Originally Posted by K-I-A 67

I don't recognize Justin's Libertarian laws as being realistic or absolute.

I wasn't aware that I had made any laws. Cool for me! Are they, like, on parchment or something?

However, the fact remains -- like the sum of angles in a triangle being 180 degrees -- that libertarian means certain basic things. And that applying them inconsistently means that one is (at most) an inconsistent libertarian. And that holding other things as superior to them means that one is something other than a libertarian. It's not a slur, and more than would be saying that a four-sided polygon isn't a triangle. It's just a fact. You need to find a word that describes you, rather than one that doesn't, if you want people to understand what you mean.

One other note, small (L's) who care about people or acknowledge threat to their personal world can or may become very authoritarian as well.

From the context of what you are saying, I begin to wonder if you are using even the word 'authoritarian' properly. Strictly speaking, 'libertarian' and 'authoritarian' are mutually exclusive opposites. Of course, libertarians can -- and do -- push people around if it comes to that; one difference would be that the libertarian would recognize that he is committing a wrong in so doing (and depending on his character, participate in restitution for it), whereas an authoritarian would assert his right to command. So far, rather than seeing you remain cognizant of the wrongs you feel need to be committed, all I've seen is you screaming that they aren't wrongs at all. Which word describes someone like that?..

Originally Posted by K-I-A 67

I'm a small (L) libertarian,

You most definitely are not! Talk about "creating your own reality"! Then I suppose up is down, down is up, left is right, right is left.... Your proclivity for, not just distorting the truth, but actually turning it on its head (such as in this case), makes you a natural born Bush Republican, something utterly at odds with any "small l" libertarian (such as myself), which even Karl Rove freely admitted shortly after assuming office. What color is the sky in your world anyway?

Originally Posted by Mikebert

Intent is hard to gauge. How do you know what Truman's intent was? Once the bombs were dropped and the Japanese surrendered unconditionally, one can claim this was the intent of the bombing.

But suppose Japan wasn't willing to surrender unconditionally, even after the bombs were dropped? Suppose the war went on, and the Americans managed to secure peace by negotiating terms. In this case the decision to negotiate terms would have responsible for preventing carnage, not the bomb. A different intent for the bombing would be assigned.

In actuality neither of these happened. The Japanese surrendered shortly after the bombing, but the surrender was not unconditional, surrender was conditional on the emperor staying on his throne. Since no effort at negotiation was made before the bombs were dropped, nobody knows if the Japanese would have surrendered before the bombings if offered this single condition.

Other motives for dropping the bomb (i.e. to send a message to the USSR) may have applied. So it is not certain what the intent really was.

And then there is the choice of target. Why not target the center of government? Why not destroy an entire army in the field to demonstrate the futility of opposing such immensely powerful weapons. Why instead chose a city of no great military significance, which has not been significantly damaged and which was ringed by hills that would magnify the blast? How does the target selection comport with an intent to minimize carnage? It seems to be the target was selected to maximize carnage (perhaps to impress the Soviets?).

As for OBL, after the 911 attack the US responded with two wars. And OBL said that this is what he intended. But suppose the US had not responded by waging two wars, but instead withdrew from the Mideast. I suspect that OBL would then say that this was his intent.

When we (after the fact) assign intent to Truman or OBL, we are informed by what actually happened. Since the Japanese surrendered, Truman claims this was his intent. Since the US counterattacked after 911, OBL claims this was his intent.

The assignation of intent still seems to depend on what the victim does.

Intent comes before decision, decision comes before action, action comes before outcome (i.e. 'victim's' response). Yes, you can retrospectively use a known positive outcome to have more confidence in both the actor's moral intent (or not) and in their competent (or not) worldviews/paradigms. However, that does not led to the conclusion that a negative outcome proves immoral intent as opposed to incompetent worldviews/paradigms. It just makes your investigation of the underlying genesis (i.e. poor intent or poor paradigms), a more difficult analysis.

Bush2's Iraq foray makes a good laboratory - unlike Truman, intended consequences gone helter-skelter. Incompetence, immoral or aspects of both? Are you suggesting that the consequences alone preclude the need for any objective analysis to ascertain the answer?

-- See my "Kirkpatrick" assessment post above.

Originally Posted by Justin '77

How interesting that your quote agrees with what I said, unless you black out in the middle. Was that just an oversight on your part? I'll repeat your quote here (with emphasis added to the part you must have meant to leave out, trying to make your point):
So, basically, he is aiming to exert increased force towards furtherance of good (as he sees it). Yep. Just like Truman. Of course, bin Laden failed in his ostensible goal, while Truman succeeded in his. It helps that Truman's ostensible goal was already a done deal before the bombs fell, and that on bin Laden's time scale the match is far from decided. But whatever floats your boat...

Well, at least you're coming around a little. Your initial point was that all poor little OBL wanted to do was get the Americans to pay attention to the terrible things we were doing. So the terrible thing that we were doing was basing in Saudi Arabia under the request of the government recognized by the UN as legitimate. Now you may agree with OBL that this is a transgression; I'm okay with that. However, if you agree that provided him the moral grounds to fly planes into large buildings and kill thousands of innocents, well, please check the sociopath box above.

Originally Posted by Justin '77

You can note, that the 'special insight' I seem to possess consists mainly in actually paying attention to the things I try to understand. Tell your bosses. Could come in handy.
A great suggestion. Let's try that 'paying attention' thing again. Hmmm...

Now, according to my sources, Little Boy was dropped on August 6, and throughout, the US, having long since broken the Japanese codes, was fully aware of the developing position of the Japanese leadership regarding the war. Very clearly, every single one of the communiqués from the wikipedia article you linked show a Japanese leadership trying to find a way to end a war that they had already recognized was lost. As President at the time, it seems safe to assume that Truman was kept fairly well-informed of that, too.

I purposefully choose (it was the morally correct thing to do ;-) not to post selected excerpts from the chronology to misinform. I suggest any one reading this chronology (with its advantage of 60-something years of analysis) would still get the sense of the complexity of the situation that still leads to debates today of how ready the Japanese were to surrender prior to the A-bombs. Again, I would point out that any clarity we can assign today to that situation would be completely befuddled by being in the fog of the largest war ever fought on this planet. It approaches the line of ridiculous pompousness to judge the morality of any decision-making then without taking that into account.

Originally Posted by Justin '77

Huh? Why does it hurt your feelings so much to have the same standards applied to your own side as to the fuzzy-wuzzies?

ooohh. I just bust a nut thinking about it you manly man, you.

Mmm-hm. Yep. No sign of that 'superiority' thing. Why you must be a thousand times more humble than any of us mere mortals here, to have seen and done all you have and not to throw that in all our faces at every opportunity. Kudos.
It is the guy who sees things incompletely (that is, who misses the various non-defective folk who might see things in a different way than himself). All manner of people can see all manner of things. I'd be willing to bet that I could find some perfectly well-adjusted Japanese (to pick a non-wog example) who might be inclined to think that way. There are probably others, too.

I was merely pointing out that the line of ridiculous pompousness is exceeded when a weeny like you attempts to judge the morality of a leader like Truman

I think the haberdasher from Missouri wasn't fit to even clean the likes of Mr. Coolidge's boots or the spots on Harding's ties. He wasn't quite as wicked as Mr. Wilson, but I'd rate him in the bottom seven as Butler-in-Chief.

His running up the numbers in the extinction of Nipponese Papists (while often applauded then and now by the Progressive sort) and then pulling an embarrassment of Dubya-like dimension in the Land of Morning Calm with warfighters unfit and unfitted for the winter of that unwelcoming land makes him a Reformer of Eurasia of the First Class; Curate's Eggs in order of Romantic Idealism and descent to the bottom of the barrel:

• McKinley
• Nixon
• Clinton
• Lyndon Johnson
• Truman
• G. W. Bush
• Wilson

HTH

Originally Posted by salsabob

Intent comes before decision, decision comes before action, action comes before outcome (i.e. 'victim's' response). Yes, you can retrospectively use a known positive outcome to have more confidence in both the actor's moral intent (or not) and in their competent (or not) worldviews/paradigms. However, that does not led to the conclusion that a negative outcome proves immoral intent as opposed to incompetent worldviews/paradigms. It just makes your investigation of the underlying genesis (i.e. poor intent or poor paradigms), a more difficult analysis.

But here's the problem. Let us assume that Truman's intentions to use the bomb were moral. That is, the goal (intent) of the bombings was to force the Japanese to surrender unconditionally, making an invasion unnecessary.

The atomic bombs failed to compel the Japanese to surrender unconditionally. In order to get an unconditional surrender, the US would have to invade anyway. All those civilians were killed for nothing.

Truman still wanted to prevent the carnage and so he tried something else. This was to withdraw the requirement for unconditional surrender. This worked, the Japanese accepted surrender with a single condition and invasion was averted.

Since this second action worked, one can ask why didn't Truman try this before he did the bombing? Then the invasion would have been avoided and over a hundred thousand civilians would not have been killed horribly.

And then there is the question of why were Hiroshima and Nagasaki selected as opposed to military targets? These two questions do not make assessing the morality of Trumans action as clear-cut as you seem to think.

The same goes for OBL. You yourself posted that Osama apologized for the assault on Afghanistan. Could this mean he did not intend what happened in Afghanistan to happen as a result of 911? I don't think we can know exactly what was OBL's intent. I think a good case can be made that OBL wanted the US out of Saudi Arabia and the Iraqi embargo ended.

Suppose the US did withdraw from the ME instead of go to war. In this case the deaths and suffering from the embargo would stop, and the half million Iraqis now dead because of our response to 911 would still be alive. Like Truman, OBLs assault against enemy civilians would have stopped further carnage.

If appears to me that the obvious difference you see in the morality between 911 and Hisroshima comes not from an analysis fo intent, but from a belief about the actor's character. OBL is a terrorist; he is evil. His intentions for ordering a mass slaughter of civilians can only be evil, hence what he did was evil. Truman was an American president you respect; he is not evil. His intentions for ordering the mass slaughter of civilians are not necessarily evil and so what he did may not be evil.

Intent for me still factors into the equation. But by intent I mean whether the action was accidental or deliberate and if deliberate, was it justified as in self-defense? To be justified it has to be directed against an aggressor. I may be justified in shooting a trespasser trying to steal my cattle, but I cannot shoot lost travelers who wandered onto my property.

In both the WTC and Hiroshima large numbers of civilians were killed deliberately. In both cases the civilians were not responsible for harming or threatening the attacker or his people. Thus the killings were not justified and so they were immoral acts. The attack on the Pentagon was justified as the people in this building are responsible for either formulating or carrying out the policies that served as the cassus belli for the war.

Similarly had Truman bombed the Japanese High command or a concentration of naval forces or an army, this attack would not be immoral as these personnel were responsible for making or implementing the policies of aggression against America.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

Goring was Hitler's legal successor in Dec 1944. Later Hitler made Donitz his successor and when Hitler died Donitz did become leader. There was no crisis of succession. As for destroying the enemy's command center, isn't that a desirable goal in war?

Of course. But the Allies could have chosen to attack Berlin at a time in which the most vital leaders of the Reich were together at once. Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, and Keitel or Himmler at once? That itself would have put the whole system in disarray.

Originally Posted by K-I-A 67

I'm a small (L) libertarian, small (R) republican. I don't recognize Justin's Libertarian laws as being realistic or absolute. Despite what you think, the majority of libertarians have minds of their own, live amongst the general population and don't adhere themselves exclusively to the Libertarian's ideals. For the most part, Libertarians like Justin appear to adhere to their principles or ideals without taking into account external events, certain people who exist or situations that call for personal civic participation or actions.

Dude, we obviously have a disagreement on whether or not we are still at war with radical factions of Islam. And whether or not factions of radical Islam reside within America. Your big issue was over-site, you got your wish in the last election, you now have over site, so quit your whimpering. One other note, small (L's) who care about people or acknowledge threat to their personal world can or may become very authoritarian as well.

First, Dubya is a right-wing Big Government hack. That itself is not libertarian.
He is the biggest Big Government supporter since LBJ... and unlike LBJ's Great Society which at least ensured that big welfare spending would flow back into a capitalist system, Dubya's style of Big Government is intended to enrich his political supporters at the expense of everyone else. Second, Karl Rove's "majority-of-a-majority" method of rule (check the etymology of Bolshevik and its derivatives) entails the establishment of a permanent majority of a single party in which internal dissent is impossible. In theory, libertarianism is the diametric opposite of Marxism-Leninism in politics and economics. Right-wing economics with Marxist techniques of maintaining power is fascism -- not libertarianism.

If "radical Islam" is a real threat to America, then fascism -- right-wing Big Government -- is the wrong method for dealing with the menace. We are big enough to defeat a major enemy be offering something better than that enemy, and that is how we defeated the most dangerous pair of enemies that America ever faced (the Axis powers) and that is how we rendered Communism irrelevant. The Union side ensured the demise of the Confederacy not by slaughtering slave-owners but by freeing slaves.

In my opinion we have a better method of organizing society for the good of more people -- liberal democracy -- than does "radical Islam". Liberal democracy depends upon process and fair play -- not liquor, narcotics, pornography, strip clubs, and pork that all offend Islam. A fascism tailor-made solely for American culture is sure to fail in organizing any country other than the USA irrespective of the similarities of the countries. Does anyone doubt that both Italy and Germany had much in common in culture with America around 1930? We could admire Goethe and Puccini while treating Mussolini and Hitler as thugs. A fascistic America will be an anathema to countries quite similar in culture to the United States -- like Mexico. Just imagine how badly a fascistic America would fare in keeping peace with India, Japan, or Indonesian democracies.

Multi-party liberal democracy without liquor, narcotics, pornography, or strip clubs is possible. Multi-party liberal democracy with a dominant party with no tolerance of internal dissent is absurd. Karl Rove tried to impose that upon us, and had he succeeded, our democracy would be as dead as democracy is dead in Belarus or even China.

Originally Posted by K-I-A 67

For the most part, Libertarians like Justin appear to adhere to their principles or ideals without taking into account external events, certain people who exist or situations that call for personal civic participation or actions.

I would broaden that to say that those so fundamentally committed to an abstract ideology, even the otherwise intellectually brilliant, are blinding themselves to certain aspects of reality. I don't care if the ideology involved is Libertarianism or Geovegesexualism (something about spreading the gospel of Dr. Ruth and cucumbers around the world). I have my own problems with Justin 77 and his affection for "northern Somalia", among other things, for that very reason.

However, in this case, he has you dead to rights.

Originally Posted by K-I-A 67

Dude, we obviously have a disagreement on whether or not we are still at war with radical factions of Islam. And whether or not factions of radical Islam reside within America. Your big issue was over-site, you got your wish in the last election, you now have over site, so quit your whimpering.

Yes, oversight between the branches of government is very important to me, since I'm not a "libertarian (small L) Fascist", or whatever.

Originally Posted by K-I-A 67

One other note, small (L's) who care about people or acknowledge threat to their personal world can or may become very authoritarian as well.

In the words of our old friend Stonewall/Seadog/Mustang:

Originally Posted by Mustang

What color is the sky in your world anyway?

Originally Posted by salsabob

Well, at least you're coming around a little. Your initial point was that all poor little OBL wanted to do was get the Americans to pay attention to the terrible things we were doing. So the terrible thing that we were doing was basing in Saudi Arabia under the request of the government recognized by the UN as legitimate. Now you may agree with OBL that this is a transgression; I'm okay with that. However, if you agree that provided him the moral grounds to fly planes into large buildings and kill thousands of innocents, well, please check the sociopath box above.

Strictly speaking, the question was not whether bin Laden's actions were proper or not. Just that the moral calculus of his novel attack method against the USA is identical to the moral calculus of Truman's novel attack method against Japan. For the record (again) I trig their courses both out to "not okay".

Your problem -- in this case, at least -- seems to be that the blinders you wear keep you from judging things on their principles; and that as such you are left with the sole choice of for/against one or the other team. Look at how, for example, you seem to be unable to take my statement regarding the identical nature of both Truman's and ObL's moral calculus as implying that, opposite your view the Truman-good; Osama-bad; I think that Osama-good; Truman-bad. Now, I just said that the two situations were fundamentally the same. So how could I come to the conclusion you seem to lay on me that they were actually different? There's a serious disconnect in your analysis.

I purposefully choose (it was the morally correct thing to do ;-) not to post selected excerpts from the chronology to misinform.

Good for you. Have a cookie. I suppose some people pick quotes to misinform. I, on the other hand, just pulled blocks off the reference you gave me. I make little claim as to the reliability of your source; but it seemed only polite of me to help you understand what it was saying. It's the tool you picked, after all..

I suggest any one reading this chronology (with its advantage of 60-something years of analysis) would still get the sense of the complexity of the situation that still leads to debates today of how ready the Japanese were to surrender prior to the A-bombs.

As the quotes I pulled demonstrated. So you agree that the question was unclear? So then Truman's bombing wasn't the only way to end the war, as far as the best information at the time had it? So indications were that negotiation and a peaceful settlement wasn't out of the question? That time and diplomacy were paying off?

You agree with me?!?

I was merely pointing out that the line of ridiculous pompousness is exceeded when a weeny like you attempts to judge the morality of a leader like Truman

Ah, there's that chubby-engendering humility again. I've always thought that the type of minds that are drawn to the Great Leader school of serfdom do the the best job of it.

Originally Posted by The Rani

One more thought ... what about someone who commits a "wrong" but neither admits it nor asserts right to command? For instance, when I killed M&L over on the other thread, I wasn't thinking that I had a right to do it, or that it was wrong either. I didn't really care whether it was moral or not, just did it to survive. Shouldn't there be a third option here?

Now, if you're talking about killing in self-defense, that's not the same thing at all. You do have a right to take actions to protect yourself against attack. You'd kill him again if it came to it, right? After all, it's not like he couldn't have stopped it at any time by leaving you be? The question of the right or power to rule was never in your hands at all.

KIA is talking about making other people kill yet other people who might be standing near someone who might someday want to hurt him. And saying not just that he has the right both to decide who must die and to decide who should do the killing, but the right not to concern himself with any other consequences of his choices. Pretty frickin unlike me, I think.

Originally Posted by pbrower2a

Of course. But the Allies could have chosen to attack Berlin at a time in which the most vital leaders of the Reich were together at once. Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, and Keitel or Himmler at once? That itself would have put the whole system in disarray.

Destroying the enemies command and control system is a desirable goal in warfare. In December 1944 the Reich was still fighting, in fact they launched a counteroffensive. Had the Americans nuked Berlin and killed Hitler then it was possible that Goering (or the army if all the senior officials were killed) would have reconsidered Hitler's strategy of putting all the remaining resources into the Western campaign. The A bomb would show that defeat was certain so why not retreat East and try to keep Prussia from falling into Russian hands even though that means giving up the Western front without a fight? The goal would change from an insane insistence on "victory or death" to a realistic policy that the war was over and all that can be done was chose to whom to surrender. Better Germany falls to the Western allies than to the Russians.

Had this happened the Western allies would have experienced fewer casualities and gained more territory--giving them a better bargaining position wrt to Russia at the end of the war. Had the Allies held all of Germany, most of Austria, and parts of Czechslovokia, we probably would have kept the Czechs and Austrians on our side of the iron curtain and perhaps Hungary or the western half of Poland too (the bomb certainly would have improved our bargaining position wrt to Stalin).

Originally Posted by Mikebert

Destroying the enemies command and control system is a desirable goal in warfare. In December 1944 the Reich was still fighting, in fact they launched a counteroffensive. Had the Americans nuked Berlin and killed Hitler then it was possible that Goering (or the army if all the senior officials were killed) would have reconsidered Hitler's strategy of putting all the remaining resources into the Western campaign. The A bomb would show that defeat was certain so why not retreat East and try to keep Prussia from falling into Russian hands even though that means giving up the Western front without a fight? The goal would change from an insane insistence on "victory or death" to a realistic policy that the war was over and all that can be done was chose to whom to surrender. Better Germany falls to the Western allies than to the Russians.

Had this happened the Western allies would have experienced fewer casualities and gained more territory--giving them a better bargaining position wrt to Russia at the end of the war. Had the Allies held all of Germany, most of Austria, and parts of Czechslovokia, we probably would have kept the Czechs and Austrians on our side of the iron curtain and perhaps Hungary or the western half of Poland too (the bomb certainly would have improved our bargaining position wrt to Stalin).

Of course, "destruction of command and control" is practically a euphemism for destroying the system. Nazi Germany had no semblance of any government -- no meaningful legislature, for example -- outside of the despotic leadership. It would have been the destruction of the government, and authority would have devolved outside of Germany to generals in the field who would have been receiving no orders at all and within Germany to the Gestapo and the SS, organizations utterly unfit to rule people. There would have been no government finance, and in view of the condition of the German treasury (bankruptcy), soldiers would have had to forage. No modern army can survive that way. Proof of the wretched state in which Germany was in was that in the absence of the tyrannical clique Germany was in utter disorganization in the aftermath of the overthrow of Hitler. Nothing could reorganize. That's not just war. Italy, Japan, and Hungary, all similarly devastated, all had something left.

It's easy to second-guess the decisions of those who led America at the end of the war in Europe. Had he not been held back, General Patton could have easily taken Prague on the pretext that the Czechs in the last large city under Nazi rule were in active revolt and needed rescue. American leadership wanted to believe that the Soviet Union that had been struggling for its existence had learned a few lessons, one of which was that those not one's outright enemy were reliable allies. American leaders misjudged Stalin because Stalin was a sociopath who was going to serve only himself and realize his delusions of grandeur when given the chance.

The ones most worthy of second-guessing were of course the Nazi leadership. It had to know that it lacked the means for winning anything after D-Day. All that it could do was to sacrifice people on both sides of a war, civilian and military, to defer the inevitable end, and to exact revenge upon enemies. That itself is pathological leadership. Had the July 20 plot succeeded, then Germany would have been unable to avoid defeat, but its new leadership could have simply left much of occupied Europe to its own means of starting over without Soviet influence. I figure that even the Baltic States would have had a chance to redeem their rightful independence because as of July 20 those countries and practically every other part of Europe were still under German rule. But that too is contrafactual history. So would be some leadership of Russia other than Stalin: Kerensky? Old Bolsheviks who would have aligned themselves consistently with Britain and France? Restored or unbroken Romanov dynasty?

Just as in the fog of war that remained in May 1945, we have to deal with realities. American and British leadership misunderstood Stalin and were unable to do anything to thwart Stalin. They tried to achieve through diplomacy what they couldn't achieve through force of arms. We in the West ended up with bigger costs for military defense than otherwise, and peoples of central and southeastern Europe paid in poverty and repression that would both remain for over forty years. But that's history.

One can make an analogy to the situation in 1945, the year in which things settled fast and not all to our liking, to the settling of cement. That's how the 4T-1T cusp operates: the situation at the end of a Crisis tends to freeze fast.
One can do masterful things with cement before it sets, shaping and even carving it, but once it sets one can do little with it to reshape it. One had better like the results.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

Destroying the enemies command and control system is a desirable goal in warfare. In December 1944 the Reich was still fighting, in fact they launched a counteroffensive. Had the Americans nuked Berlin and killed Hitler then it was possible that Goering (or the army if all the senior officials were killed) would have reconsidered Hitler's strategy of putting all the remaining resources into the Western campaign. The A bomb would show that defeat was certain so why not retreat East and try to keep Prussia from falling into Russian hands even though that means giving up the Western front without a fight? The goal would change from an insane insistence on "victory or death" to a realistic policy that the war was over and all that can be done was chose to whom to surrender. Better Germany falls to the Western allies than to the Russians.

Had this happened the Western allies would have experienced fewer causalities and gained more territory--giving them a better bargaining position wrt to Russia at the end of the war. Had the Allies held all of Germany, most of Austria, and parts of Czechoslovakia, we probably would have kept the Czechs and Austrians on our side of the iron curtain and perhaps Hungary or the western half of Poland too (the bomb certainly would have improved our bargaining position wrt to Stalin).

An interesting alternate history. Am I allowed to play?

As I see it, Hitler wanted victory, not a choice of who to surrender to. Thus, his Battle of the Bulge offensive was launched towards the West, towards a vital supply line port. He could dream of causing a major set back in the west, then possibly turning east. The opposite approach would have been delusional, even by Hitler's standards. (As a general rule of thumb, I would suggest that those with sufficient ego to start a war of choice are going to cling to delusions of possible victory. They will decline to acknowledge reality.)

Thus, you might want to nuke nuke Hitler before the Battle of the Bulge to get the effect you describe. Yes, pushing up the Manhattan Project that far would improve the Allied position, no matter what details might get invoked. That is, unless you count the increased costs of a faster paced Manhattan Project, and start asking how many fewer divisions and naval task groups one would have. (Playing the Avalon Hill style simulations, few players seem interested in pushing that option. Nukes are a very long term lead item. The resource points are better spent trying to hold back the Axis advance early in the war.)

I have played with a different what-if. Germany had considered a Manhattan Project equivalent fairly early in the war. They decided, however, that the massive resources required would lose the war well before results would have been achieved. They instead put their effort into more conventional weapons, easier to research, producing more practical results sooner. They were likely correct. Only the United States had the resources to pull a Manhattan Project while still fighting the conventional war. (At least, that is the common wisdom of those I've met who play the Avalon Hill style WW II simulations.)

So, what if some reliable allied intelligence source reported this decision? What if the US, knowing how massive an effort was required, and detecting no indication this effort was being attempted, had aborted the Manhattan Project? The result would have been a more potent US conventional force. The war would proceed more or less as it did, with a significant but not overwhelming additional edge going to the western front Allies. A good deal of the extra materials would have gone to the Soviets. The US was all in favor of letting the Soviets do most of the dying.

The war would likely play out pretty much the same until the Pacific front end game. The difference is Nagasaki and Hiroshima would have been leveled by conventional bombs, instead of nukes. The situation would have been equally hopeless. Once the Japanese discovered their neutral third party, the Soviet Union, was not negotiating a surrender in good faith, but invading their acquired territories, things would have ended pretty much as they did. In the interests of preventing the Soviets from acquiring too much more territory, the US allows the emperor to remain on the throne as a figurehead.

But would the US have started a Manhattan Project in peace time? Would the Soviets have started one without the US having gone first? Would the lesson that major powers should not fight other major powers have been strong enough without nukes to have kept the alternate Cold War cold?

I don't know how any of the above shifts the general moral debate, other than to suggest that unintended consequences might come from complicated realities and short term thinking as well as incompetence.

I might want to extend my three questions to four. You seem to be answering them decently well, though others in the discussion seem rather evasive... What factors might lead one to believe a choice about use of force might be 'moral,' 'just,' or 'good'?

1. Which faction first resorted to use of force.
2. Which faction is attempting to seize land or other resources by force?
3. Which faction is attempting to coerce undesirable social or cultural change upon the other?
4. If someone attempted to act for moral an just reasons, but the results were not as intended, were awful, to what degree does the reality of incompetence outweigh ephemeral good intentions?

Number three has lots of room for subdivision and discussion. Many nations think their culture superior to others. Few wish to see outsiders attempt to change their way of life at gunpoint. To what degree do we want to bring back 'The White Man's Burden?' Was 'The White Man's Burden' ever anything but an excuse to set up puppet governments and exclusive zones of economic influence?

Again, I don't see the above four as a complete list. I also don't know that one could definitively assert that one of the above would always take precedence over all the others under all circumstances. In the Middle East, where various countries have been occupied by European powers for some time, it is widely accepted that one always has the right to rebel against foreign invaders and occupiers. Cultures that have been invading and occupying other countries for quite some time will have different values, will place a different emphasis on 'legitimate' reasons to invade and occupy other countries.

Thus, to a great degree, moral questions remain cultural and values driven. I don't anticipate consensus. People could certainly do a better job of articulating their positions.

Aside from the morality or immorality of Truman's and bin Ladin's actions in 1945 and 2001 (and I'm inclined to agree with Justin about that btw), it's worth noting here that this kind of callous disregard for suffering and death is very 4T, and very much a warning about unintended consequences. One can have the clearest vision of where one wants to move events, but once the dice are thrown one's control is less than perfect, always.

And remember that few 4T leaders, no matter how visionary, could see through the tangled pathways of fate over which they presided to the outcome, particularly this early in the Crisis. Did Roosevelt in 1932 envision an America as the dominant great power, ultimately facing choices involving nationalism versus internationalism under global-scale threats? Hardly! He didn't even clearly see what direction to take the U.S. economy, which was the problem that was already obvious when he ran for office.

In one way, bin Ladin's action was worse than Trumans: it was more irresponsible, more a toss of the dice. Truman was simply confirming an international fact that was already obvious: the postwar American dominance of the world. His use of nuclear weapons caused, directly, many deaths and much suffering, but they did not, indirectly, lead to more and more, as the 9/11 attack has done. If we may charge Truman with misdeeds here, we may not burden him with consequences of those misdeeds that are not immediately his. That is not so of bin Ladin, any more than it was of General Beauregard at Fort Sumter. Both Sumter and 9/11 had consequences far beyond their immediate scope.

And in addition to unintended consequences, we also have to bear in mind the interesting workings of reaction. I was a half-hearted Kerry supporter in 2004, but it seems obvious to me now in hindsight that Kerry would not have been as good in office as Bush precisely BECAUSE he wouldn't have been as stupid. The immediate problem of Islamic terrorism is trivial compared to some of the ones that are looming in the near future, and the approach Bush is taking to it (a swing to the extreme of nationalism) is disastrously wrong for those looming problems. It's also the wrong approach to Islamic terrorism, and we now have had a chance to see that and to provoke a national reaction against it. All leading to the Regeneracy: we have to be sufficiently stupid before we can get wise.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

In one way, bin Ladin's action was worse than Trumans: it was more irresponsible, more a toss of the dice. Truman was simply confirming an international fact that was already obvious: the postwar American dominance of the world. His use of nuclear weapons caused, directly, many deaths and much suffering, but they did not, indirectly, lead to more and more, as the 9/11 attack has done.

To me, the above point is crucial.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

All leading to the Regeneracy: we have to be sufficiently stupid before we can get wise.

I tend to agree.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

But here's the problem. Let us assume that Truman's intentions to use the bomb were moral. That is, the goal (intent) of the bombings was to force the Japanese to surrender unconditionally, making an invasion unnecessary.

The atomic bombs failed to compel the Japanese to surrender unconditionally. In order to get an unconditional surrender, the US would have to invade anyway. All those civilians were killed for nothing.

Truman still wanted to prevent the carnage and so he tried something else. This was to withdraw the requirement for unconditional surrender. This worked, the Japanese accepted surrender with a single condition and invasion was averted.

Since this second action worked, one can ask why didn't Truman try this before he did the bombing? Then the invasion would have been avoided and over a hundred thousand civilians would not have been killed horribly.

Here's an account -

On July 26, the United States, Britain, and China released the Potsdam Declaration, announcing the terms for Japan's surrender, with the warning, "We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay."

the elimination "for all time [of] the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest"
the occupation of "points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies"
"Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshū, Hokkaidō, Kyūshū, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine." As had been announced in the Cairo Declaration in 1943, Japan was to be stripped of her pre-war empire, including Korea and Taiwan, as well as all her recent conquests.
"The Japanese military forces shall be completely disarmed"
"stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners"
But on the other hand,

"We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, ... The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established."
"Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, ... Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted."
"The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.
The only mention of "unconditional surrender" came at the end:

"We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction."
Whether the Emperor was of one those who had "misled the people of Japan", or even a war criminal—or potentially part of a "peacefully inclined and responsible government" was left unstated.

On July 27, the Japanese government considered how to respond to the Declaration. The four military members of the Big Six wanted to reject it, but Togo persuaded the cabinet not to do so until he could get a reaction from the Soviets. In a telegram, Kase Shunichi, Japan's ambassador to Switzerland, observed that unconditional surrender applied only to the military and not to the government or the people, and he pleaded that it should be understood that the careful language of Potsdam appeared "to have occasioned a great deal of thought" on the part of the signatory governments—"they seem to have taken pains to save face for us on various points." The next day, Japanese paper reported that the Declaration, the text of which had been broadcast and dropped on leaflets into Japan, had been rejected. In an attempt to manage public perception, Prime Minister Suzuki met with the press, and stated,

"The Joint Proclamation ... is nothing but a rehash of the Cairo Declaration. As for the Government, it does not find any important value in it; the government will just mokusatsu it."
The meaning of the word "mokusatsu", literally "kill with silence", is not precise; it can range from 'ignore' to 'treat with contempt'—which actually described fairly accurately the range of effective reactions within the government. However, Suzuki's statement was taken as a rejection by the press, both in Japan and abroad, and no further statement was made in public or through diplomatic channels to alter this understanding.

Is this account wrong? The first A-bomb dropped on 8/6; what communique was transmitted by the Japanese in those 10 days between rejecting Potsdam and the bombs that clarified that they would reverse themselves and accept surrender?

But that's not the crux of the argument! What happen after the bombs fell -

At 04:00 on August 9, word reached Tokyo that the Soviet Union had broken the neutrality pact, declared war on Japan and launched an invasion of Manchuria. The senior leadership of the Japanese Army took the news in stride, grossly underestimating the scale of the attack. They did start preparations to impose martial law on the nation, with the support of Minister of War Anami, in order to stop anyone attempting to make peace.

The Supreme Council met at 10:30. Prime Minister Suzuki, who had just come from a meeting with the Emperor, said it was impossible to continue the war. Foreign Minister Togo said that they could accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, but they needed a guarantee of the Emperor's position. Navy Minister Yonai said that they had to propose something—they could no longer afford to wait for better circumstances. In the middle of the meeting, news arrived that Nagasaki, on the west coast of Kyushu, had been hit by a second atomic bomb. By the time the meeting ended, the Big Six had split 3–3. Suzuki, Togo, and Admiral Yonai favored Togo's one additional condition to Potsdam, while Generals Anami, Umezu, and Admiral Toyoda insisted on three further terms that modified Potsdam: that Japan handle her own disarmament, that Japan deal with any Japanese war criminals, and that there be no occupation of Japan.

That afternoon, the full cabinet met, and likewise split, with neither Togo's position nor Anami's attracting a majority. Suzuki and Togo met with the Emperor, and Suzuki proposed an impromptu Imperial conference, which started just before midnight. Suzuki presented Anami's four-condition proposal as the consensus position of the Supreme Council. The other members of the Supreme Council spoke, as did Baron Hiranuma Kiichiro, the president of the Privy Council, who outlined Japan's inability to defend itself and its domestic problems, such as the shortage of food. Suzuki then addressed Emperor Showa, asking him to decide between the two positions.

First, do you disagree with this accounting? If not, what this shows is that even after the bombs dropped, there was a split within the Japanese leadership; some wanted at least the Emperor to be exempt from war crimes; others wanted more, perhaps even continuing toward the "decisive battle." If the account of this meeting is accurate, it squashes any speculation or analysis that "peace feelers" of consequences had any meaning whatsoever prior to this decisive meeting. August 9 was the Japanese "pee or get off the pot" meeting; EVERYTHING before was bullshit. You can argue that this party or that party wanted peace, or this condition or that condition. From the Allies position, after years of total war, it would be beyond stupidity to accept anything other than a complete committment by all Japanese leadership to total unconditional surrender. (Anyone who thinks otherwise would have made a well-pampered yes-man on Rumsfeld's or Doug Feith's staff.)

The decision came down to the Emperor -

"I have given serious thought to the situation prevailing at home and abroad and have concluded that continuing the war can only mean destruction for the nation and prolongation of bloodshed and cruelty in the world. I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer. ...
I was told by those advocating a continuation of hostilities that by June new divisions would be in place in fortified positions [east of Tokyo] ready for the invader when he sought to land. It is now August and the fortifications still have not been completed. ...
There are those who say the key to national survival lies in a decisive battle in the homeland. The experiences of the past, however, show that there has always been a discrepancy between plans and performance. ... [He then made some specific reference to the atomic bomb]
It goes without saying that it is unbearable for me to see the brave and loyal fighting men of Japan disarmed. It is equally unbearable that others who have rendered me devoted service should now be punished as instigators of the war. Nevertheless, the time has come to bear the unbearable. ...
I swallow my tears and give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation on the basis outlined by the Foreign Minister."'

Does he make clear he understands the alternative (i.e a final homeland stand)? Yes. Does he understand that this is total surrender? Yes. Does he understand that instigators (war crimes) will be punished? Yes. Does he say he wants to be exempt? No. Does he say he wants to remain in power? No. Does he state any other conditions? No. Does he reference the bombs in his decision? Yes.

Now, after this meeting (and the bombs), the cabinet decides that they will issue a communique with a counter offer -

The Foreign Ministry sent telegrams to the Allies, announcing that Japan would accept the Potsdam Declaration, but would not comprise any demand which would prejudice the prerogatives of the Emperor. That effectively meant that the Tenno would remain a position of real power within the government—power that was normally wielded in his name by the people at the tops of the military and governmental hierarchies.

And what was the Allies response? -

"From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms. ...
The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people."

Sure sounds like a go F yourself to me. And the Japanese?

On August 13, the Big Six and the cabinet were still deadlocked. The next day, with leaflets dropped from B-29s describing the Japanese offer of surrender and the Allied response, Suzuki, Kido, and the Emperor realized the day would end with either an acceptance of the American terms or a military coup. The Emperor met with the most senior Army and Navy officers. While several spoke in favor of fighting on, Field Marshall Hata Shunroku did not. As commander of the Second General Army, the headquarters of which had been in Hiroshima, Hata commanded all the troops defending southern Japan—the troops preparing to fight the "decisive battle". Hata said he had no confidence in defeating the invasion, and did not dispute the Emperor's decision. The Emperor requested that his military leaders cooperate with him in ending the war.

Game over. And this is a two-fer for you!

First, clearly the bombs had the major impact on the Japanese decision process. If this account is correct, it offers that not only was there no other direct cause-and-effect, but there was no decision-making process of consequences prior to the Aug 9 meeting that brough the entire Japanese leadership to a decision. The bombs brought that decision making process to a head -- the Emperor got "off the pot" on August 8.

Now, for your second treat --
there are always a few die-hards, dead-enders, no? They gave it a shot, but it came down to one man -- Hata. The guy who would have to lead the "decisive battle." The guy who's headquarters was in Hiroshima. Get the hint? If not, there's more: Hata oversaw the Changjiao Massacre; he was headed to being tried and convicted as a Class A War Criminal. What would make that dude surrender?! He had not only seen and participated in the most horrific combat the world had ever seen, he had commanded it! What would make him not defend his homeland or his death; or screw that, what about his assured dishonor as a war criminal? Nope, nothing that this world had yet seen would do that. Ergo --- something the world had never seen before.

This should be even more than a two-fer for you. Hata, Hiroshima and da Bomb should give you a clue of Truman's moral effort at due diligence.

And there's more! Anyone with an objective mind can only conclude that Truman practiced moral due diligence, made the intelligent and moral decision, and achieved the proper "good." Congradulations, you now have the 'Truman Standard' and its elements to measure those actions of OBL or Bush2 or any other decisions regarding open conflict.

As bad as 9/11 and the Iraq War are, they pale against the carnage of WW2 and the A-bombs. So, its not the scale of carnage. What is it? That's what makes the Truman Standard so useful.

More later. Time for a long beer.

Originally Posted by pbrower2a

It's easy to second-guess the decisions of those who led America at the end of the war in Europe.

Who's second guessing? We are talking about a hypothetical situation in which the Americans developed the bomb 9 months earlier than they actually did.

You made your case on the first point. Dropping the bombs did affect the decision to surrender. I agree that dropping the bomb did prevent carnage and that Truman's intent was this.

An observation. The term "remain in power" does not really apply to the emperor, who has been a figurehead for many centuries. Like Elizabeth II, the emperor was head of state, but had no power to rule. The situation in WW II was bizarre in that the emperor (a puppet ruled by others, who at some times in history were themselves puppets ruled by yet another string puller) was asked to make a decision. Not since the divine wind had things been this bad and the fact that the puppet emperor was consulted showed just how whacked out the Japanese were.

I can see the Hata point, but I have not read anything that suggests that Hata was a factor in target selection. What I read was that the city was a good test case to demonstrate the power of the new weapon. It still seems to me that a nuclear attack on Tokyo would work just as well. Also I wouldn't have dropped the second bomb so quickly (suppose they didn't surrender). The second bomb could be used to destroy the massed Japanese defenses at a landing spot, demonstrating the futility of armies against this type of power. The implied threat would that the Americans would either walk on shore unopposed, or if the Japanese massed defenders to stop them, they would be destroyed by nuclear attack.

I'm not saying dropping the bomb was immoral per se, I am saying dropping the bomb on a purely civilian target is immoral even if the intent is to save more lives.

Here is an analogous situation. Suppose a terrorist has placed a bomb in a school and we capture him. If we can get him to tell us where the bomb is we can evacuate the school and save lives. We cannot break him fast enough. Suppose we have captured several of his young children. We can try to get him to talk by threatening to kill his children in front of him, one by one. To show we are serious we blow one of the kids brains out. We then move the gun on the second child and he spills the beans. The bomb is disarmed and nobody in the school is hurt.

Is this a moral action? I would say it is an evil action. I would say a necessary evil, but still evil. However, torturing the terrorist, in this case, would not be evil, IMO. The reason again is that the action is taken against the aggressor rather than an innocent bystander.

Many actions in war are evil. War itself is evil--even just ones. Just wars are necessary evils, but they are still evil.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

I can see the Hata point, but I why wouldn't a nuclear attack on Tokyo work just as well?

Perhaps the ultimate in de-Bathication?

Unlike Iraq, due dilengence was given to what comes after "mission accomplished." In fact, prior to the signing ceremony on the Missouri, MacArthur quiped that "the mission" didn't end with victory, it was only beginning with Japan's transformation.

Included in the instrument of surrender -

"...we direct all such officials to remain at their posts and to continue to perform their non-combatant duties unless specifically relieved by him or under his authority."

..."The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of surrender".

Unlike Iraq, they kept much of the government structure of Japan in place. (MacArthur even bent over backwards to protect the Emperor and came close to resolving him of responsibility for the war.) Even Hata got his get-out-of-jail card in 1955!

Due diligence, baby. It was due diligence that said no to Tokyo as well as no to a solely military target or even a deserted island.

Moral due diligence. So completely lacking in both OBL and Bush2 actions, but not Truman's.

Originally Posted by salsabob

Moral due diligence. So completely lacking in both OBL and Bush2 actions, but not Truman's.

Bob, you have made a fantastic case in this thread. Impressive.

Originally Posted by Justin '77

Strictly speaking, the question was not whether bin Laden's actions were proper or not. Just that the moral calculus of his novel attack method against the USA is identical to the moral calculus of Truman's novel attack method against Japan. For the record (again) I trig their courses both out to "not okay".

When 'moral' is use as an adjective, the thesaurus has 'proper' as a synonym. However, I am willing to go along with 'proper' being akin to the 'good' that I introduced above. In that regard, morality is a component of 'proper choice' but so too is competence. And there is a third component of 'uncertainty' or 'risk.'

It gets a little sticky in that a decision-maker needs to be competent in his risk/uncertainty assessment; and stickier still, in that his competence, in turn, is derived from not only his inherent capabilities (or the processes he depends upon, e.g. his Intell Community) but also the extent that he exerted or took advantage of those capabilities to improve the competence of his decision making. Did the decision-maker undertake sufficient due diligence to match the enormity of the potential consequences of his decision/action? Would it not be immoral to act, particularly where open conflict and lives are at stake, based on information that is highly questionable should that uncertainty be due primarily to the decision-makers own lack of effort in improving the quality/certainty of said information?

Originally Posted by Justin '77

Your problem -- in this case, at least -- seems to be that the blinders you wear keep you from judging things on their principles; and that as such you are left with the sole choice of for/against one or the other team. Look at how, for example, you seem to be unable to take my statement regarding the identical nature of both Truman's and OBL's moral calculus as implying that, opposite your view the Truman-good; Osama-bad; I think that Osama-good; Truman-bad. Now, I just said that the two situations were fundamentally the same. So how could I come to the conclusion you seem to lay on me that they were actually different? There's a serious disconnect in your analysis.

No, my issue with you is not based on my misunderstanding your position to be that OBL and Truman are the opposite; my issue is with your position that their moral calculus (specifically for the dropping of the A-bombs and 9/11, respectively) were the same. IMHO, they were not. Sorry for your confusion

Originally Posted by Justin '77

So you agree that the question was unclear? So then Truman's bombing wasn't the only way to end the war, as far as the best information at the time had it? So indications were that negotiation and a peaceful settlement wasn't out of the question? That time and diplomacy were paying off?

You agree with me?!?

The short answer, no. Again, sorry for your confusion. Let me try to walk you through this -

First, the issue was not whether or not the war would end; it would. The issue facing Truman was how to minimize the carnage to the maximum extent possible and leave a Japan in place that could be transformed as the war came to its end. Truman and his military knew full well what had happen at Iwo Jima and Okinawa; his commanders would not repeat that again. Their plans of months of B-29 fire bombings of every major Japanese city would make Dresden look like a Girl Scout campfire -- millions would die. But, eventually Truman's troops would have to swarm ashore and inland on every island of the Japanese chain; as Commander and Chief, he has a sworn duty, the utmost moral obligation to those troops. That is the context that one must place his decision making regarding the A-bombing if one has a true interest in ascertaining his moral calculus as proper or not. The question facing Truman was not unclear, the proper way forward was.

Second, as detailed in the response to Mike above, the August 9 meeting of the "Big Six" with the Emperor was the Japanese decision-making process. Again, that meeting squashes any speculation or suggestion of "peace feelers" of any consequences. Even with the bombs, the Big Six were evenly split; it took their turning to the Emperor and him making the penultimate decision to move the Japanese leadership towards a consensus for surrender -- and, a surrender that did not first require their "decisive battle" of their homeland. What evidence do you have of not only prior "peace feelers," but also of a decision-making process that would break the Big Six deadlock or make it irrelevant?

Third, as I've stated above, yes, the proper way forward was unclear. But, that is always the case. I'm not suggesting that Truman possesed the cave to Plato's Truth; he had his world views, paradigms, and their always present uncertainties. But, there is considerable evidence that substantial due diligence went into his decision making to improve the confidence of those world views and paradigms and reduce the uncertainties The bottom line, however, is the positive outcome -- there was no massive combative invasion; no "decisive battle;" millions did not die; there was no massive insurgency by a huge array of "dead-enders"; and there was an unprecedented transformation of Japanese society to prosperity and advanced human freedoms. And, there is really no valid argument that these were not good outcomes. And, without the patriotic rah-rah you so fondly accuse me of, those are just the facts, jack.

Those good outcomes are tied directly to the Emperor's decision on Aug. 9 with the Big 6 to surrender (and latter, Hata's decision that avoided the coup: see above); and that decision, unless you can show otherwise, was tied directly to those bombs - which of course was Truman's moral and confident decision even in the face of uncertainties.

Once you can objectively get your mind around that, then we can take that 'Truman Standard', and objectively see how your old buddies OBL and Bush2 measure up.
Warning! Spoiler coming -

They don't.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

I can see the Hata point, but I have not read anything that suggests that Hata was a factor in target selection. What I read was that the city was a good test case to demonstrate the power of the new weapon. It still seems to me that a nuclear attack on Tokyo would work just as well. Also I wouldn't have dropped the second bomb so quickly (suppose they didn't surrender). The second bomb could be used to destroy the massed Japanese defenses at a landing spot, demonstrating the futility of armies against this type of power. The implied threat would that the Americans would either walk on shore unopposed, or if the Japanese massed defenders to stop them, they would be destroyed by nuclear attack.

Just a few pieces of military history to further develop the discussion.

As the strategic bombing campaign developed, six cities were exempted from conventional bombing attacks, including Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Koyoto, and Kokura. These cities were deliberately left untouched so they would make good laboratory test beds for the new weapon system. Any damage observed would be attributed to the new bombing, not previous missions. Thus, Tokyo, which had already been heavily bombed on multiple occasions, was not a good target for two reasons. First, most targets of any worth in Tokyo were already gone. Second, an undamaged city made a better test bed.

Second, there was a plan under way to use a-bombs to clear the way for a landing. As standard Allied doctrine called for land based air support covering beachheads, the Japanese pretty well knew where the first landings on the Japanese mainland were going to be. Just plot the effective flight radius of a P 51 fighter from Okinawa and Iwo Jima. (The Japanese attempted to defend Guadalcanal when it was at the very far reach of land based air support. This proved so difficult that neither faction tried it again.) The Japanese spread 8 divisions in the area of the intended US landings. The Allies were considering putting a stop to the bombing of cities so they would have six A-bombs available to saturate the landing area. The intent was to land US soldiers and march them right through the fallout. The Allies were also considering calling off the invasion of Japan entirely. Eight Japanese divisions defending with an intensity comparable to Okinawa or Iwo Jima was something which made even the Allies of World War II at the peak of their power pause.

The surrender came before the US had to make a decision.

I'll add one other report that the second bomb was dropped quickly to achieve what we have now come to call 'shock and awe.' The thought was to give the impression that the bombs would come quite frequently, that the US had a lot of them. One can again say that the intent was to maximize the chances of a quick surrender, but, yes, it leaves a lot of room for second guessing. I just don't think it likely, given the period values of total war, that they were likely to have chosen any path other than 'shock and awe.' They would have done anything to have avoided that invasion. I'm glad to see the issue revisited often since, though.

I guess I'm as ready to second guess and pass moral judgments as anyone, but I'm just as happy not to have had to make those calls.

Bob, you have made your point. Based on your moral calculus, Truman's decision to drop the A-bomb was not immoral--but this is largely based on the fact that it worked. Suppose it had not. Wouldn't Hiroshima and Nagasaki join a long list of Japanese cities destroyed prior to invasion. Would all these attacks be moral? At some point destroying cities becomes a for of genocide.

I prefer a morality that gives the same result to the same action regardless of what happens after ward. For me nuking Hiroshima and Nagasaki were each evil acts in an of themselves. But the result they wrought was good. On balance the net effect of all of the end-of-the-war actions was good. Thus dropping the bomb turned out to the the right choice. It was a necessary evil.

Had the Japanese not surrendered the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would be exactly the same evil actions. But they would be followed by a great many more evil actions. The net result might well have been evil.

In this case dropping the bomb would have been the wrong choice. But right or wrong the act itself was evil. That Truman did what he did and it was the right choice does not speak to his scruples, but to his wisdom.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

Bob, you have made your point. Based on your moral calculus, Truman's decision to drop the A-bomb was not immoral--but this is largely based on the fact that it worked. Suppose it had not. Wouldn't Hiroshima and Nagasaki join a long list of Japanese cities destroyed prior to invasion. Would all these attacks be moral? At some point destroying cities becomes a for of genocide.

I prefer a morality that gives the same result to the same action regardless of what happens after ward. For me nuking Hiroshima and Nagasaki were each evil acts in an of themselves. But the result they wrought was good. On balance the net effect of all of the end-of-the-war actions was good. Thus dropping the bomb turned out to the the right choice. It was a necessary evil.

Had the Japanese not surrendered the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would be exactly the same evil actions. But they would be followed by a great many more evil actions. The net result might well have been evil.

In this case dropping the bomb would have been the wrong choice. But right or wrong the act itself was evil. That Truman did what he did and it was the right choice does not speak to his scruples, but to his wisdom.

An aspect that should be mentioned is that things change in combat. On the ground, the 'big picture' gets compressed down to you and the guy next to you - what's ethical is keeping that other guy from harm, because that's what he's doing. You become 'us.' The enemy becomes in many ways less and in many ways more, than 'them' -- they become 'it,' a menacing vector. The sense forces that nagging question to the surface -- is this our natural state? But ponder that too long or at the wrong moment and you or, ethically worst, the guy next to you, doesn't get to come home. That sense permeates the ether up through the command structure to even the old men pushing the symbols on the maps.

That is why the ethical benchmark for initiating open conflict has to be considerable tougher than that for ending such conflict. Perhaps that's why those frail human beings attempting the latter should be given some benefit of the doubt? And why those attempting the former (especially with hubris) should always be given plenty of doubt.

Well, if we're finish beating this last 4T crisis horse to death, I'm just back from one of those occasional visits to the "High Water Mark" in PA; care to move it up a notch and talk about Robert E's command for Pickett's Charge? Bad outcome, poor due diligence, and done within the context of maintaining one of the two most evil of human endeavors (the other being genocide). And yet, there's that statue - beloved in the South and admire even among many Yankees. Hmm....