Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

I've told you many times -- 10 times? 20 times? 1000 times? -- you tell me -- that war deaths do not determine crisis wars.

So I referenced the battle of Malplaquet, and a web site with half a dozen web pages on the battle, and the ONLY thing you even look at is war deaths.

You referenced a webpage about the battle of Malplaquet that is supposed to show that the WSS is a crisis war. How so? I quoted the first paragraph that said that this battle was special like the battle of the Somme and Verdun were special in that it was remembered long afterward for its horror. This is a direct comparison between the WSS and WW I in terms of the horror of battle--which it seems to me to be the same thing as "genocidal fury". Nowhere do you indicate why Malplaquet is somehow more genocidal than the Somme or Verdun.

I was comparing what I perceive as "genocidal fury" in the WSS as evidenced by the horrific battle of Malplaquet to what I see as equally horrific genocidal fury in the Battle of the Somme and Verdun. I wasn't comparing war deaths for the wars. If I focused on war deaths alone, the WSS is clearly a crisis war because it had the largest number of war dead of any European war of that age. But since it is NOT about war deaths as you keep saying and I fully understand, there must be something else about the WSS that makes it special.

One can separate WW I from WW II for the French into non-crisis and crisis wars, respectively, despite the greater "genocidal fury" in WW I than WW II (as experienced by the French) when you focus on the consequences of the wars. WW I settled nothing between the Germans and the French and had to be refought 20 years later. WW II did settle things, Germany and France became friends. Thus, WW II was far more consequential for France than WW I and so WW II is the crisis war.

One can use consequences to identify the WSS as a crisis war and the war of the league of Augsburg as not, because the latter war settled nothing and had to be refought as the WSS before a stable result could be obtained. That is, the WSS is a crisis war and Augsburg is not for the same reason WW II is a crisis war and WW I is not.

But when I apply this same thinking to the Iraq war, you slap me down. Iran and Iraq were long-term enemies before and after the Iran-Iraq war, just like France and Germany after WW I. After the current Iraq war, Iran and Iraq will likely be friends like France and Germany after WW II. In addition, a new de facto nation, Kurdistan, was created. Clearly the current Iraq war will have much larger consequences for Iraq than did the Iraq-Iran war, which changed nothing.

But here you ignore consequences (which is what makes WW II and the WSS crisis wars) in favor of genocidal fury by stating that unless whole villages of Iraqis slaughter each other it cannot be a crisis war. Yet nothing like that happened in other crisis wars--you simply throw it in because you do not want the current Iraq war to be considered a crisis war because you have already assigned crisis status to the Iran-Iraq war.

You emphasize different features of different wars to get the assignments you want. This is how it looks to me (and I suppose to your original critic). And you have never addressed this, instead getting testy with the original critic and calling me names.

Are you too stupid to understand that war deaths aren't the issue, after I've told you dozens of times? Of course not. You know it very well.

That's not the issue. You continue to flog this non-issue instead of dealing with the real issue. The issue is you didn't show that the WSS was a crisis war. You just SAY it is, cited a webpage about a battle in the war with no additional commentary, and then call people names who question your assessment.

In another message you say that Generational Dynamics is too "oracular," by which you mean that Generational Dynamics uses allegedly "unobjective" evaluations,

It's oracular because it seems that only you can assign crisis wars. There is no "GD for historians" because if several historians applied your methods they would get several results, with most and perhaps none agreeing with the "one true" answer that is obtained from the oracle.

Go back to the Malplaquet web site that I referenced, and read through it for yourself to see why it was a crisis war. Hint: It's not about war deaths, except incidentally. And by the way, note that the web site gives reasons why your famous "War of the League of Augsburg" is a non-crisis war. I'll let you find it yourself, if you're capable of reading past the first paragraph.

Why can't you cite the relevant portions? You are making the case for that war being a crisis war--cite the portions of the article that make your case. Don't just give a reference and say that proves it, when the very first paragraph of the reference contradicts you. It's like that original post described. It's your theory--its not up to somebody else to prove your case. You originally asked why you got the criticism you referred to. Its the same criticism I gave and that Dave Krein gave and that just about any historian would give. You haven't proven your case that regular crisis wars exist. You SAY they do, but no evidence other than your own word is given.

You give a methodology that you say you used, but when I try to apply it and get different results than you do--you call me names. Is this what you do with all the users of your theories?

Are your books selling? Have any professional historians discussed your book Generational Dynamics for Historians with you? If not, then there is a good chance that Generational Dynamics is not for historians--at least not as they see it. There are several professional historians that post or have posted here. What is their opinion of GD?

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

As for Germany, I wish I could get a better read on the German people themselves, but I consider it at least slightly more likely that they'll side with the UK.

Maybe I can help out a bit with that. My experience with Germans was that they recognized their local "ethnic identity" (Bayerisch, Schwaebish, Dortmunder, etc.) first, their "Europeanness" second, and their "Germanness" a distant third. Given their recent history as it was drilled into their heads, most of them were distinctly uncomfortable with a German identity as such.

As a result, I would expect that they would side with "Europe" (ie France) against "America" (ie the United Kingdom.) Blair's support of the Iraq War cemented for most the notion that the UK is simply the lapdog of the US empire.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

However, there's a completely different dimension to Europe: With Muslim immigrants flooding into Europe from Africa and Turkey, there's going to be a secondary war between Muslims and ethnic Europeans, just as there'll be a secondary war in America between Latinos and Anglos.

True dat. If you ask a German to pontificate on the notion of the "European Union", the possible accession of Turkey will likely be the very first matter on their lips. If you really want to offend a good German's sense of order and propriety, try to tell him that Turks are people just like him.

Originally Posted by Zarathustra

It seems likely that Russia sees value in a strategic partnership with China and that his should make America uneasy. However, I keep thinking that Russia is duping itself by making nice with China. The latter is on the upswing, and Russia's recent growth is bascially oil-based only, not something to structurally base an economy on if you want real progress (Saudi Arabia is not exactly an industrial powerhouse).

Then add the demographic transition occurring in Siberia, esp. the Far East, with the Chinese becoming more populous there. I believe you have pooh-pooh'd that idea before, but everything I read, on the "internets" and elsewhere, point to that being a major issue.

China wants the resources in Siberia, and esp. in former Soviet Central Asia. Russia is kidding itself if they think this will not trump other issues.

Just as Stalin helped Germany build the Air Force it eventually used against Russia . . .

True, I really can't imagine what Russia is thinking, but my best guess comes from reading the Ender's Shadow series. Card is pretty out there on a lot of things, but he's a meticulous researcher, and his books remind us just how many long-standing animosities there are in the region, with every nation just waiting for the right moment to stab its enemies/allies in the back.

Consider this: after China and the US are done lobbing nukes at each other in a decade or so, neither China nor the US will be a superpower any longer. What nation believes that it will step forward instead to fill that role? Certainly Russia, and probably India.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

This is a very interesting statement, and it's related to the statement that I often hear: "We can't possibly go to war with China over Taiwan because it would be bad for business." The assumption is
that if business between countries is going well, then there won't be a war.

I think that everyone realizes that assumption has never been true in the past.

[...]

Now, what are the attitudes and convictions of the Chinese bourgeoisie? (The phrase "Chinese bourgeoisie" is so full of irony that I can never help but laugh whenever I use it.) Their attitude is: "We hate the Russians / Japanese / Americans, and they're causing all our problems, but we have to do business with them."

The mob adopts the "the attitudes and convictions of the bourgeoisie cleansed of hypocrisy," which becomes, "We hate the Russians / Japanese / Americans, and they're causing all our problems." The final clause, the hypocrisy, has been stripped off.

After that, a crisis war becomes possible, and business relationships have nothing to do with it.

Exactly. Not to mention the unspoken assumption that as long as we keep trying to do business, everything will continue to be fine. But when other (non-trade-related) events conspire to destroy our economic link, rather than being the "tie that binds" it becomes the whip for the whipping boy.

You mention it a bit in passing on your blog, but most people fail to understand just how dependent China is on the US economy. They desperately need our continued capital inflows to stave off implosion. That ten percent annual growth is all "funny money"; analysts estimate that over 80% of Chinese Central Bank loans will never be repaid.

And when China's economy collapses, it won't just be grumbling and belt-tightening like we'll have here -- it will escalate very quickly into large-scale domestic unrest. (It's already happened in various localities several times in the past year.) This will be the primary engine of the "ratcheting effect" that leads to the Crisis War with the US.

Originally Posted by Zarathustra

Russia's recent growth is basically oil-based only...

Interesting. You seem to hear this line a lot from the US media. It's worth mentioning that this -- like so many other eminations from that orifice -- is absolutely false. I could mention Russia ever-growing trades in timber, gold, vegetables and grains, other metals, fish, and so forth; in addition, the significant investment being made in local manufacture by foreign companies (Toyota, Coca-Cola, Phillip-Morris, Wrigley's, Nissan, Daewoo, Ford, LG, Electrolux, Heineken, the lis goes on just in the region of Petersburg alone...). As usual, I might advise you check out These Guys for a less 'Fox-News' version of the situation.

Oil is providing a nice booster, but the fundaments of the Russian economy are far more sound than those of the American as this point..

Then add the demographic transition occurring in Siberia, esp. the Far East, with the Chinese becoming more populous there.

You're still looking at the American Inter Nets. Unfortuately, I have trouble easily finding for you counter-examples from that region. If you like looking at indecipherable squigglies, there's this or this or this to get a sense of things in this hemisphere. It's important to remember that people from different cultures have different concepts of what might constitute an acceptable course of action. So far as I have ever personally encountered, Chinese people are significantly more interested in trading than in occupying, and Russians in that area, while they may look at Chinese people somewhat like Texans might look at Mexicans, are far from concerned about conquest.

China wants the resources in Siberia, and esp. in former Soviet Central Asia. Russia is kidding itself if they think this will not trump other issues.

But invasion and/or conquest, though the European way, might not be -- and hasn't been, historically speaking -- the Chinese way. There are options for people who want something held by another; and the Chinese are quite successfully utilizing those options.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Now, what are the attitudes and convictions of the Chinese bourgeoisie? (The phrase "Chinese bourgeoisie" is so full of irony that I can never help but laugh whenever I use it.) Their attitude is: "We hate the Russians / Japanese / Americans, and they're causing all our problems, but we have to do business with them."

An interesting contention, and, as far as I can assess, untrue. The Chinese have very little against either Americans or Russians (Japanese are a different story, of course; however, it's worth noting that in most every conflict China has ever had with Japan, the Russians have been on the Chinese side...), and I have failed to see even hints that Chinese people in bulk -- generalizing, of course, from the ones I actually met and talked with in Kunming, Kaiyuan, and Xialongtan -- are somehow harboring a grudge against America or Russia...

Where did you come by your position on this matter?

Dear Mike,

Originally Posted by Mikebert

> That's not the issue. You continue to flog this non-issue instead
> of dealing with the real issue. The issue is you didn't show that
> the WSS was a crisis war. You just SAY it is, cited a webpage
> about a battle in the war with no additional commentary, and then
> call people names who question your assessment.

I called you names because of your behavior, and because you keep
switching off between "oracular" and "war deaths."

The paragraph you quoted last time was entirely about war deaths.
Your argument was about war deaths. Now you say it wasn't about war
deaths. You're just playing mind games.

I've answered your questions about the War of the Spanish Succession
before. There's no point in answering them all again.
http://www.fourthturning.com/forum/s...&postcount=141

Originally Posted by Mikebert

> Are your books selling? Have any professional historians discussed
> your book Generational Dynamics for Historians with you? If not,
> then there is a good chance that Generational Dynamics is not for
> historians--at least not as they see it. There are several
> professional historians that post or have posted here. What is
> their opinion of GD?

I'm not a famous author like you, and I don't have the skill to write
books that give phony stock market advice based on made up and biased
data.

I went a different way. I set up my web site, which now has about
2000 regular readers, as far as I can tell from the web logs.

I knew in 2003 that if I simply claimed to be able to make valid
predictions, then I would have to be able to prove it. So I've
posted hundreds of articles on my web site, most of them containing
specific predictions. Anyone in the world can look back at all my
articles, and verify whether my past predictions have come true.

I've had many predictions come true, others are trending true, and
none have turned out to be wrong so far.

I've challenged people to find any other web site in the world that
comes anywhere close to my web site's predictive record. I've
seen other "early warning" type web sites fall by the wayside for
obvious reasons -- they try to make predictions on chaotic events.
All my predictions are about trend events, not chaotic events.
That's why my predictions are always right.

I assume that you've been checking out my web site, hoping, praying
to find a prediction that turns out wrong. What have you found?

Originally Posted by Mikebert

> What I have not done is liquidate my 401K S&P500 index fund in
> early 2003 and stay in cash as the S&P500 rose 500 points--which
> is what a believer in GD would have done.

Let's make some distinctions here.

Generational Dynamics explains why the 1990s bubble occurred -- why
it began in 1995 instead of 1990 or 2000, for example.

But once the bubble occurred, then the fact that there's going to be
a crash falls out of standard forecasting techniques that have been
available for decades (and that I've incorporated into Generational
Dynamics). These are standard exponential growth technological and
financial forecasting techniques and mean reversion techniques.

There is no doubt whatsoever that there's going to be a crash. The
market is now 200+%. A crash must occur before too much longer.
What's the date? The exact date can't be predicted, but I've been
saying probably in the 2006-2007 time range for years, based on
historical comparisons.

Now, I congratulate you for not selling out in 2003, and taking
advantage of the 500 point rise. But you haven't actually made any
money. You don't make any money until you actually sell the stock.
So unless you sell before too much longer, you're going to lose a lot
more than those 500 points.

As I've said before, you've risked pretty much everything you own on
a stock market bet. You can't agree with anything I say, because
that means you'd lose everything you own. You have to prove I'm
wrong about everything, since if I'm right about even one thing, I
might be right about everything, and you'd lose everything you own.

That gives you a major conflict of interest, which is why what you
say can't be trusted. You've given proving me wrong a higher
priority than your own credibility, because you've bet huge amounts of
money on my being wrong.

As for me, the only thing I have at stake is integrity and
credibility. Even if I were completely wrong about anything, it
would be extremely embarrassing for me, but my financial situation
would not be substantially affected. I have no secrets and no
conflicts of interest.

For anyone else who happens to be reading this, I strongly urge you
to sell your stock positions and money market funds and put your money
into short-term (6-24 month) Treasury bonds. You can purchase them
online for no commission from treasurydirect.gov . They're almost
entirely risk-free, and pay around 5% interest. (Do NOT purchase
long-term bonds, as the market is flooded with them, and they may not
be redeemable in the future.)

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Rick,

Originally Posted by Finch

> Maybe I can help out a bit with that. My experience with Germans
> was that they recognized their local "ethnic identity" (Bayerisch,
> Schwaebish, Dortmunder, etc.) first, their "Europeanness" second,
> and their "Germanness" a distant third. Given their recent history
> as it was drilled into their heads, most of them were distinctly
> uncomfortable with a German identity as such.

> As a result, I would expect that they would side with "Europe" (ie
> France) against "America" (ie the United Kingdom.) Blair's support
> of the Iraq War cemented for most the notion that the UK is simply
> the lapdog of the US empire.

I guess this makes sense. The only part I wouldn't accept is the
last sentence. Whatever decision the mass of German people make,
it's not going to be influenced by an ephemeral political decision
that occurred in the last three years.

My own reasons for leaning the opposite direction are personal. I
spent a lot of time in Europe on business in the 70s, and it was
perfectly obvious that the Germans really liked Americans and the
French really hated Americans, and I assume that those feelings have
flowed forward till today.

Originally Posted by Finch

> Consider this: after China and the US are done lobbing nukes at
> each other in a decade or so, neither China nor the US will be a
> superpower any longer. What nation believes that it will step
> forward instead to fill that role? Certainly Russia, and probably
> India.

There's no way to predict how the war will end, but I don't consider
this scenario likely.

First, I think that either America or China will win decisively, and
the winner will be a superpower.

Second, I expect both India and Russia to be devastated, and in no
position to assume a superpower role.

Originally Posted by Finch

> Exactly. Not to mention the unspoken assumption that as long as we
> keep trying to do business, everything will continue to be fine.
> But when other (non-trade-related) events conspire to destroy our
> economic link, rather than being the "tie that binds" it becomes
> the whip for the whipping boy.

> You mention it a bit in passing on your blog, but most people fail
> to understand just how dependent China is on the US economy. They
> desperately need our continued capital inflows to stave off
> implosion. That ten percent annual growth is all "funny money";
> analysts estimate that over 80% of Chinese Central Bank loans will
> never be repaid.

> And when China's economy collapses, it won't just be grumbling and
> belt-tightening like we'll have here -- it will escalate very
> quickly into large-scale domestic unrest. (It's already happened
> in various localities several times in the past year.) This will
> be the primary engine of the "ratcheting effect" that leads to the
> Crisis War with the US.

I pretty much agree with all of this, and it's very well stated.

Some of that "funny money" that will never be repaid is the trillion
dollars worth of long-term US Treasury bonds.

I do think you might be underestimating the effect of a financial
crisis on America, though. It's going to cause a lot more than
belt-tightening.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Justin,

Originally Posted by Justin '77

> An interesting contention, and, as far as I can assess, untrue.
> The Chinese have very little against either Americans or Russians
> (Japanese are a different story, of course; however, it's worth
> noting that in most every conflict China has ever had with Japan,
> the Russians have been on the Chinese side...), and I have failed
> to see even hints that Chinese people in bulk -- generalizing, of
> course, from the ones I actually met and talked with in Kunming,
> Kaiyuan, and Xialongtan -- are somehow harboring a grudge against
> America or Russia...

> Where did you come by your position on this matter?

Do you remember what happened after the Enron scandal in 2000? This
was after the Nasdaq crash, when so many people lost their life
savings. There was a substantial minority of Americans who wanted
EVERY CEO jailed.

This is what happens when people lose money. They look for people to
blame. In a generational crisis era, it can take the form of mob
panic.

That's what happened in the French Reign of Terror, when every
aristrocrat or family member or servant of an aristocrat or friend or
friend of a friend or friend of a servant was sent to the guillotine.

After 25+ years of 10% growth in China's economy, any recession will
cause a major financial crisis, as Rick points out. Once that
happens, the Chinese people will be blaming Americans by the hundreds
of millions.

I haven't yet mentioned Taiwan. Every story I've read on the subject
indicates that most Chinese are EXPECTING a war with America over
Taiwan.

I agree with you that the Chinese and the Americans like each other.
The Chinese are aware that Americans fought the Japanese on Chinese
soil in WW II, and they appreciate that.

But what's happening with Taiwan and the financial situation is going
to cause things to change quickly when the time comes.

And incidentally, don't forget that China is spending huge and
rapidly increasing amounts of money on militarization. They're
preparing for war with America, and Donald Rumsfeld is preparing our
armed forces for war with China. It's coming.

As for Russia, I'm not that familiar with their relations with China.
I do remember that a lot of people in the 1960s thought that Russia
and China were close to war, and I read a book on that subject at the
time.
https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/winter98_99/art05.html

In addition, when the financial crisis occurs, the Chinese mob will
probably find some reason to blame the Russians as well as the
Americans.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Matt,

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> Perhaps. Is the Holocaust a crisis-era action or just another
> action by a leader with immense power that could have happened in
> any turning?

Germany's fourth turning "shock" was the burning of the Reichstag in
1933. According to Wikipedia, the Holocaust came in phases
after that:

> * 6.1 Concentration and Labor Camps (1933-1945)
> * 6.2 Pogroms (1938-1941)
> * 6.3 Euthanasia (1939-1941)
> * 6.4 Ghettos (1940-1945)
> * 6.5 Death squads (1941-1943)
> * 6.6 Extermination camps (1942-1945)
> * 6.7 Death marches and liberation (1944-1945)
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holocaust

You can see that the "genocidal fury" of the Holocaust increased as
time went on. By 1942, Hitler had set up a high-tech extermination
program that's truly incredible.

So in that sense, it seems to follow a fairly familiar pattern.
Crisis wars start out slowly, with a "small war" or two (like today's
Afghan and Iraq war). In an Awakening era, the the "small wars"
would fizzle out. In a crisis era, they continue to grow until they
reach a fourth turning climax, and then they taper off again.

The Holocaust seems to have followed a similar pattern, starting off
small but increasing in intensity until it reached a climax.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

I guess this makes sense. The only part I wouldn't accept is the last sentence. Whatever decision the mass of German people make, it's not going to be influenced by an ephemeral political decision
that occurred in the last three years.

My own reasons for leaning the opposite direction are personal. I spent a lot of time in Europe on business in the 70s, and it was perfectly obvious that the Germans really liked Americans and the French really hated Americans, and I assume that those feelings have flowed forward till today.

From my experience living there in the 90's, I would say that your assumption is at least partially incorrect. Nowadays, the Germans look down the "Ugly Americans"; and the French do as always, of course.

As for the German attitude toward the UK, I'd hardly call invading another country an "ephemeral decision"; and as I said, it was only one of many things that have changed their perception. The Germans recognize that, for better or worse, their entire future is bound up in the European Experiment; and they see the UK as indifferent at best, and hostile at worst, toward the future of a united Europe. "Blair the poodle" is just the latest in a long line of caricatures of the UK.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

There's no way to predict how the war will end, but I don't consider this scenario likely.

Likely or not, I don't know; but I have absolutely no doubt that Russia is hedging their bets and hoping for a positive outcome. They invented Russian Roulette, ya know.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

I do think you might be underestimating the effect of a financial crisis on America, though. It's going to cause a lot more than belt-tightening.

Oh, I'm not underestimating anything. I'm just predicting that the anger won't manifest as civil unrest, but rather as open hostility towards America's perceived enemies (i.e. the Chinese.)

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Do you remember what happened after the Enron scandal in 2000? This was after the Nasdaq crash, when so many people lost their life savings. There was a substantial minority of Americans who wanted EVERY CEO jailed.

Yeah, I remember that. What happened... where did all that anger go?? CEO salaries are still rising through the stratosphere, but we seem to have grown numb to it. I wonder what will happen that will be so dramatic as to bring us back to that boiling point...

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

After 25+ years of 10% growth in China's economy, any recession will cause a major financial crisis, as Rick points out. Once that happens, the Chinese people will be blaming Americans by the hundreds of millions.

Why Americans? The Chinese character isn't like the American (or it's close cousin, the European) character. Historically, the Chinese mob has tended to turn against internal, rather than external targets. I've often suspected that the expectation, Stateside, of a war with China has been the result of projection. Maybe this confirms...

Every story I've read on the subject indicates that most Chinese are EXPECTING a war with America over Taiwan.

And yet, every actual Chinese person I've talked to has pretty much assumed that the short-attention-spanned Americans will eventually lose interest, and the Taiwanese and mainlanders can come to their own terms. They do take somewhat more of the long view there.

And incidentally, don't forget that China is spending huge and rapidly increasing amounts of money on militarization. They're preparing for war with America

What responsible leader these days wouldn't be either preparing to deal with American attacks or at least improving the credibility of their deterrent? The US certainly hasn't come off as particularly pacific these past several years. And don't forget, the enemy du jour before 9/11 was China all the way. And that China still spends a mere fraction (any way you decide to arrange the numbers) of what the US spends on things military.

It's coming.

Maybe. After all, as Albright said, "what's the point of having such an expensive military if you don't use it?".

Or, did you mean that China is bound to attack America?

As for Russia, I'm not that familiar with their relations with China.

Then why are you insisting that they are certain to be the subject of a Chinese attack? Russia and China have sided together more often than not throughout their history. One place to start

I do remember that a lot of people in the 1960s thought that Russia
and China were close to war

People said a lot of things in the 60s. How'd that war between Khrushchev and Deng turn out? The only time bullets ever flew between the USSR and China was during a border skirmish in 1969, that was quickly put to rest (and resolved to the favor of the Chinese, one might add)

In addition, when the financial crisis occurs, the Chinese mob will probably find some reason to blame the Russians as well as the Americans.

Why not India? They've had historically spotty relations with the Chinese in the past (they actually have right now unresolved border disputes, for that matter), and they're certainly more on China's level as far as rivalry goes. In fact, as foreign investment into China begins to cool, several foreign firms are looking to India as a next hot spot. Why wouldn't the Chinese mob -- were they to historically look outward rather than inward -- turn on the next-door neighbors who would be (presumably) benefiting from their misfortune?

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Dear Justin,



...

That's what happened in the French Reign of Terror, when every
aristrocrat or family member or servant of an aristocrat or friend or
friend of a friend or friend of a servant was sent to the guillotine.

...

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis

Dear Mr. Xenakis,

The Terror, as any Progressive Pogrom, only took a sixth of its victims from the nobility. The rest (5/6) were peasants and bourgeois. It also consumed a great many Progressives of the milder (Girondin) and then more Progressive (the Mountain) sort as the tumbrels rolled along.

When the Mobility is aroused it is a comfort (though a small one) that most of those who will take a ride on the two-wheeler will be Progressives. Not at the first descent of the blade. but soon enough the cornucopia of crania includes a plethora of Progressive pates.

Progress is a Donner Party for the most part; progress serves up the long-pig which tastes like pork as the revolution eats its children. But, then the arrow and the spit are close cousins indeed.

Yo. Ever B'ward Sv. VKS

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Dear Mike,
I called you names because of your behavior, and because you keep
switching off between "oracular" and "war deaths."

The paragraph you quoted last time was entirely about war deaths.
Your argument was about war deaths. Now you say it wasn't about war
deaths. You're just playing mind games.

I've answered your questions about the War of the Spanish Succession
before. There's no point in answering them all again.
http://www.fourthturning.com/forum/s...&postcount=141

There is nothing wrong about an oracular approach. Schlesinger just presented his cycle in his 1949 book Paths to the Present. No explanation of how he came about the dates he gave, he just gives them. S&H do the same with their saeculum, except they give a lot of explanatory material along with it. With both, one simply accepts the dating as a given, there is no straightforward way to do it yourself.

At one time you talked about an "almost computerlike algorithm" for determining crisis wars--which determines the dating of your cycle. An algorithm implies that anyone can apply it aand replicate your results. This would make GD "nonoracular" and of interest to someone like me--who is interested in applications.

You had a punch list at one time in which one could put several wars side by side and compare them to determine which wars were crisis wars and which were not. But what you cite here contains no punchlist. When we talked about the crisis natiure of the current Iraq war compared to the Iran-Iraq war you mentioned that for the current Iraq war to be a crisis war whole villages should be slaughtering each other. But by this criterion neither the WSS or WW I would qualify as a crisis war.

I don't see any evidence that you used a punchlist or any algorithm to make your crisis war determinations. It appears that you read about the war and then decide whether or not it is a crisis war by a fairly intuitive process (considering isolated events like the Chrismas truce in WW I as important is somewhat idiosyncratic). Once again there is nothing wrong about this--it simply is not an algorithm that somebody like me can do by myself.

You also talk about the hundreds of predictions you have made at your site that anyone can check for themselves. What is this but an oracle?

Now there is nothing wrong with this, but it does mean that GD isn't really a methodology than someone like me can use on my own. GD appears to be the set of predictions made by you at your website. The product isn't a method that anyone can use, but rather, the results you have obtained using GD principles.

I knew in 2003 that if I simply claimed to be able to make valid
predictions, then I would have to be able to prove it. So I've
posted hundreds of articles on my web site, most of them containing
specific predictions. Anyone in the world can look back at all my
articles, and verify whether my past predictions have come true.

I looked up some articles from 2003, figuring these have had the longest amount of time to come true or not.

http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...ww2010.i.nov15
no prediction here

http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...ww2010.i.oct10
There is a prediction here:

Generational Dynamics predicts that a major regional war cannot be avoided in the next few years. The exact timing is not yet known, but the intensity of the ping-pong terrorism provides a measure of how close that inevitable war is.

A few years have passed, there has been no major regional war between the Israelis and Arabs.

Here's another one
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...ww2010.i.oct08
This one has a prediction

It's also less important than the state of the economy, and this brings us back to the anger that Californians felt toward the incumbent governor, Gray Davis, as a result of the high unemployment rate.

Generational Dynamics predicts that the economy is going to continue to get worse, as it did in the 1930s Great Depression. We see this playing out today, with so many manufacturing, technology and service jobs leaving the country for India, China, and other low-wage countries, with unemployment increasing, and with unemployed people's savings and credit running out.

If these economic trends become major issues in the 2004 Presidential election, voters might decide to "recall" George Bush in the same way that they recalled Gray Davis -- and in the same way they "recalled" Herbert Hoover in the 1932 Presidential election.

This one did not happen. The economy did not get worse and become a major issue. Bush was re-elected.

Here is one
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...ww2010.i.aug19
that has this title: Terrorist suicide bombings in Iraq may backfire against terrorists
The implication is here is that the insurgency is going to be defeated. But this isn't specifically predicted. You also say

First, the terrorist attacks may continue and get worse.

Are they going to backfire or are they going to grow in strength? Here it appears you are predicting both, so that if the violence subsides you will be right and if the violence gets worse you will be right too. So there really isn't any useful prediction here.

Here's one that says there won't be a revolution in Iran. It is correct there hasn't been.
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...ww2010.i.jun25

Here's one with some specific forecasts:
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...ww2010.i.jun04

Generational Dynamics predicts that we're in the third year of a 1930s-style depression. Specifically, the prediction is that the stock market will fall to the 4,000 level by around 2006, and won't go up above 6,000 again until after 2015. That means that the current stock gains represent a new bubble, a bubble that will burst with major adverse news.

On January 1 of this year, I predicted that the DJIA would be around 7000 or lower at the end of 2003. That's not as certain as the prediction in the last paragraph, but I'm sticking to it for the time being.

This hasn't happened. We are not in a depression and the the Dow hasn't been declining from a 9000 level in 2003 to 4000 this year. Likewise it didn't fall to 7000 by the end of 2003.

I don't see a lot of support for your assertion that you have made many predictions, none of which have been wrong.

Originally Posted by Justin '77

Why Americans? The Chinese character isn't like the American (or it's close cousin, the European) character. Historically, the Chinese mob has tended to turn against internal, rather than external targets. I've often suspected that the expectation, Stateside, of a war with China has been the result of projection. Maybe this confirms...

And yet, every actual Chinese person I've talked to has pretty much assumed that the short-attention-spanned Americans will eventually lose interest, and the Taiwanese and mainlanders can come to their own terms. They do take somewhat more of the long view there.

What responsible leader these days wouldn't be either preparing to deal with American attacks or at least improving the credibility of their deterrent? The US certainly hasn't come off as particularly pacific these past several years. And don't forget, the enemy du jour before 9/11 was China all the way. And that China still spends a mere fraction (any way you decide to arrange the numbers) of what the US spends on things military.

Maybe. After all, as Albright said, "what's the point of having such an expensive military if you don't use it?".

Actually, just reading your responses only (stupid forum formatting!) it appears that you're making exactly the same arguments that John and I are making: if China has any sense at all ("responsible leaders", presumably in contrast to the current occupants of the White House), then they should be arming up for a balls-to-the-wall conflict with the US.

After all, I have no doubt whatsoever that anti-China (and anti-Chinese) rhetoric will ramp up considerably heading into the 2008 Presidential campaign, as the domestic economy deteriorates and we cast about for somebody to blame.

As for Russia, if they're clever they'll try to stay out of it, but given the nature of Crisis wars who knows how well they'll succeed.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

A few years have passed, there has been no major regional war between the Israelis and Arabs.

This isn't an incorrect prediction. It just hasn't come true, yet. If by 2010 or later it doesn't come true, then you could have an argument.

This one has a prediction

This one did not happen. The economy did not get worse and become a major issue. Bush was re-elected.

This economic crash is the only wrong one I know of. John has said that history was on Bush's side but it may go to Kerry. That's a political prediction, and there was no way that was predictable. He has repeatedly said that political events are chaotic.

http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...ww2010.i.aug19
that has this title: Terrorist suicide bombings in Iraq may backfire against terrorists
The implication is here is that the insurgency is going to be defeated. But this isn't specifically predicted. You also say

Are they going to backfire or are they going to grow in strength? Here it appears you are predicting both, so that if the violence subsides you will be right and if the violence gets worse you will be right too. So there really isn't any useful prediction here.

He doesn't say that the insurgency is going to be defeated. He says it may backfire since Iraqis will be sick of the violence.

I don't see a lot of support for your assertion that you have made many predictions, none of which have been wrong.

There have been many predictions, but I would actually like to see an official list. Most haven't come true yet and deal with the Clash of Civilizations World War. Many things were correct, many things have been correct so far, and only the early 2000's market crash (a specific time prediction) has been wrong.

Since then, he has mostly refrained from specific time predictions.

Off the top of my head, I can think of the situation getting worse in Israel following the disappearance of Arafat and Sharon, the anti-war movement not gaining traction, no crisis civil war in Iraq, the Darfur crisis war not being stopped etc. etc.

There are many more.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

This isn't an incorrect prediction. It just hasn't come true, yet. If by 2010 or later it doesn't come true, then you could have an argument.

The prediction said a few years, which is around 2-4, not 7 or 10 or 15. For example, anyone can correctly predict that the Dow will go to 36,000 eventually. Such a prediction is meaningless. To make it meaningful you have to give a time period--otherwise the prediction is unfalisfiable. A time period was given in this example--a few years--and in this time period it hasn't happened. In the same time period, things have gone to hell in Iraq--which was not what GD says would happen.

He doesn't say that the insurgency is going to be defeated. He says it may backfire since Iraqis will be sick of the violence.

But what does it mean? Will the violence get worse or get better? Will we accomplish our goals in Iraq or not? If the violence had subsided John would have called this prediction a success. If the violence did not subside John would call this prediciton a success. This is non-falsifiable--it's not a real prediction at all.

There have been many predictions, but I would actually like to see an official list. Most haven't come true yet and deal with the Clash of Civilizations World War. Many things were correct, many things have been correct so far, and only the early 2000's market crash (a specific time prediction) has been wrong.

Since then, he has mostly refrained from specific time predictions.

How many of the predictions are falsifiable?

Off the top of my head, I can think of the situation getting worse in Israel following the disappearance of Arafat and Sharon, the anti-war movement not gaining traction, no crisis civil war in Iraq, the Darfur crisis war not being stopped etc. etc.

This is curious. You see things getting worse in Palestine, but don't see the same in Iraq. Objectively, things have gotten worse faster in Iraq since 2003 than they have in Palestine. What is happening in Iraq is closer to a crisis war than what is happening in Palestine. Remember GD says that Palestine would graviate towards a crisis war while Iraq should not. Events on the ground have Iraq closer to a crisis war than Palsetine is right now. Over the last three years events have not moved in the direction that GD implied they would, just as the Dow has not moved in the direction John implied it would.

The stated reason the adminstration gives for staying in Iraq is to prevent civil war from developing. If civil war is impossible, as GD says, then it would have been OK for the US to have pulled out after we got Saddam. In any case the US can pull out now. Does John support immediate pullout? Do you? Why not? If Iraq cannot fall into a civil war if the US leaves, why stay?

As for an antiwar movement, surely you have noticed that public opinion has shifted against the war. The antiwar people are gaining traction. Just because the opposition to the war has been spearheaded by the right who as a rule don't like to march in the streets, doesn't mean that there isn't a movement.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

The prediction said a few years, which is around 2-4, not 7 or 10 or 15.

1 Peter 3:18 For Christ also hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit:
19 By which also he went and preached unto the spirits in prison;
20 Which sometime were disobedient, when once the long suffering of God waited in the days of Noah, while the ark was a preparing, wherein few, that is, eight souls were saved by water.

Mike,

Originally Posted by Mikebert

The prediction said a few years, which is around 2-4, not 7 or 10 or 15. For example, anyone can correctly predict that the Dow will go to 36,000 eventually. Such a prediction is meaningless. To make it meaningful you have to give a time period--otherwise the prediction is unfalisfiable. A time period was given in this example--a few years--and in this time period it hasn't happened. In the same time period, things have gone to hell in Iraq--which was not what GD says would happen.

Huh? Crisis wars typically happen 55-60 years after the last one ends (or climaxes). The last one ended in 1949. I don't see how this could be considered "too late." You can use GD however you like. At it's barest, you can just give times for crisis wars, staying within the 40-120 year boundary (or conversely, non-crisis wars). John has taken a riskier route to predict short-term events using GD principles. If the Israelis and Palestinians are entering a generational crisis period. Because of current events and longstanding "differences," there will be a crisis war between them in the near future.

So you can call it useless, but I find it useful.

But what does it mean? Will the violence get worse or get better? Will we accomplish our goals in Iraq or not? If the violence had subsided John would have called this prediction a success. If the violence did not subside John would call this prediciton a success. This is non-falsifiable--it's not a real prediction at all.

No, it's not a real prediction. At least, it's not like the Arab-Israeli one. The only thing mentioned (that you quoted) was that it may backfire since the Iraqis will be sick of the violence.

The violence has not subsided. Where has he claimed success?

How many of the predictions are falsifiable?

By your definition, not many. GD isn't so great at saying "by X date, this will happen." The theory just doesn't tell you when. A general timeframe? Maybe. But you can't be certain. That's why John, for the most part, has avoided this.

This is curious. You see things getting worse in Palestine, but don't see the same in Iraq.

Violence has been increasing in Iraq. When did I say violence wasn't?

Objectively, things have gotten worse faster in Iraq since 2003 than they have in Palestine. What is happening in Iraq is closer to a crisis war than what is happening in Palestine.

They are two entirely different scenarios..

Remember GD says that Palestine would graviate towards a crisis war while Iraq should not. Events on the ground have Iraq closer to a crisis war than Palsetine is right now. Over the last three years events have not moved in the direction that GD implied they would, just as the Dow has not moved in the direction John implied it would.

Well, not really. Iraq can't have a crisis war, so it cannot be close to having a crisis war. I see what you are saying, and Iraq is more violent. But it is not gravitating towars a crisis war because a crisis war cannot happen. Palestine is because the situation is getting worse and it does have the potential for a crisis war.

The stated reason the adminstration gives for staying in Iraq is to prevent civil war from developing. If civil war is impossible, as GD says, then it would have been OK for the US to have pulled out after we got Saddam. In any case the US can pull out now. Does John support immediate pullout? Do you? Why not? If Iraq cannot fall into a civil war if the US leaves, why stay?

I'd prefer not to turn this into a political debate, but even if the White House knew there wouldn't be a civil war, we'd be there anyway.

As for an antiwar movement, surely you have noticed that public opinion has shifted against the war. The antiwar people are gaining traction. Just because the opposition to the war has been spearheaded by the right who as a rule don't like to march in the streets, doesn't mean that there isn't a movement.

Just because public opinion has turned against the war doesn't mean that there is a "movement." I won't comment too much on this however. I have never seen a real anti-war movement in my life. But I'd be surprised if this was anywhere close to what we saw while we were in Vietnam.

Matt

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

Mike,
Iraq can't have a crisis war, so it cannot be close to having a crisis war. I see what you are saying, and Iraq is more violent. But it is not gravitating towars a crisis war because a crisis war cannot happen. Palestine is because the situation is getting worse and it does have the potential for a crisis war.

A political state created a little over 80 years ago is getting ready to fracture into three parts based on ethnic/religious loyalties that predate the nation-state. In my book, that qualifies as a crises. Theories are fun, but sometimes evidence and facts run counter to the theory.

Just because public opinion has turned against the war doesn't mean that there is a "movement." I won't comment too much on this however. I have never seen a real anti-war movement in my life. But I'd be surprised if this was anywhere close to what we saw while we were in Vietnam.

Matt

With the military situation being what it is, a draft would start a nationwide movement. The difference being that angry young civics have the potential to be a lot more explosive than their individualist boomer parents were if they feel that they need to be. Granted, what I just wrote about civics being potentially more dangerous is based on what S and H have wrote, and if I'm wrong about this, I will likely have to reevaluate the value of the S and H theory as a whole. But, so far what I've seen scince first reading Genarations in 1993 has led me to believe that there is merit to their theory. Unfortunatly, I haven't found GD as consistant.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

Well, not really. Iraq can't have a crisis war, so it cannot be close to having a crisis war.

Sure it can. The Iran-Iraq war might not have been a crisis war, perhaps the current war is. How do you know that the Iran-Iraq war was a crisis war and not this one?

John rules our the War of the League of Augsburg as a crisis war in favor of the War of Spanish Sucession partly because the former war was inconclusive and accomplished nothing:

However, the WLA ended with the indecisive Treaty of Ryswick, and the WSS began because France's Louis XIV violated the Treaty of Ryswick,
and tried to gain control of most of western Europe, from Netherlands
to Spain, and even parts of Italy.

He's right, no historian thinks the WLA is more important or "energetic" than the WSS. Some combine the two wars into a single conflict because the WSA is so obviously a continuation of the first.

But the Iran Iraq was was also inconclusive. John made the determination that it was a crisis war before the current war started. At that time it was the only candidate for a crisis war, as neither belligerent had been involved in any sizable conflict in a long time. now that there are two major Iraqi conflicts to consider as possible crisis wars how can you be sure that the 1980's was and not the current one is the crisis war. Both wars occur at an appropriate distance from the previous crisis war. Both 60ish and 80ish spacings between crisis wars occur.

Or perhaps there is no such thing as regularly-spaced crisis wars and so GD says nothing about how the Iraq war may unfold.

I don't want to throw this great exchange off; just looking for a quick answer from anyone who liked to take the time.

From just a timing aspect, could Iraq just be the prelude, something like Bloody Kansas/Harper's Ferry or the Spanish Civil War?

Originally Posted by Mikebert

Sure it can. The Iran-Iraq war might not have been a crisis war, perhaps the current war is. How do you know that the Iran-Iraq war was a crisis war and not this one?

I believe it fits into the algorithm, despite its inconclusive ending.

John rules our the War of the League of Augsburg as a crisis war in favor of the War of Spanish Sucession partly because the former war was inconclusive and accomplished nothing:

Partly is the key word here. It's just a piece of the puzzle.

He's right, no historian thinks the WLA is more important or "energetic" than the WSS. Some combine the two wars into a single conflict because the WSA is so obviously a continuation of the first.

OK. I don't think you are trying to make a point here. But I don't believe there can be that large of a break betwen two wars for both to be considered crisis wars.

But the Iran Iraq was was also inconclusive. John made the determination that it was a crisis war before the current war started. At that time it was the only candidate for a crisis war, as neither belligerent had been involved in any sizable conflict in a long time. now that there are two major Iraqi conflicts to consider as possible crisis wars how can you be sure that the 1980's was and not the current one is the crisis war. Both wars occur at an appropriate distance from the previous crisis war. Both 60ish and 80ish spacings between crisis wars occur.

It's intellectually dishonest to look at two wars and determine which one should be considered the crisis war. If the Iran-Iraq war was a crisis war, then the current conflict must be a non-crisis war.

Does the Iran-Iraq conflict fit into the algorithm in your estimation?

Or perhaps there is no such thing as regularly-spaced crisis wars and so GD says nothing about how the Iraq war may unfold.

I'm way past my period of doubt.

Originally Posted by herbal tee

Theories are fun, but sometimes evidence and facts run counter to the theory.

Hell yeah! A theory is not a religion. While S&H's and Mr. X's work is useful, my personal viewpoint is that we do not have the Grand Unified Theory of History proven yet.