Remember, the UK almost became involved in the American civil war on the side of the confederacy. The peaceful resolution of this diplomatic crises had long term impact.

One other thing, years ago, I read that Britian played the role of 'balancer' for the century between 1815 and 1914. For example, it can be argued that one of the reasons Britian became closer to France after the Franco-Prussian war is because a weaker France needed Britian as an ally more than the new state of Germany did. Perhaps playing the role of "referee" on the edge of the crises wars of other states took the place of a crises war for Britian itself in that 1855-75 4tish period for western europe.

John - I don't blame you for accepting it, but whoever wrote that Britain was at war every day of Queen Victoria's reign was being plain silly. Even if one counts minor skirmishes as wars, there were I am sure many more days between 1837 and 1901 in which Britain and its Empire saw no conflict than those that it did. For example, during the American Civil War, Britain sent their Navy with 700 marines to Mexico in January 1862 (along with Spanish and French troops) but pulled them out at the first sign that Napoleon was determined to unseat Jaurez (the marines never left the harbor at Vera Cruz, and were there a couple of months). Then, in August of 1863, the British navy bombarded the Japanese port of Kagoshima (it was a "war" that lasted 1 day and cost the British 13 and the Japanese 5 lives).There might have been a skirmish or two on the Northwest Frontier of India (then, as now, this area seems hard to pacify). But, over all, between 1861 and 1865, Britain probably was engaged in miitary conflict, and as broadly as you can define it, for a few days and certainly not more than a few months. And you could repeat this for much of Victoria's reign.

The above renders your second point nugatory.

As to the Franco-Prussian War, a consistent concern of Britain since 1859 had been fear of a French invasion and they were convinced in 1870 that the French would be in Berlin in 6 weeks. Since their capitulation over Denmark in 1864, the British were following a policy towards Europe of isolation, and Napoleon's surrender was a relief, although the British ruling class was not at all amused by the Commune. They made no extraordinary preparations for war in 1870-1, although they undoubtedly would have should Napoleon have won. Germany did not become a perceived enemy until after 1901.

In response to your fourth point, Prussia (Germany) fought three wars between 1864 and 1871, all of which took place in a 4th Turning which ended symbolically at Versailles on January 18, 1871. Collectively, these wars comprise a Crisis that goes back at least to 1858 for Prussia The German First Turning under Bismarck that ensued is directly analogous to the fledgling U.S. under Washington. It was an era of institution building, and produced a Prophet Generation whose very tail is represented by the birth of Hitler in 1889. The Commune, by anybody's standards, was a Fourth Turning event.

HTH.

Pax,

Dave Krein '42

I have been following the discussion about the 5thTurning since John first posted it, but have drawn a blank on the question ... what happens next?

I decided not to look at the American Civil War Cycle because we had the frontier to bleed off our Nomad/Hero/Artist mixture who would have been Heroes is the cycle hadn't hiccupped.

England at that time never developed a flood of suicide bombers, despite the Great Anarchist Scares of the turn of the century. Or did they?

IF this is a rare occurrence, does a 5T kick off a new megacycle? Except that new megacycles don't need to be kicked off by Crisis Wars as far as I can tell; certainly there was one that (in the Anglosphere) ran from 1485 to (? World War I? Or the Awakening that preceded it? Having looked at the cultural history, I'd now say the Awakening. But then, I consider the 20th Century (1906 - 1964?) to have been a mega-Awakening and our current saeculum to constitute a mega-Unraveling a la 17th Century.

Originally Posted by herbal tee

Remember, the UK almost became involved in the American civil war on the side of the confederacy. The peaceful resolution of this diplomatic crises had long term impact.

One other thing, years ago, I read that Britian played the role of 'balancer' for the century between 1815 and 1914. For example, it can be argued that one of the reasons Britian became closer to France after the Franco-Prussian war is because a weaker France needed Britian as an ally more than the new state of Germany did. Perhaps playing the role of "referee" on the edge of the crises wars of other states took the place of a crises war for Britian itself in that 1855-75 4tish period for western europe.

As I posted in the Western Europe thread, the Unification Crisis seems to have been Europe's equivalent of the Civil War Crisis anomaly, a short Unravelling (1848-1858) followed by a short Crisis (1858-1871). It seems just pure luck that the US CW didn't pull in other counties like Britain, unifying the American and Europeans 4Ts into a single Crisis.

Odin - Britain was in a 1st Turning from 1805 to 1822, the Awakening was 1823-1841, Unraveling from 1842 to Nov. 1857, and Crisis from Dec. 1857 to 1873. This produced an Idealist generation from 1810 to 1820, a Reactive Generation from 1821 to 1839, a Civic Generation from 1840 to 1855, and an Adaptive Generation born from 1856 to 1871. There was no shorted or anomalous turnings (just as there was no anomaly in the United States in the same time frame). The Wars of National Unification from the 1850s to the 1870s were really global in scope, from Mexico, the United States, Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina, Japan, China, India, to Poland, Italy and Germany (and Romania snuck in there without a war while Hungary got a separate identity from Austria after the 1866 loss to Prussia).

Herbal Tea - I suggested on these boards many years ago (as did Mike Alexander) that it may be that hegemonic powers like Britain in the 19th century and the United States since 1989 may be able to ride above the fray and escape the major military confrontations that swallows up the smaller fry (although I must say I am less sanguine about the U.S. the way it is headed right now).

Pax,

Dave Krein '42

Originally Posted by David Krein

Odin - Britain was in a 1st Turning from 1805 to 1822, the Awakening was 1823-1841, Unraveling from 1842 to Nov. 1857, and Crisis from Dec. 1857 to 1873. This produced an Idealist generation from 1810 to 1820, a Reactive Generation from 1821 to 1839, a Civic Generation from 1840 to 1855, and an Adaptive Generation born from 1856 to 1871. There was no shorted or anomalous turnings (just as there was no anomaly in the United States in the same time frame). The Wars of National Unification from the 1850s to the 1870s were really global in scope, from Mexico, the United States, Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina, Japan, China, India, to Poland, Italy and Germany (and Romania snuck in there without a war while Hungary got a separate identity from Austria after the 1866 loss to Prussia).

Pax,

Dave Krein '42

I highly doubt the Liberal Revolutions of the late 1840s were Unravelling events. I date the Awakening from the July Revolution in 1830 to the end of the Liberal Revolutions in 1848. I consider the post-French Revolution High (1805-1830) to be the last of Mike Alexander's Old-type turnings in Europe, both Europe and the US switched to 20-year turinings at about the same time IMO.

I agree with you that the Wars of Unification were global in scope, what I ment was that the US Civil War didn't really affect the conflicts going on in Europe.

Odin - of course the 1848 Revolutions were Third Turning events. In typical Unraveling fashion, they accomplished nothing other than putting a Bonaparte back in charge of France. Also, you need to go back and take a look when the Romantic Awakening (the 2nd Great Awakening in America) really took hold in popular culture (it was the 1820s and 30s). By the 1840s Realism was in vogue, and things were falling apart economically underneath a surge in get-rich-quick-schemes centering on the railway.

Pax,

Dave Krein '42

Dear David,

Originally Posted by David Krein

< Britain was in a 1st Turning from 1805 to 1822

Is your analysis based on the Napoleonic wars as a Crisis for
England? In your view, what role did America's War of 1812 play, and
Wellington's victory at Waterloo?

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

The 2nd Republic sounds like it existed during a shift from 2T to 3T

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolut...1848_in_France

The Rise of Conservatism Within the Second Republic

The provisional government was wildly disorganized. After roughly a month, conservatives began to oppose the new government, using the rallying cry "order", which the new republic lacked. Popular uncertainty about the liberal foundations of the provisional government became apparent in the April elections, where, despite the agitation from the left, voters elected a constituent assembly which was primarily moderate and conservative.
As is often the case in revolutions, the 1848 revolution saw a major split between the Parisian citizens and those from the more rural areas. The majority of the French population resided in the countryside, seeing as, in 1848, most people were still tied to the land. However, the radicals in Paris were determined to keep the revolutionary movement alive by pressuring the government to head an international "crusade" for democracy, in which they promoted the independence of states, such as Poland, which had, at the time, been divided amongst and controlled by the foreign powers of Prussia, Russia, and Austria, and was also undergoing its own period of revolt (See Wielkopolska Uprising).
The government set out to establish a stronger economy and provide social services. New taxes were passed on the landed class, peasants, and small farmers, with the taxes intended to pay for social services for the unemployed in the cities. The taxes were widely ignored, and the new government lost the support of rural France. Hard-working rural farmers did not want to pay for unemployed city people and their new "Right to Work," which ballooned the population of Paris with far more job seekers than there were jobs. Some jobs were provided, such as building roads and re-planting trees, but it was clear the demands of government were far more pressing than the revolutionaries had foreseen.
The need for organization was imminent. Evidence of this is in the victory of the "Party of Order". On June 21, 1848, led by ideology far more conservative than had initially created the provisional government, the dominant members of the French state closed the National Workshops. This enraged many of the artisans and workers of Paris. Between June 23rd and June 26th, in what came to be known as the "June Days Uprising", the army executed a systematic assault against the revolutionary Parisian citizenry, targeting the blockaded areas of the city. Before, workers and petite bourgeoisie had fought together, but now, lines were tighter. The working classes had been abandoned by the bourgeois politicians who founded the provisional government. This would prove fatal to the Second Republic, who, without the support of the working classes, could not continue.
The "Party of Order" moved quickly to consolidate the conservative nature of the revolution, appointing general and statesman Eugene Cavaignac to the head of the French state. Later, on the 10th of December, Louis-Napoleon was elected president of the French Republic.

Class Struggles within the Revolution

To the French elite, the June Days uprising was something of a red scare. Karl Marx saw the "June Days" uprising as strong evidence of class conflict. Marx saw the revolution as being directed by the desires of the middle-class. While the bourgeoisie agitated for "proper participation", the workers themselves had other concerns. Many of the participants in the 1848 Revolution were of the petite bourgeoisie (the owners of small properties, merchants, shopkeepers, etc.), outnumbering the working classes (unskilled laborers working in mines, factories and stores, paid for their ability to perform manual labor and other work rather than their expertise) by about two to one. Therefore the provisional government, created to address the concerns of the liberal bourgeoisie, did not have enough of a foothold in the working classes. Support for the provisional government was especially weak in the countryside, where a vast amount of France's population was agricultural and traditionally less revolutionary. Though those in the countryside did have their own concerns, such as food shortages as a result of bad harvests, the concerns of the bourgeoisie were still too far-off from those of the lower classes. Also, the memory of the French Revolution was still fresh in the minds of the French. The Thermidorian reaction and the ascent of Napoleon I to the throne are evidence that the people preferred the safety of an able dictatorship to the uncertainty of revolution. Thus, one might argue, without the support of these large lower classes, the revolution of 1848 would not carry through, despite the hopes of the liberal bourgeoisie.

The End of the Revolution in France

Politics continued to tilt to the right, and the era of revolution in France came to an end. Louis Napoleon's family name of Napoleon rallied support, and after sweeping the elections he returned to the old order, purging republicans and returning the "vile multitude" (Thiers) to its former place. By the December 2, 1851 coup, he dissolved the National Assembly without having the constitutional right to do so, and became the sole ruler of France. Cells of resistance surfaced, but were put down, and the Second Republic was over. He reestablished universal suffrage, feared by the Republicans at the time who correctly expected the country-side to vote against the Republic, Louis Napoleon took the title Emperor Napoleon III, and the Second Empire began.

1848 is too good, too important, and too well timed to be anything but a crisis or an awakening (and it's definitely not a crisis).

I think it would be the "climax" of the awakening, but not necessarily the marker for a 2T/3T shift. My guess would be a few years later.

Originally Posted by David Krein

just as there was no anomaly in the United States in the same time frame.

I am now of the opinion that S&H were right, there was a Civil War anomaly in the US. The excellent correlation between the S&H saeculum and the empirical markers is disrupted between 1860 and 1930 and then fall into place after 1930. This phenomenon is real meaning that something anomalous definitely happened around the time of the Civil War.

I believe the cause was the shift from a Kondratiev-linked saeculum with ~26 year generations/turnings to a political cycle/paradigm model-linked saeculum with variable generation length based on the average age of the "power elite", a proxy for which is the average of (1) the age of the president (2) the average age of senators and (3) the average age of Supreme Court members.. See part six of my saeculum model webpage for details.

The paradigm model arose after the Constitutional Convention in the form of the early political parties, the Federalists who presented the Progress paradigm and the Democratic-Republicans who represented the Freedom paradigm. Initially paradigms were only about political and economic ideologies, where you stood on tariffs, central banking, standing army etc. During the Transcendental Awakening a cultural/religious issue (abolition) became incorporated into paradigms. The next turning of the political cycle, the critical election in 1860 occurred right on the same schedule as the previous two in 1800 or 1828 But the outcome of the election was very different because of this cultural issue injected into the political cycle by the Awakening. The result was a civil war and a secular crisis. After this the political cycle and the saeculum ran together and cultural and "values" issues were deeply entrenched into both kinds of paradigms.

The Civil War came early wrt to the generations; the "wrong" generation (Prophets) was in power and the wrong generation (those who had received Nomad-style nurture) was coming of age during the war, By the time the "pre-Heroes" (those who had received Hero-style nurture) were coming come of age in large numbers, the Crisis was over and they did not get the empowering experience. Unempowered Heroes became Artists. Those who fought the war largely had Nomadic upbringing and experienced the war as an alienating event, like WW I for the Lost. They wanted the crisis over and done with and since their generation was older (and closer to power) than the Lost in WW I, they got their way and the High came early.

The nation revolted against the Transcendentals in the election of 1868, in which a 46-year Gilded president was elected. It was at this point that the "leadership" phase of life split into two phases: the power elite who now represented the elder phase of life and a new "manager" phase of life containing "junior leaders" who could act as a check on generational excess. The span of ages for presidents rose from 21 (one generation in leadership) before the Civil War to 35 (two generations in leadership) afterward, by the age of Presidents going both higher and lower.

As a result of the Civil War the length of a phase of life/generation shifted from one-half the age of the power elite (about 26-27 years) where it had been for centuries before 1800 to one-third the age of the power elite.

It's a little more complicated than this, the achievement of widespread suffrage provided another definition for coming of age and another measure for the length of a phase of life, the age of suffrage. The shift from 26-27 generations to 19-20 year generations occurred over the period from ~1830 when widespread suffrage was becoming reality to 1868.

This abrupt shift in generational length and the dropping of a Civil generation constitute what S&H call the Civil War anomaly.

English Turnings (Sidney Alston vs Dave Krein) vs American Turnings (S&H)
H 1594-1621 1594-1621 1594-1621
A 1621-1653 1621-1649 1621-1649
U 1653-1683 1649-1675 1649-1675
C 1683-1713 1775-1704 1675-1704
H 1713-1733 1704-1729 1704-1727
A 1733-1763 1729-1761 1727-1746
U 1763-1783 1761-1778 1746-1773
C 1783-1806 1778-1805 1773-1794
H 1806-1828 1805-1822 1794-1822
A 1828-1843 1822-1842 1822-1844
U 1843-1857 1842-1857 1844-1860
C 1857-1874 1857-1873 1860-1865

As you can see, British turnings run close to S&H turnings. Both Alston and Krien show a 68-year early 19th century saeculum, while S&H show a 71 year saeculum. Alston and Krein show 93- and 101-year saeculae, respectively before that one, compared to 90 years for S&H. Before all three have long saeculae: 119, 110 and 110 years.

If Tristan Jones is reading this, could you post your British turnings too?

Thanks

Argh! I cannot find McGuiness turnings after 1776. I have the ones before then all the way back to 2505 BC. Does anyone remember his 19th century dates? I know his crisis was 1857-1871. I think the High after it was 1871-1893 and the Unraveling after that was 1893-1912. After that is was mostly the same as S&H except the Boom Awakening ended in 1986.

John - For Britain, the bulk of the Napoleonic Wars took place in a High, just as it was for France whose Crisis ended in Nov. 1799 when Napoelon overthrew the Directory. As for Britain, Trafalgar ended any chance of a French invasion, so Britain was safe from then on (I could even argue the Crisis ending with Amiens in 1802, but Trafalgar is just more dramatic. 1812 for Britain was a sidelight and a nuisance - the real war for Britain was in Spain. Waterloo salved the national ego that had been deprived by absence from Leipzig.

Odin - your quotation from wikipedia screams Third Turning which in France's case had begun in 1840 when Guizot replaced Thiers after France had the stuffings knocked out of them by Britain over Mohamed Ali.

Now, Mike, you write "Unempowered Heroes became Artists" in your defence of a Civil War anomaly. Do the following Civics appear to be Adaptives to you:

1839 - George M. Beard, Henry George, John D. Rockefeller, Adolphus Busch, Gustavus Swift
1840 - William Graham Sumner, Francis Walker, Carroll Wright, Alfred T. Mahan, Timothy H. O'Sullivan
1841 - E. V. Smalley, Blanche K. Bruce, Marcus Daly
1842 - Sidney Lanier, John Fiske
1843 - Henry James, Russell Conwell, Aaron Montgomery Ward
1844 - George Washington Cable, Henry J. Heinz
1845 - Theodore N. Vail
1846 - Laurence Gronlund, Elbert H. Gary, George Westinghouse, Daniel H. Burnham
1847 - Henry Demarest Lloyd, John Peter Altgeld, Josiah Strong, James Walter Thompson, Thomas A. Edison
1848 - Edward King, Francis W. Ayer, Lewis H. Latimer, Edward H. Harriman, Minor C. Keith, Nathan Straus
1849 - George Bird Grinnell, Emma Lazarus, Jacob Riis, Henry C. Frick
1850 - Seth Low, Edward Bellamy, Samuel Gompers, Henry W. Grady, Edward Bellamy, J. Laurence Laughlin, Henry Cabot Lodge, Frances X. (Mother) Cabrini, Henry E. Huntington, Thomas Lipton
1851 - Herbert Welsh, Walter B. Hill, Kate O’Flaherty Chopin, William Hope Harvey, Felix Adler, Walter S. Reed, Thomas Fortune Ryan, Melvil Dewey, Asa Candler,
1852 - Charles Taze Russell, Frank W. Woolworth, Edward Bouchet, Jan Matzeliger
1853 - Stanford White
1854 - Jacob S. Coxey, Richard Ely, George Eastman

There's no necessity to "morph" generations. They just shortened, is all.

As to my earlier turnings, I posted the following in December 1998 on the old Western Europe thread, and I see nothing in the meantime that would change my mind.

"I would suggest a Third Turning from 1761, from Pitt’s deposition to Saratoga in 1777, providing a Hero (Romantic) generation born from 1756 to 1774, a Second Turning from 1729 and Wesley’s founding of the Holy Club at Oxford to 1761, with a Nomad (Georgian) generation from 1725 to 1755, and a First Turning from Blenheim in 1704 to 1729, with a Prophet (Augustan) Generation born from 1701 to 1724. Then that would make a 17th century Fourth Turning from ca. 1675 to 1704, a Third Turning from ca. 1649 to 1675, a Second Turning from 1621 to 1649, and a First Turning from 1594 to 1621.

The Turning that is missing is the Crisis from 1778 (when France globalized the American Rebellion) to 1805, and my Reform Generation of Adaptives born from 1775 to 1799.

You are mostly right about McGuinness's Turnings. I believe he ended the Crisis in 1871 with the Chicago Fire, and began the Awakening with the Columbian Exhibition in Chicago in 1893. He definitely ended the 2nd Turning with the sinking of the Titanic in 1812.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

Argh! I cannot find McGuiness turnings after 1776. I have the ones before then all the way back to 2505 BC.

McGuiness' stupifying turnings notwithstanding, Dr. Krein simply posits the notion that the British casual fourth, during the brutal American Civil War, suggests 4Ts need not be so damn negative. Seeing how the Brits were still the world leader (paradigm stuff here) even having "lost" a war to Washington's "Vietcong" rebels, I can still see his point: Hey, it ain't the end of the world, here, folks!

And he is right, of course. But why Dr. Krein still votes for libs like Al Gore is waaaay beyond me. Must be a generational thing, I guess.

Originally Posted by David Krein

Now, Mike, you write "Unempowered Heroes became Artists" in your defence of a Civil War anomaly.

It's not a defense, its an explanation. S&H claim there was no Civic generation. Since I have not done any biographical work I have little choice but to accept what they say as data to be explained by any theory I develop.

Turnings and generations DID shorten quite abruptly then. I have done turning work and I can verify that this indeed happened.

The theory I developed (with a key idea contributed by Kurt Horner) predicts shortening generations and the dropping of a Civic-type generation.

Do the following Civics appear to be Adaptives to you:

1839 - George M. Beard, Henry George, John D. Rockefeller, Adolphus Busch, Gustavus Swift
1840 - William Graham Sumner, Francis Walker, Carroll Wright, Alfred T. Mahan, Timothy H. O'Sullivan
1841 - E. V. Smalley, Blanche K. Bruce, Marcus Daly
1842 - Sidney Lanier, John Fiske
1843 - Henry James, Russell Conwell, Aaron Montgomery Ward
1844 - George Washington Cable, Henry J. Heinz
1845 - Theodore N. Vail
1846 - Laurence Gronlund, Elbert H. Gary, George Westinghouse, Daniel H. Burnham
1847 - Henry Demarest Lloyd, John Peter Altgeld, Josiah Strong, James Walter Thompson, Thomas A. Edison
1848 - Edward King, Francis W. Ayer, Lewis H. Latimer, Edward H. Harriman, Minor C. Keith, Nathan Straus
1849 - George Bird Grinnell, Emma Lazarus, Jacob Riis, Henry C. Frick
1850 - Seth Low, Edward Bellamy, Samuel Gompers, Henry W. Grady, Edward Bellamy, J. Laurence Laughlin, Henry Cabot Lodge, Frances X. (Mother) Cabrini, Henry E. Huntington, Thomas Lipton
1851 - Herbert Welsh, Walter B. Hill, Kate O’Flaherty Chopin, William Hope Harvey, Felix Adler, Walter S. Reed, Thomas Fortune Ryan, Melvil Dewey, Asa Candler,
1852 - Charles Taze Russell, Frank W. Woolworth, Edward Bouchet, Jan Matzeliger
1853 - Stanford White
1854 - Jacob S. Coxey, Richard Ely, George Eastman

I really can't say. I am unfamilar with the biographies of almost all of these people.

There's no necessity to "morph" generations. They just shortened, is all.

Highly variable generation length is harder to work into a consistent theory than simply skipping one. The questions to be addressed are exactly how do generations get their attributes in the first place and how do these attributes cause turnings to happen.

Dear Rick,

Originally Posted by herbal tee

> Maybe I shoud have made myself more clear. The law of supply and
> demand is not tripe, trying to apply it narrowly, which is what so
> called supply siders do is tripe. They've had a quarter century to
> produce and they have produced failure, it is time for Keynesian
> economics again.

Originally Posted by Justin '77

> Ah yes! The Rain God has failed to provide; we must return to the
> old ways of sacrifice to the Sun God instead!

> New ideas? A search for a more correct model? Who needs it?

That's great, Justin, I love it!

Rick, I'm not going to defend monetarism or supply-side fiscal
policy, especially since I recently wrote a lengthy article called,
"System Dynamics and the Failure of Macroeconomics Theory," which
explains why the mainstream macroeconomic theories of the last 50
years suffer from the same problem -- the standard models are too
static. After the next major financial crisis, System Dynamics will
be added to the mainstream macroeconomic models.
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/....i.macro061025

As far as returning to the Keynesian economics, you should be aware
of the following: Today, mainstream economists consider the 1970s
economy to be an almost total disaster -- inflation and unemployment
both above 10% (you remember the misery index, don't you?) -- and
they blame it squarely on Keynesian economics.

When Volcker took over the Fed, he switch to monetarist
macroeconomics, and that change is credited with getting us through
the last 25 years so smoothly -- quick recovery from the 1994-95
recession, and relatively benign recovery from the 1995-2000 stock
market bubble.

Now, as you probably know, I disagree strongly with this assessment.
Mainstream macroeconomics has totally failed to predict or explain
anything that's happened in the last ten years, and certainly doesn't
predict or explain the major financial crisis we're headed for.
Adding System Dynamics to standard macroeconomics models will in fact
explain everything that's happened in the last ten years. Returning
to Keynesian economics would do nothing but makes things worse.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

> Question: How is the poverty rate set?

> Answer: It's done by a complicated calculation that guarantees
> that exactly 11-12% of the population is below the poverty line.
> In other words, by definition, the poverty rate can never change.

Originally Posted by herbal tee

> Do you have a link for that?

Here's the link for the poverty calculation:
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/povdef.html

They've made the computation as complicated as they can make it, with
a zillion different cases, so that no one will no what's going on.

But if you boil the computation down, it's as follows for a given
family:

Let A = poverty threshold = the minimum amount of money that the
family needs to live

Let B = family income

The family is in poverty if and only if B < A

The value of A is regularly increased by the inflation rate, or CPI.

The value of B is regularly increased when the family members receive
an increase in salaries.

Generally speaking, the value of B, on the average, will also increase
by the inflation rate. If there's some variation, it will correct
itself within a few years.

Therefore, on the average, the number of families in poverty will
remain the same.

Here's another way of looking at it: If you want to "eliminate
poverty," then you have to increase all the B's so that they're all
greater than the corresponding A's. But if you increase the B's,
then wages will go up, so people will spend more money on goods, so
demand will push prices up, so the inflation rate will go up, so that
the A's will also go up. So you can't "eliminate poverty," or even
change the poverty rate.

Here's another way of looking at it: I don't care whether you're a
capitalist or a communist or a socialist or a fascist or an
anarchist. No matter how you set up your economy, there'll always be
a "wealthiest 10%," and there'll always be a "poorest 10%." That's
simple arithmetic.

Here's another way of looking at it: The difference between these
economies is whether or not your class is determined by birth. In
America, and in other free capitalist countries, a couple will accept
their own poverty if they believe that their children can break free
and do well. (I'm ignoring Mexican immigrants in that statement.)
But in communist China, or in market-dominated-minority countries
like the Philippines or Latin America, for example, your children will
be just as poor as you are, with few exceptions. But all of these
economies, without exception, will have 10% of the people in poverty
at any given time.

This morning I heard Senator Ted Kennedy ranting and raving about the
poverty rate. He said something like this (paraphrasing): "Those
jackasses in the Bush administration are so evil that there are now a
million more children in poverty than there were six years ago."

Well, duh! How much has the population increased in size in the last
six years? Take 10% of that, and that's roughly the number of
additional people in poverty. No one can ever accuse politicians of
being insufficiently sleazy.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Dave and Rick,

Originally Posted by Marx & Lennon

> So why wouldn't a Keynesian solution work now? I doubt Monetarist
> policies are suitable. But neither is directly at fault. The fault
> lies with the focus on the supply side. Tax breaks for those
> already wealthy and subsidies (welfare, if you prefer) that
> benefit the few are what needs to be reversed.

Originally Posted by herbal tee

> Good response John, somehow I missed it eailer. In terms of a
> response M and L stated a psoition very similar to mine so I will
> dispense with redundacy and get to the fun stuff.

> I agree that traditional models are static, which is why I like
> the idea of a new school of economic thought. Thanks for the links
> also. Like most people who take the time to keep up with current
> events, I too have some qualms with how statistics are
> manipulated. They should make for interesting when I have time to
> peruse them.

When you suggest re-adopting Keynesianism, it all depends on what the
meaning of "Keynesianism" is.

In the previous posting, I was actually just focusing on monetary
policy -- i.e., what the Fed does in raising or lowering interest
rates.

I suspect that when you talk about re-adopting Keynesianism, you're
taking about fiscal policy -- government spending and taxing
programs.

But I really suspect that you don't want to adopt Keynesian, since it
contains some really nasty bits.

The heart of Keynesian fiscal policy is to keep the economy on an
even keel by means of two policies:

• When the economy is going into recession, you increase the
  deficit by lowering taxes or starting more spending programs, so that
  there'll be more money in the economy, and that will stimulate
  growth.
  
• When the economy is too "hot" (i.e., expanding), you do the
  opposing: decrease the deficit by increasing taxes or reduce
  spending programs, so that there'll be less money in the
  economy.

Now, you can see the problem: When the economy goes into recession,
the lawmakers want to increase the deficit with spending programs to
help people out; and when the economy expands, the lawmakers want to
increase the deficit by taking advantage of the expanding economy to
introduce new spending programs or expand existing ones. Then you
get into situations like, "Read my lips, no new taxes." It's all
very droll.

And so, Dave and Rick, what part of Keynesianism would you like back?

The reason that monetarism has been working better is that it's far
less subject to political control. Washington politicians seem to be
willing to let Volckers and Greenspans and Bernankes of the world do
their thing, provided that they're politically "pure." In fact,
supposedly the Fed follows a specific rule called the "Taylor Rule,"
which is a non-political mathematical formula.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taylor_rule

What monetarism does is use this kind of monetary policy to keep the
economy running smoothly. One way to do it would be the same idea as
fiscal policy: When the economy is in recession, you lower interest
rates, so that there'll be more money in the economy to stimulate
growth, and vice-versa for expanding economies. But that Keynesian
monetary policy.

Milton Friedman's Monetarist monetary policy says: control inflation
rather than recessions. When inflation goes up, raise interest rates
to bring inflation down; and vice-versa when inflation goes down.
The idea is that by controlling inflation, you end up eliminating
recessions as well, and that's what I said has been going pretty
smoothly for the past 25 years. And if all goes well, Congress and
the President can do whatever they want with spending programs and
taxes (up to a point), and the monetary policy will take care of
everything.

So let's get back to fiscal policy, because I think you're talking
about "demand-side" versus "supply-side" fiscal policy. Let's take
tax cuts for example.

In its simplest form, supply-side tax cuts would target the upper
income and corporate brackets, while demand-side tax cuts would
target poor and middle class people.

Before doing that, though, take another look at this graph, that I
posted earlier this year in a long-lost thread (which is why I hate
posting a lot of stuff in other threads):



( http://calculatedrisk.blogspot.com/2...t-deficit.html )

I stumbled across this graph when I was surfing, trying to find an
explanation for why the deficit has soared in the last few years, and
I found it to be astonishing.

This graph exposes a great deal of sleaziness in Washington on both
sides of the aisle.

First, it makes it clear that the Bush tax cut has nothing to do with
the deficit, as Democratic politicians are claiming. The deficit is
caused by the sharp collapse of income that began in 2000, the last
year of the Clinton administration.

This graph only goes up to 2004, but income has been increasing
again this year, and Republican politicians are claiming that the
increase is caused by those same Bush tax cuts, which also isn't
true. It's apparently caused by substantially increased tax
collections, especially from the financial sector, thanks to the
massive stock market and real estate bubbles that are going to crash
one of these days, causing a new 1930s style Great Depression. But
until they do, we can continue to live high on the hog.

What do I think about supply side and demand side fiscal policy? I
don't really think it matters much. First off, every federal tax or
spending bill always contains a number of "sweeteners" to keep both
Republicans and Democrats happy building highways to nowhere and
such. So there's no such thing as a demand side or supply side
fiscal policy. It's all mixed together so that politicians can use
it to buy votes.

Insofar as there is pure demand-side and supply-side fiscal policy, I
would say this: Supply-side fiscal policy is good, because it puts
money in the hands of financiers, entrepreneurs and corporations, and
most of the money will be used to create jobs; and demand-side fiscal
policy is good, because it can give a "shot in the arm" to an economy
at a time when it's most needed. In other words, demand-side is a
short-term thing, and supply-side is a long-term thing, and both are
needed at appropriate times. It's all good, except for the
sleaziness of the politicians.

OK, resume bickering.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Rick,

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

> This choice is being forced on the Boomers by the Millennials

Originally Posted by herbal tee

> Looking at Bush's presidentcy, there's no evidence of this. The
> country sent about as strong a rebuke in last month's midterm as
> was possible. The result? The Baker commission recommendations
> that equivocate silent style but basicly call for getting out of
> Iraq. Trying to cut lossses in Iraq, which is the will of the
> voters, every generation voted Democratic, even the supposidly
> Republican Xers, has been shelved for trying to reddem a failing
> policy. They didn't plan for resistance after occupation. They
> didn't understand that making Iraqs old army unemployed en masse
> would lead to them joining the resistance. Everything that has
> been done has shown short term thinking. This government just goes
> from making the last problem they've made worse by creating
> another problem on top of that. The American people see this now
> even if you don't.

This is kind of hysterical, isn't it? You've really tossed at lot of
stuff into a garbled mish-mash here.

First off, I've seen very little evidence that "to cut losses in Iraq
... is the will of the voters," even in the case of Democrats.

As far as I can tell, the message from the voters, especially the
younger voters, was this: Solve the Iraq problem, exit as quickly as
possible, but without a Vietnam-style defeat. And that's what's
supposed to be happening with the rumored new policy.

As for mistakes in the Iraq war, that always happens in Crisis eras.
Remember that Roosevelt allowed the entire Pacific fleet to be
destroyed in a couple of hours, the greatest military disaster in
American history.

The only person in Washington with the skills to prevent a similar
disaster today was Donald Rumsfeld, who was born in 1932 and remembers
well from his childhood how shocked everyone was about Pearl. But
he's gone now, replaced by Robert Gates, a fine man but a Boomer,
because the Boomer politicians and journalists in Washington wanted
someone as incompetent as they are to run the Department of Defense.

As I recall, it was the Democrats who have been saying for years that
Rumsfeld was incompetent because he didn't send enough troops into
Iraq. Now that Rumsfeld is gone, the Democrats are getting their
wish.

You say that "there's no evidence," but in fact you're getting what
you've been asking for for three years. As I keep saying, be careful
what you wish for, because you get what you deserve.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Kiff,

Originally Posted by Child of Socrates

> Oh, indeed. You aren't immune from spreading rudeness around here
> on occasion. You insulted me during one of our discussions on
> feminism. You're impatient and condescending to people here who
> disagree with you.
> http://www.fourthturning.com/forum/s...postcount=1175

Since the subject of feminism is off-topic in this thread, I'm going
to answer this in the "Gender Issues" thread.
http://www.fourthturning.com/forum/s...4&postcount=71

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Nathaniel,

Originally Posted by 1990

> Hi, all. I'm still working on my map of the world project (haven't
> given up yet!), and two MAJOR countries are stumping me.

> Russia and Brazil.

> I have Russia in 4T red right now, but I'm hearing strong
> arguments for 1T as well (that is, if you think the collapse of
> Communism was a 4T rather than 3T). I'd really love to get this
> one nailed down, since it is the largest country in the world.

> Second, Brazil, South America's biggest and most populous
> country. I haven't colored it in yet, but a quick Wikipedia check
> indicates that Brazil is possibly on the
> American/Anglo/Canadian/European timeline; i.e., entering 4T.
> Brazil was supposedly even harder hit by the Depression than the
> U.S., experienced severe social turmoil in the '60s, and had
> stagflation at the same time we did - late '70s, early '80s. Is it
> a good idea to put Brazil in red? Input appreciated.

Russia's last crisis war was the Bolshevik Revolution and the
subsequent civil war, so Russia is in 4T right now.

I've never really looked at Brazil, but spending an hour with
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/brtoc.html leads me to the following
list of crisis wars, in which I have about 80-90% confidence:
> Brazilian War of Independence in 1821-1825
> Civil War / Establish Old Republic - 1889-1898
> Military takeover - 1968-1974

If this is correct, then Brazil is currently in 2T.

I thought this was an interesting paragraph from the referenced
source: "The officer corps was split into three generations. The
oldest group had helped suppress the regional revolts of the 1830s and
1840s, had fought in Argentina in 1852, and had survived the
Paraguayan War. The numerous mid-level officers were better schooled
than their seniors and had been tested in combat in Paraguay. The
junior officers had missed the war but had the most education of the
three groups and had experienced the empire only when its defects had
become clearly apparent. They were the least attached to the old
regime and the most frustrated by the lack of advancement in a
peacetime army cluttered with veterans of the great war."

Originally Posted by 1990

> Oh, and in addition, Turkey. The same problem as Russia - 4T or
> 1T? If 1T, you have to consider the 1990s Balkans wars to have
> been a Crisis for Turkey.

I've changed my mind about Turkey so many times that I can't even
remember where I was the last time. I think I finally decided that
Turkey's 1984-1991 war with the PKK Kurds was a crisis war for the
Kurds, but a non-crisis war for Turkey, and that Turkey is now in 4T.

Originally Posted by 1990

> * Brazil and India/Pakistan. I already mentioned these. I brought
> up Brazil; you, MichaelEaston, brought up India/Pakistan. I am
> leaning toward Brazil and India in 4T red and Pakistan, I dunno. I
> need thoughts from people.

> * Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Two major Middle Eastern countries; I
> have Saudi Arabia in red because Xenakis and others suggested that
> it is on our Western timeline, but Wikipedia doesn't have
> sufficient history for me to be sure, and since much of the Middle
> East is in Awakening green, I have to be positive about Saudi
> Arabia. As for Jordan, I am leaning toward painting it green since
> it was at the center of all that Middle Eastern 4T ugliness in the
> '70s and '80s -- the Lebanon Civil War, the Iranian Revolution,
> the Iran-Iraq war, etc. But I want input.

> * Indonesia. This is one of the world's most important countries,
> and yet I have put zero thought into it for my project. I have to
> think it is neither 1T nor 3T, but one of the "biggies" (2T or
> 4T). If you consider the overthrow of Sukarno in 1965 an Awakening
> event, then Indonesia is on our Western timeline and in red. If,
> however, you think of it as a Crisis event, Indonesia is on the
> same timeline as other major Muslim countries like Iran, Iraq,
> Lebanon, Syria, etc. I'm really 50/50 on this one.

India/Pakistan: This was on the WW II timeline, but there's some
discussion as to whether parts of the region were on different
timelines. But I think you're safe putting the whole Indian
subcontinent in red.

Jordan: This was part of the Ottoman Empire breakup. However, Jordan
became part of the Israel/Palestine timeline because of the 1940s war
and flood of Palestinian refugees that fled into Jordan. Anyway,
Jordan is 4T.

Saudi Arabia: The last crisis war was the Ibn Saud conquest, ending
in 1925, so it's 4T (or 5T if you're doing those).

Indonesia: The last crisis war appears to have been the violent coup
in 1965-66 (80% confidence).

Originally Posted by 1990

> Bumping this so it doesn't get totally ignored.

As I said in my posting to you on Thursday, I hadn't forgotten, but I
get a lot of postings and e-mail, and I can't always get back right
away, especially when a response requires a lot more thought.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Mike,

You know, I like you Mike. I have absolutely no taste whatsoever for
the kinds of discussions we've had.

But you've left me no choice because you keep attacking me like a
banshee, telling me that, in essence, I'm a liar, I'm biased, and all
the work I've done is full of crap.

And it angers me I answer all your questions in good faith, but you
just ignore the answers and make exactly the same attacks again. And
this has been going on for years now.

And when you fashion McGinness' turning list and your event list into
a giant club that you want to smash me in the face with, you leave me
no choice but to attack your giant club.

You don't do this with other people. A couple of days ago you
disagreed Dave Krein, but you didn't write, "Krein, you're a liar,
you're biased, and all the work you've done is full of crap." You
single me out for that.

You have access to several different sets of turning dates -- yours,
McGuiness', Horners, and Krein's, mine, and possibly others I've
forgotten. And they all give different results. (And now, I see
that you have another one, by Sidney Alston. That makes six.)

And what conclusion do you reach? You single mine out and tell me
that since so many people disagree with me I must be a liar, biased,
and all the work I've done is full of crap.

Well, why me? If you have six inconsistent sets of data, why single
mine out for your convulsive attacks. When there are differences
among the others, you just point out that there are differences. But
when mine are involved, you attack like a banshee. Why is that?

Why don't you just leave it alone? If you disagree with something,
just point it out like you do with Krein and the others, and leave it
at that? Why do you have to continue on this multi-year crusade of
destruction?

I've asked you this question before, with no result. Does this crap
really have to continue on and on? Is it really never going to stop,
until the world is at war?

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Pat,

Originally Posted by The Grey Badger

> I have been following the discussion about the 5th Turning since
> John first posted it, but have drawn a blank on the question ...
> what happens next?

> I decided not to look at the American Civil War Cycle because we
> had the frontier to bleed off our Nomad/Hero/Artist mixture who
> would have been Heroes is the cycle hadn't hiccupped.

> England at that time never developed a flood of suicide bombers,
> despite the Great Anarchist Scares of the turn of the century. Or
> did they?

> IF this is a rare occurrence, does a 5T kick off a new megacycle?
> Except that new megacycles don't need to be kicked off by Crisis
> Wars as far as I can tell; certainly there was one that (in the
> Anglosphere) ran from 1485 to (? World War I? Or the Awakening
> that preceded it? Having looked at the cultural history, I'd now
> say the Awakening. But then, I consider the 20th Century (1906 -
> 1964?) to have been a mega-Awakening and our current saeculum to
> constitute a mega-Unraveling a la 17th Century.

What's interesting about this whole thing is that the probability of
a crisis war increases for each turning.

In the first and second turning, there are so many survivors
remaining that the level of anxiety and panic necessary for a new
crisis war can't happen, since the survivors have seen it all before,
and they keep everyone calm. Even if there's an unexpected invasion,
it will be handled as a non-crisis war, in a calm, deliberate manner,
with people preferring to flee, if necessary, rather than go through
a new massive crisis war.

In the third turning (years Y = 40-50 after the end of the last crisis
war), a new crisis war becomes possible, though rare.

However, in the second half of the third turning (Y = 50-60), crisis
wars are quite common, with Y=58 being the peak year for crisis wars.

Here's the table that I've posted several times before, adding an
extra column for "turning":

Code:

    LENGTH OF INTER-CRISIS PERIOD
             Fraction
    # years  of total  Turning
    -------  --------  ------------------
      0- 40      0%    1T, 2T
     41- 49     11%    first half of 3T
     50- 59     33%    second half of 3T
     60- 69     25%    first half of 4T
     70- 79     16%    second half of 4T
     80- 89      4%    fifth turning
     90- 99      6%
    100-117      5%

By the time of the fourth turning, we have the full constellation of
generations described by Strauss & Howe, that we've become so
familiar with. We have the incompetent Prophets, the dysfunctionally
furious Nomads, and the impatient Heroes who take things into their
own hand by choosing a Prophet to guide them into war and Nomads to
lead them into war.

Now, the fifth turning is really interesting, and well worth of
study. The old Prophets are mostly gone, the Nomads are the leaders,
and finally have no one but themselves to blame, and the placid (I
assume) would-be Heroes, now in middle age, who have overcome their
impatience, and are just happy that all the bickering has stopped.

But then we have the new college-age generation, the would-be Artist
generation, the ones that I call Super-Nomads.

These kids, are completely frustrated, because of the boring
normality of life, having had no "real" war in over 80 years. Even
the slightest perceived or real injustice angers them. But if the
society has gone this long without a crisis war, then there's no easy
target to blame for the injustice, particularly because their
would-be Hero parents just want to keep things nice and steady, the
way they are. So these kids fall prey to radical clerics in other
countries who tell them that they can dissipate their frustrations,
and get 72 virgins to boot, because they'll be committing "altruistic
suicide."

Notice that kids in the fourth turning are also willing to die for
their cause or their country -- as our soldiers did on the beaches of
Normandy.

The difference between the kids in the fourth and fifth turning is
that the former are willing to die for their country when their
leaders ask them to, but the latter are willing to die for their
cause/country EVEN AGAINST THEIR PARENTS' AND LEADERS' WISHES, as
happened in the case of the London subway bombings.

In the fourth turning, the "prophets" are fully integrated into the
social system and the societal structure; in the fifth turning, it
appears that the "prophets" are external to the society, or at least
not integrated into the social system.

If you put all this together, I get the feeling that the "hunger" for
a new crisis war grows with each turning. In the fifth turning, it's
the young Super-Nomad generation that's determined to trigger a new
crisis war, by any means they can.

You ask, what happens after that? Well, what happens after that is a
First Turning.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear Taylor,

Originally Posted by Odin

> As I posted in the Western Europe thread, the Unification Crisis
> seems to have been Europe's equivalent of the Civil War Crisis
> anomaly, a short Unravelling (1848-1858) followed by a short
> Crisis (1858-1871). It seems just pure luck that the US CW didn't
> pull in other counties like Britain, unifying the American and
> Europeans 4Ts into a single Crisis.

It's true that, over the centuries, 30,000 or so separate tribes and
societies have merged into about 250 nations and about 9 great
civilizations (Western, Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic,
Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, Japanese), and all the different timelines
have merged as well, so that by the 20th century, almost all of the
timelines had converged roughly on two points (WW I and WW II).

However, it's much too America-centric to talk about a "Unification
Crisis" if it means anything more than a simple coincidence of dates.
If you mean that all these countries are somehow tuned into America
and Western Europe as guidance for when they should go to war, that
can't be. When the Jews were fighting the Arabs from 1936-1949, they
weren't worrying about the Chinese who were having a civil war from
1934-1949, even though the two crisis wars approximately coincided.

Crisis wars are very personal. Even when two countries are fighting
against each other in the same crisis war, they'll be fighting
completely different wars, just as a married couple arguing over sex
or money are really having two completely different arguments.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Dear David,

Originally Posted by David Krein

> John - I don't blame you for accepting it, but whoever wrote that
> Britain was at war every day of Queen Victoria's reign was being
> plain silly. Even if one counts minor skirmishes as wars, there
> were I am sure many more days between 1837 and 1901 in which
> Britain and its Empire saw no conflict than those that it did. For
> example, during the American Civil War, Britain sent their Navy
> with 700 marines to Mexico in January 1862 (along with Spanish and
> French troops) but pulled them out at the first sign that Napoleon
> was determined to unseat Jaurez (the marines never left the harbor
> at Vera Cruz, and were there a couple of months). Then, in August
> of 1863, the British navy bombarded the Japanese port of Kagoshima
> (it was a "war" that lasted 1 day and cost the British 13 and the
> Japanese 5 lives).There might have been a skirmish or two on the
> Northwest Frontier of India (then, as now, this area seems hard to
> pacify). But, over all, between 1861 and 1865, Britain probably
> was engaged in miitary conflict, and as broadly as you can define
> it, for a few days and certainly not more than a few months. And
> you could repeat this for much of Victoria's reign.

Thanks. That really clears things ups.

Originally Posted by David Krein

> In response to your fourth point, Prussia (Germany) fought three
> wars between 1864 and 1871, all of which took place in a 4th
> Turning which ended symbolically at Versailles on January 18,
> 1871. Collectively, these wars comprise a Crisis that goes back at
> least to 1858 for Prussia The German First Turning under Bismarck
> that ensued is directly analogous to the fledgling U.S. under
> Washington. It was an era of institution building, and produced a
> Prophet Generation whose very tail is represented by the birth of
> Hitler in 1889. The Commune, by anybody's standards, was a Fourth
> Turning event.

Wow, this really settles the questions about the Franco-Prussian war
(including the Commune) as being a (portion of) a crisis war for both
countries.

(Continued in next posting)

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

(Continued from previous posting)

Originally Posted by David Krein

> As to the Franco-Prussian War, a consistent concern of Britain
> since 1859 had been fear of a French invasion and they were
> convinced in 1870 that the French would be in Berlin in 6 weeks.
> Since their capitulation over Denmark in 1864, the British were
> following a policy towards Europe of isolation, and Napoleon's
> surrender was a relief, although the British ruling class was not
> at all amused by the Commune. They made no extraordinary
> preparations for war in 1870-1, although they undoubtedly would
> have should Napoleon have won. Germany did not become a perceived
> enemy until after 1901.

Originally Posted by David Krein

> Odin - Britain was in a 1st Turning from 1805 to 1822, the
> Awakening was 1823-1841, Unraveling from 1842 to Nov. 1857, and
> Crisis from Dec. 1857 to 1873. This produced an Idealist
> generation from 1810 to 1820, a Reactive Generation from 1821 to
> 1839, a Civic Generation from 1840 to 1855, and an Adaptive
> Generation born from 1856 to 1871. There was no shorted or
> anomalous turnings (just as there was no anomaly in the United
> States in the same time frame). The Wars of National Unification
> from the 1850s to the 1870s were really global in scope, from
> Mexico, the United States, Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil, and
> Argentina, Japan, China, India, to Poland, Italy and Germany (and
> Romania snuck in there without a war while Hungary got a separate
> identity from Austria after the 1866 loss to Prussia).

And let me also acknowledge Rick's contribution:

Originally Posted by herbal tee

> Remember, the UK almost became involved in the American civil war
> on the side of the confederacy. The peaceful resolution of this
> diplomatic crises had long term impact.
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alabama_claims

> One other thing, years ago, I read that Britian played the role of
> 'balancer' for the century between 1815 and 1914. For example, it
> can be argued that one of the reasons Britian became closer to
> France after the Franco-Prussian war is because a weaker France
> needed Britian as an ally more than the new state of Germany did.
> Perhaps playing the role of "referee" on the edge of the crises
> wars of other states took the place of a crises war for Britian
> itself in that 1855-75 4tish period for western europe.

OK, so did England have a crisis war in this period, and if so, what
was it?

I've been focusing on the Franco-Prussian war, but after this
discussion, I decided to do further research on the American Civil
War as a possibility.

I went to the wonderful books.google.com , and search for free books
on "history of england." I ended up reviewing three of them,
although the first had the most comprehensive coverage of the
American Civil War, and the other two basically confirmed the first,
although in briefer form.

• British History in the Nineteenth Century (1782-1901)
  By George Macaulay Trevelyan, 1922, pp. 329-338
  http://books.google.com/books?vid=OC...=PA1#PPA329,M1
  
  David, I recall you once criticizing Trevelyan's 1941 book as being
  outdated, and I assume you must feel even more strongly about the
  1922 book. Nonetheless, I still cling to the belief that it's better
  to refer to history books published close to actual events in
  question, because I want to capture the moods and feelings of people
  before they get too filtered by later ideologies. This is also
  similar to Strauss and Howe's research approach.
  
• A Short History of England, Edward Potts Cheyney, 1904, pp. 653-655
  http://books.google.com/books?vid=OC...PRA24-PA653,M1
  
• A History of England from the Earliest Times to the Death of Queen
  Victoria, Benjamin Stites Terry, 1908, pp. 1033-1035
  http://books.google.com/books?vid=OC...RA31-PA1035,M1

Here are the main points that I learned from these three books:

• Just prior to the American Civil War, there was almost a war with
  France caused by panic.
  
• England's upper classes favored the South, who were most similar
  to England's upper classes.
  
• England's lower classes favored the North, who were most similar
  to England's lower classes.
  
• The British government remained officially neutral, though they
  favored the South.
  
• The northern blockade of Southern ports, preventing the export of
  cotton, inflicted great hardship on Lancashire's cotton mills, which
  depended on the cotton for work
  
• The British government was tempted to break the blockade, but
  decided to stay neutral.
  
  This was the opposite situation from the Napoleonic wars, where
  England had blockaded Europe's ports, and America began the War or
  1812 to break the blockade.
  
• Even Britain's neutrality was resented by Northerners, who felt
  it indirectly supported the South.
  
• The South didn't like it much either, since they wanted real help
  from the English.
  
• When Northern Captain Wilkes boarded an British ship and removed
  two Confederate envoys, the incident caused Britain to start
  preparing for war against the North. It was averted only because the
  North backed down, freed the envoys, and apologized.
  
• The Confederacy purchased a ship, the CSS Alabama, from Britain
  through France as an intermediary, to the embarassment of Britain
  when the ship was launched. Later, an international tribunal awarded
  America damages from Britain for violating neutrality.

Now here's the thing. When I've read accounts of Britain's reactions
to the Franco-Prussian war in the past, I never detected any passion,
but only passive interest.

Here I don't see a great deal of passion, but there is SOME passion.
In particular, after the envoys were arrested, Britain was preparing
for war against the North. (This reminds of the this past summer's
Lebanon war, where Israel attacked Hizbollah for abducting two
Israeli soldiers.)

There is a similarity to Switzerland, which was able to maintain
neutrality, although it was preparing for war with Germany.

Based on these observations, and because a Crisis Era is based on
"mood" more than anything else, my tentative conclusion is that the
American Civil War was an "aborted crisis war" for Britain, and that
the Franco-Prussian war was a first turning war for Britain.

I would also conclude that Britain's crisis era ended around 1865,
with the end of the war. Do you strongly object to that conclusion?

Originally Posted by David Krein

> I would suggest ... a First Turning from Blenheim in 1704 to
> 1729

I do not see how this is at all possible. England's victory in the
Battle of Blenheim was a shock to everyone, including the English,
and so this battle can serve as a point of Regeneracy for the War of
the Spanish Succession. But clearly the climax of the war was the
Battle of Malplaquet, with resolution in 1714 with the Treaty at
Utrecht. Thus, the First Turning would would have to begin either in
1710 or 1714, depending on how you look at it, but not 1704.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com