Originally Posted by Linus

Originally Posted by HopefulCynic68

Originally Posted by Peter Gibbons

Originally Posted by Linus

Not to belabor the Iraq/Yugoslavia analogy but this quote struck me today...

Originally Posted by Sally Buzbee

"He said the army - also dominated by Shiites - is conducting raids against villages and towns in Sunni and mixed areas of Iraq, rather than targeting specific insurgents - a tactic he said reminded many Sunnis of Saddam Hussein-era raids."

Tito, who was half-Croat, half-Slovenian ruled a Yugoslavia where Serbians were the largest ethnic group. Saddam Hussein - a Sunni - ruled an Iraq where Shiites were/are the largest religious group. As Yugoslavia began to unravel the Serbs - who Tito considered "the cancer in the hills" (Tito had murdered more than 200,000 people [most of them Serbs] during the second world war, not to mention inviting into Kosovo [a traditionally Serbian territory] more than a million ethnic Albanians to displace the Serbian majority, and repeatedly lying to the Serbs) - were in many ways guilty of the worst ethnic cleansing and retribution, and it sure looks as though some Shiites (who were similiarly mistreated under Hussein) want to follow in their path.

It is not so difficult to imagine a scenario where Shiite on Sunni violence outpaces indiscriminate and targeted killings of Shiites by Sunni insurgents. Liberal hawk Thomas Friedman suggested in an op-ed not so long ago that if the Sunnis do not accept "democracy" (my quotes) in Iraq we should arm the Shiites and leave the country. Well, as a matter of fact we are arming the Shiites. They are the Iraqi army today. They have the keys to Saddam's helicopters and heavy munitions depots, as well as millions in new light arms provided by America. He with the bigger guns, and the bigger numbers, and the bigger grudges, can do considerable damage, especially with the backing of the world's last remaining superpower.

The biggest difference perhaps between Iraq and Yugoslavia (apart of course from culture, history, and everything else) is that it was the Serbian plurality who wanted to see the survival of the country (or at least a Serbian nation-state that included all the areas of the former Yugoslavia with Serbian populations), and the ethnic and religious minorities who wanted to see a loose confederation of republics. In Iraq, it is the Sunni minority who wants to preserve a strong central government, while the Shiite plurality appears to prefer a loose federation and the Kurds want to secede altogether. But these differences may not be enough to ensure that widespread ethnic cleansing doesn't take place, and that Iraq can even survive as a loose federation.

On the bright side, the dissolution of the country could - under the right leadership - actually be the biggest boon to the Sunnis. They would lose their oil wealth (the bulk of which is in the north and south), but oil and mineral wealth has tended to be more of a curse than a blessing in many places. Oil-rich countries have tended to be less free, less developed, and more corrupt than their resource-poor counterparts. In this outcome, if they managed to put aside their sense of grievance, and avoid becoming a theocracy or some other kind of authoritarian republic, the lack of resources could compel them to get their act together, tapping reserves of their own ingenuity (as successful resource-poor states have done), and cleaning up their government and economy to reach out for foreign aid and investment.

I think your analysis is spot on. The slaughter of the Iraqi Sunnis is coming, and the blood will be on Dubya's hands.

Yeah, right after the Arab Street rises. Remember the doomsday predictions from 2 and 3 years ago?

It could happen, but it's far from a sure thing, it's not even the most likely thing.

I remember predictions. We would find WMDs in Iraq. The war would be a cakewalk. They would greet us with flowers and hummus. The dominos would fall throughout the region.

I don't make predictions. I make suggestions.

No response from HC. Surprise, surprise.

Originally Posted by Linus

Originally Posted by An American

"I am an American currently working in Baghdad for a news organization. I’ve been here numerous times over the past 15 years . . .

Not good, if true.

Could the Assyrian Christians demand autonomy?

Originally Posted by Mehmet Kalyoncu

"Arguably 'Kurdistan' already enjoying de facto independence; and the powerful Kurdish statelet in Iraq provides, under Massoud Barzani's rule, an example for other long-neglected minorities in the region of Northern Mesopotamia. Could the example of the increasingly independent Kurds in Iraq presage further rounds of ethnic discord and state fragmentation in the wider area?

For one, we could see an increase in demands from the Assyrians, a nation which has the necessary arguments on their side in order to make a land claim from the yet-to-be established Kurdistan.

The Assyrians might present historical evidence of large-scale massacres carried out against them by Kurdish chieftains during the late 19th and early 20th centuries- massacres often blamed on Turkey, especially by another Christian minority with a more powerful diaspora, the Armenians.

If all the efforts now being made in Northern Mesopotamia are for bestowing the Kurds with their long-desired independent state, why so far have those who are passionately struggling for an independent Kurdistan failed to voice the same independence or autonomy arguments for other ethno-religious groups in the region? And in any case, could the latter follow the Kurdish example and demand greater autonomy?

Historical residents of Mesopotamia, the Assyrians would make a capable nation, especially considering their sizeable and wealthy diaspora. They might follow the example of the Armenian diaspora, which has constantly blamed the Turkish state for what happened in eastern and southeastern Anatolia in the early 20th century. They have done so because the Turkish state, then the Ottoman Empire, was the most relevant official entity against which those accusations and claims could be levied.

L' Angleterre-rism

Originally Posted by CESM

"arguably amounted to institutional racism"

"Freedom" setters, "Freedom" horns, "Freedom" sparrows :arrow: :arrow: :arrow:

Originally Posted by Virgil K. Saari

L' Angleterre-rism

Originally Posted by CESM

"arguably amounted to institutional racism"

"Freedom" setters, "Freedom" horns, "Freedom" sparrows :arrow: :arrow: :arrow:

Don't forget muffins. ;-)

Francis Fukuyama, who wrote "the End of History and the Last Man" has at least partially repudiated his support for the war in Iraq (he's about the only leading neonconservative to do so), but what is interesting is that the troubles we see playing out in Iraq reflect the one blind spot in Fukuyama's thinking about the post-Cold War world (which one suspects is also the thinking of many other neoconservatives).

Fukuyama clearly understands the relationship between culture (which is to say cultural cohesion) and liberal democracy, but like other contemporary conservatives suffers from the delusion (or at least the not wanting to think about) that the past forty years - culturally speaking - was some kind of bad dream from which we all awaken (see his book "The Great Disruption").

But if cultural cohesion is a vital prerequisite for the survival of unitary liberal democracies, and if cultural fragmentation is in some sense here to stay, Fukuyama's whole thesis becomes questionable, or at least fails to anticipate the fragmentation and dissolution of perhaps any number of nation-states in the post-Cold War world.

Lessons Learned in Iraq Show Up in Army Classes

For discussion purposes only.

Originally Posted by Thomas E. Ricks of the Washington Post

FORT LEAVENWORTH, Kan. -- A fundamental change overtaking the Army is on display in classrooms across this base above the Missouri River. After decades of being told that their job was to close in on and destroy the enemy, officers are being taught that sometimes the best thing might be not to attack but to co-opt the enemy, perhaps by employing him, or encouraging him to desert, or by drawing him into local or national politics.

It is a new focus devoted to one overarching topic: counterinsurgency, putting down an armed and political campaign against a government, the U.S. military's imperative in Iraq...

This is long overdue. In the early days of the Bush Administration, the focus for the Army was winning overt wars with small high tech forces. Our forces were very good at that, and likely remain so. Problem is, the conflicts we are apt to see in the immediate future are peacekeeping and counter insurgency. Major powers are not going after each other head on at this point.

Not that the Army should totally forget how to fight overt wars, but you have to be able to handle the most likely threats.

Lessons Learned in Iraq Show Up in Army Classes

For discussion purposes only.

Originally Posted by Thomas E. Ricks of the Washington Post

FORT LEAVENWORTH, Kan. -- A fundamental change overtaking the Army is on display in classrooms across this base above the Missouri River. After decades of being told that their job was to close in on and destroy the enemy, officers are being taught that sometimes the best thing might be not to attack but to co-opt the enemy, perhaps by employing him, or encouraging him to desert, or by drawing him into local or national politics.

It is a new focus devoted to one overarching topic: counterinsurgency, putting down an armed and political campaign against a government, the U.S. military's imperative in Iraq...

This is long overdue. In the early days of the Bush Administration, the focus for the Army was winning overt wars with small high tech forces. Our forces were very good at that, and likely remain so. Problem is, the conflicts we are apt to see in the immediate future are peacekeeping and counter insurgency. Major powers are not going after each other head on at this point.

Not that the Army should totally forget how to fight overt wars, but you have to be able to handle the most likely threats.

Originally Posted by Wm. S. Lind

As Russell Kirk wrote, there is no surer way of making someone your enemy than to announce you will remake him in your image for his own good. To many of the world’s peoples, what Barnett argues for in such blithe simplicity represents Hell, and they will fight it literally to their dying breath.

Like the (other?) neo-cons, Barnett sees the world and its cultures in Jacobin terms, as a combination of Rousseau’s natural goodness of man and Newtonian clockwork mechanism. Just twist a few dials here, throw a couple of levers there and presto!, Switzerlands spring up from Ouagadougou to the Hindu Kush. from Forcing the World to be Saved :arrow: :arrow: :arrow:

Originally Posted by Wm. S. Lind

As Russell Kirk wrote, there is no surer way of making someone your enemy than to announce you will remake him in your image for his own good. To many of the world’s peoples, what Barnett argues for in such blithe simplicity represents Hell, and they will fight it literally to their dying breath.

Like the (other?) neo-cons, Barnett sees the world and its cultures in Jacobin terms, as a combination of Rousseau’s natural goodness of man and Newtonian clockwork mechanism. Just twist a few dials here, throw a couple of levers there and presto!, Switzerlands spring up from Ouagadougou to the Hindu Kush. from Forcing the World to be Saved :arrow: :arrow: :arrow:

Originally Posted by Mr. Tom Engelhardt

Nor should it be strange that various neocon writers close to this administration and in thrall to the same spirit should lovingly quote American military men who also believe themselves out on some Western frontier. Robert Kaplan, for instance, cites one officer as saying, "The red Indian metaphor is one with which a liberal policy nomenklatura may be uncomfortable, but Army and Marine field officers have embraced it because it captures perfectly the combat challenge of the early 21st century."

Was Custer a Whig? Did he face billions of Lakota? :arrow: :arrow: :arrow: Oww! You g-o--t m-

"in the Greater Middle East, including the Mediterranean basin, through the Fertile Crescent, and into the remote valleys and gorges of the Caucasus and Pakistan, the deserts of Central Asia, the plateaus of Afghanistan."

Originally Posted by Mr. Tom Engelhardt

Nor should it be strange that various neocon writers close to this administration and in thrall to the same spirit should lovingly quote American military men who also believe themselves out on some Western frontier. Robert Kaplan, for instance, cites one officer as saying, "The red Indian metaphor is one with which a liberal policy nomenklatura may be uncomfortable, but Army and Marine field officers have embraced it because it captures perfectly the combat challenge of the early 21st century."

Was Custer a Whig? Did he face billions of Lakota? :arrow: :arrow: :arrow: Oww! You g-o--t m-

"in the Greater Middle East, including the Mediterranean basin, through the Fertile Crescent, and into the remote valleys and gorges of the Caucasus and Pakistan, the deserts of Central Asia, the plateaus of Afghanistan."

Originally Posted by Virgil K. Saari

Originally Posted by Wm. S. Lind

As Russell Kirk wrote, there is no surer way of making someone your enemy than to announce you will remake him in your image for his own good. To many of the world’s peoples, what Barnett argues for in such blithe simplicity represents Hell, and they will fight it literally to their dying breath.

Like the (other?) neo-cons, Barnett sees the world and its cultures in Jacobin terms, as a combination of Rousseau’s natural goodness of man and Newtonian clockwork mechanism. Just twist a few dials here, throw a couple of levers there and presto!, Switzerlands spring up from Ouagadougou to the Hindu Kush. from Forcing the World to be Saved :arrow: :arrow: :arrow:

Yep. Don't go to far with Barnett without going just as far with Roy and Chua. Then again, I wouldn't recommend going far with Roy or Chua without a balance of Barnett.

Originally Posted by Virgil K. Saari

Originally Posted by Wm. S. Lind

As Russell Kirk wrote, there is no surer way of making someone your enemy than to announce you will remake him in your image for his own good. To many of the world’s peoples, what Barnett argues for in such blithe simplicity represents Hell, and they will fight it literally to their dying breath.

Like the (other?) neo-cons, Barnett sees the world and its cultures in Jacobin terms, as a combination of Rousseau’s natural goodness of man and Newtonian clockwork mechanism. Just twist a few dials here, throw a couple of levers there and presto!, Switzerlands spring up from Ouagadougou to the Hindu Kush. from Forcing the World to be Saved :arrow: :arrow: :arrow:

Yep. Don't go to far with Barnett without going just as far with Roy and Chua. Then again, I wouldn't recommend going far with Roy or Chua without a balance of Barnett.

Was Iraq just a very expensive gesture?

Originally Posted by Noam Scheiber at TNR

"Don Rumsfeld had some interesting remarks at yesterday's Pentagon press briefing in response to a question about former defense secretary Bill Perry's report on the state of the U.S. military:

Originally Posted by Donald Rumsfeld said not

The force is not broken. The implication in what you said is also, I think, almost backwards in this sense: the world saw the United States military go halfway around the world and in a matter of weeks throw the al Qaeda and Taliban out of Afghanistan, in a landlocked country thousands and thousands of miles away. They saw what the United States military did in Iraq, and the message from that is not that this armed force is broken, but that this armed force is enormously capable.

Rumsfeld and other administration officials have hinted at this sort of thing in the past, and of course outsiders have long speculated that we invaded Iraq to re-establish our deterrent capabilities after a decade in which we were seen as backing down from external threats, at least according to the neocon* reading of history. (Bob Woodward's Plan of Attack has a good bit of reporting about the administration's thinking on this. According to Woodward, Rumsfeld referred to the country's posture under Clinton as "reflexive pullback" and argued that we needed to be more "forward-leaning.")

But, as far as I'm aware--and I could be wrong--no administration official has come so close to saying this as explicitly as Rumsfeld did yesterday, at least not in public. (Lots of Bush aides pushed this idea in unattributed quotes directly after the invasion; Rumsfeld himself has used a vaguer version of this "halfway around the world" formulation.) When you recognize that, for some administration high-ups, the point of Iraq was to impress potential adversaries rather than to accomplish something tangible, obviously our serial screw-ups there become much easier to understand.

Originally Posted by Linus

Was Iraq just a very expensive gesture?

Originally Posted by Donald Rumsfeld said not

The force is not broken. The implication in what you said is also, I think, almost backwards in this sense: the world saw the United States military go halfway around the world and in a matter of weeks throw the al Qaeda and Taliban out of Afghanistan, in a landlocked country thousands and thousands of miles away. They saw what the United States military did in Iraq, and the message from that is not that this armed force is broken, but that this armed force is enormously capable.

Rumsfeld is correct that we are a quite impressive force. We might be alone in being able to project force all over the globe. I doubt the Taliban thought they would lose overt control of Afghanistan.

But if we are quite good at open war, we are not as good as the Administration thought at nation building and suppressing insurrection. Whether or not the Army and Marines are being stretched to the point of breakdown, they are being stretched to the limits of how many campaigns can reasonably be waged. We can invade and occupy two medium small powers, and hold our own against an insurgency. We are not capable of thoroughly quashing said insurgencies.

As is not uncommon in war, both Bin Ladin and Bush 43 anticipated victory would be easier than it has proved. I don't think Saddam made quite the same mistake. His mistake was in believing he could make enough concessions to have the UN stop the invasion. A different mistake.

It might take at least another couple of years to see how Iraq settles in. At that point, Bush 43 is apt to be a lame enough duck that he won't be launching another preemptive unilateral invasion. Well, Iran is playing a nuclear brinksmanship game similar to the one Saddam played, negotiating, breaking off talks, making agreements in principle, breaking them off. The rhythm of the game is disgustingly familiar. If he could free up enough marines and soldiers, I wouldn't be surprised if Bush 43 might consider Operation Iranian Freedom. Whether Iraq's new Shiite government would cooperate is another question.

But this is a spiral of violence. I don't know that anyone will want to escalate to the next level until they know who has won the previous level, and how much the victory costs.

I don't know that the next front is apt to open during the Bush 43 years.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

Originally Posted by Linus

Was Iraq just a very expensive gesture?

Originally Posted by Donald Rumsfeld said not

The force is not broken. The implication in what you said is also, I think, almost backwards in this sense: the world saw the United States military go halfway around the world and in a matter of weeks throw the al Qaeda and Taliban out of Afghanistan, in a landlocked country thousands and thousands of miles away. They saw what the United States military did in Iraq, and the message from that is not that this armed force is broken, but that this armed force is enormously capable.

Rumsfeld is correct that we are a quite impressive force. We might be alone in being able to project force all over the globe. I doubt the Taliban thought they would lose overt control of Afghanistan.

But if we are quite good at open war, we are not as good as the Administration thought at nation building and suppressing insurrection. Whether or not the Army and Marines are being stretched to the point of breakdown, they are being stretched to the limits of how many campaigns can reasonably be waged. We can invade and occupy two medium small powers, and hold our own against an insurgency. We are not capable of thoroughly quashing said insurgencies.

As is not uncommon in war, both Bin Ladin and Bush 43 anticipated victory would be easier than it has proved. I don't think Saddam made quite the same mistake. His mistake was in believing he could make enough concessions to have the UN stop the invasion. A different mistake.

It might take at least another couple of years to see how Iraq settles in. At that point, Bush 43 is apt to be a lame enough duck that he won't be launching another preemptive unilateral invasion. Well, Iran is playing a nuclear brinksmanship game similar to the one Saddam played, negotiating, breaking off talks, making agreements in principle, breaking them off. The rhythm of the game is disgustingly familiar. If he could free up enough marines and soldiers, I wouldn't be surprised if Bush 43 might consider Operation Iranian Freedom. Whether Iraq's new Shiite government would cooperate is another question.

But this is a spiral of violence. I don't know that anyone will want to escalate to the next level until they know who has won the previous level, and how much the victory costs.

I don't know that the next front is apt to open during the Bush 43 years.

My guess is that the Bush Administration will do... nothing. Israel will not tolerate a nuclear-armed power so close to its border, certainly not one officially dedicated to "pushing it into the sea". As it did with Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981, so they are likely to do when Iran's is up and running, probably later this year. All we'd need to do is provide logistical support.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

Originally Posted by Linus

Was Iraq just a very expensive gesture?

Originally Posted by Donald Rumsfeld said not

The force is not broken. The implication in what you said is also, I think, almost backwards in this sense: the world saw the United States military go halfway around the world and in a matter of weeks throw the al Qaeda and Taliban out of Afghanistan, in a landlocked country thousands and thousands of miles away. They saw what the United States military did in Iraq, and the message from that is not that this armed force is broken, but that this armed force is enormously capable.

Rumsfeld is correct that we are a quite impressive force. We might be alone in being able to project force all over the globe. I doubt the Taliban thought they would lose overt control of Afghanistan.

But if we are quite good at open war, we are not as good as the Administration thought at nation building and suppressing insurrection. Whether or not the Army and Marines are being stretched to the point of breakdown, they are being stretched to the limits of how many campaigns can reasonably be waged. We can invade and occupy two medium small powers, and hold our own against an insurgency. We are not capable of thoroughly quashing said insurgencies.

As is not uncommon in war, both Bin Ladin and Bush 43 anticipated victory would be easier than it has proved. I don't think Saddam made quite the same mistake. His mistake was in believing he could make enough concessions to have the UN stop the invasion. A different mistake.

It might take at least another couple of years to see how Iraq settles in. At that point, Bush 43 is apt to be a lame enough duck that he won't be launching another preemptive unilateral invasion. Well, Iran is playing a nuclear brinksmanship game similar to the one Saddam played, negotiating, breaking off talks, making agreements in principle, breaking them off. The rhythm of the game is disgustingly familiar. If he could free up enough marines and soldiers, I wouldn't be surprised if Bush 43 might consider Operation Iranian Freedom. Whether Iraq's new Shiite government would cooperate is another question.

But this is a spiral of violence. I don't know that anyone will want to escalate to the next level until they know who has won the previous level, and how much the victory costs.

I don't know that the next front is apt to open during the Bush 43 years.

My guess is that the Bush Administration will do... nothing. Israel will not tolerate a nuclear-armed power so close to its border, certainly not one officially dedicated to "pushing it into the sea". As it did with Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981, so they are likely to do when Iran's is up and running, probably later this year. All we'd need to do is provide logistical support.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

Originally Posted by Linus

Was Iraq just a very expensive gesture?

Originally Posted by Donald Rumsfeld said not

The force is not broken. The implication in what you said is also, I think, almost backwards in this sense: the world saw the United States military go halfway around the world and in a matter of weeks throw the al Qaeda and Taliban out of Afghanistan, in a landlocked country thousands and thousands of miles away. They saw what the United States military did in Iraq, and the message from that is not that this armed force is broken, but that this armed force is enormously capable.

Rumsfeld is correct that we are a quite impressive force. We might be alone in being able to project force all over the globe. I doubt the Taliban thought they would lose overt control of Afghanistan.

But if we are quite good at open war, we are not as good as the Administration thought at nation building and suppressing insurrection. Whether or not the Army and Marines are being stretched to the point of breakdown, they are being stretched to the limits of how many campaigns can reasonably be waged. We can invade and occupy two medium small powers, and hold our own against an insurgency. We are not capable of thoroughly quashing said insurgencies.

Isn't it ironic that about the time you reach the point when, for the moment, you have undisputed sway in the world of traditional military power, you discover that most of your confrontations have turned into assymetrical ones and you have no earthly idea how to deal with them.

"If I squint my eyes, it kinda looks like a nail... Fetch me another hammer!"

Originally Posted by scott 63

Isn't it ironic that about the time you reach the point when, for the moment, you have undisputed sway in the world of traditional military power, you discover that most of your confrontations have turned into asymmetrical ones and you have no earthly idea how to deal with them.

"If I squint my eyes, it kinda looks like a nail... Fetch me another hammer!"

Not ironic. Evolution in action. With nukes -- and arguably with the machine gun –- warfare between major powers became not cost effective, not to mention stupid. It is too soon for the major powers to totally disregard each other and disarm. It has also still been borderline cost effective for the major powers to pick on minor powers. Afghanistan and Vietnam might suggest otherwise, but not all major powers have fully taken those lessons to heart.

This crisis might be in part about minor powers acquiring weapons of mass destruction. I am dubious about the major power's attempts to prevent proliferation. Keeping technological genies contained indefinitely is unlikely. So long as the major powers attempt to keep their advantages in wealth and power, minor powers are going to covet deterrents.

Meanwhile, it is just plain stupid to fight major powers using overt conventional tactics. The modern tradition is proxy fighting. Whenever a major power uses military force in the Third World, some other major power won't like it. Thus, there will be no lack of money or weapons to maintain an insurgency. Generally, there will also be no lack of angry natives. Thus, WMD or no WMD, meddling in the third world is becoming a dubious proposition, no matter who is doing the meddling.

I am concerned that at some point during the crisis, some WMD armed minor power will still have an ancient agricultural age autocratic mind set. WMDs will not only serve as a deterrent, but will be actively used. The world would have to discourage this rather firmly.

Man can be a violent species. As long as man could gain much while risking little, it was hard to prevent wars from occurring. As weapons become ever more deadly and destructive, one has to risk much with less and less prospect of return. Thus, in the long term, I'm hopeful for a more peaceful planet.

But many cultures, notably our own, have a long tradition of expanding territory and influence using force. Cultures often don't change until the old ways of doing things crash and burn rather horribly. We'll have both the United States, accustomed to using military force to shape the world in its liking, and Third World states with newly acquired weapons of mass destruction. Both may have to learn that violence is of dubious worth in extremely painful ways.

While I am long term optimistic, I keep thinking of 1864 Atlanta and 1945 Berlin as examples of how much force must be applied to a conservative culture before they will become willing to change. The last crisis was in great part about discovering that major power on major power violence is of highly dubious merit. The upcoming crisis might teach similar lessons about major power on minor power violence. We'll get motivation to find alternatives to force as a way of resolving differences between nations.

Thus, I wouldn't see the Iraq situation as ironic. It is a foretaste of a major theme.

What isolationism?

For discussion purposes...

Originally Posted by Andrew Bacevich for the LA Times

IN HIS STATE of the Union address on Tuesday, President Bush worked himself into a lather about the dangers of "retreating within our borders." His speech bulged with ominous references to ostensibly resurgent isolationists hankering to "tie our hands" and leave "an assaulted world to fend for itself." Turning inward, the president cautioned, would provide "false comfort" because isolationism inevitably "ends in danger and decline."

But who exactly are these isolationists eager to pull up the drawbridges? What party do they control? What influential journals of opinion do they publish? Who are their leaders? Which foundations bankroll this isolationist cause?

The president provided no such details, and for good reason: They do not exist. Indeed, in present-day American politics, isolationism does not exist. It is a fiction, a fabrication and a smear imported from another era.

Isolationism survives in contemporary American political discourse because it retains utility as a cheap device employed to impose discipline. Think of it as akin to red-baiting — conjuring up bogus fears to enforce conformity in the realm of foreign policy. In that regard, the beleaguered Bush, his standing in public opinion polls tumbling, is by no means the first president to sound the alarm about supposed isolationists subverting American statecraft...

Me! Me! Sorta.

As stated at length in the above post, weapons of mass destruction, insurgency, and proxy support of insurgency by outside powers tends to make war far less cost effective than it once was. This being true, the logical response might well be isolationism. The long term goal of a rational power would be to avoid using force to gain political or economic advantage.

I don't think this can happen instantly. The major powers created this mess of a muddled world. If long term stability is desired, helping the Third World achieve a self policing state might be prudent and wise. Still, the long term goal ought to be to withdraw into our borders and spend very little wealth and blood meddling in other people's affairs. The long term objective would be to create a plausible exit strategy.

Still, Bacevich has a point. Isolationism is not a major philosophy in US politics. In fighting fascism and communism, the long term classic American philosophy of isolationism has been nigh on eradicated. We used to cut back our army to nearly nothing after every war. Since World War II, the goal has been to keep a standing army capable of fighting one to two wars.

There are others in T4T land that remember isolationism. I don't feel particularly alone in saying we should think through our post Cold War foreign intervention policy. I do feel the T4T crowd might be mildly lonely in having semi-isolationists floating around.

But if Bush 43 wants to proclaim isolationists are the enemy, somebody has to stand up and say "I'm isolationist, and I'm proud!

that the House of Bernadotte has kept a large military at the ready in their Kingdom without trying to reform their fellow sovereigns in Cambodia or Brunei.

Just because their subjects have not killed peasants and their domestic livestock in lands near and lands afar does not make their Kingdom isolationist. They have provided the residents of many another land with milking machines, mobile telephony, wooden furniture and vacuum cleaners. They have stood between the warring parties in more troubled lands. Their media arouse without making irate.

Originally Posted by Virgil K. Saari

that the House of Bernadotte ....

You finally made me look something up, and even defied my expectations with it! I was expecting (based on the other two nations mentioned) perhaps Malaysia or Bangladesh...

The Long War






2006 Quadrennial Defense Review in .pdf format (2.2 megabytes)

The Millenarian Möbius

Originally Posted by Mr. Srdja Trifkovic

Barely 300 words into his address Mr. Bush presented the choice facing America in starkly Manichean terms: we must “act confidently in pursuing the enemies of freedom—or retreat from our duties in the hope of an easier life.” In a complex and challenging time, he went on, “the road of isolationism and protectionism may seem broad and inviting—yet it ends in danger and decline.” The only way to protect America, to secure the peace and “to control our destiny is by our leadership—so the United States of America will continue to lead.” Abroad, Mr. Bush asserted, this demands pursuing “an historic, long-term goal . . . the end of tyranny in our world.”

This is a breathtaking agenda indeed. “The end of tyranny” is a metaphysical objective that is indistinguishable from candidate John Kerry’s insistence, in 2004, that America’s interests “are consistent with the peace, prosperity, and self-determination of every country on earth . . . [America’s] interests and the world’s are one.”

Originally Posted by ST

There is nothing to choose between those two “visions.” The bipartisan consensus is set, and its implications are staggering. For as long as there is a single country anywhere in the world that is gripped by tyranny (Bush), or that does not enjoy peace, prosperity and self-determination (Democrats), it is ripe for regime change by all practicable means, USAF and USMC included. This is not to be done in order to protect America’s security interests in any traditionally defined sense: even supposing that such interests are not necessarily identical with those of “the world” smacks of “isolationism” and shows readiness to “retreat from our duties.”

:arrow: :arrow: :arrow: