Dear Sean,

Originally Posted by Zarathustra

> No reply, John? I am not surprised. Wink

Reply to what??? To your "oatmeal" remark? To your old, rehashed
Iraq war arguments? To your "psychotic prophet" remark? I didn't
even realize you expected a reply. I took the trouble to write a
lengthy, serious reponse to a posting of yours, and you just replied
with jokes and a political speech. You never addressed the main point
of my posting, which had to do with Silents versus Prophets and Xers,
and preparing the country for the impending crisis war with China and
the "clash of civilizations" world war.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Dear Sean,

Originally Posted by Zarathustra

> No reply, John? I am not surprised. Wink

Reply to what??? To your "oatmeal" remark? To your old, rehashed
Iraq war arguments? To your "psychotic prophet" remark? I didn't
even realize you expected a reply. I took the trouble to write a
lengthy, serious reponse to a posting of yours, and you just replied
with jokes and a political speech. You never addressed the main point
of my posting, which had to do with Silents versus Prophets and Xers,
and preparing the country for the impending crisis war with China and
the "clash of civilizations" world war.

Good to see that nothing has changed, ol' boy.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Dear Mr. Saari,

Seymour Hersh really disgusts me. His seething hatred of America
comes through every time he opens his mouth, and he shares with John
Kerry the belief that the soldiers in our armed forces are the same as
Nazi storm troopers.

:lol: :lol: :lol:

Talk about psychotic Boomers! Your zeal (and hyperbole) are classic. I love you John.

Not this again...

John, do you think you could lump the Gulf War into that Korea Kosovo category for Iraq? There were atrocities, but it doesn't seem to be fought with the intensity of the Iraq-Iran war of the 1980's.

Dear Matt,

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> John, do you think you could lump the Gulf War into that Korea
> Kosovo category for Iraq? There were atrocities, but it doesn't
> seem to be fought with the intensity of the Iraq-Iran war of the
> 1980's.

I've never really thought of it that way, but that makes a lot of
sense, the proof being in how quickly the Iraqi army collapsed in
1991.

However, to be precise, remember that the Gulf War really began six
months earlier, with Saddam's invasion of Kuwait. Like the Kosovo and
Korean wars, this invasion would be an "Austerity era" war, designed
to seal the gains made during the preceding crisis war (in this case,
the Iran/Iraq war that Saddam had started).

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Sorry, I was unaware that the Gulf War didn't encompass the invasion of Kuwait.

One thing I have learned from studying military history is that the mistakes in the next war often result from events in the last war. For example, the reason why the Iraqi's didn't fight hard in Gulf War I was because after fighting the Iranians, they didn't want to fight the Americans. In their eyes we were ten feet tall and immune to toxins. They were whipped before the battles began.

That's also a big part of the reason Rumsfeld and the rest of the Bush II administration underestimated the difficulty of their occupation in Gulf War II. The Iraqi military was more or less given promises that they could keep their position in society. When the army was disbanded and hundreds of thousands of young Iraqi men became effectivly unemployed, it gave everyone resisting the occupation for whatever reason a large supply of militarally skilled allies. The result was very predictable.

Originally Posted by herbal tee

> One thing I have learned from studying military history is that
> the mistakes in the next war often result from events in the last
> war. For example, the reason why the Iraqi's didn't fight hard in
> Gulf War I was because after fighting the Iranians, they didn't
> want to fight the Americans. In their eyes we were ten feet tall
> and immune to toxins. They were whipped before the battles began.

> That's also a big part of the reason Rumsfeld and the rest of the
> Bush II administration underestimated the difficulty of their
> occupation in Gulf War II. The Iraqi military was more or less
> given promises that they could keep their position in society.
> When the army was disbanded and hundreds of thousands of young
> Iraqi men became effectivly unemployed, it gave everyone resisting
> the occupation for whatever reason a large supply of militarally
> skilled allies. The result was very predictable.

While I generally agree with what you're saying, I would frame it
differently. I've been tracking a number of countries on my web
site, their history, what's happening to them today, and where
they're going. And what I've discovered is that most people don't
have even the vaguest understanding of the effects of generational
changes, even when the changes are as obvious as the nose on your
face.

So I would say that the mistakes in the next war result from the fact
that the generals and the politicians don't realize that the new
generation of soldiers is substantially different than the previous
generation of soldiers.

As for Gulf War I, I can't agree that the Iraqis thought the
Americans were ten feet tall. We had been defeated in the Vietnam
war, and we'd turned tail and run when Hizbollah blew up our barracks
in 1983. The reason they didn't fight hard is that they were REALLY
sick and tired of fighting Saddam's wars, and the crisis war fury
that had sustained them through the Iran/Iraq war had burned itself
out.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Originally Posted by herbal tee

> One thing I have learned from studying military history is that
> the mistakes in the next war often result from events in the last
> war. For example, the reason why the Iraqi's didn't fight hard in
> Gulf War I was because after fighting the Iranians, they didn't
> want to fight the Americans. In their eyes we were ten feet tall
> and immune to toxins. They were whipped before the battles began.

> That's also a big part of the reason Rumsfeld and the rest of the
> Bush II administration underestimated the difficulty of their
> occupation in Gulf War II. The Iraqi military was more or less
> given promises that they could keep their position in society.
> When the army was disbanded and hundreds of thousands of young
> Iraqi men became effectivly unemployed, it gave everyone resisting
> the occupation for whatever reason a large supply of militarally
> skilled allies. The result was very predictable.

While I generally agree with what you're saying, I would frame it
differently. I've been tracking a number of countries on my web
site, their history, what's happening to them today, and where
they're going. And what I've discovered is that most people don't
have even the vaguest understanding of the effects of generational
changes, even when the changes are as obvious as the nose on your
face.

So I would say that the mistakes in the next war result from the fact
that the generals and the politicians don't realize that the new
generation of soldiers is substantially different than the previous
generation of soldiers.

As for Gulf War I, I can't agree that the Iraqis thought the
Americans were ten feet tall. We had been defeated in the Vietnam
war, and we'd turned tail and run when Hizbollah blew up our barracks
in 1983. The reason they didn't fight hard is that they were REALLY
sick and tired of fighting Saddam's wars, and the crisis war fury
that had sustained them through the Iran/Iraq war had burned itself
out.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

I dunno. I remember seeing quite a few grown men in Iraqi fatuges crying back in 1991 before they realized that the Americans they were surrendering to without a fight weren't going to kill them. This was probabally due to a bit of both fear and fatgue, but your point about each generation of solders being different is well taken.

Dear Rick,

This is my response to your posting in another thread.
http://www.fourthturning.com/forum/s...=181043#181043

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

> Sorry David, there won't be a civil war in Iraq. John

Originally Posted by Finch

> John, what criteria would you use to determine
> whether there is a civil war in Iraq? The rate of civilian
> casualties, overall or relative to the population? Formally
> declared state of war?

> What threshholds that lead to an almost universal identification
> of civil war in, say, El Salvador, Guatemala or Afghanistan are
> not currently present in Iraq?

First off, you can call anything you want a civil war, since there's
no ironclad definition. Such definitions are often purely political
and ideological. In the current case, political partisans on the
left call it a civil war, and on the right they call it not a civil
war. Either could be right or wrong, because they're making up and
using their own definitions.

But I don't take any ideological or political position. I follow the
strict methodology of Generational Dynamics, based on the fundamental
work of Strauss and Howe.

So I'm referring to a fourth turning crisis civil war, a war that,
according to Strauss and Howe, climaxes in "human history's
equivalent to nature's raging typhoon, the kind that sucks all
surrounding matter into a single swirl of ferocious energy. Anything
not lashed down goes flying; anything standing in the way gets
flattened." Nothing like that is happening in Iraq.

I've never done a detailed analysis of the civil wars that you
mention. From the point of view of THEORY, American interference in
the central American crisis civil wars should have had no predictable
effect. Whether it had any effect that can be discerned even in
retrospect would be an interesting analytical problem in Generational
Dynamics. My guess is that no substantial effect will be found.

But here are a couple of civil wars that I HAVE looked at:

• In the Darfur civil war that's going on today in Sudan, the black
  non-Arab Muslims in Darfur, (western Sudan) and lighter-skinned Arab
  Muslim government forces in northern Sudan are fighting. The Arab
  Muslim Janjaweed militias, agents of the Sudan government, have been
  massively slaughtering, raping and starving hundreds of thousands of
  people, forcing three million people into camps, where no food is
  available, except through NGOs that the Sudanese are doing everything
  they can to prevent entry. Within the last week there's been news of
  a possible new major assault by government forces; if this happens,
  hundreds of thousands more may be killed.
  
  Nothing like this is happening in Iraq.
  
• The 1994 civil war in Rwanda was triggered by a radio
  announcement, "Cut down the tall trees." On that signal, Hutus
  across the country picked up their machetes, went to their Tutsi
  neighbors' homes, killed the men and children and chopped up their
  bodies, raped the woman and chopped up their bodies too.
  
  Nothing like this is happening in Iraq.
  
• Here's how Amy Chua described the Bosnian war: "In the Serbian
  concentration camps of the early 1990s, the women prisoners were
  raped over and over, many times a day, often with broken bottles,
  often together with their daughters. The men, if they were lucky,
  were beaten to death as their Serbian guards sang national anthems;
  if they were not so fortunate, they were castrated or, at gunpoint,
  forced to castrate their fellow prisoners, sometimes with their own
  teeth. In all, thousands were tortured and executed."
  
  Nothing like this is happening in Iraq.

A crisis war is not determined by simply counting the number of
gunmen or the number of suicide bombers or the number of war deaths.
It's determined by the raw emotion, the palpable hatred that one side
has for another, a hatred so strong that it permits any kind
slaughter, rape, dismemberment, mass starvation, or anything else.
Nothing like this is happening in Iraq.

I don't know why this is so hard for people to understand. A crisis
civil war in Iraq is impossible today because Iraq is in a
generational awakening era (2nd turning), but you don't have to be a
Generational Dynamics guru to understand this.

Today, you have half the population (the older half) with personal
memories of the Iran/Iraq war of the 1980s. Women in the 40s and 50s
especially will remember how their loved ones -- their sons, brothers,
fathers -- were slaughtered, massacred, blinded and burned by mustard
gas, or how they and their female friends were beaten and raped.

Americans like you and me have no personal idea of what that horror
is like. To us, a war is a video game, where precision bombs take
out property and no one gets hurt except for a little "collateral
damage." But the war in Darfur is no videogame war, and neither was
the Iran/Iraq war.

That's why a civil war in Iraq is impossible, or at worst a brief
non-crisis war. But no real civil war can possibly happen in Iraq
for decades, until the current generation of Artists all disappear.

Here's some more information from an essay on this subject that I
recently wrote on my web site.
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...60807iraqcivil

The concept of "normal life" in Iraq is different from normal life in
America and many other countries. In order to understand "normal
life" in Iraq, analysts look to history to see how life used to be.

What you hear most often, especially from politicians and partisan
analysts, is that before the 2003 war, there was no insurgency and no
sectarian car bombs. What these politicians don't mention is that
Saddam Hussein kept the population under control with a hard-core
Sunni police force that never hesitated to handle dissidents by
putting them into meat grinders.

From the point of view of Generational Dynamics, if you want to
understand "normal life" in Iraq today, you have to compare life
today to life in a comparable historical period, and a comparable
historical period has to be at the same point in the generational
timeline.

Today Iraq is one generation past its last generational crisis war,
the Iran/Iraq war of the 1980s. Iraq's previous crisis war
was the Great Iraqi Revolution of 1920 that concluded Iraq's
participation in World War I and the destruction of the Ottoman
Empire. So the most appropriate historical period to look at is Iraq
in the 1930s, to see how life then compares to life today.

The Library of Congress (LOC) history of Iraq was written in the
1980s, so we can feel confident that it wasn't influenced by today's
political battles.
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/iqtoc.html

The chapters "World War I and the British Mandate" and "Iraq as an
Independent Monarchy" describe in detail what "normal life" was in
Iraq during the generations following the 1920 revolution.

Britain took control of (what was to become) Iraq during WW I, and
tried to administer it (much like what America tried to do in 2003).

I've extracted some paragraphs from the LOC history below. Take a
couple of minutes to read these paragraphs, and what you see might
even amaze you: The description of life in Iraq in the 1930s is
almost identical to life in Iraq today.

According to the LOC history:

Originally Posted by Library of Congress History of Iraq

> "Three important anticolonial secret societies had been
> formed in Iraq during 1918 and 1919. At An Najaf, Jamiyat an Nahda
> al Islamiya (The League of the Islamic Awakening) was organized;
> its numerous and varied members included ulama (religious
> leaders), journalists, landlords, and tribal leaders. Members of
> the Jamiyat assassinated a British officer in the hope that the
> killing would act as a catalyst for a general rebellion at Iraq's
> other holy city, Karbala. Al Jamiya al Wataniya al Islamiya (The
> Muslim National League) was formed with the object of organizing
> and mobilizing the population for major resistance. In February
> 1919, in Baghdad, a coalition of Shia merchants, Sunni teachers
> and civil servants, Sunni and Shia ulama, and Iraqi officers
> formed the Haras al Istiqlal (The Guardians of Independence). The
> Istiqlal had member groups in Karbala, An Najaf, Al Kut, and Al
> Hillah."

Continued in next message

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Continued from previous message

The British tried to thwart these efforts, leading to the revolution:

Originally Posted by Library of Congress History of Iraq

> "Ath Thawra al Iraqiyya al Kubra, or The Great Iraqi
> Revolution (as the 1920 rebellion is called), was a watershed
> event in contemporary Iraqi history. For the first time, Sunnis
> and Shias, tribes and cities, were brought together in a common
> effort. In the opinion of Hanna Batatu, author of a seminal work
> on Iraq, the building of a nation-state in Iraq depended upon two
> major factors: the integration of Shias and Sunnis into the new
> body politic and the successful resolution of the age-old
> conflicts between the tribes and the riverine cities and among the
> tribes themselves over the food-producing flatlands of the Tigris
> and the Euphrates. The 1920 rebellion brought these groups
> together, if only briefly; this constituted an important first
> step in the long and arduous process of forging a nation-state out
> of Iraq's conflict-ridden social structure.

> The 1920 revolt had been very costly to the British in both
> manpower and money."

The situation didn't get much better throughout the 1920s. Iraq
became a sovereign state in 1932, and here's what happened next:

Originally Posted by Library of Congress History of Iraq

> "On October 13, 1932, Iraq became a sovereign state, and it
> was admitted to the League of Nations. Iraq still was beset by a
> complex web of social, economic, ethnic, religious, and
> ideological conflicts, all of which retarded the process of state
> formation. The declaration of statehood and the imposition of
> fixed boundaries triggered an intense competition for power in
> the new entity. Sunnis and Shias, cities and tribes, shaykhs and
> tribesmen, Assyrians and Kurds, pan-Arabists and Iraqi
> nationalists--all fought vigorously for places in the emerging
> state structure. Ultimately, lacking legitimacy and unable to
> establish deep roots, the British-imposed political system was
> overwhelmed by these conflicting demands. ...

> The arbitrary borders that divided Iraq and the other Arab lands
> of the old Ottoman Empire caused severe economic dislocations,
> frequent border disputes, and a debilitating ideological
> conflict. The cities of Mosul in the north and Basra in the
> south, separated from their traditional trading partners in Syria
> and in Iran, suffered severe commercial dislocations that led to
> economic depression. In the south, the British- created border
> (drawn through the desert on the understanding that the region
> was largely uninhabited) impeded migration patterns and led to
> great tribal unrest. Also in the south, uncertainty surrounding
> Iraq's new borders with Kuwait, with Saudi Arabia, and especially
> with Iran led to frequent border skirmishes. The new boundaries
> also contributed to the growth of competing nationalisms; Iraqi
> versus pan-Arab loyalties would severely strain Iraqi politics
> during the 1950s and the 1960s, when Egyptian leader Gamal Abdul
> Nasser held emotional sway over the Iraqi masses.

> Ethnic groups such as the Kurds and the Assyrians, who had hoped
> for their own autonomous states, rebelled against inclusion
> within the Iraqi state. The Kurds, the majority of whom lived in
> the area around Mosul, had long been noted for their fierce
> spirit of independence and separatism. During the 1922 to 1924
> period, the Kurds had engaged in a series of revolts in response
> to British encroachment in areas of traditional Kurdish autonomy;
> moreover, the Kurds preferred Turkish to Arab rule. When the
> League of Nations awarded Mosul to Iraq in 1925, Kurdish
> hostility thus increased. The Iraqi government maintained an
> uneasy peace with the Kurds in the first year of independence, but
> Kurdish hostility would remain an intractable problem for future
> governments."

You should go on and read this history of Iraq for yourself, because
here's the important point: If you change "British" to "American,"
and change a few of the names, then there's no difference between then
and now.

It's true that pure political partisans like David Kaiser will call
today's insurgency a "civil war" because their top priority is
political expediency rather than historical accuracy. But that reminds
me of that old Abraham Lincoln quote: "How many legs does a dog have
if you call the tail a leg? Four. Calling a tail a leg doesn't make it
a leg."

What's going on in Iraq today is "normal life" for Iraq. But there
was NO CIVIL WAR then, and there will be NO CIVIL WAR today.

Originally Posted by Finch

> Myself, I'm expecting the really serious civil war to break
> out when formal petition is declared as in Yugoslavia (probably in
> a year or so), because then the Kurdish pesh merga will
> enter the conflict. Unlike, say, the Mahdi irregulars, the
> pesh merga are a well-equipped, well-trained and
> well-organized army. Any opposition to their takeover of
> Kirkuk will simply be obliterated.

> And then Turkey will get involved, and we'll stop calling it a
> civil war and start calling it a regional war.

How can you possibly say this? Do you really know what's going on
in the minds of the Kurds? This scenario is impossible. The Kurds
suffered enormously in the Iran/Iraq war, and will have any visceral
desire for another war. As for the Turks, they're more concerned
about what's going on in the Caucasus.

If you have some time, spend some time reading the stuff on my web
site. I've now been tracking the timelines of dozens of countries,
and I don't mind saying that even I continue to be amazed by how
country after country seems to follow its generational archetype as
if hypnotized to do so. This has been proven again in the recent
Lebanese war. Once you really understand where Iraq is in its
generational timeline, you'll see for yourself that a civil war in
Iraq is absolutely impossible at this time.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

I follow the strict methodology of Generational Dynamics, based on the fundamental work of Strauss and Howe.

The relevant comparison isn't to other civil wars, its to the the Iraq-Iran war, which you have already claimed was a crisis war for the Iraqis. It seems to me that if the 1980's conflict can meet the criterion for a crisis war for Iraq then so can the current one.

The death rate for Iraqis in the current conflict (about 50,000 over 3.5 years) is greater than the 100,000 over 10 years in the Iran-Iraq war (ref: http://www.onwar.com/aced/chrono/c19...aniraq1980.htm). Note that although the Iraqi population is nearly twice that in the 1980's, the casualties in the current conflict have until recently been attributable to violence on the part of just the Sunni Arabs, who number less than half of the 1980's Iraqi population. If the Shia get as involved as the the Sunnis are, we can expect casualty rates to increase about 2-3 times their past levels (and indeed we have seen a steady increase in violence since the Samarra bombing, refecting the entrance of Shia into the conflict). If the current level of violence had been in effect over the last 3.5 years, total casualities would have been 125,000 instead of 50,000--about 70% higher on a per capita basis than the Iraq-Iran war.

Genocidal fury is seen in such things as Sunnis blowing themselves up to kill Shia, and Shia drilling holes in the skulls of living Sunnis. Of course, poison gas was used in the Iraq-Iran war, but then it was also using on the Western front in WW I, which was not a crisis war.

In fact I would claim that the 1980's conflict (like WW I and the American revolution) was a crisis war for only one side--the Iranians--who were fighting for the very survival of their new revolutionary state. In contrast, Iraq experienced no structural change in the 1980's, while they have in the 2000's.

It seems to me that the reason you don't label the current conflict as a crisis for Iraq is because you already labeled the 1980's conflict as a crisis war. If both of these conflicts had occurred in the past and one was looking at both of them with hindsight, it would make more sense to label them as I did above (1980's a crisis war for Iran and 2000's a crisis war for Iraq).

Originally Posted by Mikebert

The relevant comparison isn't to other civil wars, its to the the Iraq-Iran war, which you have already claimed was a crisis war for the Iraqis. It seems to me that if the 1980's conflict can meet the criterion for a crisis war for Iraq then so can the current one.

The death rate for Iraqis in the current conflict (about 50,000 over 3.5 years) is greater than the 100,000 over 10 years in the Iran-Iraq war (ref: http://www.onwar.com/aced/chrono/c19...aniraq1980.htm). Note that although the Iraqi population is nearly twice that in the 1980's, the casualties in the current conflict have until recently been attributable to violence on the part of just the Sunni Arabs, who number less than half of the 1980's Iraqi population. If the Shia get as involved as the the Sunnis are, we can expect casualty rates to increase about 2-3 times their past levels (and indeed we have seen a steady increase in violence since the Samarra bombing, refecting the entrance of Shia into the conflict). If the current level of violence had been in effect over the last 3.5 years, total casualities would have been 125,000 instead of 50,000--about 70% higher on a per capita basis than the Iraq-Iran war.

Genocidal fury is seen in such things as Sunnis blowing themselves up to kill Shia, and Shia drilling holes in the skulls of living Sunnis. Of course, poison gas was used in the Iraq-Iran war, but then it was also using on the Western front in WW I, which was not a crisis war.

In fact I would claim that the 1980's conflict (like WW I and the American revolution) was a crisis war for only one side--the Iranians--who were fighting for the very survival of their new revolutionary state. In contrast, Iraq experienced no structural change in the 1980's, while they have in the 2000's.

It seems to me that the reason you don't label the current conflict as a crisis for Iraq is because you already labeled the 1980's conflict as a crisis war. If both of these conflicts had occurred in the past and one was looking at both of them with hindsight, it would make more sense to label them as I did above (1980's a crisis war for Iran and 2000's a crisis war for Iraq).

I think the key difference here is that in World War One, chemical warfare was used solely for killing soldiers while in the Iran-Iraq war, chemical weapons were widely used for killing civilians.

I think that targeting civilians is indicative of a crisis war, but it does not determine it. Something that interests me is how the personality of a leader can affect both non-crisis and crisis wars, in particular, Russia during World War Two. Of course, Saddam's wars are also worth a look.

Something that I've been debating in my mind has been determining what makes a crisis war. It is an interesting mix of generational principles and genocidal violence. You state that because Iraqis will suffer more deaths in the current war, this should be the crisis war. In World War One, France suffered about 1.5 million deaths, while in World War Two, France suffered only about 500,000 deaths. So why was World War Two a crisis war for France and not World War One?

On Chapter 8 of his second book, John lays out an algorithm for historically defining how wars are judged, based on the level of political considerations, the level of genocidal violence, and the historical significance (he used to have the resolution, but I think it was put into historical significance). Using these three factors, you determine whether or not a war is a crisis war. I think he would admit that while the method is quite good, it is not perfect.

Prior to World War One, France's last crisis war was the Franco-Prussian War/Paris Commune, ending in 1871. World War One broke out in 1914, 43 years later. This would typically be in the early unraveling (3T) period, where a crisis war is next to impossible. World War Two broke out in a 4th turning, so the proper historical identification would be WWI as the non-crisis war and WWII as the crisis war. You could make the case that World War One fits John's algorithm better for France. It really is subjective. Generational Principles are not. Therefore, World War One with near certainty, does not fit, while World War Two should.

Turning that around, we could say that in a typical (LATE) 3T (Franco-Prussian/France), 4T (World War Two/America), 5T(Revolutionary War/America), and later, if a war with a very high amount of violence is exhibited, it MUST be a crisis war, because it will have the effects of a crisis war (namely, preventing another one for another 60 or so years). There have been wars that John has listed as crisis wars that should have been early 3T mid-cycle periods, but those are few and far between. This is complex, isn't it?

So for example, while many would say that World War Two must be a crisis war for Russia, it couldn't be, because World War One was the crisis war. Likewise, since the Iran-Iraq war occured 58 years after the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, it MUST be the crisis war for Iraq. Therefore, no matter what occurs in Iraq today, it cannot be a crisis war. And because we can assume that Iraq is in a non-crisis war, we can also say that there will not be a full-scale, crisis-like, civil war.

I hope this made sense,

Matt

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

It's true that pure political partisans like David Kaiser will call today's insurgency a "civil war" because their top priority is political expediency rather than historical accuracy.

What's going on in Iraq today is "normal life" for Iraq. But there was NO CIVIL WAR then, and there will be NO CIVIL WAR today.

Alright, alright. If you insist on reserving the term "civil war" to refer only to Crisis wars, then clearly the current conflict doesn't rise to that level (i.e. the level of the Iran-Iraq War.) But that's a rather idiosyncratic use of the term; David and I, and most other observers, use the term in the more common usage of "thousands of civilians being killed every month in ongoing sectarian violence", and thus defined, the term is quite applicable to present-day Iraq.

But at least you're consistent on your methodology, and I'm not so set on the Rectification Of Names, so suit yourself -- you might just be a little lonely in that company. Add to that your idiosyncratic use of the word "normal life" to refer to anything-other-than-4T-End-Of-Civilization-clinging-to-bare-existence, and I don't think you'll find too many people willing to set next to you on the bus...

That said, we're basically in agreement: like you, and unlike some of the more histrionic commentators in the Establishment Media, I don't anticipate an out-of-control spiral of violence in Iraq; clearly, the "reluctance" you describe is at work. As I already wrote, the only action that would cause a substantial escalation is a formal declaration of partition by the Occupying Power. Partition would immediately lead to ethnic cleansing, and would be just about the stupidest thing imaginable for the US to do regarding Iraq.* Unfortunately, leading figures among both the Dems and Repubes have started advocating exactly that.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

How can you possibly say this? Do you really know what's going on in the minds of the Kurds? This scenario is impossible. The Kurds suffered enormously in the Iran/Iraq war, and will have any visceral desire for another war.

Of course I don't have any idea what's going in the Kurds' minds, so I can only go by their words; and the Kurdish state-within-a-state has repeatedly, emphatically, explicitly and officially asserted that if Iraq were partitioned, they would annex Kirkuk by force.

Sure, they're tired of war, just like we were in Vietnam; that didn't stop us from methodically killing millions of people. The Kurds will calmly, methodically and dispassionately "liberate" Kirkuk, with probably only a few tens of thousands of "collateral" casualties. As in Vietnam, that's simply what happens when you have overwhelming military superiority.



*Stupid, that is, unless the US actually has the objective of destabilizing the Middle East and providing a training ground for terrorists, but who believes that??

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

As for the Turks, they're more concerned about what's going on in the Caucasus.

Speaking of Turkey, since they're more closely tied to the historic cycles in the Caucasus than those of Europe -- clearly the time of Ataturk in the '20s and '30s was their 1T -- it seems that they're far overdue for a 4T.

And a war against the Kurds would be right in line with that 4T, given that Turkey has spent the last two decades ruthlessly suppressing Kurdish separatists (with $20+ billion in US "foreign aid".)

A paragraph from your latest post...

"The Israeli people's panic is becoming even greater because of Iran. With Iran's Blow of Zolfaqar military games continuing to the end of September, with Iran testing new missile and other weapons technology, with with Iran blantantly refusing to stop developing nuclear technology, and with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad repeatedly on record as wanting to "wipe Israel off the map,"

seems incomplete. If I have one objection, and I don't mean to be rude, it is that there are too many grammatical errors. I don't mind too much, but if you want to seem more credible to others, another read might do the trick.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

You state that because Iraqis will suffer more deaths in the current war, this should be the crisis war.

Also because there was a major change in government in the current war--it is more signficant.

In World War One, France suffered about 1.5 million deaths, while in World War Two, France suffered only about 500,000 deaths. So why was World War Two a crisis war for France and not World War One?

Good question

Prior to World War One, France's last crisis war was the Franco-Prussian War/Paris Commune, ending in 1871. World War One broke out in 1914, 43 years later. This would typically be in the early unraveling (3T) period, where a crisis war is next to impossible. World War Two broke out in a 4th turning, so the proper historical identification would be WWI as the non-crisis war and WWII as the crisis war. You could make the case that World War One fits John's algorithm better for France.

Yes, WW I fits the algorithm better than does the Franco-Prussian war. So let's consider WW I and the Napoleonic wars as crisis wars for France since they both fit very well. Doesn't John also consider the War of Spanish Succession as a crisis war for france? This gives three very equally-spaced crisis wars ending in 1714, 1815 and 1918 for France.

But this isn't the issue. The question was whether the current conflict better fits the definition than the 1980's war for the Iraqis.

Dear Mike,

Originally Posted by Mikebert

> The relevant comparison isn't to other civil wars, its to the the
> Iraq-Iran war, which you have already claimed was a crisis war for
> the Iraqis. It seems to me that if the 1980's conflict can meet
> the criterion for a crisis war for Iraq then so can the current
> one.

> The death rate for Iraqis in the current conflict (about 50,000
> over 3.5 years) is greater than the 100,000 over 10 years in the
> Iran-Iraq war (ref:
> http://www.onwar.com/aced/chrono/c19...niraq1980.htm).
> Note that although the Iraqi population is nearly twice that in
> the 1980's, the casualties in the current conflict have until
> recently been attributable to violence on the part of just the
> Sunni Arabs, who number less than half of the 1980's Iraqi
> population. If the Shia get as involved as the the Sunnis are, we
> can expect casualty rates to increase about 2-3 times their past
> levels (and indeed we have seen a steady increase in violence
> since the Samarra bombing, refecting the entrance of Shia into the
> conflict). If the current level of violence had been in effect
> over the last 3.5 years, total casualities would have been 125,000
> instead of 50,000--about 70% higher on a per capita basis than the
> Iraq-Iran war.

I assume you must know that this is total nonsense, inasmuch as we've
previously spent a year or two discussing these very issues, and
you're very well aware that the war death rate is unrelated, or very
weakly related, to the evaluation of crisis wars. So I assume you
just made this up to fill a hole in your argument.

And let's not forget that it was just a month or so ago that you were
saying that America had a civil war in the 1990s. So I think it's
safe to say that your view of what a civil war is is purely
ideological and has nothing to do with historical reality.

At any rate, your analysis of war deaths is completely irrelevant.

However, there's another, more fundamental fallacy in your analysis.

You say, "The relevant comparison isn't to other civil wars, its to
the the Iraq-Iran war...," which is a brand-new concept that you've
apparently just made up for convenience, without providing any
justification.

Foreign wars are fundamentally different from civil wars in many
ways. For one thing, there are many non-crisis foreign wars -- I
believe that we've had dozens of them since 1945 -- but it's almost
impossible to have a non-crisis civil war (Caesar's crossing the
Rubicon being one of the very few well-known examples). So to say
that the relevant comparison is to the Iran-Iraq war requires a great
deal of theoretical justification, and, not surprisingly, you've
provided none.

What puts civil wars in a class by themselves is that, instead of
having a politician send an army into battle, you generally have
ordinary people getting up one morning and going out and killing
their neighbors.

I've been analyzing this claim of an Iraqi civil war for several
years now. I first reached my conclusion long before it was
ideologically important to people like you, so my evaluation has
never had anything to do with ideology.

Every time there's some new event, and some politician or journalist
starts claiming "Iraq is on the verge of civil war," which has
happened dozens of times since 2003, I do a new evaluation, and it's
always been pretty clear that this claim is simply wishful thinking.
You can almost see the journalists on tv drooling over the hope that
something explosive is about to happen, and there'll be a huge
uprising of one group against another, but it never happens, and that
makes the ideologues more and more desperate to come up with some
explanation -- any explanation -- to justify their civil war claims.

When I do my evaluations, here are the kinds of things I've been
looking for:

• Why isn't Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr leading his militia
  against Sunni militias? Why isn't he leading a Shiite uprising?
  The Boston Globe actually announced, in a page one headline in
  2004, that a Shiite uprising was beginning at that time.
  http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...040812#e040812
  But fell flat at that time, and it's never happened since then. If
  Iraq were having a civil war, then why hasn't this happened?
  
• Why do we never read a story about how the people of one Iraqi
  village or neighborhood go out and massacre the people of a
  neighboring village or neighborhood? I can't recall ever seeing
  anything like this, and if Iraq were having a civil war, this kind of
  thing would be happening all the time.
  
• Why are the supposed civil war enemies cooperating so well at the
  government level? You have an established government, with members
  from the Sunni, Shiite and Kurd populations, and the government seems
  to be functioning well. In the American civil war, for example, the
  federal government immediately fell apart. If Iraq were really in a
  civil war, then the national government would also fall apart, but it
  isn't happening.

These are the signs that I keep looking for, to see if I was wrong in
my initial evaluation of the situation, and they never appear.

The behavior of the ideologues like yourself to desperately come up
with any justification, no matter how far-fetched, to justify the
claim of a civil war in Iraq is truly disgusting.

And my cynicism is greatly enhanced by the realization that if Al
Gore had been president after 9/11, then we'd be in almost exactly
the same position in Iraq today, except that Democratic ideologues
like yourself would be making up facts to justify the Iraq war, and
Republican ideologues would be making up facts to justify the claim
that it's a civil war.

(Continued in next posting)

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

(Continued from previous posting)

Originally Posted by Mikebert

> Genocidal fury is seen in such things as Sunnis blowing themselves
> up to kill Shia, and Shia drilling holes in the skulls of living
> Sunnis. Of course, poison gas was used in the Iraq-Iran war, but
> then it was also using on the Western front in WW I, which was not
> a crisis war.

According to your analysis, the 9/11 attacks would be a crisis war,
the 7/7 subway bombings would be a crisis war, and any terrorist act
would automatically be a crisis war.

As you're well aware, because of I've said it a zillion times, when
doing any generational analysis you have to look at the actions and
behaviors of large masses of people, not the actions of a few
terrorists.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

> In fact I would claim that the 1980's conflict (like WW I and the
> American revolution) was a crisis war for only one side--the
> Iranians--who were fighting for the very survival of their new
> revolutionary state. In contrast, Iraq experienced no structural
> change in the 1980's, while they have in the 2000's.

This would be a very hard sell, inasmuch as Iraq invaded Iran.
Furthermore, the Iraqi side was also partially a civil war against
the Kurds. So this is silly.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

> It seems to me that the reason you don't label the current
> conflict as a crisis for Iraq is because you already labeled the
> 1980's conflict as a crisis war. If both of these conflicts had
> occurred in the past and one was looking at both of them with
> hindsight, it would make more sense to label them as I did above
> (1980's a crisis war for Iran and 2000's a crisis war for Iraq).

No, this is completely untrue. It's true that since the Iran/Iraq
war is clearly a crisis war, my "expectation" is that 2003 war is a
non-crisis war, but this expectation hasn't stopped me re-evaluating
the situation over and over in the last few years. I frequently test
my expectations by evaluating and re-evaluating the situation, and
I'm often forced to reach conclusions that differ from my original
expectations, but that hasn't happened in this case.

If you look at the "American war in Iraq" from a long-term historical
perspective, then you reach quite a different conclusion than the one
you're reaching for ideological reasons.

The war with Iraq didn't begin in 2003, as you're implying. From a
long-term historical perspective, it's a multi-phase war that began
in 1990 after Saddam's invasion of Kuwait.

This war has been going on for 16 years now. (People who say that
the Iraqi war has now gone on longer than WW II are talking nonsense;
it actually passed that point in the mid-1990s.)

This 16-year war has undergone several phases. First, Iraq was
ejected from Kuwait. Then there were several years of overflights to
protect the Kurds and Sunnis from Saddam.

The latest phase began in earnest in December, 1998, when Saddam
expelled the U.N. weapons inspectors. The Clinton/Gore
administration immediately began furiously bombing Iraq, and that
bombing continued on almost a daily basis, into the next
administration.
http://www.nytimes.com/library/world...-conflict.html

By 2002, after 9/11, the bombing was still going on and Saddam was
still being intransigent. After a year of debate in the United
Nations and the U.S. Congress, ground troops were sent in.

People who say that we shouldn't have started the Iraqi war in 2003
are talking complete nonsense. From a long-term historical point of
view, the war had begun in 1990, had entered a major new phase in
1993, and was already progressing furiously in 2003. The ground war
was simply the next phase. Without it, the furious bombing would have
continued till now, and we still wouldn't know, to this day, whether
Saddam was manufacturing chemical and biological weapons for use
against Israel. Given that we're so nervous today about Iran
building nuclear weapons IN THE FUTURE, imagine how nervous we'd be
today if we didn't know whether Saddam was manufacturing biological
and chemical weapons TODAY.

There's nothing about the 16-year war in Iraq that shows any sign of
being a crisis war, and in fact the long-term historical perspective
pretty much wipes out all the ideological claims about the Iraq war.

(Continued in next posting)

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

(Continued from previous posting)

Now let's take a look at your graphs from a posting in another
thread.
http://www.fourthturning.com/forum/s...&postcount=164

Here's your data:

Originally Posted by Mikebert

Monthly number of bombings that killed more than one person:



Daily insurgent attacks (monthly averages):



Civilian casualities:



Your source: http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf

When I saw these dramatic graphs last week, I went the Brookings site
to see what was going on. The first thing I noticed, as I skimmed
the file, was that none of the graphs in the file seemed nearly as
dramatic as the ones you've posted, giving rise to at least the
suspicion of selected use of data, something that wouldn't be a
surprise in view of our long relationship online.

The first problem with your data is that it depicts slow linear or
sub-linear growth over a long period of time, and that's not what I
would expect from a crisis war.

In a crisis war, there's giddy excitement followed by total panic
that engulfs the whole population. In a crisis civil war, I'd
wouldn't expect a linear growth rate at all, since the entire
population would get involved very quickly. I would expect
exponential or even faster combinatorial growth over a short period
of time. The linear and sub-linear growth rate of your data actually
supports a non-crisis war being driven by something outside the
population itself (money, politicians, etc.)

The second problem with your data is that basically depends on
roadside bombs.

This is really hilarious. What do roadside bombs have to do with a
crisis civil war?

Do you think that when the announcement, "Cut down the tall trees"
came over the radio, that the average Hutu then went into his basement
to put the finishing touches on his roadside bomb, and then went out
and put it on the road somewhere in the hope that some hapless Tutsi
would run into it? The whole concept is nonsense.

If you want to understand a crisis war, especially a crisis civil
war, you have to think of enormous energy, fury, panic and hatred.
You'd have to have massive numbers of Sunnis and Shiites slaughtering
each other, raping each others wives, mutilating and dismembering
each other, leaving the fields littered with tens of thousands of
dismembered bodies and body parts. An occasional roadside bomb or a
few isolated acts of brutality simply don't qualify.

There's obviously something going on with the Iraqi insurgency, but
it's not a civil war.

I was watching a lengthy report on CNN yesterday. Now, CNN is
tremendously biased, and is a huge cheerleader for the "civil war"
theory. They're constantly playing up the violence in Iraq, showing
dead bodies and children in hospitals whenever they can. In the last
few days, I've heard phrases like, "George Bush isn't YET calling the
insurgency a civil war," or "Donald Rumsfeld doesn't YET refer to it
as a civil war." White House correspondent Jamie McIntyre is
practically a Howard Dean surrogate. (In my opinion, CNN is far more
biased on the left than Fox News is on the right.)

So this report I was watching yesterday was going on in the usual way
about the violence in Iraq, showing the usual pictures. But the
narrative was that this was the front line in the war against
al-Qaeda. The narrative made it clear that there was a war going on
between Iraq and al-Qaeda. I can't recall hearing this kind of
narrative on CNN before.

And that illuminates the third problem with your data, and with your
argument in general -- it doesn't take into account the context.

I've already discussed the historical context -- that the current
phase of the Iraq war has to be placed in the context of an Iraq war
that began in 1990, and has been going on now for 16 years.

But there's also a regional context.



The principle driver of the fault line wars in the Mideast is what is
perceived as American's unfaltering support of Israel. But that's
not all. Bin Laden's terrorism was motivated by his hatred for his
father and the Saudi government. There's the struggle over Kashmir.
There's the war in Chechnya.

There IS a major crisis war building, but it's not in Iraq. It's in
Israel, the West Bank, Gaza, Pakistan, India, Turkey, the Caucasus,
Russia, and so forth, with al-Qaeda and Iran playing a supporting
role. Iraq would be playing a supporting role as well, but of course
the Iraq war has eliminated that possibility, at least for now.

Everything else is total ideological nonsense.

I'm feeling particular down on ideological nonsense these days thanks
to this new forthcoming film, "Death of a President," depicting the
assassination of George Bush in vivid detail. I can't tell you the
revulsion I feel about this film, and although Democrats don't
endorse this film, you just have to listen to Howard Dean for five
minutes to realize that the wish is there.

You know, in the spirit of "be careful what you wish for cause you
might get it," I hope that you get your wish and that the Democrats DO
gain control of Congress next month. Then we'll get to see what they
do with that responsibility. Will they use it to support an
aggressive legislative agenda, like Gingrich's "contract with America"
in 1994? Or will they do nothing except hold hearings designed to
raise the level of bitterness? It should be interesting to see.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Matt,

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> Something that I've been debating in my mind has been determining
> what makes a crisis war. It is an interesting mix of generational
> principles and genocidal violence. You state that because Iraqis
> will suffer more deaths in the current war, this should be the
> crisis war. In World War One, France suffered about 1.5 million
> deaths, while in World War Two, France suffered only about 500,000
> deaths. So why was World War Two a crisis war for France and not
> World War One?

War deaths is a very weak indicator in a crisis war evaluation.
Interesting examples are that WW II was a crisis Iceland and
Switzerland, but neither country suffered any war deaths, to speak
of. You have to look at the "energy" that the people bring to the
war.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> On Chapter 8 of his second book, John lays out an algorithm for
> historically defining how wars are judged, based on the level of
> political considerations, the level of genocidal violence, and the
> historical significance (he used to have the resolution, but I
> think it was put into historical significance). Using these three
> factors, you determine whether or not a war is a crisis war. I
> think he would admit that while the method is quite good, it is
> not perfect.

That algorithm was created under great strain, thanks to Mike's
incessant flagellation. Still, while not perfect, it represents a
good summary that's probably valid at least 90% of the time.

The only way to truly evaluate a crisis war is to do what Strauss and
Howe did -- read the histories and diaries at the time, and determine
people's level of anxiety and panic.

One concept that I've been playing with is a comparison to the
widespread riots and panic that followed the 1938 Orson Welles' radio
production of "War of the Worlds."

This was a very tense time for Americans, who were still in the depths
of the Great Depression. Radios were selling at a record pace, as
Hitler was rallying his forces in Europe, having already taken control
of the Sudetenland area in Czechoslovakia. On the other side of the
world, the Japanese had invaded China and were in the process of
taking over. Many were extremely anxious about war.

In this atmosphere, the radio program appeared to be a music program
interrupted by news bulletins reporting on an invasion of Martians in
cities around the country. Although announcements during the program
informed listeners that it was fiction, tens or hundreds of thousands
of listeners panicked, believing that a real invasion was taking
place. A substantial minority believed that it was a German
invasion rather than a Martian invasion.

This is a great example because it occurred in a generational crisis
era, and it illustrates how large masses of people react to threats of
war during crisis periods. If that much panic occurred among a
relatively few listeners to a radio program describing a fictional
event, imagine how much greater the panic would have been if the story
had been about a REAL German or Japanese invasion.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> Prior to World War One, France's last crisis war was the
> Franco-Prussian War/Paris Commune, ending in 1871. World War One
> broke out in 1914, 43 years later. This would typically be in the
> early unraveling (3T) period, where a crisis war is next to
> impossible. World War Two broke out in a 4th turning, so the
> proper historical identification would be WWI as the non-crisis
> war and WWII as the crisis war. You could make the case that World
> War One fits John's algorithm better for France. It really is
> subjective. Generational Principles are not. Therefore, World War
> One with near certainty, does not fit, while World War Two
> should.

You can't just go by dates. You have to look at each war
individually. What I've found is that crisis wars NEVER occur during
a first or second turning. The peak is reached 55-60 years after the
end of the previous crisis war, which would mean that the peak is
reached late in the third turning, according to the rule of 20 years
per era. However, you can also have crisis wars during a fourth
turning and during a fifth turning.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> So for example, while many would say that World War Two must be a
> crisis war for Russia, it couldn't be, because World War One was
> the crisis war. Likewise, since the Iran-Iraq war occured 58 years
> after the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, it MUST be the crisis
> war for Iraq. Therefore, no matter what occurs in Iraq today, it
> cannot be a crisis war. And because we can assume that Iraq is in
> a non-crisis war, we can also say that there will not be a
> full-scale, crisis-like, civil war.

This kind of logic is simply invalid. You absolutely CANNOT use the
number of years to evaluate a crisis war.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Rick,

Originally Posted by Finch

> Alright, alright. If you insist on reserving the term "civil war"
> to refer only to Crisis wars, then clearly the current conflict
> doesn't rise to that level (i.e. the level of the Iran-Iraq War.)
> But that's a rather idiosyncratic use of the term; David and I,
> and most other observers, use the term in the more common usage of
> "thousands of civilians being killed every month in ongoing
> sectarian violence", and thus defined, the term is quite
> applicable to present-day Iraq.

Well, I guess we could just take a vote, and determine whether it's a
civil war that way. Or let's do it this way: If the Democrats win in
November, then it must have been a civil war; if the Republicans win,
then it must NOT have been a civil war. That should settle it, no?

I would also point out that even few ideologues today are calling
this a civil war. I constantly hear Democrats using phrases like,
"It's ALMOST a civil war," or, "If it isn't a civil war yet, then
it's very close." As far as I can tell, only the staunchest
ideologues are saying that it's an actual civil war today.

So I don't agree that my definition of civil war is idiosyncratic.

In my posting to Mike, I gave three examples of things that I would
expect if this were a civil war: (1) A Shiite uprising, probably led
by al-Sadr; (2) Sunni massacre of Shiites or Shiite massacre of
Sunnis in large and growing numbers; (3) The government falling
apart.

What's clear to me, listening to the ideologues, and even some
non-ideologues, is that they see the current sectarian violence as
something that's growing into a civil war that will incorporate
things similar to the three things I've just listed.

In other words, those who are claiming this is a civil war are
EXPECTING to see uprisings and massacres, and dissolution of the
government. That's why they're saying that Iraq is "close" to civil
war; they feel that these massacres and uprisings are likely to start
any day.

What I'm saying is that, in Iraq's awakening era, these massacres and
uprisings are impossible. And I'm also saying that, in the absence
of these massacres and uprisings, most observers, even ideologues,
would not call the situation in Iraq a civil war.

Originally Posted by Finch

> But at least you're consistent on your methodology, and I'm not so
> set on the Rectification Of Names, so suit yourself -- you might
> just be a little lonely in that company. Add to that your
> idiosyncratic use of the word "normal life" to refer to
> anything-other-than-4T-End-Of-Civilization-clinging-to-bare-existence,
> and I don't think you'll find too many people willing to set next
> to you on the bus...

Well, when I take a bus I usually get a seat by myself anyway.

Originally Posted by Finch

> That said, we're basically in agreement: like you, and unlike some
> of the more histrionic commentators in the Establishment Media, I
> don't anticipate an out-of-control spiral of violence in Iraq;
> clearly, the "reluctance" you describe is at work. As I already
> wrote, the only action that would cause a substantial escalation
> is a formal declaration of partition by the Occupying Power.
> Partition would immediately lead to ethnic cleansing, and would be
> just about the stupidest thing imaginable for the US to do
> regarding Iraq.* Unfortunately, leading figures among both the
> Dems and Repubes have started advocating exactly that.

So it comes down to semantics. You and I apparently agree what's
about what's going on, and all we disagree about is whether it's a
civil war.

Similarly, I disagree with Mike that 1990s America was a civil war.

Originally Posted by Finch

> *Stupid, that is, unless the US actually has the objective of
> destabilizing the Middle East and providing a training ground for
> terrorists, but who believes that??

This gets into a whole nother subject, but I disagree with this
characterization as well. As I described in my posting to Mike, this
is a 16-year war that's been escalating since 1998. If we hadn't
used ground forces in 1993, then we still wouldn't know if Saddam is
manufacturing chemical and biological weapons, we'd still be bombing
Iraq on a daily basis, and most likely Iraq would now be a training
ground for terrorists anyway.

Originally Posted by Finch

> Of course I don't have any idea what's going in the Kurds' minds,
> so I can only go by their words; and the Kurdish
> state-within-a-state has repeatedly, emphatically, explicitly and
> officially asserted that if Iraq were partitioned, they would
> annex Kirkuk by force.

This would be an example of a non-crisis war. But if Iraq were
partitioned, would it really be a civil war?

Originally Posted by Finch

> Speaking of Turkey, since they're more closely tied to the
> historic cycles in the Caucasus than those of Europe -- clearly
> the time of Ataturk in the '20s and '30s was their 1T -- it seems
> that they're far overdue for a 4T.

I agree with this. I recently had a discussion with Matt about
Turkey and the Kurds.
http://www.fourthturning.com/forum/s...postcount=1195
http://www.fourthturning.com/forum/s...postcount=1198
I've changed my mind on this subject a couple of times, but these
postings represent my current views. However, I agree that it's a
confusing situation.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

John,

A little less than one year ago I posed the question of why World War II didn't have the effects of a crisis war for Russia, for it was at least as violent as a normal crisis war. I figured that even a huge war cannot have a major effect on the cycle because the generations would not be lined up (or be close to it).

When I was talking about the Iran-Iraq War, the current Iraqi war, and World Wars I and II, I wasn't necessarily evaulating the wars, I was talking more about their effects. Having not lived through a crisis war nor a major war, I can only imagine what it would be like. Of course, a crisis war is no ordinary war, but I figured that the effect the Bolshevik Revolution and World War II would have on me, (the war itself, not the aftermath) had I lived in Russia, wouldn't be too different.

But as you have said, even a major war cannot have an effect on the cycle. The war must be a crisis war. Of course, some wars are worse than others, but all seem to have a similar effect: Preventing another crisis war for 55+ years. Even a major war that is more deadly than a crisis war won't do the trick. Why? There could be many reasons for this, but to me, the best answer seems to be that the generational patterns are the key. If a major war occured right now and lasted for a few years, I don't believe there would be a new crisis war for 55 years. Continuing on that thought, the major war occuring in a crisis era WILL fall into your algorithm as a crisis war (with near certainty), but in a 1T or 2T it WILL NOT.

I'm not disagreeing with you, I'm just looking at it backwards.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Well, I guess we could just take a vote, and determine whether it's a civil war that way. Or let's do it this way: If the Democrats win in November, then it must have been a civil war; if the Republicans win, then it must NOT have been a civil war. That should settle it, no?

Har, har. I find both wings of the Corporate to be equally muddled in discussing the issue. Maybe if we polled the Iraqis we might get a consensus.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

I would also point out that even few ideologues today are calling this a civil war. I constantly hear Democrats using phrases like, "It's ALMOST a civil war," or, "If it isn't a civil war yet, then
it's very close." As far as I can tell, only the staunchest ideologues are saying that it's an actual civil war today.

True, but that's not circumspection, that's cowardice. Nobody wants to be the one to stand up and proclaim Bush's little adventure to be a colossal failure.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

So I don't agree that my definition of civil war is idiosyncratic.

OK, so I'll give you the benefit of the doubt and reserve "civil war" to refer to Crisis wars. What then exactly do we call a long-running intra-state sectarian conflict that claims large numbers of civilian casualties? "Monday Night Football?"

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

But if Iraq were partitioned, would it really be a civil war?

Correct, it wouldn't, as discussed above. It would just be a plain old everyday massacre.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

I recently had a discussion with Matt about
Turkey and the Kurds. I've changed my mind on this subject a couple of times, but these postings represent my current views. However, I agree that it's a confusing situation.

Hmmm, on further reflection, it seems quite possible that the Kurdish campaign was Turkey's 4T, and the capture and trial of Ocalan marked the definitive end of the "Kurdish question." Certainly Turkey's recent government reforms and overtures to Europe resemble a 1T. If that's the case, then Turkish involvement in Iraqi Kurdistan seems much less likely. Add some proferred EU and US aid, and it goes a long way toward explaining why (against all expectations) Turkey has largely remained unmoved by the separatist Kurdish state in Iraq.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

There IS a major crisis war building, but it's not in Iraq. It's in Israel, the West Bank, Gaza, Pakistan, India, Turkey, the Caucasus, Russia, and so forth, with al-Qaeda and Iran playing a supporting role. Everything else is total ideological nonsense.

Hmm. Based on your own analysis (and mine above), Turkey and Russia are 1T; Iran is 2T. Israel/Palestine and Pakistan/India are clearly late 3T, but they're probably a good 5-10 years behind our own any-day-now 4T... at least it feels that way to me. At any rate, none of them will be the flashpoint for our next Crisis War, which will be with China.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

You know, in the spirit of "be careful what you wish for cause you might get it," I hope that you get your wish and that the Democrats DO gain control of Congress next month. Then we'll get to see what they do with that responsibility. Will they use it to support an
aggressive legislative agenda, like Gingrich's "contract with America" in 1994?

Heh, speaking of ideological nonsense... at least 25 current Republican House members, who campaigned on a promise of 12-year term limits, are still running for reelection this year. 1994+12=2006. But I guess some animals are more equal than others.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Or will they do nothing except hold hearings designed to raise the level of bitterness? It should be interesting to see.

There will certainly be an escalation of partisan bitterness regardless of the outcome of the election; pointless hearings by spineless Dems will be the least of it. As the housing bubble collapses and brings down the entire US economy, even the current demonization of political opponents as traitors and Nazis won't be enough to distract an angry electorate. Politicians will have to look elsewhere for scapegoats. First the gays, then the Mexicans, then the Muslims; but eventually we'll come full circle, back to the turn of the last century and the "Yellow Peril."

Originally Posted by Finch

What then exactly do we call a long-running intra-state sectarian conflict that claims large numbers of civilian casualties? "Monday Night Football?"

An election-year issue. That nobody wants to fess up to on either side. The reactionaries would have to admit mistakes, and the radicals would have to admit that there *is* no good solution to this mess, and that we will have to swallow our collective pride, and fold. Not the stuff to get elected on, either way.