Originally Posted by The Grey Badger

Ave! Three tickets to the gladiatorial games for you. Poor Cicero.

No cable here, so I am waiting for the DVD's

Octavian: Nobody even comes close for sheer ruthlessness. Loved the Roddy McDowall portrayal in Cleopatra. He'd eat three Cheney's and ten GWB's for breakfast. Hitler for Lunch, and Stalin for dinner, fininishing off with a Lenin dessert.

I decided that I would try to knock out the remaining countries in Africa over the next month or so, since the South Pacific, Caribbean, and Oceanic islands will be much harder and slower to analyze.

Right now I'm looking at Mali and Niger, both of which I believe MichaelEaston had as "5T" or "4T+".

My sources for these countries are Wikipedia, Encarta, and the BBC.

Niger

From what I can tell, Niger is entering 1T. The 1990s was a hugely formative decade in this country. First there was the civilian constitution of 1989, which did not allow opposition parties. This drew strikes and demonstrations beginning in 1990 (a mood shift which sounds like the early part of a 4T), leading to a 1992 constitution allowing multiple parties. The rest of the decade is jam-packed with rebellions and ceasefires, government turnover, elections, and reform.

I am strongly leaning toward Niger coming out of a 4T and entering 1T. All the signs point there.

Mali

The obvious explanation is that independence in the late 1950s was a 4T. This would explain the harsh austerity in the 1970s and '80s (1T) and the student riots in the early 1990s (2T).

Actually, Mali's saeculum sounds pretty straightforward: the 1980s was a fairly stable time, analogous to the 1950s, with only a brief border dispute that sounds less destructive than the Korean War. And the year 1991 in Mali sounds about as migraine-inducing as 1968 in Europe and the U.S., with government crackdowns and protests galore.

So...3T?

Happy Oscar night, everyone.

Originally Posted by 1990

I decided that I would try to knock out the remaining countries in Africa over the next month or so, since the South Pacific, Caribbean, and Oceanic islands will be much harder and slower to analyze.

Right now I'm looking at Mali and Niger, both of which I believe MichaelEaston had as "5T" or "4T+".

My sources for these countries are Wikipedia, Encarta, and the BBC.

Niger

From what I can tell, Niger is entering 1T. The 1990s was a hugely formative decade in this country. First there was the civilian constitution of 1989, which did not allow opposition parties. This drew strikes and demonstrations beginning in 1990 (a mood shift which sounds like the early part of a 4T), leading to a 1992 constitution allowing multiple parties. The rest of the decade is jam-packed with rebellions and ceasefires, government turnover, elections, and reform.

I am strongly leaning toward Niger coming out of a 4T and entering 1T. All the signs point there.

Niger's last crisis war probably ended around 1922 or shortly before that. I see no evidence of anything spiraling out of control in the 1990s. All rebellions and coups were short lived and without much substance, all elections were free, fair, and without violence. Would you mind giving me your sources? I would like some more information (I have already seen the wiki page).

Mali

The obvious explanation is that independence in the late 1950s was a 4T. This would explain the harsh austerity in the 1970s and '80s (1T) and the student riots in the early 1990s (2T).

Actually, Mali's saeculum sounds pretty straightforward: the 1980s was a fairly stable time, analogous to the 1950s, with only a brief border dispute that sounds less destructive than the Korean War. And the year 1991 in Mali sounds about as migraine-inducing as 1968 in Europe and the U.S., with government crackdowns and protests galore.

So...3T?

Happy Oscar night, everyone.

I didn't find any evidence of a 4T in the 1950's, and independence doesn't signal anything. Do you have any evidence? The 1990's featured the Tuareg Rebellion, which seems to be isolated to that particular ethnic group. Some parts of the 1990's definitely appear unstable but it's difficult to figure out if it is just evidence of some 4T actions settling in or 2T. But nothing seems to point that the 1950's were a time of intense turmoil.

However, the timing is quite possible. Samory Toure, who led a huge army against French resistance was defeated in 1898. If you can find evidence of a late 1950's 4T, then I'm all ears.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

Niger's last crisis war probably ended around 1922 or shortly before that. I see no evidence of anything spiraling out of control in the 1990s. All rebellions and coups were short lived and without much substance, all elections were free, fair, and without violence. Would you mind giving me your sources? I would like some more information (I have already seen the wiki page).

But everything changed in the 1990s. Niger is a radically different society today than it was when you and I were born. Radically different. So either it was a 4T without a crisis war (which is not at all unheard of), or it was a suspiciously transformative 2T. 2Ts don't usually have that great an effect.

BTW, if Niger had a crisis war ending in 1922, the '90s would have been right on cue for a new 4T.

All three online source I have (Wikipedia, Encarta, BBC) gloss over the pre-1960 history, but put huge focus on the 1989-1999 period. So I don't know what that means.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

I didn't find any evidence of a 4T in the 1950's, and independence doesn't signal anything. Do you have any evidence? The 1990's featured the Tuareg Rebellion, which seems to be isolated to that particular ethnic group. Some parts of the 1990's definitely appear unstable but it's difficult to figure out if it is just evidence of some 4T actions settling in or 2T. But nothing seems to point that the 1950's were a time of intense turmoil.

However, the timing is quite possible. Samory Toure, who led a huge army against French resistance was defeated in 1898. If you can find evidence of a late 1950's 4T, then I'm all ears.

The 1950s don't sound especially bloody, but there was a lot of rapid political turnover during this period - first French rule, then the Federation of Mali with Senegal, then an independent Mali, then an independent Mali being ruled by Marxists.

The thing is, maybe Mali's last 4T was fairly mild, but the timing works out. The 1990s definitely reek of 2T.

1990,

Originally Posted by 1990

But everything changed in the 1990s. Niger is a radically different society today than it was when you and I were born. Radically different. So either it was a 4T without a crisis war (which is not at all unheard of), or it was a suspiciously transformative 2T. 2Ts don't usually have that great an effect.

BTW, if Niger had a crisis war ending in 1922, the '90s would have been right on cue for a new 4T.

How can you suggest hat Niger is radically different just by reading page-long political histories? That is way too much to assume.

The best source for this period appears to be Encarta. I've copied and pasted the information from 1989 onward. In bold is what I feel is most indicative of the masses of the people:

Originally Posted by MSN Encarta

Seybou was reelected president in 1989 after introducing a new constitution that returned Niger to civilian rule under a single-party system. A wave of strikes and demonstrations in 1990 led him to legalize opposition parties. The same year, the nomadic Tuaregs of northern Niger began to rise up in favor of an independent Tuareg state. The Tuaregs, many of whom had left Niger in the early 1980s to escape a prolonged drought and had recently returned in large numbers, claimed that Seybou’s government had failed in its promises to adequately aid the returning nomads. After violent clashes with Nigerien forces the separatist movement became a full-scale rebellion. A constitutional conference, convened in July 1991, stripped Seybou of his powers and established a transitional government, headed by André Salifou. A constitution instituting a multiparty electoral system was ratified in December 1992. In elections in early 1993 Mahamane Ousmane of the Alliance des Forces du Changement (AFC; Alliance of the Forces of Change), a nine-party coalition, was elected president, and AFC candidates won a majority of the seats in parliament. In late 1994 the cabinet was dismissed by a vote of no confidence in the National Assembly. Ousmane called for legislative elections in January 1995. A coalition of four opposition parties won a majority in the National Assembly, with the Movement National pour une Société de Développement (MNSD; National Movement for a Development Society) taking the largest number of seats. Friction between Ousmane and Prime Minister Hama Amadou, head of the MNSD, soon created a governmental deadlock. This slowed the implementation of an April 1995 peace accord signed with the northern Tuareg rebels.

In January 1996 Colonel Ibrahim Bare Mainassara seized power in a military coup, arrested President Ousmane and Prime Minister Amadou, and banned all political parties. Mainassara cited the yearlong deadlock between Ousmane and Amadou as the reason for his coup. Ousmane and Amadou were released from prison in early February. A new constitution, consolidating the president’s power and limiting the prime minister’s role, was quickly drafted and approved in a May public vote in which only 35 percent of the nation’s registered voters participated. The ban on political parties was lifted, and Mainassara announced his candidacy for president in upcoming elections; Ousmane also declared his candidacy. In July Mainassara won presidential elections under suspicious circumstances. The independent electoral committee was fired during the two-day elections and replaced with a committee handpicked by Mainassara. Several opposition candidates, including Ousmane, were placed under house arrest.

Mainassara failed to garner a broad base of political support. In April 1999 Mainassara’s presidential guard unit assassinated him and assumed control of the country. The coup leaders drafted constitutional amendments that restored the constitutional balance between the executive and legislative branches and absolved the participants in both the 1996 and the 1999 coups. The revised constitution was approved by referendum, and presidential and legislative elections were held in October and November 1999. MNSD candidate Tandja Mamadou was elected president, and the MNSD again took the largest number of seats in the National Assembly. Mamadou was reelected in December 2004.

Coups and revisions of constitutions mean little; we are determining the reactions of the masses. Unfortunately, this is the best we have so far, and this particular source focuses on the politics of the time, not the masses.

From what I gather, there is no proof of anything resembling a 4T during this time period. Although a lot of changes occured, the assumption that it must have been a crisis because of the timing is too much for me to swallow. Furthermore, if there was a crisis, I would expect there to be more information on it, since this occured only 10 years ago.

The 1950s don't sound especially bloody, but there was a lot of rapid political turnover during this period - first French rule, then the Federation of Mali with Senegal, then an independent Mali, then an independent Mali being ruled by Marxists.

The thing is, maybe Mali's last 4T was fairly mild, but the timing works out. The 1990s definitely reek of 2T.

My comments for Mali are similar to my comments for Niger. I see no evidence for a 4T and I'm not ready to assign it as such because it fits in nicely. If you take a look at John's site, he mentions that it is not so uncommon to have extremely long mid-cycle periods.

Matt

Dear Matt,

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> Coups and revisions of constitutions mean little; we are
> determining the reactions of the masses. Unfortunately, this is
> the best we have so far, and this particular source focuses on the
> politics of the time, not the masses.

> From what I gather, there is no proof of anything resembling a 4T
> during this time period. Although a lot of changes occured, the
> assumption that it must have been a crisis because of the timing
> is too much for me to swallow. Furthermore, if there was a crisis,
> I would expect there to be more information on it, since this
> occured only 10 years ago.

But what about this sentence: "After violent clashes with Nigerien
forces the separatist movement became a full-scale rebellion."?

I'm not disagreeing with you, and I haven't looked at any text except
what you provided from Encarta. But I just have the feeling that
something's missing from this text -- like: What the hell happened
with that rebellion? For example, the 1996 agreement could have been
part of a Recovery era resolution.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Dear Matt,

But what about this sentence: "After violent clashes with Nigerien
forces the separatist movement became a full-scale rebellion."?

I'm not disagreeing with you, and I haven't looked at any text except
what you provided from Encarta. But I just have the feeling that
something's missing from this text -- like: What the hell happened
with that rebellion? For example, the 1996 agreement could have been
part of a Recovery era resolution.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

I have found an excellent source on the history of the Tuareg people, and I'd like to share some passages:

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute...les/PUB200.pdf

Originally Posted by Lieutenant Colonel Kalifa Keita

Not surprisingly, some Tuaregs were more resistant to
change than others, but all Tuareg communities experienced
cognitive dissonance and internal tensions. This
began to be manifested in some intergenerational conflict:
impatient young men were no longer content to obey
traditional community elders. Uncontrollable, rapid change
is destabilizing for any society, and this one was no
exception.

This refers to the 1960's, which followed the first Tuareg Rebellion in which about 1500 Tuaregs began an insurgency campaign.

Originally Posted by Lieutenant Colonel Kalifa Keita

The original grievances of Mali’s Tuaregs in the early
1960s had never completely disappeared. These were rooted
in a Tuareg conviction that the national government was
unresponsive and hostile. The grievances were exacerbated
by the highly coercive counterinsurgency campaign during
the first Tuareg rebellion, and by the subsequent harsh
military administration of northern Mali. Many Tuaregs
still distrusted and feared their non-Tuareg neighbors.
Fears of cultural genocide stemmed also from government
handling of famine relief.

Many Tuaregs had moved to Libya, but in 1986, and economic crisis forced them to return to their homes in Niger and Mali. The Tuareg rebellion slowly picked up steam. However, the source indicates that there were less than 3000 combatants.

By 1994, the senior civil and military leadership in Mali
was strongly committed to solving the “Tuareg problem”—
and doing it in a way that would end the cycle of violence and
fear. The key element in this process—for good or ill—would
have to be the Army. And that organization was undergoing
a slow but ultimately dramatic transformation.
The government turned to a rising cadre of younger
field-grade officers, more progressive and broadly educated
than many of their predecessors, to undertake a twopronged
approach. A first step was to use the Army itself in
efforts to win the confidence of the Tuaregs. Second, and
more difficult, was to change the manner in which the Army
characteristically dealt with security problems in the north.
To win Tuareg confidence, the Army instituted recurring
consultations between senior military officers and Tuareg
community leaders. These meetings provided fora to
discuss grievances, address allegations of criminal activity,
and examine accusations of human rights abuses. At the
same time, the Army became heavily involved in relief
efforts, providing foodstuffs (rice, millet, tea, sugar, and
dates) to needy communities, and began to offer free medical
services to nomad communities. The Army also organized
regular meetings between Army units and Tuareg commun-ities, in which the Tuaregs were encouraged to share and
explain their arts, dances, singing, and other unique
cultural features. This demonstrated to the Tuaregs that
the Army valued their traditional culture, but also
generated some appreciation for the Tuaregs within the
rank and file of the Army itself.

It is possible to overrate the effectiveness of these
measures. At the outset, the climate of distrust and
suspicion was very strong. However, over the course of
about 5 years, these measures had demonstrably positive
effects. Most of the Tuareg communities discarded their fear
of the Malian Army.

The second Malian approach was perhaps the most
difficult: that of changing Army attitudes toward the
Tuareg. The long, bitter history of insurgency and
counterinsurgency had generated a legacy of hatred for the
Army among the Tuaregs, but also a hatred for the Tuaregs
among many military personnel. The mutiny in 1994 simply
reaffirmed the soldiers’ stereotype of Tuaregs as “violent,
unreasonable, unpatriotic opportunists.” These attitudes
were very difficult to overcome.

To address this problem, the Army held a recurring
series of workshops and consultations for soldiers of all
ranks. The Malians invited the Red Cross and several other
organizations to organize (or assist) in a substantial portion
of this training, concentrating on professional ethics,
respect for human rights, laws of land warfare, and the role
of the military in democratic societies.57 The effort entailed
some very hard work, and at first it was hard to see tangible
results. However, attitudes in the Army were changing,
slowly at first, more rapidly in the mid-1990s. By that point,
the efforts had been very successful: accusations of human
rights abuses committed by Malian government personnel
had declined to a very low level....

The government of Mali ultimately was able to reassert
its authority over the north, and over a population that was
much more confident in the good faith of its government.
While a certain amount of banditry remains endemic to the
region, the resentments that provoked the Tuareg rebellion
seem to have been largely attenuated.

It's clear to me that the 1960's (First Tuareg Rebellion) were an awakening era for the Tuareg, so the Second Tuareg Rebellion would have occured on the 3T/4T cusp. The rebellion was more of an insurgency with well-armed Tuareg terrorists (freedom fighters) bombing government buildings before going back to hiding. This is simple terrorism and banditry carried out by only a few thousand of 8 million Tuaregs. The government's response was harsh, and I'm actually reminded of the PKK conflict, as the Tuaregs were forced out of their homes. It seems, however, thanks to some luck and effective response, the crisis was defused before the rebellion got out of hand. The sheer lack of numbers and lack of notice indicates that this cannot be a crisis war.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

1990,



How can you suggest hat Niger is radically different just by reading page-long political histories? That is way too much to assume.

The best source for this period appears to be Encarta. I've copied and pasted the information from 1989 onward. In bold is what I feel is most indicative of the masses of the people:



Coups and revisions of constitutions mean little; we are determining the reactions of the masses. Unfortunately, this is the best we have so far, and this particular source focuses on the politics of the time, not the masses.

From what I gather, there is no proof of anything resembling a 4T during this time period. Although a lot of changes occured, the assumption that it must have been a crisis because of the timing is too much for me to swallow. Furthermore, if there was a crisis, I would expect there to be more information on it, since this occured only 10 years ago.



My comments for Mali are similar to my comments for Niger. I see no evidence for a 4T and I'm not ready to assign it as such because it fits in nicely. If you take a look at John's site, he mentions that it is not so uncommon to have extremely long mid-cycle periods.

Matt

Hmm...you're right, the evidence is thin in both countries. Back in grey it seems.

BTW, I'm taking bets: is today's stock slump a one-day aberration, or is this the beginning of a panic on Wall Street?

Originally Posted by 1990

Hmm...you're right, the evidence is thin in both countries. Back in grey it seems.

BTW, I'm taking bets: is today's stock slump a one-day aberration, or is this the beginning of a panic on Wall Street?

Grey seems right. As I read my source (see above), I can't tell if the Mali response is a 1T reaction (but I don't think it can be), a 3T reaction (but why?), or a 4T reaction (it should be, but it wasn't).

Bah. A second look with a clearer head will be necessary. Too much stuff has been happening over the past couple days.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

Grey seems right. As I read my source (see above), I can't tell if the Mali response is a 1T reaction (but I don't think it can be), a 3T reaction (but why?), or a 4T reaction (it should be, but it wasn't).

Bah. A second look with a clearer head will be necessary. Too much stuff has been happening over the past couple days.

My original analysis stands. Why didn't Mali react to the Tuareg Rebellion with 4T energy? No clue. Why didn't the Tuareg Rebellion explode into something that engulfed the entire Tuareg population (and therefore Niger and Mali)? No clue. Things just turn out a certain way, and by chance, disaster was averted. So, without any crisis during the 1990's, both Niger and Mali are deep into 4T-land.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

My original analysis stands. Why didn't Mali react to the Tuareg Rebellion with 4T energy? No clue. Why didn't the Tuareg Rebellion explode into something that engulfed the entire Tuareg population (and therefore Niger and Mali)? No clue. Things just turn out a certain way, and by chance, disaster was averted. So, without any crisis during the 1990's, both Niger and Mali are deep into 4T-land.

Sigh.

Okay, how about Madagascar? It's a big island, and will look good colored in.

Purple-state suggested 2T. A first glance suggests that this is correct. The French suppressed violent uprisings in the 1890s and instituted military rule, with new reforms coming during the turn of the century (4T-1T transition). Then during WWII there is a distinct Awakening, with rebellions against French rule and calls for independence. During the 1950s France took gradual steps toward self-governance in Madagascar, with "gradual independence" candidates winning most elections. (A compromising mood typical of early 3T - think Tip O'Neill and Ronald Reagan working together jovially in the early '80s) After over a decade of stability, violence erupted in the early 1970s, and instead of student riots there were massive populist uprisings. Reading about the '70s in Madagascar gives a strongly 4T impression.

So I think purple-state had it right. Madagascar really looks to be late 1T, entering 2T right now.

Originally Posted by 1990

Sigh.

Okay, how about Madagascar? It's a big island, and will look good colored in.

Purple-state suggested 2T. A first glance suggests that this is correct. The French suppressed violent uprisings in the 1890s and instituted military rule, with new reforms coming during the turn of the century (4T-1T transition). Then during WWII there is a distinct Awakening, with rebellions against French rule and calls for independence. During the 1950s France took gradual steps toward self-governance in Madagascar, with "gradual independence" candidates winning most elections. (A compromising mood typical of early 3T - think Tip O'Neill and Ronald Reagan working together jovially in the early '80s) After over a decade of stability, violence erupted in the early 1970s, and instead of student riots there were massive populist uprisings. Reading about the '70s in Madagascar gives a strongly 4T impression.

So I think purple-state had it right. Madagascar really looks to be late 1T, entering 2T right now.

Most African countries had their crisis war sometime around the turn of the century (the 1900 one), from there, they diverge.

You ignore the 'Madagascar Revolt,' (1947-1948) which could be either an awakening or a crisis. It is awfully late for an awakening and only slightly early for a crisis if 1896 was the end of the previous one.

If you are correct in that there were protests against WWII, I wouldn't be too surprised. This isn't as atypical for the beginning of a 4T as you may think. Plus, I would expect more of an awakening (with focus on the relations in Madagascar) in the 1910's and 1920's.

I'll look into it. Thanks for the info. Here's a good link (hat tip to John): http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/mgtoc.html

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

Most African countries had their crisis war sometime around the turn of the century (the 1900 one), from there, they diverge.

You ignore the 'Madagascar Revolt,' (1947-1948) which could be either an awakening or a crisis. It is awfully late for an awakening and only slightly early for a crisis if 1896 was the end of the previous one.

If you are correct in that there were protests against WWII, I wouldn't be too surprised. This isn't as atypical for the beginning of a 4T as you may think. Plus, I would expect more of an awakening (with focus on the relations in Madagascar) in the 1910's and 1920's.

I'll look into it. Thanks for the info. Here's a good link (hat tip to John): http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/mgtoc.html

That link still seems to suggests a 4T during the 1960s-70s. It sounds like it was a really transformative and turbulent time in Malagasy society. When I am not thoroughly exhausted, I will read more carefully, but that is my initial hit.

out of left field what about Paupua New Guinea? it seems to me to be following Australia and getting ready for a 4T

Originally Posted by purple-state extreamist

out of left field what about Paupua New Guinea? it seems to me to be following Australia and getting ready for a 4T

I would love to hit Papua New Guinea, but the "island countries" (Pacific and Caribbean) are by far the hardest to figure out, I have found. What makes you think PNG is on the Australia timeline?

Originally Posted by 1990

That link still seems to suggests a 4T during the 1960s-70s. It sounds like it was a really transformative and turbulent time in Malagasy society. When I am not thoroughly exhausted, I will read more carefully, but that is my initial hit.

Awakenings are not turbulent? They cannot be transformative?

This is about Madagascar in the 1970's.

http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/...d(DOCID+mg0015)

Originally Posted by Library of Congress

A new force on the political scene provided the first serious challenge to the Tsiranana government in April 1971. The National Movement for the Independence of Madagascar (Mouvement National pour l'Indépendance de Madagascar--Monima) led a peasant uprising in Toliara Province. The creator and leader of Monima was Monja Jaona, a côtier from the south who also participated in the Revolt of 1947. The main issue was government pressure for tax collection at a time when local cattle herds were being ravaged by disease. The protesters attacked military and administrative centers in the area, apparently hoping for support in the form of weapons and reinforcements from China. Such help never arrived, and the revolt was harshly and quickly suppressed. An estimated fifty to 1,000 persons died, Monima was dissolved, and Monima leaders, including Jaona and several hundred protesters, were arrested and deported to the island of Nosy Lava.

Another movement came on the scene in early 1972, in the form of student protests in Antananarivo. A general strike involving the nation's roughly 100,000 secondary-level students focused on three principal issues: ending the cultural cooperation agreements with France; replacing educational programs designed for schools in France and taught by French teachers with programs emphasizing Malagasy life and culture and taught by Malagasy instructors; and increasing access for economically underprivileged youth to secondary-level institutions. By early May, the PSD sought to end the student strike at any cost; on May 12 and 13, the government arrested several hundred student leaders and sent them to Nosy-Lava. Authorities also closed the schools and banned demonstrations.

Mounting economic stagnation--as revealed in scarcities of investment capital, a general decline in living standards, and the failure to meet even modest development goals--further undermined the government's position. Forces unleashed by the growing economic crisis combined with student unrest to create an opposition alliance. Workers, public servants, peasants, and many unemployed urban youth of Antananarivo joined the student strike, which spread to the provinces. Protesters set fire to the town hall and to the offices of a French-language newspaper in the capital.

The turning point occurred on May 13 when the Republican Security Force (Force Républicaine de Sécurité--FRS) opened fire on the rioters; in the ensuing melee between fifteen and forty persons were killed and about 150 injured. Tsiranana declared a state of national emergency and on May 18 dissolved his government, effectively ending the First Republic. He then turned over full power to the National Army under the command of General Gabriel Ramanantsoa, a politically conservative Merina and former career officer in the French army. The National Army had maintained strict political neutrality in the crisis, and its intervention to restore order was welcomed by protesters and opposition elements.

The Ramanantsoa military regime could not resolve rising economic and ethnic problems, and narrowly survived an attempted coup d'état on December 31, 1974. The fact that the coup was led by several côtier officers against a Merina military leader underscored the growing Merina/côtier polarization in the military. In an attempt at restoring unity, Ramanantsoa, on February 5, 1975, turned over power to Colonel Richard Ratsimandrava (a Merina with a less "aristocratic" background). Five days later, Ratsimandrava was assassinated, and a National Military Directorate was formed to restore order by declaring martial law, strictly censoring political expression, and suspending all political parties.

The political transition crisis was resolved on June 15, 1975, when the National Military Directorate selected Lieutenant Commander Didier Ratsiraka as head of state and president of a new ruling body, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC). The choice of Ratsiraka allayed ethnic concerns because he was a côtier belonging to the Betsimisaraka ethnic group. In addition, Ratsiraka--a dedicated socialist--was perceived by his military peers as a consensus candidate capable of forging unity among the various leftist political parties (such as AKFM and Monima), students, urban workers, the peasantry, and the armed forces.

Ratsiraka was elected to a seven-year term as president in a national referendum on December 21, 1975, confirming the mandate for consensus and inaugurating Madagascar's Second Republic. The guiding principle of Ratsiraka's administration was the need for a socialist "revolution from above." Specifically, he sought to radically change Malagasy society in accordance with programs and principles incorporated into the Charter of the Malagasy Socialist Revolution, popularly referred to as the "Red Book" (Boky Mena). According to this document, the primary goal of the newly renamed Democratic Republic of Madagascar was to build a "new society" founded on socialist principles and guided by the actions of the "five pillars of the revolution": the SRC, peasants and workers, young intellectuals, women, and the Popular Armed Forces. "The socialist revolution," explains the Red Book, "is the only choice possible for us in order to achieve rapid economic and cultural development in an autonomous, humane, and harmonious manner." The Red Book advocated a new foreign policy based on the principle of nonalignment, and domestic policies focused on renovating the fokonolona, decentralizing the administration, and fomenting economic development through rigorous planning and popular input.

Several early policies collectively decided by Ratsiraka and other members of the SRC set the tone of the revolution from above. The first major SRC decision was to bring the French-held sectors of the economy under government control. This "economic decolonization" was welcomed by nationalists, who long had clamored for economic and cultural independence from France. The government also lifted martial law but retained rigid press censorship. Finally, the SRC ordered the closure of an earth satellite tracking station operated by the United States as part of its commitment to nonaligned foreign relations.

Political consolidation proceeded apace following the addition of ten civilians to the SRC in January 1976. This act constituted the beginning of a civil-military partnership in that the SRC became more representative of the country's major political tendencies and ethnic communities. In March the Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution (Antokin'ny Revolisiona Malagasy--Arema) was founded as the government party, and Ratsiraka became its secretary general. In sharp contrast to the single-party states created by other African Marxist leaders, Arema served as simply one (albeit the most powerful) member of a coalition of six parties united under the umbrella of the National Front for the Defense of the Revolution (Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution--FNDR). Membership in the FNDR, necessary for participation in the electoral process, was preconditioned on party endorsement of the revolutionary principles and programs contained in the Red Book.

Ratsiraka and Arema clearly dominated the political system. In the fokonolona elections held in March 1977, for example, Arema captured 90 percent of 73,000 contested seats in 11,400 assemblies. In June 1977, Arema won 220 out of a total of 232 seats in elections for six provincial general assemblies, and 112 out of a total of 137 seats in the Popular National Assembly. This trend toward consolidation was most vividly demonstrated by Rasiraka's announcement of his 1977 cabinet in which Arema members held sixteen of eighteen ministerial posts.

Yet, less than three years after taking power, Ratsiraka's regime was confronted with growing popular disenchantment. As early as September 1977, antigovernment demonstrations erupted in Antananarivo because of severe shortages in foodstuffs and essential commodities. This trend intensified as the economy worsened under the weight of ill-conceived economic policies that gradually centralized government control over the key sectors of the economy, including banking and agriculture. Ratsiraka defiantly adopted authoritarian tactics in response to the evolving opposition, sending in the armed forces to stifle dissent and maintain order during student riots in May 1978. In the economic realm, however, Ratsiraka accepted the free-market reforms demanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF--see Glossary) in order to ensure an infusion of foreign assistance vital to keeping the economy functioning. Whereas Ratsiraka's drift toward authoritarianism provided his enemies with political cannon fodder, his economic reforms led them to charge him with abandoning "scientific socialism" and alienated his traditional base of political supporters, as well.

The results of presidential elections within the de facto single-party framework that prevailed throughout the Second Republic clearly demonstrated Ratsiraka's declining political fortunes. Widespread initial enthusiasm for his socialist revolution from above secured him nearly 95 percent of the popular vote in the 1975 presidential elections, but support declined to 80 percent in 1982 and to only 63 percent in 1989. The year of 1989 marked a special turning point in that the fall of the Berlin Wall heralded the intellectual death of singleparty rule in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and similarly transformed electoral politics in Africa. In the case of Madagascar, increasingly vocal opposition parties denounced what they and international observers considered massive fraud in the 1989 presidential election, including Ratsiraka's refusal to update outdated voting lists that excluded the anti-Ratsiraka youth vote and the stuffing of ballot boxes at unmonitored rural polling stations. Massive demonstrations against Ratsiraka's inauguration led to violent clashes in Antananarivo that, according to official figures, left seventy-five dead and wounded.

Popular discontent with the Ratsiraka regime heightened on August 10, 1991, when more than 400,000 citizens marched peacefully on the President's Palace in order to oust the Ratsiraka government and create a new multiparty political system. Ratsiraka already faced an economy crippled by a general strike that had begun in May, as well as a divided and restless military whose loyalty no longer could be assumed. When the Presidential Guard opened fire on the marchers and killed and wounded hundreds, a crisis of leadership occurred.

The net result of these events was Ratsiraka's agreement on October 31, 1991 to support a process of democratic transition, complete with the formulation of a new constitution and the holding of free and fair multiparty elections. Albert Zafy, the central leader of the opposition forces and a côtier of the Tsimihety ethnic group, played a critical role in this transition process and ultimately emerged as the first president of Madagascar's Third Republic. The leader of the Comité des Forces Vives (Vital Forces Committee, known as Forces Vives), an umbrella opposition group composed of sixteen political parties that spearheaded the 1991 demonstrations, Zafy also emerged as the head of what became known as the High State Authority, a transitional government that shared power with the Ratsiraka regime during the democratization process.

A new draft constitution was approved by 75 percent of those voting in a national referendum on August 19, 1992. The first round of presidential elections followed on November 25. Frontrunner Zafy won 46 percent of the popular vote as the Forces Vives candidate, and Ratsiraka, as leader of his own newly created progovernment front, the Militant Movement for Malagasy Socialism (Mouvement Militant pour le Socialisme Malgache--MMSM), won approximately 29 percent of the vote. The remaining votes were split among a variety of other candidates. Because neither candidate obtained a majority of the votes cast, a second round of elections between the two frontrunners was held on February 10, 1993. Zafy emerged victorious with nearly 67 percent of the popular vote.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

This is about Madagascar in the 1970's.

http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+mg0015)

To me, this doesn't sound like a 2T, at least in the traditional American model. The demonstrations aren't youths protesting a moral structure, they are uprisings by the people concerning institutional and civic woes. I'm not sure, but that's what I am seeing.

The 400,000 people marching in 1991 sounds like the climax of a turning that began around 1970-71. And since it was 400,000 people marching for democracy, that sounds much more 4T than, say, a few thousand students leading a "movement" (a 2T occurrence).

Originally Posted by 1990

To me, this doesn't sound like a 2T, at least in the traditional American model. The demonstrations aren't youths protesting a moral structure, they are uprisings by the people concerning institutional and civic woes. I'm not sure, but that's what I am seeing.

The 400,000 people marching in 1991 sounds like the climax of a turning that began around 1970-71. And since it was 400,000 people marching for democracy, that sounds much more 4T than, say, a few thousand students leading a "movement" (a 2T occurrence).

Sorry, I can't agree with this at all. Uprisings by the people, especially the younger generation, especially students, against their government is quite common in 2Ts, especially if they feel that the entire governmental structure is unfair. Intermittent violence and clashes leaving some casualties is common as well. This, and more, is clearly stated in that LOC history.

Furthermore, there is zero evidence of a 4T that you mention. I see protests and attempted revolutions, not rebellions and genocidal warfare. Where is the 4T?

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

Sorry, I can't agree with this at all. Uprisings by the people, especially the younger generation, especially students, against their government is quite common in 2Ts, especially if they feel that the entire governmental structure is unfair. Intermittent violence and clashes leaving some casualties is common as well. This, and more, is clearly stated in that LOC history.

Furthermore, there is zero evidence of a 4T that you mention. I see protests and attempted revolutions, not rebellions and genocidal warfare. Where is the 4T?

On re-reading, your case makes much more sense. Pardon me, I'm notoriously mercurial. (It's that damn Scorpio thing)

BTW, Madagascar having a 4T in WWII might make a lot more sense. For some reason a lot of former European colonies (especially in Africa) have assumed the timelines of their colonizers. Cote d'Ivoire, Chad, Sudan, and the Central African Republic, all at one time owned by France, are on the WWII timeline. Madagascar being so as well would only be logical. Likewise, the Indian subcontinent, Australia and New Zealand, Canada, and the United States are on the British WWII timeline.

I'll read that article one more time, but I'm already leaning your way on Madagascar.

Originally Posted by 1990

I would love to hit Papua New Guinea, but the "island countries" (Pacific and Caribbean) are by far the hardest to figure out, I have found. What makes you think PNG is on the Australia timeline?

I see your point, Purple-state. I find strong evidence of a 4T during the Japanese occupation in WWII, and a 2T during the '70s.

Originally Posted by 1990

On re-reading, your case makes much more sense. Pardon me, I'm notoriously mercurial. (It's that damn Scorpio thing)

I've noticed that. :P I suppose it can both come in handy and be detrimental.

BTW, Madagascar having a 4T in WWII might make a lot more sense. For some reason a lot of former European colonies (especially in Africa) have assumed the timelines of their colonizers. Cote d'Ivoire, Chad, Sudan, and the Central African Republic, all at one time owned by France, are on the WWII timeline. Madagascar being so as well would only be logical. Likewise, the Indian subcontinent, Australia and New Zealand, Canada, and the United States are on the British WWII timeline.

I'll read that article one more time, but I'm already leaning your way on Madagascar.

The thing is, the 1947-1948 Revolt, which I think is 4T (I haven't looked into it too much and the evidence is inconclusive, but I see no better option), falls slightly early. 1947-1896 (your date)= 51, so I'm a little wary of WWII falling into the real crisis. I suspect that something having to do with the war (France in particular) was the catalyst for the crisis.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

I've noticed that. ;P I suppose it can both come in handy or be detrimental.



The thing is, the 1947-1948 Revolt, which I think is 4T (I haven't looked into it too much and the evidence is inconclusive, but I see no better option), falls slightly early. 1947-1896 (your date)= 51, so I'm a little wary of WWII falling into the real crisis. I suspect that something having to do with the war (France in particular) was the catalyst for the crisis.

Well, look, if the 1890s was 4T, then the 1970s chaos was right on time for a 4T. But if the 1970s was 2T, then the 1890s events would suggest 2T.

Bleaucgh...damn colonization confuses everything. Anyway, for now I'm thinking Madagascar follows the French timeline, as other ex-French colonies do. Moving on................

Originally Posted by 1990

Well, look, if the 1890s was 4T, then the 1970s chaos was right on time for a 4T. But if the 1970s was 2T, then the 1890s events would suggest 2T.

Bleaucgh...damn colonization confuses everything. Anyway, for now I'm thinking Madagascar follows the French timeline, as other ex-French colonies do. Moving on................

How do you figure? If 1896 is the end date, then 1916 should be the start of the awakening, 1936 should be the start of the unraveling, and 1956 should be the start of the crisis. As many have noted, crises typically don't last 20 years, highs tend to be a little shorter than 20 years, and unravelings are highly susceptible to variance, so a 51 year mid-cycle period isn't so odd. If the 1970's chaos was 4T (which it wasn't, as far as I can tell, with 95%+ certainty), it wouldn't be so odd either.

Colonization may confuse the information that is presented, but it shouldn't mess with the cycle moreso than any other random factor. I'm a little frustrated with the baseless assumption by many that a smaller country with automatically switch to a larger countries timeline based on 'influence.' Influence, as far as I can tell, is just a piece of the puzzle.

I haven't looked into the 1890's events at all, but I suspect a 4T, since nearly every African country had a 4T during this time period. What is odd is that most countries tend to come together over periods of time, but African countries have seemed to diverge over the past century. Just look at the map.

Yes, Africa is diverging more and more, unlike most of the world. The domination of the Soviet Union over Eastern Europe and Central Asia put everything east of Austria and north of the Caspian on the same timeline. Mexico's 4T delay means that all of North America is now on the same timeline as all of Western Europe (minus Ireland, which may itself be absorbed next saeculum). Most of Latin America is on the same timeline, as is most of East Asia, and the 4T delay in the Arabian peninsula means the Middle East only has two timelines now.

But Africa is diverging, giving the false appearance of a never-ending series of crises in that continent (which is really only due to the diversity of timelines). As soon as Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and the Congo recover from civil wars, here comes Cote d'Ivoire and Central Africa. (Compare to, say, Western Europe, which has gone wholly without a 4T since WWII)

So yeah, that's interesting.