Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Dear Mike,

He wants to prove that this was a crisis era,

No he doesn't. He just gives the turnings with no evidence. Arthur Schlesinger does the same thing with his political cycle--he just gives the cycle dates with absolutely no rationale.

S&H give a methodology for how their cycle was determined, but there is no way for the reader to replicate their results. In the end you simply have to take their dates on faith, just like those of Schlesigner or McGuiness.

You also give a methology for how your cycle was determined. In theory it would seem that your results can be replicated, but I cannot do so. In particular I am at a loss for how one can apply them to the list of Roman wars I gave and obtain the dates you gave.

Once again, you're spouting nonsense. I didn't "simply assert that
S&H are wrong;" I wrote probably tens of thousands of words explaining the separation of timelines, especially as regards McLoughlin's dating the Puritan Awakening as beginning in 1610. I very rarely "simply assert" anything.

An assertion does not have to be short. You speculate on reasons why S&H's results differ from yours. You provide no evidence to support the validity of your reasons. A plausible explanation is not proof.

Incidentally, most academic historians I've asked think that S&H are
wrong.

I'm not surprised, most historians take a dim view on theories of history.

What I've done with Generational Dynamics is prove that, except for some details, not only are they right, but their work is brilliant.

You've done nothing of the sort. You prove nothing about their theory, instead proposing your own cycle that differs from theirs. Only four of seven crisis wars spaning the S&H time period occur largely in a secular crisis turning. The 1640-49 crisis war occurs entirely in an Awakening, the 1701-1714 crisis war occurs largely in a High as does the 1793-1814 crisis war.
Here I am using the consensus* British dates for which ca. 1777-1800 and ca. 1857-1873 are crisis turnings instead of the US dates of 1773-1794 and 1860-1865.

*Recent European turnings (including British) were much discussed over the 1997-1999 period at the old T4T site and these dates represent a consensus of views.

And incidentally you've implicity called me dishonest for years, saying that I was cherry-picking crisis wars, and you continued to do so even when I went to an enormous amount of trouble to develop the crisis war evaluation algorithm in response to your criticisms.

I have never called you dishonest. I have always maintained that the bias or "cherry picking" is unconscious. You genuinely see the crisis wars when you say they are. There is no dishonesty. McGuiness sees his turning when he does. You call his turnings garbage because to your eyes they make no sense. I'm sure your turnings make as much sense to his eyes.

Where I have a problem is when you claim a special significance for what you see--that what you see is somehow more valid than what others see.

You claim that you use an objective method, that anyone can use it to see what you do. I dispute that. I think that workers operating independently on the same set of wars (e.g. the Roman wars) will obtain different crisis wars. In the same way, people looking at Roman history will (and have) chosen different turnings.

I gave the list of Roman wars for you to make the assessment of which wars are crisis wars or not. Then I will reveal the two other sets of turning dates I have for the same period and we can compare. I don't have a method of locating turnings or crisis wars that works. I simply compare other people's turnings to see which one does the best job of fitting the observable data.

For example, I don't buy all of McGuiness's Roman turnings. Why? Because Kurt Horner has produced a set that are different from his and which seem to "work better" with the set of data I have been able to gather. I don't buy the GD turnings for Britain for the same reason. The S&H/consensus turnings seem to work better.

Is Horner "right". I don't know for sure. Perhaps the Roman turnings you come up with using the crisis war approach will be better than his. I don't know, why not give it a whirl and try?

I'd do it but I don't know how to assign crisis wars. If I was given a list of twenty wars to evaluate as a "final exam" in a course on GD I would almost certainly get half of them wrong and flunk the course. I think most students would.

Dear Justin,

Originally Posted by Justin '77

> Please, Please don't forget that the biggest victims of Lenin,
> Stalin, and the whole gang over the course of their eight decades
> of tyranny were the Russian people. Whose bill is due? And to
> who?

Well, to the Chechens, the Ukrainians, the Crimean Tatars, to start,
and to others as well. Didn't Uzi also mention the Estonians and
Latvians in another thread?

Even if Lenin's and Stalin's victims were only Russians, there would
still be a bill to pay to those subgroups of Russians who were
victimized.

Unfortunately, this appears to be a Law of Nature, as much as the Law
of Gravity is.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Mike,

Originally Posted by Mikebert

> You looked at some of the saints and found the dates associated
> with them wasn't associated with anything they did in that year.
> That is not surprising because of the methodology I used. If a
> timeline mentioned a particular event and the author of the event
> I recorded the event date and the birth date of the author. I
> calculated the average age (33) of the authors of spiritual
> events.

> When I looked up saints back in 2000 the website was much more
> conveniently organized than it is now. I could easily find the
> birth years for a couple of hundred saints without looking up
> their individual biographies. So for most of the saints listed, I
> didn't know any explicit thing they did. In these cases I added 33
> to their birth dates to obtain a date for when they "flourished".
> The term flourished is often used for the period during which a
> particular historical actor was active. This is done for ancient
> and medieval figures for whom exact dates sometimes aren't known.
> I used it for a time when, on average, a "prophet" would be doing
> an "awakening event".

> My reasoning was that in the Roman Catholic tradition, saints are
> "spiritual or religiously faithful people" selected for their
> spirituality or religious faith by people who know far more about
> these things than I. I didn't select them--somebody else did. I
> assume they did something of spiritual or religious significance
> or they wouldn't have been canonized as saints. I assume the age
> they did this (on average) was equal to the average age at which
> spiritual events I do know about were done.

There's absolutely no justification for any of this. Please point to
text in "Generations" or TFT that justifies any of this. Why should
a Saint's 33rd birthday ever be an "Awakening event"? You might as
well pick the date of the Saint's first haircut, or the date that the
Saint's mother conceived.

An Awakening event has to be related to social upheaval. What does a
Saint have to do with social upheaval?

First, using "average age" is meaningless. If one did something
spiritual at age 13, and another at age 53, your method would put
both events in the wrong decades -- in fact the wrong era.

Second, why should a Saint's work be an awakening event? It seems
more likely to me it would be crisis era event.

The 1630s was clearly a crisis era because the 30-years war was going
on in Europe. So all of those Saints who did work in the 1630s in
Europe were reacting to a crisis.

You list Joan of Arc's visions in 1428 as an awakening event. Why
are some girl's visions an awakening event? I've dated two or three
girls who claim to have visions, and that might happen in any era.
Joan of Arc isn't remembered today because she had visions in 1428;
she's remembered today for having led the French to repel the English
at Orléans in 1429. This was the explosive battle that effectively
ended the Hundred Years War and drove the English out of France. In
other words, it was a crisis era, not an awakening.

Even if it weren't for the all of the above problems, there'd still
be one more problem in using Saint's birthdays. Something that one
person does isn't a determinant of anything. Look in TFT and see
what kinds of events it uses to illustrate the Awakening. They're
all events that affect large masses of people, things like the death
of JFK and Woodstock.

As far of the 1600s decade goes, you use the King James Bible (1611)
as the event to choose. Without further proof, there's no reason to
believe that a new Bible translation would be an Awakening event.
You'd have to show that it large masses of people wanted it, or
disputed it, or something like that.

Ironically, the two events you discarded are much more indicative of
Awakening eras. The Puritans' Millenary Petition, signed by a
thousand clergymen, is a HUGE awakening event. And the flight of the
Puritans to Holland to escape persecution is another Awakening event,
because the fact that they had to go to Holland, instead of elsewhere
in England, indicates that Puritan persecution was widespread in
England, and also hints at a generational split.

Do you even have any idea what an Awakening is? There's absolutely no
way that using Saints' 33rd birthdays makes any sense. Please don't
try to defend this any more. It embarasses me on your behalf to have
to respond.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

> You haven't established there was an awakening in the 1600-1620
> period. You just assert that there was. ...

> But it is lists like this that provides the evidence for the
> existence of the GD cycle. The key claim you are making is that
> there exist crisis wars that repeat in a regular cycle. The only
> evidence you provide is lists of evenly-spaced wars that you claim
> are crisis wars. The English wars are not evenly spaced in a
> statistically signficant fashion. You provide lists of other wars
> to try to show regularity. This constitutes the primary evidence
> for your cycle. Now you say these lists might be wrong? Then there
> may not be any evidence for GD.

These are the same arguments that you were using 2-3 years ago.
Right now I can't recall a single new argument that you've used since
that time. In the meantime, all of these issues have become pretty
well resolved.

The text of McLoughlin's book, which is a basic foundational
document, clearly proves that the Puritan Awakening was an awakening
in England in 1600s-1610s, and was an awakening in the colonies in
1630s-1640s. No further proof is needed.

I don't have the vaguest idea what you mean by a "regular" cycle.
How many dozens of times have I posted the table that shows that the
inter-crisis period runs from 42-110 years, peaking at 58 years? 52
years is not a problem at all. 100 years is an issue that has to be
explored, but it's not a problem either. You're just prattling.

The crisis war list is what it is, and it's what I said it was when I
first posted it. I applied the crisis war evaluation algorithm to
the wars listed in a single source -- Peter N. Stearns' Encyclopedia
of World History. My experience is that when I use only one source,
then I make some mistakes, and so I expect that list to contain a few
errors, but not enough to make a significant difference in the
average saeculum list or the distribution of inter-cycle periods. A
full evaluation of any war may require four or five separate
historical sources. I've estimated that it would take me several
hundred hours to fully evaluate all those wars, and that's not an
option. However, I've never had a situation where a full evaluation
leads to an ambiguous result.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

> I explicitly said it was NOT intentional. Unconscious bias is
> exactly that: unconscious. Upon a quick glance, a lot of history
> can appear to show cycles. When you get further into the details
> it becomes less clear. This is why historians, who know a lot of
> these details, are generally not very keen on cyclical theories of
> history.

I've been doing this with you for several years now, and I've never
had any doubt that you were directing contemptuous comments at me and
that you were accusing me of being consciously dishonest.


(Continued in next posting)

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

(Continued from previous posting)

Originally Posted by Mikebert

> I'd do it but I don't know how to assign crisis wars. If I was
> given a list of twenty wars to evaluate as a "final exam" in a
> course on GD I would almost certainly get half of them wrong and
> flunk the course. I think most students would.

Now this is REALLY something. You don't have the vaguest idea what's
going on, do you? Have you even READ the evaluation algorithm?

How do you evaluate twenty wars during a one-hour exam? One every
three minutes? Or a three-hour final exam -- one every nine minutes?
Even a take-home exam wouldn't leave enough time.

When I was first starting out, it took me 2-3 days for each war, and
some wars took much longer. Some wars are real ballbusters -- like
the War of the Spanish Succession, WW I, and the Iroquois war that
Matt is working on.

So I wouldn't expect a beginner to be able to do full evaluations of
20 wars in less than 2-3 months. At this point, since I've done so
many of them already, 20 wars would still probably take me 2-3 weeks.

So you think that a war can be evaluated in 3-9 minutes? You really
don't have a clue about any of this, do you.

You know, so many strange things you've said to me are now beginning
to make sense. You keep talking about a "punch list," when I've
never mentioned anything like that. When I posted the web page about
the Battle of Malplaquet, you only read one paragraph, and you had to
ask me to "cite the relevant portions" that show that it was a crisis
war battle. Do you even have any idea what the War of the Spanish
Succession is all about? Have you read even one detailed source?

The reason you can't understand the crisis war evaluation algorithm
is because you just keep looking for a simple formula, a "punch
list." And since there's no punch list, you don't understand it.

What you don't understand is that you can't evaluate a crisis war
fully without reading several different sources. It's a lengthy,
time-consuming process. It's true that I've developed an intuition
at this point where I can spot phrases that usually signify a crisis
war ("the entire region was devastated and littered with bodies"),
but that intuition only comes with time, and still needs to be
confirmed with a full evaluation. But I wouldn't expect a beginner
to have that intuition.

You're always looking for a simple solution. You aren't willing to
do the work required to get real results.

I was absolutely flabbergasted that you couldn't the time to look up
the biographies of your 200 Saints. How long would that have taken --
a couple of days online or in the local library?

You went to the trouble to write and publish a book, and the content
was based on an event list. If it had been me, I would have done
everything possible to make sure that list was perfect. I'm
astounded by what you actually did.

You and David Krein once directed contemptuous remarks at me to the
effect that I was incompetent to do anything until I've read 1000
history books. Well, I've been at this for five years now, and I
don't know if I've reached 1000 yet, but I've made a pretty big dent
in it, given the huge volumes of internet material I've read.

The point is that you have to do it that way. There are no simple
formulas. You have to read many, many history books to be able to
use the Crisis War Evaluation Algorithm effectively. It's a lot of
work, and there are no shortcuts.

So if you were taking a course on Generational Dynamics that I was
teaching, it's true that you wouldn't pass the final exam -- but
that's because you would have flunked out of the course by the
midterm. I would have been giving weekly assignments requiring you
to read multiple histories to identify crisis wars, awakening
periods, and so forth. Instead of doing your homework, you would go
out on the internet and find a dataset that counts cricket chirps in
schoolyards, or something like that, and you'd claim that that
provided the answers. As I said, you wouldn't last until midterm.

So it's no surprise to me that you're unable to understand the
evaluation algorithm, but don't attempt to speak for other people or
"other students." I can assure you that there are people who can
prove you wrong. Right in this forum Matt, for example, would have
absolutely no problem doing well on the final exam. That's because
he's spent humongous amounts of time studying Generational Dynamics,
studying multiple histories, and developing his own points of view on
the theory. There are some weeks when he's done more studying of
history in that week than you've done in the past three years. And I
was very grateful to him for fielding some of your mind game
questions, which he does very well.

So if you want to declaim your own unability to understand something,
then by all means do so, but please don't profess to speak for anyone
else.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

> S&H give a methodology for how their cycle was determined, but
> there is no way for the reader to replicate their results. In the
> end you simply have to take their dates on faith, just like those
> of Schlesigner or McGuiness.

Two or three years ago I might have agreed with this, but not today.

Most people get into Generations and TFT because of its descriptions
of generations and for politics. But most people don't understand
that TFT has a brilliant, very counter-intuitive abstract model
underlying the generational descriptions. Both Schlesigner and
McGuiness developed their findings based on guesswork, with no
underlying theoretical model, so there's a huge difference.

It tool Strauss and Howe some 10-15 years to develop their model, and
to substantiate it with hundreds of histories and diaries.

In order for another reader to replicate their results, he would have
to go through the same process: understand the model, and read or
reread hundreds of histories or diaries with the intention of
relating them to the model.

That's not something that can be done in an afternoon.

Basically, Mike, if you want to do something worthwhile, there are no
"punch lists." There are no true-false questions. There are no
multiple choice questions. There are only essay questions in life.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Matt,

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> It wasn't the catalyst for the crisis war, it just put the
> Iroquois on the path where King William's War could not be
> avoided. ...

> The peace was offered in 1694. The French did not accept because
> it didn't include French allies. If the Iroquois really wanted
> peace, why would they not accept?

> I looked into it and the major French ally was the Abenaki
> (specifically the Sokoki, or Western Abenaki). The Abenaki were
> hated and the Iroquois carried out many raids against them. I'm
> not sure what the French demands were, either.

There's one more possibility, and this goes along with what you've
been saying about King William's War.

What happens to a society that gets almost completely exterminated by
an unexpected crisis war? We know what the answer to that question
has to be -- it resets to a first turning, just as in the case of
massive relocation -- but I've never found a clean example to
illustrate it.

Maybe that's what's going on here. The Iroquois were happily going
along with one non-crisis war after another, but then they got caught
in between the French and the English, not to mention smallpox and
the Abenaki.

As for the peace deal, I can only guess why they rejected it. Maybe
the French demanded that they turn in all their weapons, and they
worried that the Abenaki wouldn't honor the peace deal and would
finish them off when they had no weapons to defend themselves.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Well, to the Chechens, the Ukrainians, the Crimean Tatars, to start, and to others as well. Didn't Uzi also mention the Estonians and Latvians in another thread?

Conveniently leaving out the Lithuanians, I know...

Even if Lenin's and Stalin's victims were only Russians, there would still be a bill to pay to those subgroups of Russians who were victimized.

But to be paid by whom? Stalin was Georgian; Lenin may have been born in Russia, but spent most of his formative time abroad. People here know these things...

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

You don't have the vaguest idea what's
going on, do you? Have you even READ the evaluation algorithm?

Here's the algorithm:

Step 1: Evaluate Historical significance. If the war is historically significant, the result of the step is "Supports C"; if the war is near-forgotten, then the result of the step is "Determines N."

Step 2: Determine intensity of genocidal violence. High genocidal violence gives the result "Determines C"; intermittent, stalemated or low-level violence gives the result, "Supports N."

Step 3: Determine level of political considerations. If the war is highly politicized, the result is "Determines N"; if the pursuit of the war is nonpolitical, the result is "Supports C."

Step 4: Determine resolution. If the resolution of the war is a set of painful compromises designed to prevent future wars, the result is "Supports C"; if the resolution is that the victors impose punishment or reparations on the losers, the result is "Supports N."

I'll apply it to the 1980's Iran-Iraq war

Step 1: The Iran-Iraq war changed nothing and so is historically insignificant. Determines N

Step 2: The war saw intense genocidal violence. Supports C

Step 3: The Iran-Iraq war was fought over territory, like many wars. The US backed the Iraqis to get back at the Iranians. This might be politicization. I can't be sure. Evaluates to a not sure - supports N

Step 4: There were no painful compromise after the Iran-Iraq war. There was no victory. So I would say this one is fizzled, supports N.

I would call it a noncrisis war. If I evaluate the current Iraq war I get:

Step 1: An independent Kuridstan was created. The Iraqi government has changed from a socialist dictatorship to an Islamic Parliamentary Republic. Determines C

Step 2: The war sees intense genocidal violence. Supports C

Step 3: The Iran-Iraq war is primarily a religious war. Supports C.

Step 4: The war hasn't ended yet so cannot evaluate. Supports N

I would tenatively evalue this war as a crisis war, pending a final assessment after its over.

You get completely different results. Different people get different results using the same method. Based on this I would argue that if you and someone else did the Roman wars the two of you would get different results, just as McGuinness and Horner got different results.

Based on on your assessment of the Iraq-Iran war as a crisis war, would that mean if the US pulls out abruptly now there will be no civil war?

If no, then why not? If yes, have you made this prediction? It is nonintuitive and so if it came true it would be a compelling demonstration of GD.

Dear Justin,

Originally Posted by Justin '77

> But to be paid by whom? Stalin was Georgian; Lenin may have been
> born in Russia, but spent most of his formative time abroad.
> People here know these things...

The question is: Whom do the victims blame? Would someone who has
been victimized by Stalin blame the Georgians (because Stalin in
Georgian) or would they blame the Russians (because it was the
Russians who committed the atrocities)?

You know these groups better than I do, so I would defer to your
statement of whom they blame, but based on what I do know, my
perception is that the victims blame the Russians.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Mike,

Originally Posted by Mikebert

> I'll apply it to the 1980's Iran-Iraq war

> Step 1: The Iran-Iraq war changed nothing and so is historically
> insignificant. Determines N

> Step 2: The war saw intense genocidal violence. Supports C

> Step 3: The Iran-Iraq war was fought over territory, like many
> wars. The US backed the Iraqis to get back at the Iranians. This
> might be politicization. I can't be sure. Evaluates to a not sure
> - supports N

> Step 4: There were no painful compromise after the Iran-Iraq war.
> There was no victory. So I would say this one is fizzled, supports
> N.

> I would call it a noncrisis war.

This is a good start, but it's only the first step. (Though Step 2
should conclude "Determines C.")

You've gotten a fairly ambiguous result, and to resolve the situation
you have to consult additional sources. You might need to consult
four or five sources with detailed information on the Iran/Iraq war,
and they should be from different points of view (i.e., an Iraqi
view, an Iranian view, a Kurdish view, etc.) if possible.

You know, just do it already. Take a day or two off and go spend it
in your local library, or your favorite Borders or B&N bookstore with
a good history section, and just sit down and spend the day reading
about the Iran/Iraq war. I think you'll find it to be an interesting
and enlightening experience.

One thing you'll find is that the Iran/Iraq war was a major war in
Arab-Persian relations, with many significant effects that are just
being realized today with the increasing hegemony of Iran. I could
try to convince you of these things, but it's like learning how to
swim -- you really can't learn it by having someone explain it. You
have to jump into the water and do it.

After you've gone through this exercise, you'll find that you're a
true expert on the Iran/Iraq war, and you'll know a great deal more
about what's going on in the Mideast today.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

> If I evaluate the current Iraq war I get:

> Step 1: An independent Kuridstan was created. [[Huh?????? - JX]]
> The Iraqi government has changed from a socialist dictatorship to
> an Islamic Parliamentary Republic. Determines C

> Step 2: The war sees intense genocidal violence. Supports C

> Step 3: The Iran-Iraq war is primarily a religious war. Supports
> C.

> Step 4: The war hasn't ended yet so cannot evaluate. Supports N

> I would tenatively evalue this war as a crisis war, pending a
> final assessment after its over.

I think that this will turn out to be a crisis war, but that's
because it will be a part of the larger war that will engulf the
entire region. This war cannot be properly evaluated outside of the
rising tide of violence that's pouring over the entire region.

After you've read the multiple sources on the 1980s Iran/Iraq war, I
think that you'll look at the current Iraq war quite differently.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

> Based on on your assessment of the Iraq-Iran war as a crisis war,
> would that mean if the US pulls out abruptly now there will be no
> civil war?

> If no, then why not? If yes, have you made this prediction? It is
> nonintuitive and so if it came true it would be a compelling
> demonstration of GD.

The violence is very bad, but it's not a crisis civil war. See
what's happening in Darfur for comparison. Anyone can call anything
a civil war, but what's going on today looks more like massive
gangsterism than a civil war.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Problems with "Crisis" Terminology / Crisis Wars

A few weeks ago I posted an essay entitled "Phases of a Crisis War,"
which turns out to have been a complete mess. (Please ignore it.)

What's the relationship between the "Crisis Era" (the fourth turning)
and the "Crisis War"?

I know that I've been confused about this point, and I believe that
others in the forum have as well. I've been assuming that a crisis
war is distinct from a crisis era, and I believe that some others have
made this distinction and some have not.

Thus we've had long-standing disagreements whether America was in a
fourth turning after 9/11. I can see that someone who makes the
above distinction and someone who doesn't might give different
answers.

As I've mentioned several times before, I was extremely shocked after
9/11 when the government locked up almost a thousand Muslims living
in the United States on no charges.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1694961.stm

Just a year earlier it would have caused massive outrage if even one
Muslim was locked up with no charges, so it's obvious that something
was very different. This occurred right at the time I started reading
TFT, and I took the lockup as a sign that the book had some validity.

So I concluded that America was in a fourth turning "mood" after
9/11, which meant it was in a fourth turning. But the crisis war
hadn't/hasn't begun yet, and so for someone who takes the view that
the fourth turning IS the crisis war, then a fourth turning "mood"
doesn't mean a fourth turning.

The book TFT doesn't use the term "Crisis War," but instead uses the
word "Crisis" by itself without assuming that the Crisis is a war. I
prefer using the term "Crisis War" in preference to "Crisis" (by
itself) because I've found almost all crises to be wars and because
"Crisis" (by itself) presents some writing difficulties.

The writing difficulties come from the fact that we also have a
"Crisis Era," which is different from the above terms, and there's
also a "Crisis Mood," which occurs during the Crisis Era.

Furthermore, the Crisis War is determined by events, and the Crisis
Era is determined by mood.

Thus we have:

-- "Crisis Era" = "Fourth Turning" -- determined by "Crisis Mood"

-- "Crisis" = "Crisis War" -- determined by events

The confusion becomes greater when you try to relate the Crisis War
to the Crisis Era.

Looking at the TFT book, it's pretty clear that the authors see the
Crisis War as distinct from, but contained in, the Crisis era.

In the case of the American Civil War, the authors identify John
Brown's attack as the "catalyst" that begins the Crisis Era. But it's
pretty clear that the Civil War began much later, with the firing on
Fort Sumter.

The authors then identify three more events that are related to the
Crisis War itself, so we end up with this list:

-- The Catalyst -- changes the 3T mood to the 4T crisis mood

-- Beginning of the crisis war -- an event not identified in TFT

-- Regeneracy -- One or more events that change the mood to societal
unity

-- Climax -- the explosive conclusion of the crisis war

-- Resolution -- determining winners and losers

Now as we try to sort all of these out, we note that there are two
different mood changes: The 3T->4T transition is one mood change (to
a Crisis Mood), and the Regeneracy is another mood change (to a
"unity" mood). What's the difference?

-- Since the 3T->4T catalyst creates a "crisis mood" and

-- since the regeneracy creates a "unity mood," therefore

-- the 4T mood prior to regeneracy is "crisis, but no unity."

This appears to me to be the mood today, and for the last few years.

That's why, for me at least, we've been in a "4T mood" since 9/11,
though we haven't had anything like the regeneracy mood change.
Though I don't wish to re-ignite any "are we 3T vs 4T" arguments, I
would wonder whether, at least in some cases, those who feel that the
4T crisis era hasn't begun are perhaps confusing the 4T mood with the
regeneracy mood.

American Civil War

Let's use the American Civil War as an example:

-- The Crisis Era begins in Oct, 1859, with John Brown at Harper's
Ferry.

-- Civil war begins: April 12, 1861 - Fort Sumter

-- The Regeneracy comes after the two battles of Bull Run (July and
August, 1861).

-- Climax: Sherman's March through Georgia, December, 1864

-- Resolution: Surrender at Appomattox, April 9, 1865

In this example, the Crisis Era started in 1859, though the authors
refer to a return to a "brooding" mood throughout 1860.

World War II

Now let's take another example: The World War II crisis.

When we move to the WW II Crisis Era, the authors identify the
regeneracy as having occurred by 1933.

I have a lot of problems with this, because there was definitely no
unity after 1933, and the Roosevelt administration was loaded with
scandals. Furthermore, there was no 4T reaction to invasions by
German and Japan; for example, when Japan invaded Manchuria, the
reaction was simply to lead the League of Nations to condemn Japan.

Thus, in my opinion, the regeneracy has to be related to the war, not
to the financial crisis.

Thus, I would give these dates for the WW II crisis era:

-- The Crisis Era began in 1929 -- as identified in TFT

-- The beginning of the Crisis War for America occurred in 1941
(Pearl Harbor)

-- The Regeneracy is ... Perhaps it doesn't matter much, but instead
of putting it at Pearl Harbor, I would actually put it after the
disastrous loss in the Philippines (February) and the Bataan death
march (April, 1942).

-- Climax: Atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Aug 6-9,
1945.

-- Resolution: August 15, 1945 - Japan surrenders

It's worth pointing out that the previous two timelines are
one-sided -- that is, America-centric.

World War II - German view

If we look at WW II from the German point of view, we get this:

-- The Crisis Era began with the February 27, 1933, Reichstag burning

-- The beginning of the Crisis War for Germany - March, 1936 -
occupies demilitarized zone in the Rhineland.

-- The Regeneracy -- Some time in the late 1930s?

-- Climax - Fall of Berlin and Hitler's suicide, April 30, 1945

-- Resolution -- Creation of Allied Control Council on 5 June 1945.

1994 Rwanda genocide

Now let's look at another war, the 1994 Rwanda genocide:

-- Beginning of crisis war: 1990, (Tutsi) Rwanda Patriotic Front
(RPF) invades Rwanda from Tutsi refugee camps in Uganda.

-- Crisis era begins with invasion, as Hutus fear Tutsi takeover.

-- Regeneracy: UN-sponsored peace treaty in 1993 (Arusha Accords)
gives the RPF representation in the Rwandan government, theoretically
ending the civil war. Hutus began calling for violence.

-- Climax: A plane crash on April 6, 1994, kills (Hutu) Rwanda
President. Genocide begins on April 7.

-- Resolution: ???

Sri Lanka

The Sri Lanka civil war is currently building, but hasn't yet reached
regeneracy.

-- Beginning of crisis war: 1983, when fighting began between Tamil
rebels and the Sinhalese market-dominant majority. At this point it
was low-level violence, not a crisis war. A peace treaty was signed
in 2002.

-- Crisis era begins in 2004, with low-level violence among the
Tamils themselves. By 2005, violence had resumed with government
forces, and has been increasing to this day.

-- Regeneracy:

-- Climax:

-- Resolution:

Darfur genocide

The Darfur genocide is well under way today, and may be close to
reaching a climax.

-- Beginning of crisis war: Began as low-level violence between
farmers and herder in 1987. To gain international support, the
herders identified themselves as "Arabs," and the farmers identified
themselves as "Africans." The Sudan government (also "Arabs")
deputized the herders as "Janjaweed militias," with the job of
policing the Darfur region.

-- Transition to Crisis Era for farmers (Africans): In April, 2002,
the young men of one farmer village complained to the Khartoum
government that they were being harassed by the Arab militia group.
The young men were jailed, and so was a lawyer representing them.
The Africans created the Darfur Liberation Front.

-- Transition to Crisis Era for Khartoum (Arabs): On February 26,
2003, the Darfur Liberation Front attacked a police station to take
back lost weapons.

-- Regeneracy: The regeneracy was in full swing by January 2004, when
the Sudan army was quelling riots in western Darfur and the Janjaweed
militias were slaughtering African farmers.

-- Climax: There's reason to believe that the Climax is in progress
now, as the Janjaweed militias are stepping up genocidal attacks and
the war is spreading into Chad and Central African Republic.

-- Resolution:

Israel / Palestine

-- Beginning of crisis war: 1989 intifada began low-level violence.
In 1994, there was a peace treaty (Oslo).

-- Possible transition to Crisis Era: Sept 28, 2000: Ariel Sharon's
visit to Temple Mount triggers the Second Intifada. (This date is
actually very early, since it's only 51 years after the end of the
1948-9 war, but the reaction to this visit was so potent that it
fits.)

-- More likely transition to Crisis Era: Nov 13, 2004: Death of
Yasser Arafat.

-- Regeneracy:

-- Climax:

-- Resolution:

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

"The War of the Roses crisis war began in 1455. The next crisis war began in 1585, giving a 130 year cycle length."

Oh, now, this sounds familiar! We had another possible 130-year cycle during the Victorian Mega-High aka the Victorian Equilibrium ("The Great Wave" terminology). The United States of America had a truncated Civil War Cycle. Germany and France had the Franco-Prussian War/Paris Commune and I think some sort of plague in France ~ 1870.

Now, if I read my English history correctly, the period between 1455 and 1585 included the long reign of Henry VII and since that followed the War of the Roses and the total breakdown of Medieval society (OK - I know it was gradual. Still ... most people can tell the difference between a Plantagenet era setting and a Tudor era setting) we are looking at another 130-year cycle in the middle of a Mega-High.

What I'd do is check for a truncated crisis or a muted one somewhere around 1515-1520.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

A few weeks ago I posted an essay entitled "Phases of a Crisis War,"
which turns out to have been a complete mess. (Please ignore it.)

What's the relationship between the "Crisis Era" (the fourth turning)
and the "Crisis War"?

What I've always assumed is that the "crisis era" typically begins 50-55 years after the previous crisis war. I believe the crisis era is simply generational in nature, occuring at the time when the four generational blocks are nearing the fourth turning format. We may have seen this as early as 1995, with the beginning of the stock market bubble.

I suppose this allows the ability for some sort of catalyst to transform the nation, much like 9/11 did. When I say "I'm 4T," I'm not referring to this crisis era, but rather, I'm assuming that 9/11 was the catalyst. The argument isn't whether the crisis war (or energy crisis, or some glorious revolution) has begun, as everyone would argue that it hasn't, but whether the catalyst has occured. We entered a generational crisis era sometime before 2001, but it was 9/11 that launched us into the 4T.

By the way John, thank you for your kind words. It means a lot to me. I really don't have any free time, since my life is hectic right now, but when I do find some, I'll be happy to complete some of the things I started.

I don't understand the post-Saddam conflict in this Iraqi war.

Who the hell is fighting? What are their objectives? If someone can give me a summary with the different groups with their goals it would be much appreciated. It seems that so much is going on there and I am having trouble getting things straight.

I'm not just talking about Sunni and Shi'ite, because I know sub-divisions within these two ethnic groups are persuing different goals of their own.

Matt

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

I don't understand the post-Saddam conflict in this Iraqi war.

Who the hell is fighting? What are their objectives? If someone can give me a summary with the different groups with their goals it would be much appreciated. It seems that so much is going on there and I am having trouble getting things straight.

I'm not just talking about Sunni and Shi'ite, because I know sub-divisions within these two ethnic groups are persuing different goals of their own.

Matt

The Iraqi insurgency is composed of at least a dozen major guerrilla organizations and perhaps as many as 40 distinct groups. These groups are subdivided into countless smaller cells. Due to its clandestine nature, the exact composition of the Iraqi insurgency is difficult to determine. Because most of these insurgents are civilians fighting against an organized domestic army and a foreign occupying army, many consider them to be guerrillas. :

• Ba'athists, the armed supporters of Saddam Hussein's former nomenclature, e.g. army or intelligence officers;
• Nationalists, mostly Sunni Muslims, who fight for Iraqi self-determination;
• anti-Shi'a Sunni Muslims who fight to regain the prestige they held under the previous regime (these three categories are often indistinguishable in practice);
• Sunni Islamists, the indigenous armed followers of the Salafi movement, as well as any remnants of the Kurdish Ansar al-Islam;
• Foreign Islamist volunteers, including those often linked to al Qaeda and largely driven by the Sunni Wahabi doctrine (the two preceding categories are often lumped as "Jihadists");
• Patriotic Communists (who have split from the official Iraqi Communist Party[citation needed]) and other leftists;
• Militant followers of Shi'a Islamist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr
• Members of the Badr Organization, a militant arm of the prominent shi'a political party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.
• Criminal insurgents who are fighting simply for money; and
• Nonviolent resistance groups and political parties (not technically part of the insurgency).

Iraqi insurgency organizations
Major Iraqi guerrilla groups include, but are not limited to, the following:

• Jama'at al-Tawhid wal Jihad members with Shosei Koda and with the banner in the background
• Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'l Jihad members with Kim Sun-il giving Korea 24 hours to withdraw Korean troops out of Iraq .
• Mujahideen Shura Council
• Mahdi Army (Jaish-i-Mahdi)
• Badr Organization
• Fedayeen Saddam
• Al-Qaeda in Iraq (Tantheem Al-Qaeda fi BiladirRafidain)
• Jaish Ansar al-Sunna
• Mohammad's Army (Jaish Mohammed)
• Islamic Army in Iraq (Al-Jaish Al-Islami fil-Iraq)
• Iraqi National Islamic Resistance (Moqawama al-Islamiya al-Wataniya, "1920 Revolution Brigades")
• Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakat Al-Moqawama Al-Islamiya)
• Islamic Front for the Iraqi Resistance (al-Jabha al-Islamiya lil-
• Moqawama al-Iraqiya - JAMI)
• Jaish al-Mujahideen
• Jaish al-Rashideen
• Asaeb Ahl el-Iraq (Factions of the People of Iraq)
• Black Banner Organization (ar-Rayat as-Sawda)
• The Return (al-Awda)
• Nasserites
• Wakefulness and Holy War
• Mujahideen Battalions of the Salafi Group of Iraq
• Liberating Iraq's Army
• Abu Theeb's group
• Jaish Abi Baker's group
• Islamic Salafist Boy Scout Battalions (Kataab Ashbal Al Islam Al Salafi)

Willingist Interventionists-Commercial Republicans:

• neo-Trotskyites/neo-Conservatives (Romantic Idealists)
• Rumsfeld is (was) Rightists
• S.W.O.T.E.ians (Hard Wilsonians)
• Kerry-on-ers (Soft-Wilsonians)
• Oilists (Hamiltonians)
• Kill-'em-Allers (Jacksonians)
• In Six-monthers (Friedmanites)
• Stayers-Of-The-Course (officially disbanded but still a shadowy group)
• Poppy's Fixer Brigade (Bakerist Realist Qurom)
• Murtha's At A Removers

Similar factions with different labels exist in the Antipodes and the UK.

The list is not meant to be complete or up to date. Goals , they don't need no stinkin' goals.

More at Wikipedia: Insurgents

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander"

Based on on your assessment of the Iraq-Iran war as a crisis war, would that mean if the US pulls out abruptly now there will be no civil war?

If no, then why not? If yes, have you made this prediction? It is nonintuitive and so if it came true it would be a compelling demonstration of GD.

The violence is very bad, but it's not a crisis civil war. See what's happening in Darfur for comparison. Anyone can call anything a civil war, but what's going on today looks more like massive gangsterism than a civil war.

You didn't answer the question:

Doesn't GD say that if the US pulls out of Iraq there will be no civil war?

Originally Posted by Mikebert

You didn't answer the question:

Doesn't GD say that if the US pulls out of Iraq there will be no civil war?

No crisis civil war.

John

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

No crisis civil war.

John

What does this mean? Will the violence decline if the US pulls out?

Dear Mike,

Originally Posted by Mikebert

> John, are you in a state of shock?

Don't you wish.

By the way, do you still have all your assets in stocks?

Originally Posted by Mikebert

> Stress occurs in one place and can be transmitted by financial or
> cultural linkages to far flung places. Loan default in England
> produces economic depression in Italy. New religious ideas
> (Lollardy) arising in England, spread to Bohemia, where they take
> root (Hussites) requiring a response by German authorities
> (Hussite Wars).

> The same thing happens in the Reformation. Luther nails his theses
> to the door in Germany and within a turning length the meme of
> Protestantism is established all over Europe. This tendency for
> ideas and distress to spread through trade and cultural linkages
> tends to bind large regions containing many nations together. This
> is why I don't believe the US timeline has ever deviated all that
> much (perhaps a half dozen years here and there) from that of
> Britain.

OK, ideas travel (and who said they didn't?). It's true that the
religious wars occurred from the 1540s-1580s in Europe -- and that
isn't really synchronized, is it? -- but there's no reason to believe
that that's related to a 1517 event. And Protestantism didn't spread
to the Muslim or Orthodox civilizations, so they wouldn't be affected
at all.

As for England and America, if the European religious wars occur over
a 40-50 year period, then you shouldn't have a problem with England
and America have 40-50 year separations in their timelines. It's a
small deviation.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

> What does this mean?

A crisis civil war is a civil war that's a crisis war.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

> Will the violence decline if the US pulls out?

First tell me your prediction for whether violence will increase or
decline in the U.S. next year. When I see your methodology for
predicting violence increases, then I can try to apply the same
methodology to Iraq.

This is a dumb question, but I really can't blame you because you've
probably been listening to tv news shows, and the past few days have
exhibited the stupidest bunch of news reporters, pundits and
politicians that I've seen in a while. They're so stupid that
they're an embarassment to the country.
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...061126#e061126
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...061129#e061129

In answer to your question, here's a quote from Henry Kissinger:

Originally Posted by Henry Kissinger

> Undoubtedly mistakes have been made, but the issue we're facing
> now, is whether if we withdraw under conditions in which the
> radicals can say they drove the Russians out of Afghanistan, they
> drove the Americans out of Iraq, and there is no vestige of an
> American position left. This is bound to have serious
> consequences, not only throughout the region, but wherever there
> are significant Islamic minorities that have radical cells
> implanted in them, including in countries like India, and some of
> the European countries.

My characterization of the insurgency violence in Iraq is that it's
been funded by hundreds of millions of dollars from al-Qaeda and
Iran, and has now become self-sustaining.
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...061129#e061129

However, the core problem is Israeli/Palestinian problem -- and
that's the major problem that's generating violence in the entire
region.
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...061126#e061126

So if the US pulls out, then the violence will increase, but if the
US doesn't pull out, then the violence will increase.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Pat,

Originally Posted by The Grey Badger

> Now, if I read my English history correctly, the period between
> 1455 and 1585 included the long reign of Henry VII and since that
> followed the War of the Roses and the total breakdown of Medieval
> society (OK - I know it was gradual. Still ... most people can
> tell the difference between a Plantagenet era setting and a Tudor
> era setting) we are looking at another 130-year cycle in the
> middle of a Mega-High. What I'd do is check for a truncated
> crisis or a muted one somewhere around 1515-1520.

Well, I did a quick check of Peter N. Stearns' Encyclopedia of
World History and didn't find anything, but I'll look into it
further with some additional sources. It would be interesting to
figure out why there was such a long inter-crisis period.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Matt,

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> What I've always assumed is that the "crisis era" typically begins
> 50-55 years after the previous crisis war. I believe the crisis
> era is simply generational in nature, occurring at the time when
> the four generational blocks are nearing the fourth turning
> format. We may have seen this as early as 1995, with the beginning
> of the stock market bubble.

> I suppose this allows the ability for some sort of catalyst to
> transform the nation, much like 9/11 did. When I say "I'm 4T," I'm
> not referring to this crisis era, but rather, I'm assuming that
> 9/11 was the catalyst. The argument isn't whether the crisis war
> (or energy crisis, or some glorious revolution) has begun, as
> everyone would argue that it hasn't, but whether the catalyst has
> occurred. We entered a generational crisis era sometime before
> 2001, but it was 9/11 that launched us into the 4T.

I generally agree with this, although I believe that the interval is
more likely to be 55-60 years.

With the regard to the 1995, I've come more and more to see the
sequence of international financial crises (Tulipomania, South Sea
Bubble, French bankruptcy, Panic of 1857, Wall St. crash) as
independent of the war-based fourth turnings. Thus, the 1995 stock
market bubble would be related to the 1929 crash, but not to the WW
II crisis, except that they happen to occur at the same time.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> By the way John, thank you for your kind words. It means a lot to
> me. I really don't have any free time, since my life is hectic
> right now, but when I do find some, I'll be happy to complete some
> of the things I started.

Well, you certainly deserve them. Concentrate on your school work,
and do other things when you have a chance.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> I don't understand the post-Saddam conflict in this Iraqi war.
> Who the hell is fighting? What are their objectives? If someone
> can give me a summary with the different groups with their goals
> it would be much appreciated. It seems that so much is going on
> there and I am having trouble getting things straight.

Mr. Saari's response is both information and entertaining. Beyond
that, I'm seeing it more and more as organized crime.
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...061129#e061129

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

This is a dumb question, but I really can't blame you because you've
probably been listening to tv news shows, and the past few days have
exhibited the stupidest bunch of news reporters, pundits and
politicians that I've seen in a while. They're so stupid that
they're an embarassment to the country.

OMG, this is funny, the Corporatist Media is finally ignoring the Rovian talking points and are letting the talking heads state the obvious (that Iraq is is civil war) and John is criticizing them for it.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

So if the US pulls out, then the violence will increase, but if the US doesn't pull out, then the violence will increase.

This sort of makes GD useless. In 2003 you predict there would be no civil war in Iraq. This means that if the US withdraws open war between the Sunnis and Shia will not happen. The recent horror of the Iraq-Iran war will prevent the Sunni and Shia belligerents from escalating the violence. Isn't this what GD is all about?

But no, you say that the two sides can engage in a full scale civil war, it just won't be a crisis civil war. But this doesn't make sense. If Iraq splits into two or more states this makes the Iraq war historically significant. And by rule 1 that determines that it is a crisis war.

The only way an increase violence between Sunni and Shia post-withdrawal will not lead to a crisis war is if you define the outcome as not significant. Then by rule 1 it would not automatically be a crisis war.

In this case all GD is predicting is that you will not call the Iraq war a crisis war no matter what happens. But from the viewpoint of a future observer surveying the hundreds of thousands dead and the shards of Iraq, the 2003 prediction of no civil war in Iraq will look false.

Now if you used GD to predict that if the US withdrew, the violence would decrease, and then when the US pulled out the violence did decrease, that would be a powerful validation of the GD model. Nobody is currently predicting that the violence will decrease if the US leaves--so this would be a real surprise if it happened and a good test of GD.

Actually a good case can be made for exactly this using GD. There are two major conflicts in Iraq now. One is the Sunni insurgency waging war against the US in Anbar province. If the US pulls out this war will stop.

The other is the civil war between the Sunni insurgents and the Shia militia in Central Iraq and other "mixed" areas. The Sunni forces consist of Iraqi nationalists (mostly ex-Baathists), Iraqi Sunni zealots and foreign Sunni zealots. This last group calls itself al Qaeda. The Shia forces are Iraqi militias (the Mahdi army) and Iranian-backed Iraqi expatriates (Badr militia).

The Baathists, Iraqi Sunni zealots, Mahdi army and Badr militia all experienced a recent crisis war. Left to themselves violence between them should subside according to GD.

Violence does not subside because in Iraq now because there are two groups, al Qaeda and the American forces, who have NOT experienced a recent crisis war. So as long as these two are present, violence grows because the Iraqis are not in control of events, the foreigners are. The Sunnis did not start this war, the Americans attacked them, took away their livelihoods (Bremer's deBaathification and disbanding of the army) and are in the process of providing their Shia allies with the military wherewithal to destroy them. They have no choice but to fight or die as a people.

Similarly, the Shia did not start this fight, al Qaeda has been killing them for years. After Samarra they had had enough.

But if the US abruptly leaves, the war against the Sunnis in al Anbar will stop. At this point, GD says that the leaders of the two sides, wanting to avoid a repeat of the last crisis war, will step back from the brink of full-scale civil war. They will agree to a ceasefire provided the Sunnis stop the al Qaeda violence. The native Iraqi Sunnis outnumber the al Qaeda foreigners 10:1 and have been sheltering them. A few "nights of the long knives" and al Qaeda will be gone.

The key assumption that has to come true for this scenario to happen is for the native Iraqi Sunni and Shia forces to step back from full-scale war. This is exactly what GD says is the effect of a recent crisis war. If the Iraq-Iran war is truly a crisis war and the theory behind GD is valid, then violence should decrease if the US pulls out.

But you don't make this prediction. Instead you go with the conventional wisdom that Iraq will fall into civil war if the US withdraws. You simply won't call it a civil war and so you will still claim that your 2003 Iraq prediction of no civil war in Iraq will have come true no matter how bad the violence gets.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

With the regard to the 1995, I've come more and more to see the
sequence of international financial crises (Tulipomania, South Sea
Bubble, French bankruptcy, Panic of 1857, Wall St. crash) as
independent of the war-based fourth turnings. Thus, the 1995 stock
market bubble would be related to the 1929 crash, but not to the WW
II crisis, except that they happen to occur at the same time.

Do you think the natural differences between Artists and Prophets have anything to do with financial crises?

IMO Iraq (and the Middle East in general) was in a 3T when the US invaded. The growing violence seems to be sending Iraq into an early 4T that will lead to a split-up of the country, sending convusions throughout the Middle East and sending the rest region (except Turkey, which seems to be in a different saeculum then the rest of the ME) into Crisis.

Originally Posted by Odin

OMG, this is funny, the Corporatist Media is finally ignoring the Rovian talking points and are letting the talking heads state the obvious (that Iraq is is civil war) and John is criticizing them for it.

John, like HC, will create all sorts of Ptolmaic epicycles in his worldview in order to avoid an application of Occam's razor. Mike has been trying to lead him to a Copernican epiphany for years, but his ego won't allow it. And man, what an ego!