Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

... The Koreans and Americans had little desire to fight that war. The Korean War would have been settled quickly if China hadn't intervened.

So? The war was noentheless definitive. Prior to that littel escapade, Korea was an agrarian backwater. Now, it's two countries that couldn't be more different from one another - neither of which carries on the agrarian tradition from the previous incarnation.

You can call that anything you want. Generational Dynamics is your creation. But not recongizing the Korean War as transforming, in the face of such obvious evidence to the contrary, places the burden of proof on you.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

Wait a minute now. If GD is to be useful a war either is or is not a crisis war. Otherwise GD isn't a method but a matter of taste. You and I can go see a movie which you like and I think sucks. That happens all the time, there's even an expression, "there's no accounting for taste" to explain how people can have diametrically opposed opinions on the very same movie. But if the concept of crisis wars is to have real scientific value then we have to agree on whether or not a war is a crisis war.

We obviously haven't reached that point yet. John and I can look at wars and agree with each other 99% of the time. But you obviously couldn't. I really don't know what to tell you. I can say, without any doubt, that neither the Iraqi Conflict nor WWI (western front) are crisis wars based on his algorithm. You could not. What seems so clear to me doesn't work for you.

I'd like to see more people actually take the time to really learn GD and make an effort to apply those rules, so we can truly see the algorithm's value. I'm assuming you have taken that time.

You cannot answer the questions for each war in isolation. Otherwise you could be applying the rules inconsistently, in such a way to (unconsciously) get the answers you want. You will be unaware that you are doing it. To avoid unconscious bias you have to make the evaluations objective by using past results (particularly borderline cases like the F-P war) as "reference standards" of "crisisness"

People can run the risk of doing that, sure. I don't believe this is true for me, nor do I believe it will ever be true. When applying the algorithm to the Native American tribes, I was often tempted to fall victim to bias. Some wars are extremely easy to evaluate. Some wars are a little more difficult. For example, (since the Iroquois have been discussed extensively) I was expecting the Seven Years War to be a crisis war for the Iroquois. My knowledge prior to the research seemed to indicate that this would be the case. It was a major war for the Iroquois, and really a turning point for their role in North America.

So I started researching Iroquoian involvement, really looking for a crisis war. I didn't find it. Different Iroquois tribes fought on different sides, but the Iroquois League remained intact. It became apparent that this was primarily a political and economic war, not a crisis war. I then moved on to the American Revolution, which was obviously a crisis war.

I think it is important to keep selection bias in the back of your mind, so that you can better avoid it.

For example, on point 2 you don't compare the war to Rwanda, because that has more genocidal violence that most bonafide crisis wars. Obviously a war can be a crisis war without having Rwanda-style violence.

I've been thinking about this sort of thing for some time now. Why in one crisis war (Rwanda), does one group massacre another? And why in another (American Civil War) is there little desire to exterminate the other group? You have two different situations here, yet both are crisis wars. Is Rwanda more genocidal than the American Civil War? In the literal sense, yes. But for GD purposes it shouldn't be so different.

John has expected at least some of the types of things that we saw in Rwanda in Iraq today if it were in a crisis war. Why? Well I suppose that in crisis wars, it is typical for people of different race and/or religion to attempt to exterminate each other, but not for people who have a political dispute (American Revolution, American Civil War, Franco-Prussian War, Napoleonic Wars). In World War Two, the Nazis tried to exterminate the Jews. In Rwanda, the dark-skinned Hutus tried to exterminate the light-skinned Tutsis. In 1572, Catholics murdered 10's of thousands of Hugenots over a couple months.

Of course, a certain level of racism has to be in place beforehand. If we got into a war with the Chinese, I doubt that we would try to exterminate them since we don't hate them prior the war, but this isn't 100%, since there are a ton of factors that go into this. Since Sunnis and Shi'ites have historically hated each other, and hate each other today, you would expect more of an effort to kill each other, if this were a crisis war.

This sort of response to racism doesn't define a crisis war, it just is a natural effect.

So to evaluate point 2 you pick a mild war that is nevertheless a bonafide crisis war. The F-P and American Revolution wars are good choices for mild crisis wars so they are a good choices as standards for genocide.

You then compare the Iraqi violence against civilians to that in the reference wars. There is very serious violence occurring to large numbers of civilians in Iraq. Civilian militia of one religious group are killing civilians of the other group in horrible ways. People dragged out of their cars or homes, hauled up and tortured to death in horrible ways. How is chopping off heads and drilling holes in skulls different from hacking someone to death with a machete?

The American Revolution is kind of an iffy choice since we really couldn't attack Britain and kill all of there civilians. As for the F-P war, I'll say it: There is a greater effort to kill Iraqi civilians by Iraqis than there was to kill French civilians by Germans.

So? Why would the Germans ever try to do that? If attacks against civilians were all point 2 was about, then neither the Iraqi conflict nor the F-P war would be a crisis war. Please re-read that chapter.

In 1636, Captain John Mason and his men burned 700 women and children alive, effectively destroying the Pequots. This is a non-crisis war. In 1680, the Seneca massacred 1,000 Illinois. This is a non-crisis war. In Iraq, the opposite is happening. Instead of high-level violence over a short period of time, we are seeing low-level violence over a long period of time.

As disgusting as that is, unless you see this on a larger scale (maybe not as big as Rwanda), this doesn't prove anything. English were always slaughtering Indians and Iroquois would always go out and slaughter other tribes.

As for your Armada questions, I can't field that one. I look forward to John explaining that one.

Since Sunnis and Shi'ites have historically hated each other...

Where did you get this idea from?

The American Revolution is kind of an iffy choice since we really couldn't attack Britain and kill all of there civilians.

The Rebels could have slaughtered Loyalists and vice versa.

Before we go further can you answer question 2 for the following wars. I will supply my answers for you to challenge.

Here's question 2: Determine intensity of genocidal violence. High genocidal violence gives the result "Determines C"; intermittent, stalemated or low-level violence gives the result, "Supports N."

Armada Supports N
WSS Determines C
American Revolution Supports N
FP war Supports N
WW I Determines C
Iraq War Determine C

Justification:

• Armada: No targeting of civilians, no massive casualties, war continued on afterward as stalemate: Spanish armada followed in next year by English armada that also failed. Spainsh navy quickly recovered and then exceeded pre-Armada strength, so loss of the Spanish Armadas had no impact on war.
  
• WSS: Extremely bloody battle of Malplaquet, war ended soon after and no major war fought for a generation indicating war trauma
  
• American RevolutionNo bloody battles like Malaplaquet. Civilians not targetted like in Iraq. No evidence of national trauma, rather war was remembered as a positive event that formed the American nation.
  
• FP War: no bloody battles like Malaplaquet, no targetting of civilans like in Iraq. Short and subdued compared to most Great Power wars. War was remembered by Germans as a positive event that formed the German nation. The French was not traumatized either. Rather they were enraged at the loss of French territory and itched for revenge, but were too weak to pursue it.
  
• WW I Extremely bloody, in France an entire generation of young men were lostIn France over 80% of men age 15-49 were mobilized for the war. By war’s end, ¾ of these young Frenchmen would be dead, wounded, missing or prisoner.The French nation was so traumatized they refused to stand up to a still very weak Germany in the Rhineland, instead hiding behind their Maginot line.
  
• Iraq War: Horrendous violence directed against civilans on a genocidal scale (tens of thousands of civilans killed horribly, over a hundred thousand casualties in 3 1/2 years of fighting)

If WSS is genocidal because of Malaplaquet then WW I has to be for the same reasons. An argument can be made against C that large numbers of civilans were not deliberately slaughtered in WW I, but this didn't happen in the WSS either. On the other hand it is happening in Iraq, which is why I rate it C.

Originally Posted by Zarathustra

Okay everybody. John is right. John is always right. It doesn't matter when Mike has him dead to rights. It doesn't matter that he and Matt skirt issues or engage in illogic. John is just right.

GD says whatever John says it does at any given moment, and it will be right, and with "100% certainty". His war cycle is superior to S&H because John says so. John is a genius and the rest of us (who don't agree with everything GD says) are "idiots". Anyone who challenges him is engaging in a "hack job". That's just the way it is.

Get over it. I have felt a lot better since I did.

Why don't you put John Xenakis on your "ignore" list since he riles you up? I put Devil's Advocate on my "ignore" list and eliminated a source of stress in my life.

Originally Posted by The Wonkette

Why don't you put John Xenakis on your "ignore" list since he riles you up? I put Devil's Advocate on my "ignore" list and eliminated a source of stress in my life.

What an insult to be put on somebody's ignore list! I don't have an ignore list, not even for that annoying DA guy, because I want to know who's lurking around in my world—forewarned is forearmed. Ignore list = blinders. So I intend to find out just who has put me on their ignore list, and if I do do...well, I'll think of something.

Originally Posted by The Wonkette

Why don't you put John Xenakis on your "ignore" list since he riles you up? I put Devil's Advocate on my "ignore" list and eliminated a source of stress in my life.

Oh, he has been for a week.

I was just giving similar advice to others in my own way.

Originally Posted by Croakmore

What an insult to be put on somebody's ignore list! I don't have an ignore list, not even for that annoying DA guy, because I want to know who's lurking around in my world—forewarned is forearmed. Ignore list = blinders. So I intend to find out just who has put me on their ignore list, and if I do do...well, I'll think of something.

Don't think of them as blinders, Mr. E. This of them as shades.

I have four annoyances on the list now, and it's great. Unfortunately some of their nonsense still shows up in others' quotes. But such is life!

Originally Posted by Zarathustra

... I have four annoyances on the list now, and it's great. Unfortunately some of their nonsense still shows up in others' quotes. But such is life!

It makes one wonder who's list each of us may aspire to join. Do I anger 'Poster Y'? If so, will I ever know? Will the board became Balkanized, thus providing each of us with a microcosm of one of the very topics we discuss?

We all irritate someone. I know I do. Just ask my wife.

Found this doing schoolwork.

http://news.nationalgeographic.com/n...sex_ratio.html

Over the course of human history it is likely that male-biased sex ratios were common across societies," Tuljapurkar, the Stanford population biologist, said. "Perhaps conflict [killing men] provided a stabilizing mechanism against the sort of population trap discussed [in this paper].

Originally Posted by Mikebert

Before we go further can you answer question 2 for the following wars. I will supply my answers for you to challenge.

Here's question 2: Determine intensity of genocidal violence. High genocidal violence gives the result "Determines C"; intermittent, stalemated or low-level violence gives the result, "Supports N."

Section 2, or at least my interpretation of it, is one of desire. The desire to win and the desire to kill must be high.

Armada Supports N
WSS Determines C
American Revolution Supports N
FP war Supports N
WW I Determines C
Iraq War Determine C

K, I won't respond to the Armada one since I don't know enough about it. It looks like you are at least attempting to evaluate these individually.

Justification:[*]WSS: Extremely bloody battle of Malplaquet, war ended soon after and no major war fought for a generation indicating war trauma

It's not entirely clear what makes up a crisis war battle. I always think of D-day, but that might not fit.

[*]American RevolutionNo bloody battles like Malaplaquet. Civilians not targetted like in Iraq. No evidence of national trauma, rather war was remembered as a positive event that formed the American nation.

Maybe. The lack of a bloody battle may or may not mean anything. Sometimes a bloody battle just doesn't happen well, because people weren't in the right place to allow it. I'm not surprised loyalists weren't slaughtered on a massive scale. As I said in one of my previous postings, I expect racism (or something like it) to really allow this. Otherwise, it just doesn't make much snese. The fact that there was no national trauma was because it was a successful war of independence that has had a positive effect. Even with this, the reaction was more somber than say, the war of 1812.

Maybe. There are contradictions within the "desire" category. There was a lot of doubt about the cause and whether it was winnable, and many soldiers wanted to go home (but is this much different from WWII?). But there were many fiercly dedicated to the patriot cause. You have to think the Americans must've been crazy to take on the British.

Americans: This is a close one, and can go either way, since there is no clear climax.

[*]FP War: no bloody battles like Malaplaquet, no targetting of civilans like in Iraq. Short and subdued compared to most Great Power wars. War was remembered by Germans as a positive event that formed the German nation. The French was not traumatized either. Rather they were enraged at the loss of French territory and itched for revenge, but were too weak to pursue it.

Once again, I'm not surprised that French civilians weren't targetted, nor am I surprised that the Germans remembered this as not terribly traumatizing, for the same reason that the Americans didn't find our Revolution traumatizing. For the Germans, desire is difficult to determine just by looking at something like a wikipedia article, which encompasses what I know about the F-P war.

Germans: ?

For the French, it is pretty much the same thing, except I see a clear and fitting climax in the Paris Commune. I don't see why you can't itch for revenge if it is a crisis war. Just as long as you really don't pursue it, it's OK with me.

French: C

[*]WW I Extremely bloody, in France an entire generation of young men were lostIn France over 80% of men age 15-49 were mobilized for the war. By war’s end, ¾ of these young Frenchmen would be dead, wounded, missing or prisoner.The French nation was so traumatized they refused to stand up to a still very weak Germany in the Rhineland, instead hiding behind their Maginot line.

Battle deaths. If you want to use GD against GD, use the GD methodology. The war wasn't that much more traumatizing for the French than the Germans, as they lost even more men. But they took their revenge.

Look at the bigger picture with World War One. Western European countries were forced into the war by treaty without a real desire to win it (it was only reflected in rhetoric). The war molded into a stalemate and there was an unneccesary capitulation.

Western Europe: N

*]Iraq War: Horrendous violence directed against civilans on a genocidal scale (tens of thousands of civilans killed horribly, over a hundred thousand casualties in 3 1/2 years of fighting.

This has been discussed so extensively that I can't say anything new.

I think this is an interesting conversation. Sorry for the longer response times. I don't have much time to think, let alone respond.

Matt

Originally Posted by Zarathustra

Don't think of them as blinders, Mr. E. This of them as shades.

I have four annoyances on the list now, and it's great. Unfortunately some of their nonsense still shows up in others' quotes. But such is life!

Well, I figure if you can't make at least someone's ignore list you are probably a suck up. On the other hand, I like your shades metaphor—sneaky!

Originally Posted by Marx & Lennon

It makes one wonder who's list each of us may aspire to join. Do I anger 'Poster Y'? If so, will I ever know? Will the board became Balkanized, thus providing each of us with a microcosm of one of the very topics we discuss?

We all irritate someone. I know I do. Just ask my wife.

M&L, you always nail it.

Dear Mike,

Originally Posted by Mikebert

> How can there be a crisis war in Iraq? It only takes one side to
> create conditions for genocidal fury. Both the Americans and al
> Qaeda have no recent crisis war so they are free to generate
> genocidal fury (and have). The Iraqis have no choice be to be
> involved (its happening in their country). Now if we pull out and
> the Iraqis get rid of al Qaeda, then its just Iraqis left, all of
> whom have had a recent crisis war. GD says that the Iraq war
> should then diminish and move away from genocidal fury.

There's no crisis war in Iraq, and no civil war.

We have massive rounds of joyous journalists and politicians in
Washington chortling, "O frabjous day! Callooh! Callay! We've slain
the Jabberwock -- the evil George Bush and the evil Donald Rumsfeld
and their evil Iraq policy." Even by Washington standards, this is
truly the most bizarre time I can recall seeing, as journalists and
politicians try to top each other in saying one idiotic thing after
another.
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...061207#e061207

The current round of blathering was largely generated by the
Thanksgiving day attack on Sadr City, where some 200 people were
killed, including women and children. The joyous journalists and
politicians have chortled that this is proof that Iraq is in a war
between Sunnis and Shiites, and that's it's close to a full-scale
civil war. What a bunch of crap. As I explained on my web site, that
was a terrorist attack perpetrated by five suicide bombers who weren't
even Iraqis. In other words, it was very similar to the 9/11 attacks
on the WTC, and that wasn't an American civil war. Furthermore,
al-Sadr himself didn't blame the Sunnis -- he blamed al-Qaeda. And
he's talking about forming a new coalition government, with him as
leader, allying with Sunni and Christian groups. You can't ally with
someone you're trying to kill (genocidally). This coalition
government proposal is clearly an Awakening type thing, and cannot be
a Crisis era kind of thing.
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/...061204#e061204

Now, you previously asked me the question of whether violence in Iraq
would increase or decrease if the Americans withdrew. I said that I
didn't know, but that it would probably increase, because outside
terrorist groups would continue their activities.

Now you're posing a completely different question - whether violence
will increase or decrease if the Americans withdraws AND the Iraqis
get rid of al-Qaeda. Well, they'd have to get rid of Iranian
terrorist influence as well. So under the assumption that the
Americans withdraw AND all terrorist influences are expelled from
Iraq, then, yes, the amount of violence would decrease, subject to
the fact that there's a certain level of violence in every Awakening
era.

However, if the Americans withdraw, then there would be no way for
the terrorist influences to be expelled. Al-Qaeda and Iran are
pouring hundreds of millions of dollars into Iraq for terrorist
activity, and some powerful countervailing force is required.




Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear David,

Originally Posted by Marx & Lennon

> I believe that T4T is correct as a model, but I never ascribe
> precision to it. Things happen in cycles, because the cycle is
> self reinforcing. I see similar cycles in nature. What I don't
> accept is the idea that something as amorphous as our emerging
> history can be predicted with greater than rough precision, and
> that's fully adequate to justify my interest in the theory.

> I don't expect prophecy, just guidance.

I agree with all this. Generational theory is not precise. It makes
predictions in very general terms, and then only within a 20-30 year
window.

The only thing that I would add with respect to my own work in
Generational Dynamics on my web site since 2003 is that it's possible
to hone the theory, to provide better forecasts and information than
a 20-30 year window. This is done by working back and forth between
the generational predictions and "real time current events." You use
current events to narrow the 20-30 year window down to a few months
or a couple of years, and then you use the narrow window to forecast
near-term trends, and sometimes specific events or non-events within
a reasonable window. This is still far from completely precise, but
it's valuable.

Generational theory is a very powerful tool, but it's extremely
complex and counter-intuitive. One would not expect anything less,
given that there are 6.5 billion people on earth. It will be many
years before its full potential will be realized.

Originally Posted by Marx & Lennon

> My prediction for Iraq is something akin to the Lebanese Civil
> War, with a decade or more of wanton slaughter and general mayhem
> leading to peace out of exhaustion.

As I've said, there's no civil war between Sunnis and Shiites, so the
wanton slaughter you describe will not occur. However, there will be
a major regional war, and that's already begun on Iraqi soil, thanks
to millions of dollars of funding from al-Qaeda and Iran, and that
might result in a lot of additional slaughter.

I want to add something to this thought, but I don't wish to ascribe
the following view to you in particular, but rather to the general
view that Americans hold in general, and journalists and politicians
in particular, have about the Mideast situation.

I often get the feeling that Americans have a certain prejudice
against those "AY-rabs," that wanton slaughter of each other is their
way of life, and that it's therefore to be expected in Iraq and other
places. I get the same feeling when people talk about the civil war
in Darfur, or other massive African wars -- that it's just those
uncivilized black tribes doing what they do naturally -- killing each
other all the time.

And yet, Americans don't look at WW II in the same way. Americans
consider WW II to be some sort of anomaly, a unique situation created
by one madman that can't and won't be repeated. Once again this is a
prejudice, the mirror image of the prejudice about Arabs and Africans
that I just described.

Of course none of that can be supported. The Western world is just
as "uncivilized" as the Arabs and Africans are, and they're just as
prone to "wanton slaughter" as the other two groups. But the reason
for the widespred prejudices is just a matter of timing: Lebanon and
Iraq had their crisis wars in the 1980s, at a time when the West was
relatively at peace, so it only SEEMS that we're more civilized than
they are. Similarly, the Rwanda and Darfur crisis wars have come in
the last 15 years, once again at a time of peace in the West. (...
provided that we don't count the Bosnian crisis war, but that's
another prejudice.)

Once we get past these prejudices, and realize that we're all
uncivilized people who wantonly slaughter each other, then it's
easier to see the generational patterns in history.

Originally Posted by Marx & Lennon

> I expect the country to be partitioned into autonomous enclaves,
> with a weak central government that delivers the mail, handles
> official diplomacy, and operates the military to the extent that
> one actually exists.

This is what I would call a "chaotic event prediction" (in the sense
of Chaos theory), since it could be materially affected by remote
events. Once the "clash of civilizations" world war has ended, the
surviving political leaders will hold a big peace conference to decide
what to do next, and the structure of Iraq will be decided at that
time. However, it's worth noting two things: The new Iraqi
constitution calls for a relatively weak federal government, with lots
of local self-government, and that would tend to support your
prediction. However, in Iraq's two previous crisis wars (the Great
Iraqi Revolution of 1920 and the Iran/Iraq war of the 1980s), the
Iraqis unified and placed their "Iraq" identity group above their
"Sunni" and "Shiite" identity groups. The fate of the Kurds, however,
was more mixed, given that Saddam gassed them in 1988.

Originally Posted by Marx & Lennon

> So? The war was noentheless definitive. Prior to that littel
> escapade, Korea was an agrarian backwater. Now, it's two countries
> that couldn't be more different from one another - neither of
> which carries on the agrarian tradition from the previous
> incarnation.

> You can call that anything you want. Generational Dynamics is your
> creation. But not recongizing the Korean War as transforming, in
> the face of such obvious evidence to the contrary, places the
> burden of proof on you.

I guess I would have to ask you to clarify your thoughts here,
because I don't understand what you mean. Korea was partitioned
before the Korean War, and it was partitioned after the armistice, so
I don't understand what aspect of "transforming" you're referring to.

Furthermore, they were both agrarian after the armistice. Since
then, they've gone in different directions, but that's a result of
their governments, not a result of the Korean war.

Generally speaking, we've seen the same contrast between all
Communist versus capitalist countries in the last 60 years. North
Korea, East Germany, Cuba, Russia and China all got stuck in the
1950s, as long as they followed the Communist line, while the
capitalist countries -- South Korea, Japan, South Korea, West
Germany, etc. -- all experience very substantial economic growth.
That had nothing to do with the Korean War, however.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by pkid1980

> Sorry to nitpick on my second post, but Rep. Chris Shays (CT) is a
> Republican.

Thanks for the correction. Fortunately for me, my error doesn't
materially affect the point I was making.

Originally Posted by pkid1980

> My opinion of the conventional wisdom differs slightly. Iraq was
> not a "peaceful country" but yet another Arab nation with no
> better a record than any of its neighbors. The presence of
> occupying forces inspires more violence than would have been the
> baseline without them around. We're not going to solve animosities
> that have existed since long before the united states of America
> began to share any common culture, nor will our exit make
> everything come up roses over there.

See my previous comments to Marx&Lennon on American attitudes towards
Arabs and Africans.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Richard,

Originally Posted by Croakmore

> What an insult to be put on somebody's ignore list! I don't have
> an ignore list, not even for that annoying DA guy, because I want
> to know who's lurking around in my world—forewarned is forearmed.
> Ignore list = blinders. So I intend to find out just who has put
> me on their ignore list, and if I do do...well, I'll think of
> something.

I would like to announce that I will not be insulted if someone puts
me on their ignore list. I will be happy because, depending on the
circumstances, it almost always means less aggravation for both of
us.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Matt and Mike,

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> I've been thinking about this sort of thing for some time now. Why
> in one crisis war (Rwanda), does one group massacre another? And
> why in another (American Civil War) is there little desire to
> exterminate the other group? You have two different situations
> here, yet both are crisis wars. Is Rwanda more genocidal than the
> American Civil War? In the literal sense, yes. But for GD purposes
> it shouldn't be so different.

> John has expected at least some of the types of things that we saw
> in Rwanda in Iraq today if it were in a crisis war. Why? Well I
> suppose that in crisis wars, it is typical for people of different
> race and/or religion to attempt to exterminate each other, but not
> for people who have a political dispute (American Revolution,
> American Civil War, Franco-Prussian War, Napoleonic Wars). In
> World War Two, the Nazis tried to exterminate the Jews. In Rwanda,
> the dark-skinned Hutus tried to exterminate the light-skinned
> Tutsis. In 1572, Catholics murdered 10's of thousands of Hugenots
> over a couple months.

> Of course, a certain level of racism has to be in place
> beforehand. If we got into a war with the Chinese, I doubt that we
> would try to exterminate them since we don't hate them prior the
> war, but this isn't 100%, since there are a ton of factors that go
> into this. Since Sunnis and Shi'ites have historically hated each
> other, and hate each other today, you would expect more of an
> effort to kill each other, if this were a crisis war.

> This sort of response to racism doesn't define a crisis war, it
> just is a natural effect. ...

> The American Revolution is kind of an iffy choice since we really
> couldn't attack Britain and kill all of there civilians. As for
> the F-P war, I'll say it: There is a greater effort to kill Iraqi
> civilians by Iraqis than there was to kill French civilians by
> Germans.

> So? Why would the Germans ever try to do that? If attacks against
> civilians were all point 2 was about, then neither the Iraqi
> conflict nor the F-P war would be a crisis war. Please re-read
> that chapter.

> In 1636, Captain John Mason and his men burned 700 women and
> children alive, effectively destroying the Pequots. This is a
> non-crisis war. In 1680, the Seneca massacred 1,000 Illinois. This
> is a non-crisis war. In Iraq, the opposite is happening. Instead
> of high-level violence over a short period of time, we are seeing
> low-level violence over a long period of time.

> As disgusting as that is, unless you see this on a larger scale
> (maybe not as big as Rwanda), this doesn't prove anything. English
> were always slaughtering Indians and Iroquois would always go out
> and slaughter other tribes.

> As for your Armada questions, I can't field that one. I look
> forward to John explaining that one.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

> Before we go further can you answer question 2 for the following
> wars. I will supply my answers for you to challenge.

> Here's question 2: Determine intensity of genocidal violence.
> High genocidal violence gives the result "Determines C";
> intermittent, stalemated or low-level violence gives the result,
> "Supports N."

> Armada Supports N
> WSS Determines C
> American Revolution Supports N
> FP war Supports N
> WW I Determines C
> Iraq War Determine C

> Justification:

• Armada: No targeting of civilians, no massive
  > casualties, war continued on afterward as stalemate: Spanish
  > armada followed in next year by English armada that also failed.
  > Spainsh navy quickly recovered and then exceeded pre-Armada
  > strength, so loss of the Spanish Armadas had no impact on war.
  
• WSS: Extremely bloody battle of Malplaquet, war ended
  > soon after and no major war fought for a generation indicating war
  > trauma
  
• American RevolutionNo bloody battles like Malaplaquet.
  > Civilians not targetted like in Iraq. No evidence of national
  > trauma, rather war was remembered as a positive event that formed
  > the American nation.
  
• FP War: no bloody battles like Malaplaquet, no
  > targetting of civilans like in Iraq. Short and subdued compared to
  > most Great Power wars. War was remembered by Germans as a
  > positive event that formed the German nation. The French was not
  > traumatized either. Rather they were enraged at the loss of
  > French territory and itched for revenge, but were too weak to
  > pursue it.
  
• WW I Extremely bloody, in France an entire generation
  > of young men were lost In France over 80% of men age 15-49 were
  > mobilized for the war. By war’s end, ¾ of these young Frenchmen
  > would be dead, wounded, missing or prisoner.[/url]The French
  > nation was so traumatized they refused to stand up to a still very
  > weak Germany in the Rhineland, instead hiding behind their Maginot
  > line.
  > http://www.american.edu/ted/ice/saar.htm#worldwar1
  
• Iraq War: Horrendous violence directed against civilans
  > on a genocidal scale (tens of thousands of civilans killed
  > horribly, over a hundred thousand casualties in 3 1/2 years of
  > fighting)

> If WSS is genocidal because of Malaplaquet then WW I has to be for
> the same reasons. An argument can be made against C that large
> numbers of civilans were not deliberately slaughtered in WW I, but
> this didn't happen in the WSS either. On the other hand it is
> happening in Iraq, which is why I rate it C.

I'll just make some general comments, without attempting to address
every one of this long list of questions.

World War I/Somme versus
War of the Spanish Succession/Malplaquet

I've said many times that number of war deaths is not a factor in
determining whether a war is a crisis war. Still, a hundred thousand
war deaths within a few days at the beginning of the Battle of the
Somme does focus the mind, and at least requires further
investigation.

We have the summary of the Battle of Malplaquet, as well as the
summary that I posted in a previous message.
http://www.battlefieldanomalies.com/malplaquet/
http://www.fourthturning.com/forum/s...postcount=1453

I looked up a couple of summaries of the Battle of the Somme.
http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/somme.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Somme_(1916)

Ignoring the number of war deaths for now, what I see at Malplaquet
is a war to the death ("genocidal fury") fought by both sides.

(Continued in next posting)

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

(Continued from previous posting)

What I see at Somme is:

• A failure of purpose -- "As the bloodbath at Verdun dragged on,
  the aim of the Somme offensive changed from delivering a decisive blow
  against Germany to relieving the pressure on the French army."
  
• Unfocused preparation by Allies - "The attack was preceded by an
  eight-day preliminary bombardment of the German lines, beginning on
  Saturday 24 June. ... However the advance artillery bombardment
  failed to destroy either the German front line barbed wire or the
  heavily-built concrete bunkers the Germans had carefully and robustly
  constructed."
  
• Nonchalance by the Allies -- "The first attacking wave of the
  offensive went over the top from Gommecourt to the French left flank
  just south of Montauban. The attack was by no means a surprise to
  the German forces. Quite aside from being freely discussed in French
  coffee shops and in letters home from the front, the chief effect of
  the eight-day preliminary bombardment served merely to alert the
  German army to imminent attack."
  
• A carefully planned attack by the Allies -- an attack that
  failed:
  
  > Following the artillery bombardment, it was determined that a
  > creeping barrage would precede the advancing infantry to the
  > German front line, and onwards to the second and third trench
  > lines. The Royal Artillery had prepared an underground network of
  > telephone cables so as to enable forward observation officers to
  > monitor and correct the barrage as the battle progressed. ...
  
  > Rawlinson’s southern wing, at the centre of the attack line, was
  > instructed by Haig to consolidate after a limited advance. ...
  
  > The Fourth [and] Third Army attempted a complete breakthrough,
  > with cavalry standing by to fully exploit the resultant gap in the
  > German lines. ...
  
  > As a consequence of the lack of surprise generated by the advance
  > bombardment, and the lack of success in cutting the German barbed
  > wire and in damaging their underground bunkers, the BEF made
  > strikingly little progress on 1 July or in the days and weeks that
  > followed. ...
  
  > Many troops were killed or wounded the moment they stepped out of
  > the front lines into No Man's Land. Many men walked slowly
  > towards the German lines, laden down with supplies, expecting
  > little or no opposition. They made for incredulously easy targets
  > for the German machine-gunners.
  
  
• A carefully planned defense by the Germans -- a defense that
  succeeded:
  
  > During the bombardment the German troops sought effective shelter
  > in such bunkers, emerging only with the ceasing of the British
  > artillery bombardment, when the German machine guns were manned to
  > great effect. ...
  
  > The British troops were for the most part forced back into their
  > trenches by the effectiveness of the German machine gun response.
  > ...
  
  > On that day German troops were transferred from Verdun to
  > contribute to the German defence, doubling the number of men
  > available for the defence.

Now, when I read these descriptions I do not see anything like the
total genocidal intensity that I see in the Malplaquet description.
I don't believe that this is bias, and I believe that other people
reading those two descriptions in detail will come to the same
conclusion.

Now let's take an additional look at the war deaths. There were
190,000 men total fighting in the Battle of Malplaquet. According to
figures posted by Mike a couple of years ago, 2 million men fought in
the Napoleonic wars a century later, and 65 million men fought in WW
I, an additional century later. About 800,000 of those fought in the
Battle of the Somme.

A total of 40,000 men were killed at Malplaquet, and close to 100,000
were killed in the first day at Somme. That looks like a much higher
figure until you compare the total sizes of the armies.

First off, only a small percentage of the Allied forces fought at
Somme, while the ENTIRE ARMIES fought at Malplaquet, indicating that
Somme was much less important. Second, at Malplaquet, 40% of the
entire army was lost in the melee, but at Somme, 12% of the assigned
armies and 0.15% of the entire army were killed.

And then the aftermath -- two destroyed armies vs months of
additional trench warfare -- points to a big difference.

So I really don't see how the Battle of the Somme is comparable to
the Battle of Malplaquet.

This is what always happens. A question or ambiguity arises, and
then I look at additional historical sources, and the question gets
resolved. This has NEVER FAILED, not even once. That's why I
continue to go in this direction.

Mike, you continue to treat this as an ideology. You use the same
tone in talking about the crisis war evaluation algorithm as you do
about the 2008 presidential election. But this is not an ideology
for me. If it ever actually failed then I would have given up years
ago.

Still, perhaps my definition of "genocide" or "genocidal energy" nees
to be improved.

So Mike, how can I improve the definition of "genocide" so that it
correctly distinguishes between Malplaquet and Somme?

Armada War and Franco-Prussian War

Without more research, I wouldn't agree with your evaluation of these
wars, but let's assume for the sake of argument that you're right.

These two wars then have something in common with Switzerland in WW
II -- we might call it the "aborted crisis war." Here's the
comparison:

• Switzerland was neutral in WW II, and Germany observed the
  neutrality. However, Switzerland was over 70% German-speaking, and
  the fervently anti-Nazi population prepared for a war when German was
  "on the way back" from victory. But Germany was defeated, and the
  crisis war for Switzerland was aborted.
  
• Germany was prepared to continue fighting the French all the way
  to Paris, but Napoleon III, afraid of what might happened,
  surrendered at Sedan, thus aborting the crisis war for Germany.
  (However, the crisis war for France could not be aborted, as it
  turned into the French Commune civil war.)
  
• The English were prepared for a crisis war with the Spanish, and
  with Scotland as well, but the war was aborted when the Armada was
  unexpectedly destroyed.

We thus have a small collection of wars that can be called "aborted
crisis wars."

Or maybe there are a lot of them, but we just don't recognize them
yet.

As in the case of France in the Franco-Prussian war, sometimes a
crisis war cannot be aborted. Maybe sometimes a crisis war is not
aborted, but postponed. I've suggested before that the French and
Indian war postponed the Revolutionary War.

But let me present a different angle to this argument. Why was WW II
a crisis war for Kansas? Is it because Kansas wasn't a separate
country? Why should that matter? Is it because Kansas sent troops to
the war? Well, what if a bunch of Kansans joined the French Foreign
Legion to fight Algeria?

This whole area is very murky. It seems to be a situation that
rarely occurs, but it occurs often enough that it requires a fuller
explanation.

(Continued in next posting)

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

(Continued from previous posting)

Fixing the Crisis War Evaluation Algorithm

I already mentioned that my definition of "genocide" may have to be
improved.

There's also a typology of crisis wars: A civil war is different from
a foreign war. A foreign war on foreign soil is different from a
foreign war on home soil. An "aborted crisis war," if such exists, is
different from a regular crisis war. It may be necessary to
evaluate them differently. Certainly the outcomes of these different
types vary.

When I devised the crisis war evaluation algorithm, I did it so that
a war is evaluated entirely by itself, without regard to any other
wars.

As a practical matter, you always know about other wars, and maybe an
entirely different approach is necessary. Perhaps you evaluate all
wars within a 50-year window and pick the one that receives the most
"points."

What has to be remember is that a crisis war differs from a
non-crisis war by its emotional content. When a crisis war begins,
you have the jubilation and exhilaration. Then a military loss
brings the public to fear and almost total paralysis. Then there's
fury the value of an individual human life drops to zero, and there's
an acceptance of genocide and mass slaughter. This kind of emotional
roller coaster ride doesn't happen with a non-crisis war, and that's
what really makes the difference. Whether that can be captured in a
"crisis war evaluation algorithm" is not known to me.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Allan,

I really appreciate the opportunity to ask you some questions. It's
very rare to have to opportunity to ask questions of someone who
remembers so much of America's last crisis war.

Originally Posted by Methuselah

> Rememberances of Dec 7 1941.

> St. Louis Post Dispatch
> May 7 1945
> Washington, May 7 (AP)

> The Office of War Information said today: "The Government needs
> and asks it’s citizens in this 178 week of the war to:

> "1. Plan now to spend Memorial Day at home. Troop transfers,
> material shipments and the return of European casualties make
> pleasure travel more unwarranted than ever.

> "2. Report all above-ceiling prices to your OPA ration board.
> Overcharges feed black markets and help cause inflation.

> "3. Take a job in a lead mine or smelter. The present shortage of
> lead workers endangers military and civilian supplies of this
> critical material.

> "4. Return to sea if you are an experienced seaman for the big job
> ahead. Ships now being launched must be manned to carry increased
> Pacific shipments, returning wounded, and supplies to devastated
> countries.

> "5. Rent your spare rooms to war workers and to families of
> service men. Register the ceiling rent with OPA if you live in a
> rent controlled area"

This is very interesting. Why is this, of all clippings, the one you
saved from 1945?

Originally Posted by Methuselah

> I was only eleven when Japan bombed Pearl Harbor and I really
> didn't know what was happening and certainly not why. My mother
> and father were divorced in 1931 and I was living with my mother
> and grandmother. At home it was it was mostly a matter of shock
> and astonishment. Strangely enough outside it was a matter of
> excitement and even exhilaration. It took me about four years to
> really have a handle on what war and particularly this war was all
> about.

This is what I really wanted to focus on -- this exhilaration and
jubilation when a crisis war begins.

By any chance, do you recall the War of the Worlds radio broadcast?
You may have been a little too young. I've theorized that the
mass hysteria reaction to that broadcast is similar to the mass
hysteria that launches a war.

In his book The Culture of Defeat, Wolfgang Schivelbusch
describes what happens when war begins (though, unfortunately, he
mixes together crisis and non-crisis wars):

Originally Posted by Wolfgang Schivelbusch

> The passions excited in the national psyche by the onset of war
> show how deeply invested the masses now were in its potential
> outcome. Propaganda had reinforced their conviction that
> "everything was at stake," and the threat of death and defeat
> functioned like a tightly coiled spring, further heightening the
> tension. The almost festive jubilation that accompanied the
> declarations of war in Charleston in 1861, Paris in 1870, and the
> capitals of the major European powers in 1914 were anticipatory
> celebrations of victory-since nations are as incapable of
> imagining their own defeat as individuals are of conceiving their
> own death. The new desire to humiliate the enemy, noted by
> Burckhardt, was merely a reaction to the unprecedented posturing
> in which nations now engaged when declaring war.

What I find remarkable is the total sense of Fantasyland that exists
as a crisis war approaches. I write about this frequently on my web
site -- how the Washington politicians and journalists seem to be in
a contest to make every sentence as stupid and moronic as possible.
I'd hoped that with Silents writing the Iraq Study Group report, that
it would be sensible, but it's the craziest damn thing imaginable.
And now with Rumsfeld gone, there's no one left in Washington who has
the vaguest idea what's going on in the world.

This "state of denial" is captured by Schivelbusch's description of
the jubilation following the start of the crisis war. All of the
shared crazy fantasies that led up to the start of the war come
together in what must be the craziest celebration of all.

Now, you mention the sense of "excitement and even exhilaration" that
you saw accompanying the start of WW II, and that's certainly
consistent with what I've been saying.

But I wonder if you have any recollection of what happened only a few
weeks later, after the the disastrous loss in the Philippines
(February) and the Bataan death march (April, 1942). Do you have any
recollection of what happened then?

Here's how General Carl von Clausewitz described, in his 1832 book
On War, describes what happens to the general public after a
disastrous defeat:

Originally Posted by General Carl von Clausewitz

> The effect of defeat outside the army -- on the people and on the
> government -- is a sudden collapse of the wildest expectations,
> and total destruction of self-confidence. The destruction of
> these feelings creates a vacuum, and that vacuum gets filled by a
> fear that grows corrosively, leading to total paralysis. It's a
> blow to the whole nervous system of the losing side, as if caused
> by an electric charge. This effect may appear to a greater or
> lesser degree, but it's never completely missing. Then, instead
> of rushing to repair the misfortune with a spirit of
> determination, everyone fears that his efforts will be futile; or
> he does nothing, leaving everything to Fate.

Do you remember anything like that happening?

Originally Posted by Methuselah

> I finally came around to hating the Germans and the "Japs"
> probably as a result of the propaganda war depiction in the
> newspapers as inhuman caricatures - savages, uncivilized.

Have those feelings changed since then?

(Continued in next posting)

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

(Continued from previous posting)

Originally Posted by Methuselah

> Received today an email from a friend mentioning your name and
> "America's Destiny".

> Upon seeking and reading your site, I was somewhat stunned upon
> reading references to Generations and The Clash of Civilizations.
> The original Generations book by Strauss and Howe and Sam
> Huntingtons Clash of Civilizations books are my most important
> sources for understanding, trying to that is, and venturing into
> the future.

Please thank your friend for me.

Originally Posted by Methuselah

> An equally important book for me - was published in 1951 by Eric
> Hoffer titled "The True Believer"- thoughts on the nature of mass
> movements. The book deals with the peculiarites common to all
> mass movements, be they religious movements, social revolutions
> or nationalist movements.Although different in doctrine they share
> the same cast of characters that have the "specialness" to appeal
> to the same types of mind - the frustrated segment of a population
> desparate for change. The Man of Words", the "Fanatic", and the
> "Man of Action" wait on the sidelines to step forth at the right
> time to arouse, ignite, inflame and to release a chaotic movement
> to bring about radical change - at any cost of life and property.

I've read Eric Hoffer's book, and he has a very interesting
presentation. The problem for me is that he amalgamates all the
different kinds of "mass movements" and tries to treat them
uniformly. And then he defines a set of actors that presumably exist
in all mass movements.

For that book to be useful to me and Generational Dynamics, then I'd
really need to sort out all the actors and place them into a
generational context. In a crisis war, what generations do the "man
of words," the "fanatic" and the "man of action" come from? This all
has to be sorted out, and that's not a chunk of work that's high on
my list of things to do.

Furthermore, his use of the "mass movement" concept is too vague.
From the point of view of Generational Dynamics, every generational
behavior and attitude is a "mass movement." A population that pays
its income taxes is a mass movement.

I'm interested in mass movements related specifically to crisis wars.
These mass movements bring about the jubilation and exhilaration and
excitement that I referenced a few paragraphs ago at the beginning of
a crisis war.

This kind of mass movement is a kind of mass hysteria. You can see
the same kind of the mass hysteria in the War of the Worlds show that
I mentioned. You can also see it in something as ordinary as rock
concert, for Frank Sinatra or the Beatles, where young girls are the
main actors screaming at every word.

My hypothesis is that the mass hysteria begins with young girls and
women and quickly spreads to their boyfriends, brothers, husbands and
fathers. Then someone to follow from the Prophet generation is
chosen, in the same way that teens might choose the next fashion item
or the next rock star.

Now, all of this can fit into the paradigm described by Hoffer, but
it's only for generational crisis wars, and the different actors have
to be sorted out.

On the other hand, a religion that's been around for centuries would
be a "mass movement" in Hoffer's sense, but is a completely different
thing from a generational point of view.

Originally Posted by Methuselah

> Creating radical change requires special men. Examining
> generational differences is not the catalyst for violent action. A
> specific generation may present itself as susceptable to change
> but remains inert until a leader can be believed and followed,
> even to death.

> I think the True Believer concept is essential to bring about
> change and not left to politicians and media. I would suggest your
> vision toward the future include the Man of Words, the Fanatic to
> create the chaos, and the Man of Action waiting for the smoke to
> clear to gain control of the chaos and direct it with probably a
> personal goal.

Hoffer was heavily influenced by the Hitler experience, but I
consider that to be just one of many possible cases. When the kids
select the appropriate Prophet, it's not clear that this person wants
to be the kind of leader that Hoffer is talking about. Even in the
Nazi scenario, there were people whose anti-Semitic writings were
adopted and carried to their logical conclusion, much to the horror
of the author, who wanted to be anti-Semitic but didn't want to be
responsible for a Holocaust.

Incidentally, I've spent a lot more time with Hannah Arendt's
Origins of Totalitarianism, mapping her analysis into
generations.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Man, I wish I was this smart and able to compose such amazing posts, and not just serve as generational muscle. I guess I'll just stick to making worthless posts until the time comes when society needs able-bodied young men such as myself.

Originally Posted by BigStar

> Man, I wish I was this smart and able to compose such amazing
> posts, and not just serve as generational muscle. I guess I'll
> just stick to making worthless posts until the time comes when
> society needs able-bodied young men such as myself.

That's very self-effacing, but remember that it's your generation,
not the Boomers, that's making the decisions for how and where and
when we will confront international problems, and how this will lead
to war.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

That's very self-effacing, but remember that it's your generation,
not the Boomers, that's making the decisions for how and where and
when we will confront international problems, and how this will lead
to war.

In what sense?

Originally Posted by BigStar

In what sense?

Vote.

You millinnals are numbericaly larger than the boomers or the X'ers and demographically your voting power will grow stronger as the 4t becomes apparent because more of you will become eligable to vote. Also, being a civic generation, your rates of voting and other public centered behavior will be higher than it is for other generations.

Like all prophet generations, the boomers were loud and active as they came of age during their awakening. That left them resolved to fix the problems in the inner world of values as they understood them. However, awakening era youths, the prophets and nomads, tend to be highly individualistic and that limits the effectivness of their group behavior.

As heroes, you millies will quietly get the crises era job done and come away resolved to fix the outer world. As you age, your younger artist helpmates will also be adept at fitting into organizations and using the rules and procedures of such to your desired ends.

But it all begins with the first public centered act available to you in voting.
During the last crises, FDR would not have had the success he did without the unwavering support of the young GI's, who in 1936 voted for him by about 85%-the generational record for support in any election-over his opponet Landon. In short, the grey champion gets the title in part by championing an agenda that makes the most sense to a young heavily voting groups of civics. It's the first part of empowerment that happens to heroes in a democratic culture during a crises.