Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

First, let me dispose of a couple of things. The mechanistic triggers that you talk about are certainly not part of my model.

No they are not. What I wrote was my conception of how your model works.

So a threshold defined by the number of veterans (or Artists) remaining from the previous war is not something that I would agree would be the sole basis for crisis wars.

Do you have a revised mechanism?

As for whether wars occur at "random" times, I can't really say.

I just used Ockham's razor here. In the absence of a specific reason to believe that the incidence of wars (all types) follows a pattern, I assume they do not.

I'm also generally nervous about relating non-crisis and crisis wars to each other in any significant way, since they're so different.

How so, don't they share the commonality of being wars?

The extent to which the two can be exchanged based on a
"threshold" of some kind is far from clear. I consider crisis wars
and non-crisis wars to be so different from one another that little
meaningful comparison can be made.

So you have completely abandoned the idea that another crisis war cannot follow closely after another because too many are left who remember the first one?

My idea was that a genocidal crisis war kills enough people and uses up enough resources that it takes several decades to replenish the society's resources to the point where another crisis war is possible. The "point of minimum replenishment" appears to be 45-50 years after the end of the previous crisis war.

This replenishment mechanism would call for at most a 25 year spacing (time to raise another batch of soldiers--see WW I to WW II spacing). Besides didn't you already note that mass casualties are NOT an determinant of crisis wars. After all WW I wiped out a generation of Frenchman yet was not a crisis war for the French, while the Franco Prussian War and WW II had comparatively few French casualties, yet were crisis wars for the French.

That's the question I would ask of you, and of anyone else who cares to answer: What was different in the American public in the 1950s
from the 1940s, and how do I characterize it in the GD model?

This is a serious issue with GD. Why a war is a crisis war or a non-crisis war is pretty central to GD, or at least it used to be.

In fact, what I really want is an explanation of this table, which
I've posted many times before:

Code:

    LENGTH OF INTER-CRISIS PERIOD
             Fraction
    # years  of total
    -------  --------
      0- 40      0%
     41- 49     11%
     50- 59     33%
     60- 69     25%
     70- 79     16%
     80- 89      4%
     90- 99      6%
    100-117      5%

Why is it that a new crisis war NEVER occurs less than 41 years after
the end of the previous one, and RARELY occurs less than 50 years
after?

Is explanation of data like this the purpose of a theory? I cannot explain it because I don't follow the GD paradigm, largely because I cannot reconcile my understanding of it (which you now point out is incorrect) with these spacing.

The spacing of crisis wars determines the "saeculum" length according to GD. With the S&H saeculum one obtains the analogous lengths from the spacing of like turnings. Using the S&H dates back to 1435 and the McGuiness ones back to 1147 a distribution of lengths can be obtained like what you show here:

64-74y 9%
75-84y 13%
84-99y 28%
100-11 50%

The distribution is actually bimodal, with one cluster centered at 72 years with a 7-year SD and another clustered at 102 years, also with a 7-year SD.

I could never reconcile the S&H mechanism with this set of lengths, which is why I have always maintained that the S&H model or mechanism is incorrect, even though I believe the saeculum exists. Recently I have begun a determined effort to come up with a mechanism that works, fits the lengths and for which I can identify supporting evidence.

The first order of business was to understand exactly how the S&H mechanism works. I found I didn't really understand it in the past (S&H didn't make it very clear).

Dear Bob,

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

> Hmm... Part of it might be a supposed human trait called 'reason.'
> Being smart is helpful to the species over all. Among other
> things, one can judge on a case by case basis whether crisis war
> makes sense at a given time.

Yes, but reason applies to all four turnings. Why does reason yield
different results in 1T than in 4T? And why did it have to turn out
that way?

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

> While others might think your diagram too complex, I'm thinking
> your approach is too simple. There are lots of people who make
> sense of history without reference to cycles, without a belief
> that crisis wars are inevitable and periodic. They can find
> reasons for war without reference to anything periodic. The
> reasons they find are at least as valid and real as the cyclical
> attractors we cycle nuts play with. I'm not willing to fully
> commit to either camp. I will neither reject cycles out of hand,
> nor ignore traditional methods of historical analysis.

Here's the diagram you're referring to:



This diagram is what it is, neither more nor less. All it is is a
graphic depiction of a bunch of wars for a couple of centuries for a
few countries. It shows the relationships of different countries
during the wars, and it shows that there are regular crisis wars.

Now if I had time (anyone out there want to fund me?), I would expand
this diagram into a graphical computer application as the front end
of a "world model" database containing detailed information about the
countries in the world for at least 200 years, and for centuries more
where the data is available. You click on a country and it shows the
country's timeline. You click on a war and it shows the participants
and the lead-ins and aftereffects. You right-click, and it displays
the details of the war.

You click on a saeculum, and it displays the four turnings. You
click on a turning and it displays the details. You click on a
generation and it shows the relationships between people of that
generation and the major events of the country.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

> Just as a reality check, does anyone see the North Korean invasion
> of South Korea being a comparable threat to the United States when
> compared to the German invasion of Poland, France, Belgium, the
> Netherlands and anyone else in reach? The American elites had
> bought into the Domino Theory with respect to Korea and Vietnam.
> The general populace might have been less enthused with dominos.
> How much is this lack of enthusiasm the result of a recent crisis
> war, and how much is it the result of very valid perceptions of
> how serious the situations were?

I understand your point, but it doesn't really contradict mine.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

> Looking at Europe, there is generally one country arrogant in its
> self perception of military supremacy. Let's start with Spain at
> the time of the Armada, go north to France of Louis XIVth and
> Napoleon, then to the Germany of Bismarck and Hitler. These days,
> the arrogant superpower with the oversized military thinking it
> can win a war wherever and whenever it likes (maybe two if both
> are small) is the United States.

> Is this a requirement for crisis war? There has to be an
> aggressive nation seeking glory, wealth, or expansion of its
> culture? After World War II ruined Europe with the threat of
> nuclear destruction added on top, might this possibly reduce the
> number of aggressive regional powers to zero? Might the nature of
> conflict -- and thus its periodicity -- be changed?

I understand your political point, but in direct answer to your
question, no it's not a requirement for a crisis war. For example,
the Hutus had none of those capabilities when they killed close to a
million Tutsis in 1994.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

> I don't see linear and cyclical history being mutually exclusive.
> Both spot trends. Seeing one trend does not invalidate all other
> trends. An obsession with any one trend without considering other
> equally valid factors doesn't necessarily lead to good history.

> You might want to list everything needed for a crisis war. An
> intact population of potential soldiers, a healthy economy, a
> warrior culture, and a perception that something important might
> be either defended or gained come to mind.

I think this is a great concept, and a great subject for analysis,
and it would lead to a lot of insight, and a lot of valuable data.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

> In different times and places, there might be different limiting
> factors. In North America, I think S&H have it right. The minor
> wars were wars to acquire more territory and resources. The major
> wars transformed the country, were wars of ideology. In Europe,
> the limiting factor might have been economics. There were more
> major powers close together. When they could afford to fight, they
> did. There was more of a war culture. Before the machine gun, war
> was cost effective, at least for the winners. There was always at
> least one state that thought the next fight would bring glory,
> wealth, honor, etc...

> If this is the case, if the limiting factors saying a big war
> cannot be fought yet are different in different times and places,
> one shouldn't really expect lessons learned in Europe to fit well
> in North America or vice versa. One might have to look at any
> number of limiting factors. The slowest one in a given time and
> place might determing the cycle length.

I think this is a valuable way to look at it, and a valuable thing to
study. But as you may suspect, I'm about the most pessimistic person
you know, and I'm as gloomy as any ten other people put together, and
I don't think that human beings learn lessons. Or if they do, they
just forget them as soon as the generation that learned them dies.

I consider George Santayana's famous remark to be a bitter joke. He
said, "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat
it." But the joke is that people never remember the past because they
can't, and they're always condemned to repeat it.

So, by all means, be a Pollyanna and go ahead and believe there's
hope, but I'm just not there.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

> I don't think you can dismiss the evolution of values. To me, the
> recent string of Anglo American crisis wars is about assimilating
> the effects of technology upon culture. In the Agricultural Age,
> it took most of the population just to produce food, while muscle
> powered weapons were expensive and required intense training for
> effective use. In the Industrial Age, agricultural surpluses and
> cheap easy to use weapons produced citizen armies, which in turn
> tore apart class distinctions. The Anglo American Crisis Wars are
> about absorbing these changes, about wealth moving from the land
> to the factories, and citizen armies believing in Rights giving
> ruling elites pause.

I think values are important, but there's another side -- values in
conducting a war. Was it moral to send tens of thousands of young
Americans to their deaths on Normandy Beach? Was it moral to
firebomb Dresden and Tokyo, and use nuclear weapons? I think it was,
but those questions end up being the ones we end up having to deal
with in any crisis war.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

> Which doesn't fit neatly into data points that easily submit to
> statistical or mathematic methods. These are linear progress
> trends, more than a little ephemeral, not easy to transform into
> numbers, but if one just ignores them, one is not getting the true
> cause of all the conflict.

> And, again, I am not confident that trends true with agricultural
> economies with tiny warrior class armies will necessarily hold in
> industrial societies with huge citizen armies.

> Anyway, if some think your 'Rube Goldburg' diagram unnecessarily
> complex, don't you absolutely need someone coming from the other
> side saying how much was left out? Smile

I agree with you again, and in both my books I've tried to integrate
cyclic trends with growth trends, the latter including financial,
agricultural and technological. So much to do, so little time.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear David,

Originally Posted by Marx & Lennon

> This is a question best asked of someone that has been through the
> process. All the regulars here are too young. If I had to venture
> a guess, it's a bit of what Kiff alluded to: war weariness, with
> an equally large dose of personal appreciation of what wars at
> that scale really mean. Until the direct participants, their
> spouses and friends are marginalized, they will try their best to
> avoid a repeat perfomance. I know I would.

> Just add-up the numbers, and you get the separation you would
> expect. I would expect these wars to move further apart in time,
> as the age of public disengagement moves further into the elder
> years, and these vital elders continue to apply the brakes. It's
> also possible that the horror of it all fades with time, even for
> the participants. If we could come back in two centuries, we would
> know for sure.

Actually living through the last few years has provided us all with an
incredible appreciation of what happens during this kind of crisis --
the roller coaster changes in national mood, the anxiety, the
stagnation, the desire for retribution. It would be very valuable to
be able to get into a time machine and go back and live just one day
in each of the last six decades, just to feel what was really going
on at those times.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Richard,

Originally Posted by Croakmore

> Here we go again, John. Now you're saying "the Prophets drive the
> cycle." Earlier you said "the TIMING of the Prophets drives the
> cycle." Which is it? If yours is a dynamical model, as you claim,
> then what do you mean exactly by "drive"? The key dynamics of
> your "dynamical" model still elude me.

When I referred to the prophets driving the cycle, I was just
reflecting back on what Jeff said, and I qualified the statement in a
couple of ways. But you know that. Your standards seem to go down
on a daily basis.

Originally Posted by Croakmore

> Please direct me the precise location in your book that specifies
> the operative principles and assumptions of your argument so I can
> at least find comfort there. I'll go read them. But, frankly, I
> don't want to read the arbitrary details of a theory that claims
> to be "mathematical" by being "statistical" without explaining how
> this comes about. How am I insulting you by merely asking for
> these clarifications?

I've only written two books, and the second one isn't complete yet.
When I do more I'll let you know. But even if I'd written ten books
you wouldn't be satisfied.

Originally Posted by Croakmore

> If you expect to go Big Time with your theory, John, you might
> need to build a thicker skin. Here, on this thread, you ask for
> "Objections to Generational Dynamics," and then when someone
> throws you a fast ball you scream bloody murder. How gentle and
> kind do you expect your reviewers to be? Have you ever experienced
> a professional peer review in a scientific/mathematical context?
> You can't bring your your mother and your personal psychologist to
> these wicked affairs. It would be better if you could bring a
> skin-graft surgeon. The truth known to scientists and
> mathematicians is that it's better to be skinned alive in a
> private peer review than to be humiliated in public for the lack
> of any proper defense. To say in earnest that you have been
> insulted is not going to buy you very much favor in the public
> arena.

The above paragraph is so angry and acrimonious that it's practically
incoherent. I really don't care if you go "Big Time" or not. And
you're not throwing fast balls; you're throwing garbage. How's your
health?

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Jeff,

Originally Posted by jeffw

> As for evolution, it's not a factor in this theory. Evolution can
> explain in basic terms what we are and how we behave, but the
> cycles postulated by S&H are more of a meta-phonemena, that is,
> they derive from our evolutionarily-determined behaviors, the way
> we respond to our upbringing, but that just sets the cycle in
> motion, the cycle itself isn't evolutionarily selected.

And this is the direction I want to go in. S&H have given us an
incredibly rich theory, that tells us many details about HOW people
behave. I want to try to understand WHY people behave that way, and
why they HAVE to behave that way.

Originally Posted by jeffw

> After all, do you think that evolution selected for the ability of
> homo sapiens to be able to destroy its whole species and most if
> not all of the rest of the species on the planet?

Well, as I was saying to Bob, I'm the gloomiest person you'll ever
hope to meet. I picked up TFT shortly after 9/11, and I've been
studying it obsessively for four years now, and nothing I've learned
gives me hope.

But you know, from an evolutionary point of view, isn't every species
like that? One species of cockroach gives rise to a new species of
cockroach that makes the previous species of cockroaches obsolete,
and is willing to wipe out any other species that gets in its way.

The human species succeeded for its intelligence. Now it's giving
way to a new computer-based species that will be more intelligent.
It's what life is really all about, isn't it?

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Kiff,

Originally Posted by Kiff 1961

> I think you have to look at the saeculum as a whole in an
> evolutionary light. Societies are meant to pass through these four
> phases.

> Crises are not just about wars. They're also about institutional
> collapse. Society has to clear out the deadwood that is getting in
> the way of new growth. Our bureaucracies are exhausted,
> ineffective, and (such as in the case of Katrina) outright
> damaging to the people they're supposed to be serving.

> But people can only take so much fighting and revolution before
> that also becomes exhausting. It's at this point where the Nomad
> survivalists start taking charge through the final push of Winter
> and into Spring. At the same time, the Civics start building the
> new institutions, the Artists enjoy their coming of age during a
> time of relative peace and prosperity, and the influence of
> Prophets fades.

> Highs are safe but they're also bland. So nature gives us late
> Artists and early Prophets to stir up the values mix. Then we get
> Summer. But society can take only so much upheaval at once, and
> the Unravelling puts the brakes on.

> The saeculum is a balancing act looking for that ever-elusive
> equilibrium, always shooting past it one way or the other. That's
> why change is always occurring. Stasis is death.

Thanks for this. I was trying to simplify the problem by breaking off
one piece of it and focusing on that, but maybe you're right that all
the generations have to be considered together. Your summary is one
of the best, but still, it's too big a piece to try to accept all at
once, so there has to be a way to break it down into smaller chunks.
Maybe I'm overthinking it, and maybe there's another approach that
will work better. When I'm a little less sleepy I'm going to think
about the "ever-elusive equilibrium" you mention and see if there's a
way to make it work with everything else.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Mike,

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> This is a serious issue with GD. Why a war is a crisis war or a
> non-crisis war is pretty central to GD, or at least it used to
> be.

The basic foundation of crisis war patterns, and crisis versus
non-crisis wars is currently very solid for me. I'm now focusing on
the periods of time between crisis wars.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> Is explanation of data like this the purpose of a theory? I cannot
> explain it because I don't follow the GD paradigm, largely because
> I cannot reconcile my understanding of it (which you now point out
> is incorrect) with these spacing.

Hmmmm. What's the purpose of the GD theory? For me, I became
interested and obsessed with it shortly after 9/11 for one
major reason -- its ability to predict the coming Fourth Turning. I
wanted to know what was coming, and why. For decades I had been
amazed by the predictive ability of technological forecasting, and I
always suspected that there must be something that could predict
social and political cycles as well. TFT seemed to be exactly what
I'd been looking for at least 20 years, and I became really obsessed
with it.

The generational archetypes stuff was interesting, but it didn't seem
like much more than pop psychology. TFT's six Anglo-American seculae
were interesting, but there were only six of them -- not enough to
really establish a pattern. Furthermore, the six Anglo-American
cycles were full of inconsistencies, so they were useless in making
predictions anything about the coming Fourth Turning.

I latched onto the one aspect that I felt that I could personally
prove or disprove: The crisis war cycle. If I couldn't prove that
the crisis war cycle worked throughout all places and times in
history, then TFT would be fun and interesting, but totally useless
as a methodology. But if I COULD prove the crisis war cycle, then I
could be certain that the Fourth Turning was indeed coming, and I
would also be able to believe the other things in S&H.

So the purpose of the GD theory was to prove that the crisis war
cycle works throughout history. Then one day I had an epiphany: If I
could prove the crisis war cycle, and if I could identify where in
the cycle each of the 200+ countries was, then I could create a
"world model" like the one that I just described to Bob Butler, and
that it would have incredible predictive value. I even fantasized
about building a predictive model that would be so useful and
valuable to the nation that the State Dept. would spirit me away and
give me a job in Washington advising all the other analysts.

Well, I no longer have any fantasies worth talking about, but the
purpose of GD is to build that predictive "world model." I've come a
long way. The GD model satisfies S&H's data to my satisfaction, and
removes ALL their inconsistencies. I've identified well over 100
crisis wars throughout history that satisfy the crisis war pattern.
Matt, who occasionally posts here, has identified the same pattern for
pre-Revolutionary Indian tribes, and has promised to post his results
soon. Even more important, I haven't found a single exception to the
crisis war pattern.

In addition, I've now had three years experience predicting things on
my web site. What I've been able to do to interpret and predict
world events is almost beyond my own belief. I still haven't covered
all 200+ countries on earth, but I still add new countries to my
coverage when I have a chance. (I really MUST figure out what's
going on with Venezuela and Chávez.) Furthermore, I now feel safe in
"importing" S&H's work, minus the inconsistencies, into GD, just as
you might import one data base into another.

So the purpose of the GD theory is to complete the "world model" that
I fantasized about. There's still a lot more work to do. There are
more countries and more historical eras to analyze, and there's a lot
more fundamental theory to develop, and it's the latter that's the
subject of the current discussion. The direct answer to your
question is that "explaining the data" is not the purpose of the
theory, but it's part of the job of constructing some of the more
difficult portions of the theory.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> This replenishment mechanism would call for at most a 25 year
> spacing (time to raise another batch of soldiers--see WW I to WW
> II spacing). Besides didn't you already note that mass casualties
> are NOT an determinant of crisis wars. After all WW I wiped out a
> generation of Frenchman yet was not a crisis war for the French,
> while the Franco Prussian War and WW II had comparatively few
> French casualties, yet were crisis wars for the French.

Yes, you're right, and that's why "replenishment" has to mean
something different from raising another batch of soldiers.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> The spacing of crisis wars determines the "saeculum" length
> according to GD. With the S&H saeculum one obtains the analogous
> lengths from the spacing of like turnings. Using the S&H dates
> back to 1435 and the McGuiness ones back to 1147 a distribution of
> lengths can be obtained like what you show here:

> 64-74y 9%
> 75-84y 13%
> 84-99y 28%
> 100-11 50%

> The distribution is actually bimodal, with one cluster centered at
> 72 years with a 7-year SD and another clustered at 102 years, also
> with a 7-year SD.

> I could never reconcile the S&H mechanism with this set of
> lengths, which is why I have always maintained that the S&H model
> or mechanism is incorrect, even though I believe the saeculum
> exists. Recently I have begun a determined effort to come up with
> a mechanism that works, fits the lengths and for which I can
> identify supporting evidence.

> The first order of business was to understand exactly how the S&H
> mechanism works. I found I didn't really understand it in the past
> (S&H didn't make it very clear).

Well I guess you know what I'm going to say, and it breaks my heart
that I can't convince you of this. The reason that you're getting
the bimodal distribution is because you're adding together multiple
timelines that are really unrelated to one another. If you split
them out into separate timelines then everything works.

While I'm talking, let me address something else. I've seen you and
Kurt discuss turning lengths before, and I've always been
bothered by them, or at least by the (implicit or explicit) assumption
that all turning lengths in a saeculum are equal. This cannot
possibly be the case, because it would mean you could predict the
exact year of a crisis war 40-50 years in advance.

For example, suppose (to keep the numbers simple) that a crisis war
ended in the year 1900. You would think, "Gee, thank goodness that's
over with. Now we won't have another crisis war until 1950-2000."

So the years go by, and suddenly you detect an awakening in 1918. You
say, "Omigod!! The turning length is 18 years. That means that the
next crisis era will begin in 1954!! I'd better tell someone!!!"

That seems to me impossible. In your "Cause of the Saeculum" thread
you talk about "forcing functions" that produce the turnings. I
think that could be a very productive path to study.

But there's no reason to believe that the forcing function that
launches the awakening era has much of anything in common with the
forcing function that launches the unraveling era, and there's
especially no reason to assume (without rigorous proof) that they'll
produce equal turning lengths. I think these "forcing functions"
refer to the same kind of thing that I'm looking for, but they have
to be developed separately for each era.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Dear Jeff,

Originally Posted by jeffw

> As for evolution, it's not a factor in this theory. Evolution can
> explain in basic terms what we are and how we behave, but the
> cycles postulated by S&H are more of a meta-phonemena, that is,
> they derive from our evolutionarily-determined behaviors, the way
> we respond to our upbringing, but that just sets the cycle in
> motion, the cycle itself isn't evolutionarily selected.

And this is the direction I want to go in. S&H have given us an
incredibly rich theory, that tells us many details about HOW people
behave. I want to try to understand WHY people behave that way, and
why they HAVE to behave that way.

Is this a debating tactic? Change the subject when you're losing? You asked why the public mood in the High as it affected fighting the Korean War was different was different than the mood in the Crisis as it affected WWII. I gave you S&H's answer from their book. I'd like to know why you think you're explanation is superior to S&H's.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

...So the purpose of the GD theory is to complete the "world model" that
I fantasized about...

No, John, that's not a purpose; it's an objective. I think you would do yourself a big favor if you sharpened your argument with clear statements of purpose, objectives, principles, and assumptions. Include a null hypothesis with which to differentiate and compare the functionality and predictive value of your own. If its mathematical then there ought to be proofs. If it is statistical there ought to be samples. A keen reader will be more receptive to your argument if you square with him/her on these essential formalities. You could be entirely wrong and your keenest readership will still hang with you if the theory has clearly stated its boundaries of credibility.

You confuse "tough love" with "insults." I have no interest in insulting you; indeed I wouldn't even bother to comment on your posts if they were not sufficiently interesting to me. And I don't think you are going to kill very many buffalo with a blunt arrowhead. All I'm trying to do is to help you sharpen your weapon. Frankly, I don't think anyone can be insulted unless he/she chooses to be insulted. Why not at least try to incorporate the essentials I have suggested? They could go a long way toward achieving a broader acceptability of your GD model.

--Croak

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Dear Richard,

Originally Posted by Croakmore

> Here we go again, John. Now you're saying "the Prophets drive the
> cycle." Earlier you said "the TIMING of the Prophets drives the
> cycle." Which is it? If yours is a dynamical model, as you claim,
> then what do you mean exactly by "drive"? The key dynamics of
> your "dynamical" model still elude me.

When I referred to the prophets driving the cycle, I was just
reflecting back on what Jeff said, and I qualified the statement in a
couple of ways. But you know that. Your standards seem to go down
on a daily basis.

Actually I said that the Prophets drive the Crisis.

Originally Posted by jeffw

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Dear Richard,

Originally Posted by Croakmore

> Here we go again, John. Now you're saying "the Prophets drive the
> cycle." Earlier you said "the TIMING of the Prophets drives the
> cycle." Which is it? If yours is a dynamical model, as you claim,
> then what do you mean exactly by "drive"? The key dynamics of
> your "dynamical" model still elude me.

When I referred to the prophets driving the cycle, I was just
reflecting back on what Jeff said, and I qualified the statement in a
couple of ways. But you know that. Your standards seem to go down
on a daily basis.

Actually I said that the Prophets drive the Crisis.

Sorry.

John

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

While I'm talking, let me address something else. I've seen you and Kurt discuss turning lengths before, and I've always been bothered by them, or at least by the (implicit or explicit) assumption that all turning lengths in a saeculum are equal. This cannot
possibly be the case, because it would mean you could predict the
exact year of a crisis war 40-50 years in advance.

We are discussing theoretical models for the saeculum, not the empirical-derived saeculum, whiich we know does not feature exactly equal turning lengths. The goal would be to predict the approximate start of a turning decades in advance.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

While I'm talking, let me address something else. I've seen you and Kurt discuss turning lengths before, and I've always been bothered by them, or at least by the (implicit or explicit) assumption that all turning lengths in a saeculum are equal. This cannot
possibly be the case, because it would mean you could predict the
exact year of a crisis war 40-50 years in advance.

We are discussing theoretical models for the saeculum, not the empirical-derived saeculum, whiich we know does not feature exactly equal turning lengths. The goal would be to predict the approximate start of a turning decades in advance.

John,

I was hoping to finish everything by Monday. It's a lot of work getting the dates straight and figuring out certain things and I haven't been able to really sit down and work on it for a while. So I apologize that it is going to take a little while longer.

I'll have a couple questions for you tomorrow; I would write them up now, but it's late.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

While I'm talking, let me address something else. I've seen you and Kurt discuss turning lengths before, and I've always been bothered by them, or at least by the (implicit or explicit) assumption that all turning lengths in a saeculum are equal. This cannot
possibly be the case, because it would mean you could predict the
exact year of a crisis war 40-50 years in advance.

We are discussing theoretical models for the saeculum, not the empirical-derived saeculum, whiich we know does not feature exactly equal turning lengths. The goal would be to predict the approximate start of a turning decades in advance.

Yes, these expectations of precision are unrealistic to me too. I don't know why a few years + or - make very much difference. Explaining these differences precisely may be as difficult as explaining precisely why hurricanes are different. The saeculum is not exactly a mechanical beast; it seems to be more squishy like a slim mold, not rigid like a locomotive. I would expect a lot of unexplainable natural variation. Can anyone explain precisely why he/she eats more on Tuesday and less on Thursday or sleeps longer in the spring than in the fall, or vice versa?

--Croakmore

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Dear Pat,

Originally Posted by Idiot Girl

> Note: in many cultures, warlords have had harems.

This may be one more distinction between animals and "intelligent"
human beings.

John, are you saying that keeping harems may be a reproductive behavior that distinguishes humans from other mammals?

Originally Posted by Virgil K. Saari

Originally Posted by Idiot Girl

Bob said "Also, in the past, not all territories are worth fighting for. In many areas of the globe, there were not surpluses. Thus, it was hard to field a large warrior class. Thus, no population pressure. Thus, warlords who thought conquest was neat tended to get bred out of the population. "

Didn't they discover that 20% of the Y-chromosomes in Mongolia go back to a common ancestor at the time of Genghis Khan? And that these people were very likely *descendants* of Genghis Khan?

Note: in many cultures, warlords have had harems.

Is the S.W.O.T.E.'s spouse a warlord?

:lol:

Good one, Virgil.

More seriously, a leader doesn't (or didn't) have to be a warlord to have kept a harem. According to research by Laura Betzig, one of my old office mates at U of M, the Pharoahs of Egypt, along with the Emperors of China and the Incas, kept massive harems, whether the leader himself was a warlord or a peaceful improver. All the leader has to be is, well, a leader and in control of excess resources to maintain a harem.

Another perspective is that Bill Clinton acted more like a rock star, complete with groupies. So, by that analogy, would, say, Mick Jagger in his prime have been a warlord, too?

Dear Jeff,

Originally Posted by jeffw

> Is this a debating tactic? Change the subject when you're losing?
> You asked why the public mood in the High as it affected fighting
> the Korean War was different was different than the mood in the
> Crisis as it affected WWII. I gave you S&H's answer from their
> book. I'd like to know why you think you're explanation is
> superior to S&H's.

I've been studying TFT for four years now, and so, believe it or not,
Jeff, I already knew the TFT explanation, and I don't disagree with
it. I'm well aware that you're capable of copying a couple of
paragraphs out of TFT and posting them. I could have done that myself
if that's what I wanted. But TFT tells HOW people behave and how the
generations interact. I'm looking for an EVOLUTIONARY explanation for
WHY people behave that way, and WHY the generations interact that way.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Richard,

Originally Posted by Croakmore

> No, John, that's not a purpose; it's an objective. I think you
> would do yourself a big favor if you sharpened your argument with
> clear statements of purpose, objectives, principles, and
> assumptions. Include a null hypothesis with which to differentiate
> and compare the functionality and predictive value of your own. If
> its mathematical then there ought to be proofs. If it is
> statistical there ought to be samples. A keen reader will be more
> receptive to your argument if you square with him/her on these
> essential formalities. You could be entirely wrong and your
> keenest readership will still hang with you if the theory has
> clearly stated its boundaries of credibility.

> You confuse "tough love" with "insults." I have no interest in
> insulting you; indeed I wouldn't even bother to comment on your
> posts if they were not sufficiently interesting to me. And I don't
> think you are going to kill very many buffalo with a blunt
> arrowhead. All I'm trying to do is to help you sharpen your
> weapon. Frankly, I don't think anyone can be insulted unless
> he/she chooses to be insulted. Why not at least try to incorporate
> the essentials I have suggested? They could go a long way toward
> achieving a broader acceptability of your GD model.

Thanks for your comments, but please don't confuse what you've been
doing with "love," tough or otherwise.

I'm very, very far from a formal mathematical treatise on
Generational Dynamics, and since I want what I write to be accessible
to a more general audience, I doubt that I'll ever do it. Perhaps
some grad student will take up the task at some point. For now, my
information descriptions will have to suffice. Furthermore, I have a
huge amount of work to do just describing Generational Dynamics
informally, not to mention trying to foresee just how close we are to
war with China. And with bird flu probably coming, I don't know how
much of that work I'll have time to complete, so I have to focus on
things that are important to me.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Mike,

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> We are discussing theoretical models for the saeculum, not the
> empirical-derived saeculum, which we know does not feature
> exactly equal turning lengths. The goal would be to predict the
> approximate start of a turning decades in advance.

OK, that makes a lot of sense.

I was referring to your statement, "If generations are to move from
one phase of life to another and occupy them (forming the
constellation), then the phases have to be the same length." Was
this just a hypothetical statement?

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Matt,

John,

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> I was hoping to finish everything by Monday. It's a lot of work
> getting the dates straight and figuring out certain things and I
> haven't been able to really sit down and work on it for a while.
> So I apologize that it is going to take a little while longer.

> I'll have a couple questions for you tomorrow; I would write them
> up now, but it's late.

Sounds good. I'll be looking forward to it.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by The Pervert

> John, are you saying that keeping harems may be a reproductive
> behavior that distinguishes humans from other mammals?

I was actually referring to Pat's remarks about warlords.

The whole "harem" concept excites men because of the common male
fantasy of two women and infuriates feminists because of the common
male fantasy of two women. However, as far as I can tell, the
reality is quite different.

Any male who's ever been in a relationship with a woman knows how
difficult it is sometimes just to keep his head above water. If more
than one female is involved, then the guy really doesn't have a
chance. The sex may be great, but life goes on outside of the
bedroom, and the chance of a male having a good relationship with
multiple women is much smaller than the chance of having a good
relationship with one woman.

In today's politically correct society, it's easy to forget that
polygamy serves a valuable social purpose at times in history when
war had killed off many men, leaving many women without partners. In
those situations, the only way for most women to receive protection
is through polygamous marriages.

That helps explain why polygamy is so common on the Arabian
peninsula. That land is mostly desert, so war has always been a
continuing way of life to compete for the little bits of water and
food. Since men are more likely than women to be killed in war, a
surplus of women has almost always been a "problem" for centuries.
Hence the need for harems.

Having multiple wives carries with it a huge obligation, since all
the wives have to be protected and supported. Thus, sex can hardly
be a motivation to have a harem, since sex can be purchased much more
cheaply than by having a harem.

Those who criticize Islam often point to Mohammed's wives, including
a number of young wives. Mohammed could have had sex with these
women without marrying them. He married them out of a sense of
obligation, since many of his wives were widows who had died in
battles led by Mohammed himself, and he married these women in order
to protect them in honor of their fallen husbands.

The reverse situation, polyandry, is much rarer, and is probably not
stable, since evidently women are (biologically) more willing to
share a man than men are to share a woman.

There's kind of a test case going on today in China, where there are
far more males than females because of the "one child per family"
policy instituted in the 1980s. If polyandry were possible, it would
probably be occurring there, but it isn't, as far as I know.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

To all:

Let me try to state the problem in terms of one specific
hypothetical, in case anyone cares to answer.

Suppose that tens of thousands of years ago, two different branches
of humans had evolved in Europe, forming two different civilizations.

In one corner of Europe, humans evolved in the form that we know
today, forming civilization A.

In another corner of Europe, humans evolved exactly the same, but
with one big difference: After a crisis war, Prophets did not rebel
against their parents. Instead, their Awakening turned out to be
another Crisis cycle, and there was another crisis war. (In S&H
terminology, this would be a "two-stroke" saeculum.) This was
civilization B.

When these two civilizations finally met each other in war, which one
would have won? Why?

An adequate answer to this question would prove that S&H's saeculum
not only DID occur, but also HAD TO occur.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

But then, at the end of the 20th Century - came Civilization X! :lol:

Originally Posted by Anthony '58 II

But then, at the end of the 20th Century - came Civilization X! :lol:

Actually, I date that as starting somewhere around the end of World War I, which put an end to Civilization I. Or, why Elizabethans and Victorians have more in comon with each other, than Victorians do with us.