, I'll take your word for this, but I think it contradicts what
Miles said.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> Now this point makes your cycle scheme fundamentally different
> than S&H's. They claim that their cycle is a product of modernity
> and does not exist in pre-modern peoples like the Native
> Americans. According to S&H there can be no Indian timeline.

OK, this brings up the whole issue of Howe's treatment of the 1600s.

I previously said that I didn't really want to argue about Howe, and I
said that because there's an issue of online ethics about not dumping
on someone who isn't around to defend himself. I've followed that
rule for years, violating it only in situations like this, where the
person's statements are being used to attack me, essentially leaving
me no choice. In addition, I note that Howe publicly disagreed with
me and sided with you, so all in all I feel freed from the online
ethics consideration. I realize that you don't care about this,
Mike, but I'm posting this paragraph in case someone else in this
forum has similar concerns about online ethics.

Generational Dynamics has always been based on the theory
developed by Howe in The Fourth Turning. Where GD and TFT
differed in details, I always ascribed that to errors in applying the
theory. In particular, I've always felt that TFT's anomalous
treatment of the Great Depression, the American Civil War and the
Glorious Revolution were problems that had to be resolved if the TFT
theory was to make sense. And of course I've always believed that GD
must apply to all tribes, societies and nations at all times
in history if it was to be considered a worthwhile credible theory.
So my opinion has been that GD corrects a number of errors in TFT,
provides explanations for other problems, but is still based on the
same underlying theory, which remains solid. (Incidentally, I don't
consider having errors in details to be a big deal; I've made some
errors in my book that have to be corrected as well.)

At any rate, saying that my "cycle scheme" is the same as Howe's is
not the correct statement of the situation. It's correct to say that
my theoretical development is based on Howe's, and if the theory is
applied correctly, then we should come out to the same dates.

I've said to you in the past that the Glorious Revolution could not
possibly be a 4T event, based on Howe's own description of what a 4T
is. In a rare moment of weakness, you actually agreed with me that
the Glorious Revolution was no raging typhoon, and essentially
supported my view that the GR crisis is inconsistent with TFT theory.
I would extend that in the opposite way to the English Civil War in
England: It clear was a raging typhoon, so must be a 4T event,
not a 2T event.

But now there's a new issue. Howe's e-mail message to me, which I
posted a few messages back, is so muddled and confused that it's hard
to know what to make of it. I'll return to this below.

But first, there's always been something peculiar about Howe's
treatment of the American Civil War. He says that there's no Hero
generation. Huh? Without a Hero generation, the entire TFT theory
falls apart. There can't be an Awakening without a Hero generation,
for example. And what could he possibly be talking about? I
remember somewhere reading about parades of old Civil War veterans in
the early 1900s. Who were those parades for, if not for Heroes?
Actually every kid who fought as a Yank or a Rebel was part of the
Hero generation.

Since Howe's treatment of both the English and American Civil Wars
appears to contradict Howe's own theory, it's at least possible to
consider the possibility that Howe doesn't understand his own theory,
at least as it applies to Civil Wars.

What's special about Civil Wars? This brings up another subject.
Howe refers to the period following a crisis war as a "High," since
the people are celebrating their victory. As you know, I've been
using the word "Austerity" to refer to this period, since it isn't a
"high" for the side that loses the war. Well, that's what's special
about civil wars - there's no "high" in a civil war, since a civil
war is pretty much a disaster for everyone. So this may tie into why
Howe didn't identify a Hero generation after the American civil war,
and why he mis-identified the English Civil War as an awakening.

Now let me turn to the two main paragraphs of the e-mail message that
Howe sent me.

Originally Posted by Neil Howe

> (1) The dominant proximate drivers of Awakenings are
> religious/culture conflicts; of Crises they are secular/political
> conflicts. By this criterion, the English Civil War culminated
> an Awakening. I'm not saying that they were no purely political
> issues involves; I'm saying that the *dominant* motives of the
> main players were religious/cultural. The entire era of 1620-40s
> has been called the "Puritan Awakening" by many scholars before us
> (McLoughlin, e.g., in his famous book)--and not just for America
> and England but for much of the Continent.

Now there are tons of problems with this paragraph. Where do I
begin?

First, when you add this to his TFT argument, his main line of
reasoning is this: The 1640s was a religious/culture conflict - the
driver of an awakening; it didn't accomplish anything since they put
the King back; therefore it was an awakening. In other words, he's
using what's called in logic the "begging the question" or "assuming
the conclusion" fallacy: He essentially assumes that the period is an
awakening, says nothing was accomplished, and concludes that it was an
awakening.

Now if instead you look at it as a war, which it really is, then of
course there were HUGE secular/political motivations, and many
important things were settled. To repeat from previous postings:
This was a very violent war, ending with the beheading of the king,
then ten years of military dictatorship under Oliver Cromwell. Then,
when Cromwell died and England sank into anarchy, the desperate
Nomads and Heroes pulled together and united behind a compromise: A
new King, but with vastly reduced powers. This was a vastly weakened
King: the Star Chamber was abolished; the King's power of taxation
was abolished; the King's power to dissolve Parliament was abolished;
forced loans, imprisonment without trial and martial law were also
all abolished. In addition, Jenny has noted, "However, given that
English society was extremely stratified during that time, and
given that the Roundheads tended to be middle-class Calvinist
Protestant craftsmen and yeoman in Eastern England whereas the
Cavaliers were the nobility plus Catholics, from other parts of
England, it is extremely unlikely that either side of beligerants
would have been fighting their fathers. Along side their
fathers is more like it."

So to say that political/secular matters were not the subject of this
war has never borne much relationship to reality as I saw it.

But now look at this sentence from Howe's message:

Originally Posted by Neil Howe

> The entire era of 1620-40s has been called the "Puritan Awakening"
> by many scholars before us (McLoughlin, e.g., in his famous
> book)--and not just for America and England but for much of the
> Continent.

You can google this stuff. There are hundreds of "Puritan Awakening"
sites, and almost all seem to be derived from The Fourth
Turning itself. The only site I can find that seems to directly
describe McLoughlin's actual text is:

> McLoughlin identified five "awakenings" (or religious
> revitalization movements) in American history. The first was the
> Puritan awakening, which began in England in 1610 and lasted till
> 1640. The settlements of New England and, at least in part,
> Virginia were aspects of that movement.

> http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/...ws/carlin.html

Can you believe this? Howe has changed the goddam fucking dates.
Sorry for the language but you can't believe how much this crap
absolutely infuriates me. Based on what I see here, he purposely and
deceptively changed the dates of the Puritan Awakening as specified
by his own source, McLoughlin. Why? Undoubtedly for the reason I've
previously given: He wanted his cycles to come out right. He had to
fit a 4T between the Armada and 1776, so he made GR a 4T, even though
there's no way in hell that it's a 4T, and he made the English Civil
War an "awakening," even though there's no way in hell that it's an
awakening, and he changed his source's dates to accommodate his
desired result.

Now look: I hate this. I hate every aspect of this. I hate having
found evidence that somebody purposely fudged dates. I hate having to
accuse somebody of fudging dates. I hate accusing somebody who isn't
here to defend himself. This is a nasty situation that does me no
good, nor does anybody else any good.

But he does have an out, the out that I offered to him in my message
to him, and that I wish he had taken. His books, Generations
and The Fourth Turning, are clearly about <u>the colonies</u>,
not about England. His books say nothing about whether the ECW was an
awakening in England. It's perfectly reasonable to believe that the
Puritan Awakening took place <u>later</u> in the colonies than it did
in England. And if the Puritan awakening occurred in the 1630s-40s in
the colonies, and if you realize that the colonists may have had a
"plague on both your houses" view of the far-away ECW, then everything
makes sense, and his book is correct.

But now let's go back to England with the corrected Puritan awakening
dates. In a previous posting to Tim Walker, I gave my dates for the
English awakening to be roughly at 1603-1623, based on an Armada
crisis of 1588. Now everything makes sense. The dates in England
are:

(*) 1560s-88: Armada crisis period

(*) 1589-1602: Austerity (High) period

(*) 1603-23: Awakening period. The Puritan Awakening began in 1610,
according to McLoughlin.

(*) 1623-40: Unraveling.

(*) 1640-49: Crisis civil war, culiminating in beheading of king

(*) 1650-65: Austerity period: Military dictatorship under Oliver
Cromwell, following by anarchy, followed by great compromise that
restored the King but with vastly reduced powers.

Now that makes sense, and is consistent with the Puritan Awakening as
specified by McLoughlin.

Now let's go on to Howe's next muddled paragraph:

Originally Posted by Neil Howe

> (2) Crises, at least when not ending in catastrophe, must end in
> a long-term "settlement" of outstanding political and
> institutional disagreements. The Civil War settled nothing long
> term. The Glorious Revolution (at home) and the Wars of Spanish
> Succession (abroad) settled everything long term. Needless to say,
> I disagree (and I'm sure most English would disagree) with your
> comparison to Nixon's resignation. No ruler even approaching
> James II's autocratic pretensions ever again came to the throne.

Well, of course the civil war did that, as I've repeatedly stated.

But he gives the "Glorious Revolution crisis" dates as 1675-1704.
I've discussed before that these dates don't make any sense for
England, but in paragraph (2) he makes some really weird statement.

What is this - some sort of two-part crisis? The GR settled
everything at home in 1688, and the WSS settled everything in
Europe???? Is this a joke? Where has he ever spoken of a two-part
crisis like this? You can't just make up new theoretical elements on
the fly and still remain credible.

As I've repeatedly said, the GR did not settle anything in England,
because Scotland didn't agree to the Protestant succession, and
Scotland was where the ECW was originally launched. That was the main
question that had to be settled, and the GR didn't settle it at all.

The WSS did finally settle that question once and for all, but on
what date? Ironically, it could be argued that it was settled as a
result of the Battle of Blenheim in 1704. However, Howe reserves the
1704 date, which occurred near the beginning of the WSS, as the date
when everything abroad was "settled long term." Well, that's not
true. Everything in Europe wasn't settled until the 1714 Treaty at
Utrecht. So everything about Howe's explanation is totally screwed
up -- unless you restrict his explanation to the <u>colonies
alone</u>!!!! And then it can be supported!!!

Now, let me make one more point in his favor: The dates 1675-1704 may
be correct for the colonies in some way that I don't yet understand.

The problem for me is that King Philip's War climaxed in 1676-78, and
the American Revolution crisis period didn't begin until 1772.
That's a long time, and it's not so long as to be unreasonable, but
there's another problem: The Awakening period should have begun
around 1695, not 1730. Did some other awakening-type events occur
starting around 1695? This would make the 1730s-40s part of a long
unraveling period, and that wouldn't be an unreasonable finding.

Or did the anxieties surrounding the French and Indian wars in
America, combined with uncertainties about the dissolution of English
Empire, combine to extend the 4T period until the Battle of Blenheim
resolved everything in 1704? That's a possibility that has to be
considered, and it would also support Howe's work, when focused on
the colonies.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

In a rare moment of weakness, you actually agreed with me that the Glorious Revolution was no raging typhoon, and essentially supported my view that the GR crisis is inconsistent with TFT theory.

S&H theory doesn't say that a crisis is a raging typhoon. They have used the word in their description of a crisis, but it is not in their theory. Their theory involves generational constellations, not crisis wars. Nowhere in any of their books do they talk about genocidal wars creating the cycle, this is your concept--not theirs. Have you read the Appendix in which the theory is presented?

Since Howe's treatment of both the English and American Civil Wars appears to contradict Howe's own theory, it's at least possible to consider the possibility that Howe doesn't understand his own theory, at least as it applies to Civil Wars.

I think it is more likely that you do not understand their theory. Instead you have developed your own theory, which is not the same as theirs.

John,

I think the leadership of Iran believes (as most nations do) that Israel has 100 to 400 nuclear weapons and the ability to deliver a lot of them even in the event of the vaporization of Tel Aviv and Haifa. The most recent articles I've read state that Israel's ability to produce thermonuclear devices is primitive, so most if not all of the devices they have are "merely" fission/atomic in nature. But August 1945 has shown us that even detonations "only" in the 15-30 kiloton range can be pretty interesting.

With the nuclearization of Iran, one can count on Israel to beef up whatever capability it currently has to something even more deterence-enhancing. Indeed, I suspect they'd also go for a first strike posture (and overcome whatever obstacle they heretofore have had developing hydrogen bombs).

Even as we speak, Israel could effectively lay waste to dozens or scores of Iranian cities. Now, I give you that even with Israel meting out more absolute damage, they would most likely incur (at this point, anyway) more relative damage. So I guess it boils down to what the Mullahs are willing to "accept" to achieve their goals, should they go the nuclear route in war.

One last thing. Since Israel is likely under the American nuclear umbrella, would Iran have to worry about US nukes landing on their soil as well? That should play into the equation also.

Regardless, as the world adds more nations to the nuclear club, the chance of something going wrong rises exponentially.

Dear Mike,

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> S&H theory doesn't say that a crisis is a raging typhoon. They
> have used the word in their description of a crisis, but it is not
> in their theory. Their theory involves generational
> constellations, not crisis wars. Nowhere in any of their books do
> they talk about genocidal wars creating the cycle, this is your
> concept--not theirs. Have you read the Appendix in which the
> theory is presented?

You're really drifting into terminal silliness here. When I said
that Generational Dynamics was based on the theory in TFT, I was
referring to the theoretical discussions throughout the book,
including the lengthy description of what a 4T is like. I wasn't
referring to some obscure appendix in some other book. You're
sinking, Mike.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> I think it is more likely that you do not understand their theory.
> Instead you have developed your own theory, which is not the same
> as theirs.

Sorry, Mike, I don't think so.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Sean,

Originally Posted by William Jennings Bryan

> I think the leadership of Iran believes (as most nations do) that
> Israel has 100 to 400 nuclear weapons and the ability to deliver a
> lot of them even in the event of the vaporization of Tel Aviv and
> Haifa. The most recent articles I've read state that Israel's
> ability to produce thermonuclear devices is primitive, so most if
> not all of the devices they have are "merely" fission/atomic in
> nature. But August 1945 has shown us that even detonations "only"
> in the 15-30 kiloton range can be pretty interesting.

> With the nuclearization of Iran, one can count on Israel to beef
> up whatever capability it currently has to something even more
> deterence-enhancing. Indeed, I suspect they'd also go for a first
> strike posture (and overcome whatever obstacle they heretofore
> have had developing hydrogen bombs).

If I were a Mullah planning this kind of operation, I would look for
a way to obscure the source of any nuclear weapon delivered to
Israel. For example, I might have the nuclear weapon delivered by
ground transportation to Jordan near the West Bank boundary, and from
there flown to Tel Aviv by a suicide pilot flying a crop duster.

If secrecy could thus be maintained until the deed was done, and Iran
could maintain plausible deniability, then in the aftermath of the
blast, the Israeli army and air force would kept busy keeping back
the Palestinians who would be overruning Israeli cities, and wouldn't
have time to run off to Iran to bomb some remote target that may not
even be right.

Originally Posted by William Jennings Bryan

> One last thing. Since Israel is likely under the American nuclear
> umbrella, would Iran have to worry about US nukes landing on their
> soil as well? That should play into the equation also.

Would America respond to such a nuclear strike with a nuclear strike
of its own? If I were to guess, the answer would be no. The US has
set a fairly high bar before using nuclear weapons. My expectation
is that the US would refrain from using nuclear weapons at the
beginning, but as the clash of civilizations world war gathers steam
and reaches a climax, then the US will unleash a lot of its arsenal.
So will Russia. It'll be messy.

You know, I play both sides of the street in this kind of discussion.
What I really believe is that there's going to be a Mideast war with
100% probability.

(An aside: Last week I was talking on the phone to someone who read
my book and web site. He was very enthusiastic about it, and even
said it was "very elegant." Later we talked about something else,
and I gave him an answer from my web site. He said, "You mean you
actually believe that stuff?" Yes, I assured him.)

Anyway, the context of these discussions is, How can we avoid war,
which I know is impossible. For me the issue is: If we're going to
have a war, how can America come out the best?

So I would think that it would be best for us and for the world to
set off as few nuclear weapons as possible. Once the war approaches
a crisis, the use of many nuclear weapons may be impossible, but I
think we should make it a goal.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Dear Mike,

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> S&H theory doesn't say that a crisis is a raging typhoon. They
> have used the word in their description of a crisis, but it is not
> in their theory. Their theory involves generational
> constellations, not crisis wars. Nowhere in any of their books do
> they talk about genocidal wars creating the cycle, this is your
> concept--not theirs. Have you read the Appendix in which the
> theory is presented?

You're really drifting into terminal silliness here. When I said
that Generational Dynamics was based on the theory in TFT, I was
referring to the theoretical discussions throughout the book,
including the lengthy description of what a 4T is like. I wasn't
referring to some obscure appendix in some other book. You're
sinking, Mike.

Just because you seem to be able to look down on Mike (pun fully intended) doesn't mean that he's sinking. It could just as easily mean that you are the one floating up, up, and away with nothing to anchor you to the theory you say you base your work on. That anchor is the original presentation of Strauss and Howe's generational theory in Generations, especially the appendix to which Mike refers. If you haven't read that, then you are missing a critical piece of Strauss and Howe's model on which you say you're basing your theory.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> I think it is more likely that you do not understand their theory.
> Instead you have developed your own theory, which is not the same
> as theirs.

Sorry, Mike, I don't think so.

Sincerely,

John

You may not think so, but it could be demonstrated otherwise.

BTW, the people who have questioned your commitment to thoroughness, both in terms of theory and evidence--David Kaiser, Mike Alexander, and now me--each has a Ph.D. It might occur to you that we know something about theoretical rigor.

Dear Vince,

Originally Posted by Vince Lamb '59

> Just because you seem to be able to look down on Mike (pun fully
> intended) doesn't mean that he's sinking. It could just as easily
> mean that you are the one floating up, up, and away with nothing
> to anchor you to the theory you say you base your work on. That
> anchor is the original presentation of Strauss and Howe's
> generational theory in Generations, especially the appendix to
> which Mike refers. If you haven't read that, then you are missing
> a critical piece of Strauss and Howe's model on which you say
> you're basing your theory.

I always thought that Mike could take care of himself, but I'm sure
he appreciates your help.

The appendix in Generations only just begins talking about
"four-type cycles," and says that they don't apply to pre-modern
societies. The theory I was referring to appears throughout The
Fourth Turning, including the lengthy descriptions of
fourth-turning wars, and the contrasts between those wars and wars in
other turning periods.

I'm just wondering, is there a subtext here? Do you and Mike
consider TFT to be inferior in some way to Generations? I
only ask because you and Mike seem to be so affronted when I say that
Generational Dynamics is based on the theory in TFT.

Originally Posted by Vince Lamb '59

> BTW, the people who have questioned your commitment to
> thoroughness, both in terms of theory and evidence--David Kaiser,
> Mike Alexander, and now me--each has a Ph.D. It might occur to you
> that we know something about theoretical rigor.

First off, I think you should let other people speak for themselves.
They really don't need your help.

Second, I don't have much respect for this kind of intellectual
snobbery. If it makes any difference to you, I completed all my
course requirements and exams for a Ph.D. in Mathematics
(Mathematical Logic, Computer Science) from MIT, but didn't finish my
thesis. Even so, I believe that anyone who, like myself, understands
why the Axiom of Choice is consistent with and independent of the
other axioms of set theory has some claim to understanding what
theoretical rigor is all about.

But the problem I've seen in general, without intending to refer to
anyone here, is that people with PhDs tend to believe that they can
use it to cover up their own limitations and sloppiness. I'm sure
you could name plenty of examples, as could I, but one need only look
at the writings of, say, Noam Chomsky to realize that some of the
most moronic garbage can come from someone with a PhD. The fact that
someone completed a thesis on an obscure sub-sub-sub-topic of some
field of study 30 years ago doesn't give him anything at all, in my
opinion. In the end, people with PhDs have the same emotional
problems as everyone else, but having a PhD doesn't mean that their
emotional decisions have any validity at all.

By coincidence, I have a good example of this. My son Jason has a
summer job providing computer support at a local school teaching
computer skills to teachers. Now these are people who have advanced
degrees in education, so you'd think that they'd have some
intellectual honesty, but far from it. They're contemptuous of
computers, they don't study, they don't do their homework, and,
generally speaking, they're stupid. My point is that there's nothing
magic about an advanced degree. It doesn't indicate either
intellectual honesty OR theoretical rigor.

The situation at hand is typical of all kinds of intellectual
development. S&H developed a theory that they described in
Generations, and developed further in The Fourth
Turning. (And then, as far as I can tell, they abandoned their
own theory and went off to concentrate on things like selling cars to
Millennials.)

Nothing in life is static. If they're going to develop a theory,
then you have to expect that other people are going to come along and
examine it and perhaps even develop it further. That's the way life
is, and that's what I've been doing.

By their own statements, the theory they developed is limited to
modern times and doesn't cover periods like the American Civil War.
These are very substantial limitations.

What I've done is taken a portion of their theoretical development
(the stuff in TFT), I've refocused it and expanded it through
instruments like the Principle of Localization and the mechanics of
merging timelines, I've combined it with the analytics of
technological development, and I've come up with a derivative theory
which applies to all places and all times, and can be used to
forecast certain types of future events.

Probably it took someone like me to do that. Howe's background is in
history, and he developed things that I could never have imagined.
But my background is in mathematical logic, and I was able to take
what he's done and extend it in ways that he could never have
imagined. What's wrong with that?

If you really consider yourself to be such a big intellectual brain
trust, then you should appreciate that, and appreciate some of the
<u>truly remarkable and exciting results</u> that have come out of
Generational Dynamics, and not just reject them out of hand because
they were "not invented here."

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

To all:

For those who wish to do some research, I've scanned three chapters
from Revivals, awakenings, and reform: an essay on religion and
social change in America, 1607-1977, by William G. McLoughlin.
They are available <u>temporarily</u> at
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...k.wgmcloughlin
Take care when reading, because there are numerous scan errors still
to be corrected.

The three chapters scanned are:

• Chapter 1. Awakenings as Revitalizations of Culture
  Chapter 2. The Puritan Awakening and the Culture Core
  Chapter 3. The First Great Awakening, 1730-60

I've previously suggested that the generational awakening period in
England following the Armada crisis should be around 1603, computed
by adding 15 years to 1588. McGloughlin is clear that the Puritan
Awakening occurred in England starting in 1610, which indicates that
a date closer to 1610 is a better choice. However, I note on page 27
that the generational conflict appears to have begun in 1604 when
James VI ascended to the throne. At any rate, the generational
awakening period in England starts somewhere between 1603 and 1610,
and ends somewhere in the 1620s.

On page 30, it says that between 1630-40, almost 30,000 Englishmen of
varying degrees of Puritan commitment went to New England, and the
same number went to other colonies. The chapter continues to
describe the influence of Puritanism in the colonies after that. A
generational awakening period of the 1630s and 1640s seems reasonable
in the colonies, based on what McLoughlin wrote.

Another question remains: Since 1630 is long after the Armada crisis,
how could that awakening time be correct for the colonies? For that,
I propose a new theoretical construct, one I've mentioned briefly in
the past: When you have a large migration of people from one place to
another, then you get a "return to Austerity" or "return to 1-T."
The reason is that in such a situations, all the people are forced to
unite, cooperate with one another, and work together to develop new
institutions from scratch. Thus, such a migration has somewhat the
same effect on population as a crisis war. The same construct would
apply to the large migration of Palestinians into Jordan in the
1940s.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

To all:

For those who wish to do some research, I've scanned three chapters
from Revivals, awakenings, and reform: an essay on religion and
social change in America, 1607-1977, by William G. McLoughlin.
They are available <u>temporarily</u> at
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...k.wgmcloughlin
Take care when reading, because there are numerous scan errors still
to be corrected.

The three chapters scanned are:

• Chapter 1. Awakenings as Revitalizations of Culture
  Chapter 2. The Puritan Awakening and the Culture Core
  Chapter 3. The First Great Awakening, 1730-60

I've previously suggested that the generational awakening period in
England following the Armada crisis should be around 1603, computed
by adding 15 years to 1588. McGloughlin is clear that the Puritan
Awakening occurred in England starting in 1610, which indicates that
a date closer to 1610 is a better choice. However, I note on page 27
that the generational conflict appears to have begun in 1604 when
James VI ascended to the throne. At any rate, the generational
awakening period in England starts somewhere between 1603 and 1610,
and ends somewhere in the 1620s.

On page 30, it says that between 1630-40, almost 30,000 Englishmen of
varying degrees of Puritan commitment went to New England, and the
same number went to other colonies. The chapter continues to
describe the influence of Puritanism in the colonies after that. A
generational awakening period of the 1630s and 1640s seems reasonable
in the colonies, based on what McLoughlin wrote.

Another question remains: Since 1630 is long after the Armada crisis,
how could that awakening time be correct for the colonies? For that,
I propose a new theoretical construct, one I've mentioned briefly in
the past: When you have a large migration of people from one place to
another, then you get a "return to Austerity" or "return to 1-T."
The reason is that in such a situations, all the people are forced to
unite, cooperate with one another, and work together to develop new
institutions from scratch. Thus, such a migration has somewhat the
same effect on population as a crisis war. The same construct would
apply to the large migration of Palestinians into Jordan in the
1940s.

Though I do not agree with your analysis that the ECW is 4T, I must say you are making an interesting case. One question: When does McLoughlin end the Puritan Awakening? Wasn't it 1640? I can't remember.

I try to write coherently, although I'm not always successful. I'll
try to do better.

I was not saying that you write incoherently but rather that you eliminate the coherence of my text and then respond to it by missing the point--which you have done again.

I wonder about a couple of things:

Here you're agreeing with my point. It's not Bush's policy, it's
America's policy, and even those on the left basically support it.

If you see that, then why rehearse the recent history of U.S. policy as if I did not realize that the Bush administration's policy is a continuation? Clearly I have a beef with several U.S. administrations and the U.N. and many other people and institutions. I actually do not hate Bush (a waste of energy) and do not think anyone else would have done anything substantially different.
I can sort of see why you thought I rehearsed Bush's justifications in order to express political emotion; actually, though, I was focusing on his position because he is the current representative of American policy. He is the one who takes responsibility for invading Iraq if the buck still stops somewhere.
My point was that the invasion was wrong (and that the Clinton administration was wrong for the same reason--and we may note that Britain's Tony Blair has joined two presidents now in questionable military actions in Iraq and the former Yugoslavia).

I see one big difference between your Iran scenario and the Iraq crisis:
The evidence in the Iraq case for either the imminent or even long-range possibility of Iraq launching attacks on U.S. soil has always been weak*; in your Iran scenario, the idea is that Iran has functioning nukes and means to use them soon. This actually suggests to me that a preemptive strike on Iran would be more justified than the attack on Iraq. So maybe I should have been more willing to consider that choice. I still do not see how you can assume that Iran would believe my promise (not threat) to be empty or desperate. I would not say something like that without meaning it. If that required a face to face meeting with someone to impress that upon them, then that is what I would do.

I am curious to know what you would do. After all, attacking Iran preemptively with either nuclear or conventional weapons--if that is what you would recommend--would not help if the Iranians were ready to use their weapons before we could stop them: that sounds like a race-against-time movie plot that we should rather have stay in the movies.


BTW, I thought that the invasion of Afghanistan was defensible: the Taliban were harboring the head of al Qaeda and others who were directly involved in 9/11.

*I did think that Iraq never attacked the US, but I have learned that Iraq actually attacked the USS Stark back in the '80s when, however, we were on better terms with them; so the Reagan administration forgave them. Still, Iraq was not capable of attacking our homeland any time soon, and never did attack our homeland.