Originally Posted by GaudiaRay

Thank you Michael for your outstanding thinking.

American had its first true finiancial panic in 1819. I tend to be a skeptic of mathematical percision in human events. That's why the idea of 30 year long turnings in earlier times when transportation and communications were slower doesn't bother me.
I would suspect that in other area like finance, a few years variation in a given occurance would not necessarily destroy a theory.

Just my 1/50th of a dollar. :

Originally Posted by herbal tee

American had its first true finiancial panic in 1819.

OK. But it depends on how you define America and panic. What about the great beaver panic in the early 17th century?

I tend to be a skeptic of mathematical percision in human events. That's why the idea of 30 year long turnings in earlier times when transportation and communications were slower doesn't bother me.

There is no explanation why slower transportations and communications would have a different generational lineup than in modern times. Or rather, why faster transportations and communications would make a difference. It's nonsensical. Secondly, no one is trying to apply mathematical precision here. This is still a new and relatively untested development.

I would suspect that in other area like finance, a few years variation in a given occurance would not necessarily destroy a theory.

I agree here.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

OK. But it depends on how you define America and panic. What about the great beaver panic in the early 17th century?

How many people were in the money economy in America during the beaver panic? A few thousand at most. The scale of the economy in the early 17th century was so small that even by early 19th century standards it was practically insignificant. Neverthelees, if you insist that there was one or more recessions in colonial America, I wouldn't argue the point. A lot can happen over roughly 150 years.

why faster transportations and communications would make a difference. It's nonsensical.

The cycle does not take place in a vaccum, a fully literate population with access to fairly cheap and reliable transportation is going to experence a faster pace to events. For example, the social moment of the great awakening began in new england in 1734 and it ended there about the time that the change in outlook had filtered south to Georgia, to the extent that it did, roughly a decade later. In contrast the social moment of the boom awakening began in San Francisco in 1967 and by 1970 boomer teens in the south had long hair and asked each other "really bitchin' questions like do you dig man?" I know because I lived through it.
Not only does modern transportation and communication make a difference in speed but also in depth of pernetration. For example, how many of the great revolutionary war leaders came from Georgia? Not really any. They all came from father north, closer to the center of where the great awakening had its greatest impact in setting up the sense of America identity as seperate from that of England. OTOH, in the very 2T year of 1976 Georgia's Jimmy Carter, was elected president largely by promising a cleaner, more honest government. He even promised once, the only president who ever has, that he would never tell a lie as president. How 2T can you get?
Geprgia absorbed the boom awakening fully enough to elect a moderate southern Democrat Jimmy Carter governor in 1970. Which was a year in which the issue of segregation was still hot in the deep south. Six years later, after rpomising never to tell a lie, hewas elected president. Two centuries eariler Georgia had been too much of a backwater to provide true national leadership even 30 years, two turnings after the great awakening ended.

Yeah, I still maintain that modernity in technology speeds up the cycle. Why would you suppose that it wouldn't?

Originally Posted by herbal tee

The cycle does not take place in a vaccum, a fully literate population with access to fairly cheap and reliable transportation is going to experence a faster pace to events. For example, the social moment of the great awakening began in new england in 1734 and it ended there about the time that the change in outlook had filtered south to Georgia, to the extent that it did, roughly a decade later. In contrast the social moment of the boom awakening began in San Francisco in 1967 and by 1970 boomer teens in the south had long hair and asked each other "really bitchin' questions like do you dig man?" I know because I lived through it.
Not only does modern transportation and communication make a difference in speed but also in depth of pernetration. For example, how many of the great revolutionary war leaders came from Georgia? Not really any. They all came from father north, closer to the center of where the great awakening had its greatest impact in setting up the sense of America identity as seperate from that of England. OTOH, in the very 2T year of 1976 Georgia's Jimmy Carter, was elected president largely by promising a cleaner, more honest government. He even promised once, the only president who ever has, that he would never tell a lie as president. How 2T can you get?
Geprgia absorbed the boom awakening fully enough to elect a moderate southern Democrat Jimmy Carter governor in 1970. Which was a year in which the issue of segregation was still hot in the deep south. Six years later, after rpomising never to tell a lie, hewas elected president. Two centuries eariler Georgia had been too much of a backwater to provide true national leadership even 30 years, two turnings after the great awakening ended.

Yeah, I still maintain that modernity in technology speeds up the cycle. Why would you suppose that it wouldn't?

Because it has nothing to do with the forces that drive generational shifts. If we are talking turnings (which follow and also drive generations), then I suppose modern technology can accelerate the speed at which one region begins to experience the social moments that go along with generational alignments.

Notice that I'm separating generational alignment from turnings. Changes in generational alignments are continually occurring, but once in every 20 or so years, they usher in a new "generational era," as the oldest members of a generation enter a new "life phase." This stream is pretty constant. What is not constant is the length of the turnings, which I am defining by the events that occur. In this past saeculum, the High was 18 years, the awakening 21, and the unraveling 17, 20, or ??. In other saeculums, there is even more variance, especially for the unraveling.

So for an example, the east coast may begin to really hit the right generational alignment at year 18, but its effects may not become apparent until year 19 -- while the effects on the west coast may not become apparent until year 22. What I think improved technology can do is make the west coast's effects become apparent at year 20 or 21. With faster transportation, information and culture can travel from one region to the next with greater speed.

So yes, I do believe technology can alter the "turning," or the effects of the generational alignment slightly, but not the generations themselves -- unless through the minor alterations in turning length.

Some general comments.

The Panic of 1914

I'd never even heard of the Panic of 1914 until Matt mentioned it in
a posting a few weeks ago. Before that, I'd assumed that the Panics
of 1907 and 1921 were the only two relevant 1900s panics prior to
1929. I've just checked some reference books that I've used, and
they don't mention the Panic of 1914 either.

The stock market fell 24.39% on ONE DAY, November 11, 1914, but
mainstream historians apparently don't consider the Panic of 1914 to
actually be a panic because it occurred after the markets had been
closed for several weeks because of the outbreak of the Great War.

And yet, checking it out reveals that it's INCREDIBLY IMPORTANT, much
more important than the panics of 1907 or 1921. Furthermore, it's
important in exactly the same way that the Panic of 1987 was
important.

Here are some comparisons:
Both of the panics established or reestablished the US as the
monetary superpower of the world.
Both of the panics established the reputation of one man,
Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo and Fed chairman Alan Greenspan,
respectively, as monetary gurus who had found the way to protect the
economy by prompt, decisive action.
In both cases, the prompt, decisive action consisted of injecting
liquidity into the economy to keep the banking system solvent.
Each panic occurred 58 years after the preceding generational
crash (1857 and 1929, respectively).
In both cases, the quick recovery from the panic convinced the
investor public that the problems that had caused the preceding
generational crash had been completely solved and implemented by
McAdoo or Greenspan, respectively, and that there was nothing to fear
from a new crash.

So, I call it the Panic of 1914, but if you want to call it the
"financial crisis of 1914," that's OK too. But what's important is
the really striking parallels with the Panic of 1987.

For more information, read the extensive quotes
by William L. Silber in my article.

** Investors commemorate the false panic of Monday, October 19, 1987
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/cgi-bin/D.PL?xct=gd.e071019#e071019

The 58 Year Hypothesis

It's true that the 58 year hypothesis needs more research, but it's
not exactly an "off the wall concept." It actually makes a lot of
sense.

The cycle begins with a disaster very similar to the kind of disaster
that causes a fourth turning regeneracy. To use the words of S&H,
the disaster should have been "foreseeable but poorly
foreseen."

The disaster does not have to be synchronized with the society's
overall generational cycle, though it might be. For example, a major
disaster like the Spanish flu epidemic of 1918 is not related in any
way to any generational cycle, but the 58 year hypothesis still
applies.

Let's try to outline what happens in the general case:
Some disaster occurs. The disaster is "foreseeable but
poorly foreseen." It causes changes in behaviors and
attitudes of large masses of people, who wish to make sure that a
similar disaster never happens again. However, nobody is quite sure
whether it's even possible to keep it from happening again.
Call the people who survive the disaster Generation-A; call the
people born after the disaster Generation-B.
As the years go by, the A's are very cautious and refuse to take
any risks that might cause a recurrence of the disaster. For
example, they might be obsessively clean after a flu pandemic, or
they might never use credit after a financial crisis.
The A's preach caution to their children, the B's. The B's rebel
against their parents, just as Prophets rebel against their Hero
parents.
The A's notice that the B's aren't nearly as careful as they (the
A's) are, but as long as the A's are in charge, they don't worry
about it.
58 years after the disaster, a time of significant generational
change occurs. They youngest A's are 62 years old, just when they're
about to retire.
At precisely that point, the A's realize that the B's are
screwing up. The A's panic, and cause the "false panic" that occurs
58 years after the disaster.
When everyone realizes that the panic is a fiasco, then the B's
become convinced that their old fart parents don't know what they're
talking about, and that all the caution over a new disaster was a
waste of time and energy.
When the disaster occurs again, the whole cycle repeats.

Notice that this can be thought of as a generalization of the whole
S&H concept. Instead of looking at generational cycles as being
triggered ONLY by crisis wars, we can think of the generational cycle
triggered by ANY TYPE of disaster, provided that it meets certain
criteria, as summarized earlier.

Here are the major examples of the 58 year hypothesis that we have
now:
The False Panic of 1987 occurred 58 years after the previous
generational crash, the Panic of 1929.
The False Swine Flu panic of 1976 occurred 58 years after the
Spanish flu pandemic of 1918.
The False Panic of 1914 occurred 58(-1) years after the previous
generational crash, the Panic of 1857.
The mid-saeculum period that runs from the end of one crisis war
to the beginning of the next crisis war is most often 58 years. This
provides another way of understanding the kind of panic that causes a
new crisis war to begin.

The 58 Year Hypothesis is fairly strongly supported by both theory
and examples, but more research is needed. This research would
consist of examining historical disasters and looking for something
that would be recognizable as a "false panic," 58 years later.
Unfortunately, those false panics may be hard to find in history
books, as the lack of recognition of the Panic of 1914 illustrates.

Technology

I don't see how technology could have any systematic effect on
turning lengths or crisis wars. It's more likely that technological
developments have a chaotic effect; that is, a technological
development may either hurry or delay the start of a new crisis war
in an unpredictable manner.

However, I have hypothesized that technology might have an effect on
non-crisis wars. The hypothesis is that non-crisis wars are likely
to be correlated to technological developments, especially war
technology, since a nation that has a temporary technological
advantage may choose that time to initiate a war. (This reasoning
doesn't apply to crisis wars, since crisis wars are poorly planned
and are based on panic.)

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Great post John! Do you have any more examples of the 58 year theory?

There were a series of postings made by 1990 and I some time ago on the discovery of a "near-crisis" occurring approximately 60 years following the previous crisis. The "near-crisis" eventually petered out, only to resurface during the 5th turning -- which I suspect will happen with Russia, Mexico, Turkey, and Ireland. I suspect there may be some relation between these two theories.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

Great post John! Do you have any more examples of the 58 year theory?

There were a series of postings made by 1990 and I some time ago on the discovery of a "near-crisis" occurring approximately 60 years following the previous crisis. The "near-crisis" eventually petered out, only to resurface during the 5th turning -- which I suspect will happen with Russia, Mexico, Turkey, and Ireland. I suspect there may be some relation between these two theories.

I have doubts about a 58 year theory, because that would require crisis wars to occur while the artists still have major political influence as well as a few later born promenent heros (ex. GHW bush, dole). This conflicts with the fact that most war phases of the crisis occur when prophet/nomad cuspers occupy the top leadership. When looking at the Last saeculum and before according to this theory WW2 should have occured in the early 1920's, before that the civil war occuring in the 1840's and before that the french and indian war instead of the revolutionary war being the crisis.

Originally Posted by Cynic Hero '86

I have doubts about a 58 year theory, because that would require crisis wars to occur while the artists still have major political influence as well as a few later born promenent heros (ex. GHW bush, dole). This conflicts with the fact that most war phases of the crisis occur when prophet/nomad cuspers occupy the top leadership. When looking at the Last saeculum and before according to this theory WW2 should have occured in the early 1920's, before that the civil war occuring in the 1840's and before that the french and indian war instead of the revolutionary war being the crisis.

Once again, you didn't read very carefully. The 58 year thing isn't about crisis wars.

If it were, it's only 2 years off from 60.

Originally Posted by Cynic Hero '86

I have doubts about a 58 year theory, because that would require crisis wars to occur while the artists still have major political influence as well as a few later born promenent heros (ex. GHW bush, dole). This conflicts with the fact that most war phases of the crisis occur when prophet/nomad cuspers occupy the top leadership. When looking at the Last saeculum and before according to this theory WW2 should have occured in the early 1920's, before that the civil war occuring in the 1840's and before that the french and indian war instead of the revolutionary war being the crisis.

I think what they're saying here is that we get a *phony* crisis at such times, from which we recover, and that (artist-led?) recovery makes us cocky, so that when the real thing hits several years down the road, we think we have another phony crisis on our hands and react accordingly. Do I understand this correctly?

Originally Posted by The Grey Badger

I think what they're saying here is that we get a *phony* crisis at such times, from which we recover, and that (artist-led?) recovery makes us cocky, so that when the real thing hits several years down the road, we think we have another phony crisis on our hands and react accordingly. Do I understand this correctly?

If so then our "phoney Crisis" is 9/11, the afghan and iraq wars. This coupled with the victory in the cold war may cause our leaders to underestimate future threats (Axis of evil?, china?, resurgent russia?).

Originally Posted by Cynic Hero '86

the victory in the cold war may cause our leaders to underestimate future threats (Axis of evil?, china?, resurgent russia?).

IOW, the 3t psudocoda or false end of history, helps set up the next crises by making people think that things in the unraveling outer world are going better than they really are.
Look at the pattern. The end of the French and Indian war in 1763 was supposed to bring about a golden age for British America due to the threat of a French attack being gone. Instead, it caused a split between London and the colonies. Similarly, the Mexican War victory in 1848 didn't unify America, it likely hastened the civil war split. And everyone knew that WWI was the war that made the world safe for democracy, at least until Hitler came into power.
In a 3T, a society is ill prepaired generationally to take advantege of what should be very good news. The golden moment passes and the short term orented actions, such as the overly harsh punishing of Germany after WWI, that do result from the given situation help bring about the next crises.

Originally Posted by The Grey Badger

I think what they're saying here is that we get a *phony* crisis at such times, from which we recover, and that (artist-led?) recovery makes us cocky, so that when the real thing hits several years down the road, we think we have another phony crisis on our hands and react accordingly. Do I understand this correctly?

Pretty much

Originally Posted by Cynic Hero '86

If so then our "phoney Crisis" is 9/11, the afghan and iraq wars. This coupled with the victory in the cold war may cause our leaders to underestimate future threats (Axis of evil?, china?, resurgent russia?).

Perhaps this is true, but it doesn't have anything to do with the 58-year thing. Think of it this way: Crises start appx. 58 years following the climax of the previous one. But what happens when a major event (such as the stock market crash of 1929) occurs at the beginning of the prior crisis? Those that had lived through it would suddenly pass the torch on to a younger generation 58 years later. You may experience a brief and phony panic during the unraveling.

Now, the "phony fourth," as it is being called, has been a time of minor scares and disasters with some significant changes and government paralysis... at the same time!

For all the crap that has gone on in Iraq, the best thing that may come out of it is, "Okay, so we really don't understand. And we're not invincible." From a pro-American point of view, the decision to invade Iraq may just save our asses from a true catastrophe. Of course, it could easily be turned the other way and Iraq may directly play a role in the U.S. downfall.

Oh, the possibilities! It's like watching a horror movie!

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Some general comments.

The Panic of 1914

I'd never even heard of the Panic of 1914 until Matt mentioned it in
a posting a few weeks ago. Before that, I'd assumed that the Panics
of 1907 and 1921 were the only two relevant 1900s panics prior to
1929. I've just checked some reference books that I've used, and
they don't mention the Panic of 1914 either.

The stock market fell 24.39% on ONE DAY, November 11, 1914, but
mainstream historians apparently don't consider the Panic of 1914 to
actually be a panic because it occurred after the markets had been
closed for several weeks because of the outbreak of the Great War.

And yet, checking it out reveals that it's INCREDIBLY IMPORTANT, much
more important than the panics of 1907 or 1921. Furthermore, it's
important in exactly the same way that the Panic of 1987 was
important.

Here are some comparisons:
Both of the panics established or reestablished the US as the
monetary superpower of the world.
Both of the panics established the reputation of one man,
Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo and Fed chairman Alan Greenspan,
respectively, as monetary gurus who had found the way to protect the
economy by prompt, decisive action.
In both cases, the prompt, decisive action consisted of injecting
liquidity into the economy to keep the banking system solvent.
Each panic occurred 58 years after the preceding generational
crash (1857 and 1929, respectively).
In both cases, the quick recovery from the panic convinced the
investor public that the problems that had caused the preceding
generational crash had been completely solved and implemented by
McAdoo or Greenspan, respectively, and that there was nothing to fear
from a new crash.

So, I call it the Panic of 1914, but if you want to call it the
"financial crisis of 1914," that's OK too. But what's important is
the really striking parallels with the Panic of 1987.

For more information, read the extensive quotes
by William L. Silber in my article.

** Investors commemorate the false panic of Monday, October 19, 1987
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/cgi-bin/D.PL?xct=gd.e071019#e071019

The 58 Year Hypothesis

It's true that the 58 year hypothesis needs more research, but it's
not exactly an "off the wall concept." It actually makes a lot of
sense.

The cycle begins with a disaster very similar to the kind of disaster
that causes a fourth turning regeneracy. To use the words of S&H,
the disaster should have been "foreseeable but poorly
foreseen."

The disaster does not have to be synchronized with the society's
overall generational cycle, though it might be. For example, a major
disaster like the Spanish flu epidemic of 1918 is not related in any
way to any generational cycle, but the 58 year hypothesis still
applies.

Let's try to outline what happens in the general case:
Some disaster occurs. The disaster is "foreseeable but
poorly foreseen." It causes changes in behaviors and
attitudes of large masses of people, who wish to make sure that a
similar disaster never happens again. However, nobody is quite sure
whether it's even possible to keep it from happening again.
Call the people who survive the disaster Generation-A; call the
people born after the disaster Generation-B.
As the years go by, the A's are very cautious and refuse to take
any risks that might cause a recurrence of the disaster. For
example, they might be obsessively clean after a flu pandemic, or
they might never use credit after a financial crisis.
The A's preach caution to their children, the B's. The B's rebel
against their parents, just as Prophets rebel against their Hero
parents.
The A's notice that the B's aren't nearly as careful as they (the
A's) are, but as long as the A's are in charge, they don't worry
about it.
58 years after the disaster, a time of significant generational
change occurs. They youngest A's are 62 years old, just when they're
about to retire.
At precisely that point, the A's realize that the B's are
screwing up. The A's panic, and cause the "false panic" that occurs
58 years after the disaster.
When everyone realizes that the panic is a fiasco, then the B's
become convinced that their old fart parents don't know what they're
talking about, and that all the caution over a new disaster was a
waste of time and energy.
When the disaster occurs again, the whole cycle repeats.

Notice that this can be thought of as a generalization of the whole
S&H concept. Instead of looking at generational cycles as being
triggered ONLY by crisis wars, we can think of the generational cycle
triggered by ANY TYPE of disaster, provided that it meets certain
criteria, as summarized earlier.

Here are the major examples of the 58 year hypothesis that we have
now:
The False Panic of 1987 occurred 58 years after the previous
generational crash, the Panic of 1929.
The False Swine Flu panic of 1976 occurred 58 years after the
Spanish flu pandemic of 1918.
The False Panic of 1914 occurred 58(-1) years after the previous
generational crash, the Panic of 1857.
The mid-saeculum period that runs from the end of one crisis war
to the beginning of the next crisis war is most often 58 years. This
provides another way of understanding the kind of panic that causes a
new crisis war to begin.

The 58 Year Hypothesis is fairly strongly supported by both theory
and examples, but more research is needed. This research would
consist of examining historical disasters and looking for something
that would be recognizable as a "false panic," 58 years later.
Unfortunately, those false panics may be hard to find in history
books, as the lack of recognition of the Panic of 1914 illustrates.

Technology

I don't see how technology could have any systematic effect on
turning lengths or crisis wars. It's more likely that technological
developments have a chaotic effect; that is, a technological
development may either hurry or delay the start of a new crisis war
in an unpredictable manner.

However, I have hypothesized that technology might have an effect on
non-crisis wars. The hypothesis is that non-crisis wars are likely
to be correlated to technological developments, especially war
technology, since a nation that has a temporary technological
advantage may choose that time to initiate a war. (This reasoning
doesn't apply to crisis wars, since crisis wars are poorly planned
and are based on panic.)

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

There's another explanation: the British (and likely others) were selling off many of the American assets that they owned to finance their expensive involvement in World War I. Established assets that had never been for sale suddenly were for sale, and buyers weren't available quickly enough. Those assets included railroads that British investors had partly financed. That panic corresponds with the beginning of the decline of American railroads.

A panic that results from such a cause need not result in a Depression. There had been no prior overvaluation of assets, as would contribute to the Crash of 1929.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

Perhaps this is true, but it doesn't have anything to do with the 58-year thing. Think of it this way: Crises start appx. 58 years following the climax of the previous one. But what happens when a major event (such as the stock market crash of 1929) occurs at the beginning of the prior crisis? Those that had lived through it would suddenly pass the torch on to a younger generation 58 years later. You may experience a brief and phony panic during the unraveling.

Now, the "phony fourth," as it is being called, has been a time of minor scares and disasters with some significant changes and government paralysis... at the same time!

For all the crap that has gone on in Iraq, the best thing that may come out of it is, "Okay, so we really don't understand. And we're not invincible." From a pro-American point of view, the decision to invade Iraq may just save our asses from a true catastrophe. Of course, it could easily be turned the other way and directly play a role.

Oh, the possibilities! It's like watching a horror movie!

One explanation: most Americans have 4T attitudes, but the governmental leadership acts in post-seasonal 3T ways, acting as if little has changed and that business as usual is a good paradigm. Post-seasonal behavior -- like people trying to maintain hippie lifestyles into the 1990s is at best comical and irrelevant. At worst it is, like Herbert Hoover's reliance upon 3T fiscal restraint to meet the worsening economic conditions that brought about a 4T, Senator McCarthy's ill-founded and reckless inquisition against alleged Commies (4T attacks on "enemies of the people" into the 1T), and attempts to preserve segregation into the Boom Awakening (the attempt to maintain a 1T hierarchy into a time in which hierarchy of any kind is suspect), contemptible and destructive. "Devil take the hindmost" economics and politics that worked for Reagan are a disaster for George Worthless Bush, Karl Rogue, and Tom DeLiar because they have played out before the 43rd Presidency.

False panics vs Real panics

The discussion of the 58 year hypothesis has raised a number of very
good questions that need to be addressed. These are some additional
thoughts.

The main issue has to do with "false panics" (like the panic of 1987)
and "real panics" (like new crisis wars that begin 58 years after the
end of the previous crisis war).

False panics and real panics have something very big in common:
They're both panics.

And they both occur about 58 years after some disastrous event that
transformed society. This is reasonable, since that's the time that
the last of the people who survived the disastrous event are 62 years
old, and about to retire.

The DIFFERENCE between them is about the environment and the reaction
to the panic.

Thus, the panic of 1987 was a panic, but it was a false panic because
the stock market was underpriced and recovered quickly. A panic
today would be a real panic, because the stock market is overpriced
by a factor of 250%+.

The number 58 isn't absolute. The statistical term is "mode,"
meaning that more crisis wars begin in year 58 (of the saeculum) than
in any other year.

Here's the table that I've posted several times before:

Code:

LENGTH OF INTER-CRISIS PERIOD Fraction # years of total Turning ------- -------- ------------------ 0- 40 0% 1T, 2T 41- 49 11% first half of 3T 50- 59 33% second half of 3T 60- 69 25% first half of 4T 70- 79 16% second half of 4T 80- 89 4% fifth turning 90- 99 6% 100-117 5%

If we go back to my original figures, and we focus on the range of
years from 40-79, then here's the distribution table:

Code:

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ------- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 40-49 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 50-59 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 5 4 60-69 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 70-79 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1

As you can see, of the 100+ wars that I looked at, 5 of them began in
year 58, with 5 being the highest count. The counts drop off rapidly
before and after 58, indicating that 58 really is a special year in
generational theory.

Regeneracy versus Backlash and Resolution

Let's look at how Strauss and Howe describe the regeneracy:

Originally Posted by The Fourth Turning pages 257-258

> The catalyst can be one spark or, more commonly, a series of
> sparks that self-ignite like the firecrackers traditionally used
> by the Chinese to mark their own breaks in the circle of time.
> Each of these sparks is linked to a specific threat about which
> the society had been fully informed but against which it had left
> itself poorly protected. Afterward, the fact that these sparks
> were foreseeable but poorly foreseen gives rise to a
> new sense of urgency about institutional dysfunction and civic
> vulnerablity. This marks the beginning of the vertiginous spiral
> of Crisis.

> Once this new mood is fully catalyzed, a society begins a process
> of regeneracy, a drawing together into whatever definition
> of community is available at the time. Out of the debris of the
> Unraveling, a new civic ethos arises. One set of post-Awakening
> ideals prevails over the others. People stop tolerating the
> weakening of institutions, splintering of the culture, and the
> individualizing of daily behavior. Spiritual curiosity abates,
> manners traditionalize, and the culture is harnessed as
> propanganda for the purpose of overtly reinforcing good conduct.
> History teaches that, roughly one to three years after the initial
> catalyst, people begin acknowledging this new synergy in community
> life and begin deputizing government to enforce it. Collective
> action is now seen as vital to solving the society's most
> fundamental problems.

> A Crisis mood does not guarantee that the new governing policies
> will be well designed or will work as intended. To the contrary:
> Crisis eras are studded with faulty leadership and inept
> management -- from President Lincoln's poor record of choosing
> generals to President Roosevelt's collassal blunders with such
> alphabet soup agencies as the AAA, NRA and WPA. [p. 258] What
> makes a Crisis special is the public's willlingness to let leaders
> lead even when they falter and to let authorities be authoritative
> even when they make mistakes. Amid this civic solidarity,
> mediocre leaders can gain immense popular following; bad policies
> can be made to work (or, at least, be perceived as working); and,
> as at Pearl Harbor, even a spectacular failure does not undermine
> public support. Good policy choices pay off quickly. (In an
> Awakening, by contrast, even the best leaders and plans can fail,
> and one misstep can destroy public confidence.)

The concept behind "regeneracy" is that civic unity is "regenerated,"
and that the society rejects the old political battles and unifies.

But Strauss and Howe's description is more nuanced than that. There's
not a total unity, but a shift toward unity.

Whenever the subject of regeneracy comes up, I always remember that
in 1864, at the height of the Civil War, the Democratic Party
platform called for an end to hostilities through negotiation with
the South, allowing slavery to continue. Ironically, if you read the
1864 Democratic Party platform and change a few of the words, it
sounds just like the Democrats today. Plus ça change, plus c'est la
même chose.
http://www.sewanee.edu/faculty/Willi...emocratic.html

The point is that there's no absolute unity, even after "regeneracy."
There's simply a shifted balance of opinion from one pole to another.
It's not the regeneracy that unifies the country but the climax and
resolution (in the case above, completely discrediting the "peace
Democrats"). At that point, there's a RETROSPECTIVE decision as to
who was right.

Strauss and Howe describe the morphology of crisis eras as going
through these steps: Catalyst, regeneracy, climax, resolution.

We'll replace this morphology with the following steps:
Catalyst - series of sparks as before.
Panic or panicked response. This is most likely to occur in year
58.
There are two groups:
Regeneracy: Those that support the panicked response.
Backlash: Those that oppose the panicked response.

During a war, political power will shift back and forth between the
two groups, depending on how things are going.
Climax and resolution: Determines who was right (the "regeneracy"
people or the "backlash" people).

And so, we're now able to define the difference between a "false
panic" and a "real panic":
A "false panic" is one in which the backlash group wins -- i.e.,
the panicked response is resolved as a mistake.
A "real panic" is one in which the regeneracy group wins -- i.e.,
the panicked response is resolved as correct.

Examples of false panics

Now let's look at some examples of false panics, and see how they fit
into this morphology.
Panic of 1987, Panic of 1914.

Panicked response: Selling into the stock market collapse.
Regeneracy: Failed, because the stock market recovered. Backlash:
Resolved as correct, because the panic must have been a mistake.
Climax: The stock market recovered quickly. Resolution: Policy
decisions are credited with the quick recovery from the panic. The
resolution is that a crash will never occur again, since the same
policy decisions can always be used.

Contrafactual: If it had resulted in a Great Depression, then the
regeneracy would have resulted in another "New Deal" set of
regulations, and so forth.
Panic of 1772. The Ayr Bank in Scotland had issued paper
currency freely to aid speculators in housing and toll roads. A bad
crop harvest on the Continent triggered the failure of a speculative
investment by London banker Alexander Fordyce, which triggered the
failure of the Ayr Bank, leading to the Panic of 1772. This
triggered the failure of the Bank of England in July 1772, from which
it recovered quickly. However, many colonial businesses were in debt
to the English banks, and were suddenly unable to obtain further
credit, forcing them to liquidate their inventories, thus ending their
businesses. This infuriated the colonists, leading to the Boston Tea
Party and the Revolutionary War.

The quick recovery of the Bank of England after the Panic of 1771
indicates a "false panic," but the event occurred only 51 years after
the bursting of the South Sea Bubble (1721), so it may or may not be
an example of the 58 year hypothesis.
Swine Flu Panic of 1976. The Swine Flu False Panic of 1976
occurred exactly 58 years after the Spanish Flu epidemic of 1918. A
new pandemic was feared.

Panicked response: Massive vaccination program for American public.
Regeneracy: Failed, because no pandemic occurred. Backlash: No
vaccination program is needed. Climax: A political fiasco, as more
people died from the vaccine than from the flu. Resolution: A flu
pandemic is nothing to worry about.

Contrafactual: If there had been a large swine flu pandemic, then
there would have been major policy changes in health policy.
Palmer Raids of 1919. On June 2, 1919, a number of bombs
were detonated in Washington and seven other American cities. This
caused a panic that led to the rounding up of thousands of "radicals"
and "leftists," jailing many. The panic lasted about a year, but ended
in political fiasco when an expected "Communist revolution" didn't
occur on May 1, 1920.

This panic occurred 58 years after Abraham Lincoln suspended
habeas corpus in 1861 during the Civil War. This act
permitted the government to round up people and jail them without a
trial or legal representation.

Panicked response: Jailing of leftists. Regeneracy: Failed, because
no insurrection occurred. Climax: A political fiasco. Resolution:
Restoration of civil rights.

Contrafactual: If there had been an actual Communist uprising in
1921, then it may well have lead to a new American civil war in the
1930s or 1940s.
Israel war with Hizbollah in Lebanon, 2006.
When Hizbollah captured two Israeli soldiers, Israel panicked and,
within four hours, launched a war with no plans and no objectives.
This occurred 58 years after the creation of Israel that launched the
genocidal war between Jews and Palestinians in 1948-49.

Panicked response: War with Hizbollah. Regeneracy: Failed, because
Israel did not destroy Hizbollah, did not recapture soldiers, DID
destroy much Lebanon infrastructure. Backlash: The war was a big
mistake by the Olmert administration.
** Israeli governnment in crisis after report on war with Hizbollah
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/cgi-bin/D.PL?xct=gd.e070504#e070504

Resolution: It's too early for a final resolution.

Contrafactual: Lebanon is in a generational Awakening era. If
Lebanon had been in a Crisis era, then the attack would have spiraled
into a full-scale Mideast war.
1938 radio broadcast, "War of the Worlds."

This was a very tense time for Americans, who were still in the depths
of the Great Depression. Radios were selling at a record pace, as
Hitler was rallying his forces in Europe, having already taken control
of the Sudetenland area in Czechoslovakia. On the other side of the
world, the Japanese had invaded China and were in the process of
taking over. Many were extremely anxious about war.

In this atmosphere, the radio program appeared to be a music program
interrupted by news bulletins reporting on an invasion of Martians in
cities around the country. Although announcements during the program
informed listeners that it was fiction, tens or hundreds of thousands
of listeners panicked, believing that a real invasion was taking
place. A substantial minority believed that it was a German
invasion rather than a Martian invasion.

As far as I know, this is not an example of a 58-year panic, but it
IS an example of a panic that occurs in a Crisis era.

This is a great example because it occurred in a generational crisis
era, and it illustrates how large masses of people react to threats
of war during crisis periods. If that much panic occurred among a
relatively few listeners to a radio program describing a fictional
event, imagine how much greater the panic would have been if the
story had been about a REAL German or Japanese invasion.

Panicked response: Running out into the streets to kill the Martians
and/or Germans. Regeneracy: Failed, because there were no Martians,
and no Germans. Backlash: Nothing to worry about. Climax: People out
in the streets realize they look like idiots. Resolution: Years of
government grants for psychological studies to determine why people
panicked.

Contrafactual: If it had been an actual German invasion, WW II would
have started. It it had been an actual Martian invasion -- well, who
knows?
Salem Witch Trials of 1692. Four teenage girls appeared to
have epileptic fits, and accused several neighbors of witchcraft.
Panic ensued, and by the time it was all over, dozens of people had
been jailed and 20 had died.

This has all the earmarks of a false panic. Does anyone know of
anything special that happened in New England in 1634?

The Iraq War

I want to discuss this example at greater length.

The Iraq war began in 1991, in reaction Saddam Hussein's 1990
invasion of Kuwait. The 16-year war against Saddam began with
enormous restraint.

First, Iraq was ejected from Kuwait. Then there were several years
of overflights to protect the Kurds and Sunnis from Saddam.

The Clinton administration escalated the war with Operation Provide
Comfort in 1996 and Operation Northern Watch in December, 1998.

The latter phase began in earnest in December, 1998, when Saddam
expelled the U.N. weapons inspectors. The Clinton/Gore
administration immediately began furiously bombing Iraq, and that
bombing continued on almost a daily basis, into the next
administration.
http://www.nytimes.com/library/world...-conflict.html

Everything up to 2003 could be considered a measured, "unraveling
era" response, representing policies of containment and compromise.

We normally view the 2003 ground invasion as a follow-on to the 9/11
attacks and the Afghan war.

I would like to propose an entirely different explanation of the 2003
ground invasion:
World War II ended in 1945. The climax of the war was the use of
nuclear weapons (WMDs) on the enemy, triggering their immediate
unconditional surrender. The resolution was (in part) that WMDs were
effective weapons in immediately ending a war.
58 years later, 2003, the American public began to panic over
WMDs.
The result was a panicked, poorly planned ground invasion of
Iraq to remove Saddam and destroy the WMDs. Regeneracy: Failed,
because no WMDs were found. Backlash: The ground invasion must have
been an enormous mistake. Climax and resolution: Too early to tell.
(However, see the Democratic Party platform of 1864 referenced
earlier in this posting.)

Looking at it this way, the ground invasion of Iraq had NOTHING TO DO
with 9/11. It would have occurred anyway, because of panic over
WMDs. This may be surprising, but remember that the Iraq war has
been going on since 1991, and daily bombing had been going on since
1998. In the absence of 9/11, it's perfectly reasonable to assume
that the same kind of public panic over WMDs would have occurred, and
the same kind of ground invasion would have occurred.

Panicked response: Ground invasion of Iraq. Regeneracy: Failed,
because no WMDs were found. Backlash: Bad war, a repeat of the
Vietnam war. Climax and resolution: Too early to determine.

Contrafactual: If WMDs had been found, along with evidence that
Saddam had planned to use them, then we would have continued on into
Syria and Iran by now.

Theoretical conclusions.

Almost from the day that I picked up the book The Fourth
Turning, shortly after 9/11, the "Great Depression anomaly" has
been a major concern for me. I went through a year-long process
trying to decide for myself whether generational theory was valid, or
was at the level of astrology. TFT is based on a sample of only six
saeculae, and with so few samples, every anomaly had to be credibly
explained for the theory to have any validity.

I resolved this anomaly in two ways:
Every crisis war occurs in conjunction with a major financial
crisis. This really isn't surprising, but it has to be mentioned.
If you go back through history, there are of course many small or
regional recessions. But since the 1600s there have been only five
major international financial crises: the 1637 Tulipomania bubble,
the South Sea bubble of the 1710s-20s, the bankruptcy of the French
monarchy in the 1789, the Panic of 1857 (also known as the Hamburg
Crisis of 1857) and the 1929 Wall Street crash. These major
international financial crises are on a timeline all their own,
independent of any country's crisis war timeline.

The recognition of the 58 year hypothesis provides additional
resolution to the anomaly, by explaining how a financial crisis leads
to a false panic after 58 years, convincing people that there's
nothing to fear from a new crisis, permitting a real panic and crisis
to occur later.

Beyond that, the 58 year hypothesis adds some additional texture to
generational theory in general in the following ways:
Instead of tying all generational events to crisis wars, we can
now view any general disaster as something with generational impact.
Think of a societal disaster as an earthquake that creates a tsunami
that reaches land 58 years later.
Different kinds of events can create complete independent
generational timelines. For example, a financial timeline may be
different from a war timeline. However, timelines can interact with
each other, as a financial crisis can cause a war crisis, or vice
versa.
However, different kinds of generational timelines may not have
the same kinds of turnings as crisis war timelines. Turnings may not
apply at all to financial crisis timelines or flu pandemic timelines.
There may be no "fourth turning" concept at all. (Although I would
market the beginning of the "fourth turning" following the 1929 crash
as beginning with the 1995 bubble.)
The 1930s fourth turning never really made sense, since the
crisis mood was entirely over financial issues, not much over
war-related issues. But now we can look at the financial fourth
turning as beginning in 1929, and the war fourth turning as beginning
at some time in the 1930s.

There are plenty of opportunities for research projects here, both
formal and informal.

Just pick your favorite historical catastrophe and research whether
something related happened 58 years later; or, pick some panic that
turned into a fiasco, and look 58 years earlier to see what caused
it.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Roger Williams and the Salem Witch Trials

In my previous posting, I wrote the following:

Salem Witch Trials of 1692. Four teenage girls appeared to
have epileptic fits, and accused several neighbors of witchcraft.
Panic ensued, and by the time it was all over, dozens of people had
been jailed and 20 had died.

This has all the earmarks of a false panic. Does anyone know of
anything special that happened in New England in 1634?

It turns out that there was a really major event in Salem in 1634:
The Pastor, Roger Williams, was banished from Salem for making
controversial remarks about the Church.

What happened isn't the stuff of major catastrophes, however. On the
other hand, maybe what looks like a simple personnel change today was
much more traumatic centuries ago.

Here's the summary:

Originally Posted by Wikipedia

> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_W...8theologian%29

> Roger Williams (December 21, 1603–April 1, 1683) was an English
> theologian, a notable proponent of the separation of Church and
> State, an advocate for fair dealings with Native Americans,
> founder of the city of Providence, Rhode Island and co-founder of
> the colony of Rhode Island. He is the originator of either the
> first or second Baptist church established in America. ...

> In the summer of 1633, Williams arrived in Salem and became
> unofficial assistant to Pastor Skelton. In August, 1634, (Skelton
> having died), he became acting pastor and entered almost
> immediately into controversies with the Massachusetts authorities
> that in a few months resulted in his exile by law from Salem after
> being brought before the Salem Court for spreading "diverse, new,
> and dangerous opinions" that questioned the Church. The law
> exiling Williams was not repealed until 1936 when Bill 488 was
> passed by the Massachusetts House.

> He was formally set apart as pastor of the church about May,
> 1635, against the earnest protests of the Massachusetts
> authorities. An outline of the issues raised by Williams and
> uncompromisingly pressed includes the following:

> 1. He regarded the Church of England as apostate, and any kind of
> fellowship with it as grievous sin. He accordingly renounced
> communion not only with this church but with all who would not
> join with him in repudiating it.

> 2. He denounced the charter of the Massachusetts Company because
> it falsely represented the king of England as a Christian, and
> assumed that he had the right to give to his own subjects the land
> of the native Indians. He disapproved of "the unchristian oaths
> swallowed down" by the colonists "at their coming forth from Old
> England, especially in the superstitious Laud's time and
> domineering." He drew up a letter addressed to the King expressing
> his dissatisfaction with the charter and sought to secure for it
> the endorsement of prominent colonists. In this letter he is said
> to have charged King James I with blasphemy for calling Europe
> "Christendom" and to have applied to the reigning king some of
> the most opprobrious epithets in the Apocalypse.

> 3. Equally disquieting was Williams' opposition to the "citizens'
> oath," which magistrates sought to force upon the colonists in
> order to be assured of their loyalty. Williams maintained that it
> was Christ's sole prerogative to have his office established by
> oath, and that unregenerate men ought not in any case to be
> invited to perform any religious act. In opposing the oath
> Williams gained so much popular support that the measure had to be
> abandoned.

> 4. In a dispute between the Massachusetts Bay court and the Salem
> colony regarding the possession of a piece of land (Marblehead)
> claimed by the latter, the court offered to accede to the claims
> of Salem on condition that the Salem church make amends for its
> insolent conduct in installing Williams as pastor in defiance of
> the court and ministers. This demand involved the removal of the
> pastor. Williams regarded this proposal as an outrageous attempt
> at bribery and had the Salem church send to the other
> Massachusetts churches a denunciation of the proceeding and demand
> that the churches exclude the magistrates from membership. This
> act was sharply resented by magistrates and churches, and such
> pressure was brought to bear upon the Salem church as led a
> majority to consent to the removal of their pastor. He never
> entered the chapel again, but held religious services in his own
> house with his faithful adherents.

I also found some juicy stuff in a book: A Popular History of the
United States: From the First Discovery of the the western hemisphere
by the northmen, to the end of the first century of the union of the
states, By William Cullen Bryant, Sydney Howard Gay, Published 1876,
Sampson Low, United States.
http://books.google.com/books?id=bWE...#PRA1-PA542,M1

Originally Posted by Bryant and Gay, page 542

> But offences were sure to come. It was impossible for Mr. Williams
> to keep quiet; equally impossible, for the Council to let him
> alone. As a sort of preliminary of what was to come the colony was
> presently in a buzz, for he had persuaded the women of Salem that
> modesty required they should go veiled in public. Here was heresy.
> Cotton hastened to Salem to refute it, and his " insinuating and
> melting way " brought down every veil in the parish between the
> Sunday services. It was an exhaustive discourse, if we may trust
> Hubbard's report of it, and proved to the women of Salem that the
> Scriptural reasons were not applicable in their case; for many
> were wives and not virgins; none were like Tamar ; and none needed
> like Ruth, to hold up her veil before Boaz for a measure of
> barley. Not a woman's face was hidden on Sunday afternoon after
> this morning's" discourse. It was a great triumph over Roger
> Williams, and so pleased was Mr. Cotton with his success, that he
> carried the subject into the " Boston Lecture." But here Endicott
> met him in fierce debate, and so hot did it grow that the governor
> interfered to put an end to it.

There's no mention here of witchcraft, but as an incidental matter,
England outlawed witchcraft in 1641.

Eleven year old Abigail Williams was one of the girls who exhibited
the strange behavior leading to the Salem Witch Trials. I wondered
if she was related to Roger Williams, and found this:

Originally Posted by Lindy Allen

> http://archiver.rootsweb.com/th/read...-06/0929600752

> From: "Lindy Allen" <>
> Subject: [RIGENWEB-L] Roger Williams
> Date: Wed, 16 Jun 1999 23:25:52 -0700

> I am a direct relative of Roger Williams, the founder of
> Providence Rhode Island. I live in Washington State, and have
> traced my line through Abigail Williams who married Oliver Hazard
> Perry Clark. She is the daughter of Goliah Williams and Sarah
> Bickford. Goliah is the son of Squire Williams and Anne Potter.
> Squire is the son of Benoni Williams. Benoni is the son of Joseph
> Williams, who is the son of Daniel Williams, who is the son of
> Roger.

> I have done a lot of research, but I haven't found any further
> lineage from Abigail on down, in print. If anyone is interested, I
> can be reached either thru this forum, or by my private e-mail.

> Also, I need to get a real birth date for Roger. I have found so
> many dates, and none of them are the same.

> Lindy Allen

So all I have is a collection of jigsaw puzzle pieces that don't yet
quite fit together into a picture. But, at the very least, it is
very interesting that the Salem Witch Trials occurred 58 years after
a major event in the history of Salem.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Thought provoking post John. I'd like to address a couple things:

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

The point is that there's no absolute unity, even after "regeneracy."
There's simply a shifted balance of opinion from one pole to another.
It's not the regeneracy that unifies the country but the climax and
resolution (in the case above, completely discrediting the "peace
Democrats"). At that point, there's a RETROSPECTIVE decision as to
who was right.

And so, we're now able to define the difference between a "false
panic" and a "real panic":
A "false panic" is one in which the backlash group wins -- i.e.,
the panicked response is resolved as a mistake.
A "real panic" is one in which the regeneracy group wins -- i.e.,
the panicked response is resolved as correct.

Can anyone think of any examples where there was no consensus as to who was right following a crisis?

In World War Two, the hawks prevailed over the doves in public opinion, in the Civil War the North was viewed as the moral side, and in the Revolutionary War the Patriots prevailed. It seems as those who push hardest for victory in a win will prevail in the public sphere, and those who are more reserved will prevail in a crisis "loss." I'd like to see some examples where this does not apply.

Another thing to consider is the re-writing of history.

Salem Witch Trials of 1692. Four teenage girls appeared to
have epileptic fits, and accused several neighbors of witchcraft.
Panic ensued, and by the time it was all over, dozens of people had
been jailed and 20 had died.

This has all the earmarks of a false panic. Does anyone know of
anything special that happened in New England in 1634?

The best I can do is the Pequot War in 1637.

However, different kinds of generational timelines may not have
the same kinds of turnings as crisis war timelines. Turnings may not
apply at all to financial crisis timelines or flu pandemic timelines.
There may be no "fourth turning" concept at all. (Although I would
market the beginning of the "fourth turning" following the 1929 crash
as beginning with the 1995 bubble.)

Hmm...the fourth turning is an era with a specific generational alignment. We may have several independent timelines running at once, but we need to establish that the 'Crisis timeline' is the dominant one that launches the saeculum. Financial cycles can create minor changes in generations, but not enough to predictably offset what we call the fourth turning.

So perhaps we can look at it this way: The financial 'fourth turning' began with the 1995 bubble, while the dominant crisis 'fourth turning' began in 2001.

The 1930s fourth turning never really made sense, since the
crisis mood was entirely over financial issues, not much over
war-related issues. But now we can look at the financial fourth
turning as beginning in 1929, and the war fourth turning as beginning
at some time in the 1930s.

I can't agree with this. A country will automatically enter a 'fourth turning (this is a generational term)' -- where they will respond to events in an increasingly panicky fashion -- around 60 years after the climax of the previous Crisis (the dominant, generation launching, timeline). Thus, America entered a generational fourth turning around 1925, but 1929 was the catalyst of the Crisis.

I wonder if Pakistan's state of emergency will wind up being a false panic.

Dear Matt,

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> Can anyone think of any examples where there was no consensus as
> to who was right following a crisis?

That would be an extremely significant challenge to generational
theory.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> Hmm...the fourth turning is an era with a specific generational
> alignment. We may have several independent timelines running at
> once, but we need to establish that the 'Crisis timeline' is the
> dominant one that launches the saeculum. Financial cycles can
> create minor changes in generations, but not enough to predictably
> offset what we call the fourth turning.

The concept I'm proposing is that these timelines are entirely
independent of one another. If a "flu pandemic crisis" occurs in
1918, and a "financial crisis" occurs in 1931, and a "war crisis"
occurs in 1941, then there's no reason why the timelines or turnings
or generational changes should have to align in any way, although
they may.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> So perhaps we can look at it this way: The financial 'fourth
> turning' began with the 1995 bubble, while the dominant crisis
> 'fourth turning' began in 2001.

I agree with this except for the confusing word "dominant." I tend
to think in terms of abstract mathematical models, and in such a
model, there's not necessarily any "dominance" relationship between
two timelines. Is a "war timeline" really dominant over a "flu
pandemic timeline," especially when the latter might kill more
people?

It would be possible to DEFINE the war crisis as being the "dominant
timeline," but does the war crisis really dominate the flu pandemic
timeline? What does "dominate" really mean in that situation?

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> I can't agree with this. A country will automatically enter a
> 'fourth turning (this is a generational term)' -- where they will
> respond to events in an increasingly panicky fashion -- around 60
> years after the climax of the previous Crisis (the dominant,
> generation launching, timeline). Thus, America entered a
> generational fourth turning around 1925, but 1929 was the catalyst
> of the Crisis.

There can be different panics that are not related to one another. A
panicked response to hurricane Katrina is completely unrelated to a
panicked response to potential WMDs in Iraq.

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> I wonder if Pakistan's state of emergency will wind up being a
> false panic.

No way, José! Pakistan is VERY unstable right now. I wouldn't be
surprised at all to see full scale war within a month. There's
absolutely nothing "false" about this panic.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

John,

What I'm suggesting is that the "dominant cycle" is the one that launches and perpetuates the saeculum (and thus is the saeculum). It creates the generational archetypes that we know as Prophet, Nomad, Hero, and Artist and the turnings that come with archetypes. This is what we refer to as the saeculum.

As far as we can tell, the financial cycle doesn't have the same effect in creating generational archetypes... except in the financial world; while the saeculum (launched by the crisis) creates the peculiarities of individualism vs. collectivism, cautious vs. risk-seeking, spiritual vs. materialistic, arrogant vs. humble etc. etc. in all aspects of life. Of all the cycles, whether it be financial, flu panics or whatever, the saeculum asserts its dominance.

Is this clear?

Dear Matt,

Originally Posted by MichaelEaston

> What I'm suggesting is that the "dominant cycle" is the one that
> launches and perpetuates the saeculum (and thus is the saeculum).
> It creates the generational archetypes that we know as Prophet,
> Nomad, Hero, and Artist and the turnings that come with
> archetypes. This is what we refer to as the saeculum.

> As far as we can tell, the financial cycle doesn't have the same
> effect in creating generational archetypes... except in the
> financial world, while the saeculum (launched by the crisis)
> creates the peculiarities of individualism vs. collectivism,
> cautious vs. risk-seeking, spiritual vs. materialistic, arrogant
> vs. humble etc. etc. in all aspects of life. Of all the cycles,
> whether it be financial, flu panics or whatever, the saeculum
> asserts its dominance.

> Is this clear?

I agree with that.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Dear Matt,

I agree with that.

Now what I'd be interested in is how overlapping cycles would have an effect on the response to events. For example, what if a Prophet generation had lived through a global financial panic? The natural risk-seeking that comes with being a Prophet would come in contact with the financial risk-aversion that comes with having lived through a financial panic.

Consider that American cycles and financial panics merged in the 19th century and have stuck together, which could be due to the saeculum "wanting" to merge with financial cycles to smooth out the generational differences. What I mean by this is that as saeculums of nearby countries will come together over time, financial panics and crises may too have a niche. Thus, a Prophet would be risk-seeking in finance and global politics.

Also on a slightly different note, how does this all relate to late Crises? Here's what I wrote a couple weeks ago:

There were a series of postings made by 1990 and I some time ago on the discovery of a "near-crisis" occurring approximately 60 years following the previous crisis. The "near-crisis" eventually petered out, only to resurface during the 5th turning -- which I suspect will happen with Russia, Mexico, Turkey, and Ireland. I suspect there may be some relation between these two theories.

It could be inferred that these near-crises were really false panics (i.e. the backlash won out -- or the resolution was muddled (Russia?)) that were not fully played out.

Very interresting concept.
You've pretty much sold me on it. But the real test of any pattern is its predictive power, so they say.
So let's keep an eye out for the next big 58-year anniversaries on the horizon.
The biggest ones I can think of are the rise of McCarthyism [a purge or Neocons or foreigners, depending on who's in charge?] and the Korean War [a partitioning of Iraq into a 'good half' and an 'evil half'?].

Some general comments

False panics vs Real panics

Predictive?