John,

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

However, "traumatic events" don't change generational timelines.

Let's get back to basics here. This forum provides an example. How
often do people change their minds in this forum? Fairly seldom.
That's human nature.

Now, what kind of "traumatic event" would be required for everyone on
this forum to agree about a major political issue? How traumatic
would the event have to be? Pretty traumatic, I'm sure you'd agree.

If you look in TFT, you'll find one and only one kind of event that's
traumatic enough to have that effect, and that's the crisis war
climax:

Originally Posted by Strauss and Howe in TFT pp 258-59

> The Crisis climax is human history's equivalent to nature's
> raging typhoon, the kind that sucks all surrounding matter into a
> single swirl of ferocious energy. Anything not lashed down goes
> flying; anything standing in the way gets flattened. Normally
> occurring late in the Fourth Turning, the climax gathers energy
> from an accumulation of unmet needs, unpaid bills, and unresolved
> problems. It then spends that energy on an upheaval whose
> direction and dimension were beyond comprehension during the prior
> Unraveling era. The climax shakes a society to its roots,
> transforms its institutions, redirects its purposes, and marks
> its people (and its generations) for life. The climax can end in
> triumph, or tragedy, or some combination of both. Whatever the
> event and whatever the outcome, a society passes through a great
> gate of history, fundamentally altering the course of civilization.

> Soon thereafter, this great gate is sealed by the Crisis
> resolution, when victors are rewarded and enemies
> punished; when empires or nations are forged or destroyed; when
> treaties are signed and boundaries redrawn; and when peace is
> accepted, troops repatriated, and life begun anew.

> One large chapter of history ends, and another starts. In a very
> real sense, one society dies -- and another is born.

The basic concept is that the crisis war climax is the ONLY thing
that can launch a generational saeculum. Having it happen next door
generally won't count. For example, the Mexican Revolution didn't
generate a crisis for us.

So you ask, "Is it possible that World War II was such a big,
traumatic event world wide that most of the world got on more-or-less
the US/UK saecular rhythm?" The answer has to be almost always "no,"
as far as I know.

Let's go to Russia during World War II. Much like World War I, there was much chaos and destruction. Millions upon millions died.

However, I can agree that it was not a crisis war because of the reasons you have stated here and on your website. The question is how such a horrible war, while not a crisis war, would affect Russia. Would it alter the cycle in any way? At first glance, it seems that the answer would be yes. Do you remember the atrocities your country or region commits, or do remember what was committed onto your country? I would lean more towards the latter.

So one would think it is certainly plausible that a man or woman who experienced a horrible non-crisis war might be scarred enough to do everything in their power to prevent another from happening, regardless of their generation. However, it hasn't happened (although one could make the case that Russia has had a long mid-cycle period) as far as I know.

Why is this? Why do prophets still glorify war and are drawn into it, even though they experienced unspeakable atrocities during their lifetime? The basis of Generational Dynamics that a society learns from their mistakes after the last crisis war and then they are able to prevent such a thing for 60 years or so. But if the atrocities committed on you and your country are the same in a crisis war and during a mid-cycle war, then why should it be any different? Maybe the crisis war isn't as important as the generational features. A prophet will still glorify and will still be drawn into war, regardless of what they experience. These "traumatic events" have no effect on them. I don't understand. The Battle of Stalingrad may or may not have been a worthy climax for the Russians, but it didn't happen next door. It might have been the climax for the Germans, even though it was worse in many ways for the Russians (although they were close to home). So it launched the cycle for Germany, but didn't alter it all all for Russia?

How many cases are there when a country fights a horrible mid-cycle war?

Matt

Originally Posted by Matt

John,


(snipped)

How many cases are there when a country fights a horrible mid-cycle war?

Matt

That's a hell of a good question, Matt.

Mr X?

Dear Richard, Matt, Wally -

I'll post my answers to these questions, but in many ways these are
very much "feeling-oriented" questions, and I'd like to hear your
answers first.

What would have to happen in a non-crisis war to turn it into a
crisis war?

For example, why is WW II a crisis war for us, but the Vietnam War is
not? In some ways they're very similar:

(*) They were both fought on foreign lands. For both of them, we had
to send our soldiers overseas.

(*) One was against Naziism and the other against Communism -- that
seems pretty similar.

(*) WW II killed a lot more people -- is that all it took to make the
difference?

(*) WW II was provoked by the attack on Pearl Harbor and Vietnam was
unprovoked. If that's the difference, then the Afghan war would be a
crisis war, since it was provoked by 9/11.

(*) Why has Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi repeatedly
failed to provoke civil war in Iraq? Does my little story about Ahmed
and his mother provide an adequate explanation for why there's no
civil war?

The main thing is, suppose that you're sitting in an easy chair
listening to the radio/tv during WW II / the Vietnam War. Why would
WW II have horrified you, and the Vietnam war would not have?

What is it about WW II that (would have) made it a "very horrible"
war, and about the Vietnam war that (would have) made it a "not very
horrible" war -- for you, your mother, your father, and the rest of
your family? What would it take to "horrify" you?

This is the kind of information that's needed to answer the questions
that Richard's been asking -- how individuals in a population
"oscillate" together to produce a dynamic system.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

John,

I wrote about 2 pages worth of material answering your questions. Then I deleted it. I realize I was looking at this the wrong way, but I can't understand why. I feel so close to figuring everything out, but I can't seem to get to that point where it all makes sense.

Frustrated and in thought,
Matt

Dear Matt,

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> I wrote about 2 pages worth of material answering your questions.
> Then I deleted it. I realize I was looking at this the wrong way,
> but I can't understand why. I feel so close to figuring
> everything out, but I can't seem to get to that point where it all
> makes sense. Frustrated and in thought, Matt

It sounds like you're getting close, and you'll bring a fresh
perspective to the problem.

One thing to remember is that the person sitting in the easy chair
during WW II is in a different generation than the corresponding
person during the the Vietnam War.

I mention this particularly because I made a mistake in my last
message to Croakmore, describing moms as "oscillating" in their
attitudes towards war, inhibiting war during awakening periods and
encouraging it during crisis periods. People don't oscillate, but
changes occur through generational changes. The mom in an awakening
period is likely to be an Artist, while the mom in the crisis period
is likely to be a Nomad, and it's the generation differences that
dictate their respective attitudes.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

I apologize to everyone for the delay in responding. During the last
couple of weeks my 5x10 subcontracting job at General Dynamics has
been turning into a 7x12 job, so I'm getting pretty wiped out. I do
plan to write a fairly lengthy response, and I'll try to do so within
in a few days.

Sincerely,

John

The Prophet/Hero generational model
of mob psychology

We've been discussing a subject of increasing interest -- something
that I call "the heart" of Strauss and Howe's cycles. What are the
emotional drivers? How do people's emotions control what they do
during the various eras?

There's very little affect in The Fourth Turning. The authors
never let us know how they feel about anything. Even more, the
authors never let us know the feelings of the people they write
about. Even the extremely violent Fourth Turning itself is described
with colorless words like catalyst, regeneracy, climax, and
resolution, as if it were taking place in a high school chemistry
lab.

This writing style helped me accept the book when I first read it,
but I've wanted to understand the emotional aspects more.

The TFT analysis methodology

TFT provides specific guidelines for analyzing generational eras and
understanding them. The methodology you need to analyze the entire
generational constellation in effect at the time, and study the
history of each generation.

For example, here is how they analyze the American High (Austerity)
era:

Originally Posted by Strauss and Howe, in TFT,

> What makes the years between 1946 and 1963 seem so quaint in
> retrospect is that today we have lost touch with the generational
> mind-sets of the people who lived through that era. The
> reclusive Old World Lost elders in dank tenements could not be
> further from the hip, high-tech Silent in their move-up senior
> condos. The "high hopes" of midlife G.I.s seem utterly [p. 149]
> stale, even insensate, to Boomer culture warriors. To young 13er
> [GenX] enterepreneurs, the Silent's corporate compliance might as
> well come from a science fiction novel. And it would be nearly
> impossible for today's Millennial children to imagine parents who
> actually prod kids to explore the outer limits of adult culture
> and taste.

> To understand how and why the American High came to be, you need
> to picture the generational history of those years. Consider
> each life-cycle transition then occurring: the hard-knocks elder
> Lost cordoning off the social perimeters to enable the mood to
> calm, the G.I.s deriving energy from midlife conformism, the
> Silents becoming adaptable helpmates, and the Boomers receiving new
> indulgences. Seen from a life-cycle perspective, the postwar mood
> was in many ways inevitable. There was absolutely no way that
> post-Crisis America would feel the same way it had back in the
> 1930s or 1920s.

> Whether the American High was a good or bad era is beside the
> point. What matters is that, in the seasonal rhythms of history,
> it was a necessary era. It cleaned up after the Crisis
> that came before and set the table for the Awakening to follow.
> It lent America an infusion of optimism and constructive energy
> and a staleness that later had to be rooted out. [pp 148-149]

This excerpt describes the methodology and also provides an example
of it. But it really leaves me cold. What does a phrase like, "the
Silents becoming adaptable helpmates" mean about how the Silents
actually got through the day at that time?

So I've developed some additional material to relate individual
psychology to the turnings and archetypes. This material, which uses
concepts of "mob psychology," is not meant to replace the TFT
explanations, but rather to supplement them.

Mob psychology and Generational Dynamics

Mob psychology is a natural fit with Generational Dynamics, because
the latter describes the attitudes and behaviors of large masses of
people. It's impossible to predict what any one person or small
group of people (or politicians) is going to do, but it shouldn't be
a surprise that it's possible to predict trends of large masses of
people.

Strauss and Howe explained this point as follows:

Originally Posted by Strauss and Howe, in TFT,

> Peter Harris closed his monograph on the "cyclical system of
> human life" by inquiring whether it might offer "the hope of
> developing a predictive social science of the future." This hope,
> of course, goes against the linearist grain of most
> Americans. We like to think that we are total masters of our
> destiny, exempt from all cycles, able to choose whatever we desire
> whenever we desire it. And, in some cases, we are. But does that
> freedom mean that our desires are unpredictable? Marketers
> and pollsters don't think so, which is why they spend billions
> learning how to anticipate when people will want to buy certain
> kinds of products or vote for certain kinds of candidates. The
> statistical reliability of these patterns doesn't nullify human
> freedom. pp 115-16

> The same principle applies to the saeculum. It doesn't force
> anybody to do anything. It doesn't limit anybody's freedom. It
> merely explains when most people will want to push their own lives
> more in one direction than in another. [TFT, pp 115-116]

The principles of mob psychology fit in very closely with these
saeculum concepts. Mob psychology doesn't force anybody to do
anything either, since you don't have to join the mob.

Have you ever been in a group and acted in a manner that was
completely out of character for you? Perhaps you were in a group
that bullied or taunted someone for being from another school or had
difficulty speaking English. Maybe you went so far as to use racial,
ethnic or religious epithets. At a greater extreme, maybe you joined
in violent "partying" after a soccer game or other sporting event.

These examples illustrate "deindividuation," which means you lose
your individuality and become simply an anonymous part of a group.
In such circumstances:

• People in groups show less self-restraint than they do as
  individuals. There's a loosening of normal constraints on behavior,
  leading to an increase in impulsive and deviant acts.
  
• Group behavior tends to be more extreme than the typical behavior
  of its individual members. Thus, liberal or conservative groups will
  be more extremely liberal or conservative than its individual members
  are.

Of course, the phrase "mob psychology" sometimes has negative
connotations. The phrase is often used, for example, to explain Nazi
concentration camps or the actions of religious cults.

However, I view mob psychology much more broadly. Here are some
things that I consider to be examples of mob psychology:

• Those of us old enough to remember the crowds of teenage girls
  that came to watch the Beatles will know what I mean when I say that a
  rock star can be a trigger for mob psychology.
  
• Any fashion craze is an example of mob psychology. Why are
  champagne, mint, and peach the fashionable colors this season? I
  have no idea, but of course that's because I'm not part of the right
  mobs.
  
• Political bandwagons can be examples of mob psychology. For
  example, I saw a poll saying that 25% of Democrats support the
  impeachment of the President, following one Senator's suggestion of
  the idea.
  
• Another political example was the recent hysteria when the UAE
  company DP World was going to take over management of some American
  ports. There was enormous public opposition to this, and the
  opposition spanned both Democrats and Republicans. This example shows
  that mob psychology related to politics is not necessarily follow
  party lines.
  
• Mob psychology is also related to the general issue of identity
  group formation. When the Danish cartoon scandal broke, there were
  mobs of Muslims across the world from Africa to Southeast Asia. In
  this case, the "mob" spanned continents.
  
• Mob psychology gives rise to mob behavior, which can take many
  forms. It might take the form of new legislation. An example is the
  enactment of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in June 1930 The Act was
  opposed by an enormous number of economists as being harmful to
  everyone, but it was very popular with the public, because of the
  perception that it would save American jobs. This was mob psychology
  in its most destructive form, even though no actual violence was
  involved. The tariff law was devastating to Japan's economy, and was
  considered by them to be almost an act of war.

If we try to examine what these examples have in common, we see that
there's an underlying attitude, sometimes latent and unrecognized,
which is brought to the surface by a triggering event.

For example, suppose ethnic group A attacks someone from ethnic group
B. There might be a variety of motives among the people in group A:

• One might be jealous of group B's greater wealth.
• One might be angry because a girlfriend dumped him.
• One might be afraid of people from B or uninformed about people
  from B.
• Another might feel deeply about historic battles between A and B.
• Another's family member might have been killed by someone in
  group B.

It's possible that none of these people are racists, though each of
them has at least a slight negative attitude toward group B. These
feelings may be may be latent or unrecognized, but they come out when
the group forms. The group takes on racist attitudes and behaviors
that no individual in the group would.

This already matches the Fourth Turning paradigm described by Strauss
and Howe, where the latent attitude is hostility to immigrants, or
xenophobia in general, and the triggering surprise is the catalyst.

We already see xenophobia increasing around the world. In America
and Europe, we see laws directed against Muslims, and in the Muslim
world, we see riots and demonstrations against America and the West.

What we're now going to do is show how mob psychology fits into the
entire Fourth Turning Crisis War paradigm.

The Hero/Prophet model of mob psychology

Now as we try to model this mob pschology more generally, we note a
couple of things.

First, the people practicing mob behavior are usually young. This is
quite clear in the case of rock concerts, but it's also clear when we
see rioters in Paris or Gaza. They're almost always young kids.

Second, there's almost always some sort of elder guidance. That
isn't always true in the case of rock stars, who may be teenagers
themselves, but for political mob psychology there almost always
seems to be an elder politician whose ideas are adopted in the mob
psychology. This is the "Prophet" in Strauss and Howe's morphology.

TFT very clearly identifies the Prophet generation as providing the
inspiration and direction for a crisis war -- as "wise elders guiding
the next Crisis" (p. 84). This puzzled me for a long time, because I
don't see anything in today's boomers that appears to support that
role. Even worse, no two boomers seem to agree on anything. How can
they be the wise elders guiding the next Crisis if they don't agree on
anything themselves?

So I concluded that Strauss and Howe must mean something slightly
different: That it's the Nomads who implement the Crisis, and that
they do so by choosing from among the Prophets' conflicting visions.
Thus, the Prophets provide the vision, but it's the Nomads that do
the choosing.

However, that idea has never made me very comfortable either,
since I see very little in today's Generation-Xers that shows that
the have the capabilities of making those kinds of selections from
among Boomers' conflicting visions. What I've seen is that GenXers
would rather be wrong than agree with any Boomer.

I'm now coming to understand that it's actually the Hero geneation
that makes those choices. It's the Hero generation that chooses from
among the conflictig boomer visions, and decides which ones need to
be implemented. The Heroes then provide guidance to the Nomads, who
implement the visions, using the Heroes as willing and eager cannon
fodder.

It's mob psychology that completes the picture by telling us exactly
how this works.

It's not that the Prophets are treated like rock stars. It's that
the Heroes choose from among the Prophets' visions in the way that
they might choose among different fashion accessories.

One day these young people might be choosing between Nicholas
Ghesquière's modern play on proportion in short, molded checked tweed
suits with stand-away collars, or John Galliano's long-haired rocker
chick looks.

The next day they might be deciding between one MP's proposal to
increase welfare aid to Muslim immigrant children and another MP's
proposal to deport them.

This completes the description of hero/prophet mob psychology model
during a fourth turning:

• There's an underlying latent attitude. TFT describes it as
  opposition to immigration, but we define it more broadly as
  xenophobia.
  
• People in the Prophet generation develop various attitudes and
  proposals toward the immigrants, ranging from supportive and
  conciliatory to hostile and punitive.
  
• Some event acts as a trigger.
  
• The people in the Hero generation, acting as a group ("mob"),
  select from among the various Prophet attitudes in the same way that
  they might settle on a fashion accessory. The selected attitude may
  be a complete surprise to everyone, and may be far more extreme than
  anyone expected.
  
• The resulting mob behavior which, once again, may be surprising
  and more extreme than anyone expected, might result in new laws or
  social customs, or may spiral into violence.

Xenophobia has been increasing around the world for two decades,
especially between Muslims and Westerners. That xenophobia has been
latent for a long time, but is now becoming more obvious. Here are
some recent examples:

• The news reports that DP World, a company headquartered in Dubai,
  UAE, triggered a major scandal and calls for new laws that would
  prevent Muslim ownership of major American assets. Senators opposed
  to Muslim ownership acted as the selected Prophets.
  
• The Danish cartoons triggered worldwide riots and demonstrations
  against the West. Anti-Wesern Muslim clerics acted as the selected
  Prophets.
  
• Suicide bombings are extreme examples. In the case of 9/11,
  Osama bin laden played the role of the Prophet; in the case of the
  London subway bombings, it was the clerics in the Pakistani
  madrassas; in the case of Israeli suicide bombings, the prophets are
  the senior leaders in Hamas and Hizbollah.

We're now going to explain how mob psychology leads to Fourth Turning
Crisis Was.

The Morphology of Crisis Eras

In TFT, page 256, there is a description of the steps of a Crisis
era. We're going to go through these steps and show how these steps
are consistent with what social psychologists call "mob psychology":

• As the Unraveling era transitions into a Crisis era, mob
  psychology is almost anathema, since Unraveling is a time of
  maximum individualism.
  
• "A Crisis era begins with a catalyst -- a startling event
  (or sequence of events) that produces a sudden shift in mood."
  
  TFT discusses how "sparks of history" have different results in
  different eras: "Sparks in a High ['austerity' period] tend to
  reinforce feelings of security; in an Awakening, argument; in an
  Unraveling, anxiety. Come the Fourth Turning, sparks of history
  trigger a fierce new dynamic of public synergy." (p. 257)
  
  The "public synergy" that follows the catalyst is the first sign of
  the mob psychology that follows. A catalyst can cause any number of
  different reactions in the public. Earlier, we described how the
  public reacted to the 1929 stock market crash by demanding the
  disastrous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act.
  
  Historian Wolfgang Schivelbusch, in his 2000 book, The Culture of
  Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery, examined what
  happened when the reaction to the catalyst is to declare war.
  
  He found that an almost festive jubilation accompanies the
  declarations of war on all sides -- including festive celebrations in
  Charleston in 1861, Paris in 1870 (for the Franco-Prussian war), and
  the capitals of the major European powers in 1914. "The passions
  excited in the national psyche by the onset of war show how deeply
  invested the masses [are] in its potential outcome. Propaganda
  [reinforces the] conviction that 'everything [is] at stake,' and the
  threat of death and defeat [functions] like a tightly coiled spring,
  further heightening the tension." The jubilation is an anticipatory
  celebration of victory, since "nations are as incapable of imagining
  their own defeat as individuals are of conceiving their own death.
  The new desire to humiliate the enemy, [is] merely a reaction to the
  unprecedented posturing in which nations now [engage] when declaring
  war."
  
  If this description doesn't sound like mob psychology, then I don't
  know what does.
  
• "Once catalyzed, a society achieves a regeneracy -- a new
  counterentropy that reunifies and reenergizes civic life."
  
  TFT describes the regeneracy as a time when the public realizes that
  the fight is real, and that the country must unite to survive.
  
  Carl von Clausewitz, in his 1832 book On War, described how
  the Prussian people reacted when their army was defeated by Napoleon
  in 1806:
  
  
  Originally Posted by Carl von Clausewitz

  "The effect of all this outside the army -- on the people
  and on the government -- is a sudden collapse of the most anxious
  expectations, and a complete crushing of self-confidence. This leaves
  a vacuum that is filled by a corrosively expanding fear, which
  completes the paralysis. It is as if the electric charge of the main
  battle had sparked a shock to the whole nervous system of one of the
  contestants."
  If the catalyst makes the public react like they're going to a rock
  concert, then the regeneracy occurs when the rock concert theatre is
  on fire and the audience members are panicking and crushing each other
  in an attempt to escape.
  
• The regenerated society propels toward a climax -- a
  crucial moment that confirms the death of the old order and birth of
  the new.
  
  Strauss and Howe describe the Climax at length in TFT, pp 258-59:
  
  
  Originally Posted by Strauss and Howe, in TFT,

  > The Crisis climax is human history's equivalent to nature's
  > raging typhoon, the kind that sucks all surrounding matter into a
  > single swirl of ferocious energy. Anything not lashed down goes
  > flying; anything standing in the way gets flattened. Normally
  > occurring late in the Fourth Turning, the climax gathers energy
  > from an accumulation of unmet needs, unpaid bills, and unresolved
  > problems. It then spends that energy on an upheaval whose
  > direction and dimension were beyond comprehension during the prior
  > Unraveling era. The climax shakes a society to its roots,
  > transforms its institutions, redirects its purposes, and marks its
  > people (and its generations) for life. The climax can end in
  > triumph, or tragedy, or some combination of both. Whatever the
  > event and whatever the outcome, a society passes through a great
  > gate of history, fundamentally altering the course of
  > civilization.
  Shivelbusch describes what happens to the public on defeat:
  
  
  Originally Posted by Shivelbusch

  > "As the news is conveyed to the home front, the fact of defeat
  > takes on a monstrous and overwhelming dimension that was missing
  > on the battlefield. Whereas soldiers experience lost battles,
  > even lost wars, as painful but comprehensible outcomes given
  > their firsthand experience and exhaustion, the news of defeat, as
  > Clausewitz writes, plunges the home front into "panicked terror."
  > The home front has lived, in the words of a Paris commentator
  > after Sedan [where Germany defeated France in 1870], en plein
  > roman, or under an illusion, in the unshaken conviction of
  > certain victory. The intensity of the shock increases in direct
  > proportion to the distance from the actual site of defeat, a
  > phenomenon that stems from the experiential and psychological
  > differences between battlefront and home front."
  This description once again supports the "mob psychology"
  characterization. Of particular interest is the interesting comment
  that the "intensity of the shock increases in direct proportion to the
  distance from the actual site of defeat." The soldiers themselves are
  doing their jobs, and take victory or defeat in stride. But the
  public is viewing the war as a rock concert, cheering wildly after
  every song, but "panicked terror" sets in when victory turns to
  defeat.
  
• "The climax culminates in a resolution -- a triumphant or
  tragic conclusion that separates the winners from losers, resolves
  the big public questions, and establishes the new order."
  
  TFT page 259 says, "Soon thereafter, this great gate is sealed by the
  Crisis resolution, when victors are rewarded and enemies
  punished; when empires or nations are forged or destroyed; when
  treaties are signed and boundaries redrawn; and when peace is
  accepted, troops repatriated, and life begun anew. One large chapter
  of history ends, and another starts. In a very real sense, one society
  dies -- and another is born."
  
  The TFT description makes it pretty clear that the society is going
  through enormous turmoil. Schivelbusch shows how the "mob psychology"
  is not yet over among the general public. The public on the losing
  side experiences deep and widespread depression, contrasted to the
  joyous public celebrations of the victors. For the losers, the defeat
  usually causes an internal revolution, "the overthrow of the old
  regime and its subsequent scapegoating for the nation's defeat."
  
  The internal revolution leads to a quick reversal of the public mood
  to a unique type of euphoria that the public experiences as a kind of
  victory. "For a moment, the external enemy is no longer an adversary
  but something of an ally, with whose help the previous regime and now
  deposed system has been driven from power."
  
  This euphoria leads to a kind of dreamland: Once the internal
  revolution has deposed the "old regime," then the public expectation
  changes: nothing stands in the way of a return to the prewar
  status quo. The prevailing public attitude is, "The victor has
  freed us from despotism, for which we are very grateful, but now it's
  time for him to go."
  
  However, if the victorious nation "calls its defeated enemy to
  account -- instead of treating him as an innocent victim -- the mood
  shifts dramatically. The enmity that had been transformed into
  conciliation reemerges with all its former force or is even
  intensified by the feeling of having been doubly betrayed. In the
  dreamland state, memories of the real circumstances of defeat fade
  away, replaced by the losers' conviction that their nation laid down
  its arms of its own free will, in a kind of gentlem`an's agreement
  that placed trust in the chivalry of the enemy."

Answers to miscellaneous questions

Explaining crisis wars as mob psychology solves many theoretical
problems, and answers many questions.

It removes an enormous burden from both TFT and Generational
Dynamics. The problem that both have is to explain crisis wars in a
credible way to a first-time reader. TFT uses phrases like "raging
typhoon" and Generational Dynamics uses phrases like "visceral
energy," but these phrases are too abstract for someone previously
unfamiliar with generational theory.

Mob psychology is an easily understood concept to many readers, since
it spans everything from two guys getting drunk together in a bar to
mob violence after a sporting event. The idea of expanding the mob
psychology concept to an entire nation is not so far-fetched.

In fact, that's already been done. There is scholarly work that
explains the Nazi Holocaust by means of mob psychology. All of that
work can be brought over to explain any crisis war.

Several questions that have puzzled me for years now appear to have
relatively simple answers. For example:

• Q: Why did Japan bomb Pearl Harbor, starting a war with America,
  several times bigger than itself?
  
  A: Mob psychology.
  
• Q: Why did the South fire on Fort Sumter, starting a war with the
  North, three times bigger than itself?
  
  A: Mob psychology.
  
• Q: What would it take to make you, dear reader, pick up a machete,
  go next door, kill your neighbor and dismember his body, kill his
  children, rape his wife, and then kill her and dismember her body?
  And what more would it take to make you follow that act by doing it
  again with your other neighbors, old friends, even your extended
  family?
  
  A: Mob psychology, just as occurred in Rwanda in 1994 or Bosnia in
  1993-95. Don't think that you would be any different than anyone
  else.
  
• Q: Explain how World War II would have occurred without Hitler?
  
  A: The latent underlying attitudes among Germans in the 1920s and
  1930s were based on Germany's humiliation after it capitulated
  prematurely in WW I (which people blamed on the Jews), resulting in a
  desire for a greater, more glorious Germany. Germany's Hero
  generation decided that Hitler was the best representative of that
  attitude. They elected him and then followed him by mass psychology.
  If Hitler had never been born, then the Hero generation would have
  selected someone else with similar views.
  
• Q: Why don't crisis wars break out during Awakening periods?
  Why don't teens mobbing Beatles concerts also become xenophobic and
  want to start a war by mob psychology?
  
  A: During Crisis eras, the Hero generation can sell xenophobic mob
  psychology wars to a Nomad generation, anxious to do things and
  willing to listen to Heroes rather than Prophets. In Awakening eras,
  the young adult generation may have xenophobic war desires, but their
  Artist and Hero parents would never implement it.
  
• Q: Why are college-age students today so willing to go to war?
  
  A: Because they're in the Hero generation, and they're the ones who
  decide what wars to go to by selecting the appropriate Prophet
  politicians and supporting them through mob psychology. And don't
  forget, the underlying latent attitude is xenophobia.
  
• Q: Why does the anti-war movement keep fizzling today?
  
  A: Because it's being run by Prophet generation politicians with no
  "mob appeal" at all to the Hero generation.

Why was WW II a non-crisis war for Russia?

We'll now consider a couple of questions at greater length.

Q: Why was WW II a non-crisis war for Russia?

A: When Russia's young adult generation saw Hitler's armies coming at
them, I'm sure they were ready to strike back, and would have if they
had had a Nomad generation to feed into. Instead, their parents were
very skeptical Heroes and Artists, having seen the Bolshevik
Revolution and subsequent genocidal civil war.

Once you've experienced deindividuation in a mob, you remember what it
feels like, and you can recognize when it happens to other people.
Thus, the Russian parents in WW II recognized the mob psychology that
their children were feeling. But they undoubtedly also recognized
the same mob behavior in the German soldiers heading toward them.

The refused to fall for the pleas of their children, and they devised
a passive strategy to defeat the Germans. They allowed the Germans
to advance far enough to make their supply lines indefensible, and then
the Russians burned their own cities and towns, so that the Germans
couldn't use them for supplies. The Russians had used a similar
strategy to defeat Napoleon and the French. And, like the French,
the Germans were eventually swallowed up and defeated by the harsh
Russian winter.

Why is a civil war impossible in Iraq today?

Q: Why is a civil war impossible in Iraq today?

Iraq was formed from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, and WW I was a
crisis war for Iraq, ending in 1922. It's next crisis war was the
Iran/Iraq war of the 1980s. Thus, only about a single generation has
passed since the end of the last crisis war, so Iraq is in a
"generational awakening" period, during which a crisis civil war is
impossible.

On my web site, I've tried to explain this further to new readers by
using a little story about Ahmed. Here's the story that appeared on
my web site, and which has been quoted in this forum:

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

> "Let me try to explain this a different way. Suppose Ahmed, an
> angry young Iraqi man, tells his mom, "Mom, I'm going to fight
> the bad guys (Sunnis or Shiites). Allah be blessed!" Now, Mom is
> in her 30s or 40s. She survived the bloody Iran/Iraq war, and she
> still has nightmares about it. She says, "Ahmed, you're not going
> anywhere. I lost my father and husband in war, and you lost your
> father and your uncle. Your friend Mahmoud? His mother was raped
> repeatedly. Most of the people in our neighborhood were beaten,
> poisoned, killed, raped or tortured, or all of those. I need you
> right here, and you're going to stay here." So Ahmed stays there
> and there's no civil war."
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...060224#e060224

Now we can add a little bit more to this story. When Mom hears Ahmed
speak, it brings back memories of the time that they were going to
defeat the hated Iranians, led by Ayatollah Khomeini. It was an
exciting, romantic time for her, and she feels the same romantic
excitement when she hears Ahmed talk.

But then she quickly remembers how it all turned out. It was
exciting at first, but not after huge masses of peole started dying
-- 1 1/2 million people died in that war.

So Mom not only doesn't want Ahmed to go to a new civil war, she's
absolutely furious that those old romantic feelings are being roused
again. She lost her husband and her father because of those
feelings, and she's not about to lose her son. She angrily tells
Ahmed that he's not going anywhere.

Fernando

Q: Provide an interpretation of the lyrics to the Abba song
Fernando.

Originally Posted by Abba

FERNANDO
(B.Andersson/B.Ulvaeus)
First release 1976

Can you hear the drums Fernando?
I remember long ago another starry night like this
In the firelight Fernando
You were humming to yourself and softly strumming your guitar
I could hear the distant drums
And sounds of bugle calls were coming from afar

They were closer now Fernando
Every hour every minute seemed to last eternally
I was so afraid Fernando
We were young and full of life and none of us prepared to die
And I'm not ashamed to say
The roar of guns and cannons almost made me cry

There was something in the air that night
The stars were bright, Fernando
They were shining there for you and me
For liberty, Fernando
Though I never thought that we could lose
There's no regret
If I had to do the same again
I would, my friend, Fernando

Now we're old and grey Fernando
And since many years I haven't seen a rifle in your hand
Can you hear the drums Fernando?
Do you still recall the fateful night we crossed the Rio Grande?
I can see it in your eyes
How proud you were to fight for freedom in this land

There was something in the air that night
The stars were bright, Fernando
They were shining there for you and me
For liberty, Fernando
Though I never thought that we could lose
There's no regret
If I had to do the same again
I would, my friend, Fernando

Yes, if I had to do the same again
I would, my friend, Fernando...

A: I understand that Abba has never revealed what war these lyrics
refer to, but it appears to be the Mexican-American war of the 1840s.

This was a non-crisis war for America, but it was a crisis war for
Mexico, since it was combined with a crisis civil war.

In that case, the Fernando lyrics don't make sense. In particular,
the lyrics "If I had to do the same again, I would, my friend,
Fernando" could not be true.

Thus, the lyrics must be referring to some non-crisis war, but it's
hard to imagine what war that could be.

Chances are that the Abba lyricists were just trying to be romantic.

Answers to other questions

Originally Posted by Croakmore

> If this true then I really don't see the "dynamics" of your GD
> model. What fuels your endogenously controlled system?

There's another aspect that we can add to the systems dynamics
discussion that we've already had. The crisis war is generated by a
huge burst of energy created by a nationwide mob action. One way to
think of that is that cycle is fueled by this massive burst of
energy.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> So one would think it is certainly plausible that a man or woman
> who experienced a horrible non-crisis war might be scarred enough
> to do everything in their power to prevent another from happening,
> regardless of their generation. However, it hasn't happened
> (although one could make the case that Russia has had a long
> mid-cycle period) as far as I know.

> Why is this? Why do prophets still glorify war and are drawn into
> it, even though they experienced unspeakable atrocities during
> their lifetime?

I don't know of any Boomer that glorifes war. Here's what I've said
before: When the time comes and the nation is facing its greatest
danger, the Heroes go off to war fearlessly and do their duty. Without
any thought for themselves, they go proudly and valiantly into battle,
and they aren't even sad about it. It's the other generations that
stand on the shore in tears, waving goodby as their ships disappear
over the horizon, knowing that they'll never see most of them again,
but also knowing that there's no choice.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> The basis of Generational Dynamics that a society learns from
> their mistakes after the last crisis war and then they are able to
> prevent such a thing for 60 years or so. But if the atrocities
> committed on you and your country are the same in a crisis war and
> during a mid-cycle war, then why should it be any different?

A crisis war comes from the Hero generation's mob psychology as a
kind of rock concert form hell. When the time comes for the next
Crisis war, the people Prophet generation really don't have the skills
to hold back the tide.

A non-crisis war is different but not because of the Prophets.
It's different because the old Hero generation is still around, and
the old Hero generation does have the necessary skills. But
they're not around for the next crisis war.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> How many cases are there when a country fights a horrible
> mid-cycle war?

Originally Posted by Pink Splice

> That's a hell of a good question, Matt. Mr X?

There's a lot of confusion about this. Some people think that Iraq
must be in a crisis period because so much of the rest of the world
is, and it should "rub off" or something. But that's impossible. The
saeculum is launched by the crisis war climax, which means that if a
country's generational timeline is going to change because of a
non-crisis war, then it has to come at the CLIMAX of the war, not at
the beginning.

The same is true of Russia in WW II. I could not have started as
crisis war, by definition. If there had been a sufficiently
devastating crisis, then it might be argued that the climax could
re-launch the saeculum at the first turning. But there was no such
devastating crisis, so it couldn't have even happened then.

I know of only two cases where I believe that a saeculum was
relaunched:

• The "Puritan flip," which I've written about at length before.
  The Prophet children adopted Puritanism to rebel against the Anglican
  church, and then fled to America. Their kids then rebelled against
  the Puritanism, causing an awakening in the 1840s, just as the
  English Civil War / crisis war was going on in England. The
  Pilgrims' trip to America relaunched the saeculum in 1T.
  
• Stalin drove the Chechens out of Chechnya in 1945, and the came
  back 15 years later. The forced relocation appears to have
  re-launched their saeculum from 1T.

What both of these examples have in common is the complete
destruction of all generational relationships. Relocation is
something for the young, and so the elder generations tend to get
lost in the massive relocation. With only the younger generations
remaining, the entire saeculum is re-launched.

Summary

Interpreting a crisis war as an example of nationwide mob psychology
not only makes sense, but also is very valuable for both The Fourth
Turning and Generational Dynamics.

First, mob psychology makes generational theory much more credible
since it essentially becomes part of Social Psychology, instead of
being something off by itself.

Second, it answers a lot of questions and makes a lot of things make
a lot more sense.

John

John J. Xenakis
john@GenerationalDynamics.com
http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

This makes a lot of sense and clears up my questions. Something was off to me, but I couldn't put my finger on it. What I was saying seemed to make sense, but when I added it all up, I got the wrong number. That's why I asked so many questions. What I was saying didn't work.

Thanks,

Matt

I would like to see how this dynamic works in 40 and 80-year mid-cycle periods. That's where things get sticky!

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

The Prophet/Hero generational model
of mob psychology


Interpreting a crisis war as an example of nationwide mob psychology
not only makes sense, but also is very valuable for both The Fourth
Turning and Generational Dynamics.

First, mob psychology makes generational theory much more credible
since it essentially becomes part of Social Psychology, instead of
being something off by itself.

Second, it answers a lot of questions and makes a lot of things make
a lot more sense.

John

John J. Xenakis
john@GenerationalDynamics.com
http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Interesting. Thank you, Mr X.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Q: Why did Japan bomb Pearl Harbor, starting a war with America,
several times bigger than itself?

A: Mob psychology.

Just a quibble here, John. Isn't "mob psychology" a bit of a cop out; it has very little explanatory value, at least so far as WWII is concerned. Sure, Hitler charmed the German's into a "mob psychology." But what does that really explain? I don't believe Japan attacked Pearl Harbor out of "mob psychology." Japan attacked Pearl Harbor because the alpha samurai Hideki Tojo learned from Gen. George C. Marshall at the University of Chicago in the early 30s that "no democracy can fight a war lasting longer than seven years and win it." Tojo was betting that Japan had more tenacity in the long run, and so was Hirohito. I suppose you could say fascism causes "mob psychology," but so what?

I think you're confusing "mob psychology" with the cause, which is actually an effect. Samurais don't need to resort to "mob psychology," whatever that is. They just chop off a few heads and terrify the mob. The real action is strategic, coming from radical opportunists who put it all on the line. And no self-respecting samurai could do anything else.

—Croakmore

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

What I've seen is that GenXers
would rather be wrong than agree with any Boomer.

And that about sums up the overall value of your post.

You'd be so much more interesting if you just reduced the size of your ego to, mmm, say Jupiter's diameter. In that case maybe you'd be open to (oh God forbid!) critical feedback on the post above. Maybe you'd even try to provide straight answers to critical questions!

But, alas, I fear it's not in the cards. So I guess we'll have to just praise you on how wonderful you are, how inadequate S&H are, and put up with bigoted attitudes like the one quoted above.

And it's a shame. What could have been really fascinating is relegated to merely interesting. Carry on.

Dear Richard,

Originally Posted by Croakmore

> Just a quibble here, John. Isn't "mob psychology" a bit of a cop
> out; it has very little explanatory value, at least so far as WWII
> is concerned. Sure, Hitler charmed the German's into a "mob
> psychology." But what does that really explain?

This isn't what I'm saying at all. I'm not saying that Hitler
charmed the Germans into a "mob psychology." Just the opposite: I'm
saying that Hitler came to power in the first place because of a mob
psychology. In other words, Hitler was the effect, not the cause.

If Hitler had promoted himself as some kind of "kinder, gentler"
candidate running on a platform of helping the poor and downtrodden,
but then only revealed his true colors after he came to power, then
the concept that he "charmed the Germans" might work.

But clearly that wasn't true. Mein Kampf was published in
1925, so every person who voted for Hitler knew very well what they
were getting. For example, they didn't know that he would build
extermination chambers, but they knew that he was virulently
anti-Semitic, and that in office he would take some action to
control the Jews -- perhaps confiscating their property, perhaps
deporting them, perhaps jailing some of them.

But this is a perfect illustration of how the "mob psychology" works.
Persons who voted for Hitler agreed that Jews were the problem, but
they differed from person to person what the solution was. Some
thought confiscating property would be the solution. Others thought
that jailing or deportation would do it. Probably very, very few
considered mass genocide to be the solution. All of these people had
different solutions in mind, but they all voted for Hitler because
Hitler became the solution.

This is "deindividuation" in action. Persons voting for Hitler
might think that confiscating property or jailing or deportation was
wrong, but they weren't voting for those solutions. They were part
of the mob voting for Hitler. "I'm not doing anything wrong," a
voter might think. "I'm just voting for a candidate who shares my
views and has promised to find a solution."

Then, after Hitler is in power, the mob psychology takes the next
step. "I'm just arresting the Jews and putting them on the train.
I'm just doing my job. Whatever happens after the trains leave is
Hitler's responsiblity, not mine."

Even Adolf Eichmann, who masterminded the genocide, could say, "It's
not my fault. I was just following orders. I was just a cog in the
machine. If I hadn't done the job then someone else would have."

(We can even relate this to system dynamics again. We have
millions of "objects" moving at random with respect to one another,
except that they share one thing in common: A belief in the guilt of
Jews. Step by step, they move from individual random movements into a
concerted group action, just as a mass of water molecules under the
influence of the moon's gravity might form a wave.)

I'm really just beginning to research this whole subject, but as I
understand it, it's widely believed that "mob psychology" was the
reason that so many Germans were willing to participate in the
holocaust. If that's true, then it's reasonable to believe that mob
psychology much apply to other situations as well, and therefore it's
reasonable to speculate that "mob psychology" wars are the same thing
as "crisis wars."

One of the classic books on the subject is by Eric Hoffer, The True
Believer : Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements. This book
begins with this sentence: "It is a truism that many who join a rising
revolutionary movement are attracted by the prospect of sudden and
spectacular change in their conditions of life."

This could easily be a part of the explanation of crisis wars.

Originally Posted by Croakmore

> I don't believe Japan attacked Pearl Harbor out of "mob
> psychology." Japan attacked Pearl Harbor because the alpha samurai
> Hideki Tojo learned from Gen. George C. Marshall at the University
> of Chicago in the early 30s that "no democracy can fight a war
> lasting longer than seven years and win it." Tojo was betting that
> Japan had more tenacity in the long run, and so was Hirohito. I
> suppose you could say fascism causes "mob psychology," but so
> what?

Surely, Richard, you can't really believe that Japan attacked Pearl
Harbor because somebody had a conversation with somebody ten years
earlier. Do you really believe that if Tojo and Marshall had never
met, then Japan would not have attacked Pearl Harbor????

I would provide a different explanation. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff act
of 1930, which I described in my last message, was a MUCH more potent
factor than some conversation between two people.

Originally Posted by Croakmore

> I think you're confusing "mob psychology" with the cause, which
> is actually an effect. Samurais don't need to resort to "mob
> psychology," whatever that is. They just chop off a few heads and
> terrify the mob. The real action is strategic, coming from
> radical opportunists who put it all on the line. And no
> self-respecting samurai could do anything else.

I'm not talking about all wars, or all acts of violence. I'm talking
about a specific kind of war, a "crisis war." Crisis wars are unique
for their genocidal horror.

John

John J. Xenakis
john@GenerationalDynamics.com
http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

"Massive bursts of energy"?

"Fuel for cycles"?

"Morphology of crisis eras"?

And then the capper:

"Mob psychology"?

I was also expecting John to mention: "Historical dynamite," "ego-enriched blast caps," and "titanium-claded mob-containment devises."

I think quantitative historians like John X. and Mike Alexander need to be more careful with their physical metaphors. Historical psychology is not yet ready for physical metaphors — "massive bursts of [exactly what kind of] energy"? — [exactly what kind of] "fuel for cycles"? ... say what?

Why do social scientists need to prop up their theories with physical metaphors and then call them "dynamic" or "mechanical"? You don't see physicists propping up their theories with social metaphors, do you? Why can't historians who want to add pizzazz to their theories invent their own socio-biological metaphors? Here's a couple of constructive examples: "Hitler's Germany devoured Belgium like a bunch of hungry canibals"; or "Japan took to the air over Pearl Harbor like a flock of samurai sea gulls." Those work.

Is there enough known about "mob psychology" to model it in a physical context? I serious doubt if psychologists can model "mob psychology" in a psychological context.

At some point Ockham needs to come by and shave off these shadowy distractions with his trusty razor.

—Croakmore

Mr. E.,

I think Mike has used the "mechanism" concept in only the most generic way.

Originally Posted by Croakmore

Why do social scientists need to prop up their theories with physical metaphors and then call them "dynamic" or "mechanical"?

Because they want people to think they deserve the 'scientist' moniker? Really, 'philosopher' is a much more accurate term for the kinds of things they do. And you don't see philosophers feeling the need to patch inappropriate metaphor onto their work...

After further consideration I question my own negative assertions about historians misusing physical metaphors. Maybe you CAN'T study history without applying at least a few physical metaphors. One could hardly speak about anything without using metaphors, physical or otherwise. Metaphors, similes, and anologies pervade the forests of literature like word-boring insects. You see, you can't get away from them.

In truth, I don't have that much trouble with Mike's and John's physical metaphors, which ought to be granted a measure of contextual flexibility. Maybe I'm bitching about the lack of conciseness (elegance) in their "models" — and perhaps that's not so easy for historians to do. Maybe I'm even bitching about using the word "model." Scientific arrogance on my part, perhaps.

—Croakmore

Originally Posted by Zarathustra

Mr. E.,

I think Mike has used the "mechanism" concept in only the most generic way.

No I use it in the same way as chemists speak of a chemical reaction mechanism. That is, a serious of elementary processes or steps that make up some more complex process. In the case of the Medieval saeculum the mechanism I propose works like this:

Let P be the adult population, F be food supply, Pf be food prices, and B be birth rate. F is a constant the others are variables

1. P/F affects Pf directly
2. Pf affects B inversely
3. B affect P directly, but with a lag

These three causative relations describe a negative feedback loop with a built-in lag. Such a system will display cycles, which will show up a a price cycle.

1. High Pf causes distress
2. Distress cause unrest

This mechanism will produce an unrest cycle. The two cycles should be aligned with each other.

1. High distress/unrest + the right generational constellation cause a social moment
2. A social moment creates a dominant generation out of those coming of age during it through their common experience of the social moment.
3. Those not members of a dominant generation are members of a recessive generation.

The kind of generations formed depends on the response to the distress/unrest by the elder recessive generation who came of age before the social moment. If the elder generation are Nomads the response will be "outer-directed" and dominant Heroes and recessive Artists will be formed. If the elder generation are Artists then the response will be "inner-directed" and dominant Prophets and recessive Nomads will be formed.

In a pre-saecular population the kind of response will depend on the nature of the unrest. If it is something obviously external like an invasion, the response will be outer-directed. If it is something internal like famine or plague, the response will likely be inner-directed.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Fernando lyrics don't make sense. In particular, the lyrics "If I had to do the same again, I would, my friend,
Fernando" could not be true.

Okay, how about 'Waterloo' lyrics:

"The history book on the shelf
Is always repeating itself"

Anyway, Fernando was written in the 70's and probably more influenced by Vietnam and the idea of 'wars of liberation' then any specific war. The Viets were more than willing to 'do it all again,' until they got what they were fighting for. Whether this was the result of ideology or a desire for liberation or, as in Iraq, long established confrontational elements in the society, is debatable.

Also, explaining events by using the term 'Mob Psychology' seems to me like explaining a soccer goal by saying the ball was round and so it rolled. True enough, but...

BTW: I'm now in Saigon (Ho Chi Minh City), where I've been living for the last six months since moving down from Hanoi - which remains in many ways almost a different country.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Originally Posted by Zarathustra

Mr. E.,

I think Mike has used the "mechanism" concept in only the most generic way.

No I use it in the same way as chemists speak of a chemical reaction mechanism. That is, a serious of elementary processes or steps that make up some more complex process. In the case of the Medieval saeculum the mechanism I propose works like this:

Let P be the adult population, F be food supply, Pf be food prices, and B be birth rate. F is a constant the others are variables

1. P/F affects Pf directly
2. Pf affects B inversely
3. B affect P directly, but with a lag

These three causative relations describe a negative feedback loop with a built-in lag. Such a system will display cycles, which will show up a a price cycle.

1. High Pf causes distress
2. Distress cause unrest

This mechanism will produce an unrest cycle. The two cycles should be aligned with each other.

1. High distress/unrest + the right generational constellation cause a social moment
2. A social moment creates a dominant generation out of those coming of age during it through their common experience of the social moment.
3. Those not members of a dominant generation are members of a recessive generation.

The kind of generations formed depends on the response to the distress/unrest by the elder recessive generation who came of age before the social moment. If the elder generation are Nomads the response will be "outer-directed" and dominant Heroes and recessive Artists will be formed. If the elder generation are Artists then the response will be "inner-directed" and dominant Prophets and recessive Nomads will be formed.

In a pre-saecular population the kind of response will depend on the nature of the unrest. If it is something obviously external like an invasion, the response will be outer-directed. If it is something internal like famine or plague, the response will likely be inner-directed.

Okay, let me rephrase and say you're more respectable and specific in your application of mathamatical/scientific terms.

As you know, I am not as disinclined as you to see endogenous and ontological forces at work in the saeculum. One thing I hope to do someday is present that point of view more convincingly to you (even if you still strongly disagree, at least you forced me to reflect on and refine my thoughts).

I wish we had had time that night we met to discuss those things one-on-one. That would have been so much fun!

Originally Posted by lexpat

> Anyway, Fernando was written in the 70's and probably more
> influenced by Vietnam and the idea of 'wars of liberation' then
> any specific war. The Viets were more than willing to 'do it all
> again,' until they got what they were fighting for. Whether this
> was the result of ideology or a desire for liberation or, as in
> Iraq, long established confrontational elements in the society, is
> debatable.

You're absolutely right. I completely messed up that posting, and
right now I don't even know what I must have been thinking. Thanks
for the correction.

Originally Posted by lexpat

> Also, explaining events by using the term 'Mob Psychology' seems
> to me like explaining a soccer goal by saying the ball was round
> and so it rolled. True enough, but...

Because terms like "mob psychology" and "raging typhoon" and
"ferocious energy" are the things that distinguish crisis wars from
non-crisis wars.

For example, the 1967 Tet offensive illustrated the ferocious energy
of mob psychology. Militarily it was disastrous as the American
forces, exhibiting gallantry and using superior forces, won the
battle militarily, even though there was no mob psychology or
ferocious energy on the American side.

Originally Posted by lexpat

> BTW: I'm now in Saigon (Ho Chi Minh City), where I've been living
> for the last six months since moving down from Hanoi - which
> remains in many ways almost a different country.

My previous paragraph is, of course, an American point of view. How
do the Vietnamese see it?

Another question: Vietnam must be well into its Awakening Era by now.
How is that going? If I were to take a guess, it would be that
Saigon's young people (Prophet generation) would be expressing
increasing unhappiness with their northern masters.

Your paragraph quoted above almost seems a bit schizophrenic. You
mention that the south remains a different country from the north,
and you give both the "southern" and "northern" names of the city
you're living in. Does that mean that the old north/south
conflicts are being revived?

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
john@GenerationalDynamics.com
http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Richard,

Originally Posted by Croakmore

> After further consideration I question my own negative assertions
> about historians misusing physical metaphors. Maybe you CAN'T
> study history without applying at least a few physical metaphors.
> One could hardly speak about anything without using metaphors,
> physical or otherwise. Metaphors, similes, and anologies pervade
> the forests of literature like word-boring insects. You see, you
> can't get away from them.

I guess I can see why you might object to using physical words like
"energy" to refer to social or historical events, but in this
particular case it's been quite natural to me.

"Energy" is always the way I've come to understand crisis wars, what
Strauss and Howe call a "raging typhoon."

When I hear of tens of thousands of young soldiers rushing onto
Normandy beach to be slaughtered, the "feeling" that I have is of
enormous energy pushing those soldiers. When I hear that hundreds of
thousands of people go out and slaughter their former neighbors,
friends, lovers, and even relatives by marriage, as happened in
Rwanda and Bosnia in the 90s, and is happening in Darfur today, (but
is NOT happening in Iraq today), the "feeling" that I get is of
enormous energy.

For a non-crisis war, I don't get that feeling of energy. When
Hitler's army advanced deep into Russia, that took an enormous amount
of energy. If Russia's army had met the Germany army in a huge
battle, Russia would have been exhibiting similar energy. But when
Russia took a passive strategy, letting Germany starve and freeze to
death, then I don't get a feeling of energy.

And indeed, there is a physical energy component, isn't there? When
a tidal wave / tsunami smashes onto the shore, there's actual
physical energy. When a huge army smashes onto a shore, there's
"psychic energy" involved, but there's also a great deal of physical
energy, human energy channeled into the landing.

Whenever I get into a conversation with someone about crisis wars,
sooner or later I ask some variation of this question: What would it
take for you personally, Richard Emery, to wake up one morning, pick
up a machete, go next door, kill your neighbor and dismember his body,
kill his children, rape his wife, and then kill her and dismember her
body? And what more would it take to make you follow that act by doing
it again with your other neighbors, old friends, even your extended
family?

Now this isn't a scene out of some macabre horror movie. It's what
actually happens in real life in these crisis wars. Real people,
just like you and me and anyone else in this forum actually perform
these acts. So you can't say that you would never do anything like
that, because people just like you and me did do those things.

So I'm using the concepts of "mob psychology" to explain these acts.
But I'm easy to get along with, Richard. If you don't like the "mob
psychology" explanation, then tell me what your explanation is.
What's your explanation for why you or I or anyone else in this forum
would go out and perform acts like that?

Just one other point. When authors like Eric Hoffer and Hannah
Arendt researched the holocaust and attributed it to mob psychology,
they weren't using an analogy. They weren't saying that was happened
was "like" mob psychology, or that it was "analogous to" mob
psychology, or that it could be "modeled by" mob psychology. They
were saying that it actually was mob psychology.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
john@GenerationalDynamics.com
http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Another question: Vietnam must be well into its Awakening Era by now.
How is that going? If I were to take a guess, it would be that
Saigon's young people (Prophet generation) would be expressing
increasing unhappiness with their northern masters.

Your paragraph quoted above almost seems a bit schizophrenic. You
mention that the south remains a different country from the north,
and you give both the "southern" and "northern" names of the city
you're living in. Does that mean that the old north/south
conflicts are being revived?

Well I've always been a little skeptical about turnings outside the Anglo-American world. So many of the conflicts in this part of the world are tribal or regional. People have been living where they are for thousands of years here and really haven't been unified in nation states all that long. That may change, however, as people continue to sort themselves in other ways.

In the south, Ho Chi Minh City (official name and the one most younger people use), is a place increasingly connected to the outside world. There are many many Viet khieu here (overseas Viets) - some older ones returning to invest, some younger ones returning to discover their heritage. Many of the college age kids I teach would like to emigrate. They just see more opportunity elsewhere. Are they 'prophets?' Well I think they would very much like to be whatever people their age are in America and Europe.

In the north, where there are of course very few Viet khieu, the generational divide is much more distinct. The college aged kids are more
prophet like, but this is tempered by the inherent conservatism of Confucian culture.

I taught a class last year at PetroVietnam Finance Corp in Hanoi on western banking practices. (The government set up the corp to pool petro money for investment that would otherwise get spent all over the place). My students were all in their late twenties, mostly business grads on their way up. When we talked about the future and how the country will change, they always spoke in terms of generations. The hard nosed nationalists of the war era are still in charge and will be until they simply die off. That's the Confucian way. Deng in China was an anomaly.

Actually, to jump on my hobbyhorse for moment. I think what will change Vietnam the most is the same thing that has changed the US: mobility and sorting. HCMC, being far more capitalist minded, attracts those who think they can thrive in that environment. Those who want to rise by other means stay in Hanoi. Internal migration in Asia, and indeed all over, is one of the great stories of our time.

We humans are sorting ourselves economically and eographically ...which makes me wonder: just what am I doing living above a shop in Saigon that specializes in doing reproductions in oil of classic paintings with tourists faces inserted? :?

Originally Posted by Zarathustra

As you know, I am not as disinclined as you to see endogenous and ontological forces at work in the saeculum.

Partly because I do not know what ontological force means. As for endogenous, my model is endogenous wrt the society that experiences the saeculum and so it does involves endogenous forces, so to speak.

Where I see the difference between our viewpoints is in the actor. For me the actor are individual people whose response is depending on both their enviroment (which is produced by the negative feedback mechanism) and my their programing (their previous experiences that have shaped the way they view the world).

You appear to see the larger society as actor, but I may be wrong there.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Originally Posted by Zarathustra

As you know, I am not as disinclined as you to see endogenous and ontological forces at work in the saeculum.

Partly because I do not know what ontological force means. As for endogenous, my model is endogenous wrt the society that experiences the saeculum and so it does involves endogenous forces, so to speak.

Where I see the difference between our viewpoints is in the actor. For me the actor are individual people whose response is depending on both their enviroment (which is produced by the negative feedback mechanism) and my their programing (their previous experiences that have shaped the way they view the world).

You appear to see the larger society as actor, but I may be wrong there.

I rather agree with Zar about ontological "forces," although I'm unsure how to measure them. Evolution of the Darwinian kind, for example, does not take place in individual organisms. Something bigger is happening. Sean thinks that an individual will reflect its biological history in its early development — that its ontogeny reflects ("recapitulates") its phylogeny — but many biologists continue to refute ORP, as I do to some persnickity degree.

To me the genomic message is carried by individuals, but they are mere quanta to a larger entanglement engaged in a bottom-up (open-ended) style evolutionary career. The genome is not the individual. And it is the genome that evolves.

Mike, have you considered portraying your mechanistic theory as some kind of a simple math model based upon your principles of covariation? This might actually work in an interesting way if you weighted the measures of P, F, Pf, B etc., so as to function in a zero-sum context? The math expression "varies as" (I can't print the symbol here) becomes the "mechanical" algorithm for, maybe, a "concordance-discordance matrix" in a Condorcet decision methdology.

—Croakmore