Yet the euro continues to set new highs against the dollar. Why is that?Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis
Or if the Euro-Zone is in such bad shape, what does that say about us?
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Re: Tausch
Yet the euro continues to set new highs against the dollar. Why is that?
Or if the Euro-Zone is in such bad shape, what does that say about us?
Yes we did!
Re: Tausch
Dear Rick,
Your point is absolutely right. The dollar appears to be heading for
some sort of crash, quite possibly next year. Statements by Alan
Greenspan and other Fed Governors have become increasingly weird and
contradictory, which I consider to be a bad sign.
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...og0410#e041021
However, comparing the euro to the dollar is an America-centric view.
If you switch to a Europe-centric view of the euro, then things look
quite different.
My analysis of the a possible euro currency collapse
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...g0408#e040815b
(based on a Morgan Stanley report) is based on differences among
Euroland countries themselves. Some countries have been pursuing
"virtuous" budgetary policies, and others (France and Germany) have
not. Depending on how the ECB (European Central Bank) handles the
situation, these disparities will make it highly desirable for
disadvantaged countries to to revert to their national currencies.
I see the collapse of the euro, possibly as early as 2005, as the
first step in the road to a new European war. The EU, which issues
rules and opinions that reveal enormous levels of denial, will
attempt a number of compromises to prevent war. Once the euro
disintegrates, the next step will be the disintegration of the EU
itself. Once the great "clash of civilizations" world war is over,
the EU will revive itself with renewed vigor.
Sincerely,
John
John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
Re: Tausch
Who in Europe do you think will fight with whom?Dear Rick,
Your point is absolutely right. The dollar appears to be heading for
some sort of crash, quite possibly next year. Statements by Alan
Greenspan and other Fed Governors have become increasingly weird and
contradictory, which I consider to be a bad sign.
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...og0410#e041021
However, comparing the euro to the dollar is an America-centric view.
If you switch to a Europe-centric view of the euro, then things look
quite different.
My analysis of the a possible euro currency collapse
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...g0408#e040815b
(based on a Morgan Stanley report) is based on differences among
Euroland countries themselves. Some countries have been pursuing
"virtuous" budgetary policies, and others (France and Germany) have
not. Depending on how the ECB (European Central Bank) handles the
situation, these disparities will make it highly desirable for
disadvantaged countries to to revert to their national currencies.
I see the collapse of the euro, possibly as early as 2005, as the
first step in the road to a new European war. The EU, which issues
rules and opinions that reveal enormous levels of denial, will
attempt a number of compromises to prevent war. Once the euro
disintegrates, the next step will be the disintegration of the EU
itself. Once the great "clash of civilizations" world war is over,
the EU will revive itself with renewed vigor.
Americans have had enough of glitz and roar . . Foreboding has deepened, and spiritual currents have darkened . . .
THE FOURTH TURNING IS AT HAND.
See T4T, p. 253.
Re: Tausch
Dear Sean,
This is an interesting guessing game, and it would actually be fun if
there weren't so much at stake.
It's pretty certain that France and England will be at war with each
other. These two countries have been fighting crisis wars since 1066
-- since before that, actually -- and England siding with France in
World War II has to be considered a historical exception.
Next, it's seems pretty certain that Spain and France will be allies.
Spain was a Muslim country until the 1400s, and although the Muslims
were expelled, Spain has always been close to northern Africa. The
3/11 subway bombings seem to have congealed public opinion firmly
against England and America.
Germany seems to me to be leaning toward the West. I know from
personal experience spending time in Europe in the 70s that the French
really hate Americans and the Germans really like Americans, so my
expectation is that Germany will side with England and America. Pity
the plight of the poor east German Nazi who has to decide whether
he'd rather side with Jews or side with Muslims. It's a wrenching
Sophie's choice that will require years of therapy.
Italy appears to me to be moving toward the West, though I have far
less information. I wish I had a way to hire high school kids to go
into shopping centers in each country in Europe and ask questions and
get people's opinions. If I could do that, then I could probably
figure all this out pretty precisely.
So my guess is that the "axis" will be France and Spain, jumping to
Morocco and Algeria, across to Egypt and the Mideast.
Once you get into the Mideast, Israel is a tiny red dot in an
enormous ocean of Islam. As it has for millennia, Jerusalem will be
the center of the world war. Since it's the "clash of
civilizations," and since this is the world's last world war before
the Singularity, Jerusalem at the center is appropriate.
The Orthodox Christian eastern European countries will side with
Russia and the West.
Turkey is the interesting dilemma. Turkey is in a "generational
austerity" period, having just fought a crisis war from 1984 to 2000.
Under the generational model, this means that Turkey will make a
political decision, rather than an emotional/genocidal decision like
the countries of western Europe. It seems to me that Turkey could go
either way, but I have the feeling that Turkey will side with West,
which would probably make it the only Muslim country in the world to
do so.
There's a lot of speculation in the above scenario, of course, but as
the months go by and positions harden, the above feels more and more
right to me.
Sincerely,
John
John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
Mike Alexander and War Deaths
To: Mike Alexander
Dear Mike,
A long time ago you posted a graph of war deaths through time:
(The site csf.colorado.edu seems to have disappeared; have you moved
your web site elsewhere?)
The graph showed war death peaks in the 20th century to be ten times
as great as war death peaks in the 19th century.
It seemed to me that these results were not possible. The graph
shows gradual increases in war death peaks prior to 1900, and so a
sudden jump by a factor of 10 just didn't seem possible.
However, I've been thinking about this recently, and I now have a
theory as to why this is possible. I don't have the figures to back
this up, so this has to be counted as speculation.
The argument is as follows:
(*) The population has to grow at the same rate as the food supply
(roughly 0.96% per year)
(*) Therefore, assuming that the birth rate is relatively constant,
then the death rate must also be constant.
(*) Therefore, of the three major methods of death (war, famine and
disease), if one of them suddenly decreases, then the "slack" must be
taken up by the other methods.
(*) During the 1900s, the rate of death from disease fell
dramatically, as evidenced by the fact that the average lifespan went
from about 38 years to over 70 years.
(*) Therefore, the number of war deaths had to increase
substantially.
It's still hard to go from this reasoning to a war death increase of
a factor of 10. And this is what I mean when I say I don't have the
figures to back it up.
But suppose that in the 1800s, the percentage of deaths caused by
disease was 95%, and war deaths accounted for only 5%. (We'll ignore
famine for now.)
Suppose that the number of deaths caused by disease was cut almost in
half during the 1900s, so that disease accounted for only 50% of the
"required" number of deaths. Then war deaths would have to take up
the slack, or 50%, which would be a tenfold increase.
Does that make sense? Do you have the figures or any information
which might support that view?
Sincerely,
John
John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
I've been burned once before - by Ravi Batra in the late '80s - and I'm beginning to believe that I've been burned again, by a seemingly convincing argument in favor of historical cycles.
And I'm not just saying this now because Bush won; if he had won by a landslide I would have regarded 2004 as a realigning election (and Bush as our answer to Winston Churchill in the previous saeculum!) - but since the sectional fronts actually hardened from 2000 (because Bush lost in New Hampshire and won in New Mexico), absolutely nothing has changed from 2000, which everyone agrees was still part of 3T.
And if 4T hasn't started already, when will it ever start?
Which makes me think that now there may be no such things as turnings.
Well there's certainly nothing clockwork about it. I'm more a Generations fan than a 4T fan but do believe specific generational line ups make reactions to Big Events more intense. Nothing inevitable about it though.
But about this idea of a war between England and France. Mr. X, have you been over there recently? There's a nice tunnel under the channel. Thousands go back and forth all the time. No longer do 'the wogs begin at Calais," as some wag once said. Now, I know cycles are illustrative and all, but sometimes technological innovation and other linear stuff are far more important. I think war between St. Paul and Minneapolis is more likely.
Turnings
Dear Anthony,
You have to look beyond the electoral vote to understand turning
changes. On Tuesday, if a small percentage of voters had voted the
other way in Ohio, then the entire election would have gone the other
way. But a small change in the number of votes cannot possibly
dictate whether or not there's been a turning change.
The people on this forum seem to be split about 50-50 as to whether
we're in a 3T or a 4T, but count me as firmly in the 4T camp. I
became absolutely certain of it late in 2002 when we started locking
up Muslims just because they were Muslims. It's the first time we've
ever done anything like that since we locked up Japanese in World War
II.
I have a couple of things on my web site that might help. One is an
analysis of the ection results at
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...election041103
It's particularly significant to note that voters named "moral
values" as the most significant issue. Another article,
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...weblog#e041011
"It's going to be the 1950s all over again," shows how high-powered
young career women are deciding to stay in home in droves to take
care of the kids.
Another article, at
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/....sixties040501
describes America during its "generational awakening" in the 1960s,
and shows how its different from America today, but quite similar to
Iraq today, which is also in a "generational awakening" period.
The turning concept really is pretty well established, but you have
to separate out political passions, which is not easy to do since
people in this forum tend to mix them all the time.
Sincerely,
John
John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
France
You have to look at different possible scenarios. You're right that
Chirac isn't suddenly going to order his troops through the tunnel to
capture London in a replay of 1066, but there are other scenarios.
Actually, there was a time very briefly last year when I wondered if
England and France might go to war over Iraq. The scenario would have
been as follows: France was furious that England and America were
going after Saddam, so France might have sent 100 troops to Baghdad to
"protect" Saddam's palace. In that case, the coalition forces could
not have captured the palace without fighting the French troops.
That was a very unlikely scenario, but it shows the way how a war
with France could begin. I'm fairly certain that when a Mideast war
between Jews and Palestinians breaks out, France will side with the
Palestinians. That means that English and French troops will engage
each other in the Mideast and, since it's a generational crisis
period, the hostilities will expand to full-scale war between the two
countries. That's one of the more likely scenarios that will lead to
war.
As for the time frame, I've done some research in places and times
throughout history to measure the amount of time from the end of one
crisis war to the beginning of the next, and came up with the
following table:
Since it's been 60 years since the end of WW II, we're well into theCode:Fraction # years of total ------- -------- 0- 40 0% 41- 49 11% 50- 59 33% 60- 69 25% 70- 79 16% 80- 89 4% 90- 99 6% 100-117 5%
period when a new war can be expected any year now.
Sincerely,
John
John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
I agree.Well there's certainly nothing clockwork about it. I'm more a Generations fan than a 4T fan but do believe specific generational line ups make reactions to Big Events more intense. Nothing inevitable about it though.
But about this idea of a war between England and France. Mr. X, have you been over there recently? There's a nice tunnel under the channel. Thousands go back and forth all the time. No longer do 'the wogs begin at Calais," as some wag once said. Now, I know cycles are illustrative and all, but sometimes technological innovation and other linear stuff are far more important. I think war between St. Paul and Minneapolis is more likely.Wishful thinking for dramatic effect? (thou art a blogger, eh Mr X? :wink: ) The core EU members aren't going to war with each other - anymore than the US is "returning to the 1950's." Europe has learned it's lesson.
Anthony '58 II - as WJB implied in another thread - the "clock" seems to be keeping pretty good time. I don't think you'll have to wait much longer. Remember - the authors said middle oh-oh's or so.
Exactly. S&H in T4T called out 2005 "give or take a few years". To me, that implies a window of 2002-2008. My CCI suggests 2003-2006.
From there S&H talk about a "catalyst phase" (I prefer "cascade") that lasts one to five years. Even if the triggering spark waits to, say, 2007, and the cascade phase lasts, say, four years, we could wait until 2011 for a regeneracy at S&H would still be well within parameters.
But I don't think you'll have to wait that long. :shock:
Americans have had enough of glitz and roar . . Foreboding has deepened, and spiritual currents have darkened . . .
THE FOURTH TURNING IS AT HAND.
See T4T, p. 253.
For those of us who know what's up, waiting for T4T to manifest without a shadow of a doubt is something akin to watching a pot of water start to boil. :wink:Exactly. S&H in T4T called out 2005 "give or take a few years". To me, that implies a window of 2002-2008. My CCI suggests 2003-2006.
From there S&H talk about a "catalyst phase" (I prefer "cascade") that lasts one to five years. Even if the triggering spark waits to, say, 2007, and the cascade phase lasts, say, four years, we could wait until 2011 for a regeneracy at S&H would still be well within parameters.
But I don't think you'll have to wait that long. :shock:
How true! :lol:For those of us who know what's up, waiting for T4T to manifest without a shadow of a doubt is something akin to watching a pot of water start to boil. :wink:Exactly. S&H in T4T called out 2005 "give or take a few years". To me, that implies a window of 2002-2008. My CCI suggests 2003-2006.
From there S&H talk about a "catalyst phase" (I prefer "cascade") that lasts one to five years. Even if the triggering spark waits to, say, 2007, and the cascade phase lasts, say, four years, we could wait until 2011 for a regeneracy at S&H would still be well within parameters.
But I don't think you'll have to wait that long. :shock:
Americans have had enough of glitz and roar . . Foreboding has deepened, and spiritual currents have darkened . . .
THE FOURTH TURNING IS AT HAND.
See T4T, p. 253.
Ditto! And the ironic thing is that I, like Marc Lamb, have reasons of my own for wanting the 3T to continue for as long as possible. (Just not the same ones he would have.)How true! :lol:For those of us who know what's up, waiting for T4T to manifest without a shadow of a doubt is something akin to watching a pot of water start to boil. :wink:Exactly. S&H in T4T called out 2005 "give or take a few years". To me, that implies a window of 2002-2008. My CCI suggests 2003-2006.
From there S&H talk about a "catalyst phase" (I prefer "cascade") that lasts one to five years. Even if the triggering spark waits to, say, 2007, and the cascade phase lasts, say, four years, we could wait until 2011 for a regeneracy at S&H would still be well within parameters.
But I don't think you'll have to wait that long. :shock:
What are your reasons?? I don't give a darn about his.Ditto! And the ironic thing is that I, like Marc Lamb, have reasons of my own for wanting the 3T to continue for as long as possible. (Just not the same ones he would have.)How true! :lol:For those of us who know what's up, waiting for T4T to manifest without a shadow of a doubt is something akin to watching a pot of water start to boil. :wink:Exactly. S&H in T4T called out 2005 "give or take a few years". To me, that implies a window of 2002-2008. My CCI suggests 2003-2006.
From there S&H talk about a "catalyst phase" (I prefer "cascade") that lasts one to five years. Even if the triggering spark waits to, say, 2007, and the cascade phase lasts, say, four years, we could wait until 2011 for a regeneracy at S&H would still be well within parameters.
But I don't think you'll have to wait that long. :shock:
Americans have had enough of glitz and roar . . Foreboding has deepened, and spiritual currents have darkened . . .
THE FOURTH TURNING IS AT HAND.
See T4T, p. 253.
Re: Mike Alexander and War Deaths
I don't see why you have a problem with this. WW I and WW II were the largest wars in history. Here is a battle website.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_battles_1801-1900
The biggest war before WW I was the Napoleonic wars and the biggest battle in that war was the Battle of Leipzig (1813). The site has this to say:
In total, the French had around 190,000 soldiers and the Allies almost 330,000 with both sides having significant artillery, so there were about 520,000 troops involved in this biggest of the Napoleonic battles. Casualties are estimated at 80-110 thousand.
The Somme was one of the biggest battles of WW I, with over 100 divisions fielded and more than a million casualties.
The database I use gives total war dead of 16 million for the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815) as compared to 58 million for WW I. The total war dead ratio is less than 4:1, but the former was spread over a longer period of time making the causalty rate about 10:1 as you point out. As the battle casualties comparisons show the intensity of the WW I relative to Napoleonic wars was around 10:1.
By the early 20th century the technology of mass killing reached a level where war could give disease a run for its money as a leading killer. This trend culminated with the development of nukes which created the potential for a real-life Armageddon.
Re: Mike Alexander and War Deaths
Dear Mike,
First let me explain why I have a such a problem with this.
In nature you have different kinds of trends. Here's an exponential
growth trend (time increases downward):
Next, here's an exponential decay trend line:Code:** *** ***** ******** ************** ************************ **************************************** ******************************************************************
Here's a linear trend line:Code:************************************************************ **************************************** ************************** ****************** ************ ******** ***** *** ** *
Finally, here's a sinusoidal trend line (some lemmings and voles haveCode:** *** **** ***** ****** ******* ******** *********
populations that follow this trend):
Now, you've presented me with a battle death trend line that's quiteCode:****************************** ******************************************** ************************************************** ******************************************** ****************************** *************** ********** *************** ***************************** ******************************************** ************************************************** ******************************************** ****************************** *************** ********** ***************
different from any of the above:
Now all of the previous examples are trend lines that occur inCode:*** *** **** **********************************************
nature, but the last does not occur in nature.
Can you tell me any other example in nature that exhibits a trend line
that looks like this? I doubt that you can, because this kind of
trend does not occur in nature.
That's why I've had such a problem with your battle deaths example.
The battle death trend line you've presented appears to be impossible
because it never appears in nature. That's why I said the data trend
line is impossible.
At the very least, the battle deaths trend line has to be explained.
If it's going to be used, some reason has to be explained to show
that there's an extraordinary statistical anomaly that gives rise to
this trend line.
The reason I posted my message last week is because it suddenly
occurred to me that there is indeed an extraordinary statistical
anomaly that explains it.
Before getting to it, let me discuss why "ordinary" explanations are
not sufficient.
First, you talk about the "technology of mass killing." What
technology are you talk about? The only technology you mention is
nuclear weapons, but that can't explain WW I. I did some googling,
and all I could find was a web site that says the new "technology" of
WW I was digging trenches. Now forgive me, but I don't think that
trenches account for a tenfold increase in battle deaths.
Even so, technology could not account for the trend line you've
presented. Technology could provide a small perturbation in the
trend, but not anything like a factor of 10.
The explanation you've given comparing the Napoleonic Wars to WW I is
compelling, but even the 4:1 ratio is hard to explain. Furthermore,
that's only two data points, and the problem is the entire trend
line.
So now let me explain what I believe is the extraordinary statistical
anomaly.
Consider this equation (ignoring deaths from famine):
> Total-deaths(T) = battle-deaths(T) + disease-deaths(T)
When you see an equation like this, it usually means that
battle-deaths grow exponentially as a function of time T,
disease-deaths grow exponentially, and so total-deaths also increase
exponentially, with the value of total-deaths dominated by whichever
of the two components that exhibit superior growth.
However, that's not the case here. What's going on in this equation
is very different. The total-deaths value is, for all practical
purposes constant. (Actually, it grows very slowly, but for
simplicity, we'll assume that it's constant.) The total-deaths value
is essentially determined by the amount of food available.
Since the total-deaths is (essentially) constant, and the two
components add up to it, then if one component goes down, the other
must go up, and vice-versa.
So now let's graph the situation:
where D represents disase-deaths and B represents battle-deaths.Code:DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD B DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD B DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD BB DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD BBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
This shows what might have happened. A relatively realistic
perturbation in the number of deaths from disease could cause a large
perturbation in the number of battle deaths.
That's the extraordinary statistical anomaly that makes the
battle-death trend a possibility. Battle-deaths is not an
independent variable; it depends on disease deaths, and a small
change in disease deaths can cause a large change in battle deaths.
Now, I don't have the figures to back this up, which is what I was
asking about in my last posting, but I note that your figures provide
some support for this. You talk about the Battle of Somme, which had
1 million battle deaths. From the web page you referenced, I see
that a total of 130.5 divisions participated, which I gather was
around 2 million men.
Now where did 2 million men come from? How come they were available?
Answer: Because they had survived childhood diseases.
In other words, the number of battle deaths in WW I was caused not by
technology but by availability, and the availability was caused by
reduction in disease, especially among babies and children.
So that's the explanation. It's an extraordinary statistical
anomaly, and it explains why the battle death trend you presented
could be correct, even though such a trend line would normally never
appear in nature.
Sincerely,
John
John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
A new crisis war in 2005?
Dear Sean,
It's recently occurred to me that I may have enough data to be able
to make an estimate of the probability of America beginning a new
crisis war in 2005.
I start with the research in over 100 places and times throughout
history to measure the amount of time from the end of one crisis war
to the beginning of the next, and came up with the following table:
I took the data that went into this table, I did some smoothing andCode:Fraction # years of total ------- -------- 0- 40 0% 41- 49 11% 50- 59 33% 60- 69 25% 70- 79 16% 80- 89 4% 90- 99 6% 100-117 5%
made some computations involving conditional probabilities, and came
up with this:
Probability of new crisis war in a given year
If you know the number of years since the end of the preceding crisis
war, then the following table gives the probability of a new crisis
war beginning in that year:
(If the above table doesn't appear right, then try widening yourCode:|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------| | Yr| +0 | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | +6 | +7 | +8 | +9 | |---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------| | 40| 0.00%| 0.11%| 0.23%| 0.34%| 0.46%| 0.58%| 0.70%| 0.85%| 0.99%| 1.15%| | 50| 1.31%| 1.47%| 1.68%| 1.90%| 2.13%| 2.37%| 2.83%| 3.33%| 4.31%| 4.31%| | 60| 4.32%| 4.32%| 4.32%| 4.32%| 4.33%| 4.33%| 4.33%| 4.33%| 4.34%| 4.34%| | 70| 4.34%| 4.34%| 4.35%| 4.35%| 4.35%| 4.35%| 4.36%| 4.36%| 4.36%| 4.36%| | 80| 4.37%| 4.37%| 4.37%| 4.37%| 4.38%| 4.38%| 4.38%| 4.39%| 4.39%| 4.39%| | 90| 4.39%| 4.40%| 4.53%| 4.68%| 4.84%| 5.01%| 5.20%| 5.41%| 5.63%| 5.87%| |100| 6.14%| 6.44%| 6.77%| 7.14%| 7.56%| 8.04%| 8.60%| 9.24%|10.00%|10.91%| |110|12.02%|13.40%|15.18%|17.54%|20.85%|25.00%|25.00%|25.00%|25.00%|25.00%| |---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
browser window.)
Thus, America's last crisis war ended in 1945, which is 60 years ago,
so the probability of a new crisis war beginning in 2005 is 4.32%.
Merging timelines
However, I think that it's more complicated than that. We're in a
period of merging timelines. Consider the following regions:
(*) America / Western Europe / Japan / Pacific
(*) Palestine / Israel
(*) India / Pakistan
(*) Russia / Caucasus
(*) China / Taiwan
(*) North / South Korea
For each of these regions, the previous crisis war was an independent
war on its own timeline.
Today we believe that all of these separate crisis wars will merge
into a single "clash of civilizations" world war.
So, it's now appropriate to ask: What's the probability that at
least one of these regions will have a crisis war in 2005?
For that, we need to compute the probability P of a crisis war
beginning in 2005 for each region separately, where Y is the year of
the last crisis war:
(*) America / Western Europe / Japan / Pacific, Y=1945, P=4.32%
(*) Palestine / Israel, Y=1949, P=2.83%
(*) India / Pakistan, Y=1945, P=4.32%
(*) Russia / Caucasus, Y=1928, P=4.36%
(*) China / Taiwan, Y=1949, P=2.83%
(*) North / South Korea, Y=1946, P=4.31%
Probability of a crisis war in 2005 in at least one of the
above regions is:
1 - (1-.0432)*(1-.0283)*(1-.0432)*(1-.0436)*(1-.0283)*(1-.0431)
= .2089 = 20.89% ;
So, according to this calculation, the probability of a new crisis
war in at least one of these regions in 2005 is about 21%, or a
little more than 1 in 5. If it doesn't happen in 2005, then the
probability in 2006 will be a little bit more, still around 21%.
International situation in 2005
However, this 21% result assumes you know nothing else about the
countries involved, other than the one fact - how long it's been
since the last crisis war. My personal feeling is that the
international situation has deteriorated significantly just in the
last year, and the probability of a major crisis in 2005 is
definitely higher in 2005 than it was in 2004. I note in particular
the following:
(*) The Presidential election is over, and many plans that were put
on hold around the world are now going full steam.
(*) Yasser Arafat has died, and I've long predicted that his
disappearance would be the most likely trigger to a Palestinian
crisis, within a year or two after his disappearance.
(*) The conflict between Iran and Israel is escalating significantly.
(*) Russian President Vladimir Putin is taking on some
near-dictatorial powers, following numerous terrorist acts in the
Caucasus, including the assassination of Chechen President Akhmad
Kadyrov, a dual airplane bombing, and the school massacre at Beslan.
(*) Increasing ethnic violence in China, and increasingly active
moves towards independence in Taiwan, leading to actual threats of
war from Beijing.
(*) The 3/11 subway bombing in Spain is polarizing Europe; and now
Holland seems to be almost unbelievably melting down after the murder
of a Dutch author by a Muslim terrorist.
(*) Before 2004, the last generational crisis wars were in the
Balkans and Rwanda, ten years ago. But 2004 saw a new crisis war,
the Darfur genocide. And in the last few weeks, violence between
Catholics and Muslims in C?te d'Ivoire has gotten so bad that it
appears very close to becoming the world's second current crisis war.
If C?te d'Ivoire turns into another crisis war, it will pull France
in.
(*) Financial: US public debt has substantially increased to
historically astronomically highs; Europe's and Japan's economies
suffered sharp slowdowns in the last few months; China's unraveling
bubble seems very close to bursting, especially since China itself is
trying to cool its economy down. A recession next year is almost
certain, and it may trigger a major financial crisis.
If I had produced a list like this at the end of 2003, the list would
have been shorter, with fewer specific items. That's why I say that
things have gotten significantly worse in the last year.
Here's what we may be looking at: The crisis wars in Darfur and
(possibly) C?te d'Ivoire may mean that we'll see a new crisis war
every few months, until one triggers a larger war; a recession in
2005 may trigger a crisis war somewhere, or it may trigger an
international financial crisis.
If "nothing happens" in 2005, then my expectation is that the above
list (with the exception of the first item) will only get longer for
2006.
Sincerely,
John
John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
Re: Mike Alexander and War Deaths
Enzyme induction. Ionized fatty acids as pH rises.
Machine guns, posion gas, high explosives, improved artilliary are all major increases in the deadliness of weapons. Trench warfare was a response to the deadliness of such weaponry. No longer could armies meet in a field and fight it out. Whichever army got their weaponry set up first would simply destroy any force which came against them.First, you talk about the "technology of mass killing." What
technology are you talk about? The only technology you mention is
nuclear weapons, but that can't explain WW I. I did some googling,
and all I could find was a web site that says the new "technology" of
WW I was digging trenches. Now forgive me, but I don't think that
trenches account for a tenfold increase in battle deaths.
The second even bigger factor was the size of armies was much bigger. In WW I the allies mobilized over 40 million men. The Central Powers mobilized more than 25 million men. Compare to approximately two million mobilized by Napoleon.
Prior to the twentieth century it was economically impossible to field the sort of mass armies that fought in the world wars.
Re: Mike Alexander and War Deaths
Dear Mike,
OK, I'm not familiar with these, so I take your word for it.
Well OK, but my point with technology was that there was new
technology in previous centuries as well.
Now this is closer to my point. 65 million men in WW I versus 2
million for Napoleon. There were ten times as battles deaths because
there were 30 times as many men available.
Why were so many more men available in WW I? You say economics, but
for the same reasons as for technology, I don't see that explaining a
ten-fold jump.
But I do see reduced disease as an explanation. 65 million men were
available because they didn't die in childhood. And the
extraordinary statistical anomaly that I described in yesterday's
posting explains how a small perturbation in the number of deaths from
disease can have a multiplier effect on the number of battle deaths.
At any rate, if you care, if it makes a difference, for what it's
worth, I now believe that your battle death trend line is credible,
where I didn't before, which is what I wanted to tell you, which is
why I posted my message last week.
Sincerely,
John
John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
Re: Mike Alexander and War Deaths
The causualty graph is adjusted for population so the reason for more men available isn't because there were more men available. The reason was because a larger fraction of the men available could go to war--fewer were needed to raise food. In the 18th century only a small percentage of men could take part in war, the vast majority had to stay on the farm. By the early20th century only a minority of men were required to be on the farm and there were vast quantities of draftable manpower.
Re: Mike Alexander and War Deaths
Dear Mike,
This explanation gets back to the reason that I believed in the first
place that the casualty figures were impossible.
If this were the explanation, then the graph would show a steady
increase over the centuries, not a fairly small, steady growth for
centuries, and then a sudden explosive growth by a factor of 10.
Despite enzyme induction and ionized fatty acids, such things do not
occur in nature or, if they do, then an exceptional explanation has
to be provided.
Now, if we accept your explanation, then we need to understand why
the number of people required on the farm didn't grow more rapidly in
the 1500s through 1800s? Weren't there plenty of agricultural
innovations during those centuries?
Wouldn't Emperor Napoleon have required every able-bodied man to join
the army? Wouldn't he have levied all the taxes necessary to feed
them? Why would he have been less successful -- by a factor of 30!
-- in conscripting men for his army than the French did in World War
I?
As I've said, you can't use any standard technology or economics
analysis to justify the tenfold explosion in battle casualties. You
need an extraordinary explanation why only 2 million fought in the
Napoleonic wars, when 65 million men fought in WW I -- a 30-fold
increase in army size, resulting in ten times the casualties.
Still, you raise an additional point that has to be addressed. If we
take the benchmark figure that I've been using -- that food
availability grows by .96% per year -- and we assume that the
population must grow at the same rate as food availability, then the
population should have grown 1.0096^100 = 2.6 times in a century. So
2 million people should have become 5.2 million, not 65 million. (I
realize we're discussing different sized regions here, but factors of
10 and 30 give us a great deal of latitude to make simplifications.)
So how could there be so many more soldiers? The disease explanation
has to be modified to emphasize that most of the decrease in deaths
due to disease was due to reduced deaths in childhood. That would
create a "youth bulge" of soldiers available to fight in a new war.
That's the only explanation that makes sense.
P.S.: The phrase "youth bulge" is used by Huntington in his book
The Clash of Civilizations to describe what's happening in all
the Muslim countries. Possibly the youth bulge that's occurring in
Muslim countries today is the same sort of thing that happened in
Western countries early in the 20th century.
Sincerely,
John
John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
Trade Deficit
Sharp increase in trade deficit surprises economists
Mainstream economists had expected the trade deficit to level off,
and were surprised by the sharp 7.7% increase in November to $60.3
billion, announced yesterday.
(Monthly trade deficit, 2002-present. Source: WSJ)
As you can see from the above graph, the monthly trade deficit
rose substantially in 2002 through early 2004, but then appeared to
be leveling off for several months, until the November up-spike.
On my web site, I've emphasized long term structural fundamentals
in the economy, such as astronomically high public debt, and
astronomically high stock valuations.
Mainstream economists downplay the importance of these problems
because they consider the economy to be "self-correcting." In the
case of the trade deficit, this should work as follows:
- The high trade deficit causes the dollar to weaken, and other
currencies to become stronger. This in fact has happened, as the
value of the dollar against the euro has gone from 92 cents per euro
just a few years ago to $1.32 per euro today.- If the dollar weakens, then European goods sold in America become
more expensive, and American goods sold in Europe become cheaper.- Therefore, Europeans import and purchase more American goods,
because they're cheaper, and Americans import and purchase fewer
European goods, because they're more expensive.- Therefore, the trade deficit decreases, and the problem has
corrected itself.
But this hasn't been working in today's economy. With the dollar
falling so precipitously in the last few years, the trade deficit
should be falling as well; instead, the above graph makes it clear
that it's increasing. The only we can't tell for sure is whether the
increase is linear or exponential, but either way it means the
economy is not correcting himself.
From the point of view of Generational Dynamics, here's what's going
on: During the 1930s Great Depression, most old businesses went
bankrupt, and every new business was "lean and mean," with every
employee required to pull his full weight.
In the intervening 70 years, these businesses have all been getting
calcified with bureaucracies, older employees who are waiting around
for retirement, middle aged employees whose job skills are obsolete,
or whole departments or divisions producing products and services
that people no longer want. Therefore, the average American business
today is producing too many overpriced products that nobody really
wants. The same calcification process has also happened with
government agencies, universities, and all other organizations.
So the economy will "correct itself," but will do so by a major
adjustment like the crash of 1929. This will force all the existing
businesses into bankruptcy, and the cycle will repeat with the
creation of new "lean and mean" businesses. Unfortunately, the side
effects of massive homelessness and even starvation will also occur.
As I say all the time, Generational Dynamics tells us what our final
destination is, but doesn't tell us how we'll get there, so we can
only guess at the scenario. We know that we're headed for a major
stock market collapse that will cause the stock market to lose 50-75%
of its value, possibly in a single day. We don't know what will
trigger that event, and we don't know whether the trigger will come
tomorrow, next month, next year, or in a couple of years. We just
know it's coming.
Since we don't know when it's coming, we have to be on guard every
day. It's possible that this trade deficit surprise will cause the
rapid adjustment, as international investors and foreign banks
frantically race with each other to pull out of the stock market. I
just want my friends to know that both the economy and the world
security situation is much worse today than it was a year ago,
and that unless things start to settle down again, you should be very
wary.
Sincerely,
John
John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
Re: Trade Deficit
John,
Sharp increase in trade deficit surprises economists
Mainstream economists had expected the trade deficit to level off,
and were surprised by the sharp 7.7% increase in November to $60.3
billion, announced yesterday.
(Monthly trade deficit, 2002-present. Source: WSJ)
As you can see from the above graph, the monthly trade deficit
rose substantially in 2002 through early 2004, but then appeared to
be leveling off for several months, until the November up-spike.
On my web site, I've emphasized long term structural fundamentals
in the economy, such as astronomically high public debt, and
astronomically high stock valuations.
Mainstream economists downplay the importance of these problems
because they consider the economy to be "self-correcting." In the
case of the trade deficit, this should work as follows:
- The high trade deficit causes the dollar to weaken, and other
currencies to become stronger. This in fact has happened, as the
value of the dollar against the euro has gone from 92 cents per euro
just a few years ago to $1.32 per euro today.- If the dollar weakens, then European goods sold in America become
more expensive, and American goods sold in Europe become cheaper.- Therefore, Europeans import and purchase more American goods,
because they're cheaper, and Americans import and purchase fewer
European goods, because they're more expensive.- Therefore, the trade deficit decreases, and the problem has
corrected itself.
But this hasn't been working in today's economy. With the dollar
falling so precipitously in the last few years, the trade deficit
should be falling as well; instead, the above graph makes it clear
that it's increasing. The only we can't tell for sure is whether the
increase is linear or exponential, but either way it means the
economy is not correcting himself.
From the point of view of Generational Dynamics, here's what's going
on: During the 1930s Great Depression, most old businesses went
bankrupt, and every new business was "lean and mean," with every
employee required to pull his full weight.
In the intervening 70 years, these businesses have all been getting
calcified with bureaucracies, older employees who are waiting around
for retirement, middle aged employees whose job skills are obsolete,
or whole departments or divisions producing products and services
that people no longer want. Therefore, the average American business
today is producing too many overpriced products that nobody really
wants. The same calcification process has also happened with
government agencies, universities, and all other organizations.
So the economy will "correct itself," but will do so by a major
adjustment like the crash of 1929. This will force all the existing
businesses into bankruptcy, and the cycle will repeat with the
creation of new "lean and mean" businesses. Unfortunately, the side
effects of massive homelessness and even starvation will also occur.
As I say all the time, Generational Dynamics tells us what our final
destination is, but doesn't tell us how we'll get there, so we can
only guess at the scenario. We know that we're headed for a major
stock market collapse that will cause the stock market to lose 50-75%
of its value, possibly in a single day. We don't know what will
trigger that event, and we don't know whether the trigger will come
tomorrow, next month, next year, or in a couple of years. We just
know it's coming.
Since we don't know when it's coming, we have to be on guard every
day. It's possible that this trade deficit surprise will cause the
rapid adjustment, as international investors and foreign banks
frantically race with each other to pull out of the stock market. I
just want my friends to know that both the economy and the world
security situation is much worse today than it was a year ago,
and that unless things start to settle down again, you should be very
wary.
Sincerely,
John
John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
Could you add more into your analysis about China, esp. the currency peg, and how that's affecting things in your view?
Americans have had enough of glitz and roar . . Foreboding has deepened, and spiritual currents have darkened . . .
THE FOURTH TURNING IS AT HAND.
See T4T, p. 253.
Would this imply then that this:
(Monthly trade deficit, 2002-present. Source: WSJ)
relates to this?
If so, this would mean that we are withdrawing our home equity and sending it overseas. Not a bad place to send our children's inheritance.
--Croakmore
