Originally Posted by
Lawrence Kaplan
"It is not true, as Democrats were quick to claim, that President Bush's speech on Iraq yesterday offered nothing in the way of new ideas. The document that accompanied the president's speech, grandiosely titled "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq," describes a new military strategy to "clear, hold, and build." Rather than sweep through towns and villages only to move on the next day, thereby allowing insurgents to flood back in, U.S. forces will now sweep through and leave Iraqi units behind to "hold" the towns. In his speech, Bush held up the recent offensive in Tal Afar as a model. "Iraqi forces not only cleared the city, they held it," the president said. "And because of the skill and courage of the Iraqi forces, the citizens of Tal Afar were able to vote in October's constitutional referendum."
If the clear-and-hold strategy rings familiar, that's because it is. The concept was a signature of the Vietnam War, when it was employed to mixed effect during the latter years of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. Hence, the good news: U.S. forces will no longer be fighting World War II all over again in Iraq, employing conventional tactics and operations against an unconventional foe. In its decision to revive tactical and operational concepts that were tested and found wanting in Vietnam, however, the administration seems to have missed a few things. First, it's not so clear that what worked in Vietnam will work again in Iraq. Second, we lost the war in Vietnam...
Iraq is populated by Iraqis, not Vietnamese. Unlike, say, in Western Iraq, the population of South Vietnam wasn't uniformly hostile to the U.S. presence. "The peasant in Vietnam cares as little about the ideology of the [Viet Cong] as it does about the ideology of the [South Vietnamese government] counterinsurgency," expert William Corson wrote in 1968. What this meant was that, in theory at least, it was possible to secure the population from the insurgency. In the Sunni areas of Iraq, by contrast, the insurgency amounts partly to an authentic expression of popular will. In Tal Afar, for instance, which the president held up as an example of the new strategy, the mostly Shia units that moved in to "hold" the town had to be pulled out in the face of overwhelming Sunni hostility. How, then, can U.S. forces or their allies hold a place that has no desire to be held in the first place?
Then, too, if already overstretched U.S. and Iraqi forces remain in place to hold one area, what happens to the areas they're not holding? In fact, Westmoreland's Vietnam-era complaint about clear-and-hold remains just as valid today: "[T]he practice left the enemy free to come and go as he pleased throughout the bulk of the region." He also pointed out that, in Vietnam, there were "simply not enough numbers to put a squad of Americans in every village and hamlet." The same holds true in Iraq, which hosts a fraction of the U.S. forces that operated in Vietnam and an even smaller number of indigenous troops, spread out over a much bigger country.
Finally, it's a bit late in the day to rediscover tactics that the administration and the Army should have been experimenting with from the outset. If it was true that, by 1972, America was winning the war in Vietnam, it was also true that America had already lost the war here at home. Just as it did in Vietnam, an effective counterinsurgency strategy requires time and patience. And just as they did in Vietnam, Americans have run out of both. Rather than devise a strategy that tackles this problem head on, Bush's speech today finds its answer in the assumption that what worked, or ought to have worked, in the past will work again. Senior military officers, too, have fallen into the same trap--having ignored the topic for 30 years, they all are busy reading standard texts on counterinsurgency in Vietnam like Lewis Sorley's A Better War and Andrew Krepinevich's The Army and Vietnam. Yesterday, we had people like Maxwell Taylor and Henry Kissinger thinking about these things. They got nowhere. Today, we have leaders that get surprised by problems and then go read a book or two to resurrect some dubious answer from the past. Does anyone honestly think they'll get any further?"