Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

I've said many times that number of war deaths is not a factor in determining whether a war is a crisis war.

Of course it is

Still, a hundred thousand war deaths within a few days at the beginning of the Battle of the Somme does focus the mind, and at least requires further investigation.

See?

We have the summary of the Battle of Malplaquet, as well as the summary that I posted in a previous message.
http://www.battlefieldanomalies.com/malplaquet/
http://www.fourthturning.com/forum/s...postcount=1453

I looked up a couple of summaries of the Battle of the Somme.
http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/somme.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Somme_(1916)

Ignoring the number of war deaths for now, what I see at Malplaquet
is a war to the death ("genocidal fury") fought by both sides.

There is an example of what I was referring to as unconscious bias. What you see is genocidal fury. Of course it is.

What IS genocidal fury? Genocidal fury is what the violence of a crisis war is seen as. The violence of a non-crisis war is NOT seen as genocidal fury.

The violence of the WSS will be seen as genocidal fury because the WSS is a crisis war.

In contrast, the violence of WW I will not be seen as genocidal fury because WW I is not a crisis war.
************************************************** *********************************
I haven't found a real objective definition for genocidal fury in GD for Historians. In one section you say you are going to provide a definition, but you actually don't. What you do give is a list of nine points that indicate genocidal fury. I give them here.

I also list a number of wars and apply each of the nine to them. Note that WW II gives a score of 8 the highest score of all the wars. It is the "gold standard" of crisis wars. By comparison non-crisis WW I (west) has a score of 3. WW I (east) and the US Civil War have high scores (5) consistent with their being crisis wars, but so does Iraq which does not have genocidal violence war by your reckoning.

However a crisis war like the WSS gets a very low score. If WW I (west) is not genocidal in GD terms than neither are the WSS, FP war or American Revolution.

You also implicitly define genocidal fury in your definition of a crisis war:

Crisis wars are cyclic within a society, region or nation. They're the most horrible kinds of wars. They're so horrible and they traumatize a nation so much that there's unanimous agreement to do everything possible to prevent any such war from ever happening again.

Looking at the four points in the crisis war algorithm, the only one that is capable of inflicting horror upon a population sufficient to traumatize it is point (2) which deals with genocidal fury. Based on this one might define genocidal fury as follows:

genocidal fury war violence that is so horrible and traumatizes a nation so much that there's unanimous agreement to do everything possible to prevent it from ever happening again.

Here the key is trauma. Did a war's violence traumatize a population? For example did the WSS traumatize the population?

The central argument you make for the WSS being a crisis war and WW I (west) not is the battle of Malplaquet versus WW I battles like the Somme or Verdun. To argue that somehow Malplaquet was somehow conducted in a more genocidal way than the Somme is silly. So what? Only a small fraction of all French families could have had a son or father at the battle of Malaplaquet because the size of the forces was so small. Sixty percent of Frenchmen of military age were either killed, wounded or captured in WW II. Nothing remotely like this could have happened in the WSS with the much small armies of those days.

A better approach would be to look for indirect evidence of trauma wrt to the WSS. You will find it in what happened after the war. During the late 17th century France fought a series of wars. None of them traumatized the nation's leaders sufficiently to get them to stop fighting more wars until the WSS. For 25 years, there was peace. This observation implies trauma, at least amongst the ruling class who makes policy. This gives the support to the WSS as a crisis war.

But this also supports the idea of genocidal fury in WW I. Using the objective material presented in GD for Historians, I cannot see how one can include the WSS as an example of genocidal fury and not WW I west.

Instead of addressing the issue (what elements might an objective method for finding crisis wars have), you mainly attempt to justify your prior assessments made apparently based on your own subjective opinion on these matters by bring up tidbits like the Xmas truce in WW I. Really. The Xmas truce is a blip in a war that killed or scarred six out of ten Frenchmen. People excoriate the French and British for not standing up to Hitler. They just had a crisis war, they would do anything to avoid another one--even appease Hitler. Not only does WW I obvious traumatic violence, its shows textbook case of a prior crisis war making a people not willing to engage in another one.

You argue that timelines merge. For this to happen means somebody's timeline gets squeezed (that is, crisis wars can occur close together if timelines are merging). Thus, an Iraq traumatized by a crisis war in the 1980's can have another one today because they didn't choose war--it chose them. As you point out the US is ripe for another crisis war. The US as a rule doesn't endure genocidal fury, it inflicts it on others (like the Germans and Japanese in WW II) As Kissinger says, the US didn't do enough in Afghanistan--so we went into Iraq. That is, the US did not engage in sufficient genocidal fury in Afghanistan and so went to Iraq to engage in some more. This is what GD says nations DO when a certain amount of time has passed since the last time they engaged in genocidal fury.

Similar the Iraqis, Hitler forced war on Britain and France and they ended up in another crisis war. Having had a recent crisis war doesn't protect you from someone else engaging in genocidal fury on you.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

You argue that timelines merge. For this to happen means somebody's timeline gets squeezed (that is, crisis wars can occur close together if timelines are merging). Thus, an Iraq traumatized by a crisis war in the 1980's can have another one today because they didn't choose war--it chose them. As you point out the US is ripe for another crisis war. The US as a rule doesn't endure genocidal fury, it inflicts it on others (like the Germans and Japanese in WW II) As Kissinger says, the US didn't do enough in Afghanistan--so we went into Iraq. That is, the US did not engage in sufficient genocidal fury in Afghanistan and so went to Iraq to engage in some more. This is what GD says nations DO when a certain amount of time has passed since the last time they engaged in genocidal fury.

Similar the Iraqis, Hitler forced war on Britain and France and they ended up in another crisis war. Having had a recent crisis war doesn't protect you from someone else engaging in genocidal fury on you.

And yet, Hitler's people had been just as traumatized as the British and French. More so. It was the German soldiers whose will broke in WW I. On the other hand, the terms of WW I's peace were provocative. This suggests that the desire to avoid traumatic wars in rapid succession would be a powerful force, but not a decisive causal force. An elite seeking to increase their power can provoke a traumatized people into full battle mode in spite of recent trauma.

Similarly, it has been some time since the United States engaged in genocidal fury. This does not make it inevitable that we must do so, only that recent trauma is not a force inhibiting us from doing so. If September 11th had not provoked anger and fear among the People, if the neocons had no desire for military bases near the Middle Eastern oil supplies, Americans would not be sitting frustrated in a pool of genocidal fury, looking for a target. Without September 11th, I would expect Americans would have still embraced the 'zero casualty' aversion to foreign adventures which prevailed during the Clinton administration.

I would think that the seeds of genocidal rage lurk in the hearts of men, can be suppressed by trauma in the recent past, but can also be nurtured and inflamed by idealist dreamers, bigots or power hungry elites. This would be part of my 'spiral of violence' schtick. A spiral of violence building to homicidal fury is often preceded by a spiral of rhetoric. The revolutionary patriots, the abolitionists and Hitler's brown shirts might all be examples.

Spirals of violence can be suppressed as well as inflamed. After the Oklahoma City bombings, government, press and religious organizations denounced the violence. There was a broad consensus and active pressure that domestic terror was not a proper tool to manipulate government policy. After September 11th, many of the same organizations spun up the potential for violence. Foreign terror was to be answered with violence.

To some degree, the elites might be able to manipulate emotion to achieve hidden motivations. To some degree, the emotions exist in and of themselves. The government can get swept up in the same waves of emotion as the People. I would just keep a skeptical eye on the elites, know that such forces can be manipulated, and keep track of which aspects of which culture are spinning which way.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

And yet, Hitler's people had been just as traumatized as the British and French. More so. It was the German soldiers whose will broke in WW I. On the other hand, the terms of WW I's peace were provocative. This suggests that the desire to avoid traumatic wars in rapid succession would be a powerful force, but not a decisive causal force. An elite seeking to increase their power can provoke a traumatized people into full battle mode in spite of recent trauma.

Similarly, it has been some time since the United States engaged in genocidal fury. This does not make it inevitable that we must do so, only that recent trauma is not a force inhibiting us from doing so. If September 11th had not provoked anger and fear among the People, if the neocons had no desire for military bases near the Middle Eastern oil supplies, Americans would not be sitting frustrated in a pool of genocidal fury, looking for a target. Without September 11th, I would expect Americans would have still embraced the 'zero casualty' aversion to foreign adventures which prevailed during the Clinton administration.

I would think that the seeds of genocidal rage lurk in the hearts of men, can be suppressed by trauma in the recent past, but can also be nurtured and inflamed by idealist dreamers, bigots or power hungry elites. This would be part of my 'spiral of violence' schtick. A spiral of violence building to homicidal fury is often preceded by a spiral of rhetoric. The revolutionary patriots, the abolitionists and Hitler's brown shirts might all be examples.

Spirals of violence can be suppressed as well as inflamed. After the Oklahoma City bombings, government, press and religious organizations denounced the violence. There was a broad consensus and active pressure that domestic terror was not a proper tool to manipulate government policy. After September 11th, many of the same organizations spun up the potential for violence. Foreign terror was to be answered with violence.

To some degree, the elites might be able to manipulate emotion to achieve hidden motivations. To some degree, the emotions exist in and of themselves. The government can get swept up in the same waves of emotion as the People. I would just keep a skeptical eye on the elites, know that such forces can be manipulated, and keep track of which aspects of which culture are spinning which way.

All of your comments are quite valid. As far as I can tell GD has some holes in it and so when I employ it I will probably write questionable things.

In that post I was trying to employ GD as best as I can to argue that lots of things can happen and still follow the rules. John argues that it is imposible for two crisis wars to be as close together as WW I and WW II. Yet it seems to me that merging timelines ought to allow close-together crisis wars.

For John it's bedrock GD that both WW I and WW II cannot be crisis wars for the same people. Thus he makes WW I not a crisis war and WW II a crisis for the West and flips them around for the East. I cannot see how WW II has more genocidal fury for France than did WW I but John insists that this is so.

Similarly the Great Patriotic War doesn't exhibit genocidal fury and so isn't a crisis war for the USSR. This completely baffles me.

Originally Posted by herbal tee

Originally Posted by BigStar

In what sense?

Vote.

-snort-

Yes indeed, focus all your attention on selecting between the choices that they decide to offer you. That's the way to take control!

Originally Posted by Justin '77

-snort-

Yes indeed, focus all your attention on selecting between the choices that they decide to offer you. That's the way to take control!

Well, I could go deeper and add that one get involved in the primary process of the party of your choice. All snark aside, if the constitutional process does not redress grievences anymore, well Thomas Jefferson said it best.

we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, — That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

Mike,

Originally Posted by Mikebert

I haven't found a real objective definition for genocidal fury in GD for Historians. In one section you say you are going to provide a definition, but you actually don't. What you do give is a list of nine points that indicate genocidal fury. I give them here.

As you acknowledge, this wasn’t really meant to be done on a point system, but I think this list can be modified so that a point system can be developed. Note: This must be evaluated for each group individually if the war contains 2 or more. The system you list now is a start, but it needs to be honed so as to focus on more telling information. It’s important to remember that there are several types of wars. You can have a typical war, (WWI, WWII) a civil war (Darfur, US Civil War), or a terrorism war (Iraqi). These may have to be evaluated separately, but for now we’ll clump them together and see how it works out. I will go through each of the 9 criteria you list:

1. Highly secretive mobilization, with the intent to hide from other countries the war intention
2. A massive surprise attack on the enemy
3. A pursued desire for "ethnic cleansing"
4. A sustained program of mass murders, mass rapes, massacres, torture, destruction of entire towns (with inhabitants), forced relocation of huge populations of people - sustained over a period of months (a single battle doesn't count)
5. "Scorched earth policy" that kills as many civilians as possible, leaving the survivors to starve or die from exposure. This involves burning of villages, and destruction of wells and crops.
6. Nation at end is "devastated" or perpetrates devastation
7. A "D-Day" type mass assault, a willingness to sacrifice one's own forces for victory. This includes regular use of "suicide terrorism" and such things as the Japanese kamikazes.
8. "Spiraling out of control"
9. A refusal to capitulate, a willingness to fight to the death, even when defeat is almost certain

#1: In your table, the only one that receives a yes is World War Two. It is possible that John had this war in mind when he wrote this. Does highly secretive mobilization show genocidal violence? If looked at in the proper context, it is possible; but from an evaluative stance, it seems unnecessary.

#2 seems almost certainly related to #1, and accordingly, World War Two is the only one that receives a yes. This would indicate that #1 and #2 might not belong in the point system.

#3, on the other hand, is very important. If the country pursues a desire for ethnic cleansing, it is almost certainly a crisis war. However, if there is no ethnic cleansing, it isn’t necessarily a non-crisis war, as this happens only in certain scenarios.

#4 almost reads like #3, but it should be quite different. #4 could receive a yes for America in WWII with the destruction of Japanese cities and the lockup of Japanese-American civilians. #4 indicates a desire to use all force necessary (and unnecessary) to win the war. There is some slight overlap on #3, so it’s important to make the distinction.

#5 could serve as a replacement for #4 that receives a no. It is slightly less important and #4 may not be even slightly reasonable or feasible on some occasions. It makes you wonder, if we had found the bomb in the American Civil War, would we have used it? I believe the answer is yes, but it’s impossible to know for sure.

#6. A nation doesn’t have to be devastated for it to be a crisis war, nor do they have to perpetrate devastation. It should be expected, however, that one or the other should happen during the crisis war. This indicates an amount of “genocidal violence” used or withstood. This may, however, not work if the opposing nation is in a non-crisis war and attacking them is not feasible.

#7 is difficult to find an objective evaluation. On what scale does this need to happen? This needs to be improved, since it can be useful. How do you sacrifice your forces? Do you send them to certain death? This has to do with the value of human life and is still maybe a little too subjective.

#8 is really vague. I don’t find it useful.

#9 is a good useful, indicator that, like #6, concentrates on “the other side” of a conflict. This, however, is not applicable for the winners. For the winners, it may be a refusal to negotiate and a refusal to back down until the job is done.


This leaves #’s 3, 4, 6, 7, and 9 as the most useful indicators of “genocidal violence,” with #5 being a replacement for #4 if #4 receives a no. I’ll test this out (sorry for the lack of a table… this will go 3, 4 (except where indicated), 6, 7, 9 ) :

Germany World War Two: Yes+, Yes, Yes, Yes, Yes (5+/5) = Determines C
America World War Two: No, Yes, Yes, Yes, Yes (4/5) = Determines C
America (North) Civil War: No, Yes (#5), Yes, Yes, Yes (4/5) = Determines C
America (South) Civil War: No, No?? (or N/A?) (#5), Yes, Yes, Yes (3/5) or (¾) = Determines C
American Revolution: No (or N/A), N/A (or No), N/A, No, Yes (1/3) = Supports ? To N
WWI (France): No, No (#5), Yes, Yes?, No (2/5) = Supports N
WSS (France): No, No (#5), No, Yes, Yes (2/5) = Supports N
F-P (France): No, Yes (Commune), Sorta (.5), Yes (Commune), Yes (3.5/5) = Determines C
F-P (Germany): No, No? (#5), No, Yes, Yes (2/5) = Supports N
WWII (Russia): No, Yes, Yes, Yes, Yes (4/5)= Determines C

Alright, that works a lot better, but it’s obviously not complete. If a country picks up a C for genocidal violence, it must be a crisis war; if not, then this isn’t enough. The only one for where this "algorithm within an algorithm" doesn’t work for is Russia in World War Two, which I expected. But that’s alright. If this thing can work 98% of the time that’s good enough.

genocidal fury war violence that is so horrible and traumatizes a nation so much that there's unanimous agreement to do everything possible to prevent it from ever happening again.

Here the key is trauma. Did a war's violence traumatize a population? For example did the WSS traumatize the population?

Ehh.. That isn’t really to be evaluated; rather, it is just a natural result of the crisis war. So, if a crisis war happens, there can’t be another one for some time… the nomads on through the artist’s prevent another crisis war… the cycle is reborn etc. etc.

A better approach would be to look for indirect evidence of trauma wrt to the WSS. You will find it in what happened after the war. During the late 17th century France fought a series of wars. None of them traumatized the nation's leaders sufficiently to get them to stop fighting more wars until the WSS. For 25 years, there was peace. This observation implies trauma, at least amongst the ruling class who makes policy. This gives the support to the WSS as a crisis war.

But this also supports the idea of genocidal fury in WW I. Using the objective material presented in GD for Historians, I cannot see how one can include the WSS as an example of genocidal fury and not WW I west.

No one is arguing that Frenchmen in World War One weren’t traumatized. They just were Nomads and Prophets. That is why it didn’t matter.

You argue that timelines merge. For this to happen means somebody's timeline gets squeezed (that is, crisis wars can occur close together if timelines are merging). Thus, an Iraq traumatized by a crisis war in the 1980's can have another one today because they didn't choose war--it chose them.

That’s impossible. War may be forced on you, but that doesn’t make it possible for a crisis war if you‘re in an awakening period. Iran, in a 2T (which has clearly been shown over the last two days), will undoubtedly be involved in this next war. But it won’t be “their” crisis war.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

Ehh.. That isn’t really to be evaluated; rather, it is just a natural result of the crisis war. So, if a crisis war happens, there can’t be another one for some time… the nomads on through the artist’s prevent another crisis war… the cycle is reborn etc. etc.

This does not make any sense. Why do people not want to repeat the crisis war. Because the last one traumatized them. For a war to be a crisis war it has to be bad enough that it makes the survivors unwilling to do it again. A crisis was must be traumatic. So of course you can evaluate wars based on their inducement of trauma.

No one is arguing that Frenchmen in World War One weren’t traumatized. They just were Nomads and Prophets. That is why it didn’t matter.

What? If a war meets the crisis war specifications, it's a crisis war, nowhere in the definition are generations even mentioned.

That’s impossible. War may be forced on you, but that doesn’t make it possible for a crisis war if you‘re in an awakening period.

This is a tautology. You are saying that a crisis war by definition cannot occur shortly after a previous one because it violates the GD theory. But how do we know that the GD theory is valid? Because crisis wars don't occur close together. You are going in circles.

One problem I have with how GD is formulated is it is a series of conjectures, which are then used to "prove" other conjectures. No evidence is ever provided for anything. For example, a conjecture is made that war serves as the principal Malthusian check, greater than famine or disease. No evidence is given to support this conjecture. The conjecture is then used as if it were a fact to support additional conjectures.

Don't you think this question might have been addressed? I seem to recall from something I read in the past that disease was by far the greatest of the Malthusian checks, war was nearly irrelevant as a means of population control. Wouldn't citations from studies showing that war is the main Malthusian check be a good idea?

The whole basis of GD is based on a conjecture: there exist a category of wars called crisis wars, examples of which are the F-P war, the American Revolution, the Spanish Armada (and the 27 years of peace before it but not the 16 years of actual war afterward), and 1870-71 In Britain (which was at peace). These wars (or periods if there is no actual war) are so horrible that the people who lived through them don't want to repeat the experience.

Crisis wars are distinct in their horror from less horrible non-crisis wars like WW I in France, WW II in Russia, the current Iraq war and the Seven years War.

Written this way it sound ridiculous. But the horribleness of crisis wars is really the only feature that matters to the basic mechanism of GD. How does whether or not the war started with a sneak attack, or whether the war was inconclusive matter wrt to the desire of the populace to avoid a repeat. Most of the points John (and you) are using to develop rules for crisis wars are based on a pre-existing set of crisis wars.

You assume the standard list of crisis wars are correct and then try to develop rules that will make all the crisis wars come out as crisis wars and all the non crisis wars come out as non-crisis wars. But how do you know that the initial set of crisis wars is correct? Obviously, you cannot have applied rules if they are still under development.

They entire project is tautological. The only way to proceeds is to treat the GD crisis wars like S&H's turnings, McGuiness turnings, or Schlesinger's political eras. As expression of the author's opinion, that is oracular in nature.

What one can then do it see if you can come up with a set of rules that can be used to define turnings, political eras or crisis wars. I have done this for turnings and for political eras. I have been unable to do this for crisis wars. I cannot come up with a set of self-consistent procedures that would allow one to distinguish a crisis are from a non crisis war. Obviously I have made use of the material John has provided. His initial checklist, his algorithm, his nine point characterization of genocidal fury. Nothing works.

Empirically it seems to me that the current Iraq war is a crisis war. John says its not. By definition (crisis wars are what John says are crisis wars) the current Iraq war is a non crisis war, while the F-P war is.

I don't see how the F-P qualifies as one of "the most horrible kinds of wars." Wars so horrible that they traumatize a nation so much that there's unanimous agreement to do everything possible to prevent any such war from ever happening again.

The Iraq war seems much closer to this definition, yet it is not a crisis war.

This definition of a crisis cannot be right, because known noncrisis wars fit it and known crisis wars do no not. Yet this is the definition given. I arrive at a fundamental contradiction, I can make no further progress.

Come on folks, has anyone using this forum ever fought in a war or lived through the devastation of war.

A war is a war is a war!!!

Crises my *** it's all about killing people, destroying infrastructure, forcing submission, ruining economies. It's a horrible experience.

Find another word - you're trying to force a square peg into a round hole.

methuselah - korean war

Originally Posted by Methuselah

Come on folks, has anyone using this forum ever fought in a war or lived through the devastation of war.

A war is a war is a war!!!

Crises my *** it's all about killing people, destroying infrastructure, forcing submission, ruining economies. It's a horrible experience.

Find another word - you're trying to force a square peg into a round hole.

methuselah - korean war

Semo (current Iraq war) and Marx and Lennon (Vietnam) come to mind. I believe that Pink Splice is also a vet. There are probably a number of others out there.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

This does not make any sense. Why do people not want to repeat the crisis war. Because the last one traumatized them. For a war to be a crisis war it has to be bad enough that it makes the survivors unwilling to do it again. A crisis was must be traumatic. So of course you can evaluate wars based on their inducement of trauma.

You're taking the most basic description of crisis wars and using it as if it were an algorithm itself. A crisis war will automatically produce trauma, as will some non-crisis wars. The Vietnam war was a traumatic war that influenced our country for more than a generation.

But there is a difference. Our foreign policy was drastically changed following World War Two that still influences us. This has to do with historical significance. But to say that World War One must be a crisis war because it was so traumatic is silly. WWI was a major war, for sure. It traumatized an entire generation. But its effect was short-lived, which indicates a non-crisis war.

What? If a war meets the crisis war specifications, it's a crisis war, nowhere in the definition are generations even mentioned.

I wouldn't disagree with that.

This is a tautology. You are saying that a crisis war by definition cannot occur shortly after a previous one because it violates the GD theory. But how do we know that the GD theory is valid? Because crisis wars don't occur close together. You are going in circles.

GD is valid because crisis wars don't occur close together. Therefore we can assume that there won't be a crisis war shortly after the last one because it would violate this pattern. If there is a crisis war, my assumption is incorrect.

I really don't see a problem with that logic.

The whole basis of GD is based on a conjecture: there exist a category of wars called crisis wars, examples of which are the F-P war, the American Revolution, the Spanish Armada (and the 27 years of peace before it but not the 16 years of actual war afterward), and 1870-71 In Britain (which was at peace). These wars (or periods if there is no actual war) are so horrible that the people who lived through them don't want to repeat the experience.

Crisis wars are distinct in their horror from less horrible non-crisis wars like WW I in France, WW II in Russia, the current Iraq war and the Seven years War.

Written this way it sound ridiculous.

You wrote it, not me.

What do you want me to say? WWI was less horrible than the American Revolution?

It's true that crisis wars are typically more bloody than non-crisis wars, but you're comparing a war in the 18th century to one in the 20th. You're comparing a war between two (or three) to one with a dozen. You're not going to get anywhere doing that.

But the horribleness of crisis wars is really the only feature that matters to the basic mechanism of GD. How does whether or not the war started with a sneak attack, or whether the war was inconclusive matter wrt to the desire of the populace to avoid a repeat. Most of the points John (and you) are using to develop rules for crisis wars are based on a pre-existing set of crisis wars.

This is something I've mentioned in the past. I can't believe a sneak attack etc. can simply relaunch a cycle. I think the generations have to be nearly in place and a major war has to occur. The fact that rules are established using a pre-existing set is the only way to do it... that I can think of. But we can evaluate wars after creating the set, eh?

You assume the standard list of crisis wars are correct and then try to develop rules that will make all the crisis wars come out as crisis wars and all the non crisis wars come out as non-crisis wars. But how do you know that the initial set of crisis wars is correct? Obviously, you cannot have applied rules if they are still under development.

His work was based off of S&H's. Fortunately, America's cycle is obvious.

They entire project is tautological. The only way to proceeds is to treat the GD crisis wars like S&H's turnings, McGuiness turnings, or Schlesinger's political eras. As expression of the author's opinion, that is oracular in nature.

OK. John's was based off of S&H's, so I can't disagree.

I have been unable to do this for crisis wars. I cannot come up with a set of self-consistent procedures that would allow one to distinguish a crisis are from a non crisis war. Obviously I have made use of the material John has provided. His initial checklist, his algorithm, his nine point characterization of genocidal fury. Nothing works.

Maybe your rules for defining an awakening era work really really well. I bet they do. Personally, I don't need it, but if you do, more power to you.

If you want to find an algorithm for the crisis war then help us out. I wasn't around for the checklist, but I do think the current algorithm is good. It's how you get to genocidal violence, politicization, historical significance that needs work.

Originally Posted by Methuselah

Come on folks, has anyone using this forum ever fought in a war or lived through the devastation of war.

A war is a war is a war!!!

Crises my *** it's all about killing people, destroying infrastructure, forcing submission, ruining economies. It's a horrible experience.

Find another word - you're trying to force a square peg into a round hole.

methuselah - korean war

Let me get this straight. You don't think wars that happen during a crisis will have distinguishing characteristics?

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

You're taking the most basic description of crisis wars and using it as if it were an algorithm itself. A crisis war will automatically produce trauma, as will some non-crisis wars. The Vietnam war was a traumatic war that influenced our country for more than a generation.

But there is a difference. Our foreign policy was drastically changed following World War Two that still influences us. This has to do with historical significance.

Well yes, the definition is a good place to start. Any crisis war must first and foremost fit the definition. The algorithm is simply a tool for applying the definition:

Crisis wars are cyclic within a society, region or nation. They're the most horrible kinds of wars. They're so horrible and they traumatize a nation so much that there's unanimous agreement to do everything possible to prevent any such war from ever happening again.

The horribleness gets to the concept of genocidal fury, which is central. The purpose of the algorithm is to try to nail down this concept. I know significance is in the algorithm. But it is not clear what signficiance has to do with the basic mechanism of GD. Are highly significant wars (like the American Revolution or the FP wars) crisis wars even though they were not trauamtic and so there could not be unaminous agreement to prevent such a war from ever happening again?

But to say that World War One must be a crisis war because it was so traumatic is silly.

Huh? In your mind what causes the GD cycle?

Originally Posted by Mikebert

Well yes, the definition is a good place to start. Any crisis war must first and foremost fit the definition. The algorithm is simply a tool for applying the definition:

Definition? That's simply a general description. It's true that all crisis wars must be "horrible," to which both the F-P and the American Rev. apply.. as do WWI and the current Iraqi war.

The purpose of the algorithm is to make a set of rules so that you have a definition of a crisis war.

The horribleness gets to the concept of genocidal fury, which is central. The purpose of the algorithm is to try to nail down this concept. I know significance is in the algorithm. But it is not clear what signficiance has to do with the basic mechanism of GD. Are highly significant wars (like the American Revolution or the FP wars) crisis wars even though they were not trauamtic and so there could not be unaminous agreement to prevent such a war from ever happening again?

It's unclear just how the algorithm actually relates to the basic mechanism of GD. It obviously plays a role, but I have no idea how much.

Huh? In your mind what causes the GD cycle?

Traumatic wars don't necessarily have to be crisis wars, but all crisis wars must be traumatic (that goes without saying). I believe that there are two major factors that drive the cycle. #1 is the generations and #2 is the crisis war. Both rely on each other.

After a crisis war happens, the generational structure is shifted and the new way of life is different than the old. Those who lived through the crisis war will prevent it from happening again. They have the skills to do so because of their generational nature and because of the lessons they learned from the previous crisis war. When artists disappear and the crisis block is formed, the society is ripe for a new crisis war. If the crisis block passes and there is no crisis war, "super-duper nomads," as Sean likes to put it, fill the Hero block.

So there. The crisis war launches the reformatting of the generational cycle, which in turn, launches the crisis war. This really is no different than the S&H format if you just take out the word "war."

It's more a matter of WHO causes-starts, wars: not WHAT. Who being a nations leader that starts a war for usually personal reasons aka. Hitler, Islamic Fundamentalists, Napolean, Ho Chi Minh, Chairman Mao, Alexander the Great, Pol Pot, Hirohito, and just about every war through history by somebody wanting to annex land from a neighbor or avenge a perceived injustice or assasination.

methuselah

Originally Posted by Methuselah

It's more a matter of WHO causes-starts, wars: not WHAT. Who being a nations leader that starts a war for usually personal reasons aka. Hitler, Islamic Fundamentalists, Napolean, Ho Chi Minh, Chairman Mao, Alexander the Great, Pol Pot, Hirohito, and just about every war through history by somebody wanting to annex land from a neighbor or avenge a perceived injustice or assasination.

methuselah

I wouldn't disagree with the assertion that the personality of a people or their leader will have a major effect on the war, but (I'll ask this again) do you think there are any common traits that wars during crises will share?

Originally Posted by Mikebert

This is a tautology. You are saying that a crisis war by definition cannot occur shortly after a previous one because it violates the GD theory. But how do we know that the GD theory is valid? Because crisis wars don't occur close together. You are going in circles.

One problem I have with how GD is formulated is it is a series of conjectures, which are then used to "prove" other conjectures. No evidence is ever provided for anything . . .

The whole basis of GD is based on a conjecture:

They entire project is tautological. The only way to proceeds is to treat the GD crisis wars like S&H's turnings, McGuiness turnings, or Schlesinger's political eras. As expression of the author's opinion, that is oracular in nature . . .

. . . (crisis wars are what John says are crisis wars) . . .

. . . I arrive at a fundamental contradiction, I can make no further progress.

That about sums things up. Going round and round with John and Matt is very tiresome.

Originally Posted by Methuselah

It's more a matter of WHO causes-starts, wars: not WHAT. Who being a nations leader that starts a war for usually personal reasons aka. Hitler, Islamic Fundamentalists, Napolean, Ho Chi Minh, Chairman Mao, Alexander the Great, Pol Pot, Hirohito, and just about every war through history by somebody wanting to annex land from a neighbor or avenge a perceived injustice or assasination.

methuselah

Haven't you ever read Tolstoy?

Man's mind cannot grasp the causes of events in their completeness, but the desire to find those causes is implanted in man's soul. And without considering the multiplicity and complexity of the conditions any one of which taken separately may seem to be the cause, he snatches at the first approximation to a cause that seems to him intelligible and says: "This is the cause!" In historical events (where the actions of men are the subject of observation) the first and most primitive approximation to present itself was the will of the gods and, after that, the will of those who stood in the most prominent position- the heroes of history. But we need only penetrate to the essence of any historic event- which lies in the activity of the general mass of men who take part in it- to be convinced that the will of the historic hero does not control the actions of the mass but is itself continually controlled. It may seem to be a matter of indifference whether we understand the meaning of historical events this way or that; yet there is the same difference between a man who says that the people of the West moved on the East because Napoleon wished it and a man who says that this happened because it had to happen, as there is between those who declared that the earth was stationary and that the planets moved round it and those who admitted that they did not know what upheld the earth, but knew there were laws directing its movement and that of the other planets.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

After a crisis war happens, the generational structure is shifted and the new way of life is different than the old.

There IS no (pre-existing) generational structure in GD.

Those who lived through the crisis war will prevent it from happening again.

Why? If the war was not traumatic (like the F-P for the Germans) then why would this happen?

They have the skills to do so because of their generational nature and because of the lessons they learned from the previous crisis war.

What is their "generational nature". Where does this come from? You are putting all sorts of stuff into this that isn't there.

When artists disappear and the crisis block is formed, the society is ripe for a new crisis war. If the crisis block passes and there is no crisis war, "super-duper nomads," as Sean likes to put it, fill the Hero block.

You can't mix and match S&H with GD. S&H rely on a completely different mechanism than does GD. Although the two theoretical constructs attempt to describe essentially the same cycle, they are completely different theories.
S&H do not use the crisis war concept at all. It is completely absent from their theory. Similar GD does not use generational constellations at all, it is completely absent from the theory.

S&H's theory and GD are completely different theories (explanations for the cause) of the saeculum. Although GD uses some of the same nomenclature as does S&H, in no way should generations from one system be considered as the same as those in the other system.

So there. The crisis war launches the reformatting of the generational cycle, which in turn, launches the crisis war. This really is no different than the S&H format if you just take out the word "war."

This is wrong. S&H has their own mechansim that has nothing to do with generational forgetting of crisis wars. If you don't understand this then you have no grasp on how the generational constellation (in S&H) and crisis war (GD) mechanisms work. GD proposes a completely different cause of the cycle.

Just because the two theories predict similar results does NOT mean they are the same or even that they have any relationship with each other.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

Why? If the war was not traumatic (like the F-P for the Germans) then why would this happen?

Sure the war was traumatic. But, much like the American Revolution, it was also remembered as a positive event. I see no reason why the three generations who survived it wouldn't serve the same purpose as the three generations who survived WWII. They were, after all, the same archetypes.

What is their "generational nature". Where does this come from? You are putting all sorts of stuff into this that isn't there.

...I don't know what you're talking about. You're acting like there is no generational structure in GD.

You can't mix and match S&H with GD. S&H rely on a completely different mechanism than does GD. Although the two theoretical constructs attempt to describe essentially the same cycle, they are completely different theories.

The mechanism of S&H, with regards to the crisis, states that when the crisis block is filled, the crisis should begin. The mechanism of GD states the exact same thing.

S&H's theory and GD are completely different theories (explanations for the cause) of the saeculum. Although GD uses some of the same nomenclature as does S&H, in no way should generations from one system be considered as the same as those in the other system.

That's absurd. Prophets are prophets. Heroes are heroes.

This is wrong. S&H has their own mechansim that has nothing to do with generational forgetting of crisis wars. If you don't understand this then you have no grasp on how the generational constellation (in S&H) and crisis war (GD) mechanisms work. GD proposes a completely different cause of the cycle.

Their structure is really quite close, it is just that GD relies more heavily on the crisis to anchor the cycle.

Just because the two theories predict similar results does NOT mean they are the same or even that they have any relationship with each other.

That's just not true. The generational cycle and the saeculum are basically identical. How can you even suggest that there is no relationship?

This is really quite bizarre Mike, especially considering your familiarity with GD. This discussion was much better with your legitimate concerns dealing with the algorithm.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

This is really quite bizarre Mike, especially considering your familiarity with GD.

I don't think you understand how S&H's cycle works it you think it is the same as GD.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

I don't think you understand how S&H's cycle works it you think it is the same as GD.

You're right. S&H's "high" is GD's "austerity." I didn't even think of that.

There are some subtle differences; namely the flexibility and possible 5th turnings, and GD relying more heavily on the crisis war to serve as an anchor. But the basics are all there. You still have your four turnings and generations. You still have generational changes ushering in new eras. I'm not going to say they are exactly the same but the basics are all there.

Is this guy an Artist?

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6180301.stm

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

You're right. S&H's "high" is GD's "austerity." I didn't even think of that.

There are some subtle differences; namely the flexibility and possible 5th turnings, and GD relying more heavily on the crisis war to serve as an anchor. But the basics are all there. You still have your four turnings and generations. You still have generational changes ushering in new eras. I'm not going to say they are exactly the same but the basics are all there.

These are just descriptive similarities. I am talking about the basic mechanism. That is, what CAUSES the cycle.

Strauss and Howe are not at all clear about causes. They dance around the issue, but here and there they do manage to piece together a basic mechanism. I suspect John found that frustrating. Exactly what is a generational constellation and why does that matter.

Johns' mechanism for the saeculum is much more concrete. You can write a mathematical model for it, try doing that for S&H. Basically he has two fundamental types of "generations". Crisis generations and non crisis generations.

Crisis generations are those who were adults during a crisis war. They are psychological scarred by the experience of the crisis war. They do not wish to repeat the experience of another war. You can divide a crisis generation into two. Those who took part (or who were of an age to have taken part) and those who were holder. The aversion is strongest in this younger group who we will call "Heroes". Not although corresponding to S&H heroes they are different. S&H heroes are empowered by the war, GD heroes have an aversion to the war. S&H heroes learn martial lessons for their war experience (like the "lesson of Munich"). GD heroes learn "never again". A debacle like the Civil did not produce S&J heroes. It is tailor-made to make GD heroes.

Non crisis generations are everybody else. Non crisis generations can be divided in further groups. For example there are those who were children during the crisis war. They are not scarred by the war, but they were affected. They tend to be dominated by their crisis generation elders and so they come of age into conformist adults. We can call them Artists.

Then they are those born immediately after the crisis war. They come of age in a world ruled by heroes. There will be no crisis war on their watch, not if they can help it. And they are willing to do quite a lot to see that this is so, including suppress uppity youngsters. Hence a divide occurs between elder heroes and uppity "prophets" that defines the awakening period. Once again the GD awakening is the same period as the S&H awakening, but it arises out of a different mechanism.

After the Awakening period, the hero elders fade from the scene. Eventually a new crisis war emerges one the heroes power is gone and a "spark" of sufficient magnitude to start the war has come. There is a random element to the sparks and unraveling can last varying amounts of time. As a result the spacing of crisis wars is not uniform but instead varies from as little as 40 years (a minimum amount of time for the heroes to leave the scene) to as long as 80 or even 90 years (sparks have not occurred simply by good luck).

In the S&H mechanism generations are based on phases of life and necessarily will be of the same length. This is not the case for GD.

They are two very different systems.

Amen, Brother Alexander.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

In the S&H mechanism generations are based on phases of life and necessarily will be of the same length. This is not the case for GD.

They are two very different systems.

Indeed. GD is just another war cycle theory, and a bad one at that. S&H's saeculae are more complex then a simple war cycle because they include cyclical changes in societal mindset, child-raising styles, religious/spiritual/idealogical Awakening periods in the middle of the cycle, etc. S&H's model also doesn't require a Crisis to have a brutal war (unlike GD which is so full of contradictions caused by John's assertion that a Crisis must have a brutal war with "genocidal enegy" it's pathetic).