Originally Posted by Marx & Lennon

Assume that the cycle is also dependent on hysteresis, and that hystersis is determined by the rate at which concepts are communicated through society. As the world has grown more advanced in this area: better methods of printing, better roads, better physical conveyances, and finally - virtually instantaneous communications, hysteresis has declined.

This is certainly simplistic, but works as a basic hypothesis. If applied to the Civil War anomoly, the argument could be made that the emergence at that time of railroads and later of the telegraph produced a singular shift of substantial magnitude and created a disruption. Of course, it could also be hogwash.

You are right that hysteresis is one way to produce cycles. But your proposed mechanism can't be correct because it operates on the wrong time scale. If we adopt a hysteresis mechanism the lag will be many years in length. The rate of information flow, even in Medieval times was much too fast to be responsible for this lag.

Originally Posted by Marx & Lennon

I had to think about this before I responded, and I'll agree that analyze is the wrong word to describe what I mean. In fact, you can analyze virtually anything, and gather something of value from it. I meant to say that technical analysis will not, in and of itself, tell us much about the underlying mechanisms that produce the patterns the analysis reveals. That requires insight and the wisdom to recognize it when you see it.

What I was speaking about was scientific investigation. Insight is also involved. Analysis involves reframing the problem in ways that increase the likelihood of achieving an insight. My point was that social phenomena are by nature no less amenable to scientific investigation as natural phenomenon. The opposing view is that human-related phenomena are fundamentally different from natural phenomena and cannot be understood, even in principle, through science. This same sort of argument was once applied to living matter (vitalism) to argue that laws derived from the study of inanimate things did not apply to living things. Practitioners of astrology like Eric would disagree with me as well as those who favor intelligent design.

Dear Mike,

What can this topic possibly be about? Of course the generational
constellation causes the saeculum. Strauss and Howe showed that.
Hell, even I've shown it. The validity of the generational groups is
shown by this very forum, which for years has hosted discussions with
people from the different generations, validating the generational
distinctions.

And the artifice of saying "the constellations are there - they just
don't cause the saeculum" doesn't work either. I'll tell you the
same thing that I told someone in another thread: The generational
model consists of logically interlocked parts, and you can't
logically find one portion valid and another part, logically
interlocked with the first, invalid.

In other words: This whole forum proves that the generational
constellations exist, and from that you can logically conclude the
saeculum.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> I interpret this large change as a change in fundamental cause, so
> I think of the pre-1820 saeculum and the post-1820 saeculum as
> having different basic causes.

There's no difference whatsoever in basic causes. The reason for the
difference in your data is obvious: Prior to 1820 the English and
American timelines were about 30-40 years apart, but after 1820 they
were more closely synchronized.

The contortions that you continue to go through to maintain the
fiction that the American and English timelines aren't separate are
so bizarre that they would qualify you for a job in the circus as
"Mr. Pretzel."

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

I would like to start a discussion on posssible causes for the saeculum. I'd like to start with what Strauss and Howe suggested as a cause of the cycle in Generations.

I think we agree that their proposed cause is at best half right. On a previous thread you set up a model using two variables Amax and Apar. As I recall, Amax was the most common age of persons elected to Congress used as a metric for determining when particular generations peaked in political power. Apar was the age when a persons political views became relatively hardened, for which age 25 seemed like a good value for our society. Amax had increased from 45 in the early 1800s to about 57 or so today.

In that model, the median age of those in power is 57, thus born in 1948 and thus their political views coalesced around 1973. Which is a phenomenal result since 1973 is the year that Watergate became a big story and the year of the Roe v. Wade decision. Hell of a time to have a major scandal and multiple Supreme Court vacancies!

That model has some interesting explanatory power. In the mid-90s you would have the peak of people whose formative event would have been the Kennedy assassination. Psychically, the late 90s seemed to be a time of plenty waiting for an inevitable disaster. Both E2K and 9/11 seem to be those inevitable disasters -- and the people peaking in power then would be those whose formative years were the time of Tet and the MLK and RFK assassinations. Now we're in synch with Watergate and Roe. We're two years out from being in synch with the fall of Saigon (which might explain the popularity of the two year withdrawal timetable being thrown about).

Now, what that model doesn't seem to capture is the notion of distinct age blocks called "generations." Are the generations simply an image that we project onto an endless series of people influenced by their younger years? Or do actual clusters of people occur with similar charateristics, and do those characteristics appear in a cycle?

Some here have drawn attention to Generation Jones (essentially the latter half of S&H's Boomers). This sub-generation is significantly conservative. In fact, it's the only block of the population where women consistently vote Republican. Tying your theory to the Jones observation, we could note that Generation Jones' formative experiences would fall in the Awakening to Unraveling transition, while the True Boomers (the first half) would have formative experiences solidly within the Awakening. It seems like a more refined model to split the generations into halves, but frankly, couldn't we just refine all the way until each birth year is a unique "generation"? Again, the existence of the "generations" seems like it might just be something we're "seeing" in the data.

(As an aside, the split generations thing is somewhat interesting. Each generation would be composed of a early wave that figures the world out in the middle of the next turning and a late wave that figures the world out during the transition to the next turning after that.)

Returning to the Jonesers, there is a big question that arises. Why are they more conservative? Why do True Boomers seem to lean left? You could point to their formative moments (i.e. stagflation as an influence on the Jonesers) but then why are they influenced the way they are? Why did stagflation create conservatives? The problems for a good causal model are just piling up.

Also, if formative experiences and age of peak political power are the driving factors that would put the Jonesers in power in the 2012-2020 range and we can expect an extremely conservative regime. Or can we? Is there any predictive value to these models at all?

I think the main problem is that no one, as yet, has come up with a cohesive model (with a proposed cause) that has a good explanation for all of the phenomenon that S&H noted. Mainly, this seems to be because S&H's work has been labeled a "theory" when it really is just observation and some hypotheses.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Originally Posted by Marx & Lennon

Assume that the cycle is also dependent on hysteresis, and that hystersis is determined by the rate at which concepts are communicated through society. As the world has grown more advanced in this area: better methods of printing, better roads, better physical conveyances, and finally - virtually instantaneous communications, hysteresis has declined.

This is certainly simplistic, but works as a basic hypothesis. If applied to the Civil War anomoly, the argument could be made that the emergence at that time of railroads and later of the telegraph produced a singular shift of substantial magnitude and created a disruption. Of course, it could also be hogwash.

You are right that hysteresis is one way to produce cycles. But your proposed mechanism can't be correct because it operates on the wrong time scale. If we adopt a hysteresis mechanism the lag will be many years in length. The rate of information flow, even in Medieval times was much too fast to be responsible for this lag.

I'm not sold on this concept by any means, but the only impact hysteresis may have on cycles is the shortening of them. There is still an underling mechanism, like the one S&H describe. At most, the effects due to compacting hysteresis can only account for how quickly the mood changes, ushering the next turning.

At most, this is an untested hypothesis.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

I think we agree that their proposed cause is at best half right. On a previous thread you set up a model using two variables Amax and Apar. As I recall, Amax was the most common age of persons elected to Congress used as a metric for determining when particular generations peaked in political power. Apar was the age when a persons political views became relatively hardened, for which age 25 seemed like a good value for our society. Amax had increased from 45 in the early 1800s to about 57 or so today.

In that model, the median age of those in power is 57, thus born in 1948 and thus their political views coalesced around 1973. Which is a phenomenal result since 1973 is the year that Watergate became a big story and the year of the Roe v. Wade decision. Hell of a time to have a major scandal and multiple Supreme Court vacancies!

That model has some interesting explanatory power. In the mid-90s you would have the peak of people whose formative event would have been the Kennedy assassination. Psychically, the late 90s seemed to be a time of plenty waiting for an inevitable disaster. Both E2K and 9/11 seem to be those inevitable disasters -- and the people peaking in power then would be those whose formative years were the time of Tet and the MLK and RFK assassinations. Now we're in synch with Watergate and Roe. We're two years out from being in synch with the fall of Saigon (which might explain the popularity of the two year withdrawal timetable being thrown about).

Now, what that model doesn't seem to capture is the notion of distinct age blocks called "generations." Are the generations simply an image that we project onto an endless series of people influenced by their younger years? Or do actual clusters of people occur with similar charateristics, and do those characteristics appear in a cycle?

The paradigm model is only half of the story. The generation model I am working on says that turnings are a product of a generational constellation of some sort plus a "forcing function" produced by a separate mechanism. The forcing function is sort of like S&H's "trigger" for the crisis except its not a single event but an era in which the "activation energy" necessary for one turning to turn into another is lowered sufficient to let the rather weak effects of the generation constellation operate. This forcing function produces a provocation or "itch" that has to be responded to "scratched" by some sort of collective social behavior. What this behavior turns out to be will make the history of the era, and the nature of the behavior is influenced by the generation constellation of the time. This same history sets conditions for nurture and COA experiences that produces a new generation which will be involved in helping determine social behavior in the future. Thus history creates generations (in youth and COA) and generations help create history (in midlife). But the generations have help from the cyclical forcing function that creates the itch that must be scratched.

My models are "weak" generational models as opposed to S&H's "strong" generational models. The latter require stark differences between generation archetypes that the bulk of S&H's writing tries to convince us actual exists. Since S&H's archetype-based model for the saeculum doesn't correlate with their own generations and turnings (the predicted generations/turnings are too short before 1700) there is no need to preserve the strong generation assumption. One can go with a weak generation model and so dodge the damning critiques that "The Dude" and others have made about the proposed characteristics of generations alive today wrt to each other that are called for by strong generational models.

Before 1700 this forcing function is hypothesized to have been natural, a simply Malthusian population cycle similar to analogous cycles in animal cycles and can be modeled using a logisitics model with a lag:

dP/dt = kP(Pmax - P) ran with the P's on the right lagged by L years.

Here P is poplation, Pmax is the carrying capacity of the environment (a function of the amount and quality of arrable land) and k is a growth constant. The lag is to represent the time it takes before a change in fertility has a major impact on food consumption, or the time it takes for a new cohort to be born and age into physical adulthood (meaning when they start consuming adult caloric levels). I assume L to 12-15 years.

If you implement this model on a spreadsheet you will get damped cycles of length 4L or 48-60 years. If you put in "famines" that reduce Pmax by 5% in random years, this perturbation keeps the cycle going without damping out.

This sort of population cycle should produce periods of relative food scarcity when P > Pmax and plenty, when P < Pmax, which should translate into periods of high, volatile prices and low, less volatile prices. That is the population cycle ought to translate into a price cycle. This price cycle is the Kondratiev cycle and observationally it runs 50-60 years.

An external imposed agricultural price cycle will impact production decisions. Sustained periods of high or rising prices due to surplus population should be good times for landowners and capitalists. Labor will be plentiful and cheap and agricultural demand will be high. Money supply will be expanded, promoting general inflation, meaning prices of everything (except wages ) go up. The result will be commodity booms or at least this is what is actually observed when you look at trade records. More commodity output means more tax revenue. More tax revenue means more governmental activity (warfare).

Given a money-based economy and an international banking system (and these were coming into place in the late Medieval era) one would expect military activity to start showing an induced cycle of 50-60 years in length, which is what happened. Bob Butler has presented this cycle in warfare and so have I.

So cycles external to the saeculum can produce cyclical "nastiness" in the form of food shortages/high prices and war that can serve as an itch.

The population cycle no longer functions by the 19th century and the war cycle stopped at WW I. Thus for the past 200+ years we need another source of a cyclical itch to interact with generations to produce the saeculum for my style of mechanism to work. The paradigm model provides this itch.

Returning to the Jonesers, there is a big question that arises. Why are they more conservative? Why do True Boomers seem to lean left? You could point to their formative moments (i.e. stagflation as an influence on the Jonesers) but then why are they influenced the way they are? Why did stagflation create conservatives? The problems for a good causal model are just piling up.

Also, if formative experiences and age of peak political power are the driving factors that would put the Jonesers in power in the 2012-2020 range and we can expect an extremely conservative regime. Or can we? Is there any predictive value to these models at all?

The paradigm model doesn't work this way. It's more complicated than that.

Originally Posted by Marx & Lennon

I'm not sold on this concept by any means, but the only impact hysteresis may have on cycles is the shortening of them.

Try the idea yourself. You won't be able to get it to work.

There is still an underling mechanism, like the one S&H describe. At most, the effects due to compacting hysteresis can only account for how quickly the mood changes, ushering the next turning.

Whether you have 18 or 27 year turnings, what does it matter if the mood changes in five minutes or five months? Both are short wrt to the turning length. Changes in communication technology can make for a change in the time needed for "meme diffusion" on the order of months to minutes, but why does this matter for something as slow as the generational cycle?

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

Returning to the Jonesers, there is a big question that arises. Why are they more conservative? Why do True Boomers seem to lean left? You could point to their formative moments (i.e. stagflation as an influence on the Jonesers) but then why are they influenced the way they are? Why did stagflation create conservatives? The problems for a good causal model are just piling up.

I didn't face a compulsive military draft as I came of age. It's probably no more complicated than that. Those who faced the draft issue in the late sixties typically came to "loathe the military" and everything it stands for. As such, they identify with the Democrat Party.

It only gets a bit complicated when one realizes that every major U.S. war in the last century, WW I, II, Korea and Vietnam, was started by Democrats. Weird, huh?

But that's what's so critical about the Democrat National Convention in 1972 and McGovern. That's when Democrats literally discarded their past and embraced an anti-war platform. Same goes for the race and the feminist issues. Long forgotten, by 1972, were the sexist ways of the Kennedy clan, the 60 day Democrat filibuster of the the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the warmongering of LBJ. No, the Democratic Party was literally born-again, and had tossed away all the old liberalism of their warmongering, sexist, racist Fathers. Scoop Jackson, you're outta here, pal!

That's why Democrats eventually lost their once "solid South," and just about every Presidential campaign since. And it would not have been possible without a new generation coming of age and propelling this change.

Lagging behind in age, I saw something entirely different in the Reagan Revolution than my older brother and sister did. While I did vote for Carter in 1980, I was still young enough to not be so hardened in my world-views. Thus I gave Reagan another look... and liked what I saw. My older siblings, oth, were much too hardened to allow that to happen.

Moralists tend to get that way with a bit of age. :wink:

Thus, as late-sixties boomers, they remain staunch, Republican-hating, liberal Democrats to this day. I, as a mid-seventies whatever-generation, am quite the opposite.

Originally Posted by Devil's Advocate

That's why Democrats eventually lost their once "solid South,".

Oh come on. The Democrats lost four Southern states in 1948, in a year they won the election. They lost five southern states in 1964, a year they won in a landslide and had a Southerner on the ticket. In fact, the Democrats won every single non-Southern state except Goldwater's home state.

In 1968 they lost all but one Southern state.

The South ceased to be reliably solid for the Democrats after 1947.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Originally Posted by Devil's Advocate

That's why Democrats eventually lost their once "solid South,".

Oh come on. The Democrats lost four Southern states in 1948, in a year they won the election. They lost five southern states in 1964, a year they won in a landslide and had a Southerner on the ticket. In fact, the Democrats won every single non-Southern state except Goldwater's home state.

In 1968 they lost all but one Southern state.

The South ceased to be reliably solid for the Democrats after 1947.

The Democrats started losing the South when Truman made steps towards integration. It turned into a torrent when LBJ signed the Civil Rights Act, and the mantle of the racist party switched from the Democrats to the Republicans.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Originally Posted by Devil's Advocate

That's why Democrats eventually lost their once "solid South,".

Oh come on. The Democrats lost four Southern states in 1948, in a year they won the election. They lost five southern states in 1964, a year they won in a landslide and had a Southerner on the ticket. In fact, the Democrats won every single non-Southern state except Goldwater's home state.

In 1968 they lost all but one Southern state.

The South ceased to be reliably solid for the Democrats after 1947.

You left out, "and just about every Presidential campaign since," as I meant to differentiate between national and local politics. Most notably the fact that it took a long time for the South to lose it's Democrat roots. The Democrat Party winning every two years, and maintaining majority control of the U.S. House from 1953 to 1994 could only be accomplished if local politics in the South remained under Democrat control (Tip O'Neil's great axiom).

Looking only to the Presidential races tells but part of the story of how the South flip flopped. Which didn't obviously occur for good until 1994.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

Returning to the Jonesers, there is a big question that arises. Why are they more conservative? Why do True Boomers seem to lean left? You could point to their formative moments (i.e. stagflation as an influence on the Jonesers) but then why are they influenced the way they are? Why did stagflation create conservatives? The problems for a good causal model are just piling up.

It wasn't just stagflation. It was the Iranian hostage crisis and Jimmy Carter's inability to solve it. It was also high energy prices.

And Jonesers were looking for someone who might have some answers. I turned away from Carter toward John Anderson. But many more went for Ronald Reagan.

He was safe, strong, and had that twinkle in his eye that all his dour predecessors lacked. At last here was an adult (a GI!!) that would take charge and make things OK again.

Originally Posted by The Wonkette

The Democrats started losing the South when Truman made steps towards integration. It turned into a torrent when LBJ signed the Civil Rights Act, and the mantle of the racist party switched from the Democrats to the Republicans.

Well, then, let me put it another way:

• Lagging behind in age, I saw something entirely different in the Reagan Revolution than my older brother and sister did. While I did vote for Carter in 1980, I was still young enough to not be so hardened in my world-views...
  
  Thus, as late-sixties boomers, they remain wonderful, fun-loving liberal Democrats to this day. I, as a mid-seventies whatever-generation, am now proudly wearing the warmongering KKK clad, women-hating mantle that Democrats used to wear.

Not only that, I wanna starve the kiddies and make grandma eat Alpo! 8)

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

The paradigm model is only half of the story. The generation model I am working on says that turnings are a product of a generational constellation of some sort plus a "forcing function" produced by a separate mechanism. The forcing function is sort of like S&H's "trigger" for the crisis except its not a single event but an era in which the "activation energy" necessary for one turning to turn into another is lowered sufficient to let the rather weak effects of the generation constellation operate. This forcing function produces a provocation or "itch" that has to be responded to "scratched" by some sort of collective social behavior.

A forcing function which is a famine cycle prior to the 18th century. So, as a result, the saeculum is two famine cycles of average 54 years and you get the 27 year turnings that seem to have occurred in the middle ages and renaissance. Except that, at this point in the theoretical development it is premature to have "turnings" or for half of the famine cycles to feature "Awakenings" and half "Crises." How do we get to the saeculum from the Kondratiev cycle (logically that is)?

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

The population cycle no longer functions by the 19th century and the war cycle stopped at WW I. Thus for the past 200+ years we need another source of a cyclical itch to interact with generations to produce the saeculum for my style of mechanism to work. The paradigm model provides this itch.

This statement seems to indicate that you believe the generations to be observable entities, but it isn't clear how history creates them. While it is clear that history would create people with commonalities in their worldview grouped by age -- why are there specifically four archetypes and why do they repeat? It seems the origin of the archetypes is in need of an explanation.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

This statement seems to indicate that you believe the generations to be observable entities, but it isn't clear how history creates them.

Yes, I now believe S&H found historical generations and that they didn't find a Civic type generation in the 19th century. I believe that their methods do not allow detection of generations before the mid-15th century, but that they probably still existed. Their existence can be inferred from the detection of turnings (which uses different methods).

How do we get to the saeculum from the Kondratiev cycle (logically that is)?

This is why I said the itch models are only half the story. Actually the paradigm model is a bit more than half of the story because it can actually produce three kinds of turnings, while the K-cycle can only produce two. There is an interaction between generations and the itch that produces the four kinds of turnings. This part of the model is similar to S&H's model but I am still working on it. Because the ancillary mechanism (K-cycle famine and paradigm) does some of the work, the S&H generations have less heavy lifting to do in creating the cycle and I don't require them to be so distinctly different (which they, in reality aren't, as The Dude is so elegantly demonstrating).

While it is clear that history would create people with commonalities in their worldview grouped by age -- why are there specifically four archetypes and why do they repeat?

The explanation given by S&H is that there are four phases of life, each of which is filled by one generation at certain points that define "turnings" of the cycle. But if we look at 26 year generations/phases of life (which is the average length between 1433 and 1821) there will not be four, but only three generations active in any given constellation.

If there are only three active phases of life then why wouldn't there be three types of generations, one for each role? Sean Love got around this by making the number four axiomic.

There is evidence in support of the idea that phase of life hasn't changed much over the last 700 years, or if it has, it has risen slightly in length (not shortened). I'll be presenting the data in a future post. Thus I am inclined to stick with S&H's 20-22 year phase of life.

It seems the origin of the archetypes is in need of an explanation.

Speculating on this will have to wait until I have a working mechanism.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Thus I am inclined to stick with S&H's 20-22 year phase of life.

This always seemed to me the weakest part of the theory. Why should the phases of life be equal in length?

Originally Posted by jeffw

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Thus I am inclined to stick with S&H's 20-22 year phase of life.

This always seemed to me the weakest part of the theory. Why should the phases of life be equal in length?

If generations are to move from one phase of life to another and occupy them (forming the constellation), then the phases have to be the same length.

I have long pondered on the shortening of generational length and the constellation line up problem the farther one goes back in time. And since generations were at least 25 years long at one point in the past, I find hard to swallow that a fourth life-phase of ages 75-100 (with very few people in it -- remember, we're talkin' centuries ago) had any useful impact on the cycle.

So I came up with the "Multi-Modal Saeculum" idea. I offer my Sept. 17, 2004 summary on this thread since we are covering topics it touched on. Please note that this is something of a musing, not something I would defend as "100% certain". :wink:

Multi-Modal Saeculum

I. PURPOSE

I am attempting to synthesize Strauss & Howe's saecular cycle with observations that seem to conflict with their cycle and theory. The most basic observation (and one that others arise from) is that generations seem to have been of significantly greater length in pre-modern and early-modern times than they are today: They seemed to have dropped from an average of about 27 years in length in pre-modernity to around 20 years or less in the late 20th century with a small reduction after the Renaissance and larger reductions after the Civil War and after the 1920's.

The main question that arises is how can Strauss & Howe's four phase, four archetype, tetralogical ("of a four way dialogue or interaction") dynamic work properly, if at all, when members of the mechanically essential fourth phase are 81-108 years old? -- not mention those in "midlife" being 54-80 years old, and all sorts of other problems? Before the aforementioned reduction in generational length, those are exactly the issues we are faced with.

To Messrs. Strauss and Howe this is (to my interpretation of them) not much of a problem to begin with since, one, they don't recognize as much of a decrease in generational length as many on the T4T discussion board do; and two, they only recognize the Saeculum as operating infrequently and sporadically prior to the modern period whereas several on the discussion board basically see the Saeculum acting essentially uninterruptedly through antiquity and the Middle Ages.

My solution to the problem is a trilogical dynamic that describes four archetypes but only three phases instead of four. This saecular mechanism I call Saeculum I since it would predate Strauss & Howe's mechanism, Saeculum II, which operates today and possibly at several irregular instances in pre-modernity.

Before I go on, a caveat: By coming up with this "solution" I do not mean to attack Strauss & Howe's work. Consider it more a Gedanken experiment or even a musing. This is just meant as a possible solution to a perceived set of problems.

II. Main Points/ Assumptions

1. There are three phases of life in Saeculum I:

• Youth (Pre-social-autonomy). Ages 0-26. Primary role (first half): Dependence, growth/ Primary role (second half): "Grunt work", acquisition of skills for social autonomy.
  
  Primacy. Ages 27-53. Primary role: Management, leadership, dominance.
  
  Elderhood. Ages 54-80. Primary role: Stewardship, then dependence.

2. It is assumed that there is a roughly 54 year famine cycle in pre-modernity that creates alternating (apx.) 27 year periods of famine and (relative) plenty and that though this cycle helps drive Saeculum I, it is quite possible that Saeculum I may continue to operate if a famine is skipped. Also it is assumed that if the famine cycle is, for whatever reason, severely disturbed, the saeculum will quickly realign with it. The aforementioned famine cycle works on a Malthusian dynamic of human population surging during "good times" so that a new, burgeoning generation pushes society's resources past support levels and a famine and subsequent population crash ensue (via death and low birth rates), with these "bad times" eventually leading to a renewed surplus of resources.


3. It is assumed that the four archetypes (Prophet, Nomad, Hero, Artist) are fixed, permanent forms because I believe they represent fundamental qualities of humanity. I am a Wilberian and as such I find some of his concepts applicable to this discussion.

4. It is assumed that the length of the Youth phase determines the approximate length of generations and turnings. And the length of the Youth phase is determined by how long it takes a person to be considered an autonomous adult.

In the works of Strauss and Howe, "As the Great Event scenario showed, history puts a different stamp on different peer groups according to their age-determined social roles. Thus the length of a generation (in birth years) should approximate the length of a phase of life" [The Fourth Turning, 65].

Prior to that they write, "Where a season's length is determined by the time from solstice to equinox, the length of each life-cycle phase is determined by the span of time between birth and the coming of age into young adulthood . . . Afterward, a person is deemed to be an autonomous adult. The length of life's first phase fixes the length of the other life phases as well." [The Fourth Turning, 57]

5. I believe humans are, or can at least be studied as, "holons". A "holon" is something which is a whole unto itself, but is simultaneously a part of something (or somethings) else, and in turn is itself made up of parts. This gives an individual-communal axis to the existential condition of the human holon.

But just as importantly, the human holon has what could be called a subjective and an objective dimension. By "subjective" it is meant what humans feel internally, mentally, intentionally. By "objective" it is meant what humans observe externally, physically, behaviorally. The former deals with the arts, ethics, spirituality. The latter deals with science, technology, materiality. This duality is often explained at the individual level as the difference between "mind" and "brain". If one could pop off one's scalp and place a few mirrors so that one could see the brain, they still would not be looking into their "mind" but rather looking at their brain. The mind is not something they can "observe"; it is internal, subjective. The brain, on the other hand, is something one can observe; it is external, objective. This gives a subjective-objective axis to the existential condition of the human holon.

If you put these two axes together you have Wilber's "four quadrants" as diagrammed below:




It is my assertion that four archetypes identified by Strauss & Howe correspond to these four quadrants:

• Prophet: individualistic-subjective
  Nomad: individualistic-objective
  Hero: communitarian-objective
  Artist: communitarian-subjective

6. It is hypothesized that somewhere along the way to human civilization, if not much, much earlier, one aspect (or quadrant) was emphasized to such an extent that it caused a disequilibrium that called out for adjustment and we have been chasing an elusive balance ever since. Moreover, this chase seems to occur in a specific order, i.e., clockwise around the quadrants.


III. Construction of an Idea

As I have said, Mike Alexander has noted a 27-year generational pattern operating in (at least) pre-modern Europe. This is 5-10 years longer than more current generational lengths (depending upon who you read and how "currently" you look in history). He also notes a pendular effect of demographically smaller and larger generations due to a directly related alteration between periods of famine and plenty. Going one step further, he also notes that the periods of high stress (famines) oscillate between types of critical stress (i.e., Social Moments), one secular and institutional, usually involving great wars, the other spiritual and personal, usually involving emotive awakenings, monastic enthusiasm, and rashes of heretical fervor.

Many may balk at a 27 year generation since it would mean a 27 year life phase. At first glance this makes sense since a 27-year "pueritia" or childhood phase and an 81-107 year old elderhood phase are nonsensical.

But what if the saecular mechanism operating through most of history was not a four phase, tetralogical dynamic, but rather a three phase, trilogical one? --- an interaction of three of the four archetypes at a time, yet still operating in four turnings/constellations?

What if a 27-year "youth" phase could actually make sense? I propose that in pre-modern society this actually did work, if we define "youth" as pre-autonomy. As Mr. Alexander points out, biological/demographic realities created a perfect format for generational division, and this division was roughly a 27-year delineation. And in an average demographic snapshot one could easily see the biologically-familiar three generation scenario of a 13 year old child (mid-youth), two 40 year old parents (mid-maturity), and one or two 67 year old grandparents (mid-elderhood). And by the time the youth in this example hits 27, chances are all the grandparents are gone and he or she is in the middle of raising a new crop of youngsters. What's more the youth's parents are now biologically old (by pre-modern standards) and ready to pass the baton of fully-realized social maturity, what I will call "Primacy", to a new group.

In premodernity the extended family was the rule, not the nuclear family of today. One could easily see the mature fortysomething father still holding strong functional authority over physically mature but still socially inferior sons in their early-to-mid twenties. Furthermore there was little impetus to have the young men strike out on their own at physical maturity like today. Extended family-members relied closely on one another in pre-industrial times, often in the same household, especially in the more common non-urban setting.

If one takes a look at pre-modern and early modern societies, one sees that, though there were rites-of-passage marking physical maturation, these societies? young men did not share in full societal responsibility until much after puberty.

Jesus, for example, did not begin his ministry until he was 30. This has been attributed to ancient Hebrew society's recognition of 30 years of age as when a man reached full social maturity. Jesus might have not been taken seriously if he tried much earlier. One can note that he began showing other aspects of maturity as early as 12, and the Hebrews, then and now, held a rite-of-passage about that age denoting the beginnings of physical maturity. Ancient Hebrews also considered a male to be of military age at 20. So, as now, there were stages of maturation, but full social acceptance as a full, autonomous adult came considerably later than today.

Strong vestiges of this higher pre-modern limit to recognized social maturity can also be seen in the Founding Fathers not allowing any one younger than 25 to enter the House of Representatives, and younger than 30 to enter the Senate.

Perhaps further research should be done on Strauss & Howe's interpretation of the Romans' fourfold biological divisions. I would contend that in the saeculum, as it often manifested in three-phase premodernity, the Roman designations "pueritia" and "iuventus" are actually subsets of the same phase: Pre-autonomy (Youth).

If one accepts 27 year phases of life for pre-modern society (some tending toward 25 and some toward 30) and accepts that the four generational archetypes are a constant (and I believe they are) then the four turnings looked much like they do today except that one archetype is completely missing per turning.


IV. The Trilogical Dynamic

With these assumptions and points in place, here are some diagrams (below) to help demonstrate the operations of a three phase saeculum.

The first diagram shows the arrangement of the archetypes at the end of each turning. Please keep in mind that these generations spend most of the turning filling in these phases and only completely fill them at the end. Thus, "turning".

Code:

Phase         1T	         2T	         3T	        4T

Elder        Hero	      Artist	     Prophet       Nomad
54-80

Primacy     Artist	     Prophet        Nomad        Hero
27-53
	
Youth       Prophet	    Nomad	       Hero	      Artist
0-26

The second diagram displays the relative emphasis of each generation in each phase in terms of the individual-communal axis. Please note the concept of "load" whereby at some points there is a distinct overemphasis (overload) of one or the other. This leads the dynamic to prepare the generation in Youth to counteract this lack of balance through a combination of child rearing and youth attitude coming-of-age.

Code:

Phase	         1T	       2T	        3T	         4T
Elderhood	   Communal    Communal    Individual Individual

Primacy	     Communal   Individual   Individual    Communal

AdultWorld      Overly       Near        Overly        Near 
LOAD	        Communal      Mean      Individual      Mean

Youth         Individual  Individual    Communal     Communal

This third diagram describes the same thing along the subjective-objective axis.

Code:

Phase	         1T	       2T	        3T	         4T
Elderhood	   Objective   Subjective   Subjective  Objective

Primacy	     Subjective  Subjective   Objective   Objective

AdultWorld       Near        Overly       Near       Overly 
LOAD	          Mean      Subjective     Mean      Objective

Youth         Subjective   Objective    Objective  Subjective

V. Turnings Described

Now we can put these concepts together and see how the archetypes, phases, famine cycle, and turnings interact.

First Turning

Heroes replacing Nomads in Elderhood

Heroes try to hubristically strengthen community and institutions but continue to do so, as much as they are still able, in an objective, this-worldly, works-related way. Nomads leave the stage with a few individuals surviving as stoic, curmudgeonly hermits.

Artists replacing Heroes in Primacy

Artists come to social maturity buttressing Hero-founded community but bring a new subjectivity to it; they balk at the theretofore dominant objectivism of their Nomad and Hero elders, seeing it as stifling and sterile in their youth. Rather they pursue a relative emphasis on values and spiritualism over works and materialism.

Prophets replacing Artists in Youth

Prophets are born and raised by Artists without emphasis on community-building since the adult world is relatively satisfied in that aspect. But they are still instilled with the importance of values and spirituality as Artists still see a societal need and pass it on to their children.

Turning Mood

A first turning begins when population and resources have come back into a favorable balance and the society realizes that the period of famine and war is over. With the Nomad Crisis Champion now passing the Heroes and Artists together lead a community renaissance in the arts and sciences (to such extent as these exist). Population and economic activity boom and occur within a context of relative social cohesion and stability.


Second Turning

Artists replacing Heroes in Elderhood

Artists try to systematically strengthen community and institutions but continue to do so, as much as they are still able, in a subjective, other-worldly, faith-related way. Heroes leave the stage with a few individuals surviving as congenial, ceremonial stewards.

Prophets replacing Artists in Primacy

Prophets come to social maturity suffused with and supporting Artist-founded subjectivity but bring a new individualism to it; and they attack the theretofore dominant communitarianism and institutional order of their Hero and Artist elders. Rather they pursue a relative emphasis on individually-derived, extra-institutional interpretations and expressions of faith over the community-accepted institutional ones .

Nomads replacing Prophets in Youth

Nomads are born and raised by Prophets without emphasis on subjectivity since the adult world is relatively saturated in that aspect. But they are still instilled with the importance individual action and circumventing institutions as Prophets see a societal need and pass it on to their children and the children see a need for it in order to survive in a dysfunctional environment.

Turning Mood

A second turning begins when population has outstripped resources and society realizes a period of famine and turmoil has begun. With the dying Odysseus now discredited, and possibly betrayed, the Artists and Prophets together lead society into a period of spiritual hysteria. Population and economic activity crash within a context of blossoming heresies and a flourishing of monastic orders.


Third Turning

Prophets replacing Artists in Elderhood

Prophets try to dogmatically strengthen individualism and (newly-established) doctrinal purity but continue to do so, as much as they are still able, in a subjective, other-worldly, faith-related way. Artists leave the stage with a few individuals surviving as playful, wistful, old storytellers.

Nomads replacing Prophets in Primacy

Nomads come to social maturity buttressing Prophet-founded individualism but bring a new objectivity to it; they balk at the theretofore dominant subjectivism of their Artist and Prophet elders, seeing it as impractical and chaos-inducing in their youth. Rather they pursue a relative emphasis on works and materialism over faith and spiritualism.

Heroes replacing Nomads in Youth

Heroes are born and raised by Nomads without emphasis on individuality since the adult world is relatively satisfied in that aspect. But they are still instilled with the importance of works and materialism as Nomads see a societal need and pass it on to their children.

Turning Mood

A third turning begins when population and resources have come back into a favorable balance and the society realizes that the period of famine and spiritual turmoil is over. With the Artist Renaissance Man now passing the Prophets and Nomads together lead a relatively fragmented society of cloister and bazaar. Population and economic activity boom and occur within a context of individual expression and social flux.


Fourth Turning

Nomads replacing Prophets in Elderhood

Nomads try to pragmatically protect individuality and doctrinal relevance but continue to do so, as much as they are still able, in an objective, this-worldly, works-related way. Prophets leave the stage with a few individuals surviving as wise, eccentric sages.

Heroes replacing Nomads in Primacy

Heroes come to social maturity suffused with and supporting Nomad-founded objectivity but bring a new communitarianism to it; and they reject the theretofore dominant individualism and doctrinal skirmishing of their Prophet and Nomad elders. Rather they pursue a relative emphasis on community-accepted, institutionally-grounded works over mere professions of faith.

Artists replacing Heroes in Youth

Artists are born and raised by Heroes without emphasis on objectivity since the adult world is relatively saturated in that aspect. But they are instilled with the importance of group action and institutional order as Heroes see a societal need and pass it on to their children and the children see a need for it in order for society to survive.

Turning Mood

A fourth turning begins when population has outstripped resources and society realizes that a period of famine and war has begun. With the dying Jeremiah now vindicated the Nomads and Heroes lead society into a period of general warfare and group struggle for survival. Population and economic activity crash within a context of competition for resources between groups, often under the aegis of Higher Principle.


VI. What About the Shadow?

This new mechanism goes far in overcoming much that is incongruent with the four phase model as applied to premodern and early modern history. Gone is the problem of 100 year old fourth phasers presumably affecting history. And in this arrangement, the tragic fall and passing of an elderly, hubristic Odyssean Hero-figure signals the beginning of an Awakening, not the peak or ending of one; likewise, the passing of an elderly, reproving, Jeremiadic Prophet-figure signals the beginning of a Crisis, not it's climax or resolution.

What about the "Shadow" mechanism described by Strauss & Howe? How do the generational archetypes affect one another and produce their archetypal shadow in a trilogical dynamic? Mike Alexander explains this in several posts at the T4T site. He posits a slightly different mechanism than the tetralogical shadow.

Mike Alexander at T4T website on February 13, 2004 wrote:

"During the social moment, the generation being born and growing up rebels against their elders by adopting the other outlook. Hence in a crisis spiritual Artists are born to secular Heros. Artists retain the communitarian ethic of their parents because this style is favored by the conditions of the Crisis, but Artists rebel during the High against the spirit-dead world created by their Hero parents and Nomad grandparents. On the other hand, secular Nomads are born to spiritual Prophets during the Awakening. Nomads retain the individualistic ethic of their parents as this style is favored by the conditions of the Awakening During the unraveling, Nomads rebel against their (too) spirit-filled elders by adopting a pragmatic, secular worldview. In my scheme, the "gray champions" of the crisis are Nomads."


This mechanism explains how Saeculum I manages to perpetuate the four archetypes with three phases instead of four.

And indeed, as stated above one could argue that in the Early Modern period the Crisis Champions (as opposed to Grey Champions) were Nomads: Margaret of Anjou, Elizabeth I, Benjamin Church, George Washington. Using Mike Alexander's mechanism this was probably the case in most Crises before modernity.

But what of Strauss and Howe's convincing argument of a mythic resonance through the ages of an elder Prophet- young Hero bond? What is more, what of the enduring images elder Hero-young Prophet conflict? This will be addressed later when discussing the modal shift from Saeculum I to Saeculum II.


VII. Condensation of the Youth Phase and Saeculum II

This all begs the question, why is Saeculum I no longer operating?

First, it may actually still be operating in certain societies today (or at least until very recently) that still retain many pre-modern aspects (e.g., agricultural-based economy, poor nutrition, poor education, cyclical worldview, opposition to change). Indeed, it was the waning of these aspects and the advent of modern, and especially industrial, society that led to the shift to Saeculum II.

Part of my thesis is that under certain stress, saecular structures change mode, either temporarily, as possibly on occasion in the distant past, --- or structurally, as in modern times.

In pre-modernity the saeculum usually involved a 27-year generation due to the first phase of life being that length (as explained from extrapolations of Mike Alexander's data). But around the 16th and 17th centuries forces came into play that began to alter the demarcation point between Youth and Primacy.

First, with the Gutenberg Revolution, the Renaissance, Protestant Reformation, and other massive paradigm shifts (socio-cultural and techno-economic) of the early modern period, the pace of change increased to an unprecedented degree. Changes from generation to generation acted as a stressor on the 27-year-based mechanism that theretofore worked well for the relatively slow pace of change of pre-modernity. The quickened pace of life is presumably more easily absorbed in shorter cohort groupings therefore putting at least some degree of downward pressure on phase length.

Furthermore, by the 17th and 18th centuries the Famine Cycle had been (largely) allayed, further loosening the Youth phase from it's previously solid 27-year mooring. From some of Mike Alexander's other writings, one could speculate that the now less stable and pressured phases interacted in some way with the War/Debt Cycle of the time period.

Saeculum I was under stress. As the length of generations dropped by a couple of years, the permutational demarcation points between phases dropped. Soon the Youth-Primacy transition was at or below 25 years, Primacy to Elderhood at or below 50 years, and the vanguard age for Post-Elderhood was closing in on 70, allowing a "Post-Elder" cohort group to begin affecting the saecular dynamic.

But it is with the Industrial Revolution that Saeculum I finally broke under the strain. At least four factors affected the final transition.

1. An evidentially exponential rate of change.

One could argue that the rate of change in human society has always been exponential. Only at this point, i.e., the advent of industrialization, this factor became much more obvious and relevant. As in the early modern period, this put additional pressure on the saecular mechanism to process change.


2. The beginning of ontogenic compaction (earlier pubescence) due to improved nutrition.

With agricultural production and variety increasing, with better transportation systems for delivery, and with higher average real purchasing power, improved nutrition in the 18th and 19th centuries (depending upon the Western country in question) began a trend continuing to this day of a younger and younger onset of physical maturity.


3. The beginning of psychogenic compaction (accelerated mental development) due to better and more comprehensive education.

This is the most controversial of the postulations. However, one could argue that improved childhood education stimulated certain mental capacities earlier and more profoundly. It is possible that the commencement of Piagetian "concrete operations" and "formal operations" may occur earlier (and more comprehensively) today on average than two or three centuries ago.


4. The earlier acquisition of social autonomy due to the above items, but especially because of the nuclearization of the family.

Migration to the cities, migration cross-country, less emphasis on acquired vocational skill and therefore parental mentoring in familial occupations, among other things, led to the gradual breakdown in the cohesiveness and functionality overall of the traditional extended family and ushered in a new emphasis on the nuclear family. This transition largely weakened the firm hold middle-aged parents (read: father) had on young adult children. For this and other reasons stated above, full social autonomy would arrive years earlier than under the conditions the first saecular mode (Saeculum I) evolved in.


VIII. Modal Shift and the Civil War Anomaly

It is quite clear, at least in American history, that a great saecular upset occurred in the 19th century. For Strauss & Howe, this means the Civil War Anomaly. For Mike Alexander, this means a dramatic shortening of generation length. Within the context of the Multi-Modal Saeculum concept, both occurred. The combination created a saecular hiccup, a shift from dissonance to a new equilibrium. What brought it to a climax was the vagaries of fate creating a Prophet generation (the Transcendentals) of regular length by the standards of the first saecular mode proper, but of dysfunctional length within the context of the saecular discord then occurring.

The result was the omission of an Hero archetype generation, truncated turnings, and persistent saecular settling: No testaments to communitarian Olympian rationalizers, shortened fourth and first turnings, dilatory spiritualism extending into the following third turning, Nomads with Hero qualities (Gilded), Artists with Hero qualities (Progressives), and a subsequently somewhat archetypally-attenuated Prophet archetype (Missionaries).

If we go by Mike Alexander's observations, we can surmise that modal pressure became extreme around 1820. The following collapse of Saeculum I occurred in the 1860's. And one could argue that it would not be until the following fourth turning that the saecular dynamic fully stabilized into its new mode: Four operating phases, with what was formally "primacy" and "elderhood" morphing into "rising adulthood" and "midlife" respectively, and "post-elderhood" becoming the new "elderhood".

What of other societies? In regards to the European saeculum, could this help explain the catastrophe of World War One? And what of industrializing societies today? This is especially germane when one considers China and the Middle East. Developing societies today are modernizing at a pace far greater than what the West experienced. What implications does this have for their modal transitions? What "hiccups" may occur or already have occurred with them?

Finally, back to antiquity: How is it that Strauss and Howe found compelling evidence of a tetralogical interaction in such diverse sources as Exodus and Homer? And what of the profound Prophet-Hero interactions mentioned earlier? One explanation is that archetypal forms were mythographically distilled into a four part story since the generational archetypes, of which there are unavoidably four, are easier to convey that way.

Another explanation is that in times of profound stress or some other X factor, Saeculum I societies temporarily metamorphosed into a Saeculum II mode, presaging the structural shift of recent times. However, whenever the stress or X factor passed, the saecular dynamic "de-excited" and shifted back to the original mode (metaphorically akin to an electron descending an atomic orbit after expending energy).

Strauss and Howe attributed the fading of their tetralogical dynamic to when "the inertia of tradition dampened this cycle and pushed society back to a prescribed and changeless role for each phase of life."[The Fourth Turning, p.90]. Since the authors do not recognize a continuing premodern saeculum, let alone a three phase alternative, and also since the trilogical saeculum (Saeculum I) is arguably not as intense as its successor, they mistake the recession of the tetralogical form as the discontinuation of the saecular mechanism altogether.


IX. Other Modes?

If we accept the thesis of this post, that the saeculum is disposed to different modes under different conditions, and we see that the lowering of the age of social autonomy completely rearranged the phasic structure of the system, what of the new pressures being created by the extension of the human life being made possible via modern medicine?

If we accept 20 as the current age of the advent of social autonomy (compromising between Alexander's 18 and Strauss & Howe's 21.5) then the permutational effect calls for a current Elderhood phase of 60 to 79. What of the millions of Post-Elders in their 80's and 90's? Has the longevity of the GI generation already betrayed an effect? Will the Silent, or the Boomers, bring on a dysfunctional fifth wheel to the saecular vehicle?

Both three and four phases work well mathematically with four archetypes and turnings. The transition from a trilogical to a tetralogical dynamic, though difficult, worked. A pentalogical set-up will be highly distorting to the four archetypes. A period of profound dissonance could be in the offing once again. My belief is that, if this does come to pass, and barring other factors, we will need to wait for modern medicine to even further extend life span so we can fit in eight phases. In between, how would a hexalogical or septalogical Saeculum III dynamic work? We can only wildly speculate.

Besides, due to factors such as eschatological calamity, an evolutionary "singularity", or the categorical arrest of old age due medicinal breakthroughs, such speculation may not only be highly fanciful, but moot as well.

I ask that those who, like me, ponder these issues to digest this Multi-Modal Saeculum idea and provide feedback: What's wrong with its premises? What changes would you make? What would you add? Do you agree categorically?

Thank you for your time and attention.

An obvious solution to the poor fit of the constellation model would be to change the length of the phase of life to a larger value for the early generations. For example, suppose a 26-year phase of life were employed until the early 19th century and a 20 year phase of life used for the recent generations? By adding 26 years to the immediately previous generation, 52 years to the one before that and 78 years to the one before that, one can obtain an estimate for the generational constellations up to 1822. After the Civil War a 20 year phase of life would be employed. Projected generation starts made with this model were compared to the actual values and residuals calculated. The residuals for are plotted in Figure 1 (see earlier post) as the red symbols. The residuals average 0.3 and do not show a statistically significant trend. That is, the model residuals are randomly distributed around zero, as is necessary for a good-fitting model.

In short, the generational constellation model with a 26 year phase of life fits the Strauss and Howe generations up to the 1822-1842 generation and the constellation model with a 20 year phase of life fits the generations after the Civil War. Given this fact, why not amend the Strauss and Howe constellation model to employ 26-year-long phases of life up to 1822 and 20-year-long ones afterward? Since life expectancy is much greater today it seems questionable to assert that phases of life were some 30% longer hundreds of years ago than they are today. A good idea might be to look at the ages at which people played phase of life roles over time and see what trends, if any, can be elucidated.

Figure 2. Average ages of pontiffs and national leaders over time


One measure of the phase of life is the age of onset of adulthood. For modern Americans, mileposts of adulthood might include the military age of 18, the age of suffrage of 18, the minimal age for drinking of 21 or for renting a car of 25. A consensus value of age 20-21 for coming of seems reasonable. For Medieval people one might consider the age a squire became a knight or an apprentice as journeyman as coming of age markers. Both these typically happened in the late teens, usually by age 20. These coming of age values place a lower limit on the length of a phase of life, and it would seem that they haven't changed that much over time.

A key role of the mature phase of life is leadership. The average age of national leaders should provide information concerning the start of the mature adult phase of life. If we stipulate that leaders on average should be in the mature adult phase of life, then one-half the average leader age should provide an estimate for the maximum value of the length of a phase of life over time. Figure 11 shows a plot of the average age of national leaders: the monarchs of England, France and Portugal up to the late eighteenth century and the average age of U.S. Congressmen and governors after that. National leaders averaged about 41 years old from the Middle Ages until around the end of the seventeenth century, after which it started to rise reaching 47 by the middle of the 18th century and where it remained for more than a hundred years. Late in the nineteenth century it rose again and has averaged about 53 years during the twentieth century. These values place an upper limit on the phase of life of 20-21 years in Medieval and early modern times, rising to 23-24 years in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and reaching 26-27 today.

A key role of elderhood is stewardship. One might consider the Roman Catholic pontiff as a steward of the faithful, in which case, popes should, on average be in the elder phase of life. In this case, another estimate for the upper limits of phase of life length can be obtained by dividing the average age of pontiffs by three. Figure 11 shows a plot of the average age of pontiffs over time. From Medieval times to the beginning of the seventeenth century, the average age of popes was about 64. After this it rose to about 72 years. Based on these values an upper limit of about 21 years in length can be placed on the phase of life in the early period, rising to 24 years in the later period.

Based on these arguments estimates for length of a phase of life can be obtained from Medieval (20-21 years) to modern times (20-24 years). A constant value of 21 years is consistent with all these arguments. Thus, the evidence suggests that the length of a phase of life has either remained constant or risen modestly since the thirteenth century, but it certainly was not longer in the past than today. This rules out the idea that phases of life of the type Strauss and Howe propose could have been longer than 22 years in the past.

This conclusion assumes that there must be four phases of life having the central roles Strauss and Howe claim for them. Suppose there are three? Saeculum enthusiast Sean Love has proposed that generations before the early nineteenth century reflected three phases of life rather than four (see above). These would be youth (age 0-26) whose primary role would be dependence and then activity, primacy (age 27-53) whose primary role is leadership, and finally elderhood (age 54-80) whose primary role is stewardship. All the pre-1850 leader ages shown in Figure 2 comfortably fall into the primacy phase of life, and the papal ages in the elderhood phase of life, so these phases of life agree with the historical ages at which these roles were played.

When phase of life shorted in the early 19th century, a new rising adult phase of life emerged, taking on the activity role from youth and pushing up the age range of the leadership phase of life to keep in line with the rising age of leaders.

Saeculum enthusiast Kurt Horner has proposed a cause for why turning/generation length might have shortened at the time of the early 19th century. Horner argues that prior to the rise of representative governments, policy (i.e. history) was determined by the propertied class. Members of this class typically gained political power only after succeeding to their father's estate. In contrast, under representative governments, young people gain a voice at the age of suffrage, typically age 21. Thus, after representative government emerged, the end of the youth phase of life occurred around age 21. Before then, it was later, perhaps in the late 20's. The average age of ascension for English, French and Portuguese monarchs ruling between the eleventh and late eighteenth centuries was 29 years. This observation is consistent with the start of the primacy phase of life in the late twenties.

Thank you for the summary Mike.

I now realize that Kurt's reasoning for the longer length of generations (and therefore turnings) is similar to mine.

In my hypothesis, the primary (though not exclusive) reason for the shortening was the break-up of the extended family and the new primacy of the nuclear family as a result of the Industrial Revolution. In Kurt's, it's the democratization that came with Industrialization (at least in the core West) that caused it. I wonder if this is all interrelated somehow.

Kurt, what do you think about this?

And Mike, what would be your synopsis of J. Xenakis's reasoning on this matter? IIRC, he doesn't think anything shortened.

Originally Posted by Peter Gibbons

Thank you for the summary Mike.

I now realize that Kurt's reasoning for the longer length of generations (and therefore turnings) is similar to mine.

In my hypothesis, the primary (though not exclusive) reason for the shortening was the break-up of the extended family and the new primacy of the nuclear family as a result of the Industrial Revolution. In Kurt's, it's the democratization that came with Industrialization (at least in the core West) that caused it. I wonder if this is all interrelated somehow.

Kurt, what do you think about this?

And Mike, what would be your synopsis of J. Xenakis's reasoning on this matter? IIRC, he doesn't think anything shortened.

Since I have you and Kurt here now, I'm going to explore this issue now. I continue my previous post below.

Strauss and Howe posit that generations are created by the impact of eventful history on the occupants of the different phases of life:

Originally Posted by [i

Generations[/i] p 61]Now suppose a decisive event--say, a major war or revolution--suddenly hits the society. Clearly, the event will affect each age group differently according to its central role. In the case of a major war, we can easily imagine youths encouraged and willing to keep out of the way (dependence), rising adults to are and meet the enemy (activity), midlifers to organize the troops (leadership) and elders to offer wisdom and perspective (stewardship). We can also imagine how most people will emerge from the trauma with their personalities permanently reshaped in conformance with the role they played (or were expected to play but didn't). The decisive event, therefore creates four distinct cohort-groups--each about twenty-two years in length and each possessing a special collective personality that will later distinguish it from its age-bracket neighbors as it ages in place.

Strauss and Howe clearly imply that the number of generations must be equal to the number of phases of life. Thus, if there are only three phases of life, then there should be only three types of generations, if generations are created in the way Strauss and Howe propose. Love does not suggest an alternate way to form generations; he proposes that four generation archetypes exist as an axiom. Horner doesn't address this issue explicitly.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Since I have you and Kurt here now, I'm going to explore this issue now. I continue my previous post below.

Strauss and Howe posit that generations are created by the impact of eventful history on the occupants of the different phases of life:

Originally Posted by [i

Generations[/i] p 61]Now suppose a decisive event--say, a major war or revolution--suddenly hits the society. Clearly, the event will affect each age group differently according to its central role. In the case of a major war, we can easily imagine youths encouraged and willing to keep out of the way (dependence), rising adults to are and meet the enemy (activity), midlifers to organize the troops (leadership) and elders to offer wisdom and perspective (stewardship). We can also imagine how most people will emerge from the trauma with their personalities permanently reshaped in conformance with the role they played (or were expected to play but didn't). The decisive event, therefore creates four distinct cohort-groups--each about twenty-two years in length and each possessing a special collective personality that will later distinguish it from its age-bracket neighbors as it ages in place.

Strauss and Howe clearly imply that the number of generations must be equal to the number of phases of life. Thus, if there are only three phases of life, then there should be only three types of generations, if generations are created in the way Strauss and Howe propose. Love does not suggest an alternate way to form generations; he proposes that four generation archetypes exist as an axiom. Horner doesn't address this issue explicitly.

Mike,

As you quote, S&H say, "The decisive event, therefore creates four distinct cohort-groups . . . ". So if there are only three life-phases, then naturally there would indeed be only three distinct cohort-groups (at any given time). But I do not think it necessarily follows that there must be only three archetypes.

What if "Cohortia" (as they say in Generations) suffers from an ontological imbalance as a result of the "major event"? By this I mean, one of the four poles (Agency, Objective, Communal, Subjective) is overemphasized -- or one quadrant is overemphasized creating an overemphasis on two poles. The subsequent compensating factors would drive four archetypes into existence, but only three would appear at a time.

How could this be self-sustaining then? There is no tetralogical "shadow" mechanism that S&H call out for. Ah, but this is where I bring your attention to the "Alexander mechanism".

Mike Alexander at T4T website on February 13, 2004 wrote:

"During the social moment, the generation being born and growing up rebels against their elders by adopting the other outlook. Hence in a crisis spiritual Artists are born to secular Heros. Artists retain the communitarian ethic of their parents because this style is favored by the conditions of the Crisis, but Artists rebel during the High against the spirit-dead world created by their Hero parents and Nomad grandparents. On the other hand, secular Nomads are born to spiritual Prophets during the Awakening. Nomads retain the individualistic ethic of their parents as this style is favored by the conditions of the Awakening. During the unraveling, Nomads rebel against their (too) spirit-filled elders by adopting a pragmatic, secular worldview. In my scheme, the "gray champions" of the crisis are Nomads."

So there is a (partial) one-apart shadow, instead of a (whole) two-apart shadow. Add to this the concept of "load" I introduced, and one can have a three phase/four archetype system.

But I am not "100% certain". :wink:

Originally Posted by Peter Gibbons

Add to this the concept of "load" I introduced, and one can have a three phase/four archetype system.

One can have any number of generations one wishes with a three phase model. My point was that one of the mechanisms S&H provide for generation creation implies that the number of generations be equal to the number of phases of life.

What I talked about with a younger generation rebeling against a secular parental generation by becoming spiritual (and so forth) is a different mechanism than what S&H propose.

Think of generations as archetypcal boxes. THe S&H mechanism prints new boxes every social moment, impressing archetypes into rising adult and mature geenrations. A generation in youth isn't actually any type of generation. It's not until they experience a social moment that they get stamped as a defintie type. Parental nurture produces "protoarchetypes" that are more suitable for some archetypes than others. For examples tihgtening parental nurture makes the youth of the time more suitable as Heroes or Adaptives than as Prophets or Nomads.

But if they are "printed right" youth that should have turned out to be Heroes can end up as artists, such as in the CWA.

A three-phase model doesn't use printing as a mechanism. The model you cited has a two 2-stroke alternating types. Here's a figure I made back in 2001 that illustrates it.



In this model I rely on externally-supplied stress the cause social moments. What response you get depends on whether Artists or Nomads are in elderhood. With Artists you get an Awakening because they are an inherently "spiritual" generation (they are put in the spiritual box). With Nomads you get a crisis because they are inherently secular.

I then had to make up some reason why Artists and Nomads would live in these boxes and what you cited is what I came up with. I use youthful rebellions and you use ontological balance.

There is another way to think about phases of life. Consider the midlife/primacy role of leadership. Let AL is the average age of secular leaders (e.g. those who occupy the top positions in government, industry etc.) and AS be the average age of stewards of the culture (e.g. religious prelates, elder statesmen, etc.). Estimates for historical values of AL are given by the average ages of monarchs and American politicians in Figure 2. Estimates for AS over time are given by the average age of Roman Catholic pontiffs in the same figure.

A birth cohort in year zero should reach maximum institutional power in year AL. A collection of contiguous birth cohorts (a generation) born in the years 0-20 would collectively reach maximum institutional power in the year AL + 10, when the center of the generation reaches age AL. In this case leaders up to 10 years older and 10 years younger than the average age would belong to the same generation and the fraction of all the positions of power held by that generation should be at a maximum. Table 1 tests this idea using the Strauss and Howe generations and the dates when each of these generations achieved their maximum share of all seats in Congress and all governorships. An estimate is also calculated by summing AL and the generational midpoint as just described. The value for AL was obtained from Figure 2. On average, the predicted date of maximum power was 0.9 years before the actual. In seven of 10 cases the forecast was within a year of the actual suggesting that this method of forecasting when a generation should have maximum leadership impact is valid. An analogous argument can be made for the AS + 10 as the time when a generation reaches maximum impact on stewardship.

Table 1.


An analogous argument can be made that a generation begins to occupy a plurality of leadership positions when its leading edge reaches age AL and ceases doing so when its trailing edge reaches age AL. That is, for a generation born in years 0-20, the period AL to AL +20 will see the time when it holds a plurality of leadership. This period is the time when that generation provides more leadership than any other generation. Similarly, the period AS to AS +20 will be the time when the generation provides more stewardship than any other.

By definition, the mature adult phase of life for individuals is that phase of life that provides more leadership than any other phase of life for typical individuals. By analogy, the mature phase of life for a generation can be defined as that period when a generation provides more leadership than any other generation. Let L be the length of a phase of life and of a generation. For the individual, the mature (leadership) phase of life begins as age 2L and ends at age 3L. For the generation, the leadership era begins at age AL and ends at age AL + L. By analogy this means AL = 2L. A similar argument for elderhood/age of stewardship gives the relation AS = 3L. Finally, one can argue that a generation comes of age L years after its birth dates.

The top portion of Table 12 summarizes the location of generational phases of life for each generation type in terms of L. An Idealist generation is assumed to start being born in year zero. This generation is born over the years 0 to L-1, with the next generation being born over L to 2L-1 and so forth. The idealist generation comes of age (COA) over the years L to 2L-1, dominates the leadership positions in society over the years 2L to 3L-1 and dominates the stewardship positions over 3L to 4L-1. The next Reactive generation follows though the same sequence L years later, the Civic generation L years after than and so on.

The bottom portion of Table 12 replicates the information in the top portion, but arranges it differently. Now each row reflects one of the sequential periods of length L and the generation type comprise the entries. The columns remain the same, the phase of life roles. Each entry gives the generation type that dominates each role during a particular period. For example, during the 3L to 4L-1 period, an Adaptive generation dominates the birth role (by definition, it is the only generation being born). At the same time a Civic generation dominates the COA role; a Reactive generation dominates the leadership role, and an Idealist generation dominates the stewardship role. This period is characterized by a particular permutation of generation types when expressed in order of rising phase of life. These permutations of generation types are what Strauss and Howe call the generational constellation. It is obvious from this Table that in years 0, L, 2L etc. new generations start being born and start gaining "plurality" in the next higher phase-of-life roles. That is, these dates correspond to aligned generational constellations. If we assume that it takes a few years for fresh entrants into new roles to "learn the ropes" sufficiently to have an important impact on events (i.e. history) then there should be a similar lag between when a generation enters new roles and when that generation starts shaping history. This lag is the spacing between the start of a new generation and the start of a new turning.

Table 12. Periods of Birth, COA, Leadership and Stewardship for Generation Types


This alternate formulation provides a way to directly assess generation length using average age for roles closely corresponding to the phase of life roles. For example, for the period 1200-1700, AL is approximately 41 and AS is approximately 64. Using a four phase of life model, in which leadership is exercised by members of the third phase of life, AL is equal to 2L and L is about 20-21 years. Similarly, since stewardship is exercised in the fourth phase of life, AS is equal to 3L and L is about 21 years. A consensus value of 21 years can be obtained for L.

Using a three phase of life model, in which leadership is exercised in the second phase of life (Primacy), AL is equal to L and L should be about 41 years. Similarly since stewardship is performed in the third phase of life, AS is equal to 2L and L should be about 32 years. There is a large discrepancy between these tow estimates for L. Furthermore, the values for L are much longer than those called for in the three phase model. Based on this finding, the three phase model as proposed by Love is rejected.

Three phase models can be formulated that do not suffer from this problem if the central roles for different phases of life are changed. Instead of society leadership, which is practiced by 40-somethings, as the central role of primacy, some role that is practiced by people around age 27 should be chosen. An obvious choice would be parenthood. Another might be coming of age in the sense that Horner described, that of coming into one's inheritance. Primacy would then be the time when a generation establishes itself as the leaders of a household. Primacy could be divided into junior members (age 27-40) and senior members (age 41-53). Society leadership would then be the province of people in senior primacy. Elderhood would be defined as grandparenthood, those who provide stewardship to the household. Elderhood could also be divided into junior and senior members. The juniors would play a role in society leadership, while the senior members would practice society stewardship.

The weakness of this model is it doesn’t provide a clear mechanism by which generations create history. It is easy to see how performance of society-wide leadership by a new generation with a different way of thinking will affect policy. When one considers that policy includes such things as war and peace, economic development and legislation, which are the very stuff of history, the way generations in society leadership can create history is clear. The same is true of generations in society-wide stewardship shaping culture, which is also history. In contrast, the way household leaders and stewards shape history is less clear.

On the other hand, the three phase-of-life model has the role of parental nurture dominated by a single generation. The four phase-of-life model would have the role of parental nurture performed by split generations, requiring junior and senior members of the parenthood role. Strauss and Howe argue that the senior parents set the tone for child nurture, an argument analogous to my proposal that senior members of primacy practice society leadership.

Thus, a four-phase model does a better job of explaining how generations create history, while the three-phase model does a better job of explaining how generations can be created through nurture. Strauss and Howe's mechanism for creating generations does not solely depend on nurture. In fact, as quoted earlier, they argue that history acting directly on occupants of all phases of life, but especially those coming of age, can create generations. Thus, generation formation according to Strauss and Howe depends on both parental nurture and by history (the policy of older generations) acting on younger generations. For example, a war policy promulgated by midlife leaders for reasons espoused by elder stewards can strongly affect rising adults and youth required to endure privation and face death: for rising adults their own or that of a loved one, for youth that of a revered mentor.

In all, the four phase of life provides a more satisfactory explanation for how the saeculum works than the three phase of life model. It's only major drawback, it would seem, is it calls for a generational length that is shorter than those observed. In the next section, a modification to the Strauss and Howe model that rectifies this problem is presented.

Thanks for your input Mike. It's going to take me a while to digest this.