Just a couple clarifications -
- I think the operative word in Kurdistan will be to "protect" rather than "enforce" stability; they want our partnership.
- Again, not interested in actively letting reform rip through Eurasia, I think that's a trend far beyond our ability to either hinder or facilitate.
- Mostly interested in realistically dealing with a relatively small number of folks (compared to all of Eurasia), who's own Tinkerbell thinking has them desiring departure from this world with a large number of us in hand. I'd like to keep them at least off-balanced, if not alone on their heavenly voyages.
- I was in a couple of the Sandwich Islands just last summer. Appparently, Pele has moved off shore from the Big Island and we should be getting some new real estate poking through in about 10,000 years. Problem is, the land-buliding process comes with earthquakes or worst, underwater major landsides, that could send a tsunami into Honolulu and put it under 20 meters of water! Let's be thankful that didn't happen this time!
"Che l'uomo il suo destin fugge di raro [For rarely man escapes his destiny]" - Ludovico Ariosto
Iraq: Leave Or Be Forced Out
Gareth Porter
October 17, 2006
Gareth Porter is a historian and national security policy analyst. His latest book, Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam was published in June 2005.
While George W. Bush continues to use the rhetorical device of linking the occupation of Iraq with the war on terrorism, warning in his most recent press conference that “the terrorists would take control of Iraq” if the U.S. withdrew its forces. But for many politicians and pundits the argument that has kept them supporting the occupation is that withdrawing too soon would make sectarian violence even worse. This argument for continued occupation is not based on the real political-military situation in Iraq, and it is important to understand why.
When U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad gave a speech in Washington his main argument against a “precipitous” withdrawal was that it “could unleash a sectarian civil war, which inevitably would draw neighboring states into a regional conflagration…” That was also the main theme of Sen. Joe Lieberman in arguing against Democratic amendments calling for a timetable for withdrawal in June.
It is not that the civil war won't get worse in Iraq; it now seems very likely that it will. But the United States is not militarily capable of preventing the worse war yet to come, and trying to do so would only start a new war between the United States and the Shiites who want the U.S. to leave. Since we cannot prevent sectarian violence, the only question is whether we leave before the inevitable confrontation with Shiites—a battle U.S. troops would certainly lose.
First, the military reality. With the buildup of the Shiite sectarian militias—and particularly the Mahdi army of Moqtada al-Sadr—the U.S. occupation force no longer represents the predominant military power in Iraq. A study issued in August by Chatham House, the influential British strategic think tank, said the Mahdi army, which was believed to have fewer than 10,000 men under arms when the United States tried to destroy it August 2004, may now be “several hundred thousand strong.” In addition, the Badr Organization, which is affiliated with the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq, has tens of thousands of Shiite militiamen.
Sadr is confident that, once the Shiite government has gotten everything it can out of the United States to strengthen Shiite forces, they can defeat the Sunnis by military force. As Moqtada al-Sadr’s spokesman Mustafa Yaqoubi told The Washington Post last month, the “other forces” would not “have the capability to match us.” Yaqoubi also made it clear that Sadr’s Mahdi army intends to force the United States out of Iraq. “If we leave the decision to [the Americans], they will not leave,” he said, “To get the occupiers to leave, [the Americans] need some sacrifice.”
The dominant power of the Shiite militia means that it is impossible for the United States to remain longer than the Shiites believe it to be useful. As former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst Pat Lang has observed, U.S. troops depend on supply lines that run for hundreds of miles through territory controlled by the Mahdi army. Once Sadr gives the word, supplies can be squeezed enough to render military operations very difficult.
As early as last December, Col. Joseph DiSalvo, commander of a brigade of the U.S. Army’s 3rd Infantry Division, who was responsible for eastern Baghad, told Knight-Ridder’s Tom Lasseter it would be all but impossible for coalition forces to defeat the Shiite militias. “We cannot negate the militias,” he said. “You’d have to have more manpower than is feasible.”
U.S. forces are incapable of stemming the violence that has blossomed this summer. This June, the Bush administration made much of Operation Forward—its move to bring more U.S. troops into Baghdad and provide security from the forces of sectarian violence. But during the first three months of the new strategy, from June through August, the number of civilians killed each month by sectarian death squads increased to 3,249—one-third more than during the previous three months.
What’s more, the U.S. forces were unwilling to confront the most lethal elements of the violence in Baghdad, thus exposing their inability to provide any meaningful security to civilians. Operation Forward Together actually steered clear of the Mahdi army and the Badr Organization. U.S. officers told Peter Beaumont of The Guardian that the United States had supported a decision by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government not to confront the militias, “because of fears of a full-scale battle with the militia in Sadr City.” It is important to note that al-Sadr’s political bloc in the Iraqi Parliament were instrumental in providing the votes that brought al-Maliki to power.
Despite rhetoric to the contrary, preventing sectarian violence has never been the priority of the Bush administration in Iraq. At the very time the Shiite militias were building up their power in 2004 and 2005, according to Iraq’s interim interior minister Falah al-Naquib, he warned Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and other U.S. officials about the threat they would pose, but “They didn’t take us seriously.”
The reason for the Bush administration’s inattention to the sectarian violence is simple: Focusing on that issue conflicted with the main interest of the Pentagon in building up overwhelmingly Shiite security force to fight the Sunni insurgency. In 2005 and even in 2006, the U.S. command used some of the most notorious Shiite sectarian paramilitary forces, who were known to be guilty of widespread torture of Sunnis, like the Wolf Brigade, to maintain control of Sunni cities like Ramadi.
The Bush administration has no strategy for Iraq except to keep strengthening official Shiite-controlled paramilitary forces of the Iraqi government. The assumption is that Shiite security forces will constrain the larger rogue elements and Shiite militias. But of course, from February through July of this year, in the crucial period of transition to much larger civil war, Iraqi security forces stood aside while Shiites and Sunnis carried out massacres of each other.
Some of the Shiite sectarian forces carrying out revenge killings of Sunnis are headquartered right in the Iraqi Ministry of Interior—the very ministry with which the Bush administration continues to collaborate closely against Sunni insurgents and foreign terrorists. The senior U.S. adviser to the national police admitted that last month that there are “still some militias operating within the national police.” And a senior U.S. military commander said at least five or six battalions of paramilitary police were believed to have commanders who had shown themselves to be either “criminal or sectarian or both.”
The ministry official responsible for the torture center in Baghdad that was revealed by U.S. officials last November is Mahmoud Waeli, who is also known to be the top intelligence official of the Badr Corps. Yet Waeli continues to operate out of the ministry’s headquarters, according to a senior U.S. military official who spoke on background to the Los Angeles Times last summer. The same official said Pentagon and State Department officials were “disengaged” on the issue of the ministry’s links with militias.
No, the withdrawal of U.S. forces will not result in an outbreak of sectarian violence leading to civil war. That’s already happening. Now, the only recourse for the United States is to pursue the course that the Bush administration has thus far resisted: dropping its threatening demeanor toward Iran and working with it and Iraq’s Arab neighbors to craft a settlement that would constrain the Shiite militia and prompt the kind of political and economic concessions to Sunni minority that could bring a Lebanon-style peace between the two communities. But to get the Sunnis on board, such a settlement would require that Bush agree to a timetable for withdrawal.
The argument that U.S. occupation is the only thing standing between Iraq and complete civil war and chaos argument is symptomatic of a broad refusal to face unpalatable realities that has distorted the national discourse on Iraq. In order to make the national decision to end the occupation, the pundits and politicians will have to face those realities squarely and start making them part of that discourse. Meanwhile, our troops are doing no good to anyone as sitting targets for both sides
Last edited by cbailey; 10-17-2006 at 02:36 PM.
"To announce that there must be no criticism of the president, or that we are to stand by the president right or wrong, is not only unpatriotic and servile, but is morally treasonable to the American public." -- Theodore Roosevelt
Beyond the nature of the killings, the following quotes from the article give me pause:
Here we have police officials publicly placing the blame on government-backed death squads.Militias allied with Iraq's Shiite-led government roamed roads north of Baghdad, seeking out and attacking Sunni Arab targets Sunday, police and hospital officials said.
Here we have a specific (anecdotal) claim that the government must be opposed by force because of its identification with the death squads."This has pushed us to the point that we must stop this sectarian government," Ali Hussein al-Jubouri, a Sunni farmer in Duluiyah, said.
Here we have a formal declaration of sectarian partition (cf. Mr. Saari's crayons.)The slaughter came as Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on Sunday renewed pledges by the Iraqi government to break up the militias, and as al-Qaeda in Iraq and other Sunni Arab insurgent groups declared a new Islamic republic in the western and central parts of the country.
So now we not only have goverment-sponsored death squads, we have a "Baghdad office". Just great, it's a death squad franchise.Shiite leaders in the town appealed to a Baghdad office of Moqtada al-Sadr, an influential Shiite cleric, to send militiamen to defend local Shiites and to take revenge. Sadr's political party is a member of a Shiite religious alliance that governs Iraq.
Yes we did!
For some time a certain poster has been claiming that the mothers of Iraq will prevent it from descending into a civil war. This, from today's Wash Post, is interesting about this:
Militia attacks on Sunnis in and around Balad ended only when large numbers of Iraqi army troops, seen as more neutral than Iraq's police, were deployed. By Tuesday, all but four or five Sunni families had fled. Until recently, members of the town's Sunni minority had lived and intermarried peacefully with Shiite neighbors for generations.
"What shall I say to Bush, to the armed men, to Maliki?" cried Um Mustafa, sheltering in a stranger's home on the outskirts of Duluiyah, referring to Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. She was with her 11-year-old son, Mustafa, and 7-year-old daughter, Reaam. Fleeing Balad this past weekend, the family had watched Shiite militiamen dressed in black beat her pleading husband in the face with rifle butts and take him away. The next day, her phone calls traced her husband's body to the Balad hospital morgue.
"What have I done that my husband gets killed in this way?" she said. "I have Mustafa. And I will teach him how to avenge his father's death by the Mahdi Army, and take his revenge, from them."
David K '47
The article, above, was excellent. I think the real issue is whether Sadr is going to be allowed to try to take control of all of Arab Iraq by force, or whether we an work out partition. Of course, since that's the only sensible alternative, the Administration refuses to think about it.
David Kaiser '47
My blog: History Unfolding
My book: The Road to Dallas: The Assassination of John F. Kennedy
This is interesting that al Sadr has come up, for there is a related 'change-in-landscape' that may alter my thinking on what we need to do in Iraq.
Here's some considerations to consider -
First, one must understand that our continuing presence in Iraq is completely depended on the acquiesce of the Iraqi Shia. By orders of magnitude, our LOC (line of communications which really means major supply line) runs down from the Baghdad area through Kut, Amara, Nasiriya and Basra to Kuwait where the roots of the supply base are. There is some resupply through Turkey, but the bulk of everything comes through and from the ports in Kuwait. As the Chinese intervention in the Korean war clearly showed, a large force of light infantry can cut a heavy mechanized forces supply lines with devastating consequences. If the Shia should focus 4GW attacks on our main supply line, we could be facing a Dien Bien Phu in Baghdad within days. And to reopen that LOC would likely require the scale of force we used to originally invade the country and that would take months -- in the meantime, our kids would be sitting ducks.
Then why haven't the Shia done so? Perhaps they need us there? Its clear that the al Qaeda Sunni types need us in there as their huge recruiting machine, but that doesn't make sense for the Shia. So why haven't they shut us down or at least caused us an incredible degree of damage?
Who has voiced strong opposition to federalizing Iraq let alone breaking the country up? In Shiastan, that would be Moqtada al-Sadr -
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...100264_pf.html
Who in Shiastan wants to at least federalize, if not create a stand alone new country? Well that would be Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, al-Sadr's rival. Hakim is the man in Basra and the south; al-Sadr is the man in Sadr city -- if the country breaks, who would get the oil riches of the south and who would be stuck with Beirut-of the-80s in the Baghdad?
Here's an interesting article -
http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/...icleid=2370161
In the scheme of things, who is our greater enemy - Sunni Jihadists or Shia militia? Could we have enlisted one to help get rid of the other (and after that's accomplished, just 'work-out' our own differences)?
Back to my possible reconsideration. My suggested redeployment to Kurdistan would have our LOC from Turkey. I thought this might be more than feasible if the right in-county SOB arranged it (and our numbskull Administation was co-opted). However, something has happen that makes this doubtful. I'm now leaning toward cut n' running. But, perhaps holding on until al Sadr is finished with his cleaning? Gruesome business.
"Che l'uomo il suo destin fugge di raro [For rarely man escapes his destiny]" - Ludovico Ariosto
As I understand it, the Shiite majority in the current government gives them an advantage in getting more arms, equipment and training out of the occupying force than the Sunni. The Sunni had the advantage during the Saddam era. The Shiite were playing catch up. Sheer numbers likely gives the Shiite an advantage already, but this advantage can be increased for a while by continued delay.
While the occupation is still in place, large amounts of American money and supplies are just flowing in. No matter how much one dislikes the goose that lays the golden eggs, one might put up with her for a while for the sake of the eggs. Think in terms of the Cargo Cults. Once the Americans leave, the opportunity to get rich off of corrupt government will be much reduced.
I don't anticipate this will continue indefinitely. At some point, the Shiite will be as well armed and trained as they are going to get, and the ability to live off American largess will not be worth the resultant limitations on Shiite power and freedom of action.
I'm not sure I agree with your military spin, though. The US already has enough forces in theater to fight and win a conventional conflict. I don't see an overt infantry action sealing off supply lines. No matter how many men with AK 47s one has, setting up a road block and attempting to make it stick against tanks, helicopter gunships and air support just won't work. Forget 3rd generation warfare. The Shiite will target the Sunni population using 4th generation hide among the population tactics, with genocide and ethnic cleansing being the goals. It will be much harder for the international community to stop an ethnic blood bath than it would be to maintain supply.
Last edited by Bob Butler 54; 10-18-2006 at 04:48 PM.
My impression--not based upon anything I've heard in my regular job--is that we are actually airlifting the bulk of our supplies to bases already because the roads are so insecure. I am pretty sure that is true.
It seems we have a possible basis for federalist solution that looks like a compromise. Al-Sadr has to be told that he isn't going to rule the Sunnis under his thumb. The Shi'ites have to be told that they may be totally crushed if they don't settle for a separate federal unit of their own.
David K '47
Do you realize how much more sophisticated this discussion is than any that has taken place in the oval office? No joke.
David Kaiser '47
My blog: History Unfolding
My book: The Road to Dallas: The Assassination of John F. Kennedy
Dear David,
What credible evidence do you have to support this claim?
Sincerely,
John
John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
Well, there's this, from Raw Story:
Now, I don't put much stock in Raw Story, but you can read the book yourself and decide if Peter Galbraith is a credible source. (Two of the three present at that meeting with Bush have confirmed the account.)Former Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith is claiming President George W. Bush was unaware that there were two major sects of Islam just two months before the President ordered troops to invade Iraq, RAW STORY has learned.
In his new book, The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created A War Without End, Galbraith, the son of the late economist John Kenneth Galbraith, claims that American leadership knew very little about the nature of Iraqi society and the problems it would face after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
A year after his “Axis of Evil” speech before the U.S. Congress, President Bush met with three Iraqi Americans, one of whom became postwar Iraq’s first representative to the United States. The three described what they thought would be the political situation after the fall of Saddam Hussein. During their conversation with the President, Galbraith claims, it became apparent to them that Bush was unfamiliar with the distinction between Sunnis and Shiites.
Galbraith reports that the three of them spent some time explaining to Bush that there are two different sects in Islam--to which the President allegedly responded, “I thought the Iraqis were Muslims!”
Perhaps Bush's level of edumacation has improved somewhat since then, but if so I see no external evidence of it.
Yes we did!
Who knows...there may have been sophisticated discussion going on in the Oval Office after all...but if it did take place, clearly it was over Bush's head, and the Cheney/Rumsfeld axis just said, "screw all this egghead talk anyway, we're going to do what we want to do."
The invasion was a bad choice, and I wish we had never done it. It's turned out much as I expected.
I agree with all of what you say here, BobB, except for our ability to keep the LOC open with current force-in-theatre should the Shia decide to turn the spigot off. If the Shia population is stirred to this objective, you are basically talking genocide to keep the line open --- and, at that moment, what would be the point? If that moment comes (and, as you said, it will, if we "stay the course"), I think we would have no choice but to fold our tents. Of course, the exception would be if the Shia are stupid enough to attempt to carry out a Dien Bien Phu against our kids, then near-genocide could happen. I think the Shia are too smart for that. The poker moment might come, but we'll back down.
But what is real interesting is what comes next. If the invasion was Chapter 1 and our presence and the insurgency is Chapter 2, then a Shia-dominated Iraq is the next chapter. Will they attempt to fight the Kurds? Will they move beyond "managing" the Sunni in Baghdad and the western province to taking on a wider array of Sunni? Will the other Sunni countries take them on directly or through surrogates? Can they broker a deal with the Sunni Bathists and/or Jihadists? Will they align with the Persians or will historical wedges form? Could they align with us? And most important, what persona/tribe/sect will emerge as the leader(s), and which horse(s) are the Persians betting on? And, what should we do in Chapter 3 and how best to prepare for that in Chapter 2, given our current situation?
God, what a mess. :-(
[Whoops, boss, just walked by] --- I mean, what a challenge and opportunity! Gee whiz! Yippee! ;-0
Okay, personal note to me, check further cynism today. Beginning of month coming up, must pay the rent.
"Che l'uomo il suo destin fugge di raro [For rarely man escapes his destiny]" - Ludovico Ariosto
Only a fraction of the bulk is airlifted; some high valued stuff (e.g. like Condi Rice; now there's a joke in there ;-) comes that way though. BobB alluded to it -- the route is extremely profitable to the Shia; don't mess with it unless you want to risk a portable DeWalt against your skull!
You might be able to buy the Sunnis off with 20% oil revenue, but who would enforce that once you're in Chapter 3? It be great if you could still enforce agreements by sending off a couple of princesses to be married or just held by your 'previous' enemy, but hey, we've come a long way, baby, from that kind of barbarisms!
Hmm, maybe I’ll google “shia princesses” just to see what comes up (no pun intended!)
"Che l'uomo il suo destin fugge di raro [For rarely man escapes his destiny]" - Ludovico Ariosto
From the article:
See, the president is determined to win, so whaddya worried about? Of course, Dubya's free to "make adjustments as necessary", up to and including the redefinition of "victory".Acknowledging that the Tet offensive “was successful from a propaganda point of view,” Snow said the violence in Iraq would not have the same result.
“The important thing to remember is, the president’s determined it’s not going to happen with Iraq because you have a president who is determined to win,” he said. “And the strategy is a threefold strategy that involves security, economics and political reconciliation, working with the Iraqis. And we’ll continue to make adjustments as necessary to pursue victory.”
(Hmmm, "political reconciliation", wonder what that's code for? Amnesty? Re-Baathification?)
Yes we did!
Can I squeeze into this Amen corner, too? Iraq has been the 2nd Vietnam many of us feared and exactly what All the Presidents Amen-corner pooh-poohed as wrong-headed, overly dramatic, and possibly treasonous. If there is a real swing in this election, it will be due to the fact that this is now undeniable ... except to the Kool-Aid addicted, of course.
Marx: Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it everywhere, diagnosing it incorrectly and applying the wrong remedies.
Lennon: You either get tired fighting for peace, or you die.
Sounds like a definite rebranding. For discussion purposes...
Major Change Expected In Strategy for Iraq War
It looks like all the deaths didn't move the White House, but the prospects of a big loss in the upcoming elections might. This would be the preliminary 'throw it out and see how it flies' notice.Originally Posted by The Washington Post
So of course I had to go ahead and try it
Nothing much about blushing brides, but I did find this very interesting article about Wahhabism. (The link is to the Google cache since the actual web site is down.)
It supports the comparison sometimes made here regarding religious fundamentalism, namely that the radlic Islamists have remarkable similarities to the radical Xtianists.
More broadly, Wahhabi:Sunni:Muslim :: Evangelical:Catholic:Christian.
The parallels are remarkable. For example, Sunni consider themselves the orthodox Muslims, who have a claim to the true faith by virtue of a historical chain of authority leading back to the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), while the Wahhabists claim to have rediscovered the original true way (sunnah) through the preaching of charismatic leaders born within the last few centuries. Also, the chief accusation made by Wahhabists against the Sunni is the Sunni practice of tawassul, prayers for divine favor made to a deceased righteous person as intermediary (analogous to a Catholic saint.) Wahhabists call this practice shirk, or polytheism, one of the core sins in monotheistic Islam.
At any rate, the article is long but interesting for a solid background. I guess I'll have to look elsewhere for mail-order brides...
Yes we did!