John - I apologize for being contemptuous. I mistook your vigorous defense of your positions as arrogance when I should have realized you were a Boomer (-: Seeing you welcome my comments and criticisms, I will try to oblige. You are frequently aggressive in promoting positions that are based on factual errors or single sources that are outdated or really not expert enough. For example, you frequently quote Peter Stearns - he is an expert on 19th century French labor history who has expanded his interests to 20th century American consumerism, and is a leading proponent of an inclusionary world history (as opposed to those who use world history to bash the West). the most recent example of using outdated material is relying on Trevelyan's 1941 book. While good for its time, it has been superceded by two generations of historians. He is THE classic example of a Whig historian (even his middle name harkens back to the greatest of the Whig historians - and a friend of his father's), and his approach (which should delight Mr. Saari) has been thoroughly rejected. It doesn't negate much of what you quote from him, but you need to be aware of where the state of acholarshuip is now. Similarly, your insistence that Germany got involved in the First World War because of its Austrian alliance might have been acceptable in the 1950s (and apparently was to Hajo Holborn who you seem to rely on). Fritz Fischer's Griff nach der Weltmacht was published in 1961 (translated as Germany's Aims in the First World War in 1968) and you would have to at least take into account his conclusion, based on thorough archival research, that Germany actively pushed Austria into its war with Russia in 1914 and that Germany's war aims were not subtantially different than Hitler's some 25 years later; that is, Holland, Belgium, northeastern France as well as Poland and the Ukraine in the East, which of course was confirmed by Brest-Litovsk in 1918.

As to Philip II and Mary Stuart, the Scottish alliance was always with France, Scotland was a Protestant country by the time Mary returned from France, a widow at 18. Philip was still actively pursuing Elizabeth, and did not turn to her cousin Mary in his goal of re-catholicizing England until long after she was Elizabeth's "guest" after 1568. I also noted that you take the Act of Union as the solution to the Scottish/English animosity, but, if so, how do you explain the "15" or the "45", or do the Highland Scots not count (I was, by the way, impressed that you found a recent account of Queen Anne's reign).

On more general themes, I may have some comments later, but, for now, I can't help thinking you find what you are looking for and fall victim to procrusteanism. For the historian, the major question is always what level of generalization will the evidence support and, because you are essentially proposing THE law of history, you really need more evidence than you produce. It is, however, provocative and worthy of consideration. When I first read Strauss and Howe, I kept saying to myself *yes, but..." With GD, I am more inclined to say "maybe, but..."

Kurt - where are you getting your demographic data from? Do you have a source for your contention that life expectancy at 20 was 45 in Europe, and, if so, for what centuries? I am also curious about the source for your view that in aristocratic societies age ca. 27 was the age of inheritance. I checked my data and found something rather different. Of the 2584 men elected to the British House of Commons between 1832 and 1868 (this is pre-eminently Britain's political class), 239 were eldest sons of Peers. Eighteen died before their father's did leaving 221 who eventually inherited. The average age on succeeding to their father's titles and estates was a little over 41. They were all born between 1781 and 1845. Three of them were sons of Irish peers who could sit in Commons unless they were elevated to a U.K. peerage, so that three of the 221 inherited at age 8 and one, and most prominently Lord Palmerston, at age 16. If they are removed from the data set, the age of succession increases to 41.6. It could be that there is skewdness here because, with these four exceptions, their fathers were all still living when they reached their twenties (when is the age at which most of them were elected). Do you have a source that would demonstrate an earlier age of inheritance either then, or in previous periods?

Pax,

Dave Krein '42

The paradigm model I presented contains two adjustable parameters, Amax and Apar, whereas yours contains only one Apol, defined as the age at which young persons become politically active. Both of our models assume that politics is the medium through which the saeculum operates. We differ in that I believe that a different, economic mechanism operated before 1820 and that even after 1820, turnings still have an economic component.

The table below shows the application of the model to fit critical elections. Because I have two parameters and can only fit one, I set Apar equal to a constant, 25.



We start with a combination of an economic, political and turning eras to defined a consensus social moment era that contains the War of Independence.

The Revolutionary social moment creates a paradigmic generation that is very close to S&H's Republican generation. I obtained this generation by subtracting Apar (25) from the consensus social moment dates. According to the paradigm model, the generation should trigger political change (represented by a critical election) when they collectively reach the age of Amax. This generation was 46 years old at the first critical election in 1800, and so Amax = 46 is needed to fit the model to the data in this case. This value appears in the figure below in red.



The critical election launches a liberal era over 1800-1816. There is no associated economic cycle and so there is no social moment at this time, just a liberal political era. Nevertheless this era creates a paradigmic generation of "young Jeffersonians" born from 1775-1791, who when they reach Amax, launch the age of Jackson with another critical election in 1828. The Amax needed to fit the data here is 45, which also appears in the figure.

The Jacksonian liberal era does have an associated economic cycle and there is a social moment at this time. All three are averaged into a composite era, as was done for the Revolutionary era, and used to create a paradigmic generation by subtracting 25. These are the Young Jacksonians (in the South) and the Abolitionists (in the North). The first is the political generation, similar to the Young Jeffersonians from the previous liberal era. The second is a cultural generation created by the awakening era religious/cultural developments. The former age into the Confederates, while the later age into the Radical Republicans.

This generation, when they reach Amax, create the conditions leading to the Civil War, which is triggered by another critical election in 1860. This generation was 52.5 in 1860, and this value appears in the figure.

The Civil War political era is combined with its associated economic era and turning to produce another consensus era, from which another paradigmic generation is obtained. This generation serves the political function of the missing Civil War heroes. Some of them age into the Populists and Progressives who appear in the late 19th century when this generation approaches Amax. The first of these is involved in the 1896 critical election, which requires an Amax value of 54 to fit.

The liberals lose the critical election, and the populist movement is destroyed. A liberal era begins some years afterward, anyway, spearheaded by Republican Progressives, another faction from this generation.

Once again I average the liberal era, economic cycle and turning to get a consensus era from which another paradigmic generation can be constructed. This generation has its own critical election in 1932, which requires a value of 51 for Amax to fit. This value appears in the figure.

The same procedure produces another paradigmic generation from the liberal era/social moment associated with the 1932 critical election. This generation can be recognized as the GI's. An Amax value of 54.5 is needed to fit the next critical election in 1968. This critical election is associated with the last Awakening. The paradigmic generation from this era turns 56 in 2004. Assuming this election is a critical one, this gives another red symbol in the figure for 2004.

Notice that the red symbols in the figure, which are the values of Amax obtained by fitting the model to critical election data, show a rising trend. This trend is shown by the regression line also shown in red. Amax is interpreted as the age at which a generation "comes to power", just as Apar is interpreted as the age at which a generation develops its paradigm (its way of thinking that will influence how they wield power when they later obtain it). The red data show that to fit the data, one has to assume a rising trend in Amax.

Now the figure also shows estimates for the average age of persons in positions of political power (Congressmen and governors). Amax ought to be closely related to this average age. If Amax shows a trend, then this average age should show the same trend, and vice versa. The figure shows that this average age shows the same trend as the Amax values.

This means that values for Amax should rise over time, just as the average age of people in power has risen over time. The reason for this rise is increasing life expectancy of society's elites, brought about by advances in medicine and sanitation.

Dear Kurt,

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

> 1) Peak in power is assumed to occur in correlation with plurality
> of influential positions held by that generation.

> 2) The diminishment of the prior generation from power has no
> bearing on the amount of influence wielded by the ascendant
> generation.

> 3) That elected offices are a representative sample of positions
> of influence (an assumption I'm OK with, but it is nonetheless
> there).

> 4) Assumes that turning boundaries will come at the peak in a
> generational oscillation rather than (for example) after a
> particular threshold is reached or (another example) when a
> particular ratio of influential positions is held relative to one
> of the other archetypes.

> 5) Generational boundaries in S&H's work are not created by theory
> but deduced from historical analysis. The historical assumptions
> of S&H become part of your data set.

This is a very good list of assumptions because even if we agree or
disagree about the validity of any one of them, I think we can all
agree that each of them has to be addressed one way or another.

Here are some additional assumptions:

6) There are four archetypes. I've previously speculated that in
very long seculae there's a fifth archetype.

7) That all archetypes are equivalent in terms of when they reach
peak power. For example, maybe rules work differently for Heroes and
Artists.

8 ) That age-related factors are the only ones that are important.
For example, Mike has analyzed numerous financial values in order to
correlate them to wars and war deaths. Maybe some of those financial
values also affect when an archetype reaches peak power.

9) That the length of the crisis war doesn't affect the results. For
example, the 1994 Rwanda massacre lasted just 3 months, WW II lasted
four years (for America), but the French Revolution + Napoleonic Wars
lasted over 20 years. Doesn't that affect the size of the Artist
generation?

10) That influence doesn't vary by policy area. I'm struck by how
much influence Donald Rumsfeld has on our pursuit of the war on
terror, and how much influence Yasser Arafat and Ariel Sharon have on
events in Palestine/Israel. It's possible that younger people in
one of these positions could affect events markedly. In other words,
isn't the reason that seculae have been relatively constant over the
centuries, despite an increasing average lifespan, caused by the fact
that a few wise elders have enormous influence in certain particular
areas (especially wars)?

11) That wise elders can pass on their wisdom. If wise elders can
have that much influence on certain policy areas, then it's possible
that they can pass that wisdom on to younger people in the same
policy area. This might explain, for example, why the Seven Years
War didn't turn into a crisis war.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

> If older generations coming to power are the driving force of the
> saeculum, then saeculum length will not exceed average life
> expectancy at 20. Ever. The Prophets will (theoretically) achieve
> their peak of power when the last wave of artists begins to die
> out.

I agree with the last sentence. However, the previous sentences
don't follow and aren't true. See "assumptions" 10) and 11) above.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

> I see the older generations as having defined the extremes. The
> Heroes then choose which camp to back. I don't see the Heroes as
> being quite so drone-like as you do. They are cliqueish -- they
> build coalitions and gather allies -- but they are not monolithic
> in their views.

My son and his friends, and my friends' children, are not drones.
But they're the opposite of 60s youth, in the sense that 60s kids
wanted to oppose their parents, and today's kids want to support
their parents. This has been written about in many different places.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

> Take the current situation in the US as an example. Things got
> fairly tense in 2000 with the close election. A close or disputed
> election in 2004 could spark open violence. However, a landslide
> will almost certainly quell any possibility of civil war. If the
> election is close or disputed we may be in for a wild ride. If
> it's a landslide, whichever faction wins will dominate the Crisis
> and determine what external enemies we have that need to be
> crushed.

Absolutely not. The politics of the crisis period do not determine
the crisis. It's the other way around. The crisis period realigns
politics. Politics is essentially irrelevant in the pursuit of the
crisis period; recall Gephart and Bush hugging each other on the
House floor.

And to say that another close election will cause anything remotely
like a civil war is really silly. The country, Democrats and
Republicans, are united on the War on Terror.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

> It is huge problem for a society to "miss" its Crisis period. If
> you have a mechanism that predicts a Crisis within a particular
> range, and no Crisis occurred, then the mechanism is suspect.

As I've previously said, I've found mid-cycle periods that range from
50 years up to a little over 100 years (rarely).

I would like to find an explanation for the variance. However, it's
worth noting that the very long mid-cycle periods are extremely rare
(probably around 1%), and a mechanism that was 99% effective would
still be pretty good.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

> It wouldn't if youth emergence was your model. So long as GD
> relies on elder ascendance it cannot explain long cycles. A
> generation cannot create a turning mood if they're already dead
> and buried.

You've managed to boil down a very complex model into two words,
"youth emergence," and then you've used your two-word description to
knock the whole model down. That's a nice technique.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Mike,

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> The particular model for the post-1820 turnings that I favor has a
> new social moment turning beginning around the time that a
> paradigmic generation reaches Amax. That is, the social moment
> turning begins Amax years after the midpoint of the birth years of
> the elder paradigmic generation. ...

> Currently Amax is about 55 (see Figure). With an Apar of 25 this
> gives an 80 year saeculum. This suggests the the saeculum we are
> in the midst of should run from about 1964 to 2044. But Amax has
> been trending up. Should it reach 60, saeculum length would reach
> 93 years based on equation (3). If max power should reach 65,
> which is not impossible with today's life expectancies, saeculum
> length would reach 107 years, which is well beyond today's life
> expectancy.

Could you explain this a little more, and what you mean by the
saeculum starting in 1964? Is this what you really believe?

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> What the max power graph says is the average age of holders of
> political power in the early 19th century was about 47, but today
> is it around 55. That is, holders of political power are older
> today than in the past. Since lifespan has increased it seems
> reasonable that Amax should also have increased.

This gets back to the issue of "wisdom of elders" that I raised in my
posting to Kurt. The direction you're going here implies that cycle
length should increase with time, but S&H say that it decreases with
time, and also say that cycle length depends on the length of a
maximum (not average) lifespan.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Mike and Kurt,

We've been discussing different models to explain cycle lengths. I'd
like to suggest going at it from a different angle.

The fact is that cycle lengths do vary. As I've said, I've found the
mid-cycle period to vary from 50 to 100+ years, though they're mostly
in the 60-80 year range. How is this variation explained? This has
to be addressed.

There are two completely separate questions that have to be
addressed: why are there short periods, and why are there long
periods? So let's look at some possible theories.

First, why might a period be short?

(*) The crisis is triggered by an external invasion in a "merging
timelines" situation.

(*) Something causes the Artists to disappear early, so that the
Prophets take over early. For example, this could happen because of a
disease that strikes old people especially hard.

(*) An early war starts out as a mid-cycle war, and would normally
have ended quickly, but something goes wrong and it drags on long
enough and metastasizes into a full-fledged crisis war.

(*) Extreme poverty forces the society to war in order to survive.

Next, why might the period be long?

(*) When the crisis period begins, there is no available war partner.

(*) Something extended the preceding crisis period substantially
beyond the end of the climax of the crisis war.

(*) There are a few "wise elders" who are exceptionally revered, and
hold off a new crisis war for a long time.

(*) The society becomes wealthy, and has little need to have a war.

With regard to the last point, Haiti would undoubtedly be embroiled
in a massive civil war by now if America weren't pouring aid into the
country.

Here is my latest attempt at a model that's believable at least to
me, and explains the variation. This description has some changes
from previous statements of it.

(*) Each cycle is launched by the explosive climax of a crisis war.

(*) [This is new.] There may be an extended period of civil
uncertainty during which the society's coherence and way of life
appears to be at stake. Examples: America 1783-90 - adoption of new
Constitution; Germany, 1945-49, formation of Federal Republic of
Germany; Perhaps even Civil War, 1865-??, reconstruction in the
South. Question: Are kids born in this period Artists or Prophets?

(*) The following Austerity period lasts 15-20 years.

(*) The Awakening period lasts 10-20 years, and climaxes with some
confrontation between kids and adults. If the adults win (Tiananmen
Square), then a civil war is in the offing.

(*) [This is also new.] There may be an extended period of political
uncertainty during which the awakening issues have to be sorted out.
S&H seen to hint at this when they refer to Nixon's resignation as
some sort of climax of the awakening period, but continue the
awakening period to 1984.

(*) The Unraveling period begins next. This is now 25-50 years past
the climax.

(*) The Unraveling period lasts 20+ years, and ends no earlier than
50 years past the climax.

(*) The Unraveling period can be extended by either (a) the wisdom of
"elder wise men"; or (b) the lack of available war "partner."

As I said, this model is believable to me, even if it isn't to you
guys.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Difficult Wars - Venezuela

I'm writing up some "difficult wars." These are wars that are
difficult to evaluate as crisis/non-crisis wars for one reason or
another.

Examples that I've discussed previously include:

World War I - Eastern European crisis war, Western European
non-crisis war

War of the Spanish Succession - Difficult because neither France nor
England appears to have really won it.

---

This past week I've been trying to do an evaluation of Venezuela, in
order to make a judgment whether the current unrest surrounding the
recall election of Chavez might lead to a full-scale civil war.

This evaluation presented a series of problems which I think I've
resolved, and they're pertinent to the current discussions of cycle
lengths.

We start with the War of Independence, 1811-22. There's also a
"period of civic uncertainty," until 1830, when Venezuela became
independent of Gran Colombia.

Then we come to the 1859-63 Federal Wars, a civil war.

For a while, I thought that this war might violate the minimum
50-year mid-cycle rule. But I've now checked four different sources,
and I can't find any description of this period that reads like a
crisis civil war. It appears that this war was low to medium level
violence driven by politicians.

(As an aside, this means that I'll have to carefully refine my
previous claim that civil wars are always crisis wars. The point I
was making then is still valid, but has to be stated more sharply.
See also the next message on Caesar's civil war.)

But that raised another problem: I can't find anything to the present
time that reads like a crisis war. All the books I've looked at talk
about various glorious periods, and various not-so-glorious periods,
but nothing that reads like a crisis war. Thus we would have
Venezuela with no crisis war between 1823 and 2004.

I was really puzzled by this for a long time until I looked at the
history of Colombia, which is right next door.



It turns out that Colombia does have a fairly clear timeline,
following the same war of independence that Venezuela fought:

1899-1902 War of a Thousand Days - prolonged civil war

1948-60 La Violencia - civil war

For Venezuela, these are described as periods of great turmoil, but
not as periods of war. The most reasonable explanation is that these
two Colombian civil wars were crisis periods for Venezuela as well,
though this needs a lot more research. In order for this to make
sense, I'd have to establish something like a fluid border between
Colombia and Venezuela, and that will take more research.

A similar situation is England's mid-cycle period from 1814-1937. As
we've previously discussed, the Franco-Prussian war went on in the
late 1860s, and England was involved in a number of other wars at
that time, starting with the Crimean War in the early 1850s.
(England was at war somewhere in the world every single day of Queen
Victoria's reign.)

This observation has serious consequences. If Venezuela was in a
crisis period from 1948-60, then it means that country is currently
in an early Unraveling period, and so there won't be a major
crisis civil war in Venezuela.

On the other hand, if Venezuela's last crisis period was WW II, which
is what I first speculated, then there probably will be a
major crisis civil war in Venezuela.

So Generational Dynamics really does have some important real-world
applications.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Difficult Wars - Caesar's Civil War

I've previously posted evaluations of three Roman wars:

Second Punic War (218-201 BC). Hannibal marched his
Carthaginian army through southern France and headed for Rome,
defeating one Roman army after another along the way. The war raged
on for years, until 202 when Hannibals army was annihilated. Carthage
was to accept Rome's terms of surrender, and the unfaithful Italian
allies were punished as well. Evaluates to a crisis war.

Code:

    Evaluation: C
        Historically significant war: Yes - Supports C
        Genocidal violence: Yes - determines C
        Politicization: Low - supports C
        Resolution: Annihilated - supports C

Social War, Civil War, Mithridatic Wars (91-64 BC). Italian
allied states formed their own republic, Italia, and declared war on
Rome. Rome attempted to undermine Italian solidarity by extending
Roman citizenship to all Italians (unraveling strategy), but the war
continued. Before the war was over, 50,000 had died on each side and
Italy was devastated. [Stearns] A further civil war in Rome resulted
in much further bloodshed. This evaluates to a crisis war.

Code:

    Evaluation: C
        Historically significant war: Yes - Supports C
        Genocidal violence: Yes - determines C
        Politicization: Low - supports C
        Resolution: Devasted - supports C

Rioting in Rome, Civil War, Caesar assassinated (55-35 BC).
Caesar "crossed the Rubicon" and thus initiated a short-lived civil
war. Caesar made Cleopatra ruler of Egypt -- gender issues are often
important during awakening periods. Caesar carried out other foreign
campaigns, achieved power in Rome, and was assassinated in 44. This
evaluates to a mid-cycle war.

Code:

    Evaluation: N
        Historically significant war: No - determines N
        Genocidal violence: No - supports N
        Politicization: High - determines N
        Resolution: Fizzled - supports N

These three wars present some problems for two separate reasons. The
time from the first to the second is very long, and the time to the
third is very short.

The evaluation of the third one, Caesar's civil war, as a non-crisis
war, has raised some questions, and I've been hoping I could find
some historical material that would clarify the situation.

The criteria that are used to distinguish between a crisis and
non-crisis war have been posted previous in this thread.
http://www.fourthturning.com/forums/...?p=98544#98544 As a
practical matter, it usually turns out that it's much easier to prove
that a war is a crisis war than to prove that it's a non-crisis war,
since it's often hard to prove a negative in any domain.

The criteria for proving a crisis war are usually clear and
straightforward. If the war doesn't meet those criteria, then it's
probably a non-crisis war. To prove a non-crisis war
affirmatively requires delving deeper into the politics
surrounding the war.

Caesar's Civil War presented that kind of problem, and I've wanted
something more definitive.

The book Caesar's Civil War 49-44 BC by Adrian Goldsworthy,
Osprey Publishing, 2002, provides a great deal more political context
surrounding the war. In particular, it provides an analysis of
Cicero's contemporaneous views of the war.

I've scanned an posted this chapter of the book below. The political
nature of Caesar's Civil War is pretty clearly shown by this account.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com


Portrait of a civilian: Cicero and the Civil War


The Civil War presented the vast majority of Romans with a dilemma,
for it was clear that joining either side or remaining inactive all
had their perils As we have seen, only a minority even among the
Senate actually wanted war. The letters written and received by the
great orator Cicero during these last months of peace and the years
of war provide us with a remarkable insight into these times and the
impact of the war on one man, his family and friends. The majority
of these letters were to his long-time frIend and correspondent
Atticus, an equestrian who remained outsIde formal politics and yet
seemed to know, and have friendly relatIons with, every prominent
Roman in this period.

Marcus Tullius Cicero was a 'new man', the first in his famIly to
reach the consulship his rise was almost entirely due to his skill as
an orator, for his fame came more from winning famous cases in the
courts than military achievements. Almost an exact contemporary of
Pompey, Cicero had advanced his career through the same turbulent
decades of civil war, dictatorship and attempted coups and
revolutions his great moment came as consul in 63, when he presided
over the defeat and punishment of Catiline's conspirators. In spite
of his fame, Cicero did not have the wealth, influence and
client-base of a Pompey, Crassus or Caesar and would never be more
than one of a number of distinguished senators. His vulnerability
had been made all too clear in 58, when Clodius had forced him into
exile for alleged illegal behaviour during his consulship. Although
this was only temporary, it had proved that he could not rely on the
support and protection of men like Pompey.

On 24 November 50 as tension grew in Rome, Cicero arrived back at
Brundisium after a year-long tenure as proconsul of Cilicia in Asia
Minor. This in itself was an indirect consequence of the machinations
of Caesar's opponents, for the law decreeing a five-year interval
between magIstracy and governorship had created a shortage of
provincial governors As a result, men like Cicero, who had been
consul over a decade before and had no real ambition to go to a
province, were required to fulfil their obligations in Cilicia he dId
his best to govern well, preparing the defences in case the Parthians,
flushed with their success at Carrhae, launched the expected invasion.
When this dId not materialise he conducted a minor campaIgn against
the tribesmen of Mount Amanus, for which he hoped to receive a triumph
In spite of the continuing ParthIan threat, Cicero left at the first
legal opportunity, arriving back in Rome just in the last period of
peace. As a governor he still had imperium, which he could not
lay down If he wanted to be granted a triumph. In fact in the end he
was only granted the lesser honour of a 'supplication', which was
probably more in keeping wIth the scale of his success

Cicero's correspondents had kept him well informed about the
impending crisis. He had always been closer to Pompey than Caesar,
though Pompey's failure to protect him from Clodius still rankled.
When Pompey had been allied wIth Crassus and Caesar, Cicero had aided
them, for instance, delivering a powerful speech in favour of
extending Caesar's initial command in Gaul, whIle his brother Quintus
had served as one of Caesar's legates in Gaul. Even before he reached
Rome, Cicero was Writing to Atticus saying that, publicly, he would
vote with Pompey, although in private he would urge him to strive for
peace. Caesar's supporters he saw as wastrels, most of them young
and already associated with criminal activity.

>>> Caption: Cicero was the greatest orator of his day and was also a
prolific author. His letters which were published after his death
provide a very vivld picture of the period of the Civil War (AKG
Berlin)

Yet he realised their strength, claiming that the only thing Caesar's
side 'lacked was a good cause, since they had everything else in
abundance'. Yet already Cicero could not help wondering why thIs
situation had been allowed to occur. Would it not have been better
to have opposed Caesar when he was weaker, rather than waiting until
the Senate itself had granted him honours and power, making hIm a far
more dangerous opponent. Caesar had been allowed to win office
because the Senate had not effectively opposed him when he was weak
and vulnerable.

By the middle of December Cicero was outside Rome and began to
realise just how divided the Senate was over the issue. The vast
majority, both in the Senate and the equestrian order, wanted peace.
Most were also dubious about Pompey's intentions and what would
happen once he defeated Caesar. As Cicero put it, 'from victory (for
Pompey and the Senate) will come many evils, and certainly a tyrant.'
Seeing just how strong was the desire for peace, he again wondered why
they had allowed Caesar so much power if they were only going to fight
him in the long run. When war finally came, Cicero's correspondence
became filled with the rumours that circulated among the nervous
citizens. He could not understand Pompey's decision to leave Rome and
then not to make any effort to defend the city, seeing this as an open
admission of weakness. He remained there for a few days, before
retiring to the country. He corresponded with Pompey and Caesar as
well as many other friends, most of whom urged him to declare himself
more openly.

Marcus Caelius Rufus was one of that wild, irresponsible generation
that figured so heavily in the radical politics of the Late Republic,
but he remained very friendly with Cicero, who had successfully
defended him in court. During his tenure in Cilicia, Caelius had sent
a series of gossipy letters packed with news and scandal from the
city. Now he had joined Caesar, feeling that even if Pompey might
have the more honourable cause, then Caesar certainly had the better
army, which was what counted as soon as a political dispute spilled
over into open war.

Pompey's decision to abandon Italy and instead build up his power in
the east dismayed Cicero along with many others. It also added to his
own uncertainty, made worse because he had still not laid down his
imperium as proconsul and therefore had the power to command
troops. During these months his letters to Atticus were probably more
frequent than at any other time in his life, and on some days he wrote
more than one. Pompey's strategy seemed misguided, and yet still he
felt a loyalty to him and gratitude, even if he did not really believe
in his cause. Both Caesar and several of his associates begged Cicero
to return to Rome, for he wanted to summon a legitimate Senate, and
the presence of a distinguished ex-consul would add greatly to its
authority. There is a strange, almost unreal quality about some of
these letters, as Caesar's associates quote their commander's letters
reporting that his army has cornered Pompey in Brundisium and telling
of the progress of the siege. At the end of March, as Caesar returned
to Rome, he called on Cicero and in person assured him of his respect
and tried to persuade him to go back to Rome. Cicero said that if he
came, he would say that the Senate could not approve of Caesar taking
his legions to fight in Spain or Greece, and then lament Pompey's
fate. When Caesar replied that he did not want such sentiments
expressed publicly, Cicero explained that he could not go to Rome and
speak under any other circumstances, which was why he chose to remain
in the country.

Caesar left soon afterwards for the Spanish campaign, and Cicero
began to wonder about belatedly following Pompey, or perhaps
travelling simply to stay out of the conflict. Caelius marched with
Caesar and in April wrote to Cicero during the march, telling him
that he ought not to join the enemy, for Caesar was already gaining a
marked advantage. Around the same time Curio stopped at Cicero's
villa en route to Sicily. Cicero found him as boastful and
unrestrained in his speech as ever, and was disturbed to hear that
Curio also believed that Caesar's clemency was a temporary ploy and
that his true nature would eventually assert itself. In the end, after
continued heart-searching, he decided to embark for Macedonia and join
Pompey's army. his teenage son, also called Marcus, was already there,
having volunteered to serve as a cavalry officer. What Cicero found in
the Pompei an camp dismayed him, for the senators had become
increasingly extreme, and spoke of extreme punishments not simply for
Caesar's partisans, but also for anyone who had remained neutral.
Pompey seemed to lack his old confidence and purpose and there was
little sense of unity among the commanders. Illness kept him from the
field at Pharsalus where the defeat confirmed his low opinion of the
army. In the aftermath as an ex-consul still possessed of proconsular
imperium, Cato is supposed to have offered him command of the
survivors, but Cicero declined and returned to Italy.

Caesar's long stay in Egypt, and the lack of communication from him
for months on end were incomprehensible. All Cicero wanted was for
the war to end, and for at least some semblance of normality to
return to Roman politicS, but now that Caesar had won the war, he
failed to end it utterly. Cicero waited near Brundismm for the
victor to return, nervously wondering how he would be treated In the
event, Caesar proved extremely friendly, but even so Cicero spent
increasingly little time in formal politics and more writing
philosophical works. Part of him hoped that Caesar could guide the
state and allow a gradual return to the proper institutions of the
Republic. Yet the reality of Caesar's supremacy, and the dictator's
continued reliance on the dubious individuals who had proved loyal to
him in the past, steadily alienated him. Cicero was not involved in
the conspiracy, although since the letters to Atticus for the months
before Caesar's death were not published it is possible that his
friend was implicated in some small way, but wished to conceal this
by the time that the letters were published. He had high hopes of
better things after the deed and, for almost a year, once again took
a leading role in politics. His respect for Brutus was considerable,
even though he had seen the ruthless and unscrupulous side of his
character during his own governorship of Cilicia, where Brutus'
agents had demanded four times the legal rate of interest on a loan
given to the City of Salamis Even so, he was not persuaded by Brutus
when the latter argued that he should not encourage Octavian's
ambitions, lest they raise up another Caesar Cicero saw Antony as the
real enemy, and was willing to deploy any means to destroy him. He
failed, and himself perished, leaving his letters, speeches and
philosophical books as a permanent memorial.

Source: Caesar's Civil War 49-44 BC by Adrian Goldsworthy,
Osprey Publishing, 2002, pp. 74-77

[End of message]

Dear David,

Originally Posted by David Krein

> You are frequently aggressive in promoting positions that are
> based on factual errors or single sources that are outdated or
> really not expert enough.

I use a variety of sources, both modern and older. In many cases I
have to read three or four sources in order to evaluate a war. In
many cases the older source provides better information for my
purposes.

My objectives in validating the Generational Dynamics model do not
always coincide with the objectives of professional historians.

Historians get their kicks out of validating the tiniest details
about past times. Did Lincoln have fried eggs for breakfast on the
day he signed the Emancipation Proclamation? Proving or disproving
that claim is a major find in the world of historians. Thus, if a
1920s book says that he did eat fried eggs, but a more modern
discovery showed that he had pancakes instead, then it's worth
throwing a party to celebrate.

This attention to the tiniest detail is both the strength and the
weakness of historians. There is a HUGE difference between crisis
and non-crisis wars, but historians miss the differences because they
can't step back and look at the bigger picture.

I was having a discussion with a professor of history a few weeks
ago, and I was comparing World War II to the Vietnam War. I said
something like, "We dropped nuclear weapons on Japan in WW II, but in
the Vietnam War we prosecuted soldiers for harming civilians."

Well, he got all excited. "No, we didn't prosecute all the soldiers
who harmed civilians. There were a lot more soldiers who didn't get
prosecuted."

Listening to him I got this weird feeling that I always get that
historians are sometimes totally oblivious to what's going on. I
stared at him for a second, and then raised my voice a little. "WE
DROPPED NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON JAPANESE CITIES!"

I don't think he ever got the point.

Question: How come a historian can't tell the difference between a
summer drizzle and a raging typhoon? Answer: Because a historian
can't focus on anything more than one raindrop at a time.

Originally Posted by David Krein

> For example, you frequently quote Peter Stearns - he is an expert
> on 19th century French labor history who has expanded his
> interests to 20th century American consumerism, and is a leading
> proponent of an inclusionary world history (as opposed to those
> who use world history to bash the West).

I quote Stearns' book because it covers everything, and because it's
so convenient. The book came with a CD-ROM that I've installed on my
computer, so I can bring up any historical period at any time very
conviently.

I've now evaluated hundreds of wars as crisis or non-crisis wars, and
I've followed a kind of layering technique. Stearns' bare-bones
description of any war is usually not enough, but it is enough maybe
40-50% of the time.

The rest of the time, Stearns' description leaves questions
unanswered, and so I have to go to other sources, sometimes several
sources.

Originally Posted by David Krein

> the most recent example of using outdated material is relying on
> Trevelyan's 1941 book. While good for its time, it has been
> superceded by two generations of historians. He is THE classic
> example of a Whig historian (even his middle name harkens back to
> the greatest of the Whig historians - and a friend of his
> father's), and his approach (which should delight Mr. Saari) has
> been thoroughly rejected. It doesn't negate much of what you
> quote from him, but you need to be aware of where the state of
> acholarshuip is now.

I've found that "outdated" material is often the best for my purposes
because it's closer to the actual events and provides more detail.

Let me give you another example which will probably horrify you even
more: I've found the Catholic New Advent Encyclopedia, written in
the 1900s decade, at http://www.newadvent.org to be a fantastic
resource.

One more example: When I was working on the thread "The Causes of the
American Civil war" at
http://fourthturning.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=1261 I came across an
online book, The Great Conspiracy, by John Alexander Logan, a
detailed history of the Civil War written in the 1880s, at
http://www.gutenberg.net/etext/7134 .

Now if you're going criticize Trevelyan because he's a Whig
historian, then you don't have to tell me the outrage you might
express at someone who uses a century old Catholic encyclopedia or a
120 year old Southerner's view of the Civil war as sources. You
would point out that these sources are outdated and biased.

And yet the irony is that those are often the best kinds of sources
for evaluating what's going on. A "real historian" will focus on
minute details that make little or no difference to the evaluation of
a crisis war; a biased source will express a viewpoint that tells you
whether the war was a crisis war or not. If a war is a raging
typhoon, as opposed to a summer drizzle, then you'll get a clearer
picture of that fact from a source closer to the actual event, even
from a biased source.

Now don't misunderstand me. I've used plenty of modern books by
"real historians." It's just I've learned that that evaluating crisis
wars is a specialized discipline requiring sources and skills that
professional historians don't normally need in the pursuit of their
own work.

Originally Posted by David Krein

> Similarly, your insistence that Germany got involved in the First
> World War because of its Austrian alliance might have been
> acceptable in the 1950s (and apparently was to Hajo Holborn who
> you seem to rely on). Fritz Fischer's Griff nach der Weltmacht was
> published in 1961 (translated as Germany's Aims in the First World
> War in 1968) and you would have to at least take into account his
> conclusion, based on thorough archival research, that Germany
> actively pushed Austria into its war with Russia in 1914 and that
> Germany's war aims were not subtantially different than Hitler's
> some 25 years later; that is, Holland, Belgium, northeastern
> France as well as Poland and the Ukraine in the East, which of
> course was confirmed by Brest-Litovsk in 1918.

I've used lots of sources for WW I, because it's always the BIG ISSUE
when discussing the generational paradigm.

I understand your desire to score points by comparing Germany's aims
in WW I to Hitler's aims in WW II, but else would they be? Germany
and France have been having wars for centuries, and the purpose of
all of those wars was to gain territory. Isn't the "purpose" of any
war to either gain territory, or to prevent someone else from gaining
territory? Actually, when you come right down to it, crisis wars are
more likely to be genocidal, with territory a secondary objective.

At any rate, Germany's political machinations in WW I do not affect
the evaluation as a non-crisis war.

Originally Posted by David Krein

> As to Philip II and Mary Stuart, the Scottish alliance was always
> with France, Scotland was a Protestant country by the time Mary
> returned from France, a widow at 18. Philip was still actively
> pursuing Elizabeth, and did not turn to her cousin Mary in his
> goal of re-catholicizing England until long after she was
> Elizabeth's "guest" after 1568.

I should have said that the alliance was between Mary and Spain.

Originally Posted by David Krein

> I also noted that you take the Act of Union as the solution to the
> Scottish/English animosity, but, if so, how do you explain the
> "15" or the "45", or do the Highland Scots not count (I was, by
> the way, impressed that you found a recent account of Queen Anne's
> reign).

Sorry. What are the "15" and the "45"?

Originally Posted by David Krein

> On more general themes, I may have some comments later, but, for
> now, I can't help thinking you find what you are looking for and
> fall victim to procrusteanism. For the historian, the major
> question is always what level of generalization will the evidence
> support and, because you are essentially proposing THE law of
> history, you really need more evidence than you produce. It is,
> however, provocative and worthy of consideration. When I first
> read Strauss and Howe, I kept saying to myself *yes, but..." With
> GD, I am more inclined to say "maybe, but..."

Hmmmm. Great word. I finally tracked down:

> http://www.philosophy.leeds.ac.uk/GM.../hobhuman.html

> The most suitable term I have come across for this particular
> syndrome is `Procrusteanism', coined by Antony Flew, in his
> article `Socialist Procrusteanism or Conservative Justice', in The
> Salisbury Review 4, No.2 (1986), pp.16--20. Admittedly, Professor
> Flew's primary concern is to distance a conservative conception of
> justice, consisting in giving each person their due, from a
> socialist conception, consisting in an enforced taking away from
> some and giving to others, just as the Greek hotelier Procrustes
> chopped off the feet of tall guests and stretched short guests on
> the rack, so that they would all exactly fit his bed. But Flew's
> analogy needs no stretching on the rack in order for it to extend
> to the concept I have just outlined.

So now at least I know what you're talking about.

I've tried mightily not to do this. My original concern with S&H was
that they had done this very thing. By taking a completely different
approach -- the "top-down" Generational Dynamics approach versus the
"bottom-up" Fourth Turning approach -- and then showing that the two
approaches yield roughly equivalent results for the time periods they
have in common, I believe I've established a pretty firm benchmark.
By developing the crisis war criteria and rigorously applying them to
nuermous wars throughout history, I've provided a body of work that
makes a very strong case that both Generational Dynamics and the
Fourth Turning are correct.

Basically the bottom line is this: The difference between crisis and
non-crisis wars is so huge that there's seldom or never any doubt
which is which. That's what I've found, and once that fact is
established, then Generational Dynamics is established.

When you came to your conclusion about Strauss and Howe, you had
probably read one or both of the books Generations and The
Fourth Turning in their entirety, and you read them long after
the work had been completed, so that they had become fairly well
established. You're judging Generational Dynamics based on a few
messages posted in an online forum, at a time when the theory is
still quite new, so ironically you're making the mistake you imply
that I've made: Passing judgment based on incomplete information.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Could you explain this a little more, and what you mean by the saeculum starting in 1964? Is this what you really believe?

I am using the term "saeculum" to refer the the four-turning cycle starting at any turning--not only the one in the canonical order 1T-2T-3T-4T. So when I say "the saeculum that began in 1964" I am refering to a 2T-3T-4T-1T sequence of turnings that is "one saeculum long" and is centered on the present, the cusp between the 3T and 4T.

This gets back to the issue of "wisdom of elders" that I raised in my posting to Kurt. The direction you're going here implies that cycle length should increase with time, but S&H say that it decreases with time, and also say that cycle length depends on the length of a maximum (not average) lifespan.

Yes, after the one-time drop in length around 1820 that is due to the advent of the paradigm mechanism, saeculum length should slowly increase:

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

As I said, this model is believable to me, even if it isn't to you guys.

The model is plausible enough, but plausibility isn't enough. It has to work too. For example, lets apply the model to 18th century Britain and America.

For Britain:
We start with the WSS crisis that ends in 1714.

We follow with 15 years of austerity to 1729.

We then add 20 years of awakening to 1749.

In both of these cases I chose the maximum length so 1749 is as late as I can make the start of the unraveling.

The unraveling lasts 20+ years, implying the next crisis war should be the first war that follows 1769. This means the Seven Years War will be a mid-cycle war. This makes sense as 1756 is only 42 years after 1714 and there should be plenty of elders left who remember the crisis war.

The next war after 1769 is the American Revolution in 1775. Now consider the situation in 1775. It is 61 years after the last crisis war and those who can recall the last crisis war are past 80 and so out of the picture. It is 26 years into the unraveling, well past the 20+ marker. According to the model the American Revolution should be a Crisis war for Britain.

For America:
The situation is the same on the other side of the Atlantic. Here the Crisis climax is 1688. The austerity period would be 1688-1703 and the awakening 1703-1723, again using maximum values. This makes the unraveling begin in 1723 and we should start looking for crisis conditions after 1743.

The next war is the French and Indian War in 1756. This is 68 years after the last crisis, just about everybody who can recall it is dead. This war should be a crisis war for the Americans, but not for the British. The next war, the American Revolution, should be a mid cycle war for the Americans and a crisis war for the British. But this isn't how it works out.

Now the same analysis can be done for Kurt's model. Basically Kurt's model says that turnings length is equal to Apol, the age at which youth begin to express themselves politically. An obvious choice for Apol would be 21, the age of suffrage for most of the period since the early 19th century.

Here are the predicted turnings with Apol =21 from the youth emergence model (YEM) starting with an Awakening in 1822:

1822-1843 (A)
1843-1864 (U)
1864-1885 (C)
1885-1906 (H)
1906-1927 (A)
1927-1948 (U)
1948-1969 (C)
1969-1990 (H)
1990-xxxx (A)

Obviously this is a poor fit, the last Crisis did not end in 1969 and we aren't halfway through an Awakening now. The best fit is obtained using Apol = 18:

1822-1840 (A)
1840-1858 (U)
1858-1876 (C)
1876-1894 (H)
1894-1912 (A)
1912-1930 (U)
1930-1948 (C)
1948-1966 (H)
1966-1984 (A)
1984-2002 (U)

This is a good fit. So we can conclude that YEM produces a good fit to the actual data using a value of 18 for Apol. There is a problem with the interpretation of Apol as the age at which people begin to have political influence. At 18, people couldn't even vote until 1971. It doesn't seem very plausible that the age at which youth begin to influence politics can be as early as 18, yet that is the value needed for YEM to work.

This discrepancy is one of the "nuts and bolts" problems I have with YEM. I considered this sort of model when it became clear to me that generational length dropped to 18 years in the 19th century. I could not come up with a plausible explanation for 18 years, as opposed to something around 21-22, which would correspond S&H's phase of life, or a "coming of age" thing like your youth emergence concept.
************************************************** ********
The paradigm model (PM) has the advantage that Apar, which serves the same role as Apol in YEM, fits the data with a higher value of 25. Developing a paradigm by age 25 is more plausible than youth impacting politics at age at 18, on average.

Now I only use PM for the recent period. But one could formulate a plausible model for the aristocratic age based on PM. Here the idea would be that the leaders of an aristocratic society are born to rule, and so are trained during childhood for that task and thus have developed paradigms by their teens. The leaders of a populist society, as you call it, would be self-made men. They would not have been born to rule and so they start the learning process to develop their paradigms after childhood, at an age when their aristocratic predecessors have largely finished. Aquisition of their paradigms is complete about ten years later at age 25.

Thus we have 18-year turnings for Amax = 52 and Apar = 25. And we have 25-year turnings for Amax = 52 and Apar = 15.

Dear Mike,

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> Yes, after the one-time drop in length around 1820 that is due to
> the advent of the paradigm mechanism, saeculum length should
> slowly increase:

I have to agree that this result looks significant, but I don't
completely understand it.

Could you explain in words what's going on? What's "the advent of the
paradigm mechanism"? Is the dip in the S&H values caused by the fact
that S&H skips the Hero generation in the Civil War?

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> For Britain:

> We start with the WSS crisis that ends in 1714.

> We follow with 15 years of austerity to 1729.

> We then add 20 years of awakening to 1749.

> In both of these cases I chose the maximum length so 1749 is as
> late as I can make the start of the unraveling.

> The unraveling lasts 20+ years, implying the next crisis war
> should be the first war that follows 1769. This means the Seven
> Years War will be a mid-cycle war. This makes sense as 1756 is
> only 42 years after 1714 and there should be plenty of elders left
> who remember the crisis war.

> The next war after 1769 is the American Revolution in 1775. Now
> consider the situation in 1775. It is 61 years after the last
> crisis war and those who can recall the last crisis war are past
> 80 and so out of the picture. It is 26 years into the unraveling,
> well past the 20+ marker. According to the model the American
> Revolution should be a Crisis war for Britain.

I don't hold the view that crisis wars automatically start just
because you're in a crisis period. Crisis wars are genocidal, and
require a monumental level of hatred by the time they're through.

We can see this today in Iraq. Even though we're in a crisis period,
our war in Iraq is not a crisis war. If it were, we'd be nuking
Najaf. We only pursued the war because we feared the use of their
WMDs.

So 1770s England did not feel the same hatred for the colonists that
the colonists did for the English.

That's why I'm wary of these purely age-related seculum analyses.
Especially for crisis wars, there's a huge visceral element that the
age arguments don't capture.

For example, suppose that Puerto Rico decided to have a war of
independence from America today. Would we really smash it with all
we had, or would we just say bye-bye? There'd be a debate about it,
to be sure, and maybe we'd even send a few gunboats over to try to
smooth things down, but when all was said and done, we'd let them
go. That appears to be what happened with England and the American
colonies. They did not hate us, and in the end decided that letting
us go was the right thing to do.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> For America:

> The situation is the same on the other side of the Atlantic. Here
> the Crisis climax is 1688. The austerity period would be 1688-1703
> and the awakening 1703-1723, again using maximum values. This
> makes the unraveling begin in 1723 and we should start looking for
> crisis conditions after 1743.

> The next war is the French and Indian War in 1756. This is 68
> years after the last crisis, just about everybody who can recall
> it is dead. This war should be a crisis war for the Americans, but
> not for the British. The next war, the American Revolution, should
> be a mid cycle war for the Americans and a crisis war for the
> British. But this isn't how it works out.

Well, this is the case that motivated this whole discussion. I don't
have the answer to this yet. All I have is a couple of theories.
One of the possibilities is that the migration of Englishmen in the
early 1700s created a generational mix that held off the crisis.
Another is that we would have had the Revolutionary War in the 1750s,
except that still needed the British to fight off the French. One
thing seems pretty clear: That end of the Seven Years War seems to
have triggered America's entry into the crisis period, since things
got pretty hostile starting around 1764. So I'm not sure what
happened to make the cycle length so long, but it really looks like
it had to do with the end of the Seven Years War. This could very
well be an example of how "external events," unrelated to people's
ages, can have an effect on the crisis period.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

I don't hold the view that crisis wars automatically start just because you're in a crisis period. Crisis wars are genocidal, and require a monumental level of hatred by the time they're through.

Well that's what your model says. Obviously you are missing an important element in the model. Remember the goal is to predict the crisis war. The model you presented predicted that the Revolution would be crisis war for Britain, which was wrong. Remember an observer isn't going to know ahead of time whether there will be geneocidal energy in a war that's still in the future. A valid model will have to predict that energy in advance.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

I have to agree that this result looks significant, but I don't completely understand it.

Could you explain in words what's going on? What's "the advent of the
paradigm mechanism"? Is the dip in the S&H values caused by the fact
that S&H skips the Hero generation in the Civil War?

As I explain here I believe the saeculum followed a Malthusian popluation model up to the late 17th century. As I explain here, I believe that this mechanism morphed into a war-finance mechanism after 1675 and this mechanism functioned until the mid-19th century.

That was as far as I got four years ago. I wrote the results of this analysis in The Kondratiev Cycle, which I believe you have a copy of.

What I didn't have when I wrote TKC was a model for the saeculum that covers the 19th and 20th centuries. The paradigm model is this model. So the advent of the paradigm mechanism refers to the period when the paradigm model becomes valid.

The dip in S&H values is simply what they give. The period from 1844 to 1865 is an end of an awakening to an end of a crisis. That is, it is one-half a saeculum in length, yet it is only 21 years long. If 1/2 a saeculum is 21 years, S&H are impliying that in the 1850's the saeculum ran only 42 years in length. that is, saecular time moved at twice its normal rate.

Now S&H could have included Reconstruction in the Civil War Crisis as they included the post Revolutionary war aftermath. Had they done so the Crisis would have run from 1860-1877 and the half-saeculum length from 1844 to 1877 would be 33 years, implying a much more reasonable saeculum length of 66 years. This is not much different from the 1860-1929 full saeculum of 69 years.

But they didn't do that, and as a result their saeculum length fluctuates wildly in what they call the Civil War anomaly.

Dear Mike,

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> Well that's what your model says. Obviously you are missing an
> important element in the model. Remember the goal is to predict
> the crisis war. The model you presented predicted that the
> Revolution would be crisis war for Britain, which was wrong.
> Remember an observer isn't going to know ahead of time whether
> there will be geneocidal energy in a war that's still in the
> future. A valid model will have to predict that energy in
> advance.

Well OK, I need to be clearer.

How about a probabilistic statement: Let P(t) be the probability of a
crisis war starting on or before time t, measured from the end of the
previous crisis war. Then P(t) = 0 for t < 50 years and P(t) is
monotonically increasing for t >= 50 years. P(100 years) =
approximately 0.99.

In the meantime, it's still possible to have non-crisis wars, even
during "crisis periods."

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by Mr. Xenakis

Now if you're going criticize Trevelyan because he's a Whig

historian, then you don't have to tell me the outrage you might

express at someone who uses a century old Catholic encyclopedia or a

120 year old Southerner's view of the Civil war as sources. You

would point out that these sources are outdated and biased.

My dear Mr. Xenakis,

It not the source that is the major problem with Whig History but its attempt to show that all the Past was a Progress to the Present.

The trouble with "Weird" theory of History is its penchant to use the Past as a guide to the Future, the Past will Project the Future through a Present lens. This may be of great value but its in the province of the haruspex and not the historian.

The "backward" hold that history is an Art and not a Science and is not in the main, or even in a great portion, a Useful Art but a backward glance that tries to explain the Past to the Present in the Past's terms. It is not to tell us very much about today and nothing at all about tomorrow.


I read the Whigs for their reasoned and well written Paths of Progress, and, as Mr. Krein noted, am gladdened that they are known as unsound as to their scaffold rather than their several beams and planks.

I read the "Weird" such as yourself and Mr. Alexander with great interest as I would pour over blueprints of homes made and others unmade. You are the Albert Speers* of Future Architectures, but recall that he came to regret some of his more unfortunate plans. It is valuable work, these architectures built and unbuilt, that the "Weird" do; it is too often mistaken as inspired by Clio rather than some other daimon.

I am "backward" because Clio is my Muse.

Yo. Ob. Sv. Virgil K. Saari



*This is NOT an attempt to link either you or your "weird" school to the National Socialists but to those who would plan the Future and not always get it constructed.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

How about a probabilistic statement: Let P(t) be the probability of a crisis war starting on or before time t, measured from the end of the previous crisis war. Then P(t) = 0 for t < 50 years and P(t) is monotonically increasing for t >= 50 years. P(100 years) = approximately 0.99.

That covers it, but it kind of ruins any predictive ability since you have a 50 year window during which a crisis war will happen. For example, you predict a crisis war between Palestine and Israel, but we could wait until 2047 for that war to happen. Predicting a major war sometime in the next 40 years is way different than predicting a war soon (which is what you imply on your site). How can you tell whether any conflict that develops there in the near future won't be like 1756 in America or 1775 in Britain?

I've been trying to keep up with John's and Mike's discussion on how to measure the saeculae. I find it vastly interesting, and so well developed by these two contributors. This seach for saecular boundries ought to have its own place in the histroy departments of all of our universities.

One thing that comes to mind however, as a biologist, is the problem of over-interpretation, assuming too much from the body of data, looking for margins that dance in the fog. The data presented by John and Mike are compelling, but they are also ambiguous to arguable degrees. I don't know, for eaxmple, how much statistical anaylses have been applied or if I am comfortable with the application. Perhaps someone needs to invent a method to measure this ambiguity in a way that everyone finds useful (but I haven't a clue how to do it). Maybe there is an ambiguity coefficient that should be installed in all historical models. But I still happen to like ambiguities (almost to the point of seeing the whole show as ambiguities!).

And I really like the metamorphical seasonality of this baseline analog (Mike's):



It is not hard to see it as: spring -> summer -> fall -> winter.

I can also see it as : eggs -> larvae -> pupae -> adults.

And I know one thing about entomology from experience (one more for Brian): when you get down to counting the number of unbanded spicules on the sexual organs immature dobsonflies at two a.m. in the morning, you have to realize that you are in there for the counting of spicules, however arcane they might be.

Just a thought, Croakmore

Dear Virgil,

Originally Posted by Virgil K. Saari

> It not the source that is the major problem with Whig History but
> its attempt to show that all the Past was a Progress to the
> Present.

> The trouble with "Weird" theory of History is its penchant to use
> the Past as a guide to the Future, the Past will Project the
> Future through a Present lens. This may be of great value but its
> in the province of the haruspex and not the historian.

> The "backward" hold that history is an Art and not a Science and
> is not in the main, or even in a great portion, a Useful Art but a
> backward glance that tries to explain the Past to the Present in
> the Past's terms. It is not to tell us very much about today and
> nothing at all about tomorrow.

> I read the Whigs for their reasoned and well written Paths of
> Progress, and, as Mr. Krein noted, am gladdened that they are
> known as unsound as to their scaffold rather than their several
> beams and planks.

> I read the "Weird" such as yourself and Mr. Alexander with great
> interest as I would pour over blueprints of homes made and others
> unmade. You are the Albert Speers* of Future Architectures, but
> recall that he came to regret some of his more unfortunate plans.
> It is valuable work, these architectures built and unbuilt, that
> the "Weird" do; it is too often mistaken as inspired by Clio
> rather than some other daimon.

> I am "backward" because Clio is my Muse.

> Yo. Ob. Sv. Virgil K. Saari

> *This is NOT an attempt to link either you or your "weird" school
> to the National Socialists but to those who would plan the Future
> and not always get it constructed.

One of the reasons I was so quickly accepting of The Fourth Turning,
and its evident claim to predict the future is that since the 1970s
I've already been familiar with another technique for predicting the
future: technological forecasting. New inventions for things like
artificial light sources



or top speeds of aircraft bombers



or supercomputer performance



all follow predictable paths.

I've had almost 30 years to understand technological forecasting, and
I've always suspected that there must be some way to predict things
like politics or gender issues, but I could never put my finger on
it. S&H was like a revelation to me.

So I do think that these explorations do have something to tell us
about the future, and perhaps even a Whig can help us.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Mike,

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> That covers it, but it kind of ruins any predictive ability since
> you have a 50 year window during which a crisis war will happen.
> For example, you predict a crisis war between Palestine and
> Israel, but we could wait until 2047 for that war to happen.
> Predicting a major war sometime in the next 40 years is way
> different than predicting a war soon (which is what you imply on
> your site). How can you tell whether any conflict that develops
> there in the near future won't be like 1756 in America or 1775 in
> Britain?

Well first off, we always knew that the range was 70-90 years, so
there was a 20 year window. As a practical matter, there isn't much
difference between a 40 year window and a 20 year window.

There are several reasons that come together for the prediction that
we're close to a war in the Mideast:

• (*) These are (at least) three possible sites from which a war
  might be launched, along with the time since the end of the last
  crisis war: Palestine, 55 years, Kashmir, 57 years, Caucasus, 74
  years. Assume P(t) = 0.2, 0.3, and 0.8 respectively. Then the
  probability of a crisis war in at least one of these areas in the next
  year is (1 - .8*.7*.2) = (1 - .112) = .9, or 9 to 1. Those
  probabilities are just guesses, of course, but you can see that the
  combined probabilities for three sites quickly gets very high. And I
  believe that a crisis war in one of these three regions will spread to
  the others.
  http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...weblog#e040706
  http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...eblog#e040812b
  
• (*) That doesn't even count the probability of war in Taiwan or
  Korea or the Philippines or Malaysia. There are other sites too.
  It's quite likely that a war in any one of these regions will soon
  trigger wars in the others.
  http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...i.taiwan040706
  http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...ww2010.i.korea
  
• (*) A successful new major terrorist attack on American soil will
  cause the country to demand retribution. I can't predict what will
  happen, but there's a good chance that it will trigger a crisis war
  in one of the above regions.
  
• (*) The world is entering a new 1930s style depression. So far
  the Fed bubble has kept any real harm from happening, but when the
  bubble bursts because of a collapse of the China unraveling bubble,
  or a collapse of the worldwide real estate bubble, or terrorist
  attack on an oil facility that doubles oil prices, then any of the
  above locations will be even more likely to ignite into a crisis war.
  http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...ww2010.i.sep10
  http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...eblog#e040730b
  http://www.generationaldynamics.com/....oilpeak040803
  
• (*) The situation in Palestine with Yasser Arafat appears to me to
  be a classic case where a generational change (Arafat retiring or
  dying) could ignite a local war. This is a "gut call," but it's
  based on real poll results that show that Arabs are becoming
  increasingly furious at America and Israel. Also, let's not forget
  that Hamas has promised a major terrorist strike on Israel by the end
  of 2004.
  http://www.generationaldynamics.com/....i.zogby040726
  http://www.generationaldynamics.com/....i.hamas040321

By the way, did you see on my web site that Russia is increasing its
defense budget 40% next year? 40%!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...weblog#e040813

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

You still aren't getting it. S&H did the work to find out what fraction of the members of Congress and governors were born between 1860-1882 in a whole bunch of years. 1923 is the year in which the largest number of Congressmen and governors were born between 1860 and 1882, 83% of all of them. The average birth year for people born between 1860 and 1882 is roughly 1871. The average birth year for Congressmen and governors in 1923 will be about the same (1871), based on symmetry arguments I made previously. This makes the average age of Congressmen and governors in 1923 roughly 52. It has nothing to do with S&H's generational structure whatsoever.

I agree, your data points are individually acceptable. The difficulty I have is with your use of S&H's dates as a test of your theory. We both express significant doubts about their dates.

In reading through your posts, I think your model may actually be correct. There is a problem with the youth emergence theory that I will note below. First though, I must note that 18-year turnings seem to fit the historical really well for the United States and there is a good explanation for why turning rates were not very short in the early 1800s nor lengthening now. Apar can be presumed to have been increasing on par with Amax. The same technological structure that is increasing Amax requires substantially more educated people in order to create and maintain the capital structure. As a result, the average age at which a person begins work (in the pivotal fields that dominate our civilization) have been steadily increasing from about 18 to 22 or 23. Thus Apar has probably gone from 21 to 26 in the same time that Amax has gone from high 40s to 55. Turning length would thus fall in a consistent 18-20 year range over the whole period.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Side comment: Interestingly, the paradigmic Missionary generation is roughly 1873-1892, about what you have.

It is interesting. And it is good to see someone else providing evidence for my long-held position that Reconstruction was part of the Crisis. For some time I've had a hunch (without any real data) that turning structure had to be related to when people came of age. The youth emergence concept was a pretty good stab at that concept.

Here's the major problem with youth emergence, however. For the industrial era, political participation definitely occurs by the early 20s and considering the archetype imprint can't possibly occur before 4 years of age (not enough memory capacity) That 18 year turnings work pretty well -- 18+4=22. However, with aristocratic societies you get something closer to 26+4 = 30 year turnings. The presumption I have had is that due to the "clumped" nature of power and influence in such a society that a turning shift could happen slightly before the point of average resulting in turning lengths in the high 20s. That's a bit ad hoc, of course, but it isn't implausible.

The one major thinking shift required to accept your model is that one must dispense with the notion that gnerations are primarily imprinted by their childhood. The youth emergence model works because it assumes that generational imprinting occurs twice -- once around 5 years old to determine active/reactive behavior and again at the emergence age to determine the exact archetype. This allows for each archytpe to be born in a particular turning regardless of turning length but it has the implication that long cycle saecula do not have Prophet leaders during the Crisis. Instead, imprint occurs in the "emergence" turning. So Prophets are not created by Highs, they are created by Awakenings . . . and so forth. Thus, long cycles will still have Prophet leaders, but their birth years will fall in both the High and the Awakening.

Your model has some interesting implications -- one of which is that it would be difficult to have a two-part or six part cycle. I have one issue with the cycle your model presents -- what causes the social moments? In S&Hs model, my model and (to some extent) in GD -- the generation breaks occur right before a turning shift and thus children are affected by the change in parenting style triggered by the new turning which in turn, creates children who will cause or modify the next mood shift. In your model, it is possible to have a generation straddle two turnings and thus nurturing modes seem to be dropped from your model.

Perhaps you're right that a social moment is created by the generation that came of age during the last social moment. A similar pattern would explain alternating reactive generations. However, this doesn't explain the existence of alternating calms and storms in the first place. It seems you've solved one problem and created another. OTOH, maybe you have an explanation for alternating calms and storms.

BTW, as a check of your system I took the birth years of William of Orange and the Immortal Seven that petitioned him to sieze the throne. Their average birth year is 1644 -- which means the average conspirator against the King would have been an older teenager when the Restoration occurred and 44 years old (a plausible value for Amax) when the Glorious Revolution occurred. In other words the average one of them would be a late-wave Prophet. Individually: 4 Prophets (Osborne, Cavendish, Compton and Sidney), 3 early Nomads (William himself, Lumley and Russel) and one middle wave Nomad (Talbot). That's not a huge amount of data, but it does give a pleasing result.

Originally Posted by David Krein

Kurt - where are you getting your demographic data from? Do you have a source for your contention that life expectancy at 20 was 45 in Europe, and, if so, for what centuries? I am also curious about the source for your view that in aristocratic societies age ca. 27 was the age of inheritance. I checked my data and found something rather different. Of the 2584 men elected to the British House of Commons between 1832 and 1868 (this is pre-eminently Britain's political class), 239 were eldest sons of Peers. Eighteen died before their father's did leaving 221 who eventually inherited. The average age on succeeding to their father's titles and estates was a little over 41. They were all born between 1781 and 1845. Three of them were sons of Irish peers who could sit in Commons unless they were elevated to a U.K. peerage, so that three of the 221 inherited at age 8 and one, and most prominently Lord Palmerston, at age 16. If they are removed from the data set, the age of succession increases to 41.6. It could be that there is skewdness here because, with these four exceptions, their fathers were all still living when they reached their twenties (when is the age at which most of them were elected). Do you have a source that would demonstrate an earlier age of inheritance either then, or in previous periods?

I guessed at a late 20s average age of inheritance in fuedal societies based upon a general knowledge of history. As a point of confirmation, I looked at the age at which Kings of England took the throne and found the average age of succession ranged from about 25 in the Dark Ages to 27 in the late middle ages and early modern period. I haven't tried any other monarchies -- probably should.

With regard to your data, there are several issues. First, it's 19th century information. By that time life expectancy had begun to skyrocket. More important to the youth emergence model, however, is the small proportion of the Commons coming from a background of inherited title. By this point, the House of Commons was definitely a strong part of the English system of government and hereditary distinction was no longer significant in their political structure. I'm actually struck by how small the percentage is even at that early of a date.

With regard to life expectancy, I may be overestimating a bit. Life expectancy at 20 was 40 years in 1850 in the US (http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0005140.html). Roman life expectancy was at 20 was about 35 years during the Imperial period (http://www.utexas.edu/depts/classics...ents/Life.html). I can't find info about the American colonies but I recall a value of 40 years at 20 for the New England area and as low as 30 for the South. I figured 45 was a good stab at a value for the propertied class in modern Europe before mechanzed agriculture. The average of all people in early modern Europe was probably close to the New England value of 40.

My guess is that the poorest agricultural civilizations had a general life expectancy at 20 of about 30 years and the more wealthy ones up into the low 40s. The upper class would have 3 to 5 years more on average due to their better diets.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

My son and his friends, and my friends' children, are not drones. But they're the opposite of 60s youth, in the sense that 60s kids wanted to oppose their parents, and today's kids want to support their parents. This has been written about in many different places.

Leaving aside your other comments for now, I should address this one more time. Heroes are not the same as Prophets. I agree. But what's more important is that they're not the same as Nomads. When Prophets make a call to arms, the Nomad response is "whatever." The Hero response is "Where do I sign up?"

Regardless of Mike's characterization of the youth emergence concept as "romantic" -- my contention is not that the Heroes are "rebellious" it is that they are more enthusiastic than the apathetic Nomads that come before them.

John - the "15" was the rising of the Scots in support of James' II, James (the "Old Pretender" or the "King over the Waters" assiduously promoted on these threads by Mr. Saari and Seadog) in 1715 and marked significant Scottish opposition to George I and ghe Hanoverian succession. And the "45" was James' son Bonnie Prince Charlie's similar attempt 30 years later. The Stuart cause died hard (as did a number of prominent Scottish Lairds) in the Highlands.

Kurt - I gave a false impression, I fear, in giving aristocratic data for the Reformed House of Commons. I was presenting figures for eldest sons of peers. If I throw in younger sons of peers with their older brothers the number rises to 507. Further, there were 301 sons of Baronets, and additional 975 sons of the landed gentry (which would qualify as nobles in any other place than the U.K.). So that makes 1483 of 2584 who would probably meet your conception of "aristocratic". I could run the numbers for age of inheritence of the eldest sons of baronets if you wish, although my data base is not keyed that way. I don't have the data at hand (I am in the process of moving) but I think life expectancy of British aristocrats in this period was a little over 70. Assuming that they married in their late 20s and started having children right away (which is also in my data set, but again not keyed quite that way) which I think is a fair assumption, the 41 age of inheritance makes sense. Dad would have died in his early 70s and his son would have inherited in his early 40s.

Pax,

Dave Krein '42

John - sorr, the first sentence should have read "James II"s son, James".

Dave K.