Greetings casewestwill

Thanks Tim Walker!
I'm not trying to change the subject - just interested in what Mr. Xenakis is thinking.

Originally Posted by casewestwill

Also, in your post on the Vatican's document on feminism you state that "the "sexual revolution" was being reversed" and "would continue for several decades". Can you give me an example of what you see happening? Do you mean it will be totally reversed to say, 1964? Will there be no (or very few) women in politics? the media? the board room? academia? the military? road crews? construction? I see a generation of astute, ambitious young women before me, who are, in many cases, far superior to their male counterparts (which is a good thing in my opinion - I also don't feel that "respect for their womenly contributions" alone will satisfy them) I'm interested in some speculation of the possibilities you see. I think it is important to remember that many aspects of the "sexual revolution" of the 1920's remained intact through the last crisis and into the next High.

Thank you for your comments.

I'd like to comment on the feminist aspect of your post. When we look at the role of women in mid-century, it looks quite conservative by our standards. However, look at what the GI women were doing from the vantage point of, say, 1918.

• The Fifties women wore skirts that exposed some of the leg, and in casual situations, even pants.
• No corsets, hat pins. Short hair, or long hair put back in a pony tail were common. On the other hand, nice women wore rouge and lipstick, something that would have been shocking in the previous century.
• Women voted.
• Women smoked and drank in public, along with the men. Nobody found that shocking.

Much of this was what was bitterly fought over in the period between around 1900 and 1930, but became enshrined after the Crisis ended.

Likewise, I fully expect to see today's Millie women continuing to work, pursue careers, and fully participate in public life and leadership roles in the next High.

Originally Posted by Hermione Granger

Originally Posted by casewestwill

Also, in your post on the Vatican's document on feminism you state that "the "sexual revolution" was being reversed" and "would continue for several decades". Can you give me an example of what you see happening? Do you mean it will be totally reversed to say, 1964? Will there be no (or very few) women in politics? the media? the board room? academia? the military? road crews? construction? I see a generation of astute, ambitious young women before me, who are, in many cases, far superior to their male counterparts (which is a good thing in my opinion - I also don't feel that "respect for their womenly contributions" alone will satisfy them) I'm interested in some speculation of the possibilities you see. I think it is important to remember that many aspects of the "sexual revolution" of the 1920's remained intact through the last crisis and into the next High.

Thank you for your comments.

I'd like to comment on the feminist aspect of your post. When we look at the role of women in mid-century, it looks quite conservative by our standards. However, look at what the GI women were doing from the vantage point of, say, 1918.

• The Fifties women wore skirts that exposed some of the leg, and in casual situations, even pants.
• No corsets, hat pins. Short hair, or long hair put back in a pony tail were common. On the other hand, nice women wore rouge and lipstick, something that would have been shocking in the previous century.
• Women voted.
• Women smoked and drank in public, along with the men. Nobody found that shocking.

Much of this was what was bitterly fought over in the period between around 1900 and 1930, but became enshrined after the Crisis ended.

Likewise, I fully expect to see today's Millie women continuing to work, pursue careers, and fully participate in public life and leadership roles in the next High.

We can safely assume that there will be some manifestation of the "Cult of Domesticity" as there has been in previous 1T's. The important point is that there will be some type of gender differentiation that will be shattered in the following 2T and 3T. And almost certainly the 1T differentiation will ironically be integrated with aspects considered progressive in the previous saeculum.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

You know, for some reason that I can't explain right now this never occurred to me, but you're absolutely right. Why didn't the French and Indian wars become a crisis war itself?

Perhaps because King Philip's War was only a Crisis for the Indians. (And the French and Indian War was a Crisis War for them as well.)

Here is one way of dealing with this dilemma (which I said I'd put in a separate post in my last post):

On previous threads, I have stated my belief that turning length tends to be uniform from Crisis to Crisis and that the length can vary between 18 and 27 years. The 18 year limit can be called the ?Populist Limit? and the 27 year limit the ?Aristocratic Limit.? The basic concept is that societies are torn between social changes initiated by young adults who exert influence upon reaching adulthood and social changes initiated by late 20s adults who are finally achieving wealth and status. Social systems that respond strongly to populist fervor and mass protest will be closer to the Populist Limit. Social systems that are dictated mainly by inherited status will be closer to the Aristocratic Limit.

Normally these two forces should achieve some sort of equilibrium and create a turning length somewhere between the limits. However, in a society with very distinct social classes (such as those of early modern Europe) a split cycle could occur where the mass of the population has mood swings based on the Populist Limit while the bulk of political events keep time with the upper classes operating at the Aristocratic Limit. In most cases, the Aristocratic cycle would be what we would observe as a saeculum.

However, in the 16th century, the colonies in the New World provided a means for the short-cycle elements of society to flee the long-cycle elements and create a wholly separate cycle. Consider that the English Civil War as a Crisis for the lower classes and an Awakening for the upper classes. The period of the eleven-year tyranny and the heavy fighting of the 1840s is a short-cycle Crisis that then becomes an Austerity during the Commonwealth. But the situation goes awry as the upper classes, Cromwell among them, continue to bicker (for they are still in an Awakening) and ?betray the revolution.? By the time of the Restoration, many of the more radical populist elements are headed to the colonies to establish there the society they thought they had established in England.

The populist cycle forms a background to events in the Anglosphere. Its next Crisis falls during the War of Spanish Succession and thus its effect is muted. (In this schema, King Philip?s War falls in a populist Awakening but is, of course, a Crisis for the Indian cultures.) The English social structure becomes slightly less aristocratic as a result of the Glorious Revolution (in this schema, the start of an Aristocratic Crisis) and drops to a 25-year turning length. In the colonies, the Seven Years War is an Unraveling for many but still an Awakening for the more traveled classes. When the populist cycle hits Crisis, however, the mother country is too distant (and in the wrong turning) to sufficiently quell the rebellion. A unique American cycle results. The new American cycle is in a society not yet fully populist but more strongly tilted that way than the English cycle (a shorter 21-year cycle results). In the 19th century we would get an American Crisis from the late 1850s to the mid-1870s.

The English cycle continues on to have a Crisis from roughly 1790 to 1815, after which populism begins to exert considerable force in English politics and European politics in general. By the time we get to WWII, the entire West is essentially on a common populist cycle. My guess is that had there not been any New World colonies, the Puritans would have remained in England, suppressed, and eventually England would have had an event similar to the French Revolution and at roughly the same time.

HG

I tend to agree with you 100% I also somewhat object to JJX's implication that women now are 'trying to be like men" only for wanting the same opportunities in policy, academia and the marketplace. I must refrain from final judgment until he has a chance to respond, though. However, I do feel that there will be a change in the point of veiw of the culture regarding women's issues. I think it could be something as simple as motherhood being celebrated instead of disparaged and most of the culture being OK with that - all the while women quietly attain some of the top spots in our culture (just in the nick of time to bring some of their "unique values and contributions" into play when it matters the most). :wink:

That's one possibility - I'd like to see what JJX sees.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

This is an interesting idea, but it's hard for me to grasp. The English would have had visceral fury at France, while the colonists had visceral fury at England. I would guess that English businessmen or tourists visiting the colonies would keep their mouths shut about politics, just as an American visiting Paris today would probably
keep his mouth shut about politics.

I think the colonists would still hate the French more than the English. The difference is that once the French were out of North America, the only people left to blame were the English.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

I look at crisis wars a little differently. I don't think you can say a crisis war occurs just because a generational change takes place; if so, then crisis wars would occur at times that could be
predicted precisely well in advance.

Not precisely, but within a known range.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

The model I have is that when the Prophets take over, then the society enters a "crisis period," which is what S&H call a "fourth turning." During the crisis period, a society is "ready" for a crisis war, but doesn't have one until the appropriate "partner" (i.e., enemy) is available. During a crisis period, the society has to balance between political and visceral desires. At the beginning of a crisis period, the political desires still predominate, and so the society may proceed very cautiously. But as the crisis period goes on, the balance gradually shifts away from politics towards the visceral.

This is similar to my model, except that I see the emergence of the Heroes as the trigger. In a long-cycle saeculum, the Prophets would achieve power during the Unraveling. In a short-cycle, during the Crisis. (Granted, this does away with the S&H model of Heroes as foot soldiers for the Prophets -- but in a long cycle the new Heroes are much older when they achieve influence and more likely to be players in their own right.)

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Incidentally, my analysis is that the Revolutionary War was an Unraveling war for the English, and that's why England was pursuing so many conciliatory moves during the 1760s.

I also see it as an Unraveling war. The English response to the rebellion is far too nuanced to be a Crisis response.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

I assign a little less weight to the importance of individuals than TFT does. I see a crisis period as determined by large masses of people, not by an individual. For example, I see the German
generational changes as having "created" Hitler, not as Hitler
developing a theory and convincing an entire nation to abide by it.

Sorry, I wasn't clear in what I meant. By bringing up individuals, I did not mean to endorse the "Big Man" theory of history but rather to suggest that the psychological experiences that cause people to grow up to be a "Prophet" or a "Hero" can happen at any time and a Prophet generation is noted not by a common outlook but a preponderance of people with Prophet-type formative experiences. Also, simple peer pressure and social mixing would tend to spread the Prophet attitude to people in that generation even if they had personal formative experiences more typical of a different archetype.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

I don't think either Carter or Bush senior have much influence today. I thought Carter's speech at the DNC last week was weird. This is a guy who's been nailing houses together for the last 20 years.

Maybe, but Bush the Elder is certainly still a major force in politics. He may not be seen all that often, but he continues to wield vast wealth and influence. However, I agree that Hero and Artist influence on the saeculum is now minimal. The key shift is the rise of Millenials -- taking the roles of protestors, campaign workers, bloggers or just the general voting public. My point was simply that very influential people usually continue to direct things up until their deaths.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

I have the American crisis wars as: King Philip's War, Revolutionary War, Civil War, and WW II.

Agree, except for King Philip's War.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

The Western Europe crisis wars are: 30 Years War, War of the Spanish Succession, Napoleonic Wars, Franco-Prussian War, and WW II.

I largely agree, with the Thirty Years War being the point when a lot of the West aligns. England and Spain had a crisis war that is out of synch with this and both of those countries remain out of alignment until the Napoleonic Wars.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

There's a piece missing here: I can't pin down a crisis war for England between Napoleon and WW II.

The big issue for England was its growing Empire, so all of its Crisis conflicts are colonial. Since I place the mid-century Crisis in the mid-1860s to early 1880s range, you have British military action in Abyssinia (1866), 2nd Afghan War (1878-1880), Zulu War (1879), The Transvaal (1880-81), Arabi's Revolt (1882) and the Sudan (1884-85). This last is most interesting as it shows a cooling of Imperial zeal. The expedition to relieve General Gordon was an embarassment and led to greater restraint in military deployment.

The muted nature of this Crisis could be attributed to echoes of the Aristocratic cycle having a dampening effect on the cycle -- or more likely, with the English having experienced Crisis Wars in India and the Crimea they were less inclined to fight one of their own.

Originally Posted by casewestwill

> I have read T4T and Generations upon the recommendation of one of
> my students and have found it quite intriquing. I also came upon
> your website through this site. I appreciate your commentary in
> regards to your theory, even though you run the risk of being
> mistaken - a risk the authors of T4T seem unwilling to engage in.
> (Some commentary or speculation, however neutral, would be
> appreciated from time to time, wouldn't you agree?)

I'm taking your statement about my willingness to be mistaken as a
compliment, so thank you. If I want to prove that Generational
Dynamics can be used for forecasting, then I have to be willing to
take that kind of risk.

Originally Posted by casewestwill

> I appreciate you bringing to our attention the Morgan Stanley
> report on the housing market. After reading it and doing some
> research (and reading some excellent posts on this site), I'm
> convinced that economic catastrophe is (relatively) right around
> the corner. What strikes me is the fact that I was oblivious to
> all the data that is out there strongly suggesting what is about
> to occur. What made me think that my house would continue to
> appreciate in double digits yearly into the future? A logical
> person wouldn't do such a thing, right? I think self-interest has
> cast a spell of denial over us.

What really amazes me is the amount of denial that I see in financial
analysts who are actually paid to know what's going on, and still
keep saying that prosperity is just around the corner. These are all
the same people who said that stocks would keep going up in the late
1990s. You'd think they'd have learned. This afternoon I saw an
interview with a major fund analyst on TV, and he was asked why the
stock market wasn't going up. He said, "That's what usually happens
in August. I think the market is waiting for the Republican
convention to see what happens. I think that come September and into
the Fall, the market is going to do very well." He gave no support
for this opinion. This guy is paid big bucks to give opinions like
this, and he sounds like an airhead.

Originally Posted by casewestwill

> On your weblog post, "Why didn't Kerry get a post-convention
> bounce?" you say that whoever wins the election this fall will
> probably be the next "great president." Tell me, if Bush is,
> indeed, re-elected this November and lets say that the other shoe
> drops next fall and we experience real economic hardship (which
> would rest squarely on Bush, Alan Greenspan, & the Republican
> agenda) don't you think that the whole lot would be thrown out
> next time around (ala H. Hoover)? After all, jobs and pocket-book
> issues are the most important aspects of elections. Please
> comment.

Before I launch into this, let me say that both Kerry and Bush are
wonderful leaders, and either one, if elected, will make a fine, fine
President. Nothing that I write in the following paragraphs, which
is about very long term trends, reflects in any way on either of
these fine, fine candidates.

It's interesting to look at the political realignments that have
occurred in each of the crisis wars. In each case, the political
realignment generated powerful entrenched interests that were
repudiated in the next crisis war.

The great compromise of the Revolutionary War was slavery. In the
Civil War, the established interests, the southern cotton farmers,
depended on that compromise. Generally speaking, the Democrats were
aligned with the South, and the Republicans repudiated the
compromise and won.

The Civil War compromise was freedom, and this extended to business,
allowing the growth of large trusts. There were large, powerful,
entrenched interests -- businesses -- that were committed to
laissez-faire capitalism, and Hoover was entirely bought into that.
When he said, "Prosperity is just around the corner," he really
believed that the Depression would end quickly, just as previous
"depressions" had done. He infuriated Americans because he refused
to do anything. Roosevelt repudiated the total freedom concept, and
implemented the new compromise: The regulated economy.

Today it can be argued that most of the large entrenched special
interests are vested in some aspect of the regulated economy, and the
perception (fair or not) is that the Democrats are the main
supporters of the regulated economy. Thus, Bush has a historical
advantage in this election over Kerry.

That's not to say that Kerry can't win. I just saw a pro-Republican
analyst on TV say that he was expecting surging employment numbers
when the July unemployment figures come out this Friday. My
prediction is that you will not see that, and that if the
unemployment rate changes at all, it will change in the upward
direction. This could give Kerry the argument he needs to win.

As for your 2005 scenario, the trick for any President will be to
make sure that he doesn't make the same mistake Hoover made.
Greenspan will lower the funds rate again, and will repurchase long
term bonds to pour money into the economy. The President will
immediately recommend whatever programs sound good to improve the
economy. He will not say, "Prosperity is just around the corner."

But remember that if the "real economic hardship" is associated with
an act of terrorism or war, then the President may not be blamed at
all.

Originally Posted by casewestwill

> Also, in your post on the Vatican's document on feminism you state
> that "the "sexual revolution" was being reversed" and "would
> continue for several decades". Can you give me an example of what
> you see happening? Do you mean it will be totally reversed to say,
> 1964? Will there be no (or very few) women in politics? the media?
> the board room? academia? the military? road crews? construction?
> I see a generation of astute, ambitious young women before me, who
> are, in many cases, far superior to their male counterparts (which
> is a good thing in my opinion - I also don't feel that "respect
> for their womenly contributions" alone will satisfy them) I'm
> interested in some speculation of the possibilities you see. I
> think it is important to remember that many aspects of the "sexual
> revolution" of the 1920's remained intact through the last crisis
> and into the next High.

I always enjoy the love I feel when I comment on gender issues.

I really didn't mean anything more than S&H do in their books - that
gender roles diverge in crisis and austerity periods, and converge in
awakening and unraveling periods.

An interesting read is Naomi Wolf's 1993 book, Fire with Fire, The
New Female Power and How It Will Change the 21st Century. (You
may recall that in 2000, Wolf was appointed as an advisor to Al Gore.
Her job was to help Gore learn to act and dress as more of an "alpha
male.") She details how the poorer women filled factory jobs in the
earlier 1800s, while the wealthier women moved "into lives of
enforced domesticity, sexual repression, economic dependency, and
unpaid `good works.'" It's the first group that continually expanded
women's rights through war and peace. And you're right -- these
changes will not backtrack during the next decades.

But there's another aspect. The mothers of the 1950s were not the
same as the mothers of today. The mothers of the 1950s had lived
through the 1940s, and seen their brothers, fathers and friends
killed overseas. Even people who've seen the movie see the D-Day
invasion as something like a live cartoon, but these 1950s mothers
had seen the men they love storm the Normandy beach and get shot down
like fish in a barrel. If we were traumatized by 9/11, imagine how
they must have felt.

So in the 1950s, these mothers wanted to stay home and be close to
their children. Thus, women in the 1950s focused much more on home
life than women today. That will happen again after the "clash of
civilizations" world war.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Jenny,

Originally Posted by Hermione Granger

> I'd like to comment on the feminist aspect of your post. When we
> look at the role of women in mid-century, it looks quite
> conservative by our standards. However, look at what the GI women
> were doing from the vantage point of, say, 1918.

> * The Fifties women wore skirts that exposed some of the leg, and
> in casual situations, even pants.

> * No corsets, hat pins. Short hair, or long hair put back in a
> pony tail were common. On the other hand, nice women wore rouge
> and lipstick, something that would have been shocking in the
> previous century.

> * Women voted.

> * Women smoked and drank in public, along with the men. Nobody
> found that shocking.

> Much of this was what was bitterly fought over in the period
> between around 1900 and 1930, but became enshrined after the
> Crisis ended.

> Likewise, I fully expect to see today's Millie women continuing to
> work, pursue careers, and fully participate in public life and
> leadership roles in the next High

And don't forget Rosie the Riveter during World War II.

However, note that all of the changes you mention occurred prior to
the crisis period. When I say that the "sexual revolution is over,"
I mean that we're not going to see any more major changes of this
type. We're going to see women wanting to stick closer to home,
rather than venturing out more into the wilds of business and war.
That's not because of some male plot, but because they'll want to.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Sean,

Originally Posted by William Jennings Bryan

> We can safely assume that there will be some manifestation of the
> "Cult of Domesticity" as there has been in previous 1T's. The
> important point is that there will be some type of gender
> differentiation that will be shattered in the following 2T and 3T.
> And almost certainly the 1T differentiation will ironically be
> integrated with aspects considered progressive in the previous
> saeculum.

Exactly. The sexual revolution is over, but will begin again in the
next awakening, provided the computers haven't taken over.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Kurt,

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

> On previous threads, I have stated my belief that turning length
> tends to be uniform from Crisis to Crisis and that the length can
> vary between 18 and 27 years. The 18 year limit can be called the
> "Populist Limit" and the 27 year limit the "Aristocratic Limit."
> The basic concept is that societies are torn between social
> changes initiated by young adults who exert influence upon
> reaching adulthood and social changes initiated by late 20s adults
> who are finally achieving wealth and status. Social systems that
> respond strongly to populist fervor and mass protest will be
> closer to the Populist Limit. Social systems that are dictated
> mainly by inherited status will be closer to the Aristocratic
> Limit.

I'll have to take your word for this, but this doesn't have a
realistic feel to me. Somehow the retirement age (de jure or
de facto) has got to figure into the cycle length. Also, what
are aristocratic children doing until age 27? They must be passing
the time somehow. Whether they're working, going into politics,
going into the armed services, or going to college, they're going to
start exerting influence around age 17-20.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

> However, in the 16th century, the colonies in the New World
> provided a means for the short-cycle elements of society to flee
> the long-cycle elements and create a wholly separate cycle.
> Consider that the English Civil War as a Crisis for the lower
> classes and an Awakening for the upper classes. The period of the
> eleven-year tyranny and the heavy fighting of the 1840s is a
> short-cycle Crisis that then becomes an Austerity during the
> Commonwealth. But the situation goes awry as the upper classes,
> Cromwell among them, continue to bicker (for they are still in an
> Awakening) and "betray the revolution." By the time of the
> Restoration, many of the more radical populist elements are headed
> to the colonies to establish there the society they thought they
> had established in England.

I don't see how it's possible for the English Civil War to be a
crisis for England, and then be an Awakening for England. That seems
to contradict the TFT model, and it certain contradicts my model.
(Also, Cromwell was a Prophet.)

Maybe I just don't understand the point you're making, but I don't
see how this can work.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

> This is similar to my model, except that I see the emergence of
> the Heroes as the trigger. In a long-cycle saeculum, the Prophets
> would achieve power during the Unraveling. In a short-cycle,
> during the Crisis. (Granted, this does away with the S&H model of
> Heroes as foot soldiers for the Prophets -- but in a long cycle
> the new Heroes are much older when they achieve influence and more
> likely to be players in their own right.)

This is an interesting distinction, but I don't understand how the
Heroes instead of the Prophets can trigger the crisis war. How do
you explain this?

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

> Sorry, I wasn't clear in what I meant. By bringing up individuals,
> I did not mean to endorse the "Big Man" theory of history but
> rather to suggest that the psychological experiences that cause
> people to grow up to be a "Prophet" or a "Hero" can happen at any
> time and a Prophet generation is noted not by a common outlook but
> a preponderance of people with Prophet-type formative experiences.
> Also, simple peer pressure and social mixing would tend to spread
> the Prophet attitude to people in that generation even if they had
> personal formative experiences more typical of a different
> archetype.

What do you mean by "formative experiences" that differs from the
ordinary meaning? A prophet is someone who grows up during an
austerity period, with no personal memory of the crisis war just
ended, who rebels against the rules imposed by those rebuilding
society. Is that the formative experience you mean?

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

> The big issue for England was its growing Empire, so all of its
> Crisis conflicts are colonial. Since I place the mid-century
> Crisis in the mid-1860s to early 1880s range, you have British
> military action in Abyssinia (1866), 2nd Afghan War (1878-1880),
> Zulu War (1879), The Transvaal (1880-81), Arabi's Revolt (1882)
> and the Sudan (1884-85). This last is most interesting as it shows
> a cooling of Imperial zeal. The expedition to relieve General
> Gordon was an embarassment and led to greater restraint in
> military deployment.

So which war do you see as a crisis war for England?

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by casewestwill

> I tend to agree with you 100% I also somewhat object to JJX's
> implication that women now are 'trying to be like men" only for
> wanting the same opportunities in policy, academia and the
> marketplace. I must refrain from final judgment until he has a
> chance to respond, though. However, I do feel that there will be a
> change in the point of veiw of the culture regarding women's
> issues. I think it could be something as simple as motherhood
> being celebrated instead of disparaged and most of the culture
> being OK with that - all the while women quietly attain some of
> the top spots in our culture (just in the nick of time to bring
> some of their "unique values and contributions" into play when it

> matters the most).

I didn't say that women "are trying to be like men." If you're going
to set me up by quoting me and then using the quote to knock me down,
at least get the quote right. What I said on my web site is:

Originally Posted by Generational Dynamics website

> This does not mean that women are not respected. Quite the
> contrary, women will be respected more and more for their unique
> values and contributions as women, rather than for their
> similarity to men.

I might add that this issue of respect has nothing to do with men.
Men rarely pass judgment on other women, unless their wives,
girlfriends or mothers tell them that it's OK. Whatever respect
women get or don't get will come from other women, not from men.

I love the Martha Stewart case as an example of this. You always
hear about how "people love Martha Stewart" or "people hate Martha
Stewart." It wasn't "people," it was women. Before the scandal
broke, I doubt that one man in 100 could even tell you who Martha
Stewart was, though 99 women out of 100 could tell you not only who
she was, but whether she was good or evil. All this gender stuff is
determined by women, not by villainous men conspiring in smoke filled
rooms.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Originally Posted by casewestwill

> I tend to agree with you 100% I also somewhat object to JJX's
> implication that women now are 'trying to be like men" only for
> wanting the same opportunities in policy, academia and the
> marketplace. I must refrain from final judgment until he has a
> chance to respond, though. However, I do feel that there will be a
> change in the point of veiw of the culture regarding women's
> issues. I think it could be something as simple as motherhood
> being celebrated instead of disparaged and most of the culture
> being OK with that - all the while women quietly attain some of
> the top spots in our culture (just in the nick of time to bring
> some of their "unique values and contributions" into play when it

> matters the most).

I didn't say that women "are trying to be like men." If you're going
to set me up by quoting me and then using the quote to knock me down,
at least get the quote right. What I said on my web site is:

Originally Posted by Generational Dynamics website

> This does not mean that women are not respected. Quite the
> contrary, women will be respected more and more for their unique
> values and contributions as women, rather than for their
> similarity to men.

I might add that this issue of respect has nothing to do with men.
Men rarely pass judgment on other women, unless their wives,
girlfriends or mothers tell them that it's OK. Whatever respect
women get or don't get will come from other women, not from men.

I love the Martha Stewart case as an example of this. You always
hear about how "people love Martha Stewart" or "people hate Martha
Stewart." It wasn't "people," it was women. Before the scandal
broke, I doubt that one man in 100 could even tell you who Martha
Stewart was, though 99 women out of 100 could tell you not only who
she was, but whether she was good or evil. All this gender stuff is
determined by women, not by villainous men conspiring in smoke filled
rooms.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Mr Xenakis

Forgive me for paraphrasing your sentence into an all- too- familiar refrain from those who are opposed to women flexing their muscle in various endeavors. I read something into your post that was not there.

I must say that your observations make sense - except your Martha Stewart analogy. I think that may a generational thing. Most men under the age of 45 or so would know of Martha Stewart. Most certainly wouldn't follow her, but mention her name and you would get a and an opinion one way or another. She would certainly be part of their cultural consciousness.

Thank you for sharing your thoughts (and yes, it was a compliment) :wink: I'll leave you with your prior subject.

Dear casewestwill,

Originally Posted by casewestwill

> I must say that your observations make sense - except your Martha
> Stewart analogy. I think that may a generational thing. Most men
> under the age of 45 or so would know of Martha Stewart. Most
> certainly wouldn't follow her, but mention her name and you would
> get a [Rolling Eyes] and an opinion one way or another. She would
> certainly be part of their cultural consciousness.

I'm talking about the time before her financial scandal. Are you
sure of this? I was aware of Martha Stewart, partly because David
Letterman was always making jokes about her, but do you really think
that men under age 45 knew enough about her to care? I don't know,
maybe you're right, but I would think she was invisible to most men.

Originally Posted by casewestwill

> Thank you for sharing your thoughts (and yes, it was a
> compliment) [Wink] I'll leave you with your prior subject.

Drop in anytime.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

John,

Check out the pissing and moaning already going on about higher interest rates. :lol: Wait until the 4T mood really settles in and ends the party. :shock: And I note with some trepidation, that if the feeling will be that most are "victims", I'd hate to see what the masses will do to the "perpetrators". :!: :!: :!:

http://money.cnn.com/2004/08/05/mark...ex.htm?cnn=yes

**For Discussion Purposes Only**

Who will be the Fed's next victim?

From Franklin National Bank to Orange County, rate hikes have hurt. Who will suffer this time?
August 5, 2004: 2:48 PM EDT
By Mark Gongloff, CNN/Money senior writer



NEW YORK (CNN/Money) - Almost as surely as war takes casualties, Fed rate hikes in recent decades have triggered disasters of one kind or another in global financial markets.

But many analysts believe that the Federal Reserve's string of victims, from Franklin National Bank in the 1970s to Orange County in the 1990s and the flattened tech bubble of the year 2000, might not grow much longer in the current tightening campaign.

Other observers worry that the next victim could be a pretty big one: the U.S. consumer.

After taking its key overnight lending rate, the fed funds rate, to 1 percent, the lowest level in more than 40 years, the U.S. central bank this summer has started ratcheting rates back up.

It's widely expected to throw another quarter-point hike on the stack next Tuesday and could add several more hikes in the next year, in an effort to take the overnight rate to a mythical "neutral" level, from its current red-alert emergency level.

What is neutral? "When we arrive at neutral, we will know it," Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan said last month, in typically Delphic fashion.

David Rosenberg, chief North American economist at Merrill Lynch, suggested one possible landmark to let us know when neutrality has been achieved:

"Maybe we only know when 'you are there' when we get the first financial calamity, which has been part and parcel of every tightening cycle over the past three decades," Rosenberg wrote in a recent note, helpfully providing a list of the victims, including Penn Square Bank in 1982; Continental Illinois in 1984; Askin Capital Management in 1994 and Long Term Capital Management in 1998.

The Fed's trail of victims
Fed tightening campaigns have triggered financial crises in the past few decades.

Victim and Year
Franklin National Bank, 1974
Penn Square Bank, 1982
Continental Illinois, 1984
U.S. stock market, 1987
Savings & loan industry, real estate, 1989
Mexico, Orange County, Kidder Peabody, Askin Capital, 1994
Asia, Russia, Long Term Capital Management, 1998
Nasdaq stock bubble, 2000

Source: Merrill Lynch

There's almost no telling which individual firms will get stung this time around, though there are a few anecdotal hints, such as the recent news that Aether Systems (AETH: Research, Estimates), which invested heavily in tech just before the bubble burst, has recently taken the plunge into mortgage-backed securities, just as mortgage rates have begun to rise.

Merrill senior economist Jose Rasco suggested that some Japanese and Chinese banks -- not exactly models of health to begin with -- could be vulnerable.

Closer to home, Rasco also suggested the firms involved in the U.S. housing market, which has been driven into the stratosphere by super-low rates, could also be vulnerable.

"In the United States, we have this leverage situation, with home equity borrowing and consumers' use of that leverage and the risks that presupposes," Rasco said. "That whole sector of the financial services business, those particular types of lenders ... are sort of exposed here."

Even the recent mild rise in interest rates led No. 2 mortgage lender Washington Mutual (WM: Research, Estimates) to warn of falling revenue, leading some investors to look askance at others in the sector, including Wells Fargo (WF: Research, Estimates), Countrywide Financial (CFC: Research, Estimates) and Golden West Financial (GDW: Research, Estimates).

Steady Fed could ease the pain
Still, many analysts believed that WaMu's problems were unique to WaMu and that the other firms would weather the storm of higher rates.

What's more, many observers believe the Fed has been so excruciatingly careful to telegraph its rate hikes this time around that most financial firms with any sense have battened down the hatches for higher rates, meaning the Fed's trail of dead could be shorter than usual.

"The Fed's painfully aware of this, and that's one of the better reasons they try to telegraph what they're doing, so people don't get caught," said Lakshman Achuthan, managing director of the Economic Cycle Research Institute, an independent research firm. "The institutions that have taken decisions that might put them into harm's way are probably fewer."

The Fed is expected to raise rates very, very slowly, possibly not hitting the elusive "neutral" level until 2006. Meanwhile, the "real" fed funds rate, which excludes the rate of inflation, might remain low enough for all but the most thick-headed institutions to survive.

"I wouldn't be especially concerned about a major episode of financial distress resulting from the recent and forthcoming Fed rate hikes," said John Lonski, senior economist and bond analyst at Moody's Investors Service. "I don't think it would be enough to cause pain -- unless you have people managing financial institutions being very reckless in their oversight of the situation."

Consumers at risk?
But U.S. consumers, some of whom refinanced into adjustable-rate mortgages when rates were at rock-bottom and then burned up all their home equity, might not have the ability to hedge against higher rates.

Lonski doubted this segment of the population would be large enough to do real damage to the overall economy, but other economists aren't so sure.

"I have to believe that, more than ever before, some importantly large number of Americans are exposed to short-term interest rates through the mortgage market," said James Grant, editor of Grant's Interest Rate Observer, "and an important, dramatic rise in those rates would choke off consumption."

As long as rates rise gently and the labor market improves steadily, most economists agree, most consumers should survive. Fiddle with either of those variables, and you could have trouble.

"If for some reason the Fed has to act more aggressively, or if for some reason the job market does not cooperate, then you probably have more of an imminent danger in the consumer debt area or the housing area in particular," said Achuthan of ECRI.

But James Grant, a vocal critic of Greenspan, suggested that, despite the pain, rates should rise, and relatively dramatically, to stifle the potentially dangerous speculation that super-low rates have encouraged.

"As much anxiety as we might extend over the victims of a rising funds rate, we ought to also spare a thought for the consequences of rates having been here in the first place," Grant said.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

I'll have to take your word for this, but this doesn't have a realistic feel to me. Somehow the retirement age (de jure or de facto) has got to figure into the cycle length. Also, what are aristocratic children doing until age 27? They must be passing the time somehow. Whether they're working, going into politics, going into the armed services, or going to college, they're going to start exerting influence around age 17-20.

Certainly people do important things in early adulthood, the question is whether those things are significant to the social order on a grand scale. In a society of inherited status true influence is something you gain with wealth and title. In a society of popular will true influence can be attained as soon as people will listen to your words. In the former society, early adulthood is the time when one is in training for the later exercise of power (education, courtesanship, military training). In a popular society, young adulthood is the time to exercise power (activism, voting, military command).

In the whole gamut of young adult activities, a society of status is much more tranquil. A university in the 18th century was a place of scholarship -- today it is a crucible of political activism. New military officers in an aristocratic society are in their late 20s or early 30s. The average age of new officers in the modern US military is 23. The ability to influence politics comes with wealth and title in an aristocratic society. On average this occurs in one's late 20s. In a democratic country, voting age is rarely higher than 21. It's all about how power is transferred. If power is transferred by an ordered inheritance process then social change will be slower. If power is transferred by winning debates then society can shift as soon as a new generation is old enough to be taken seriously as public speakers.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

I don't see how it's possible for the English Civil War to be a crisis for England, and then be an Awakening for England. That seems to contradict the TFT model, and it certain contradicts my model. (Also, Cromwell was a Prophet.) Maybe I just don't understand the point you're making, but I don't see how this can work.

You're dealing with two different populations existing in the same geographic area. In the late 15th century a class begins to emerge that is literate and of moderate means and zero political power. The only politics they have is internal debate about theology. Until the Civil War, this class has few opportunities to impact the nation's politics. Many of them become convinced that an expansion of Parliament is the only means for them to truly take part in English politics. The catalyst for the popular Crisis is when Charles disbands Parliament.

Now Charles was born in 1600, Cromwell 1599. I place the end of the previous Crisis around 1604 when the final truce with Spain was made by King James I. That makes Charles and Cromwell cuspers -- early wave Prophets. I'd note that their personal histories are consistent with the Aristocratic Cycle -- Charles takes the throne at 25, Cromwell becomes a Puritan at 27, an MP at 29. Cromwell becomes the vessel through which the populist cycle can burst onto the scene and amplify the Awakening.

By 1649, the popular crisis is over. The monarchy has been destroyed and the Commonwealth established. But the shift took too long and the changes are not enough to bend the Aristocratic cycle. Parliament bickers amongst themselves and Cromwell sees fit to seize power. By the time of the Restoration, the spirit of many of the Puritan reformers is broken. The most radical among them feel they were betrayed.

As to how this works -- see below.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

This is an interesting distinction, but I don't understand how the Heroes instead of the Prophets can trigger the crisis war. How do you explain this?

When a turning change occurs, what has changed generation-wise to affect the system? Is it the arrival of Prophets in positions of influence? Nope, they've been around since the Awakening. It's the change of the mixture that is important. Either it is the departure of the oldest generation, the arrival of the youngest generation or both that causes the shift. So which is it?

The departure of the oldest generation can only be said to be helpful in that it clears some of the roadblocks preventing change, but that does not, by itself, generate new ideas. Furthermore, if this were the main criterion, saeculum length would be governed wholly by retirement age. However, that just doesn't fit. The influence of older generations should be fading slower in the 20th century yet turning length has remained short. We are in the early stages of a Crisis now and we have plenty of Artists still around. In fact, we had a Lost generation Senator as late as 2003 (Strom Thurmond). Yet the Crisis mood is clearly building.

The change in the mixture is the new blood coming in from the bottom -- a generation that knows nothing of Carter's "malaise," stagflation and Watergate. To them, history begins with Ronald Reagan. Sure, there are conflicts between the older generations but the new generation will pick who wins.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

What do you mean by "formative experiences" that differs from the ordinary meaning? A prophet is someone who grows up during an austerity period, with no personal memory of the crisis war just ended, who rebels against the rules imposed by those rebuilding society. Is that the formative experience you mean?

Yes, and so on for each archetype. Each archetype gains influence in the turning after they were born and they have no personal experience with the turning before that.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

The big issue for England was its growing Empire, so all of its Crisis conflicts are colonial. Since I place the mid-century Crisis in the mid-1860s to early 1880s range, you have British military action in Abyssinia (1866), 2nd Afghan War (1878-1880), Zulu War (1879), The Transvaal (1880-81), Arabi's Revolt (1882) and the Sudan (1884-85). This last is most interesting as it shows a cooling of Imperial zeal. The expedition to relieve General Gordon was an embarassment and led to greater restraint in military deployment.

So which war do you see as a crisis war for England?

All of them. England scoured the world in search of monsters to destroy.

However, I must admit the Crisis is rather mild in Europe. The Crimean War has to be the explanation for the aversion to apocalyptic war. Note that the part of the West furthest removed from the Crimean conflict (the US) was, by contrast, more than willing to fight a terrible bloody war.

Job growth figures worst in 8 months,
far below analysts' estimates

The economy is not producing new jobs at anywhere near the rate that
pundits, high-priced analysts and politicians have been promising.

I've been listening to analysts all week talk about an expected "job
surge" to be reported today. Analysts were predicting 215,000 to
300,000 net new jobs to be created in July, and some said that
anything as low as 100,000 would be a tremendous shock. The figure
came in at only 32,000. Furthermore, the May and June figures were
adjusted substantially downward as well.

Word of this morning's jobs report is causing bond prices to jump
immediately, indicating that investors are likely to be moving money
from stocks into bonds this morning.

The White House projected in February, just six months ago, that the
economy would create 2.6 million jobs this year. They made this
estimate by assuming that the recent recession is just like other
recent recessions, such as the 1991 recession, or other recessions
since 1945.

What Generational Dynamics says is that today's economy is like the
1930s-40s depression economy. The reason is that, within the last ten
years, the generation of people who lived through the great depression
have all disappeared (retired or died), all at the same time, and so
our society has been making the same mistakes that gave rise to the
1930s depression.

The major "mistake" was the stock market bubble of the late 1990s
which was, in essence, no different than the stock market bubble of
the 1920s. The Federal Reserve has postponed, but not prevented, the
aftereffects of the 1990s bubble by keeping interest rates at near
zero. That's why we've been saying, since 2002, that we're entering a
new 1930s style Great Depression.

The fact that stocks are due for a big fall has been evident for years
to anyone looking at the extremely high price/earnings ratios, well
into the 20s. If history is any guide, and it is, then the
price/earnings ratios are going to fall below 10, which means that the
Dow Jones average will fall to the 4000 range and the S&P 500 index
will fall to the 400 range.

There is one thing about the current job report that's very
intriguing: The number of people calling themselves "self-employed"
grew by 641,000, causing the unemployment rate to tick down to 5.5%
from 5.6%. Are these "self-employed" people just saying they're
self-employed because they've given up seeking work? Or are these
people actually creating new businesses that will eventually grow
large enough to replace our aging business infrastructure? Only time
will tell. (6-Aug-04)

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Generational Dynamics Newsletter, August 6, 2004

JULY JOB REPORT WORST IN 8 MONTHS
I've been hearing about an expected "job surge" from pundits,
high-priced analysts and politicians, but today's very depressed jobs
report is sending shock waves through the financial markets.
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...weblog#e040806

Alan Greenspan, born in 1926, may understand what's going on better
than his younger Fed colleagues.
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...reenspan040706

OIL PRICES SPIKING ON SUPPLY FEARS
Russia's herky-jerky moves to nationalize Yukos are roiling oil
markets and frightening investors in Russia. They may also indicate a
serious historic split in Kremlin leadership.
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...eblog#e040805b

There is increasing concern that Saudi Arabia's oil production is
peaking, and that prices will rise significantly farther.
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/....oilpeak040803

ARAB VIEWS WORLDWIDE ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY HOSTILE TO AMERICA
Arab attitudes towards America have been falling for years, and fell
precipitously in the last two years to about 10% favorable, 90%
unfavorable, as a result of America's continued support of Israel and
the Iraq war. This is part of a generational "hardening of attitudes"
that's occurring worldwide.
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/....i.zogby040726

John J. Xenakis

---------------------------------------------

If you DO NOT wish to receive this newsletter, then "Reply" with the
subject "Unsubscribe."

If you DO wish to receive it, then add "news@GenerationalDynamics.com"
to your e-mail address book, so that your spam filter won't filter it
out.

This is intended to be an informative, friendly, non-intrusive,
irregularly published, text-only newsletter for those interested in
Generational Dynamics. Your e-mail address will NOT be given to
anyone else under any circumstances.

Thank you for reading it.

[End of message]

Dear Sean,

Originally Posted by William Jennings Bryan

> Check out the pissing and moaning already going on about higher
> interest rates. [Laughing] Wait until the 4T mood really settles
> in and ends the party. [Shocked] And I note with some trepidation,
> that if the feeling will be that most are "victims", I'd hate to
> see what the masses will do to the "perpetrators". [Exclamation
> Exclamation Exclamation]

There's a certain irony that you posted this the day before the bad
jobs report caused stocks to fall substantially here and in Europe.

I'm sure that today's result is at least going to cause the Fed to
rethink its plan to increase the overnight funds rate from 1.25% to
1.50% on Tuesday. The market certainly thinks so, since the ten year
Treasury bonds took a HUGE jump today, causing a very substantial
fall in interest rates to 4.21% to 4.09%. This means that the market
believes that the Fed will, at the very least, slow down its plans to
continue interest rate increases throughout the fall.

Since this is the rate most often used to compute mortgage rates, now
would be a good time to refinance, for those who haven't.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Kurt,

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

> Certainly people do important things in early adulthood, the
> question is whether those things are significant to the social
> order on a grand scale. In a society of inherited status true
> influence is something you gain with wealth and title.

This would have to be proved, but my guess is that if anything the
opposite can be proved. The generational paradigm does not depend on
the influence of those with status; it depends on the attitudes and
behaviors of large masses of people. In an awakening, the "people
with status," even the young people with status, may well be regarded
by the masses as part of the establishment to be rebelled against.
And in the Reign of Terror following the French Revolution, it was the
aristocrats that were sent to the guillotine by the people "without
status."

The whole point of the generational paradigm is that it's the large
masses of ordinary people who will have the various attributes that
are described by S&H: sensitive, visionary, reclusive, busy,
moralistic, pragmatic, powerful, indecisive, alienated, heroic,
conformist, narcissistic, protected, suffocated, indulged,
criticized.

Those attributes have nothing to do with status; they have to do with
generations. And these large masses of people will start exhibiting
these attributes and make their power felt around age 20,
irrespective of the how the people of the upper class spend their
time.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

> You're dealing with two different populations existing in the same
> geographic area.

This isn't possible except in the rare case of a large population
migration, such as the Palestinians into Jordan in the 1940s.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

> Now Charles was born in 1600, Cromwell 1599. I place the end of
> the previous Crisis around 1604 when the final truce with Spain
> was made by King James I.

I don't see this. The Armada crisis began in the 1560s and ended in
1588, or shortly thereafter.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

> The departure of the oldest generation can only be said to be
> helpful in that it clears some of the roadblocks preventing
> change, but that does not, by itself, generate new ideas.
> Furthermore, if this were the main criterion, saeculum length
> would be governed wholly by retirement age. However, that just
> doesn't fit. The influence of older generations should be fading
> slower in the 20th century yet turning length has remained short.
> We are in the early stages of a Crisis now and we have plenty of
> Artists still around. In fact, we had a Lost generation Senator as
> late as 2003 (Strom Thurmond). Yet the Crisis mood is clearly
> building.

> The change in the mixture is the new blood coming in from the
> bottom -- a generation that knows nothing of Carter's "malaise,"
> stagflation and Watergate. To them, history begins with Ronald
> Reagan. Sure, there are conflicts between the older generations
> but the new generation will pick who wins.

There's a difference between the awakening and the crisis. The
awakening is driven by the younger generation (the Prophets), so it
always begins 15-20 years after the climax of the crisis period. The
crisis is driven by the older generation (the Prophets), and so the
retirement age of the Artists has an effect. So the retirement age
affects the crisis, but not the awakening.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

> All of them. England scoured the world in search of monsters to
> destroy.

> However, I must admit the Crisis is rather mild in Europe. The
> Crimean War has to be the explanation for the aversion to
> apocalyptic war. Note that the part of the West furthest removed
> from the Crimean conflict (the US) was, by contrast, more than
> willing to fight a terrible bloody war.

This could be the case. The only thing I would add is that I believe
that the Franco-Prussian war must have had an effect on England, even
though they didn't fight in it.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by Tim Walker

Interesting. One thing, though. Old Toby posted that most of WWII was an Unraveling war for Japan-until near the end. For Japan we would need double symbolism, such as a small dot overlapping a large dot.

Old Toby's comments on the Japanese saeculum and generations come from a very well-informed person. He has stuided Japanese history and society in huge detail and it's popular culture as well. The behaviour of Japan's generations in the 1980's and 1990's is really different from the rest of the world, it very much what our societies were during the 1960's and 1970's.

Many of his observations of Japanese history and society match my own less well informed observations. I doubt there are many places in the world that are currently not roughly on the same saeculum as us. However Japan is most likely one of those places.

On the Middle East, The Middle East (I bet Israel shares the same saeculum as it's Arab neighbours) is quite behind us on the saeculum. The 1980's were an core awakening decade (sort like the late 60's and 1970's were for Europe) in the Middle East and the mystical militants there are much younger than our own. Bin Ladin is a Prophert, however he is only in the early cohorts of the Middle East's current Prophert generation.

The last Awakening did not start there until c.1975-c.1979. The Middle East is now currently in a unravelling, however the next 4T is not expected to start there until 2015 at the earliest, more likely 2019.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

[
This anomaly is perhaps the most criticized portion of S&H's work. I am not alone in thinking it is an error in S&H's historical analysis -- not a actual anomalous event. In my opinion, the Crisis period is roughly 1856 to 1874, encompassing Burning Kansas and most of Reconstruction.

My opinion that the Civil War Crisis ran from 1860 to 1865 or 1868, it climaxed with Gettysburg. It ended at the very latest after the Gilded Generation threw the Transcendentals out of power in a stunning generational landslide.Although the reaction aganist the attempted impeachment of president Andrew Johnson might been a High era reaction to the radicalism of the previous Crisis.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

This is an interesting view, but it's hard to justify. I do agree
with him on the rough start of the crisis period, though I would
prefer to begin it with the Ansei Purge of 1858.

However, it's hard to see how the crisis extended past 1868. Once
the Emperor took control, everything was settled, as the following
descriptions indicate:

If you look at the 17 years which followed the Meiji Restoration Japan experienced a political and social revolution of seismic proportions and there was a fair bit of resistance to it by conservative elements. Hence the civil war during the 1870's and the Satsuma rebellion. Meiji revolution is a lot like the American Revolution or the French revolution. It was a time of massive institutional upheaval, which an old order was destroyed and a new one rose out of the ashes of the old. Like the other revolution above the Meiji revolution was a time of political radicalism and trying out new institutional ideas for society. Some people in that period even considered changing the writing of Japanese to the Latin script and making chirstianity the offical religion of Japan!. Very much like the introduction of a new calendar and measurement system during the French revolution.

The period between 1885 and 1905 was a time of political stasis and little questioning of the established order and some reaction to the more radical elements of the period before. It was a pretty quiet time where the institutional order which had been born in the Meiji restoration, consolidated. That was the High that followed the upheaval of the previous 20 years.

The after 1905 Japan entered another political radical period, where a new generation of youth rebelled and pretty violently aganist the establishment and proposed new ideas on what kind of nation Japan should be. Japan during the 1910's and 1920's had a lot of young romantics with heads in the clouds around the place, riots, strikes, lifestyle experimentation, plenty of fighting aganist the establishment order. Japan for a while even had an experiment with Liberal democracy.

This ends around 1925 and Japan during the 1930's enters a stifling reactionary unraveling, similar to say the Restoration period in 17th century England or even our own era and lasts pretty much until the end of the Pacific War. The Militarist ideology is a Prophet ideology, although of an anti-awakening nature. It is very romantic and spirituality filled, yet quite empty in concrete goals. Also some of these leaders were a little nutty with their belief in fighting spirit of the Japanese nation able to overcome Japan's deficits in manpower and equipment.

The Nazi leadership under Hitler by contrast was much more realistic in what Germany could achieve with her military power; in fact they underestimated Germany?s military strength and the weakness of enemies like France and Russia. Any well informed person would have known that Japan could not defeat the United States in a military struggle, yet many militarist leaders believed this could done due to superior fighting spirit of the Japanese nation.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

The major themes of the Japanese awakenings in the 1960s were antiwar
and anti-American. An interesting place to look at one aspect of
Japan's post-war awakening is with the Japan Revolutionary Communist
League. This web page gives a detailed timeline that can be used as a
launching point for research into other aspects of the awakening at:

True Japan had student protests and riots during the late 60's, however that could been an finishing chapter of the furious radical political activism which was part of 50's Japan. In the 70's this died down quite considerly and student activism would not pick up again until the 1990's. The generation of Japanese who were student activists in the 50's and 60's were outer world driven, they wanted to change the world instead of 'changing your head' which many Boomers in the west did duriing the last awakening.

Japan social and cultural revolution which occured in the west during the 1970s during did occur in Japan until the 1990's. Japan in the 70's and 80's was very much in a High period. Japan's confident, workaholic, conformist, sexist culture (including those suited corporate drones known as salarymen) is carbon copy of the USA during the 1950's. Books like Nightwork: Sexuality, Pleasure, and Corporate Masculinity in a Tokyo Hostess Club document the generational lineup and attuites of Japanese society during the 1980's.

Japan during the 1990's had seen new generation of youth who have rebelled against the social norms of parent's generation and people are questioning many aspects of Japanese like sexism, the state of Japan's environment, Japan's official policy of pacifism, educational system, homophobia, treatment of minority groups, state of the environment, Japan's bureaucratic-industrial complex and etc Even the modern Japanese icon of the Salaryman and the culture it was a part of has become passe. Japan in the 90?s was very much Australia was in the 1970?s, if you took out the Vietnam War and the Prime Ministership of Gough Whitlam (Long story).

Japan's current youth generation are more interested in ?drop out and tune in? and exploring the inner world, than conforming to the rest of society and establishing careers than their next elder's were doing 20 years ago or kind of behavior that X'er peers in the rest of the world are doing, like making money or emigrating in droves out of nations which have a dire economic situation. Despite a worse economic situation for youth in Japan than in the 80?s, Japanese young adults are not doing as badly as their peers in Europe for say and have pretty much shrugged off the recent economic woes.

Good discussion between Ken and John. I thought I might sumarize my understanding of the two mechanisms and perhaps you could correct me where I get it wrong.

I'll start with Generational Dynamics. As I understand it, the key to GD is the Crisis War. Crisis Wars occur across what John calls fault lines, which are fundamental divisions between people of all ages that periodically boil over into intense, extremely violent conflagrations--the Crisis Wars. Unlike S&H's theory, in which a Crisis creates four different generations based on phase of life, GD has the Crisis War homogenizing the generations, creating a consensus aversion to future Crisis Wars. As long as those who remember the Crisis War (the crisis generation) still are active in running society, there will be no new crisis war. Thus the average spacing of Crisis Wars (i.e. the length of the saeculum) is roughly an average human lifespan. John lists English Crisis Wars over the last millenium and the average spacing is 73 years, close to the Bibilical "three score and ten".

The Crisis War is followed by an Austerity period (what S&H call a High) during which all the adults belong to the crisis generation and a new non-crisis generation is being born. This is a period of maximum consensus, when differences across fault lines are most supressed for the sake of avoiding another crisis war. When the new generation that "knows not the crisis" comes of age, conditions arise for generational conflict between young and old. This conflict occurs across what John calls the generation gap. It does not develop into a conflict across the fault line (i.e. a Crisis War) because of the restraining influcence of elder members of the "crisis generation".

This period of generational struggle is the Awakening. After 15-20 years the Awakening is exhausted. Society has been changed by the Awaekning. New differences between people appear, which can give rise to new fault lines over which a struggle can occur. Such struggle does not occur in the period after the Awakening because members of the Crisis-adverse "crisis generation" are still in power. This post-Awakening era is the Unraveling. The Unraveling lasts as long as it takes for two things to happen. First, the old crisis generation must "age out" of power. Second a pretext for serious conflict over a fault line must appear after the crisis generation is gone. This makes the Unraveling the longest and most variable-length turning. Thus, a characteristic of the GD-based saeculum would be a spacing between Awakenings and the next Crisis that is longer than the spacing between the Crisis and the next Awakening. Turning length should not be uniform: the Unraveling should be longer (on average) than the other three turning types.
************************************************** *********
If I understand Ken's model correctly, it is the entry of a new generation into the political arena that creates a turning change. The timing of turning changes (and hence generational length) depends on the age at which young people can express political power. For aristocratic societies, it is when young people come into their inheritance or about 26 years on average. For democratic societies it is when young people become politically active or about age 21. Hence turning length has shortened from about ~26 years during the aristocratic age to ~21 years in the modern democratic age. Turning length is independent of the kind of turning.

The mechanism that creates different generations is their experience during their "formative years". This concept is not competely clear to me. The only idea that comes to mind is that social moments arise because of the entry of a new "boat-rocking" generation into the political arena, which results in a new "non boat rocking" generation being formed. When this new generation enters the political arena one turning later, the social moment ends and a non-social moment begins.

The result is alternating social moment and non-social moment turnings spaced ~26 years apart (aristocratic society) or ~21 years apart (democratic society). What isn't clear to me is how the different kinds of social moments occur. Why is one social moment a Crisis while another is an Awakening? And why do these two kinds of social moments strictly alternate?
************************************************** ***********
Anyways, if these descriptions are roughly correct, it should be possible to look at the structure of the turnings to find support or lack of support for each model. GD holds that saeculum length should not have shortened. GD has ten Crisis Wars between 1066 and 1714, defining nine saeculae of average length 72 years. It shows four Crisis Wars between 1714 and 1945 defining three saeculae of 77 years. This supports the idea that saeculum length did not shorten.

Assuming Ken accepts the S&H turnings, there are 13 turnings that span the 1435-1773 period of average length 26 years and 10 turnings that span the 1773-1984 period of average length 21.1 years. This supports the idea that turning length shortened from an "aristocratic" to a "democratic" length.