Ok, almost done. I have completed the timeline for all Indian tribes, I just have to recheck a couple to make sure I have the dates right. I also want to include an English, French, and Dutch timeline. This has been quite a lengthy project, and I have repeatedly wanted to smash the computer/book due to the lack of information. But I think I've got it right now. I just have to make sure.

Very very interesting. A couple tribes didn't fight wars, but this was because of their numbers and the fact that they were under the influence of another tribe. All tribes fit within the 40-120 year cycle, with most falling between 50-60 years. One mid-cycle period was just over 40 years (I will have to recheck the date). The horrors of war and disease in a mid-cycle period didn't seem to effect the cycle at all.

Expanding on the best turning to fight a war in, there are many wars which support your theory, however I can't believe that EVERY WAR EVER FOUGHT should be fought with mid-cycle energy. However, if the Iroquois hadn't been stupidly raiding American towns during the Revolutionary War (4T for both) they wouldn't have met their bloody end (yet). My question a few days ago had to do with the Mahican timeline and your 2t/4t hypothesis helped me figure it out. The Mohawk, fighting in a 3T against the Mahican (4T), could have been wiped out if they had lost. Instead they stayed back and ambushed the Mahican, and somehow got the Dutch to pull out of the war.

I should have it to you soon.

Matt

Dear Clark,

Originally Posted by Clark

> Getting back to my original point, the potential problem I see
> with energy is that growth rates have cycled around a high enough
> average that they have remained positive for essentially all of
> the industrial revolution. If the growth rate begins to cycle
> around some lower average due to energy supply constraints or if
> terrorist acts repeatedly result in oil supply disruptions, then
> growth rates may actually become negative for substantial periods
> of time. This might take the stock market to valuations more
> resembling those of the Great Depression or worse. All I'm really
> saying is that your website analysis should address this
> possibility in some fashion or at least state the assumptions. It
> would be a great public service because nobody that I know of is
> doing a thoughtful and accurate analysis of this issue.

I feel like an idiot for not thinking of it sooner, but you're right
about the difference in my DJIA and S&P 500 graphs -- the S&P figures
are inflation adjusted and the DJIA figures are not.

Originally Posted by Louis Menand

> The same blurring characterizes professional forecasters as well.
> The predictions on cable news commentary shows do not have
> life-and-death side effects, but the predictions of people in the
> C.I.A. and the Pentagon plainly do. It’s possible that the
> psychologists have something to teach those people, and, no doubt,
> psychologists are consulted. Still, the suggestion that we can
> improve expert judgment by applying the lessons of cognitive
> science and probability theory belongs to the abiding modern
> American faith in expertise. As a professional, Tetlock is, after
> all, an expert, and he would like to believe in expertise. So he
> is distressed that political forecasters turn out to be as
> unreliable as the psychological literature predicted, but
> heartened to think that there might be a way of raising the
> standard. The hope for a little more accountability is hard to
> dissent from. It would be nice if there were fewer partisans on
> television disguised as “analysts” and “experts” (and who would
> not want to see more foxes?). But the best lesson of Tetlock’s
> book may be the one that he seems most reluctant to draw: Think
> for yourself.

Thanks for posting that article. Now I have another college
professor to write to about Generational Dynamics and not get so much
as a one-sentence e-mail message in return.

I really have to chuckle at the pundits who predict whether the stock
market will go up or down, or who even try to explain why the stock
market went up or down that day. Their predictions are seldom valid
for more than a couple of hours; at least weather forecasters can
predict the weather a day or two in advance. One day they'll say,
"Stocks fell today because the price of oil went up a dollar a
barrel." The next day they'll say, "Investors shrugged off the
increase in the price of oil as stocks soared." It astounds me that
(theoretically) intelligent people at the Wall Street Journal can do
this day after day, and it astounds me even more that people pay
attention.

The Fourth Turning provides what I call a "long-term forecasting"
capability. TFT predicted, back in 1995, that America will have
Fourth Turning sometime in the time frame 2000-2030. That prediction
has 100% certainty, but because of the indefiniteness of the time
frame, the prediction isn't very useful. On the other hand, the
prediction that stocks will go up today is VERY useful information,
but it has only a 50% chance of coming true.

I like to tell people that it's easy to get a million predictions
right -- just make two million predictions!

However, there's one other factor about predictions that the article
doesn't mention: People do not want to heard gloomy predictions.
To put it another way, the pundits that Tetlock describes are not
just guessing; they're actually telling people what they want to
hear. If it's a political pundit, then he targets either the "love
Bush" or "hate Bush" crowd; if he's a financial pundit, then he
predicts that stocks are going up, either because they're already
going up and they have momentum, or because they've been falling and
now people will buy because they're cheap.

I've actually seen financial pundits on tv get shooed away because
they're too negative -- predicting a stock market fall to Dow 4000 or
so.

I know that my web site has a few hundred regular readers, but except
for the few dozen who have written messages to me, I have absolutely
no idea who they are. And since I've been running some low-key
Google ads recently, so they may now be above a thousand. I wonder
what they think when they see the site? Do they think, "This site's
predictions make a lot more sense than other sites'"? Or do they say,
"This guy should be locked up for his own safety"? Do the generational
explanations make sense to them? What do they think of the
predictions? I suppose I ought to try some kind of survey.

Well, I'm babbling, but that was an interesting article.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Matt,

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> Ok, almost done. I have completed the timeline for all Indian
> tribes, I just have to recheck a couple to make sure I have the
> dates right. I also want to include an English, French, and Dutch
> timeline. This has been quite a lengthy project, and I have
> repeatedly wanted to smash the computer/book due to the lack of
> information. But I think I've got it right now. I just have to
> make sure.

> Very very interesting. A couple tribes didn't fight wars, but this
> was because of their numbers and the fact that they were under the
> influence of another tribe. All tribes fit within the 40-120 year
> cycle, with most falling between 50-60 years. One mid-cycle period
> was just over 40 years (I will have to recheck the date). The
> horrors of war and disease in a mid-cycle period didn't seem to
> effect the cycle at all.

> Expanding on the best turning to fight a war in, there are many
> wars which support your theory, however I can't believe that EVERY
> WAR EVER FOUGHT should be fought with mid-cycle energy. However,
> if the Iroquois hadn't been stupidly raiding American towns during
> the Revolutionary War (4T for both) they wouldn't have met their
> bloody end (yet). My question a few days ago had to do with the
> Mahican timeline and your 2t/4t hypothesis helped me figure it
> out. The Mohawk, fighting in a 3T against the Mahican (4T), could
> have been wiped out if they had lost. Instead they stayed back and
> ambushed the Mahican, and somehow got the Dutch to pull out of the
> war.

> I should have it to you soon.

This sounds like some really fantastic work. I can hardly wait to see
it.

But do double-check those dates that are out of range. 75% of the
the mid-crisis periods are generally in the 50-80 year range, so it's
not that unusual, but it's worth checking again.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Mr. Xenakis,

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Dear Clark,

...


I know that my web site has a few hundred regular readers, but except
for the few dozen who have written messages to me, I have absolutely
no idea who they are. And since I've been running some low-key
Google ads recently, so they may now be above a thousand. I wonder
what they think when they see the site? Do they think, "This site's
predictions make a lot more sense than other sites'"? Or do they say,
"This guy should be locked up for his own safety"? Do the generational
explanations make sense to them? What do they think of the
predictions? I suppose I ought to try some kind of survey.

Well, I'm babbling, but that was an interesting article.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis

You have found amongst those who visit your site a number who fit the certain reader profile. These are people who take your information, knowledge, and wisdom and will apply it to their lives and those about them someday in the future or even today. They may do so without quite recalling why they came to believe you or just when it dawned on them that "that guy" is/was right and I had better act upon his words.


I don't think a survey will catch the "certain reader"; but an appeal to those who have profited or lost because of your works might be of some value.


Yo. Ob. Sv. VKS

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Dear Clark,

I know that my web site has a few hundred regular readers, but except
for the few dozen who have written messages to me, I have absolutely
no idea who they are. And since I've been running some low-key
Google ads recently, so they may now be above a thousand. I wonder
what they think when they see the site? Do they think, "This site's
predictions make a lot more sense than other sites'"? Or do they say,
"This guy should be locked up for his own safety"? Do the generational
explanations make sense to them? What do they think of the
predictions? I suppose I ought to try some kind of survey.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Your overall approach of identifying important trends, cycles, and possible developing events is why I thought your site was good. Since that's what I do too, I suppose it's natural for me to think so (I don't just look at cycles and don't really think cycles are the most important thing to look at but that's what TFT is about--I might post my thoughts about that later).

The most valuable thing about your site in my opinion, though, is the analysis area and the basic message that you deliver to the public that the experts are unable to deliver through the mass media or have not delivered in a timely manner:

"Stocks don't always go up and will probably go down."
"A pandemic can still happen and there is more than a small probability that it will."

and so on. It has the potential to be a one stop shop that summarizes the important issues for busy specialists. Whether it's Dow 4,000 or 1,000 or Dow not at all is not the most important thing, it's that the message is getting delivered in a way that people can understand it.

Since I've looked at all these things too, there are areas where I think improvements could be made and I've talked about some specific things. Generally, in the analysis area, I think using a more flexible and integrative approach would be better and would probably increase your readership substantially. I also think expanding into some other areas would be useful.

When I speak of an integrative approach, I mean, for example, taking a look at how a bird flu pandemic would affect economic and war (I've stayed away from that subject) scenarios or at least mentioning the fact that there would be an impact beyond the scenarios that you discuss absent of the impact. You speak of these things as separate issues, but they really can't be separated. Maybe I missed something but, if I did, then chances are that other people have too. When I wrote the other day of capital and labor or energy being limiting factors in economic growth, well, bird flu could certainly place some constraints on labor availability. Of course, that has to be stated in a way that people can understand it. What you did the other day with the discussion of valuing real estate and comparing that to valuing stocks was really good.

Some areas that I think are worthy of expanding into might be, as I alluded to the other day, the issue of natural resource availability and whether the long term trend of lower real commodity costs is beginning to reverse. Another would be demographics. Although that does get some coverage in other places, important points seem to be missed by most experts. Finally, one other area comes to mind that doesn't get much emphasis on this forum (I think because most of the people here have a historical perspective on things) or anywhere else and that is the area of financial derivatives and the growth of speculative capital. It's an accident waiting to happen and could result in a repeat of some of the 19th century panics only on a larger scale because the linkage problems are similar but more extensive. The best summary I've read of the issue is in one of Berkshire Hathaway's annual reports (2002 or 2003, I think).

You might wonder why I don't do some of these things myself. It's because my interest is in beginning to work toward building the kind of world that might exist after TFT.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Dear Jeff,

Originally Posted by jeffw

> That's BS John. You only started talking EVOLUTIONARY for the past
> few days. When you asked the question about the Korean War,
> evolution wasn't part of it. If you know TFT as well as you say
> you do, you wouldn't have asked that question in the first place.

You're a complete idiot. Please post the URLs of the messages where
you believe that I discussed the Korean War issue without reference
to evolution.

To help you with your research, let me point this out to you:
http://fourthturning.com/forums/view...=147342#147342
In that message, I outlined for Mike the evolutionary argument that I
wrote for my book a year ago. In paragraph #4 I referred to the
"point of minimum replenishment," the point after which a new crisis
war can be fought -- 45-50 years after the end of the last crisis war
for humans. Mike pointed out that I had a flaw in my argument about
"minimum replenishment," and that's where the Korean war came up.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

I don't have the time to do the necessary research to verify this claim. John, if what you say is true and I took your post out of context, then I apologize.

Dear Jeff,

Originally Posted by jeffw

> I don't have the time to do the necessary research to verify this
> claim. John, if what you say is true and I took your post out of
> context, then I apologize.

It's true, and I'm sorry to be so oversensitive.

John

Dear Mr. Saari,

Originally Posted by Virgil K. Saari

> You have found amongst those who visit your site a number who fit
> the certain reader profile. These are people who take your
> information, knowledge, and wisdom and will apply it to their
> lives and those about them someday in the future or even today.
> They may do so without quite recalling why they came to believe
> you or just when it dawned on them that "that guy" is/was right
> and I had better act upon his words.

> I don't think a survey will catch the "certain reader"; but an
> appeal to those who have profited or lost because of your works
> might be of some value.

If I understand your recommendation correctly, you're saying that I
should eschew the general reader survey, and instead direct something
more narrowly by saying something like: "If you've found this web site
useful or valuable, then please let me know by telling me what you
find useful or valuable about it." That's an interesting idea. I'll
think about it.

Sincerely,

Mr. Xenakis

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Clark,

Originally Posted by Clark

> Your overall approach of identifying important trends, cycles, and
> possible developing events is why I thought your site was good.
> Since that's what I do too, I suppose it's natural for me to think
> so (I don't just look at cycles and don't really think cycles are
> the most important thing to look at but that's what TFT is
> about--I might post my thoughts about that later).

> The most valuable thing about your site in my opinion, though, is
> the analysis area and the basic message that you deliver to the
> public that the experts are unable to deliver through the mass
> media or have not delivered in a timely manner:

> "Stocks don't always go up and will probably go down." "A pandemic
> can still happen and there is more than a small probability that
> it will."

> and so on. It has the potential to be a one stop shop that
> summarizes the important issues for busy specialists. Whether it's
> Dow 4,000 or 1,000 or Dow not at all is not the most important
> thing, it's that the message is getting delivered in a way that
> people can understand it.

I generally agree with what you're saying here, but I place a very
high value on demonstrating credibility. You seem to be saying that
just laying out the issues is enough, even if the predictions are
wrong. I can't agree with that. That's why every prediction I've
ever made -- every article I've ever written -- is still on my web
site, linked to from either the home page or the archives page.

As long as I stick to my own rules -- which means not making
predictions about "chaotic" events -- every prediction I've made in
the last three years has turned out either to be true or to be coming
true. Not a single one is false. On my web site, I've tried to be
very careful never to make such predictions. I sometimes can't resist
the urge to state an opinion on an upcoming chaotic event, but I
always (try to remember to) use words to indicate that it
isn't a prediction; so I might say that it's "likely" or
"possible," or "probable."

But other predictions I've been making for years have come true or
are coming true, although they fly in the face of "standard"
predictions: "There won't be a civil war in Iraq"; "The Mideast
Roadmap will never produce two side-by-side Palestinian and Israeli
states"; "We're headed to war with China"; "We're entering a new
1930s style Great Depression."

It's important to me that I be able to demonstrate a credible track
record, not just state issues.

Originally Posted by Clark

> Since I've looked at all these things too, there are areas where I
> think improvements could be made and I've talked about some
> specific things. Generally, in the analysis area, I think using a
> more flexible and integrative approach would be better and would
> probably increase your readership substantially. I also think
> expanding into some other areas would be useful.

> When I speak of an integrative approach, I mean, for example,
> taking a look at how a bird flu pandemic would affect economic and
> war (I've stayed away from that subject) scenarios or at least
> mentioning the fact that there would be an impact beyond the
> scenarios that you discuss absent of the impact. You speak of
> these things as separate issues, but they really can't be
> separated. Maybe I missed something but, if I did, then chances
> are that other people have too. When I wrote the other day of
> capital and labor or energy being limiting factors in economic
> growth, well, bird flu could certainly place some constraints on
> labor availability. Of course, that has to be stated in a way that
> people can understand it. What you did the other day with the
> discussion of valuing real estate and comparing that to valuing
> stocks was really good.

I'm sure it would be useful to expand into other areas, but as it is
I'm usually working on articles at 1 am, and then getting up at 7:30
am to go to work. All I can do is all I can do.

Last year I wrote an article called "The Six Most Dangerous Regions
in the world today."
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...i.danger041120

Since then I've added the following graphic to my web site:



These materials provide the integration you're describing. I'll try
to update this article for the New Year.

Originally Posted by Clark

> Some areas that I think are worthy of expanding into might be, as
> I alluded to the other day, the issue of natural resource
> availability and whether the long term trend of lower real
> commodity costs is beginning to reverse. Another would be
> demographics. Although that does get some coverage in other
> places, important points seem to be missed by most
> experts.

One of the themes that I frequently return to is that population is
growing faster than the food supply, and that food prices have spiked
since 2000 because China is sucking up all food (and oil) it can get.
This applies generally to other kinds of natural resources as well.

A couple of subjects that I don't write about are "Peak Oil" and
"Global Warming," since I don't believe that these are important
problems at the current time. They may become important after the
war, but not now.

Originally Posted by Clark

> Finally, one other area comes to mind that doesn't get much
> emphasis on this forum (I think because most of the people here
> have a historical perspective on things) or anywhere else and that
> is the area of financial derivatives and the growth of speculative
> capital. It's an accident waiting to happen and could result in a
> repeat of some of the 19th century panics only on a larger scale
> because the linkage problems are similar but more extensive. The
> best summary I've read of the issue is in one of Berkshire
> Hathaway's annual reports (2002 or 2003, I think).

I have indeed written about hedge funds.
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...050608#e050608

And I have mentioned Bershire Hathaway's annual report.
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...reenspan040706

[quote="Clark"]
> You might wonder why I don't do some of these things myself. It's
> because my interest is in beginning to work toward building the
> kind of world that might exist after TFT.[quote]

There's no way, to my knowledge, to know what kind of world there'll
be at that time. In fact, we have no way of knowing whether China
will win or America will win.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

A year after tsunami, children survivors still feel traumatized



And yet, on this Christmas day, the tsunami aftermath tells a
story of hopefulness and renewal.

"Imagine you're sitting with your father on a bicycle getting
groceries in the market," says John Prewitt Diaz of the American Red
Cross in New Delhi. [1] "You see the wave, you try to go back to your
house, but the wave is already covering the house. You'll never see
your mother and brother again. These are the experiences that children
had during the tsunami."

A year after the huge tsunami struck Southeast Asia, a UNICEF survey
of 1633 children in four countries [2] shows that most children who
survived the tsunami still exhibit some signs of trauma. They lived
in fear of another earthquake or tsunami, or they fear losing another
loved one. One in five are not eating regularly. The majority feel
lonely, but they're still able to describe themselves as happy and
confident and are able to remain hopeful that the future holds promise
for themselves and their families.

Adults are lonely too, and they have a special method for expressing
their hopefulness about the future: There's a baby boom going on.

One young girl lost both her parents and al three siblings[3], when
they were all washed away by the tsunami. Scared and alone, she
married a man she hardly knew in a mass wedding in February and
immediately became pregnant. "I'm the only person to survive, so I'm
all alone," she says. "If I have a baby, I will have a friend."

Some older women are going to extremes. Some in their 40s are
risking complications trying to get pregnant again, and some are
trying to reverse sterilization procedures. One says, "I will wait
for some time. If I am not pregnant again, I will kill myself."

Renewal

For these people as individuals, the loss, loneliness and desperation
are traumatic.

But for the people as a society, it's a time of renewal. We can
begin to see how a society renews itself after an enormous disaster,
whether the disaster is a tsunami or a crisis war. (In Generational
Dynamics, a crisis war is the worst, most genocidal kind of war.)

The tsunami was like a crisis war in terms of the amount of
devastation it caused, particularly the loss of lives. But a tsunami
lasts only one day, and a crisis war can last for months or years, and
so a crisis war is much worse than a tsunami. Children growing up
during a crisis war are surrounded by death, disease, poverty,
starvation and homelessness for months or years at a time. They
suffer a kind of "generational child abuse" and, like most abused
children, they grow up into an entire generation of indecisive,
nonconfrontational adults.

But even though the tsunami was much briefer than a crisis war, we're
still seeing the same kinds of aftereffects, and we're seeing how a
society renews itself after a disaster.

The children who survived will be affected by that experience every
day for the rest of their lives, and will do everything in their power
to protect themselves, their families and their communities from
another tsunami.

When these children become adults, they'll insist on raising their
own families safely far from the seaside. Those who become teachers
will tell their students to do the same. Those who grow up to be
architects or homebuilders will create buildings that can withstand
tsunamis and will have "panic rooms" on the top, where people can run
to escape a tsunami. Those that grow up to become political leaders
will support laws that require "tsunami-safe buildings," as well as
early warning systems. If a new tsunami occurs, there'll be few
deaths since everyone will be prepared.

And that's not all. Just as America had a "Baby Boomer" generation
after World War II, the tsunami-struck regions are also having a baby
boom, led by mothers who feel lonely. These mothers will want to
stay close to their children -- just as American mothers in the 1950s
wanted to stay and home with their children.

The children of this new baby boom will form a new generation in a
time of hope and optimism about the future. They'll quickly get sick
and tired of hearing their parents talk about the "Great Tsunami of
2004." Their mothers will tell them to stay away from the sea shore,
and they'll obey at first, but soon they'll see that the beaches are
great, especially in the summer. As the population grows and real
estate becomes more expensive, the children in this new generation
will ignore the "tsunami-safe building" laws. If a new tsunami
occurs at that time, these people will not be prepared, and the new
tsunami will be as devastating as the tsunami of 2004.

This is cycle of life for a society. Individuals suffer, but their
individual suffering renews and preserves the society as a whole, and
makes it stronger.

We can see the same thing today in New Orleans. Under the slogan,
"ReNew Orleans," the city is renewing and rebuilding itself. After
the pain and loss and trauma inflicted by Hurricane Katrina, a whole
"NewNew Orleans" is rising.

This cycle of destruction and renewal brings back a memory. When I
was growing up in New Jersey in the 1950s, my mother commuted to New
York City, where she work. She had a love-hate relationship with New
York, and she would often joke, "They ought to drop an atom bomb on
New York and start all over."

Since she was joking I never really asked her what she meant, and
I'll never know. But both my parents lost many family members in
Europe in World War II, and she was probably thinking about something
that happened in the war. Maybe she was thinking of Japanese cities
that we had targeted with atom bombs, or maybe she was thinking of
some city in Greece that had been devastated by the war, and now was
rebuilding and renewing itself. She had the wisdom to know there are
many disasters, but disasters always lead to rebirth and renewals.

People acquire wisdom through experiencing disasters. As a man gets
older, and experiences more and more disasters, he gets wiser and
wiser until he becomes a wise elder. At that point, he's wise enough
to guide his children and other young people, so that they won't make
the same mistakes he made, and suffer the same disasters. The same
is true of an entire generation of people: As it becomes a generation
of wise elders, it can guide the people in younger generations not to
make the same mistakes. The elders can make sure that their children
don't suffer the same disasters that they did.

The above paragraph sounds great, but it really contains an inherent
contradiction: If the "generation of wise elders" guides the younger
generation not to make the same mistakes, then the younger
generations won't experience the same disasters, and so they won't
become wise.

That's the way it works. It's like a dirty trick that our collective
memories play on us. George Santayana's famous saying, "Those who
cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" is usually
quoted by someone who's about to brag that he remembers something
that other people have forgotten. But the hard truth is that
Santayana's saying is a joke, because when you're talking about
generations of people then it's impossible to remember the past, with
the result that new generations are always condemned to repeat
the past.

So this brings us to the final conclusions of our little Christmas
message. First, remember that death is part of life. Second,
remember that disasters are disastrous for individuals, but lead to
an aftermath of hope and rebirth for the survivors and for society as
a whole.

And third, in moments of quiet contemplation on Christmas day, as you
think of parents and other loved ones who are no longer with you, try
to remember the things they used to say, and try to understand anew
the wisdom behind those sayings. You might gain some wisdom for
yourself that will be invaluable to you during the next few difficult
years.

[1] http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1219/p01s03-woap.html

[2] http://www.unicef.org/media/media_30540.html

[3] http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/...n1155704.shtml

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

I'm having trouble with some colonist cycles. So I will leave that out and tackle that another time.

If all goes well, you should have the Indian list by tomorrow. Happy new years.

Dear Matt,

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston10

> I'm having trouble with some colonist cycles. So I will leave that
> out and tackle that another time.

> If all goes well, you should have the Indian list by tomorrow.
> Happy new years.

Sounds great. I'll be looking forward to it.

And Happy New Year to you and everyone else.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

The list....

Wampanoag

War against Micmac war parties (1615-1620?) - Unable to Determine if this is a crisis war or not. The timing fits well.

“King Philips War” (1675-1676) - Crisis War

Narragansett

War vs. Pequot (1622) - Likely Crisis War

“King Philips War” (1675-1676) - Crisis War

Massachusett

Unable to locate any crisis wars. Information is lacking and they disappeared quickly.

Pequot

“Pequot War” (1636-1637) - Crisis War

Mohegan

“Pequot War” (1637) - Crisis War

Nauset

Unable to locate any crisis wars. It appears that they didn’t fight any wars from 1614 through King Philip’s war. They were small in number and were under the influence of the both the English and the Wampanoag.

Niantic

“Pequot War” (1636) - Crisis War

Nipmuc

“King Philips War” (1675-1676) - Crisis War

Wappinger

“Wappinger War”/ “Governor Kieft’s War” (1643-1645) - Crisis War

Pocumtuc

War Vs. Mohawk (1605-1610?) - Possible Crisis War

“King Philip’s War” (1675-1676) - Crisis War

Penacook

War against Micmac War Parties (1615-1620?) - Unable to Determine if this is a crisis war or not. The timing fits well.

“King William’s War” (1689-99) - Crisis War

“French and Indian War” (1754-59) - Crisis War

Androscoggin

“Tarrateen War”- (1607-1614) - Likely Crisis War

“King William’s War” (1689-99) - Crisis War

“French and Indian War” (1754-59) - Crisis War

Norridgewock

“Tarrateen War” (1607-1614) - Likely Crisis War

“King William’s War” (1689-99) - Crisis War

“French and Indian War” (1754-59) - Crisis War

Penobscot

“Tarrateen War”- (1607-1614) - Likely Crisis War

“King William’s War” (1689-99) - Crisis War

“French and Indian War” (1754-59) - Crisis War

Mahican

War Against Mohawk (1624-1628) - Crisis War

“King William’s War” (1689-99) - Crisis War

“American Revolutionary War” (1775-1778) - Crisis War

Iroquois

Intertribal Warfare, War against Huron? (1540?-1560’s?) – Unable to determine if this is a Crisis War or not. The historical consensus is that the Iroquois formed around 1570, most likely due to intertribal warfare.

“Beaver Wars”- (1629-1649) - Crisis War

“Beaver Wars”/ “King William’s War” (1689-1699) - Crisis War

“American Revolutionary War” (1777-1782) - Crisis War

Huron

War against Iroquois and Algonquin? (1540?-1560’s?) - Unable to determine if this is a Crisis War or not. The timing fits well.

“Beaver Wars” (1629-1649) - Crisis War

Susquehanook

War with Iroquois (1590’s?-1590’s?) - Unable to determine if this is a Crisis War or not. The timing fits well.

“Beaver Wars” (1650-1656) - Crisis War

Erie

“Beaver Wars” (1648-1656) - Crisis War

Shawnee

“Beaver Wars” (1680?-1694) - Crisis War

“French and Indian War-Pontiac Rebellion” (1755-1763) - Crisis War

Those are the 20 tribes I did. That encompasses most of the eastern woodland tribes however there are a few I haven't gotten around to doing. This took many many hours for me to get all of this information and make sure it was correct. In evaluating a crisis war, some took 10 minutes, others 5 hours. However I still cannot claim 100% certainty on most wars.

""'s around a war means that is the official name. Those without quotes don't have names, or I don't know of their names. A question mark after the date means I am speculating about the start and it is little more than an educated guess. A / means it is another name for the war and a - means that it includes a second war or part.

I was a little disappointed that for many tribes there was only 1 crisis war I could locate. There is virtually no information from anything before 1605 and most tribes relocated, disappeared, merged, or were conquered before 1720.

Dear Matt,

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> Those are the 20 tribes I did. That encompasses most of the
> eastern woodland tribes however there are a few I haven't gotten
> around to doing. This took many many hours for me to get all of
> this information and make sure it was correct. In evaluating a
> crisis war, some took 10 minutes, others 5 hours. However I still
> cannot claim 100% certainty on most wars.

> ""'s around a war means that is the official name. Those without
> quotes don't have names, or I don't know of their names. A
> question mark after the date means I am speculating about the
> start and it is little more than an educated guess. A / means it
> is another name for the war and a - means that it includes a
> second war or part.

> I was a little disappointed that for many tribes there was only 1
> crisis war I could locate. There is virtually no information from
> anything before 1605 and most tribes relocated, disappeared,
> merged, or were conquered before 1720.

That's really great stuff. Don't worry about it being incomplete,
because it's a tremendous start. Now that it's down in print, you or
someone else might decide to add to it from time to time. Also, at
some point I'd like to talk to you on the phone about this material.

Do you happen to know of an online map that shows where all these
tribes lived?

Just one additional thought: Perhaps some of the tribes shared in
other tribes' crisis wars. For example, if the Nauset were under the
influence of the Wampanoag, then perhas the Wampanoag's crisis wars
were also Nauset crisis wars.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

That's really great stuff. Don't worry about it being incomplete,
because it's a tremendous start. Now that it's down in print, you or
someone else might decide to add to it from time to time. Also, at
some point I'd like to talk to you on the phone about this material.

Yeah, I plan on doing that. I'd also like to get some narrative going for a few tribes.

The Wyandot was a combination of tribes, including the Huron, who were conquered by the Iroquois and fled to the midwest. It would be complicated to find out their cycle. Maybe if I get good at this I'll try to attempt to figure that out.

Do you happen to know of an online map that shows where all these
tribes lived?

The map I used was taken down today for some reason or another. It had been up there for years, so the timing is strange.

Although, a new version went up but unfortunately it is difficult to see some of the tribal names and doesn't include the west.

Just one additional thought: Perhaps some of the tribes shared in
other tribes' crisis wars. For example, if the Nauset were under the
influence of the Wampanoag, then perhas the Wampanoag's crisis wars
were also Nauset crisis wars.

Well, the Nauset never really fought a war from 1600 on so I hesitated in calling King Philips' war a "Crisis War" for them. In a way, they are similar to Switzerland.

By the time of King Philips' war, most had been converted to Christianity and they didn't participate in the uprising against the English. They were close to Massasoit, who urged them to befriend the English, but after Massasoit's death the Nauset had become closer to the English than the Wampanoag.

Here is the new and unimproved map:

http://www.tngenweb.org/maps/eastribe.jpg

@

Ties the Multi-modal Saeculum to the War Cycle. Explains why World War I- though of large scale-was a mid-cyle war for the West.

For the West World War I was the 4T war that might have been.

Originally Posted by Tim Walker

Mike Alexander's War Cycle

Ties the Multi-modal Saeculum to the War Cycle. Explains why World War I- though of large scale-was a mid-cycle war for the West.

For the West World War I was the 4T war that might have been.

A good read, though the graphics seem to have been pulled. Could someone re-post the graphics? I'd be most interested.

I like where the paper is going, but it emphasizes materialistic stuff while minimizing values. Through much of the time period the paper emphasizes, war was cost effective. Becoming the dominant sea power, for example, was a good thing for a nation and its people.

I am not sure, in the days of open ports and weapons of mass destruction, that becoming a dominant power will remain cost effective. When there are no longer colonies to provide one cheap resources and captive markets, should the Great Powers play the same games by the same rules? Thus, while the cycles described look solid and valid during the Second Wave era of steam power, printed communications and gunpowder weapons, will they hold true in an Third Wave era of renewable power, computer networks and weapons of mass destruction? Thus, might we be moving beyond the era of great powers into a global era? Nice work, but I wouldn't bet the farm that the Industrial Age cycles will necessarily hold indefinitely.

I am also wondering if Keynesian Economics might have a role in the World War Anomaly. Might the ability to alter economic cycles effect economic cycles? If the economic and war cycles are in sync, and the economic cycles change, might this be part of the anomaly?

Mind you, in many ways I like Mike Alexander's approach of basing his cycles on measurable benchmarks, such as economic indicators and war casualties. Other attempts at cycles based purely on psychology and cultures are much more subjective, much harder to verify. I'm just into waves as well as cycles. Patterns valid through one wave might not necessarily hold during another wave. The World War anomaly could well mark an age boundary, where weapons have become powerful enough that the rules of the great power games are changing radically.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

A good read, though the graphics seem to have been pulled. Could someone re-post the graphics? I'd be most interested.

I loaded the article (with figures) here:
http://my.net-link.net/~malexan/War-Cycle.htm

It's chapter seven of my Kondratiev book.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

I am also wondering if Keynesian Economics might have a role in the World War Anomaly. Might the ability to alter economic cycles effect economic cycles? If the economic and war cycles are in sync, and the economic cycles change, might this be part of the anomaly?

The world war anomaly is the same thing as the Civil War anomaly. It's cause is the shortening of the saeculum causing the saeculum to become out-of-sync with the Kondratiev cycle. Later, with the rise of Keynesian economics the Kondratiev cycle now became a consequence of the saeculum, or more properly the influence of the saeculum on the political sphere, which impacts government policy, which impacts the economy. Through this linkage, the K-cycle came to roughly align with the saeculum. Using the stock market as a proxy for the K-cycle, the 2000 market peak signaled a "seasonal" change from fall to winter in the K-cycle. Back in 2000, based on this change I forecast that the fall to winter transtion in the saeculum was likely to happen soon. A year later came 911, which I took as evidence that a seasonal change in the saeculum had indeed begun.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

I am also wondering if Keynesian Economics might have a role in the World War Anomaly. Might the ability to alter economic cycles effect economic cycles? If the economic and war cycles are in sync, and the economic cycles change, might this be part of the anomaly?

The world war anomaly is the same thing as the Civil War anomaly. It's cause is the shortening of the saeculum causing the saeculum to become out-of-sync with the Kondratiev cycle. Later, with the rise of Keynesian economics the Kondratiev cycle now became a consequence of the saeculum, or more properly the influence of the saeculum on the political sphere, which impacts government policy, which impacts the economy. Through this linkage, the K-cycle came to roughly align with the saeculum. Using the stock market as a proxy for the K-cycle, the 2000 market peak signaled a "seasonal" change from fall to winter in the K-cycle. Back in 2000, based on this change I forecast that the fall to winter transtion in the saeculum was likely to happen soon. A year later came 911, which I took as evidence that a seasonal change in the saeculum had indeed begun.

That sounds like you're saying that you think that 9/11 was caused by the saecular cycle. Is that what you really think?

Dear Matt,

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> Here is the new and unimproved map:

> http://www.tngenweb.org/maps/eastribe.jpg

Thanks,

John

Dear Mike,

I know that you know what I'm going to say, so I'm posting this for
other people who wish to follow this issue.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> The world war anomaly is the same thing as the Civil War anomaly.
> It's cause is the shortening of the saeculum causing the saeculum
> to become out-of-sync with the Kondratiev cycle. Later, with the
> rise of Keynesian economics the Kondratiev cycle now became a
> consequence of the saeculum, or more properly the influence of the
> saeculum on the political sphere, which impacts government policy,
> which impacts the economy. Through this linkage, the K-cycle came
> to roughly align with the saeculum. Using the stock market as a
> proxy for the K-cycle, the 2000 market peak signaled a "seasonal"
> change from fall to winter in the K-cycle. Back in 2000, based on
> this change I forecast that the fall to winter transtion in the
> saeculum was likely to happen soon. A year later came 911, which I
> took as evidence that a seasonal change in the saeculum had indeed
> begun.

The world war and Civil War anomalies are unrelated. I discussed the
Civil War anomaly in conjunction with my recent work on fifth
turnings. (A fifth turning is a distinctly different era that comes
about because there was no crisis war during the fourth turning.)
This work was based on new research by Prof. Robert Pape on suicide
bombers that was published after the 7/7 London subway bombings.
http://fourthturning.com/forums/view...=145535#145535
http://fourthturning.com/forums/view...=145539#145539

The world war anomaly isn't an anomaly. It just represents the fact
that west Europe and east Europe are totally separate timelines, with
WW I being an east European war and WW II being a west European war.

More details about the following discussion can be found in Chapter 6
of my new book, Generational Dynamics for Historians, the
current draft of which can be read for free on my web site. (I don't
have your skill at selling books.)

Your work has shown a correlation between war cycles and Kondratiev
cycles:



However, the correlation breaks down in the last century because of
WW I and WW II occurring about 20 years apart.

However, your proposed explanation is very complex and not very
satisfying. My explanation is more straightforward (in my opinion
anyway).

In the early part of the last millennium, Western Europe consisted of
many small regions. Each of these regions had its own separate
timeline, with crisis wars 70-90 years apart.

In addition, each region had non-crisis wars at various times. The
assumption I'm making is that these non-crisis wars are correlated to
technology cycles, or K-cycles. This assumption makes sense because,
although new technology spreads quickly from region to region, one
region may acquire the technology a little earlier, and will want to
rush to war and take advantage of the technology before the enemy
region requires it.

(This kind of thing can also happen with crisis wars too. One of the
major examples was the first phase of the Hundred Years' War between
England and France. The first phase began in 1337 and was a major
victory for the English, thanks to technology. A 14,000 man English
army wiped out a 50,000 man French army in 1347, thanks to advanced
weaponry. However, the French got back at England in 1429 using a
different kind of weaponry -- Joan of Arc.)

So now we have the following:

• Crisis wars in individual regions at 70-90 year intervals.
• Non-crisis wars, largely corrlated with technology/K cycles.

This can be graphed as follows:



In this graph, the crisis wars of 11 different regions are modeled at
the bottom.

The "technology effect" refers to non-crisis wars correlated to
K-cycles.

Adding them all together gives the "grand total" graph at the top.

Notice that the crisis wars in the 11 small regions occur at
essentially random times, and so the "technology effect" dominates
the grand total. That's why the war cycle is dominated by the
K-cycle.

However, as time goes on, the 11 separate timelines tend to merge
more and more, finally merging into WW II.

At that point, it's the crisis war that dominates, completely
swamping the K-cycle effect.

Now do the same thing for Eastern Europe. The following graph is the
same, except that the crisis wars are shifted 20 years earlier.
However (and this is imporant), the "technology effect" line is NOT
shifted, since it's the same across Eastern and Western Europe.



This shows how the 11 separate timelines in Eastern Europe finally
merge into WW I.

Now add together the two "grand total" graphs, and you get this:



This makes complete sense, and is totally consistent with your
findings.

Your findings are that war cycles correspond to K-cycles prior to the
1800s, and that's because all the crisis wars occur at essentially
random times (looking at the continent as a whole), and so there's no
detectable pattern. The only detectable pattern during this period
are the wars attributable to technology cycles (K-cycles).

But things change by the 1900s. By that time, all the East European
timelines have merged into WW I, and all the West European timelines
have merged into WW II, resulting in two world wars where the crisis
wars finally dominate the technology effect wars.

That is, I believe, the explanation of the "world war anomaly."

In fact, it really has to be something along these lines. If
K-cycles dominate the war cycle prior to the 1800s, and then they
don't after the 1800s, then something else must be dominating
K-cycles after the 1800s. Merged crisis wars is the logical choice.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

...
The world war anomaly isn't an anomaly. It just represents the fact that west Europe and east Europe are totally separate timelines, with WW I being an east European war and WW II being a west European war.
...

I don't agree. The essential difference between WWI and WWII was NOT geographical. In fact the essential difference between those wars flew high above mere geography, both metaphorically and physically. The essential difference between WWI and WWII can be summarized in just two words: Billy Mitchell. Indeed it was aviation technology, which had no geographic boundaries, that defines the difference. And I am beginning to think that those K-cycles and their ilk are there just to be worried over by tinkering historians, who, like tinkering biologists (me, in particular), need such delightful things to bother us.

And one more thing. I don't know how ANY credible history of Native Americans can be posited without the recognition that smallpox and measles were vastly more genocidal, in real time, than those conquering Europeans can be credited for. Coastal Indian Tribes of the Northwest, for example, suffered >90% extinction by way of peaceful contacts with Europeans. This makes the white race superior by way of antibody protection alone. Forget the horses, gunpowder, and religion. I don't think those microbes really cared very much about K-cycles.

--Croakmore