At Mecca, the Islamic movement Hamas had pledged to respect past agreements between the pLO and Israel, an implicit recognition of the Jewish state and therefore a big stride towards meeting the terms imposed by the Quartet (United States, Russia, EU and UN) for resumed cooperation and funding of the palestinian government.
It seemed that Saudi Arabia’s mediation had managed not only to avert a full-blown palestinian civil war but also to allow the lifting of the crippling international boycott of the Hamas government, which has reduced the palestinians to abject penury over the past year.
The hope was that the much heralded summit on 19 February, between Israeli prime Minister Ehud Olmert and palestinian Authority president Mahmud Abbas, which Rice was to chair, would jump-start talks on substantive issues such as borders, refugees and Jerusalem.
In the event, of course, nothing of the sort happened. The meeting turned into an acrimonious shouting match. Olmert accused Abbas of betraying him by doing a deal with Hamas, a movement Israel wants to destroy not co-opt. Abbas retorted angrily that he had given Olmert no such promise and that his priority was to stop an intra-palestinian war.
The outcome had in fact been decided before Rice even touched down in Israel. Olmert had phoned George Bush on 16 February, and had secured a private assurance from him that the Mecca agreement changed nothing and that the United States would join Israel in continuing to shun Hamas. In the Israeli view, Mecca had actually set back the cause of peace by legitimizing Hamas. Olmert was able to crow that the US and Israeli positions were identical. His spokeswoman, Miri Eisin, ruled out any talks on a final peace deal with Abbas, if he went ahead with plans to form a new cabinet that included Hamas. "We’re not talking about negotiations on final-status issues," Elsin said.