Originally Posted by Uzi

Oh yeah, there are some in Russia that believe that anywhere a Russian ever crapped belongs to Russia. It's ancient Russian land -- like Alaska.

You met that guy, too? I like to point out to him that prior to Novgorod, the capital city of the confederated kingdoms that ended up Russia was in Vilnius. So really, it all belongs to Lithuania...

Maybe Berezovsky did this one too?

The more things change, the more they stay the same.

Vladimir Putin on Tuesday graciously accepted his nomination as chairman of the United Russia (UR) party that dominates Russia's legislature, a stepping-stone to his expected confirmation as Prime Minister on May 8. And if there was something rather Soviet about the rituals of the congress of the dominant party in Russia's legislature, the new distribution of power between Putin and his successor, President Dimitri Medvedev, is not entirely unfamiliar. Putin has made no secret of the fact that he envisages his new role as that of a head of government, nor do any observers of Russian politics doubt that Putin, rather than Medvedev, will be in charge.

Comrade Medvedev will prove quite a useful puppet, no?

The new democratic and anti-fascist youth movement, Nashi, intends to eliminate the "regime of oligarchic capitalism".
Speaking at a congress of initiative groups to set up the movement, Marching Together leader Vasiliy Yakemenko

The last promise of Yakimenko was to move the Estonian embassy in Moscow to Estonia brick by brick. He promised that his Nashi would leave the embassy till Estonians were not put the monument of our soldier to its place.
Yakimenko is a clown, but his role in our political circus is very important.
You are forgetting, gentlemen, that there is such a thing as elections in Russia and the Kremlin wants to get some votes in it.
The Pro-Western regime of Putin has to say something to anti-Western population.
Not long time ago I opened a poll on a democratic forum who is most to blame for the war in Yugoslavia. Absolute majority answered – it was the USA.
After Yugoslavia and Iraq even our pro-Western democrats believe that bombing is the only American argument.
Putin knows that NATO is not a threat for Russia, but most voters think the opposite. So he and Medvedev need clowns as Yakimenko which draw attention of people from his policy. After Bush for most Russians American democracy is pure enemy for us and it is not impossible for the Kremlin not to pretend that it is fighting against this threat.
The same with oligarchs. Most of people hate them and they indeed robbed the county. What is going to be done has nothing to do with words.

'He promised that his Nashi would not leave the embassy..' - for some reason my edit box doesn't work.

Any thoughts about the possibility of war erupting between Russia and Georgia?

TSKHINVALI, Georgia - Georgian troops launched a major military offensive Friday to regain control over the breakaway province of South Ossetia, prompting a furious response from Russia — which vowed retaliation and sent a column of tanks into the region.

The fighting was the worst outbreak of hostilities since the province won de-facto independence in a war that ended in 1992 — raising fears that war could once again erupt.

Originally Posted by The Wonkette

Any thoughts about the possibility of war erupting between Russia and Georgia?

Again, in the heart of Eurasia, a small Nation State is oppressing a portion of its peoples. All the Not-Warriors of the Balkan Liberation of the Albanians ought applaud the work of the Russians to see a free Ossetia on the lines of Kosova:

Is there a Celestial Embassy in Tbilisi that can be bombed?
Do you think the War Criminal Georgians will get sent to The Hague?
Will Romantic Idealists call for the Crushing of Georgian Skulls?

Originally Posted by Virgil K. Saari

Is there a Celestial Embassy in Tbilisi that can be bombed?

Yes.

Originally Posted by VKS

Do you think the War Criminal Georgians will get sent to The Hague?

No.

Originally Posted by VKS

Will Romantic Idealists call for the Crushing of Georgian Skulls?

Yes.

The conflict that just erupted between russia and the republic of georgia is just the opening salvo of WW3, alliances between US, nato and georgia and the well known russian desire to reunite the former russian empire as a precurser to the conquest of europe, the middle east and the americas ensures that the conflict can only escalate, soviet deception operations designed to lull americans and other westerners that the russian war machine is non-threatening and lull thirdworlders into thinking that russia is an ally against foreign exploitation.

The Russian planners count on american obsession with ideology in order to win alienated nations to their side. Given the known incompetence and bumbling of the bush administration, russia is determined to launch global war before the 2008 election restores a more competent administration to america no matter who wins the election. The continued official encouragement of tibetan protests and rocking the boat in beijing is resulting in china moving day by day into the russian sphere, just as russia hopes to be able to arrange a world division arrangement with china, although russia ultimately plans the eventual elimination of chinese, as well as all other non-whites as well as westerners whom eurasianist ideologues such as alexander dugin regard as racially impure.

It seems that the Georgian/South Ossetian relationship goes back to the middle ages, even predating their Russian-Soviet incorporation. Given such a history, at what point does "breaking away" become taboo? At what point odes the acceptability of fragmentation cease? Should Basque separatism be countenanced? What of the perennial calls for Quebec’s independence from Canada? If a U.S. state wished to leave the union, are we to stand idly by? While I don't endorse one world government, I also don’t endorse primitive tribalism which is what such separatism would logically end in if left unchecked. Thoughts?

JVS

Originally Posted by Jeremiah175

It seems that the Georgian/South Ossetian relationship goes back to the middle ages, even predating their Russian-Soviet incorporation. Given such a history, at what point does "breaking away" become taboo? At what point odes the acceptability of fragmentation cease? Should Basque separatism be countenanced? What of the perennial calls for Quebec’s independence from Canada? If a U.S. state wished to leave the union, are we to stand idly by? While I don't endorse one world government, I also don’t endorse primitive tribalism which is what such separatism would logically end in if left unchecked. Thoughts?

JVS

Colonial empires aren't pretty when being formed, and they are ugly when they are in the break-up stage or when they are so rotten that some conqueror posing as a liberator can simply knock down the door. There have been marriages of convenience (Quebec as a part of Canada, the merger of Aragon (Catalonia) and Castille (central Spain), the Austro-Hungarian Empire, "French" and "English" Canada, Czechoslovakia, and the Kingdom of the Southern Slavs (Yugoslavia)...and, of course, the United States of America. Some have worked, and some divorced amicably.

Adolf Hitler had the foresight to recognize that the Soviet Union was a rotten system from its inception that would be easy pickings for some wise conqueror -- An Alexander-like figure -- who had no fear of its geographic scope. Unfortunately for all concerned, Adolf Hitler was not Alexander the Great, the latter knowing when to quit killing people (that is, after he conquered them).

Two means exist of keeping an empire of great expanse from collapsing of its own weight: one is sheer terror -- the ability of the central government to destroy any real or imagined threat to the political order, and the other is liberty. Under Putin, Russia has tried a middle course, one that has clear lines of permissible behavior with comparative safety and one in which elite forces move swiftly to deal harshly with those that go to far. That middle course is a delicate balancing act that depends upon a personality.

Happy World War III everybody!!!!!!!!!!!!

Originally Posted by sean '90

Happy World War III everybody!!!!!!!!!!!!

It's not *that* bad. This is just the latest round of the wars to determine the borders of post-Soviet Russia. Does anyone remember Chechnya? Ingushetia? They're only a hundred miles or so away from South Ossetia. The entire Caucasus is a awful mess, a hodgepodge of tiny and distrustful ethnicities... much like Yugoslavia.

Georgia has been trying to turn this into a NATO contest as part of his bid to join NATO. The problem is that NATO has enough to chew on at the moment, between absorbing the difficult meal of the Balkans and fulfilling their pledge to fight in Afghanistan (under the only invocation of Article V to date). While the Bear is discouraged from making further westward pushes or otherwise annoying the European Union, I'm not sure states not actually bordering Russia care enough about the land of the Golden Fleece to intervene. They might squawk a little more if Russia tries to shut down the Trans-Caucasus Pipeline, raising oil prices again.

Trying to do anything about the Caucasus always runs into the same problem. Namely, only Russia, Turkey, and Iran have any kind of easy access to the area. (You might be able to get stuff over from Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria, but only if you defeat the Russian Black Sea Fleet and maintain air superiority thereafter.) If the Caucasus peoples presented a united front, a Caucasian Federation might be able to defend itself -- playing balance-of-power to keep the three powers around it under control, and using its terrain advantages to maintain defence. Unfortunately, like the Kingdom of Poland (which had the same problem two centuries ago), the Caucasus is waaaaay too divided against itself to attempt any such thing. As long as that situation remains, the Caucasus will continue to play the role it has throughout history: a middle ground squabbled over by whatever powers hold Sarmatia, Anatolia, and the Farsi Plateau.

The only danger whatsoever is the rumor that, in the process of taking Abzhakia, Russia might impinge on Ukrainian sovereignty. As the Ukraine really does have a chance of being admitted to the European Union at some point -- and Poland would be HIGHLY interested in that prospect -- any escalation of tensions on the Ukraine-Russia border WOULD have the prospect of a wider conflict.

James H Kunstler, in his blog this week, has an interesting take on the Russian/Georgia war.

For instance, the war currently underway in former Soviet Georgia (I say this in case the folks in Atlanta wonder why Stone Mountain is not being bombed) will at least end up with Russia in control of the major oil pipeline that runs from the Caspian region across Georgia, through Turkey, to Europe -- even while parts of that pipeline get blown up. The net effect will be of Russia will taking control of even more of the oil now flowing to Europe. The whole point of building that pipeline was to bypass Russia, which was crippled by its own paradigm shift in the years when the pipeline was built.

The US might talk tough about this threat to the status quo, but what is it going to do? Pull troops out of Iraq and Afghanistan to mount a land war against Russia in a landlocked region of its own neighborhood? Fuggeddabowdit.

Notice, the Europeans are not making so much as a peep -- because when the time comes that Russia does control that pipeline, the Europeans will do anything to keep the contents flowing toward them. Europe may be organized as a trade-and-currency confederation, but not as a military power. NATO is strictly a US auxiliary, not a power unto itself. The result of all this will be that Russia, already the world's leading oil producer, even as it has entered depletion, will now possess a potent geopolitical-and-financial weapon with control of that pipeline. A collateral effect will be Europe's inclination to bid more desperately for Middle East oil -- the oil that comes via the Suez Canal -- which can't help but boost the price-per-barrel that the US is forced to pay.

Our Vladimir, having successfully brought Russia out of the post-Soviet chaos, is now consolidating his victory and harnessing the popular energies by cleaning up all those niggling little problems such as rebellious border nations etc. This is not unprecedented: there was once a little Corsican who did the same after bringing France out of the post-Revolutionary turmoil, and his people went along with him enthusiastically.

Not that I think Putin is any Napoleon, but the impulse is the same although the scale is different.

Stratfor is posing that this is bigger than even the control of the oil pipelines, although the pipelines are crucial.

It is to intended to re-establish Russia hegemony throughout the former Soviet states again -

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/int..._south_ossetia

Given the speed with which the Russians reacted to Georgia’s incursion into South Ossetia, Moscow was clearly ready to intervene. We suspect the Georgians were set up for this in some way, but at this point the buildup to the conflict no longer matters. What matters is the message that Russia is sending to the West.

Russian President Dmitri Medvedev summed this message up best: “Historically Russia has been, and will continue to be, a guarantor of security for peoples of the Caucasus.”

Strategically, we said Russia would respond to Kosovo’s independence, and they have. Russia is now declaring the Caucasus to be part of its sphere of influence. We have spoken for months of how Russia would find a window of opportunity to redefine the region. This is happening now.

All too familiar with the sight of Russian tanks, the Baltic countries are terrified of what they face in the long run, and they should be. This is the first major Russian intervention since the fall of the Soviet Union. Yes, Russia has been involved elsewhere. Yes, Russia has fought. But this is on a new order of confidence and indifference to general opinion. We will look at this as a defining moment.

The most important reaction will not be in the United States or Western Europe. It is the reaction in the former Soviet states that matters most right now. That is the real audience for this. Watch the reaction of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Nagorno-Karabakh and the Balts. How will Russia’s moves affect them psychologically?

The Russians hold a trump card with the Americans: Iran. They can flood Iran with weapons at will. The main U.S. counter is in Ukraine and Central Asia, but is not nearly as painful.

Tactically, there is only one issue: Will the Russians attack Georgia on the ground? If they are going to, the Russians have likely made that decision days ago.

Focus on whether Russia invades Georgia proper. Then watch the former Soviet states. The United States and Germany are of secondary interest at this point.

Stratfor has talked frequently about a window of opportunity for the Russians (as well as others) to assert an increase in power on the world stage due to the U.S present situation including a spent Presidency. They tie it back to Bush's Iraq gambit where we are now in no position, militarily, diplomatically, or ethically, to counter Russia's hegemony in all the former Soviet states and beyond - Reagan must be turning over in his grave. Strategically, this could be the lasting CF of the Iraq war.

more from stratfor with good map -

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/geo...ssia_checkmate

The presence of Russian troops in Senaki has a number of important implications.

First, the Russian forces used in the operation approached from Abkhazia. There has been a U.N. buffer force between Abkhaz- and Georgian-controlled territory, so for Russian forces to be near Senaki, the Russians would have had to move through — and ultimately beyond — that buffer. Georgia’s best troops are also typically kept near Abkhazia, suggesting that those forces have been either bypassed or destroyed. Several reports indicate the Georgians are engaged in combat with Abkhaz forces in the upper reaches of the Kodori Gorge, so it seems likely they were bypassed.
Second, Senaki sits astride a railroad juncture that links the rest of the country not only to Abkhazia, but to Georgia’s largest port: Poti. The Russians have already bombed Poti several times, but taking Senaki completely removes the port from the equation.

Third, another Georgian city — Samtredia — is only an hour’s march from Senaki. Samtredia sits astride the Baku-Tbilisi-Supsa oil pipeline, transit fees from which are a major portion of Georgia’s economic wherewithal. But its military significance for Georgia cannot be overstated.

Samtredia is where Georgia’s transport links to its only other ports, Supsa and Batumi, merge with its link to Poti. (Technically, Sukumi is also a Georgian port, but the Abkhaz have controlled it since achieving de facto independence in 1993.) Should Samtredia fall, Russia will have, in effect, enacted a naval blockade of Georgia without using its navy. The city is also the only land link of any meaningful size to Turkey. While Turkey — along with the rest of the world — does not want to get involved in the conflict, the capture of Samtredia effectively blocks any potential land-based reinforcements from reaching Georgia via Turkey.

Furthermore, there is only one road and rail line that leads east from Samtredia to the rest of the country. This transport corridor is, in essence, the backbone of the entire country. Should Samtredia fall, there is really nothing that can be done — by Georgia or anyone else — to stop the Russians from taking over Georgia outright, one piece at a time, at their leisure.

In essence, the Russians are a heartbeat away from being able to dictate terms to the Georgians without even glancing in the direction of Tbilisi.

Analysis:

1. Russia swore yesterday that they would not move outside the borders of South Ossetia, trying to convince everyone that they would not invade further. While literally true, it was part of the <i>maskirovka</i>. South Ossetia was the primary target, but having secured it, it becomes a distraction that draws Georgia's reinforcements. That left Abkahzia more vulnerable.

2. The Black Sea Fleet is already deployed and blockading Georgia's ports. Therefore, the Stratfor analysis suggesting that an attack on Samtredi would create an effective blockade is redundant: Georgia is already under blockade. It can't be for taking the pipeline, either: the main force in South Ossetia could just have taken Gori and seized the pipeline there. It must be for taking the road from Turkey.

3. The pipeline is definitely a target of the attack, however. The Russians will demand control of the pipeline, military or economic, as part of their terms. It's not just the oil profits that bug them; the whole thing was a non-Russian project, and Russia wants no one else having independent thoughts in the area. Might be a prelude to invasion, after all. (Remember that Kunstler is obsessed with peak oil, and this colors his analysis.)

4. U.N. buffer zones are voluntary only. The U.N. keeps peace, but does not enforce or create peace -- <i>especially</i> not when one of the combatants is a permanent member of the Security Council. Between this and the U.S. actions, other nations may consider seeking a way to take action without the Security Council. The U.N. is weakened by this action; it is, to my knowledge, the first time a permanent member is deliberately defying a U.N. force in place. (The People's Republic of China did not hold the Security Council seat when it acted against U.N. forces in the Korean War.)

5. Russia asserts that it does not intend to take Tblisi. Based on their past actions and statements, this is both true and deceptive. As STRATFOR notes, if Russian forces break the main corridor connecting Georgia's strategic assets into three pieces, Georgia is practically helpless anyway, and Georgia will fight much harder to defend Tblisi than anywhere else. Why spend the lives and ordnance? This isn't the 19th century; taking the enemy capital is not strictly necessary, especially with a country in such a precarious strategic position as Georgia.

6. The Baltics are not going to give Russia an inch, and as EU and NATO members, they have the power to thumb their nose at Russia in security. We are committed to their defense, and as they are behind the new Border of Europe, all of Europe would react to serious provocations. They may consider the expulsion of their Russian minorities... just to be on the safe side.

7. The Ukraine is also not interested in having creeping Russian influence returning to their lands, and have made it clear that the Black Sea Fleet is not welcome to return to Sevestapol (treaties notwithstanding). It will be very interesting to see if Russia tries to enforce the treaty provisions that claim the Black Sea Fleet's berths there until 2017. Unlike tiny Georgia, Ukraine has not insignificant military resources at its disposal; it also has an advocate inside the European Union (Poland). The EU was not sure it wanted to expand into the Caucasus, but Ukraine was and is a serious potential candidate nation. Any move toward the Ukraine would also make it clear that Russia is in a conquering mood and spur a greater response from Europe. It seems unlikely that Russia will challenge Ukraine at this time -- divide and conquer requires keeping your enemies from uniting. But if they do, despite the Atlantic Alliance's commitments, actions against Russia will become almost mandatory.

8. If the Caucasus states and peoples could unite against the Russians, matters would be significantly more stable. The Caucasus is a network of valleys and mountain ranges; the Tbilisi area of Georgia could be reinforced through Armenia and Azerbijian and Russia would have to attack them to stop it. Unfortunately, that same geographic division also encourages political balkanization. The Caucasus is aiding in its own subjugation by obsessing over tiny disputes regarding mere thousands while the bear of Russia, the lion of Iran and whatever animal represents Turkey -- each with dozens of millions available -- loom over them.

Originally Posted by catfishncod

Analysis:

1. Russia swore yesterday that they would not move outside the borders of South Ossetia, trying to convince everyone that they would not invade further. While literally true, it was part of the <i>maskirovka</i>. South Ossetia was the primary target, but having secured it, it becomes a distraction that draws Georgia's reinforcements. That left Abkahzia more vulnerable.

2. The Black Sea Fleet is already deployed and blockading Georgia's ports. Therefore, the Stratfor analysis suggesting that an attack on Samtredi would create an effective blockade is redundant: Georgia is already under blockade. It can't be for taking the pipeline, either: the main force in South Ossetia could just have taken Gori and seized the pipeline there. It must be for taking the road from Turkey.

3. The pipeline is definitely a target of the attack, however. The Russians will demand control of the pipeline, military or economic, as part of their terms. It's not just the oil profits that bug them; the whole thing was a non-Russian project, and Russia wants no one else having independent thoughts in the area. Might be a prelude to invasion, after all. (Remember that Kunstler is obsessed with peak oil, and this colors his analysis.)

4. U.N. buffer zones are voluntary only. The U.N. keeps peace, but does not enforce or create peace -- <i>especially</i> not when one of the combatants is a permanent member of the Security Council. Between this and the U.S. actions, other nations may consider seeking a way to take action without the Security Council. The U.N. is weakened by this action; it is, to my knowledge, the first time a permanent member is deliberately defying a U.N. force in place. (The People's Republic of China did not hold the Security Council seat when it acted against U.N. forces in the Korean War.)

5. Russia asserts that it does not intend to take Tblisi. Based on their past actions and statements, this is both true and deceptive. As STRATFOR notes, if Russian forces break the main corridor connecting Georgia's strategic assets into three pieces, Georgia is practically helpless anyway, and Georgia will fight much harder to defend Tblisi than anywhere else. Why spend the lives and ordnance? This isn't the 19th century; taking the enemy capital is not strictly necessary, especially with a country in such a precarious strategic position as Georgia.

6. The Baltics are not going to give Russia an inch, and as EU and NATO members, they have the power to thumb their nose at Russia in security. We are committed to their defense, and as they are behind the new Border of Europe, all of Europe would react to serious provocations. They may consider the expulsion of their Russian minorities... just to be on the safe side.

7. The Ukraine is also not interested in having creeping Russian influence returning to their lands, and have made it clear that the Black Sea Fleet is not welcome to return to Sevestapol (treaties notwithstanding). It will be very interesting to see if Russia tries to enforce the treaty provisions that claim the Black Sea Fleet's berths there until 2017. Unlike tiny Georgia, Ukraine has not insignificant military resources at its disposal; it also has an advocate inside the European Union (Poland). The EU was not sure it wanted to expand into the Caucasus, but Ukraine was and is a serious potential candidate nation. Any move toward the Ukraine would also make it clear that Russia is in a conquering mood and spur a greater response from Europe. It seems unlikely that Russia will challenge Ukraine at this time -- divide and conquer requires keeping your enemies from uniting. But if they do, despite the Atlantic Alliance's commitments, actions against Russia will become almost mandatory.

8. If the Caucasus states and peoples could unite against the Russians, matters would be significantly more stable. The Caucasus is a network of valleys and mountain ranges; the Tbilisi area of Georgia could be reinforced through Armenia and Azerbijian and Russia would have to attack them to stop it. Unfortunately, that same geographic division also encourages political balkanization. The Caucasus is aiding in its own subjugation by obsessing over tiny disputes regarding mere thousands while the bear of Russia, the lion of Iran and whatever animal represents Turkey -- each with dozens of millions available -- loom over them.

http://www.fourthturning.com/forum/s...42&postcount=1

Originally Posted by catfishncod

Analysis:

1. Russia swore yesterday that they would not move outside the borders of South Ossetia, trying to convince everyone that they would not invade further. While literally true, it was part of the <i>maskirovka</i>. South Ossetia was the primary target, but having secured it, it becomes a distraction that draws Georgia's reinforcements. That left Abkahzia more vulnerable.

2. The Black Sea Fleet is already deployed and blockading Georgia's ports. Therefore, the Stratfor analysis suggesting that an attack on Samtredi would create an effective blockade is redundant: Georgia is already under blockade. It can't be for taking the pipeline, either: the main force in South Ossetia could just have taken Gori and seized the pipeline there. It must be for taking the road from Turkey.

3. The pipeline is definitely a target of the attack, however. The Russians will demand control of the pipeline, military or economic, as part of their terms. It's not just the oil profits that bug them; the whole thing was a non-Russian project, and Russia wants no one else having independent thoughts in the area. Might be a prelude to invasion, after all. (Remember that Kunstler is obsessed with peak oil, and this colors his analysis.)

4. U.N. buffer zones are voluntary only. The U.N. keeps peace, but does not enforce or create peace -- <i>especially</i> not when one of the combatants is a permanent member of the Security Council. Between this and the U.S. actions, other nations may consider seeking a way to take action without the Security Council. The U.N. is weakened by this action; it is, to my knowledge, the first time a permanent member is deliberately defying a U.N. force in place. (The People's Republic of China did not hold the Security Council seat when it acted against U.N. forces in the Korean War.)

5. Russia asserts that it does not intend to take Tblisi. Based on their past actions and statements, this is both true and deceptive. As STRATFOR notes, if Russian forces break the main corridor connecting Georgia's strategic assets into three pieces, Georgia is practically helpless anyway, and Georgia will fight much harder to defend Tblisi than anywhere else. Why spend the lives and ordnance? This isn't the 19th century; taking the enemy capital is not strictly necessary, especially with a country in such a precarious strategic position as Georgia.

6. The Baltics are not going to give Russia an inch, and as EU and NATO members, they have the power to thumb their nose at Russia in security. We are committed to their defense, and as they are behind the new Border of Europe, all of Europe would react to serious provocations. They may consider the expulsion of their Russian minorities... just to be on the safe side.

7. The Ukraine is also not interested in having creeping Russian influence returning to their lands, and have made it clear that the Black Sea Fleet is not welcome to return to Sevestapol (treaties notwithstanding). It will be very interesting to see if Russia tries to enforce the treaty provisions that claim the Black Sea Fleet's berths there until 2017. Unlike tiny Georgia, Ukraine has not insignificant military resources at its disposal; it also has an advocate inside the European Union (Poland). The EU was not sure it wanted to expand into the Caucasus, but Ukraine was and is a serious potential candidate nation. Any move toward the Ukraine would also make it clear that Russia is in a conquering mood and spur a greater response from Europe. It seems unlikely that Russia will challenge Ukraine at this time -- divide and conquer requires keeping your enemies from uniting. But if they do, despite the Atlantic Alliance's commitments, actions against Russia will become almost mandatory.

8. If the Caucasus states and peoples could unite against the Russians, matters would be significantly more stable. The Caucasus is a network of valleys and mountain ranges; the Tbilisi area of Georgia could be reinforced through Armenia and Azerbijian and Russia would have to attack them to stop it. Unfortunately, that same geographic division also encourages political balkanization. The Caucasus is aiding in its own subjugation by obsessing over tiny disputes regarding mere thousands while the bear of Russia, the lion of Iran and whatever animal represents Turkey -- each with dozens of millions available -- loom over them.

It will be interesting to see what the Russians have bought into over the longer term. In addition to the Caucasus region being ideal for 4th Generation Warfare, there are large contingents of Georgian migrants (note - Stalin was Georgian) in most Russian urban areas as part of the recent 1/4 million per year legal migrants from former Soviet states due to the upturn in the Russian economy and as much as 10 million illegal migrants, mostly from these states, now live there out of about 140 million total Russian population. Along with an increasing heavy police state hand since Putin, the commodity/energy economic boom has kept things relatively quiet since the Ruskies leveled Grozny for the second time. However, if the global economic downturn gains momentum as some are expecting, there may be more of a reliance on a the heavy hand -- an in-country retaliatory terrorism should not be unexpected.

Land wars in Asia usually always prove very messy.

Originally Posted by playwrite

It will be interesting to see what the Russians have bought into over the longer term. In addition to the Caucasus region being ideal for 4th Generation Warfare, there are large contingents of Georgian migrants (note - Stalin was Georgian) in most Russian urban areas ...

Along with an increasing heavy police state hand since Putin, the commodity/energy economic boom has kept things relatively quiet since the Ruskies leveled Grozny for the second time.

You just answered your own question. The correct tactic if Georgia is overrun or occupied is 4GW/guerilla warfare. Georgia is as well designed for this as Spain... or Afghanistan.

"The Centauri learned this lesson once. We will teach it to them again." -- Ambassador G'Kar's final speech

And I don't choose the analogy of Russian Federation::Centauri Republic lightly. Like the Centauri, the Russians are a conquest-dreaming but dying people. Look up their birthrate. We should let them pass.

However, terrorism in Russia proper will be answered with the leveling of Tbilisi and anything else Russia considers a good target.

Land wars in Asia usually always prove very messy.

Vizzini. 'nuff said.

To any and all Not-Not-Warriors here at T4T that would make the case that it is vital to the Anglosphere when the question of who will control the Ossetias? is posited.

Are there any T4Ters who were or have become dubious about the Kosova and Irak projects but now think that the Third Time in the late Third Turning is the 'charm' and the Anglosphere ought to make a military adventure to the border of Europe and Asia in Order that reform might be instituted?

If you are now, or have ever been a Skull Crusher™ you may make comment as well, but Yo. Ob. Sv. reserves the right to dis-believe. Thank you.



______

Skull Crusher™ is the trademarked Policy of Kristol Korp., LTD and is only lent out to fellow Romantic Idealists for Eurasian Reform on a non-fee basis. Any and all other infringements will be dealt with by cranial downsizing and application of Godwin's law. (--that the Present is the 1930s, that the landform in question is Mittel Europa, and the leader in question is an Austrian watercolorist--)

Can "The West" afford to allow this foray to go unpunished? If Russia continues deeper into Georgia in an imperialist style isnt it telling us all we need to know of its intentions? Isnt this all too familiar? Does this not stink of Germans move into Poland to "liberate" the German minority within the "polsih corridor"? Swift and serious action needs to be taken, lest we appear to be hand-wringing do-nothings which would only serve to further embolden Russia.

JVS

Originally Posted by Jeremiah175

Can "The West" afford to allow this foray to go unpunished? If Russia continues deeper into Georgia in an imperialist style isnt it telling us all we need to know of its intentions? Isnt this all too familiar? Does this not stink of Germans move into Poland to "liberate" the German minority within the "polsih corridor"? Swift and serious action needs to be taken, lest we appear to be hand-wringing do-nothings which would only serve to further embolden Russia.

JVS

I totally agree. It appears that Russia, once again, will be at the forefront of our next Fourth Turning.

The question is, just how serious does this get? With Russia closing in on the capital of Georgia, it is only a matter of time before Russian troops are on NATO's doorstep. If a conflict with Russia is inevitable at this point, do we engage within the end of the next decade? Or the next year?

What are the Russians going for? They have the military strength to outright annex Georgia if that is their aim, but so far that's not how this is unfolding. They took South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Senaki, but deny that they've taken Gori, a critical strategy point with Georgia's only west-east highway. Georgia claims Russia has taken Gori and that the Georgian military has retreated to defend Tbilisi against an expected Russian invasion there, but Russia claims it has no plans to move deeper into Georgia. Much as I don't trust any Russian government line on this, Georgia's credibility is also far from established (Exhibit A: Saakashvili signs a ceasefire, concedes defeat in South Ossetia, then promptly starts shelling South Ossetia again).

So what is this about? Georgia and Russia both know the U.S. and Europe won't go to war with the Great Bear for the sake of a tiny country in the Caucasus. I have been watching the Google News headlines roll by all day and have not seen any more confirmed military milestones since this morning, when Russia admitted to taking Senaki but denied taking Gori. It's obvious that this can no longer be called the "South Ossetia War" as Wikipedia dubs it, since fighting is now occurring in Georgia proper, but where is this heading, and what do these people want?

Moreover, would you say Russia (or Georgia for that matter) is acting in a "hot" 4T fashion, or using consolidating 1T strategies? This might be our chance to come to some sort of consensus about the timeline in former Soviet nations.

EDIT: Sounds like Russia also took Zugdidi earlier today. Georgia insists the Russians are moving in on Tbilisi, while the Russians say they are only working to secure South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and surrounding areas in the north. To hear Saakashvili tell it, Putin is the new Hitler and Ossetia is the new Sudetenland. I'm inclined to agree with such a harsh assessment, but am still trying to learn more about the conflict.