On 2002-04-01 12:37, pindiespace wrote:
And here's a counter-example to the tech-centric and ego-centric 'Astrocop' idea...an excerpt from:

http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2002/03/landesman.htm


A Modest Proposal From the Brigadier

What one prominent Pakistani thinks his country should do with its atomic weapons

by Peter Landesman


....As we were wrapping up our conversation, I looked at the oil painting. It was a strange picture, a horizontal landscape about four feet across, with overtones of socialist realism. In the foreground a youthful Benazir Bhutto stood in heroic pose on an escarpment overlooking the featureless grid of Islamabad. Beside her stood her father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a Prime Minister who in 1977 was ousted in a coup and two years later hanged. On the other side of Bhutto was Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the long-dead founding father of Pakistan. Their postures were exalted, their expressions a combination of pride and awe. Jinnah's arm pointed to the vast plain beyond the city, where a rocket was lifting out of billowing clouds of vapor and fire into the sky.

Aman noticed me looking at the painting and followed my gaze. I asked him if Benazir Bhutto had commissioned it, and Aman said no. He told me that one day when she was still Prime Minister, an unknown man, an ordinary Pakistani citizen, had come to the gate of Zardari House with the picture and told Aman that he'd painted it for the Prime Minister and wanted to present it to her as a gift. Aman said that he was immediately transfixed by the painting. He called to Bhutto inside the house, but she refused to come down to see the man. Aman was persistent, and eventually she came down.

"I insisted Benazir accept it as a gift," Aman told me.

We both looked up at the painting in silence. "A rocket ship heading to the moon?" I asked.

Aman tipped his head to the side. A smirk tugged at the corners of his mouth. "No," he said. "A nuclear warhead heading to India."

I thought he was making a joke. Then I saw he wasn't. I thought of the shrines to Pakistan's nuclear-weapons site, prominently displayed in every city. I told Aman that I was disturbed by the ease with which Pakistanis talk of nuclear war with India.

Aman shook his head. "No," he said matter-of-factly. "This should happen. We should use the bomb."

"For what purpose?" He didn't seem to understand my question. "In retaliation?" I asked.

"Why not?"

"Or first strike?"

"Why not?"

I looked for a sign of irony. None was visible. Rocking his head side to side, his expression becoming more and more withdrawn, Aman launched into a monologue that neither of us, I am sure, knew was coming:

"We should fire at them and take out a few of their cities?Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta," he said. "They should fire back and take Karachi and Lahore. Kill off a hundred or two hundred million people. They should fire at us and it would all be over. They have acted so badly toward us; they have been so mean. We should teach them a lesson. It would teach all of us a lesson. There is no future here, and we need to start over. So many people think this. Have you been to the villages of Pakistan, the interior? There is nothing but dire poverty and pain. The children have no education; there is nothing to look forward to. Go into the villages, see the poverty. There is no drinking water. Small children without shoes walk miles for a drink of water. I go to the villages and I want to cry. My children have no future. None of the children of Pakistan have a future. We are surrounded by nothing but war and suffering. Millions should die away."

"Pakistan should fire pre-emptively?" I asked.

Aman nodded.

"And you are willing to see your children die?"

"Tens of thousands of people are dying in Kashmir, and the only superpower says nothing," Aman said. "America has sided with India because it has interests there." He told me he was willing to see his children be killed. He repeated that they didn't have any future?his children or any other children.

I asked him if he thought he was alone in his thoughts, and Aman made it clear to me that he was not.

"Believe me," he went on, "If I were in charge, I would have already done it."

Aman stopped, as though he'd stunned even himself. Then he added, with quiet forcefulness, "Before I die, I hope I should see it."

And the 4T clock ticks away...

Regarding nuclear war, I recommend a book by Herman Kahn, written back in the early sixties, called Thinking About the Unthinkable, in which he discusses various possible scenarios for nuclear warfare besides the Hollywood version where everybody launches everything they have all at once.

Nuclear war doesn't necessarily mean that the whole world blows itself up, other possibilities (all of them nightmarish, but not all equally so) do exist.

<font size=-1>[ This Message was edited by: HopefulCynic68 on 2002-04-01 18:34 ]</font>

[quote]
On 2002-04-01 18:24, HopefulCynic68 wrote:

I don't think the Roman Empire could not fall, without assuming some very different conditions. The Empire had been in long, slow, painful decline for well over a century, and the circumstances leading to its fall were almost insurmountable.

But if it had lived, I'm not sure how far we'd be. Compared to the Republic, the Empire was very static. Technological advancement was much faster under the Republic than it was under the later Empire, for a variety of reasons.

I'm not sure the Empire could survive any circumstance that got technology advancing at a high rate.

Actually, the EasternRoman empire continued another 1,000 years. It was called the Byzantium Empire. I don't seem to recall any wonderful technological innovations coming from Byzantium -- as Hopefully Cynic pointed out, the Roman empire was very static.

[quote]
On 2002-04-01 18:31, Jenny Genser wrote:

On 2002-04-01 18:24, HopefulCynic68 wrote:

I don't think the Roman Empire could not fall, without assuming some very different conditions. The Empire had been in long, slow, painful decline for well over a century, and the circumstances leading to its fall were almost insurmountable.

But if it had lived, I'm not sure how far we'd be. Compared to the Republic, the Empire was very static. Technological advancement was much faster under the Republic than it was under the later Empire, for a variety of reasons.

I'm not sure the Empire could survive any circumstance that got technology advancing at a high rate.

Actually, the EasternRoman empire continued another 1,000 years. It was called the Byzantium Empire. I don't seem to recall any wonderful technological innovations coming from Byzantium -- as Hopefully Cynic pointed out, the Roman empire was very static.

Very static in both cases.

The Byzantine Empire was very different culturally and linguistically from the Western Empire, though. Latin was the language of the Western Empire (and it still is the language of southern Europe in mutated form, the Romance languages).

Greek was the language of the Byzantine Empire, and their culture and government were even more absolutist than the Western Empire's, especially after the emperors effectively also became the equivalent of the popes.

The two empires were different enough that many historians count them as fundamentally seperate polities.

Susan wrote:

I like the idea of being an Oracle! I suppose the town soothsayer would most likely have to be an INFP or INFJ, so that would fit.

I would live in the woods outside of town in a small cottage with my cats, keeping pretty much to myself (to avoid those who might want me burned at the stake), but I would accept local visitors and not charge those who could not afford to pay for my divining services.

Remember to keep your oracles vague and general, open to multiple interpretation. If you make a specific one and it goes wrong, the traditional result is not entirely pleasant. :lol:

On 2002-04-01 12:59, Susan Brombacher wrote:

I like the idea of being an Oracle! I suppose the town soothsayer would most likely have to be an INFP or INFJ, so that would fit.

I would live in the woods outside of town in a small cottage with my cats, keeping pretty much to myself (to avoid those who might want me burned at the stake), but I would accept local visitors and not charge those who could not afford to pay for my divining services. On weekends I would join the Koffeeklatchers doing their wash by the river, keeping up to date on the local gossip. Occasionally Justin, Craig, William or JayN would come by and offer to purchase us some mead at the local tavern, when they are not working as apprentices and journeymen. Stonewall would be a Royal who slums in the evenings, drinking mead at the tavern with us peasant women and tradesmen, and genuinely enjoying our unpretentious company. When he's at the palace, he would be advising King William Strauss and Duke Neil Howe on serious matters pertaining to governing the kingdom. Virgil and Marc would be the King's court jesters, providing the entertainment.

Eric would be the Royal Astrologer, and Chris and Robert would be the designers of Bill's kingdom. Eric, Chris, Robert and Stonewall would all be educated and literate. Dave '71 would be the kindly parish priest who is unusually tolerant of all the mead-drinking and soothsaying going on. Edgar would try to have Father Dave excommunicated and burned at the stake but would leave town instead, after having stones thrown at him by the townspeople.

I've had this idea in my head that if the worst happened in the coming 4T, and if all of us managed to survive, that we could come together somewhere and manage to build a society. Kind of like something out of The Stand.

This group has talent, grit, and vision. I think we could do it. :grin:

On 2002-04-01 18:48, Kiff '61 wrote:

On 2002-04-01 12:59, Susan Brombacher wrote:

I like the idea of being an Oracle! I suppose the town soothsayer would most likely have to be an INFP or INFJ, so that would fit.

I would live in the woods outside of town in a small cottage with my cats, keeping pretty much to myself (to avoid those who might want me burned at the stake), but I would accept local visitors and not charge those who could not afford to pay for my divining services. On weekends I would join the Koffeeklatchers doing their wash by the river, keeping up to date on the local gossip. Occasionally Justin, Craig, William or JayN would come by and offer to purchase us some mead at the local tavern, when they are not working as apprentices and journeymen. Stonewall would be a Royal who slums in the evenings, drinking mead at the tavern with us peasant women and tradesmen, and genuinely enjoying our unpretentious company. When he's at the palace, he would be advising King William Strauss and Duke Neil Howe on serious matters pertaining to governing the kingdom. Virgil and Marc would be the King's court jesters, providing the entertainment.

Eric would be the Royal Astrologer, and Chris and Robert would be the designers of Bill's kingdom. Eric, Chris, Robert and Stonewall would all be educated and literate. Dave '71 would be the kindly parish priest who is unusually tolerant of all the mead-drinking and soothsaying going on. Edgar would try to have Father Dave excommunicated and burned at the stake but would leave town instead, after having stones thrown at him by the townspeople.

I've had this idea in my head that if the worst happened in the coming 4T, and if all of us managed to survive, that we could come together somewhere and manage to build a society. Kind of like something out of The Stand.

This group has talent, grit, and vision. I think we could do it. :grin:

We would lack the broad range of necessary skills, the natural resources and the skills to exploit them, the critical number of personnel necessary to build anything above subsistance agriculture at neolithic levels,
and the practical day-to-day knowledge of survival in a low tech environment.

Our nearly certain fate (99.9% plus) with be death by thirst, starvation, or predation.

Sorry, but my Xer reality streak is up and running tonight. :lol:

On 2002-04-01 19:17, HopefulCynic68 wrote:

Our nearly certain fate (99.9% plus) with be death by thirst, starvation, or predation.

Sorry, but my Xer reality streak is up and running tonight. :lol:

I know, I know, I'm being silly....being born a little closer to the Prophet/Nomad boundary can rub off on a person after awhile.

But at least you've got the laughing smiley going tonight, HC! Things can't be that bad! :smile:

On 2002-04-01 19:25, Kiff '61 wrote:

On 2002-04-01 19:17, HopefulCynic68 wrote:

Our nearly certain fate (99.9% plus) with be death by thirst, starvation, or predation.

Sorry, but my Xer reality streak is up and running tonight. :lol:

I know, I know, I'm being silly....being born a little closer to the Prophet/Nomad boundary can rub off on a person after awhile.

But at least you've got the laughing smiley going tonight, HC! Things can't be that bad! :smile:

Things aren't bad at all! But that doesn't mean my perverse little reality-voice isn't awake and kicking.

A few comments about biological extinctions, since this is my era of specialty:

1. There actually was an "Age of Insects" -- the Carboniferrous. While primitive amphibians were present at the shore and in swamps, insects dominated dry land with giant forms (up to three feet long). When reptiles developed, they out-competed insects. This is because the internal skeleton of vertebrates costs less to support and maintain than the external skeleton of arthropods.

2. The K/T extinction that provided the final end of the dinosaurs is dwarfed by the Permian/Triassic extinction -- in the latter, up to 95% of all plants and animals died out. An asteroid is suspected in this extinction, but it may be harde to prove. At that time all earth's continents were fused on one side of the globe, with the giant Tethys sea covering the other hemisphere. An impact in the sea would have been erased by continental drift.

Note that the Permian extinction wiped out a very promising group -- the "mammal-like" reptiles. Advanced forms looked very much halfway between a lizard and hairless rat. They were big, possibly warm-blooded, and might have led to an Age of Mammals much sooner if they weren't destroyed. Only a few tiny forms survived the transition and evolve into true mammals. Instead, the dinosaurs moved into the empty niches and grabbed the world for 140 million years.

There may have been an even worse disaster just prior to the emergence of complex life 600 million years ago. Some scientists believe that the earth went into a super-ice age that froze the oceans except for a thin band around the equator. Practically everything alive would have died except those in the thin equatorial band.

Re: 4T possibilities 1-4 -- both the K/T and Triassic/Permian asteroid impacts released energy much greater than all the nukes around. Radiation wouldn't exist, but the physical hardship was much greater. For example, with no ozone layer, large land animals might have gone blind in a few weeks(!) On the other hand, a few bombs in the wrong place might have unexpected physical impact. Some believe that an earlier asteroid impact at the end of the Age of Dinosaurs causes the Deccan Traps to form -- huge volcanoes pouring out funes at a level thousands of times anything today.

Re: Rome living today. There is the old series Star Trek where this happens. They show silly stuff like televised combat to the death. However, Jerry Pournelle wrote a story a long time ago with an interesting theme. He postulated a world State formed and was stable since nothing from outside interferred. However, a single spaceship was rounding the galaxy and was due back several thousand years later. The computer on-board tries to stop the return -- on the theory that the State would be sooo weak by then that a *single* barbarian from the spaceship would be able to take it down!

On 2002-04-01 20:41, pindiespace wrote:
A few comments about biological extinctions, since this is my era of specialty:



Re: 4T possibilities 1-4 -- both the K/T and Triassic/Permian asteroid impacts released energy much greater than all the nukes around. Radiation wouldn't exist, but the physical hardship was much greater. For example, with no ozone layer, large land animals might have gone blind in a few weeks(!) On the other hand, a few bombs in the wrong place might have unexpected physical impact. Some believe that an earlier asteroid impact at the end of the Age of Dinosaurs causes the Deccan Traps to form -- huge volcanoes pouring out funes at a level thousands of times anything today.

Is that theory still considered 'in play'? I've also seen it expressed as the explanation for the 'hot spot' that created the Columbia Plateau, the Snake River Canyon, and now maintains the Yellowstone heat flow.

But I didn't know if it as still taken seriously or not, my information is several years old.

On 2002-04-01 20:41, pindiespace wrote:
thousands of times anything today.

Re: Rome living today. There is the old series Star Trek where this happens. They show silly stuff like televised combat to the death. However, Jerry Pournelle wrote a story a long time ago with an interesting theme. He postulated a world State formed and was stable since nothing from outside interferred. However, a single spaceship was rounding the galaxy and was due back several thousand years later. The computer on-board tries to stop the return -- on the theory that the State would be sooo weak by then that a *single* barbarian from the spaceship would be able to take it down!

The author was Larry Niven, the book A WORLD OUT OF TIME.

On 2002-04-01 18:48, Kiff '61 wrote:



I've had this idea in my head that if the worst happened in the coming 4T, and if all of us managed to survive, that we could come together somewhere and manage to build a society.

This group has talent, grit, and vision. I think we could do it.

As long as it isn't a progressive vision, I'd sign up. HTH

[quote]
On 2002-04-01 18:31, Jenny Genser wrote:

Actually, the EasternRoman empire continued another 1,000 years. It was called the Byzantium Empire. I don't seem to recall any wonderful technological innovations coming from Byzantium -- as Hopefully Cynic pointed out, the Roman empire was very static.

Actually, I believe there were two innovations under the Roman and Byzantine Empire, only one of which survives to this day. That survivor is the book in it's present form (hardback), which replaced the scroll starting in the 4th C. The other was Greek Fire, discovered 300 years later, but was lost due to the formula never having been written down - the formula was a closely guarded state secret. Still, spread out over a period of some 14 centuries as they are(including the earlier Roman phase), two isolated innovations present very much the appearance of being the exceptions that prove the rule of no innovation.

<font size=-1>[ This Message was edited by: jds1958xg on 2002-04-02 08:49 ]</font>

On 2002-04-01 20:41, pindiespace wrote:

1. There actually was an "Age of Insects" -- the Carboniferrous. While primitive amphibians were present at the shore and in swamps, insects dominated dry land with giant forms (up to three feet long). When reptiles developed, they out-competed insects. This is because the internal skeleton of vertebrates costs less to support and maintain than the external skeleton of arthropods.

Actually, I would have classified the preceding Devonian Period as the 'Age of Insects'. The amphibians had not yet developed past the stage of lungfish, while the mega-bugs dominated the coastal areas, river banks, lakeshores, and wetlands - the only land areas with life present at the time, as far as I know. By the Carboniferous, the amphibians had come into their own, and the mega-bugs were forced to share. By the Permian, pindiespace's analysis proves to be entirely correct. But now, back to our regular and very relevant topic.

<font size=-1>[ This Message was edited by: jds1958xg on 2002-04-02 09:11 ]</font>

<font size=-1>[ This Message was edited by: jds1958xg on 2002-04-02 09:13 ]</font>

H.C.:

Over the course of the period roughly from Alexander to Julius Caesar, a whole slew of powers (Athens, Pergamum, Carthage, Rome, the other Italian peninsula city-states, etc) fought with each other, allied with each other, and so on, and as they did the number of 'players' steadily decreased. At the end, it was Rome vs. Carthage for control of the Med Basin in a very nasty series of wars, and Rome won.

The 'Classical World' was more than just geographically defined. The Classical World can be defined as that region within which Hellenic/Hellenistic culture had become either predominant, as it had in Greece and Italy, or at least a major force, as it had in parts of the Middle East.

The Roman Empire never did expand much beyond its own 'world'. It expanded into southern Britain, and Gaul, and over into the Middle East and northern Africa, but for the most part the borders set by Octavian were never much expanded afterward.

I suggest that you are placing some interpretations on this sequence of events that the facts won't support.


In the first place, if you're going to talk about consolidation of powers in the Mediterranean world, you need to take it back considerably before Alexander. That civilization was an outgrowth of the earliest historical civilizations in the Middle East, where the so-called fertile crescent agricultural package, writing and the alphabet, the wheel, and bronze were all invented. When you speak of Mediterranean civilization, you are actually referring to a culture that started in modern-day Iraq and moved west. (Another offshoot moved east and evolved into India. Chinese civilization emerged independently and later.) It did not reach the Atlantic coast, in Spain, until about the time of the Punic Wars, when it was brought there by Carthage, which was itself a colony founded from Phoenicia in modern Lebanon/Israel. It did not reach southern France until the Helenistic expansion after the conquests of Alexander. It did not reach Britain until brought there by the Romans. And it never did reach Germany.


So we are talking about a span of history roughly 4,000 years long from those beginnings until the transtition from Roman Republic to Roman Empire. Add another few centuries until the fall of the Western Empire, or 1400 years to the fall of the Eastern Empire.


During this very long time, the consolidation of power to which you refer happened many, many times, but never reached the peak you posit for it -- total dominance by one power with the elimination of all opposition. There were also many instances of the opposite transition, the fragmenting of monolithic empires. Most famously this occurred after Alexander's death, but more typical examples may be found in the breakup of Solomon's empire, of the Assyrian empire, of the Babylonian empire, of the Egyptian New Kingdom/Empire, and so on. I say more typical because the conquests of Alexander were very rapid and did not allow for the laying of a firm foundation of governance; slower growth and slower dissolution were both more typical.


In each case, the new imperial power grew, not until it had eliminated all opposition and become sole power, but rather until it reached the limits of its ability to govern. There were several factors that created these limits. They included limitations of communication technology, or of government organization, or of manpower; also natural barriers such as deserts or trackless forests or high mountain ranges; primitive regions that were difficult to civilize and inhabited by barbaric tribes both hard to subdue and relatively profitless if one did; and other empires too powerful to overcome easily, which regarded one's own realm with the same caution.


Rome encountered every one of these. It could not expand south into Africa because of the Sahara. It could not expand east past Mesopotamia because of the Kingdom of the Parthians and those of India. It could not expand northeast toward Russia because of the Hercynian forest, the Swabian alps, and the Germans. It could not expand west to America because it lacked the navigation skills to get there.


At no time in Rome's history was it lacking in rival powers. All of those named above were rival powers until the end of the Empire, and indeed one of them destroyed the Empire. (If we're talking Western Empire. If we're talking Eastern Empire, then it was another rival power that emerged on the scene later.)


America is not limited by communications technology in the spread of our empire. (Well, unless we want to go extraterrestrial.) But we do have rival powers: the European Community, the Islamic world, Russia, Japan, China. One of those is militantly hostile, two are reasonably friendly but not subordinate, and the other two can be considered neutral for the moment. In order to become a true "sole superpower," we would have to reduce all of those to the status of satrapies.


I honestly don't see how we can. Do you?

On 2002-04-02 09:09, jds1958xg wrote:

On 2002-04-01 20:41, pindiespace wrote:

1. There actually was an "Age of Insects" -- the Carboniferrous. While primitive amphibians were present at the shore and in swamps, insects dominated dry land with giant forms (up to three feet long). When reptiles developed, they out-competed insects. This is because the internal skeleton of vertebrates costs less to support and maintain than the external skeleton of arthropods.

Actually, I would have classified the preceding Devonian Period as the 'Age of Insects'. The amphibians had not yet developed past the stage of lungfish, while the mega-bugs dominated the coastal areas, river banks, lakeshores, and wetlands - the only land areas with life present at the time, as far as I know. By the Carboniferous, the amphibians had come into their own, and the mega-bugs were forced to share. By the Permian, pindiespace's analysis proves to be entirely correct. But now, back to our regular and very relevant topic.

<font size=-1>[ This Message was edited by: jds1958xg on 2002-04-02 09:11 ]</font>

<font size=-1>[ This Message was edited by: jds1958xg on 2002-04-02 09:13 ]</font>

Insects have been extremely successful evolutionarily speaking. They mutate fast enough to adapt to sudden changes in environment or even become immune to pesticides, and there is enough variety that even if many species of insect were to die off suddenly, there are tens of thousands of other species to take over.

Their most successful adaptation since the advent of larger land animals has been to attain a small size, where they are more elusive and can reproduce in greater numbers without running out of food.

In the Devonian and Carboniferous periods, insects were quite large. There were dragonflies with wingspans two feet across and giant ants and cockroaches up to a foot long scoured the planet. This worked for them then, when they competed with no other land animal. Once the dinosaurs and other primitive land animals took over, insects began to lose size, eventually becoming the minuscule critters we're familiar with today.

Insects are not intelligent in the sense humans think of as intelligence, but some species have a sort of instinctual intelligence and are highly organized, such as ants, bees, and termites. Their behavior is quite complex, and their method of communication flawless. Some studies have even claimed that certain more advanced insects (again, ants, bees and termites) are even capable of learning, and could conceivably be trained.

While in most classes of animals, species are diminishing, new species of insect are still being discovered, and there is no end in sight. Some even seem to thrive on chemical and industrial pollution and gravitate to urban areas.

If the human species is destroyed, say through a nuclear war, it's entirely possible that insects would survive and mutate to adapt to the new radioactive environment, and eventually develop a psuedo-human intelligence, or more likely, a completely alien composite intelligence (think of what happened to the children at the end of Arthur C. Clarke's Childhood's End) that is equal to or surpasses our own.

_________________
Labels tell you where the box is coming from and where it is headed and are quite helpful. They do not tell you what's inside though they might indicate "fragile", "handle with care", "this is not a Bill", "magnetic medium", etc.--VIRGIL K. SAARI

<font size=-1>[ This Message was edited by: Susan Brombacher on 2002-04-02 19:51 ]</font>

On 2002-04-02 10:48, Brian Rush wrote:
H.C.:

Over the course of the period roughly from Alexander to Julius Caesar, a whole slew of powers (Athens, Pergamum, Carthage, Rome, the other Italian peninsula city-states, etc) fought with each other, allied with each other, and so on, and as they did the number of 'players' steadily decreased. At the end, it was Rome vs. Carthage for control of the Med Basin in a very nasty series of wars, and Rome won.

The 'Classical World' was more than just geographically defined. The Classical World can be defined as that region within which Hellenic/Hellenistic culture had become either predominant, as it had in Greece and Italy, or at least a major force, as it had in parts of the Middle East.

The Roman Empire never did expand much beyond its own 'world'. It expanded into southern Britain, and Gaul, and over into the Middle East and northern Africa, but for the most part the borders set by Octavian were never much expanded afterward.

I suggest that you are placing some interpretations on this sequence of events that the facts won't support.

Not quite. We're using different definitions of certain terms.

In the first place, if you're going to talk about consolidation of powers in the Mediterranean world, you need to take it back considerably before Alexander. That civilization was an outgrowth of the earliest historical civilizations in the Middle East, where the so-called fertile crescent agricultural package, writing and the alphabet, the wheel, and bronze were all invented. When you speak of Mediterranean civilization, you are actually referring to a culture that started in modern-day Iraq and moved west. (Another offshoot moved east and evolved into India. Chinese civilization emerged independently and later.) It did not reach the Atlantic coast, in Spain, until about the time of the Punic Wars, when it was brought there by Carthage, which was itself a colony founded from Phoenicia in modern Lebanon/Israel. It did not reach southern France until the Helenistic expansion after the conquests of Alexander. It did not reach Britain until brought there by the Romans. And it never did reach Germany.


So we are talking about a span of history roughly 4,000 years long from those beginnings until the transtition from Roman Republic to Roman Empire. Add another few centuries until the fall of the Western Empire, or 1400 years to the fall of the Eastern Empire.

Here's one of those different definitions. It's true that the roots of Classical Civilization go all the way back to the river-valley civilizations of the Fertile Crescent, especially the Nile and the Tigris/Euphrates, but that doesn't make them the same civilization.

My definition of a civilization, or a culture, or choose the word you like, is somewhat loose, but not without meaning. It's a group of powers and cultures, or a single government and culture, that from a distance in space and/or time looks 'akin'.

The modern West, for example, is such an 'akin grouping. Our roots run back to Classical Europe and further back to those same river valleys, but we are not the Classical Civilization or the Nile Valley Civilization.

During this very long time, the consolidation of power to which you refer happened many, many times, but never reached the peak you posit for it -- total dominance by one power with the elimination of all opposition. There were also many instances of the opposite transition, the fragmenting of monolithic empires. Most famously this occurred after Alexander's death, but more typical examples may be found in the breakup of Solomon's empire, of the Assyrian empire, of the Babylonian empire, of the Egyptian New Kingdom/Empire, and so on. I say more typical because the conquests of Alexander were very rapid and did not allow for the laying of a firm foundation of governance; slower growth and slower dissolution were both more typical.

Yes, there were always other powers in the physical, planetary world. But within each system of states, one power usually ended up reaching a position of nearly total dominance. Persia was not part of the Hellenic cultural world, in fact, Persia was a hostile threat to the Hellenes and their cultural desendents century after century. Rome became the dominant power within the Hellenic world.

The Classical civilization to which I refer rose in what is now Greece, and spread, by war and trade, around the shores of the Mediterranean. I chose the time of Alexander because it was then the the real internal power struggle for that society got started. Before that, unity wasn't even really taken serious as an idea in Hellenic culture, in fact, the general outlook was quite hostile to the idea.

In each case, the new imperial power grew, not until it had eliminated all opposition and become sole power, but rather until it reached the limits of its ability to govern. There were several factors that created these limits. They included limitations of communication technology, or of government organization, or of manpower; also natural barriers such as deserts or trackless forests or high mountain ranges; primitive regions that were difficult to civilize and inhabited by barbaric tribes both hard to subdue and relatively profitless if one did; and other empires too powerful to overcome easily, which regarded one's own realm with the same caution.


Rome encountered every one of these. It could not expand south into Africa because of the Sahara. It could not expand east past Mesopotamia because of the Kingdom of the Parthians and those of India. It could not expand northeast toward Russia because of the Hercynian forest, the Swabian alps, and the Germans. It could not expand west to America because it lacked the navigation skills to get there.


At no time in Rome's history was it lacking in rival powers. All of those named above were rival powers until the end of the Empire, and indeed one of them destroyed the Empire. (If we're talking Western Empire. If we're talking Eastern Empire, then it was another rival power that emerged on the scene later.)


America is not limited by communications technology in the spread of our empire. (Well, unless we want to go extraterrestrial.) But we do have rival powers: the European Community, the Islamic world, Russia, Japan, China. One of those is militantly hostile, two are reasonably friendly but not subordinate, and the other two can be considered neutral for the moment. In order to become a true "sole superpower," we would have to reduce all of those to the status of satrapies.


I honestly don't see how we can. Do you?

We can't right now (and I don't want to do so).

When I originally referred to the pattern of history, I meant it within the families of nations, not necessarily between them.

To use my analogy in the modern world, the European Union and the United States are both components of the West, and in a sense are rivals for dominance of the West. That's part of the real reason that the EU was organized, in fact, was to counterbalance American power.

In my analogy, the EU would be to America something like the various Greek confederations were to Rome in Classical civilization. There were abortive attempts by the Greek city-states to organize as a counter force to Rome, but Rome and Greece were both part of the same basic culture.

To use my analogy in the immediate past, consider the 20th century. It opened with at least four major powers and a broad range of second-tier powers vying for the lead position within the West. The big four were America, Britain, France, and Germany. The second tier included Austro-Hungary, Italy, Spain (that one might have been third-tier), Russia (whether or not Russia is a part of the West depends on your point of view), possibly some of the Scandinavian powers, etc.

As the 20th century went on, the number of 'players' shrank steadily, until at the end of the century only one was left within the West, plus a potential (but not yet actualized) rival in the EU.

Note that I keep saying "systems of states". Governments and nations are akin to each other in ways analogous to families. Thus America and the states of Western Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, form a system of states. Some of the Latin American nations for another system of related states, more closely related to each other than to the western states. The Islamic world forms a system or family of related states.

China was once such a system, but eventually consolidated into one. Likewise India. Likewise Egypt. Likewise (at one time) the Roman Empire.

It's my opinion that there is an inherent tendency for such related states to consolidate over time.

<font size=-1>[ This Message was edited by: HopefulCynic68 on 2002-04-02 20:08 ]</font>

On 2002-04-02 10:48, Brian Rush wrote:



During this very long time, the consolidation of power to which you refer happened many, many times, but never reached the peak you posit for it -- total dominance by one power with the elimination of all opposition. There were also many instances of the opposite transition, the fragmenting of monolithic empires. Most famously this occurred after Alexander's death, but more typical examples may be found in the breakup of Solomon's empire, of the Assyrian empire, of the Babylonian empire, of the Egyptian New Kingdom/Empire, and so on. I say more typical because the conquests of Alexander were very rapid and did not allow for the laying of a firm foundation of governance; slower growth and slower dissolution were both more typical.

It's true that Alexander's empire was ephemeral. Those empire that do last for centuries tend, it appears to me, to have certain general traits in common.

They usually rise from the 'sole surviving power' within a system of states, and usually dominate that entire system, sometimes officially, sometimes unofficially. Rome did both, at various times.

The generally are very stable culturally and technologically, usually have a well-established system of social ranks and a stable, fairly professional bureaucracy.

The tend to be conservative, in a traditional sense, somewhat slow to adopt new innovations of any sort. They have to have some flexibility to operate, but it's usually somewhat reluctant. Their borders are usually at least semi-stable, sometimes by force of circumstance and geography, sometimes by choice, sometimes both.

These tendencies were found in the Roman Empire, Imperial China, India during its imperial period, in the Ottoman Empire, etc.

Interestingly, these 'long-life' empires tended to show very similar patterns in their final stages of failure, as well.

They weren't found in ephemeral polities such as the Alexandrine Empire, the European colonial empires of Spain, Britain, and France, etc.

In each case, the new imperial power grew, not until it had eliminated all opposition and become sole power, but rather until it reached the limits of its ability to govern. There were several factors that created these limits. They included limitations of communication technology, or of government organization, or of manpower; also natural barriers such as deserts or trackless forests or high mountain ranges; primitive regions that were difficult to civilize and inhabited by barbaric tribes both hard to subdue and relatively profitless if one did; and other empires too powerful to overcome easily, which regarded one's own realm with the same caution.

No argument, all that is of course true, and I don't dispute any of it.

Comparing the EU to a confederation of city states brings up another scenario. Germany could start its own bloc in Mitteleuropa. However, this would not be a confederation. The Central European countries would become satellites of Germany. This bloc would be smaller in population and economy than an EU that included both western and central Europe. But it would have one, single definite leader, and could thus be reasonably coherent.

Such a bloc could have a significant place in world affairs. In the West it would be #2, with Britain and France also being powers worth mention.

However, Germany would need a nuclear deterent. The old European balance of power thing would likely cause Britain and France to ally against the bloc, and those two countries already have nuclear arsenals. Nukes might permit a Uni-multipolar system to appear in Europe, somewhat similar to the current world situation in which there is one super power and several regional powers (Russia, China, India).






<font size=-1>[ This Message was edited by: Tim Walker on 2002-04-03 09:07 ]</font>

On 2002-04-02 22:31, Tim Walker wrote:
Comparing the EU to a confederation of city states brings up another scenario. Germany could start its own bloc in Mitteleuropa. However, this would not be a confederation. The Central European countries would become satellites of Germany. This bloc would be smaller in population and economy than an EU that included both western and central Europe. But it would have one, single definite leader, and could thus be reasonably coherent.

Such a bloc could have a significant place in world affairs. In the West it would be #2, with Britain and France also being powers worth mention.

However, Germany would need a nuclear deterent. The old European balance of power thing would likely cause Britain and France to ally against the bloc, and those two countries already have nuclear arsenals. Nukes might permit a Uni-multipolar system to appear in Europe, somewhat similar to the current world situation in which there is one super power and several regional powers (Russia, China, India).






<font size=-1>[ This Message was edited by: Tim Walker on 2002-04-03 09:07 ]</font>

I could see Italy also joining the Anglo-French alliance. However, I have a feeling that a lot of Germans' response to the whole idea would be along the lines of 'Been there, done that, got burned, no thanks'.

HopefulCynic writes...

Note that I keep saying "systems of states". Governments and nations are akin to each other in ways analogous to families. Thus America and the states of Western Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, form a system of states. Some of the Latin American nations for another system of related states, more closely related to each other than to the western states. The Islamic world forms a system or family of related states.

China was once such a system, but eventually consolidated into one. Likewise India. Likewise Egypt. Likewise (at one time) the Roman Empire.

It's my opinion that there is an inherent tendency for such related states to consolidate over time.

I tend to agree with you as a broad tendency, though Brian's push into more details is also valid. I suspect you are consciously echoing Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations model. This is one of the three models (along with S&H's Generations and Toffler's Waves ) which I respect and include in my own perspective.

Thus, I too could nitpick you by going into more detail. Islamic civilization is currently in transition between agricultural and industrial Waves. Islamic nations have monarchies, primitive agricultural tribes, fundamentalist religious theocracy, military dictatorship, and struggling semi-stable democracies. With such diverse governments and values, is it a wonder that Huntington says the Islamic civilization has no "core state," no dominant nation that acts as the center of similar states sharing a religion, language, and other aspects of culture? If one believes progress is inevitable, one would think Turkey or Egypt will lead the way. One of them might in time become the core state. At the moment, though, the oil monarchies have the wealth, and are purchasing western military power. While their governments are the most obsolete if you believe in progress, Saudi Arabia might be as close to being a core state as any.

The transition between agricultural and industrial civilization is often painful. The S&H's Western crises from the Black Plague through World War II are a litany of how painful the transition can be. In my view, much of the tension and energy powering S&H's generational cycle comes from new technology forcing cultural upheaval. While the West pioneered this path, and fought many destructive wars finding a new way of integrating new technology into a new civilization, other civilizations don't have it any easier. They have had to compete with the West. Our advantages of Guns, Germs and Steel destroyed many a civilization, and crippled others.

What new basic broad truths might define the upcoming crisis? The Cold War established that capitalist representative democracies were economically more competitive than autocratic single party states, or other, older, forms of autocratic government. It is becoming clearer that wars of aggression between major states are not cost effective. Defensive alliances between industrial democracies and their client states are suppressing overt wars of aggression. Weapons of Mass Destruction make direct conflict between major powers not cost effective from the point of view of the capitalist elites that finance the industrial age politicians.

Thus, while the technology is available to cross deserts and mountain ranges, and communications and modern governments allow huge nations, it is entirely plausible that the old agricultural age civilizations might continue to exist in a post-industrial era. The civilizations were created by technological and natural barriers that might be obsolete. Still, cultural borders of language and religion might have sufficient inertia, even if natural military and political boundaries can been overcome by technology.

Thus, basing one's guess of the near future on tendencies derived from study of agricultural age civilizations might give false impressions.

The Industrial Age was dominated by competition among Western powers, and their struggles to set up Zones of Influence, the better to rape the other civilizations. The Cold War might have been the last pseudo-struggle internal to Western civilization. Western nation states might no longer be seeking military dominance over zones of influence, but rather economic advantages.

The interesting problem to me is whether the West will attempt to continue enforcing Zones of Influence. If there is only one power, one zone of influence, do the victors get to keep the spoils? Can we meddle in far away politics, seeking advantage, as much as other western powers did during the Industrial Age? Or in a post industrial age, when minor governments from other civilizations, working through proxies, have access to weapons of mass destruction, might it be prudent to stop screwing over minor powers?

We are a pseudo empire. We don't overtly occupy foreign states any more. Our rich and powerful industrialists just make deals with foreign powerful and corrupt government officials, and screw their people with permission from their leaders. The result is still a hatred of the West, and a continued division of wealth between the third and first worlds. Can this be sustained?

Then there are ecological considerations. There is only so much wealth to go around, and populations are increasing. Many have been striving to ignore ecological concerns. Current values stress short term profits over long term balance. There are enough other distractions that the ecology might not be addressed in the immediate future. Still, I don't think the tensions between and among civilizations can be addressed without balancing the wealth, which means a global ecological perspective might well become necessary to a successful resolution of the crisis.

The more obvious concerns are at old civilization Al boundaries. As military occupation of zones of influence are no longer cost effective or fashionable, the core states would just as soon wash their hands of old problems. However, centuries of conquest and reconquest have left ambiguous borders. These were frozen during the Cold War, as few local conflicts were considered worth chasing by the Superpowers. They are no longer frozen.

Huntington noted how wealthy core states are tending to finance proxy wars on civilization boundaries. Ethnic minorities count on support from more peaceful states closer to their civilization's core. Thus, US private and public funds finance Jews and Catholics in Israel and Northern Ireland. Similar funds from other civilizations support Serb and Palestinian efforts. Another key question is if the core states can unite to stop financing such ethnic struggles, or will a habit Imperial partisanship draw them into continued spirals of violence.

Northern Ireland and the Balkans are looking decent. Israel and Palestine are looking really ugly just now. Other fronts await.

OK. Nothing new said above. I just can't resist breaking in on a single model discussion by folding in a few other models. Anyway, Islam is not a well defined civilization with a clear core state and united values. It is a region in transition. The West's support of Israel - perhaps the last of the West's colonial imperialistic adventures - vastly complicates what might otherwise be just another cultural upheaval. Oil money going to the most anarchistic of the regional forces doesn't help. The West has a self-interest in maintain perhaps the most obsolete of the local cultures, and the most alien.

Neither the West or the United States should be considered innocent. Our perceived self interests are pulling against the directions of "progress," whether one prefers the Civilization or Wave model. While I would tend to agree with a broad statement that civilizations tend to develop core nations, and that a progression from agricultural to industrial to (maybe) post industrial civilization is in general likely, I wouldn't bet on a calm quiet peaceful transition. I might see where we need to go, but I certainly can't see how to get there from here.

There is indeed only so much wealth to go around-if one thinks only of this one little planet. This is thinking inside of the box. To summarize, there is a diversity of concepts about bringing down energy or materials from space. (And of ways to get up there so that one can do so). Perhaps Millies will be more open minded than their Boomer parents.

H.C., may I understand, then, that you're speaking of America as the dominant power of Western civilization rather than as a world empire? I think there might be some problems with that as well, insofar as Western civ incorporates an ideal of democracy and self-government, and would not be likely to accept imperial dominance nor America easy in asserting it. But at least it's more doable than a world empire.


Tim:

There is indeed only so much wealth to go around-if one thinks only of this one little planet. This is thinking inside of the box. To summarize, there is a diversity of concepts about bringing down energy or materials from space. (And of ways to get up there so that one can do so). Perhaps Millies will be more open minded than their Boomer parents.

Perhaps, but they're unlikely to repeal the laws of physics and ecology. We can get energy and minerals from space, sure, but we can't get life support. That comes from earth or nowhere.


We can expand into space, but only slowly. We can't just transplant human civilization to another planet, because human civilization is built on a foundation of life support provided by the terrestrial biosphere. We must, therefore, transplant the whole biosphere, terraforming another planet (e.g. Mars) by introducing life forms from earth starting with the bacterial bed, and then moving up to more and more complex plants and animals, adapting as we go for the different physical conditions. Human society could colonize the new world only as the final step.


We don't have the science to do this yet, but it should theoretically be possible. Nonetheless, it is not an escape hatch, nor a solution to our planetary problems. Rather, it is a reward for solving them. Only by doing that will we have time to make this expansion.

On 2002-04-03 13:19, Bob Butler 54 wrote:
HopefulCynic writes...

Note that I keep saying "systems of states". Governments and nations are akin to each other in ways analogous to families. Thus America and the states of Western Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, form a system of states. Some of the Latin American nations for another system of related states, more closely related to each other than to the western states. The Islamic world forms a system or family of related states.

China was once such a system, but eventually consolidated into one. Likewise India. Likewise Egypt. Likewise (at one time) the Roman Empire.

It's my opinion that there is an inherent tendency for such related states to consolidate over time.

I tend to agree with you as a broad tendency, though Brian's push into more details is also valid. I suspect you are consciously echoing Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations model. This is one of the three models (along with S&H's Generations and Toffler's Waves ) which I respect and include in my own perspective.

Thus, I too could nitpick you by going into more detail. Islamic civilization is currently in transition between agricultural and industrial Waves. Islamic nations have monarchies, primitive agricultural tribes, fundamentalist religious theocracy, military dictatorship, and struggling semi-stable democracies. With such diverse governments and values, is it a wonder that Huntington says the Islamic civilization has no "core state," no dominant nation that acts as the center of similar states sharing a religion, language, and other aspects of culture? If one believes progress is inevitable, one would think Turkey or Egypt will lead the way. One of them might in time become the core state. At the moment, though, the oil monarchies have the wealth, and are purchasing western military power. While their governments are the most obsolete if you believe in progress, Saudi Arabia might be as close to being a core state as any.

The transition between agricultural and industrial civilization is often painful. The S&H's Western crises from the Black Plague through World War II are a litany of how painful the transition can be. In my view, much of the tension and energy powering S&H's generational cycle comes from new technology forcing cultural upheaval. While the West pioneered this path, and fought many destructive wars finding a new way of integrating new technology into a new civilization, other civilizations don't have it any easier. They have had to compete with the West. Our advantages of Guns, Germs and Steel destroyed many a civilization, and crippled others.

What new basic broad truths might define the upcoming crisis? The Cold War established that capitalist representative democracies were economically more competitive than autocratic single party states, or other, older, forms of autocratic government. It is becoming clearer that wars of aggression between major states are not cost effective. Defensive alliances between industrial democracies and their client states are suppressing overt wars of aggression. Weapons of Mass Destruction make direct conflict between major powers not cost effective from the point of view of the capitalist elites that finance the industrial age politicians.

Thus, while the technology is available to cross deserts and mountain ranges, and communications and modern governments allow huge nations, it is entirely plausible that the old agricultural age civilizations might continue to exist in a post-industrial era. The civilizations were created by technological and natural barriers that might be obsolete. Still, cultural borders of language and religion might have sufficient inertia, even if natural military and political boundaries can been overcome by technology.

Thus, basing one's guess of the near future on tendencies derived from study of agricultural age civilizations might give false impressions.

The Industrial Age was dominated by competition among Western powers, and their struggles to set up Zones of Influence, the better to rape the other civilizations. The Cold War might have been the last pseudo-struggle internal to Western civilization. Western nation states might no longer be seeking military dominance over zones of influence, but rather economic advantages.

The interesting problem to me is whether the West will attempt to continue enforcing Zones of Influence. If there is only one power, one zone of influence, do the victors get to keep the spoils? Can we meddle in far away politics, seeking advantage, as much as other western powers did during the Industrial Age? Or in a post industrial age, when minor governments from other civilizations, working through proxies, have access to weapons of mass destruction, might it be prudent to stop screwing over minor powers?

We are a pseudo empire. We don't overtly occupy foreign states any more. Our rich and powerful industrialists just make deals with foreign powerful and corrupt government officials, and screw their people with permission from their leaders. The result is still a hatred of the West, and a continued division of wealth between the third and first worlds. Can this be sustained?

Then there are ecological considerations. There is only so much wealth to go around, and populations are increasing. Many have been striving to ignore ecological concerns. Current values stress short term profits over long term balance. There are enough other distractions that the ecology might not be addressed in the immediate future. Still, I don't think the tensions between and among civilizations can be addressed without balancing the wealth, which means a global ecological perspective might well become necessary to a successful resolution of the crisis.

The more obvious concerns are at old civilization Al boundaries. As military occupation of zones of influence are no longer cost effective or fashionable, the core states would just as soon wash their hands of old problems. However, centuries of conquest and reconquest have left ambiguous borders. These were frozen during the Cold War, as few local conflicts were considered worth chasing by the Superpowers. They are no longer frozen.

Huntington noted how wealthy core states are tending to finance proxy wars on civilization boundaries. Ethnic minorities count on support from more peaceful states closer to their civilization's core. Thus, US private and public funds finance Jews and Catholics in Israel and Northern Ireland. Similar funds from other civilizations support Serb and Palestinian efforts. Another key question is if the core states can unite to stop financing such ethnic struggles, or will a habit Imperial partisanship draw them into continued spirals of violence.

Northern Ireland and the Balkans are looking decent. Israel and Palestine are looking really ugly just now. Other fronts await.

OK. Nothing new said above. I just can't resist breaking in on a single model discussion by folding in a few other models. Anyway, Islam is not a well defined civilization with a clear core state and united values. It is a region in transition. The West's support of Israel - perhaps the last of the West's colonial imperialistic adventures - vastly complicates what might otherwise be just another cultural upheaval. Oil money going to the most anarchistic of the regional forces doesn't help. The West has a self-interest in maintain perhaps the most obsolete of the local cultures, and the most alien.

Neither the West or the United States should be considered innocent. Our perceived self interests are pulling against the directions of "progress," whether one prefers the Civilization or Wave model. While I would tend to agree with a broad statement that civilizations tend to develop core nations, and that a progression from agricultural to industrial to (maybe) post industrial civilization is in general likely, I wouldn't bet on a calm quiet peaceful transition. I might see where we need to go, but I certainly can't see how to get there from here.

Back some four pages ago, I posted my impressions of Susan Brombacher's eight crisis outcome scenarios, in which I speculated that a lot of leftist radicals would particularly like to see scenario #5 (America defeated, conquered, and occupied, it's government abolished, it's people enslaved), but could live with #6 (America plunged into a permanent depression or otherwise left a broken shadow of it's former self, barely able to defend itself or hold itself together, with little or no hope of ever recovering from the catastrophe) as the outcome of the next 4T. I tend to suspect that Bob Butler and Brian Rush fall into this group. After all, if one feels that America is such an irredeemably evil nation, then could not #5, or at the very least #6, be considered a suitable minimum punishment for the American people?

<font size=-1>[ This Message was edited by: jds1958xg on 2002-04-04 06:58 ]</font>

<font size=-1>[ This Message was edited by: jds1958xg on 2002-04-04 08:41 ]</font>

<font size=-1>[ This Message was edited by: jds1958xg on 2002-04-04 08:44 ]</font>

jds1958xg writes...

Back some four pages ago, I posted my impressions of Susan Brombacher's eight crisis outcome scenarios, in which I speculated that a lot of leftist radicals would particularly like to see scenario #5 (America defeated, conquered, and occupied, it's government abolished, it's people enslaved), but could live with #6 (America plunged into a permanent depression or otherwise left a broken shadow of it's former self, barely able to defend itself or hold itself together) as the outcome of the next 4T. I tend to suspect that Bob Butler and Brian Rush fall into this group. After all, if one feels that America is such an irredeemably evil nation, then could not #5, or at the very least #6, be considered a suitable minimum punishment for the American people?

Back in Intro to Philosophy 102, the professor assigned three writings on duty. One French philosopher talked about how God created him, provided everything he needed in life, and thus how he owes God a debt which included following God's commandments. A German philosopher waxed poetic about the state, how it had protected him, taught him, fed him, and thus how he owed his country a debt, which included marching with his nation's army. One American philosopher talked about family, how his parents made him, sheltered him, taught him, brought him joy, and how he would resolve this debt through his relationship with his wife and children.

The professor wanted a debate. At most, only one of these three could be correct. Thus, the other two must be wrong. Whichever option the student selected as being correct, the professor would shoot the student down from the perspective of one of the other two.

I worked for synthesis. As with waves, generations and civilizations, I was not content with a, b or c, but went for d, all of the above. There were common themes, of debt, of love, and about giving back all to those who had given one all. I saw love of God, country and family. I saw cultural differences. I found myself unable to insist to a German that he love family more than his country, or to a Frenchman that he should love France more than God. One cannot tell someone whom to love. Given that, one cannot tell him to whom he owes the greater debt, to whom his duty lies.

Duty is an aspect of love. Love is blind.

The German philosopher wrote before Hitler. Can love of one's country justify war of aggression? Can love of God justify holy war, when the war in question violates commandments that God has given? Can a desire to give one's family all one can justify leaving so little that another man's family is left in dire want?

Philosophy and values are cultural. The base premise underlying all the arguments on duty is not logic. It is emotional. It is values. It is also genetic. It is territory, the peer bond, the male-female bond, the child-parent bond, and aggression.

My assumption is that every man deeply feels his values. Every man can justify in his heart what he feels he has to do. Would I argue with an ancient Frenchman about to launch a Crusade? Yes. Would I argue with a Nazi, about to launch his blitzkrieg? Yes. Would I question current day American policies? Yes. Can I see and understand all their cultural inertia, the clinging to past evils? Yes. Does this make their actions any more moral? No.

Human culture is evolving. For the most part, it is becoming more moral, not less. This is a broad trend, not an absolute law, comparable to the tendency for core states to emerge for each civilization. Slavery, war of aggression, and overt colonial imperialism are becoming less common.

S&H's generation / cycles theory ought to teach one that fourth turnings are a time of increased morality, when an habitual injustice is overturned. It ought to teach that the establishment which benefits most from the established status quo will resist changes to the status quo. What was the norm during the prior third turning becomes regarded as an obvious and grievous evil in the following first turning.

Thus, I would attempt to examine all cultures. Which cultures include evils that might ought best be overthrown? Which culture is the establishment culture, which would benefit most from maintaining the status quo? All cultures might be presumed to be understandable and moral if one loves what their people love, if one sees history as their people see it. No culture is perfect. All cultures, if they are to improve themselves, must first examine themselves with a critical eye.

Blind love can be dangerous.

Is America the last best hope for a free world? Yes. If the planet is to advance to the next high in peace and prosperity, it would be better to start from Western values than from agricultural age fundamentalist religious perspectives. Does this imply we should shun fundamentalist religious perspectives? No. God, in all his various guises, talks much about love. Fundamentalists are too often deaf to their God in the desire to remake their neighbor's culture, the desire to expand the size, power and glory of their own culture. While it is dangerous to claim knowledge of God's will, I'll take the risk. God wants no such thing.

America is not perfect. Can a business man, one who has given considerably to major party campaign coffers, expect assistance from the government in establishing himself overseas? Yes. Is any one instance of this morally reprehensible? No. Is a persistent pattern of using US power to gain economic advantage abroad problematic? Yes. If we are seeking advantage for ourselves abroad, we are suppressing others.

Should the US support Israel? Should we support democratic states which share our principles? Does Israel use assassination? Is assassination one of the tactics defined by Dubya as terrorist? Should the US support terrorist states? More broadly, should the wealthy "core" states and their developed allies provide money and arms to ethnic freedom fighters and terrorist seeking to secure territory, wealth and power on civilization boundaries? Or should the core states refrain from supporting and escalating violence? Should they have established policies to resolve the rash of ethnic-religious conflicts no longer suppressed by the Cold War? Should the emphasis be more on peace and prosperity than defending and pushing outward civilization boundaries?

Is US business policy driven by the long term, or the short term? Do corporate executives have an obligation to employees and shareholders? Do companies owe employees any form of loyalty, or, if there is no love, is there no duty? Should the government owe its loyalty to those who give campaign contributions, or to The People?

America is not irredeemably evil. It is redeemably evil. In any given fourth turning, the establishment faction will be striving to preserve privilege and power. The radicals will be righting an injustice. The radicals generally win. The radicals generally get to write the history books. Taxation without representation is evil. Slavery is evil. Hitler, Fascism and war of aggression were and remain evil.

The conservative factions didn't see this before the fact. They were blind to the future, self serving, secure in acting as countless others had acted in the past. The South asserted with confidence that all the highest classical civilizations were based upon slavery. They saw not any handwriting on the wall.

No, we are not irredeemably evil. Redemption is possible. First, a good long hard look in the mirror is necessary. If we do not move forward, if we are content with covert imperialistic supremacy, if we attempt to maintain our superpower superprivileged status, options 5 and 6 are possible. Not desirable, but possible. Not a goal, but perhaps deserved.

My vision of the future includes a US much more responsive to The People, much less to Big Business. US will remain first among equal core states, willing to support other core states in developing their civilizations, but not dictating to other core states. Division of wealth must be reduced. Ethnic conflict must be settled. Resources used must be balanced against resources available and resources recycled. The emphasis is on the word 'must'. If we wish to remain first among equals, we must lead, we must not resist. In a fourth turning, one bets on the radicals, not the reactionaries. In a fourth turning, forget liberals and conservatives, it is radicals and reactionaries.

If we resist, if we attempt to maintain echoes of Industrial Age imperialism, you can guess who will write the history books, and what the history books will say.

Five. Six.