Very interesting, and not only for the analysis of Iraq, but the analysis of the American decision making as well. The viewpoints seem to be breaking down into the following categories:
1) Grunts. Just want to survive the tour and hope their service is doing some good.
2) Field officers. Are beginning to draw accurate conclusions about effectiveness of various strategies for Iraq.
3) Senior "field officers". Live in somewhat realistic fairy or video game worlds in the Green Zone or Tampa, where the "Iraqi government" and the "Iraqi army" matter.
4) Pentagon officers. Can't tell anything about conditions in Iraq, but know damned well that readiness, morale, equipment stocks, and so on are falling, research is being neglected, medical support is overwhelmed, etc.
5) Political appointees, Congress, and the White House. Believe what they want to believe and to hell with reality. Unwilling to listen to any of 1-4 above unless they already agree, or unless a boot to the head (cf. Election Day 2006) is applied. Democrats affected only slightly less than Republicans.
'81, 30/70 X/Millie, trying to live in both Red and Blue America... "Catfish 'n Cod"
An important read.
I've often enough distinguished between Agricultural Age values and Industrial Age values, and tried to suggest that democracy does not easily take hold in a land where it has never existed. This guy has been there, and is trying to call out the specific Iraqi values and cultural traits which have been, are and will continue to cause problems.
How to change all of the above in a few Friedman Units is beyond me.
'81, 30/70 X/Millie, trying to live in both Red and Blue America... "Catfish 'n Cod"
One of the article's points is that it cannot be changed in a few Friedman Units, at least not by the direct actions of the United States.How to change all of the above in a few Friedman Units is beyond me.
Democracy cannot be imposed. There is not a large enough booj-wah for it to happen in the way we meant for it to. Iraq is going to remain a clan society for as long as they choose to stay loyal to clans over country. The level of force necessary to change that is on the order of that required to commit genocide. We can't change that and build a democracy; al-Qaeda can't change that and build a caliphate; Iran can't change that and build a theocracy.
What we can do is let the power structures set themselves up naturally, and then (via many examples in daily life) let the Iraqis realize the benefits of positive sum behavior. But that's a long term project, longer than we can keep soldiers on the streets. We must pull back to base (which is not the same thing as abandoning Iraq). Only Iraq can stabilize Iraq.
'81, 30/70 X/Millie, trying to live in both Red and Blue America... "Catfish 'n Cod"
How to spot a shill, by John Michael Greer: "What you watch for is (a) a brand new commenter who (b) has nothing to say about the topic under discussion but (c) trots out a smoothly written opinion piece that (d) hits all the standard talking points currently being used by a specific political or corporate interest, while (e) avoiding any other points anyone else has made on that subject."
"If the shoe fits..." The Grey Badger.
This is an excellent article, and one that raises a political question: at what point does the active and reserve miltary begin to shed their communal embrace of all things GOP? The Republicans have counted on a near universal GOP alliance from the miltary to leverage and arm-twist the US population. Is that ending now?
None of which solves the issues raised in this article, of course.
Marx: Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it everywhere, diagnosing it incorrectly and applying the wrong remedies.
Lennon: You either get tired fighting for peace, or you die.
Yes, and isn't that the inherent fallacy of the entire enterprise? You have to wonder how supposedly intelligent people failed to understand basic human nature so completely.
Clans exist in places that have embraced democratic concepts, but even there they act as a countervailing force. If clannish Scotland and Ireland continue to have issues, why would anyone think that a country like Iraq could adopt this concept more readily than they have? I'm more baffled by that than I am at the temerity of invading in the first place.
Marx: Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it everywhere, diagnosing it incorrectly and applying the wrong remedies.
Lennon: You either get tired fighting for peace, or you die.
America even has its share of clannish factions still in existance. Peace, mutual respect and common interest will take time to cultivate in a world which violence, social dominance or absolute power and strict social class structures have ruled for centuries. How many years did it take America to remove the social ceilings that prevented access to economic and political opportunities, human growth and the right to enter into a higher social class?
Scotland's transition out of clan-based society was effected by the "Harrowing of the Glens" after the Forty-Five. (I should know, I'm descended from lots of Scots.) Massive efforts at depopulation, agricultural conversion, what would today be called "cultural genocide", etc. damaged the Scottish clan system sufficiently for the Enightenment to take hold. (Which it did, and Scots turned out to be quite good at capitalism and engineering and so on.)
We can't do today what the British Parliament did to Scotland. First, we preach against it, in no small part because many of us are descended from the victims. Second, it probably wouldn't work, because Iraq is not an island; people melt away or cross a border and resupply.
The peoples that Saddam harried as the Scots were harried -- such as the Kurds, the Assyrians, and to a lesser extent the Shi'a -- are further along the path to modernity than the Sunni. This is not a coincidence.
Now, how do you accomplish the same goal without committing war crimes?
'81, 30/70 X/Millie, trying to live in both Red and Blue America... "Catfish 'n Cod"
Well, a start might be seriously talking about clan culture at the diplomatic level. If America came to understand they aren't going to create a fully functional democracy, if Iran understood they aren't going to create a theocracy, if (dream on) Al Qaida understood that the Caliphate isn't coming back, things might be better. They could settle down and create a meeting place of the clans. Perhaps what is needed is a forum where clan chiefs or their appointed representatives might haggle and dicker, with rules that keep each other off the other's turf.
I was pleased by the Seven Pillars article. I'm into culture, values, and how individuals see the world through very different perspectives, shaped by their history. Anyone who follows S&H turning theory ought not to be greatly surprised that Iraqi politics is shaped by solutions to old crises. It is dismaying to realize that such an understanding of how humans and nations work is rare and exotic to the professional politicians. Even on this web site, there are a lot of people who casually assume that their values are the One-True-Values, and that everyone with different values is wrong. Even here, where we study how values change, few wish to be aware of how their own values came to be, how their own view of the world is distinctly different from what others elsewhere would consider plain obvious common sense.
And as most here are veterans of our 3T Red-Blue bickering, we all should be very aware how seldom reason can be used to overcome a values based evaluation of the situation. If fact conflicts with values, many individuals will find ways to disregard inconvenient truths.
In the long run, I'd like to think modern values would triumph in modern Iraq. The less corrupt tribes, in the long run, will create more prosperous regions. Tribes that can cooperate, creating something resembling a modern economy, such as Kurdistan, might slowly win a darwinian competition with the old style politics of what's in it for me and my family.
But after watching Clan Bush in action, let's just say that the process could take a while...
It's not that a Caliphate can't come back; indeed, that may have to be part of the resolution of this Crisis.. because al Qaeda's Caliphate can't come back, and if there were an accepted Caliphate, most of their support would collapse.
What if there were a forum where clan chiefs (chosen by acclimation of their clan), the patriarchs of their bloodlines, could come together? We might call it... um... "The Senate".Well, a start might be seriously talking about clan culture at the diplomatic level. Perhaps what is needed is a forum where clan chiefs or their appointed representatives might haggle and dicker, with rules that keep each other off the other's turf.
Because that's what the Roman Senate originally was!
Don't forget that our solution has to be consonant with our values, too. It hurts us to be forced to retreat from our idea of How Things Should Be. It would help a lot if we could see how the path could lead to our values, should the Iraqis decide.
History is Lamarckian.Anyone who follows S&H turning theory ought not to be greatly surprised that Iraqi politics is shaped by solutions to old crises.
Or survivors...And as most here are veterans of our 3T Red-Blue bickering
'81, 30/70 X/Millie, trying to live in both Red and Blue America... "Catfish 'n Cod"
Interesting point. How much power would this Caliphate have to have? Can you expand on the idea of a new Caliphate? How dedicated to traditional Islamic law and values would it have to be? I have a suspicion that renaming "The Arab League," just calling it "The Caliphate," wouldn't abort the crisis. The problems of uniting the many governments who all have clan like tendencies of their own would not be easy to overcome.
Hmm... Might there be a way to compromise the two cultures in a practical way that will both work and let everyone save face? Partition along tribal lines. Hold elections in each tribal zone. Allow the traditional tribal chief to nominate a candidate, with the understanding that he might usually nominate himself. Allow some sort of partition method to add other candidates to the ballot. One might have to weigh the number of votes a senator might have by the size of the tribe.
That's just off the top of my head. I expect it would work far better in rural areas than in the cities.
But that's the issue. Installing democracy was NOT the original goal. The original goal almost certainly was regime change, not governmental reconstruction. Remember Rumsfeld sent Garner, who gathered a group of senior Baathists which he planned to fill the top posts in the existing government. The old Iraqi army was to be employed (at full strength and full pay) in reconstruction tasks. An interim leader would be chosen (not a US proconsul). "Elections" would be held as soon as it was clear that the guy already in power would win. The Sunnis would stay in charge.
It was Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith (the "fucking stupidest guy on the face of the earth" according to Gen Franks) who were the big proponents of the bonehead democracy idea. OF course, the Decider liked the idea, but what kind of endorsement is that?.
I think that's a bit simplistic. Many soldiers and Marines (the two most affected groups) will reenlist for the money and status, while they also see the effect of the war destroying their families. In some cases, reenlisting with a substantial bonus, especially in the no-tax war zone, is perceived as much smarter than waiting for a stop-loss order. How they actually feel about it is probably mixed. After all, they wanted to be warriors or they would never have enlisted in the first place.
The services have spent a lot of money making it hard to walk away and easy to stay. Add to that, bonding with ones fellow warriors has always been part of all militaries while at war. Even Vietnam draftees had good morale in-country, at least for the most part.
There is a theory that increasing operational tempo improved morale until the tempo crosses some imaginary line, and morale begins to decline. I have no idea where we are on that curve, but common sense has to say we're going to cross the threshold soon if we haven't already. I also have no idea how those troops will react when the threshold is well behind them. I doubt that stop-loss will be well received, though.
Marx: Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it everywhere, diagnosing it incorrectly and applying the wrong remedies.
Lennon: You either get tired fighting for peace, or you die.
This is the same technique followed in post-WW-II Italy, Germany and Japan, though it does smack of a higher level of cynicism. I agree that it would have had a high probability of success, though not invading was still the best option, hands down.
Of the two bad choices, being cynical and smart is always better than pompous and stupid.
The worst part is the buy-in from the American people. Are they now anti-Bush because he insisted on doing stupid things, or have they been convinced that those "things" were good ideas, just poorly executed. If we, as a nation, are still in the mode that we can and should go wherever we wish and do whatever we want, it will be a long and miserable 4T.
Marx: Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it everywhere, diagnosing it incorrectly and applying the wrong remedies.
Lennon: You either get tired fighting for peace, or you die.
Let's not forget it was Cheney who had Rumsfeld pull Garner; and the replacement, Bremer, who was way way out of his league and did immeasurable damage disbanding the Iraqi Army and his complete de-Bath'ication - probable putting 10s of thousands pissed-off Iraqi soldiers and officers into the insurgency. But one guy thought he did a great job -
"Che l'uomo il suo destin fugge di raro [For rarely man escapes his destiny]" - Ludovico Ariosto
Some of the best work along these lines is by Reidar Visser with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs who has a fasinating book about southern Iraq history and culture -
http://tinyurl.com/ywt48u
Here is a very insightful piece on the extreme historical uniqueness of what is being attempted in Iraq -
http://historiae.org/Federalism-from-Below.asp
Even without consideraton of Iraq's specific clans and tribes, we are trying (and it is now enshrined in their constitution) into a decision-making framework that is not sufficently localized to be relevant, let alone, successful -Among the 25 existing federations of the world, the vast majority belong to one of two categories, or to a combination of these two. Firstly there are “evolutionary” federations – either polities that developed gradually from below by the amalgamation of entities that wished to federate (as in Switzerland), or those built on imperial remnants similarly created over time but which, with a single stroke, were converted into federations, often at independence (like Micronesia). Secondly, there are “designed” federations – political systems whose geographical make-up has been decided by a small group of political elites, often in closed-doors forums of experts on constitutional questions and democratic theory (examples include South Africa and Ethiopia). Only one existing federation has a method for implementing federalism comparable to that of the new Iraq: Spain.(2)
Oh, and the notion, now enshrined in the constitution, of 18 Iraqi provinces being the basis for the electorate to determine the level of federalism? Why that be the CPA proconsul, Bremer.By the early 1980s, Spain had a population of some 35 million distributed in around 8,000 municipalities, i.e. on average 4,000 citizens behind every decision on an autonomy initiative; by contrast, the perhaps 25 million citizens of today’s Iraq have a local-level layer of government limited to around 500 entities, which yields a citizen/entity ratio of approximately 1 to 50,000. Clearly, such an arrangement would have represented an improvement on today’s proposed procedure and its roughly 1,400,000 citizens per governorate, but it would still be far from Spanish standards with regard to local-level control of the federalisation process.(13) A simple juxtaposition of the administrative maps of Iraq and Spain illustrates the salient differences in “democratic density” between the two cases of bottom–up federalism.(14)
MAP 3. Left, Spain’s fine-grained system of some 8,000 municipalities and the starting point for federalisation in the 1980s; right, Iraq’s provinces which form the suggested and comparatively crude framework for federalisation by way of “popular” initiatives. The relevant population figures are 35 million for Spain in the 1980s and 25 million for today’s Iraq.
"Che l'uomo il suo destin fugge di raro [For rarely man escapes his destiny]" - Ludovico Ariosto
That romantic idealists who would often contemn the Several States at home in Our Commercial Republic would be hostile at worst or indifferent at best to the idea of any other than the modern mass man and filled with hatred toward an idea of tribe should not surprise any Progressive here at T4T.
Spain also had the House of Borbón in the figure of the son of the Count of Barcelona, Don Juan de Borbón y Battenberg and grandson of the previous monarch HM Alfonso XIII to provide a place for some political passions to cool and temper.
The dictatorship, whatever its sins, was not nearly so destructive nor Progressive as that of Ba'ath Socialism. It was based on Church, Crown (at some remove) and Country. It had destroyed the most Progressive streams that would have returned Spain to civil warfare; and time's delay, life, had removed much of the appeal of Scientific Socialism from the Spainards dream states. Romance wasn't in the air nor was the noxal effort of Reformers from the Western Hemisphere on the ground. The reign in Spain mightly eased the pain. I am afraid we haven't got it.
Perhaps all the more reason to have better suggested to our Iraqi friends a much more local and responsive structure for self-determination?
Can the Several States boast of its own 1-1.4 million that all think alike?
We've left it to Iraqis to establish 18 such fairly unique areas in the world.
Last edited by salsabob; 03-05-2007 at 02:49 PM.
"Che l'uomo il suo destin fugge di raro [For rarely man escapes his destiny]" - Ludovico Ariosto