Originally Posted by
Chris Seamans '75
I'm very much interested in the topic that kicked off this thread, but there's been very little substance recently. I've been thinking about "Martin, Barton, and Fish" and whether or not the Culture Wars really will end as abruptly as Strauss and Howe suggest now that the Crisis begins to take shape.
The Depression and World War II were the crises that defined the last 4T, but they're presented as a single, unified Crisis in "The Fourth Turning". This is problematic because the conformist, collectivist attitude and trust in leadership that Strauss and Howe suggest are defining characteristics of the 4T weren't really in abundance until the United States formally entered into World War II--especially with respect to foreign policy. Throughout the '30s, when it was becoming increasingly clear that European fascism and Japanese imperialism were dire threats to global stability, popular opinion was manifestly isolationist and, in many cases, anti-war.
This combination of isolationism and anti-war sentiment that prevailed right up until Pearl Harbor was fueled, in large part, by the bitter memory of the Great War. Even though America's involvement hastened the war's end, the rest of the world seemed unable to govern itself. For various reasons, the governments of Italy, Germany, and Japan were replaced by militant, imperialist political cults. The shattered remnants of the Austro-Hungarian empire appeared fragile and vulnerable. The Soviet Union was consolidating its power and, if the rumors were true (and they were) starving their own people. China was folding in the face of Japanese aggression. France was building a massive bunker complex and re-arming in anticipation of a possible war. Most Americans felt that the nation's entry into the Great War had achieved nothing at the unacceptable cost of American lives.
The Republican Party, a coalition of what would be referred to today as "paleoconservatives" and "paleolibertarians"*, successfully traded on these bitter memories. As threats to world peace and stability increased, they engineered legislation that ensured America would remain neutral in the coming conflict.
America, it would seem, was going to sit this one out.
With the formal start of the war, popular sentiment favored the Allies, but this sentiment was not strong enough to overcome America's isolationism. Popular figures like Charles Lindbergh spoke out against America's entry into the war, claiming that the American military was no match for the Nazis. A group called America First organized protests and rallies supporting isolationism. The anti-liberal elements of the Left also opposed American involvement, some on moral grounds, and some on the grounds that Hitler and Stalin had signed a Non-Aggression pact.
Roosevelt's Lend-Lease program and the country's first "peacetime" draft were met with fierce resistance. America was willing to get involved, as long as American lives were not at stake. Though he was able to muscle through sizable aid to the allies and prudent preparatory measures, Roosevelt was unable to change popular opinion on the subject of direct American involvement.
Then the Japanese attacked.
It was then and only then that Roosevelt really had the nation behind him.
The bitter political rivalries that had characterized the 3T did not evaporate until 1941, less than five years before the end of the Crisis. Up until that point America was quite divided on the issue. The shift in public opinion afterwards was so decisive that the Old Right would sputter and fail in short order, suffering its ultimate defeat with the nomination of Dwight D. Eisenhower--a moderate who trended towards liberalism--in 1952. The Old Right's isolationism was thoroughlt discredited, and America would, overwhelming, trust interventionist liberals until late in the Vietnam War. (When liberals would become increasingly less interventionist.)
Any thoughts?
