Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

You have to find crisis wars by looking at each one individually. If you are looking at England, you have to apply the same criteria to each war. You can't simply say, "Well one of them has to be the crisis war. World War Two has better timing." or conversely, "World War one had more British deaths. That's the best choice." That would be dishonest. If you apply criteria to one war, you have to apply it to all wars. If you don't provide the same criteria, your theory has no basis whatsoever.

That's why you cannot look at World War One and Two for England, and say, "Well if I had to choose one, I'd say World War One because a little more British died." (or there was more violence, energy, etc.) You can't simply choose the "better one." If both fit the algorithm, then both are crisis wars. If none, then none are.

What you can say is the British fought World War Two energetically, targeted civilians and accepted nothing less than total victory, making it an obvious choice for a crisis war. World War One lacked that "genocidal energy", even though casualties were high.

Note: All quotes from the wikipedia article

If this is true then the Franco-Prussian war is hardly a crisis war. France started the war with the same goal as Louis XIV, to achieve "natural borders" for France-that is, a French-German border at the Rhine. France moved against the Germans on 28 July 1870. Five weeks later, after a series of battles in which the French were defeated--once even when they had 4:1 odds in there favor, emperor Napoleon III and the main French army was captured at the Battle of Sedan:

By the next day, on September 2, Napoleon III surrendered and was taken prisoner with 104,000 of his soldiers. It was an overwhelming victory for the Prussians, for they not only captured an entire French army, but the leader of France as well. The defeat of the French at Sedan had decided the war in Prussia's favor. One French army was now immobilized and besieged in the city of Metz, and no other forces stood on French ground to prevent a Germans invasion.

So the French surely did not fight with genocidal energy. Mostly they fought with incompetent energy. After Napoleon III was captured, a bloodless revolution removed the second Bonapartist monarchy and put in another republic in France. The Germans figured since they had France by the balls they could easily negotiate a peace.

At first, the outlook for peace seemed fair. The Germans estimated that the new government of France could not be interested in continuing the war that had been declared by the monarch they had quickly deposed of. Hoping to pave the road to peace, Prussia's Prime Minister Von Bismarck invited the new French Government to negotiations held at Ferrières and submitted a list of moderate conditions, including limited territorial demands in Alsace. This area west of the Rhine, inhabited by Germans for over thousand years (bi-lingual Oaths of Strasbourg 842), had been annexed by Louis XIV in 1681.

But the new French republic would have none of that:

But while the republican government was amenable to reparation payments or transfer of colonial territories in Africa or in South East Asia to Prussia, Jules Favre on behalf of the Government of National Defense declared on September 6 that

"We are not going to cede a single inch of our territory and not a single stone of our (Vauban-built) fortresses"

The republic renewed the declaration of war, called for recruits in all parts of the country, and pledged to drive the enemy troops out of France.

Now this is certainly energetic speech. But what did the new French government do?

Under these circumstances, the Germans had to continue the war, yet couldn't pin down any proper military opposition in their vicinity. As the bulk of the remaining French armies were digging-in near Paris, the German leaders decided to put pressure upon the enemy by attacking the capital of France. In October, German troops reached the outskirts of Paris, a heavily fortified city. The Germans surrounded it and erected a blockade, as already established and ongoing at Metz.

There was nobody to fight, the enemy just holed up in the capital--so they laid siege. No energy here.

The French Republic did raise new armies--using war propaganda about German war crimes to arouse the populace. The Germans for their part did not want to occupy France.

News about an alleged German "extermination" plan infuriated the French and strengthened their support to their new government. Within a few weeks, five new armies totaling more than 500,000 troops were recruited.

The Germans noticed this development and dispatched some of their troops to the French provinces in order to detect, attack, and disperse the new French armies before they could become a menace, for the blockade of Paris or elsewhere. The Germans were not prepared for an occupation of the whole of France. This would stretch them out, and they would become vulnerable.

On October 10, fighting erupted between German and French republican forces near Orléans. At first, the Germans were victorious, but the French drew reinforcements and defeated the Germans at Coulmiers on November 9. But after the surrender of Metz, more than 100,000 well-trained and battle-experienced German troops joined the German 'Southern Army'. With these reinforcements, the French were forced to abandon Orléans on December 4, to be finally defeated near Le Mans (between 10-12 January).

A second French army which operated north of Paris was turned back near Amiens (November 27, 1870), Bapaume (January 3, 1871) and St. Quentin (January 19).

Remnants of the French forces in the South reformed into the army of the East, which was dispatched by the Germans at Lisaine. Armies raised in the north were defeated by the Germans at St. Quentin.

The war then dribbled to its end:

With Paris starving, and Gambetta's provincial armies reeling from one disaster after another, French Premiere Jules Ferry was permitted to leave Paris and arrived at Versailles on January 24th to discuss peace terms with Bismarck.

Bismarck agreed to end the siege and allow food convoys to immediately enter Paris (including trains carrying millions of German army rations), on condition that the Government of National Defense surrendered several key fortresses outside Paris to the Prussians. Without the forts, the French Army would no longer be able to defend Paris. Although public opinion in Paris was strongly against any form of surrender of concession to the Prussians, the Government realized that it could not hold the city for much longer, and that Gambetta's provincial armies would probably never break through to relieve Paris. President Jules Trochu resigned on January 25 and was replaced by Jules Favre, who signed the surrender two days later at Versailles, with the armistice coming into effect at midnight. Several sources claim that in his carriage on the way back to Paris, Favre broke into tears, and collapsed into his daughter's arms as the guns around Paris fell silent at midnight.

At Tours, Gambetta received word from Paris on January 30 that the Government had surrendered. Furious, he refused to surrender and launched an immediate attack on German forces at Orleans which, predictably, failed. A delegation of Parisian diplomats arrived in Tours by train on February 5 to negotiate with Gambetta, and the following day Gambetta stepped down and surrendered control of the provincial armies to the Government of National Defense, which promptly ordered a ceasefire across France.

A peace treaty was signed in which France agreed to pay an indemnity and ceded most of Alace-Lorraine to Germany. There was no total victory.

There is no energy in this war either and there was no genocide. Civilians suffered only because their idiotic government decided to continue a hopeless war, barricading themselves in Paris without adequate supplies. If that is genocidal fury then the American embargo of Iraq in the 1990's is genocidal fury too.

The war had significance. It helped create a German identity and led to a unified German state--but the war itself was a limited war fought non-energetically to limited ends that did not target civilians. Both sides put more effort into WW I and the consequences imposed on the loser were more severe. Neither war saw the "total victory" of WW II, but then few wars do.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Mike uses the phrase "punch list," a phrase that I've never used.

I'm an engineer. A punchlist is a checklist. You used to have a list of crisis critieria on which you put crosses to check them off much like we use punch holes on a "punchlist".

I've tried to avoid using the word "judgment" because I used it once before, and Mike's response was something like, "Aha! You admit you use judgment." But we're talking about human beings, and there are no magic formulas for evaluating human actions numerically.

You called it an almost "computer like algorithm", which implies a great deal more objectivity than is actually involved.

Basically, the difference between crisis and non-crisis wars is completely obvious, once you look at numerous examples. You can "feel" the difference between crisis and non-crisis wars. I use the phrase "genocidal energy" to describe it, and it's something that you can feel without much trouble.

That's it. You feel the answer. So does a mystic or an oracle, hence my characterization of GD as "oracular"

On another subject, Mike claims that I believe that violence is increasing in Palestine and decreasing in Iraq. Mike knows that's silly. There's a tide of increasing violence throughout the Mideast, as you point out. It's just that it's not a civil war in Iraq.

But there is a civil conflict in Iraq. It may not be quantitatively a full-scale civil war, but qualititively it is.

When the Mideast Roadmap to Peace was released in May 2003, I made the following predictions:
[*] The Mideast Roadmap would fail, and would not produce side by side states.

So have the many peace plans before it--this is like saying the sun will rise tomorrow.

[*] The disappearance of Ariel Sharon and Yasser Arafat would signal a major generational change that would lead the region into massive regional war.

This isn't a prediction because it doesn't involve any externally visable features.

[*]It was possible that the departure of Arafat alone would do this, and a new regional war would probably occur within a couple of years of the disappearence of Arafat.

No regional war involving the Israelis has occurred as of yet. So this one hasn't come true. You made one successful prediction in this group. It is about as startling as this one from SNL:

tonight's forecast: darkness--with scattered light in the morning

[*] There would not be a massive uprisings against the Americans or a civil war, since Iraq is in an awakening era.

At the time this prediction was made the US government did not recognise the presence of an insurgency as it was yet quite small. This forecast says that a full-blown insurgency would not develop. It implies that the US would not fall into a Vietnam-like quagmire and we would win. In other words GD was supportive of the idea that no additional troops would be needed to fight the insurgency because the insurgency wasn't going to grow into a serious "massive" threat. It was wrong--a massive insurgency did develop and continues to grow.

[*] The terrorist attacks may continue and get worse, and were quite possibly funded by Palestinian groups or other external groups.

The insurgents are not being funding by Palestinians. The sectarian violence is Sunni Muslim on Shia Muslim--it has nothing to do with Palestinians or Israel

[*] The really dangerous scenario is that large numbers of Palestinian and "mujahadeen" terrorists will be motivated by identity group relationships to move into Iraq as a theatre of war against the Americans. That isn't happening now, but it's one of several possible scenarios that may unfold in the Mideast region during the next few months and years."

Right, it hasn't happened.

These predictions were COMPLETELY novel.

Most of them were, expect for the failure of the peace plan which has happened over and over again for thirty years. None of the novel predictions came true--probably because they were so novel as to be unlikley and unlikely things are, not surprisingly, unlikely to occur.

So Mike is right that I let some errors creep into my writing in 2002 and early 2003. But the basic prediction -- that we're entering a new 1930s style Great Depression was not wrong, and a stock market
crash to Dow 3000-4000 cannot be avoided.

Except it's three years later and still no depression. The Dow did not crash to 4000 and it is making new highs. An outline of what I expected in March 2003 can be found in Figure 1.1 of my book Retiring Rich:
http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listing/0971804842

I reproduce the figure here and add in what has happened since in red



Obviously the market hasn't exactly tracked my forecast--but I got the direction right and that's all you need to make money. And you see I too forecast a market collapse--we just aren't there yet.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

There are many things wrong with this statement.

First, you don't know that it's going to fracture into three parts.
Many times during the last 80 years, Iraqis overcame their
differences and decided that they were Iraqis before they were Sunnis
or Shias, and they decided to stick together.

*Snare drum lightly and then harder*

Yes those fine Iraqi patriots have decided freely and without the compulson of a ruthless sunni dictatorship to "stick together". Iraqis first, last and always! LOL

*fade snare drum*

Second, you can call anything a crisis. It may be a crisis in "your
book," but that doesn't make it a crisis in anyone else's book. You
can make things up as you go along, but that doesn't mean that the
things you make up are worth anything.

I'll defer to you as an unmatched expert at making up things that aren't worth anything. *rimshot followed by light audence laughter*

There is no evidence at all to support the concept of one group
"inheriting its timeline" from another group. Strauss and Howe
assumed it, but provided no evidence.

Actually they provided a hell of a lot of evidence. Unless you're claiming that the mores established in the New England Puratan colonies in the 1630's are not signs of a group in an awakening. If that's true then the trancendentalist colonies are not products of an awakening and let's forget about Johnatan Edwards preaching in the 1730's. That doesn't matter either.

When a group is forced to
relocate from one place to another, they don't "inherit" the
timeline; instead, their existing generational structure gets
destroyed, and their timeline gets reset to the First Turning. After
that, it takes only two generations before Strauss and Howe's entire
constellation of generations has been reinstated.

IOW, the cavalers are really prophets? Then mathmatically,it must have been the heroic glorious swinging on Salem's gallows hill in 1692. Heroes as scapegoats, that makes a lot of sense.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

I'm an engineer...I reproduce the figure here and add in what has happened since in red.

As a frog engineer, I would love to see you post the oscillation equation you used to project your S&P 500 index into the future.


Crrribbbittt!

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

So I know you love China, and can't believe that
there'll ever be a war between China and America

Umm. No and no.
I have a couple of friends in China; I did manage to get roaring blitzed with some customers there; and I thought that the countryside was absolutely stunning to look at. That said, I don't really care for southeast Asia in general -- it's crowded, hot, filthy, stinky, and I stick out like a sore thumb -- and my affections don't run any direction in aprticular with repect to states and/or their ruling cliques.
And as for a war? What, exactly, would China do in a war against the US? Attack our various military outposts in their neighborhood? I suppose I could see that; then again, a goodly chunk of Okinawa might not be so much opposed to that kind of thing, with the way the US forces there have been known to comport themselves. Send their troops over to invade the mainland US? Don't be silly. OTOH, the US has already established itself as perfectly willing to lay out the cash to ship it's weapon-platforms over to the other side fo the planet to make other people's lives miserable.

Of course it can't be predicted how it will all turn out, but I see
no way around it that China will have a civil war, a war with Japan
and a war with America.

Call them as you see them; for me, while the evidence may support the possibility of a Chinese revolution, there's nothing to indicate that America would get dragged into it, or that it would somehow jump the borders and come to us.

And yet, every actual Chinese person I've talked to has pretty much assumed that the short-attention-spanned Americans will eventually lose interest, and the Taiwanese and mainlanders can come to their own terms. They do take somewhat more of the long view there.

If your friends really believe that, then they really are in a
complete "state of denial."[/quote]
Prove them wrong. US history up to now bears out the Chinese POV.

Is India preparing for an American attack?

Yes. Joint military exercises under the auspices of the SCO (a club to which America has been pointed denied its several requests for if not membership, at least 'sitting-at-the-table' rights) amount to something along those lines

Is Japan?

Probably not. But then again, they are trying to scrap the 'pacifistic' clauses of the constitution the US forced on them...

Is Russia?

See above, 'India'. Russia has perhaps one of the bigger causes, as the US has, rather than cooling the hostile stance post Cold-War, taken even more aggressive moves against Russia in her near-abroad.[/quote]

China is actively preparing for a major thermonuclear with America, and they have no doubt that it's coming.

They most likely fear it -- and who wouldn't? America is the only nation in the history of humankind ever to launch a nuclear attack, and the rhetoric coming from the US is indicating a decrease in whatever scruples may have kept them from doing it again since. As I said before, any reasonable leader, anywhere, has made at least some preparations for what to do if the psychotic giant turns his way. (Probably even France...)

Originally Posted by Zarathustra

Not that I disagree, but why would you say it's likely without the past animosity?

I don't know. There are plenty of reasons why Japan and China are poised for war. They're probably the same reasons you would come up with.

IOW, what, if anything, is GD relying on to predict a war between Japan and China other than the past animosity and the fact that present generations have no direct memory of what tragedy those animosities can lead to? And if there is something, what does it have to do with generational study?

It relies on a bunch of things. That's just a piece of the puzzle, albeit a large one. The present generations having no memory of the conflict is key. It is one of the main factors determining pre-crisis era actions with crisis era actions. It isn't past animosity that always leads to the next war, but it can play a role.

So GD relies on the fact that generations have not seen a crisis war, but not how past animosity can lead to war.

The "near" descriptive does not help much, no. Is the animosity primary to the prediction or not? The answer to this would tell me much.

I can't answer that with the word "primary." Sorry.

Any half-informed, non-GD analysis can tell that there are tensions now between Japan and China, but there are not between Germany and Russia (at least nothing anywhere near close). What makes GD special?

Nothing really. All you have to do is pick up a newspaper. What GD does tell you is that tensions are rising because of generational changes.

All I have seen mentioned about GD predicitive tools is past animosity from genocidal "crisis" wars and the forgetfulness of younger generations (those and something about crusty bureaucracies). Have I missed something?

Yes. You should take another look.

By "it" I'm assuming you mean past animosty. And I am assuming that you're saying that said animosity is just one component of GD's analysis. I think I hear what you're saying. Okay then, but ...

What else does "Generational Dynamics" bring to the table in these analyses that is based on generational studies? Like I said, anyone can tell that one set of nations is on a collision course, and that the other set is not. What is GD bringing to this that is different?

I don't know. Show me another site that is predicting what John is predicting using a non-generational analysis. For all I know, there could be one out there. I would like to see it.

And to say that these predictions aren't based on generational studies is absurd. Look at the recent Iraqi civil war article on his website. I haven't read it yet, but I'm going to take a stab and say that the world generation is in it.

90% of the predictions are based on generational analyses.

Like I said, anyone can tell that one set of nations is on a collision course, and that the other set is not.

I'm glad to see that you are coming around to accepting GD.

If you cannot supply anything other than the GD generational tools I have mentioned before then they are all John has. Therefore, the only thing GD, as such, can rely on is the past animosity and forgetfulness about it's dangers. Period. If that is all there is to it, and that is what he used to determine Japan & China's problem, then the same should apply for Germany & Russia or it's useless. Therein lies the performatve contradiction.

Let me explain.

1. Past animosity from the previous crisis war is not certain.
2. Generations not remembering the crisis war is certain after about 55 years.
3. When past animosity remains (for whatever reason or another) it can tell us about how the war is going to be shaped.

So for some reason or another, Japan and China have past animosity. This has nothing (or very little) to do with GD. The crisis war brought on this animosity and it has remained. Don't ask me why, I don't really know. For some reason, it remained in East Asia but not in East Europe. So because there is no past animosity in East Europe, it won't tell us how the war is going to be shaped. Because there is past animosity in East Asia, it will.

First, as a result of John not answering my questions, I am left with the implications that GD relies heavily on war casualties. One of the reasons I recently gave was John's answer on the English Civil War: that it couldn't be a Crisis War because wars of it's magnitude simply don't occur in anything other than 4T's, by (his) definition. This and other argument he has had with Mike leave this as a STRONG implication.

OK I see what you are saying. But it doesn't rely on war deaths. I can't speak for John, (then again..) but I'm sure he was looking at something else.

Strictly speaking, I know of no crisis war where at least one person wasn't killed. But what's war without death?

Second, I agree with you. War casualities a relatively poor indicator of 4T wars (though there I would say there is a low-to-medium correlation).

I'd agree with this. One of the reasons I'm skeptical about the 1947 war over Kashmir as being a crisis war was that deaths were in the lower thousands. For a nation as big as India, this should raise some eyebrows.

And I also agree for this reason that GD has fatal flaws. He may say he doesn't rely on war casualties, but what does GD actually do?

The T4T definition of a crisis and GD's crisis war are similar. They really are. The sole difference is that GD says there must be a war. Society still goes through the same change and the generations are shifted and forever changed.

Interestingly, S&H only consider war intensity and genocidal "fury" (as they'd say) as one criterion out of many. More basic is the question of whether or not the outer-world of a society is fundamentally changing and reforming. If one were to whittle things down to a primary aspect, that would be it.

Well, OK.

No, but unlike with John, you were civil and lacked overbearing arrogance even though you are obvious attached in some way to GD. Quite refreshing, actually.

Thanks, I think. Hopefully a discussion can happen without so much fighting.

Matt

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Dear Matt,

You're doing a fantastic job of keeping Mike at bay. Thanks.

No problem! I'm learning a lot by actually applying what I know. Thanks for letting me do this.

But the Crisis War Evaluation Algorithm that I've created does, I
believe, very substantially reduce the amount of judgment required to
evaluate a war. It turns out that the War of the Spanish Succession
is just about the hardest war to evaluate. If you apply this
algorithm to other wars, it evaluates very quickly and unambiguously.
Even WW I is easy to evaluate, as long as you remember that it has to
be applied to different countries separately.

When I first started studying Strauss and Howe after 9/11, I wanted
to try to verify its validity. It was quickly apparent that TFT only
covered six cycles, and three of the six contained major anomalies.
That meant that unless I could find a way to validate TFT for all
countries and times in history, it would be basically useless.

As I dug into it in 2002, it turned out that the most productive was
to verify that crisis wars occur throughout all places and times in
history. I spent many hours on this endeavor, and the more I looked
at histories of various wars, the more the concept of a crisis wars
was just "common sense."

Basically, the difference between crisis and non-crisis wars is
completely obvious, once you look at numerous examples. You can
"feel" the difference between crisis and non-crisis wars. I use the
phrase "genocidal energy" to describe it, and it's something that you
can feel without much trouble.

But it took the greater part of a year to reach that point. It was a
very long learning experience.

So I see the Crisis War Evaluation Algorithm as a teaching/learning
tool. This tool isn't needed by someone who has taken the time to
develop the needed intuition, but for someone who's just starting
out, it helps to get a feel for the various factors that go into an
evaluation.

Thanks for mentioning this. I sometimes am too reliant on the algorithm. I'll keep this in mind in the future.

Actually, there are other cases. There's Switzerland and Iceland in
WW II, for example. But you could also say that Kansas didn't have a
crisis war. This raises the question: What has to happen for a
country to be part of a crisis war? If you're not an actual
belligerent (such as Kansas or Switzerland), then how strong a
connection do you have to have for it to be a crisis war for you?

Oh, I'm well aware of cases where crisis wars have been avoided. The difference is that England was a major European (World) power. So I'm not surprised that tiny countries with relatively little significance on European politics avoided a crisis war. England is a whole 'nother ballpark.

With regard to England in the 1800s, my guess is that the
Franco-Prussian war was a crisis war for England, in the same way
that WW II was a crisis war for Switzerland. This is one of those
many things I'd like to research. In particular, were the English
afraid that Germany would beat France, and then go on to England?

OK. But Switzerland was smack in the middle of things. Iceland is probably a better example.

I believe it is possible for a country to experience a crisis war in
this way, provided that the country has plenty of food and little
poverty.

That doesn't describe 19th century England, does it??

Finally, there's another point: England was at war somewhere in the
world every day of Queen Victoria's reign. This all has to be
analyzed by reading diaries and histories that were written at the
time.

You know, I just can't agree with this having the effects of a crisis war. A crisis war somehow has to scar and shock the nation. British Imperialism didn't have this effect. Not that the Franco-Prussian war did either..

I'd agree that the Franco-Prussian war was a crisis war for England, but I'll still consider it both an anomaly and a mystery.

Matt

Originally Posted by Croakmore

As a frog engineer, I would love to see you post the oscillation equation you used to project your S&P 500 index into the future.


Crrribbbittt!

The graph datapoints actually contain only the peaks and troughs. Excel's smoothing function produces the nice curvy lines.

As for how the peaks and troughs are obtained, that is the topic of this month's Stock Cycles article. I'll post the link when it comes out.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

The graph datapoints actually contain only the peaks and troughs. Excel's smoothing function produces the nice curvy lines.

As for how the peaks and troughs are obtained, that is the topic of this month's Stock Cycles article. I'll post the link when it comes out.

Just a tiny hint, like the wink of a mantid before it strikes its prey, would be enlightening.


Kaapoochie?

Originally Posted by Croakmore

Just a tiny hint, like the wink of a mantid before it strikes its prey, would be enlightening.


Kaapoochie?

Mantid with prey - Tenodera

Springfield, Virginia, USA
September 18, 2004
A Chinese mantid eating a bumble bee.

http://bugguide.net/node/view/7365/bgpage

That's Gladys! I went out with her in high school, unil I leaned that she ate her dates.


Yyyyyipppzzzipppity!

From Newsweek:

Originally Posted by Fareed Zakaria

Iraq is now in a civil war. Thirty thousand Iraqis have died there in the past three years, more than in many other conflicts widely recognized as civil wars. The number of internal refugees, mostly Sunni victims of ethnic cleansing, has exploded over the past few months, and now exceeds a quarter of a million people. (The Iraqi government says 240,000, but this doesn't include Iraqis who have fled abroad or who may not have registered their move with the government.) The number of attacks on Shiite mosques increases every week: there have been 69 such attacks since February, compared with 80 in the previous two and a half years. And the war is being fought on gruesome new fronts. CBS News's Lara Logan has filed astonishing reports on the Health Ministry, which is run by supporters of radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. According to Logan, hospitals in Baghdad and Karbala are systematically killing Sunni patients and then dumping their bodies in mass graves.

Dear Mike,

Originally Posted by Mikebert

Iraq in Civil War

Originally Posted by Fareed Zakaria

Iraq in Civil War
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15177998/site/newsweek/

Well, this is amusing on several levels.

First, I assume you're aware that I wrote an article on Zakaria's
comments on the panel on Sunday's "This Week With George
Stephanopoulos."



In my article, I called Zakaria "learning-impaired."
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...061008#e061008


I believe that he appeared on the panel after writing his Newsweek
column. During his panel appearance, he DIDN'T say that Iraq was in
a civil war. He said that the Iraqi government had failed, that
America had failed, that a "civil war dynamic" (whatever that is) has
set in, and that the trend is wrong for every issue that "relates to a
building civil war" (whatever that is). But he didn't say that Iraq
was in a civil war.

So the learning-impaired Zakaria is flip-flopping right before our
eyes.

Even in the article you quoted, the very next sentence is "Iraq's
problem is fundamentally political, not military," indicating that
this is not a crisis civil war.

As I've said before, you can call this a civil war if you want. It
depends on the definition of civil war. But it's most certainly NOT
a crisis civil war. Indeed, a crisis civil war is impossible, since
Iraq is in a generational awakening era, only one generation has
passed since the genocidal Iran/Iraq war of the 1980s.

You've been flip-flopping right before our eyes too. You started by
arguing it is a civil war, then you said "Oh gawrsh no, I didn't
actually mean it was a civil war." Now you're posting a message with
the title "Iraq in Civil War," which I assume means that you DO
think it's a civil war.

So which is it, Mike? What is YOUR position? Is it a civil war
(BONG) or not a civil war (BUZZ)?

If you're not sure, then try plugging one or two random data points
into your spreadsheet and let excel draw some curves. Maybe that
will help you decide.

At any rate, please select one position or the other.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

If Iraq walks murderously like a duck, quacks religiously like a duck, flies headlong into sectarian war like a duck, and lacks any civility whatsoever like a duck, then it's is a bloody civil-war duck, if I know my quacky waterfowl, and I do.


Waaaabbobbit!

Originally Posted by Mikebert

Note: All quotes from the wikipedia article

If this is true then the Franco-Prussian war is hardly a crisis war. France started the war with the same goal as Louis XIV, to achieve "natural borders" for France-that is, a French-German border at the Rhine. France moved against the Germans on 28 July 1870. Five weeks later, after a series of battles in which the French were defeated--once even when they had 4:1 odds in there favor, emperor Napoleon III and the main French army was captured at the Battle of Sedan:


So the French surely did not fight with genocidal energy. Mostly they fought with incompetent energy. After Napoleon III was captured, a bloodless revolution removed the second Bonapartist monarchy and put in another republic in France. The Germans figured since they had France by the balls they could easily negotiate a peace.

Part of the reason the Franco-Prussian war had relatively less casualties than other crisis wars was due to the utter incompetence of the French, who lost the war in the opening moments. Part of the reason you might not have seen as much "energy" as say, World War Two, was because of the sanity of Bismarck. It's pretty much assumed now that Hitler was crazy (which he probably was) and that Bismarck was rational. Something I would like to know more about is how leaders can affect crisis and non-crisis wars. A pragmatist like Bismarck might have made a crisis war like the Franco-Prussian war seem less violent, while a madman like Stalin may have made a non-crisis war against the Germans (who were in a crisis war) more horrific than it should have been. However, I do think that it would be a gross understatement to say that there was no "genocidal energy" in the Franco-Prussian war.

Something else to consider is what you describe as "national will," which in many respects is the same thing as genocidal violence. If you read that wikipedia article you can see that there was plenty of will to fight from the people, even if their leaders opposed it.

This is probably related to the American Revolution in some respects. "Genocidal violence/energy" may not be the right words to describe it, but "national will" certainly is. If you just look at anything related to the American Revolution, and you get the feeling that these actions could only happen during a crisis era.

Also, do not forget "Bloody Week" in France. It's hard to imagine that sort of thing occuring in a 1T, 2T, or 3T
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Commune

Dear Matt,

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> Part of the reason the Franco-Prussian war had relatively less
> casualties than other crisis wars was due to the utter
> incompetence of the French, who lost the war in the opening
> moments. Part of the reason you might not have seen as much
> "energy" as say, World War Two, was because of the sanity of
> Bismarck. It's pretty much assumed now that Hitler was crazy
> (which he probably was) and that Bismarck was rational. Something
> I would like to know more about is how leaders can affect crisis
> and non-crisis wars. A pragmatist like Bismarck might have made a
> crisis war like the Franco-Prussian war seem less violent, while a
> madman like Stalin may have made a non-crisis war against the
> Germans (who were in a crisis war) more horrific than it should
> have been. However, I do think that it would be a gross
> understatement to say that there was no "genocidal energy" in the
> Franco-Prussian war.

> Something else to consider is what you describe as "national
> will," which in many respects is the same thing as genocidal
> violence. If you read that wikipedia article you can see that
> there was plenty of will to fight from the people, even if their
> leaders opposed it.

> This is probably related to the American Revolution in some
> respects. "Genocidal violence/energy" may not be the right words
> to describe it, but "national will" certainly is. If you just look
> at anything related to the American Revolution, and you get the
> feeling that these actions could only happen during a crisis era.

> Also, do not forget "Bloody Week" in France. It's hard to imagine
> that sort of thing occuring in a 1T, 2T, or 3T

> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Commune

The concept of "crazy" versus "rational" leadership is an interesting
one since it relates to the question of just how much influence
political leaders have on the climax of a crisis war.

The German literature makes it pretty clear that, from the German
point of view, the climax of the Franco-Prussian war was Napoleon
III's surrender at Sedan, allowing Bismarck to gain control of Alsace
and Lorraine. Bismarck's goal was to unify all German lands, and once
he got what he wanted from France, he was willing to stop. (Hitler
had the same goal, but while he was at it he decided to go a tiny bit
farther -- conquer the world.)

However, from the French point of view, the climax of the crisis era
was not Sedan but the Paris Commune. So France and Germany had
different points of climax in their respective fourth turnings, and
there's nothing wrong with that.

So Bismarck's rationality permitted the German slaughter to stop, but
it didn't permit the French slaughter to stop. If Bismarck had
continued on, then those additional 50,000 French deaths probably
would have occurred in battles with the Germans; when the Germans
withdrew, those 50,000 French deaths occurred in battles with each
other.

Loaded with irony, as so many things are in this stuff.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

Part of the reason the Franco-Prussian war had relatively less casualties than other crisis wars was due to the utter incompetence of the French, who lost the war in the opening moments. Part of the reason you might not have seen as much "energy" as say, World War Two, was because of the sanity of Bismarck. It's pretty much assumed now that Hitler was crazy (which he probably was) and that Bismarck was rational. Something I would like to know more about is how leaders can affect crisis and non-crisis wars. A pragmatist like Bismarck might have made a crisis war like the Franco-Prussian war seem less violent, while a madman like Stalin may have made a non-crisis war against the Germans (who were in a crisis war) more horrific than it should have been. However, I do think that it would be a gross understatement to say that there was no "genocidal energy" in the Franco-Prussian war.

Something else to consider is what you describe as "national will," which in many respects is the same thing as genocidal violence. If you read that wikipedia article you can see that there was plenty of will to fight from the people, even if their leaders opposed it.

This is probably related to the American Revolution in some respects. "Genocidal violence/energy" may not be the right words to describe it, but "national will" certainly is. If you just look at anything related to the American Revolution, and you get the feeling that these actions could only happen during a crisis era.

Also, do not forget "Bloody Week" in France. It's hard to imagine that sort of thing occuring in a 1T, 2T, or 3T
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Commune

You are missing the point. You wrote that the British fought World War Two energetically, targeted civilians and accepted nothing less than total victory, making it an obvious choice for a crisis war. World War One lacked that "genocidal energy", even though casualties were high. Here you are applying key characteristics of crisis vs non crisis wars: (1) were civilians targeted? (2) was the war fought energetically, (3) was only total victory accepted?

WW II is Yes on all three whereas WW I was not, which supports the assignment of WW II as a crisis war and WW I as a non-crisis war. So I show that for the F-P war the answer to all three of these questions is No. The F-P was is less of a crisis war than even WW I on these criteria.

If you are looking for crisis wars in ancient Rome, you may only have accounts recorded by ancient Chroniclers. You will likely have no information about public attitudes. You will have only the description of the war itself: the individual battles, perhaps something of the war strategy and especially the exploits by notables. Take the Illiad as an example. Lots of stories about the exploits of heroes and stories about strategy (Trojan horse). Nothing about the real (probably economic) reasons for the war or how the Greek people felt about Troy. We infer the war was a crisis war largely because Troy is burned the the ground and all of its inhabitants are put to the sword including the Priam's grandson, a mere child, slaughtered in frony of the old man. Plenty of genocidal fury in this war account.

But a similar account of the F-P war reveals a total lack of genocidal fury. It is clear that the Germans don't want to fight this war and are frustrated by these stupid and stubborn Frenchmen who insist on impaling themselves on the German spear. If all you had was a chronicle of the F-P war that described the battles and the exploits of the leaders you would have to conclude that the F-P war was a non-crisis war, when in fact it was a crisis war.

Similarly, WW II shows much geocidal fury. The Battle of the Somme has lots of futile heriocs like Pickett's charge or Hector in combat against Achilles. WW I it has plenty of tragic, pointless slaughter like the sack of Troy. In the absence of auxilliary information about public attitudes and the political environment in which the war took place (which we have about WW I because it is recent, but lack for ancient wars) we would assign WW I as a crisis war (and be wrong as it was a non-crisis war).

So is the third Punic War a true crisis war because of its genocidal fury (Carthage is utterly destroy like Troy) or it a particularly bloody non-crisis war like WW I? Carthage was weak; it was no threat to Rome. Was the war truly a reflection of genocidal fury amongst the Roman population as a whole or was it a "war of choice" designed to advance the fortunes of a political faction or certain political leaders?

What I am trying to get it I don't think you can assign crisis wars reliably by just looking at descriptions of the wars themselves and not also at what is going on in the larger society at the same time. But much of the time, like for example, the native American wars you examined, you probably will not have information about the political views of the ordinary people in the societies fighting the wars.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

You are missing the point. You wrote that the British fought World War Two energetically, targeted civilians and accepted nothing less than total victory, making it an obvious choice for a crisis war. World War One lacked that "genocidal energy", even though casualties were high. Here you are applying key characteristics of crisis vs non crisis wars: (1) were civilians targeted? (2) was the war fought energetically, (3) was only total victory accepted?

Mike,

I applied three typical characteristics of a crisis war to which World War Two fit. It is true that France wasn't reduced to rubble by the Germans in the Franco-Prussian War. But that doesn't automatically make the Franco-Prussian War a non-crisis war. In other words, total victory in a war is indicative of a crisis war, but less than total victory is not indicative of a non-crisis war, as there are plenty of examples when total victory is not acheived. What is total victory anyway? I assume it means all stated objectives are accomplished. So in many respects, the Germans did acheive total victory. France did not. They lost.

As for #'s 1 and 2, I would have to disagree with you. It wasn't on the scale of World War Two (not too many things are), but it beats World War One.

So if I'm talking about the Franco-Prussian War, I'd say that total victory was acheived, civilian casualties were high, it spawned a hugely important nation, and there was no backing down.

If you are looking for crisis wars in ancient Rome, you may only have accounts recorded by ancient Chroniclers. You will likely have no information about public attitudes. You will have only the description of the war itself: the individual battles, perhaps something of the war strategy and especially the exploits by notables. Take the Illiad as an example. Lots of stories about the exploits of heroes and stories about strategy (Trojan horse). Nothing about the real (probably economic) reasons for the war or how the Greek people felt about Troy. We infer the war was a crisis war largely because Troy is burned the the ground and all of its inhabitants are put to the sword including the Priam's grandson, a mere child, slaughtered in frony of the old man. Plenty of genocidal fury in this war account.

Well I know nothing about ancient Rome, but I'll take your word for it.

But a similar account of the F-P war reveals a total lack of genocidal fury. It is clear that the Germans don't want to fight this war and are frustrated by these stupid and stubborn Frenchmen who insist on impaling themselves on the German spear.

It seems to me like you are suggesting that this fits as a crisis war for France, but not Germany. Can you confirm this?

Similarly, WW II shows much geocidal fury. The Battle of the Somme has lots of futile heriocs like Pickett's charge or Hector in combat against Achilles. WW I it has plenty of tragic, pointless slaughter like the sack of Troy. In the absence of auxilliary information about public attitudes and the political environment in which the war took place (which we have about WW I because it is recent, but lack for ancient wars) we would assign WW I as a crisis war (and be wrong as it was a non-crisis war).

I don't have enough experience with actual battles to make that determination. I'm interested to hear more about why Malplaquet could have only happened during a crisis war, and Somme could not. Maybe John can field this one.

What I am trying to get it I don't think you can assign crisis wars reliably by just looking at descriptions of the wars themselves and not also at what is going on in the larger society at the same time.

Maybe. The algorithm may not work for some people. It doesn't work for you in many wars. For me, I don't love it for the Soviet Union in World War Two. However, I have found it that it works nearly all of the time, but for the iffy ones, you have to look into it a bit more.

But much of the time, like for example, the native American wars you examined, you probably will not have information about the political views of the ordinary people in the societies fighting the wars.

The bigger problem was lack of information about the war. I would have loved more about King William's War for the Iroquois. True, I had virtually no information about the people. It would have helped a little, but not terribly much. Often times, in crisis era, the views of ordinary people are expressed through action. Plenty of examples on that one.

Side note: I'm beginning to think that the Pequot War was not a crisis war for the Pequots, as I look back into my research for a school project.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

In other words, total victory in a war is indicative of a crisis war, but less than total victory is not indicative of a non-crisis war, as there are plenty of examples when total victory is not acheived.

Total victory was offered to the Germans in the F-P war. They controlled the whole country. They could have taken more, but did not. Similarly, the Americans captured the Mexican capital and could have taken the whole country, but only took a part--that within what America thought of as our "natural boundaries". The Germans did the same. What the Germans did in this respect in the F-P war is indicative of a non-crisis war, just as what the US did in the Mexican war is consistent with a non-crisis war.

What is total victory anyway? I assume it means all stated objectives are accomplished.

Total victory is to take the maximum that your force of arms permits. In the War of Spanish Succession, allied arms did not permit the capture of France (France didn't lose that badly). What they got was all they could get--and it was enough to prevent a repeat of the same war again. This makes the WSS a total victory for the allies.

In the FP war and the US-Mexican wars, the winners could have been more demanding. In fact, the victory in WW I was more total than the F-P war in that the allies probably got everything that their force of arms could get them, just like in the WSS. What makes WW I different from the WSS was that Germany didn't stay defeated as France did--they were willing to try again just twenty years later.

As for #'s 1 and 2, I would have to disagree with you. It wasn't on the scale of World War Two (not too many things are), but it beats World War One.

Wait a minute, how were civilans targeted in the F-P war? In WW II, the Germans lobbed V1 and V2 flying bombs to London. That's targeting civilians. In WW I the Germans lobbed man-sized explosive shells into Paris from 70 milies away using massive guns. That's targetting civilans. Where were civilians targeted in the F-P war? Sure lots of French civilians died as collateral damage in normal acts of war. To capture Paris (a legitimate military objective) a seige was undertaken, that resulted in civilian deaths as collateral damage. In WW I the front was 70 miles from Paris. No military objective could be accomplished by lobbing shells into Paris. Like Hezbollah rockets, they were a weapon of terror directed at civilians.

I would say WW I had more targetting of civilans than the F-P war.

As for energy. Well the war certainly wasn't fought energetically by the French "surrender monkeys". As for the Germans, it was fought competently, but not particularly enthusiatically, since the Germans clearly didn't want to keep fighting and offered easy peace terms several times.

However, I have found it that it works nearly all of the time, but for the iffy ones, you have to look into it a bit more.

But you aren't applying it the same for various wars. You talk about targeting civilians in WW II (lots more of this in WW II than WW I), but in the F-P war you talk about civilian casualties, as opposed to targetting, because civilians were not targeted in the F-P war. So it seems to me that you are bending the rules so those wars that you need to be crisis wars come out as such.

Mike - Don't forget the 20 or so German dirigible attacks on London in 1916.

Pax,

Dave Krein '42

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Dear Mike,
...If you're not sure, then try plugging one or two random data points
into your spreadsheet and let excel draw some curves. Maybe that
will help you decide.

What would we do without that curve-fitting function of Excel? It's almost as good as reality when we don't really know what goes on in that speculative space between those arbitrary data points. Heck, I could even see a civil war breaking in there without bothering Excel's curve-fitting function one bit.


Twwoot?

Originally Posted by Mikebert

Total victory was offered to the Germans in the F-P war. They controlled the whole country. They could have taken more, but did not. Similarly, the Americans captured the Mexican capital and could have taken the whole country, but only took a part--that within what America thought of as our "natural boundaries". The Germans did the same. What the Germans did in this respect in the F-P war is indicative of a non-crisis war, just as what the US did in the Mexican war is consistent with a non-crisis war.

I don't completely disagree here. The fact that the F-P war stopped is indicative of a non-crisis war, or perhaps more accurately, is not indicative of a crisis war. With that being said, I'm not surprised. Bismarck et al got all they really wanted out of the war. Sanity perhaps?

Total victory is to take the maximum that your force of arms permits. In the War of Spanish Succession, allied arms did not permit the capture of France (France didn't lose that badly). What they got was all they could get--and it was enough to prevent a repeat of the same war again. This makes the WSS a total victory for the allies.

Can you link me to some definition of that, or did you come up with it? I'm having trouble finding a defintion.

In the FP war and the US-Mexican wars, the winners could have been more demanding. In fact, the victory in WW I was more total than the F-P war in that the allies probably got everything that their force of arms could get them, just like in the WSS.

Huh? There was no way the allies could have gotten more?

Wait a minute, how were civilans targeted in the F-P war? In WW II, the Germans lobbed V1 and V2 flying bombs to London. That's targeting civilians. In WW I the Germans lobbed man-sized explosive shells into Paris from 70 milies away using massive guns. That's targetting civilans. Where were civilians targeted in the F-P war? Sure lots of French civilians died as collateral damage in normal acts of war. To capture Paris (a legitimate military objective) a seige was undertaken, that resulted in civilian deaths as collateral damage. In WW I the front was 70 miles from Paris. No military objective could be accomplished by lobbing shells into Paris. Like Hezbollah rockets, they were a weapon of terror directed at civilians.

There was no real concentrated effort to kill civilians on the Western Front of World War One. All events were isolated. Most deaths were due to famine and the Spanish flu.

As for the F-P war, I was surprised to find that about the same amount civilians died as did soldiers (~550,000.. not sure if it includes the commune) This is in stark contrast to the Western Front of World War One, where military deaths were much much higher. This is probably partly due to three sieges, but still, the numbers still don't come close. Something else happened, but I'm not sure exactly what. But the man who spawned the idea of the International Criminal Court got the idea following his horror at the atrocities that occurred during the Franco-Prussian war.

I'm aware that there were many armed civilians who fought as well.

As for energy. Well the war certainly wasn't fought energetically by the French "surrender monkeys". As for the Germans, it was fought competently, but not particularly enthusiatically, since the Germans clearly didn't want to keep fighting and offered easy peace terms several times.

This is quite a different statement than when you said France insisted on impaling themselves by the German spear.

But you aren't applying it the same for various wars. You talk about targeting civilians in WW II (lots more of this in WW II than WW I), but in the F-P war you talk about civilian casualties, as opposed to targetting, because civilians were not targeted in the F-P war. So it seems to me that you are bending the rules so those wars that you need to be crisis wars come out as such.

Whatever happened during the Franco-Prussian war in terms of civilian deaths doesn't compare to the concentration of World War Two. Maybe I misspoke when I talked of civilian casualties, but then again, maybe not. But I didn't mean to imply that it was the same as World War Two. World War Two took it to a whole new level.

However, I don't see how the Franco-Prussian war doesn't fall in.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

There was no real concentrated effort to kill civilians on the Western Front of World War One. All events were isolated. Most deaths were due to famine and the Spanish flu.

As for the F-P war, I was surprised to find that about the same amount civilians died as did soldiers (~550,000.. not sure if it includes the commune) This is in stark contrast to the Western Front of World War One, where military deaths were much much higher. This is probably partly due to three sieges, but still, the numbers still don't come close. Something else happened, but I'm not sure exactly what. But the man who spawned the idea of the International Criminal Court got the idea following his horror at the atrocities that occurred during the Franco-Prussian war.

Here you are counting bodies. Actually the answer is simple. In WW I the front held and the violence was largely focused on the enemy who was at the front, soldiers.

In the F-P war the Germans had free run of the whole country. When the French didn't opt for peace after the Battle of Sedan, the war continued--not just in Paris, but elsewhere. The French tried to raise fresh armies. The Germans tried to destroy these armies before they could form into militarily effective units. What does this mean? It means taking out the armies as they are forming, in the towns and cities. It means killing a lot of civilians as collateral damage. Of course there were atrocities. There are atrocities in all wars. But French civilians in the FP were not targeted by the Germans just as Iraqi civilians are not being targeted by the Americans in the Iraqi case. Lack of targetting hasn't prevented enormous loss of life amongst Iraqi civilans; civilian deaths are at least ten times higher than combatant deaths.

Civilian deaths are going to occur in just about all wars. Targetting civilians means going out of your way to specifically kill noncombatants for no military purpose.

I haven't seen any evidence that the Germans targetted French civilians in the F-P war. I don't think they did.

This is quite a different statement than when you said France insisted on impaling themselves by the German spear.

I didn't mean it to be, both statements were intended to convey the general incompetance of French arms in that war. One does not do much damage to an enemy by attacking his spear with your body. It's like assaulting someone's fist with your face. Similarly, the term surrender monkeys does not convey the idea of military competence.

I can see that the image of impaling one's self on the German spear (as opposed to surrendering and saving one's skin) does convey a sense of energy. This is the same type of energy shown by human wave assaults into the face of machine guns in WW I. Since WW I was fought "non energetically" this type of "energy" apparently doesn't count.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

Total victory was offered to the Germans in the F-P war. They controlled the whole country. They could have taken more, but did not. Similarly, the Americans captured the Mexican capital and could have taken the whole country, but only took a part--that within what America thought of as our "natural boundaries". The Germans did the same. What the Germans did in this respect in the F-P war is indicative of a non-crisis war, just as what the US did in the Mexican war is consistent with a non-crisis war.

I don't know that much about German society during the 1860s and 1870s, but might one possibility be that Germany's primary Crisis issue was uniting as a country? After that task was done, Germany wasn't interested in taking over the world or even the non-Germanic parts of France -- at least not at that time.

One could argue that the US didn't go for broke during World War II -- we did occupy Germany and Japan, but only for a limited time period.

Dear Justin,

Originally Posted by Justin '77

> Umm. No and no.

> I have a couple of friends in China; I did manage to get roaring
> blitzed with some customers there; and I thought that the
> countryside was absolutely stunning to look at. That said, I don't
> really care for southeast Asia in general -- it's crowded, hot,
> filthy, stinky, and I stick out like a sore thumb -- and my
> affections don't run any direction in aprticular with repect to
> states and/or their ruling cliques.

Sorry. The last two people that I had this discussion with both love
China and can't imagine why those loving people would want to have a
war with us.

Originally Posted by Justin '77

> And as for a war? What, exactly, would China do in a war against
> the US? Attack our various military outposts in their
> neighborhood? I suppose I could see that; then again, a goodly
> chunk of Okinawa might not be so much opposed to that kind of
> thing, with the way the US forces there have been known to comport
> themselves. Send their troops over to invade the mainland US?
> Don't be silly. OTOH, the US has already established itself as
> perfectly willing to lay out the cash to ship it's
> weapon-platforms over to the other side fo the planet to make
> other people's lives miserable.

On my web site I've documented a few analytical pieces, by both
American and Chinese analysts, indicating that China is planning a war
with America, and how their planning what they call "acupuncture"
warfare, which strikes at America's weakest point.

China has been militarizing at double-digit increases for years.

With regard to the Taiwan issue, last year General Zhu Chenghu, a
top-level officer in China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) said, "If
the Americans are determined to interfere [then] we will be determined
to respond. We . . . will prepare ourselves for the destruction of all
of the cities east of Xian. Of course the Americans will have to be
prepared that hundreds . . . of cities will be destroyed by the
Chinese."

This what bothers me -- that someone like yourself could ask a
question like, "What, exactly, would China do in a war against the
US? Attack our various military outposts in their neighborhood?"

This is exactly the kind of lack of preparedness that causes nations
to lose wars. China has the goal of using its navy to defeat the
American navy and take control of the entire Pacific Ocean region and
all the sea lanes, and to be the dominant power in Africa. In
addition, China is making plans with Iran to be the dominant power in
the Mideast and destroy Israel.

To say that China can only attack a few military outposts is VERY
unfortunate.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com