Originally Posted by
John J. Xenakis
> John,
> We Americans are incapable today of remotely understanding the
> anxiety and horror that our grandparents felt in 1944 when they
> sent their sons, brothers and fathers onto the beaches of
> Normandy, fully knowing that they would be massively slaughtered;
> or the fury and desire for revenge they felt when they firebombed
> and nuked German and Japanese cities, killing millions of
> civilians. Concepts like "good," "bad" and "collective
> responsibility" recede in relevance in a crisis war, when a
> panicky country believes that its very existence is in danger.
> Recent crisis wars include the Balkans and Rwanda wars of the
> 1990s, and the Darfur genocide of today, which numerous U.N.
> Resolutions have somehow failed to stop.
> In the Lebanese war, it's interesting to contrast the styles of
> the two belligerents. Israel is fighting in a "hot" crisis war
> style, furiously bombing infrastructure, calling up new reserves
> every day, confronting Hizbollah terrorists on their own soil, and
> now feeling very anxious about the U.N. peace deal.
> Iran/Hizbollah terrorists have been fighting in a "cool"
> non-crisis war style, planning for six years, launching missiles
> from the comfort of home, manipulating and drawing in Israel,
> forcing them to kill civilians, and now methodically using the
> U.N. deal as a pawn to advance its longer-term strategy.
> You've listed the options when a nation loses a war, but when
> something goes wrong in a crisis war there's a lot more going on.
> Here's how Carl Von Clausewitz described it in his 1832 classic,
> On War:
> "The effect of defeat outside the army -- on the people and on
> the government -- is a sudden collapse of the wildest
> expectations, and total destruction of self-confidence. The
> destruction of these feelings creates a vacuum, and that vacuum
> gets filled by a fear that grows corrosively, leading to total
> paralysis. It's a blow to the whole nervous system of the losing
> side, as if caused by an electric charge. This effect may appear
> to a greater or lesser degree, but it's never completely missing.
> Then, instead of rushing to repair the misfortune with a spirit of
> determination, everyone fears that his efforts will be futile; or
> he does nothing, leaving everything to Fate." The concept of
> "good v. bad" means something completely different at such times.
> And it's hardly an exaggeration to say that neither the Germans
> nor the Japanese have yet fully dealt with their defeats 61 years
> ago.
> You write:
> >>> "Some Americans, to judge from my email bag, apparently
> believe we are in a crisis war today. I don't agree; but I do
> think it possible that, if we continue to permit the proliferation
> of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons—and all the evidence
> indicates we shall so continue—we could be in a crisis war in a
> decade or so. And Israel, a nation we regard as a friend, is in a
> crisis war right now, against an enemy that has sworn to
> annihilate her.
> >>> "Perhaps it’s time to take out the doctrine of collective
> responsibility and take a look at it, make up our collective mind
> about it. Or else, brace ourselves to lose that coming crisis
> war, or—what really amounts to the same thing—to end it
> inconclusively."
> Israel is indeed in the early stages of a crisis war, as is
> America. The Afghan, Iraqi and Lebanese wars are just early
> skirmishes. The real gathering storm can be seen in increasing
> cooperation of the members of the new axis: Iran, China, Korea and
> Pakistan. Before it's over, we'll all remember again the same
> anxiety, fury and desire for vengeance that we felt in 1945.
> It's impossible to predict many things, such as who the winners
> and losers of this crisis war will be. But there's one thing that
> can be predicted with total, absolute, almost mathematical
> certainty: It will not end inconclusively.