http://www.bartleby.com/189/401b.html

Originally Posted by K-I-A 67

M&L/Pink, did Nam start with five fanactical groups of VC flying planes filled with innocent passengers including babies into two American buildings loaded with civialians located in the heart of NYC? The political climate is similiar, the political faces are similiar, the influential generation involved in both is also similiar to Nam However, the underlying reason or justification why we're in Iraq makes Iraq very, very different from Nam in my opinion.

KIA, Iraq was not involved in 9/11. Iraq did not support Al Qaeda; Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia did.

Saddam Hussein was a thug and a nasty piece of work. However, he was not involved in 9/11.

Originally Posted by The Wonkette

KIA, Iraq was not involved in 9/11. Iraq did not support Al Qaeda; Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia did.

Saddam Hussein was a thug and a nasty piece of work. However, he was not involved in 9/11.

In general agreed. One caveat.

I would be dubious about treating Saudi Arabia as a single entity. One of Al Qaeda's basic goals is to overthrow the House of Saud. The House of Saud and House of Bush are two aspects of Big Oil. While I vehemently disapprove of the sort of religious autocracy that Al Qaeda attempts to create, the means they use in attempting to create it, and do not believe such a government would benefit the people of Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Somalia, or anywhere else, I quite understand how those living in such countries might come to intensely dislike the House of Saud, Bush 43 and Big Oil. Saudi Arabia is quite genuinely divided. The entire country should not be judged by the acts of a few.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

Originally Posted by The Wonkette
KIA, Iraq was not involved in 9/11. Iraq did not support Al Qaeda; Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia did.

Saddam Hussein was a thug and a nasty piece of work. However, he was not involved in 9/11.

In general agreed. One caveat.

I would be dubious about treating Saudi Arabia as a single entity. One of Al Qaeda's basic goals is to overthrow the House of Saud. The House of Saud and House of Bush are two aspects of Big Oil. While I vehemently disapprove of the sort of religious autocracy that Al Qaeda attempts to create, the means they use in attempting to create it, and do not believe such a government would benefit the people of Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Somalia, or anywhere else, I quite understand how those living in such countries might come to intensely dislike the House of Saud, Bush 43 and Big Oil. Saudi Arabia is quite genuinely divided. The entire country should not be judged by the acts of a few.

But doesn't the House of Saud provide financial support to Al Qaeda and various radical madrassas to buy them off?

Originally Posted by K-I-A 67

Originally Posted by Pink Splice

Originally Posted by Marx & Lennon

Another Vietnam parallel. They're piling up so fast now, commenting on them seems almost redundant. Ask HC why this a good thing. He always has an answer ... of sorts.

Notice how loudly Zilch/DA, HC, Chris Seamens, the Rani and their ilk have defended themselves on this. They've refused to take the witness stand to defend their words and actions, and those of the Administration they support.

M&L/Pink, did Nam start with five fanatical groups of VC flying planes filled with innocent passengers including babies into two American buildings loaded with civilians located in the heart of NYC?

No, but then, the Iraqis didn't either. That would be al Qaeda: Saudis, Yemenis and Egyptians. Let's invade Cairo, if that's an excuse.

Originally Posted by K-I-A 67

The political climate is similar, the political faces are similar, the influential generation involved in both is also similar to Nam However, the underlying reason or justification why we're in Iraq makes Iraq very, very different from Nam in my opinion.

I find both highly similar. Both wars were begun because someone thought, wrongly, that failure to fight communists/terrorists was a danger to The American Way (TM). The truth: Vietnam was about nationalism, and their desire for self rule. Iraq is about vanity ... ours.

Originally Posted by K-I-A 67

....makes Iraq very, very different from Nam in my opinion.

Thanks, that's real informative.

In the meantime, da beat goes on -

Tuesday, August 14, 2007

Four more US troops have been announced killed in Iraq.

PKK Threatens to Iraq Shiite Government

In the wake of PM Nuri al-Maliki's talks with Turkey and his commitment to expel the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) from Iraq, the PKK has threatened both Turkey and Iraq with terroist acts if they follow through on any crackdown:

The Iraqi government should not interfere in the conflict between us and Turkey, spokesman Abdelrahman Chadarchi told AFP by telephone from the Qandil mountains on the Iraq-Iran border. If they plan to strike at the PKK politically or militarily, Iraq and Turkey will pay the price and the crises in Iraq and Turkey will deepen, he added without elaborating.

Amid mortar attacks and assassinations, Baghdad police found 17 bodies in the streets of the capital on Monday.

Persistent power shortages are making life miserable in the Baghdad heat.

Mitt Romney's gaffe on his sons' (lack of) service in Iraq is not getting any media attention beause of an MSM double standard whereby if a Democrat puts his foot in his mouth, it is the end of the world, but Republicans can say the craziest things and they don't get media coverage

From Juan Cole who provides a daily tally of this CF -
http://www.juancole.com/index.html/

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/articl...1D61.DTL&tsp=1

Originally Posted by Pink Splice

2) It's the pattern of US fuckups that make the war similar, not the kickoff event.

THANK you. Whenever I hear either "Iraq is exactly like Vietnam" or "Iraq is nothing like Vietnam" I know someone has had the Post-Watergate Brain Freeze Treatment.

As I said before, I don't claim to fully understand Vietnam. But I know this much:

* The enemy is different.
* The enemy's goals are different.
* The casus belli on both sides are different.
* The world geopolitical situation is different.
* The local terrain is different.
* The indigenous culture is different.
* The neighbors are different.
* The equipment is different.
* The politics are different.
* The history is different.
* The Armed Forces are different.

The ONLY things that are similar are:
* the distance
* the confusion of goals
* the repeated strategic and tactical errors
* the micromanagement that caused these errors
* the lack of clear communication with Washington
* the disastrous communication with the American people
* the even more disastrous communications with people in the field
* the political unwillingness to concede even the slightest errors
* the reactions by politicians of all stripes to the debacle.

In short, pretty much everything that went wrong happened not in the field but in Washington. And since our political class pays attention ONLY to events in Washington (or events in which Washingtonians play roles), they think the war is a disaster.

Check me, Mr. Splice. The latest reports I read online suggest that the Iraqi Army is finally getting some gumption and ability, and terrorism is receding, but the Iraqi Police are still hopeless, the politicians are even more hopeless, and infrastructure is going nowhere. Does that sound right?

Deity help me, I'm starting to think Iraq's best hope is a coup and a Turkish style "managed democracy" where the Army keeps the politicians at their desks. I don't like it, but I like civil wars less, and at least al-Qaeda would be unable to play around. :-(

Originally Posted by catfishncod

THANK you. Whenever I hear either "Iraq is exactly like Vietnam" or "Iraq is nothing like Vietnam" I know someone has had the Post-Watergate Brain Freeze Treatment.

As I said before, I don't claim to fully understand Vietnam. But I know this much:

* The enemy is different.
* The enemy's goals are different.
* The casus belli on both sides are different.
* The world geopolitical situation is different.
* The local terrain is different.
* The indigenous culture is different.
* The neighbors are different.
* The equipment is different.
* The politics are different.
* The history is different.
* The Armed Forces are different.

The ONLY things that are similar are:
* the distance
* the confusion of goals
* the repeated strategic and tactical errors
* the micromanagement that caused these errors
* the lack of clear communication with Washington
* the disastrous communication with the American people
* the even more disastrous communications with people in the field
* the political unwillingness to concede even the slightest errors
* the reactions by politicians of all stripes to the debacle.

In short, pretty much everything that went wrong happened not in the field but in Washington. And since our political class pays attention ONLY to events in Washington (or events in which Washingtonians play roles), they think the war is a disaster.

Check me, Mr. Splice. The latest reports I read online suggest that the Iraqi Army is finally getting some gumption and ability, and terrorism is receding, but the Iraqi Police are still hopeless, the politicians are even more hopeless, and infrastructure is going nowhere. Does that sound right?

Deity help me, I'm starting to think Iraq's best hope is a coup and a Turkish style "managed democracy" where the Army keeps the politicians at their desks. I don't like it, but I like civil wars less, and at least al-Qaeda would be unable to play around. :-(

A "Turkish solution" would indeed be preferable to the current situation. Your read sounds pretty close, but the Iraqi army is still too weak a force to counter the militias that pose as police. The US is all that keeps the lid on, WRT to the Iraqi factions. The present government is beyond fixing.

Originally Posted by The Wonkette

But doesn't the House of Saud provide financial support to Al Qaeda and various radical madrassas to buy them off?

I highly doubt the House of Saud would ever give financial support to a group that aims to depose them with the intent of buying them off. They know it would backfire.

Allah save His Majesty King Abdullah I of Saudi Arabia!

Originally Posted by The Wonkette

But doesn't the House of Saud provide financial support to Al Qaeda and various radical madrassas to buy them off?

As I understand it, there is a strong taint of 'liberation theology' in the Saudi religious establishment. The House of Saud would find it very difficult to hang on to power without the backing of the religious establishment. However, many in said religious establishment preach anti Western, anti US, anti Israel hate stuff. This puts the House of Saud between rock and hard place, as they are trying to make good with both the US and the local religious establishment.

But while Al Qaeda recruits from Saudi Arabia, and shares theology with some in the Saudi religious establishment, it is simplistic to say the House of Saud is in bed with Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda wants to overthrow the House of Saud.

http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/...ain/index.html

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/a2347bd0-46a...0779fd2ac.html

http://observer.guardian.co.uk/world...rc=rss&feed=12

may be a re-post:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...080601401.html

Originally Posted by catfishncod

As I said before, I don't claim to fully understand Vietnam. But I know this much:

* The casus belli on both sides are different.

The stated casus belli were different. But why did Kennedy want to get the US involved in a pissant little country like Vietnam in the first place? Eiseonhower was prepared to write them off in '57. Nixon wold never have gotten involved in that mess. So there wasn't any compelling national interest reason for getting involved in that war. The actual casus belli was entirely about Washington politics.

In short, pretty much everything that went wrong happened not in the field but in Washington.

Of course, because the war was about Washington politics.

The big question is whether this is true for the current war, in which case it would share a critical feature with Vietnam that explains why both wars have been CF's.

The latest reports I read online suggest that the Iraqi Army is finally getting some gumption and ability,

According to this report by Michael Totten (who briefly posted here some years back) the Army is riddled with Sadr's people. This survey suggests nationalism is on the rise in Iraq.

Sadr is a nationalist. He's a Shiite, but he opposed the Americans like the Sunnis (and has cooperated with them in the past). Yet he has extensive contacts with Iran and has established a stronghold in Basra, which is the chief city of "Sumer" the Shia domininated southland.

The rise of Sadr and the rise in nationalism suugests to me the possibility that the Shia and Sunnis could reach a compromise agreement were the Americans to leave (I think this is Sadr's strategy--he wants to be the compromise). You may recall my belief that the Sunnis would turn on al Qaeda in a "night of the long knives" just as soon as AQ was no longer useful to their cause. The events in Anbar, with non-AQ Sunni insurgents cooperating with the Americans to take AQ down pretty much makes my case. I suspect they sense the Americans and getting ready to depart and they figure it makes sense to use American firepower to clean up AQ before they go.

Deity help me, I'm starting to think Iraq's best hope is a coup and a Turkish style "managed democracy" where the Army keeps the politicians at their desks.

I think what we might see in Iraq is an Arab Iraqi state under Sadr. The Kurds will proably remain nominally part of Iraq, but otherwise independent. From what I've read, Sadr's relationship with the Iranians is as good as SCIRI. Their backing would make Sadr a major player in Shiite circles. On the other hand, he has been anti-American from the beginning and a big supporter of a unified Iraq, both of which are Sunni positions.

The other Shia parties are seen as American and/or Iranian patsies. Sadr might be able to portray himself as his own man.

Now a Sadr government would be Islamic, allied with Iran and anti-American, but it would not be allied al Qaeda. In fact, it would likely be an enemy of AQ. It's not what we want, but it might be the best we can get.

http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/...eref=rss_world

For non-commercial use, etc:

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20288335/

Army suicides at highest level in 26 years
Military study finds link between attempts and days deployed in war zones

WASHINGTON - Army soldiers committed suicide last year at the highest rate in 26 years, and more than a quarter did so while serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to a new military report.

The report, obtained by The Associated Press ahead of its scheduled release Thursday, found there were 99 confirmed suicides among active duty soldiers during 2006, up from 88 the previous year and the highest since the 102 suicides in 1991.

The suicide rate for the Army has fluctuated over the past 26 years, from last year’s high of 17.3 per 100,000 to a low of 9.1 per 100,000 in 2001.
Story continues below ↓advertisement

Last year, “Iraq was the most common deployment location for both (suicides) and attempts,” the report said.

The 99 suicides included 28 soldiers deployed to the two wars and 71 who weren’t. About twice as many women serving in Iraq and Afghanistan committed suicide as did women not sent to war, the report said.

Preliminary numbers for the first half of this year indicate the number of suicides could decline across the service in 2007 but increase among troops serving in the wars, officials said.

Factors for suicide
The increases for 2006 came as Army officials worked to set up a number of new and stronger programs for providing mental health care to a force strained by the longer-than-expected war in Iraq and the global counterterrorism war entering its sixth year.

Failed personal relationships, legal and financial problems and the stress of their jobs were factors motivating the soldiers to commit suicide, according to the report.

“In addition, there was a significant relationship between suicide attempts and number of days deployed” in Iraq, Afghanistan or nearby countries where troops are participating in the war effort, it said. The same pattern seemed to hold true for those who not only attempted, but succeeded in killing themselves.

There also “was limited evidence to support the view that multiple ... deployments are a risk factor for suicide behaviors,” it said.

History of mental disorders
About a quarter of those who killed themselves had a history of at least one psychiatric disorder. Of those, about 20 percent had been diagnosed with a mood disorder such as bipolar disorder and/or depression; and 8 percent had been diagnosed with an anxiety disorder, including post traumatic stress disorder — one of the signature injuries of the conflict in Iraq.

Firearms were the most common method of suicide. Those who attempted suicide but didn’t succeed tended more often to take overdoses and cut themselves.

In a service of more than a half million troop, the 99 suicides amounted to a rate of 17.3 per 100,000 — the highest in the past 26 years, the report said. The average rate over those years has been 12.3 per 100,000.

The rate for those serving in the wars stayed about the same, 19.4 per 100,000 in 2006, compared with 19.9 in 2005.

The Army said the information was compiled from reports collected as part of its suicide prevention program — reports required for all “suicide-related behaviors that result in death, hospitalization or evacuation” of the soldier. It can take considerable time to investigate a suicide and, in fact, the Army said that in addition to the 99 confirmed suicides last year, there are two other deaths suspected as suicides in which investigations were pending.

Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is an anxiety disorder that can develop after exposure to a terrifying event or ordeal in which grave physical harm occurred or was threatened. Traumatic events that can trigger PTSD include violent personal assaults such as rape or mugging, natural or human-caused disasters, accidents, or military combat. PTSD can be extremely disabling.

PTSD can be complicated by the fact that it frequently occurs in conjunction with related disorders such as depression, substance abuse, problems of memory and cognition and other physical and mental health disorders. The condition is also associated with impairment of a person's ability to function in social or family life, including occupational instability, marital problems and divorce, family discord and difficulties in parenting.
Source: National Center for PTSD, APA, NIMH, AACAP
© 2007 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

I was afraid no one was going to dispute my summary...

Originally Posted by Mikebert

The stated casus belli were different. But why did Kennedy want to get the US involved in a pissant little country like Vietnam in the first place? Eiseonhower was prepared to write them off in '57.

Supporting data, please? I thought it was Eisenhower's administration that promulgated the domino theory in the first place, reflecting the experience of Korea. It was the domino theory -- the idea that the Cold War would be won or lost in "pissant" Third World nations -- that spurred interest in Vietnam.

Nixon wold never have gotten involved in that mess.

Supporting data, please?

So there wasn't any compelling national interest reason for getting involved in that war. The actual casus belli was entirely about Washington politics.

The stated national interest was the domino theory, which I had thought there was bipartisan agreement on in The Year Of Our Lord 1960. I do note that the South Vietnamese government, while pressed by the North for years, only announced an aggressive policy regarding the war in December, 1960; it is likely Diem was waiting on the results of the US Presidential election. Now, whether Nixon would have acted differently or not, Kennedy's domestic stance may have encouraged escalation of Vietnam; but it has not been proven to my satisfaction that domestic politics was the main reason for Kennedy's actions to the extent that Bush's were domestic. I could be wrong, of course.

Now the later actions of Johnson, or rather McNamara, and Nixon can be traced more soundly to internal Washington squabbles. But in 1960 the domino theory was thought sound, and no real dissent existed. Or so I thought.

It's easy to say in hindsight that we screwed up. In John Birmingham's "World War 2.1" series (where a 2021 anti-terror UN task force, with the US carrier Hillary Clinton as flagship, is sent back to 1941), one of the pieces of advice given to the US State Department is to "call up Ho Chi Minh; tell him if he'll support democracy and capitalism we'll give him all the guns he wants and keep the French from coming back." But did anyone know in 1960?

The big question is whether this is true for the current war, in which case it would share a critical feature with Vietnam that explains why both wars have been CF's.

It is much, much easier to say that for Iraq. Even in 2002, there were well known complaints that taking on Iraq would be a serious misallocation of resources. All testimonies of participants in planning and execution -- except, of course, on the pure military side -- describe the high levels of partisan ideology motivating decisions and actions.

According to this report by Michael Totten (who briefly posted here some years back) the Army is riddled with Sadr's people. This survey suggests nationalism is on the rise in Iraq. Sadr is a nationalist.

Bull. Sadr is a bought-and-paid-for agent of Iran, and the so-called Mahdi Army is the Iraqi Hezbollah. This is in contrast to SCIRI -- the al-Sistani organization -- who really WERE Shi'ite nationalists, and therefore refused to take orders from Iran.

Unless you think Sadr will double-cross the Iranians if-and-when he controls Iraqi Shiastan?

The rise of Sadr and the rise in nationalism suugests to me the possibility that the Shia and Sunnis could reach a compromise agreement were the Americans to leave (I think this is Sadr's strategy--he wants to be the compromise).

That would almost require double-crossing the Iranians. Iraqi Sunnis are not going to accept Iranian hegemony.

You may recall my belief that the Sunnis would turn on al Qaeda in a "night of the long knives" just as soon as AQ was no longer useful to their cause. The events in Anbar, with non-AQ Sunni insurgents cooperating with the Americans to take AQ down pretty much makes my case. I suspect they sense the Americans and getting ready to depart and they figure it makes sense to use American firepower to clean up AQ before they go.

Precisely. Analysis:

All sides have realized that only two things are keeping the Americans in Iraq. These are:

1) The continued operations of al-Qaeda in Iraq territory
2) The fear of "civil war", with blame attached to America

Maintaining the current government is no longer a strategic goal; there is no national unity government, and there won't be as matters stand. The parties distrust each other too much. All other stated war aims of the United States (elimination of Saddam and the Ba'ath Party; capture and containment of WMDs, if any; strategic rearrangement of the Mideast) have been met, and other unstated war aims of the United States (oil plundering, war profiteering, force projection, domestic political victories, etc.) have either been attained or are now impossible.

Al-Qaeda is being fought. This pleases all parties. They are enemies of civilization; they consider themselves at war with everyone who is not indistinguishable from al-Qaeda, and do not obey even the most minimal laws of war. I am reporting simple facts -- as Totten and Yon will attest -- when I say that no barbarity or atrocity is beyond Qaedists. Everyone is better off if al-Qaeda is driven off. As a result, all parties are now cooperating with the US in anti-Qaeda operations. The sooner they're gone the better. Meanwhile, Americans of all parties are happy... al-Qaeda is the one universally acknowledged enemy, nutballs excluded.

As for the "civil war", the sooner the Americans leave, the sooner the the tribal power struggle can begin. Therefore we must make things look as shiny and happy as possible, so they'll leave, so we can get to the main event. Therefore, former Ba'athists and Mahdi Army alike are shutting up and going with the flow. Besides, we get the stupid Americans to train and arm us this way!

I think what we might see in Iraq is an Arab Iraqi state under Sadr. The Kurds will proably remain nominally part of Iraq, but otherwise independent.

Only because they still can't defend themselves against Turkish invasion. They sure WANT to secede.

From what I've read, Sadr's relationship with the Iranians is as good as SCIRI.

It's far, far better. And please do not forget that twenty years ago, Iranians and Iraqis were trying to kill each other in very large numbers.

The other Shia parties are seen as American and/or Iranian patsies. Sadr might be able to portray himself as his own man.

He can portray himself as independent all he wants; he isn't.

Now a Sadr government would be Islamic, allied with Iran and anti-American, but it would not be allied al Qaeda. In fact, it would likely be an enemy of AQ. It's not what we want, but it might be the best we can get.

My hope would be that, by fighting somewhat alongside each other against al-Qaeda, ex-Ba'athist and Mahdi units can gain just enough trust to dicker with each other about powersharing. It's for certain there's a better chance of that then for the politicians to make powersharing agreements. If Sadr takes control, there is every reason to expect ethnic cleansing to resume.

Originally Posted by catfishncod

The ONLY things that are similar are:
* the distance
* the confusion of goals
* the repeated strategic and tactical errors
* the micromanagement that caused these errors
* the lack of clear communication with Washington
* the disastrous communication with the American people
* the even more disastrous communications with people in the field
* the political unwillingness to concede even the slightest errors
* the reactions by politicians of all stripes to the debacle.

A fine list. I don't know that it is an absolutely complete list. I have a few that might extend yours, but might be more specific.

When fighting an insurgent war, the rule of thumb is 1 occupier per 50 in the population. Rules of thumb are not infalible, but should not be lightly discarded either. Both LBJ and Bush 43 deliberately over rode the advice of the Pentagon in disregarding that rule of thumb. Thus, no matter how many different strategies were tried in either war, it just didn't work.

In both cases they were trying to force a government on a people that didn't particularly care for the ruling elite or style of government. In both cases, the government they were trying to keep in power was corrupt, with no great support from the people. Thus, attempts to hand over the ground war to local forces failed. The local forces were not particularly loyal to the local government, or willing to fight hard for it. Thus, the burden remained on the yankees.

Originally Posted by catfishncod

Check me, Mr. Splice. The latest reports I read online suggest that the Iraqi Army is finally getting some gumption and ability, and terrorism is receding, but the Iraqi Police are still hopeless, the politicians are even more hopeless, and infrastructure is going nowhere. Does that sound right?

The impression I'm getting is that by concentrating lots of troops near Baghdad, they have been able to keep a lot of the violence away from most of the TV cameras. From what I'm hearing, the civilian death count over all is similar to or higher than last year, though this is the hot season when even terrorists tend to reduce their activities.

(The White House is neglecting to mention this, but if you look at the numbers, things always quiet down some in summer. While the 'surge' might have cut down casulty rates as compared to the spring, they have not cut down casulties as compared to last summer. Thus, the alleged success of the surge may well be just the usual summer lull.)

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

When fighting an insurgent war, the rule of thumb is 1 occupier per 50 in the population. Rules of thumb are not infalible, but should not be lightly discarded either. Both LBJ and Bush 43 deliberately over rode the advice of the Pentagon in disregarding that rule of thumb.

The population of South Vietnam was about 15 million in 1965. Application of your rule would call for 300,000 troops. The US had 400,000 troops in Vietnam in 1966. As far as I can tell, LBJ did not violate this particular rule.

Originally Posted by catfishncod

I was afraid no one was going to dispute my summary...

Supporting data, please? I thought it was Eisenhower's administration that promulgated the domino theory in the first place, reflecting the experience of Korea. It was the domino theory -- the idea that the Cold War would be won or lost in "pissant" Third World nations -- that spurred interest in Vietnam.

http://www.historyplace.com/unitedst...ndex-1945.html
Note the absence of activity after 1956. 50,000 troops sent in 1957 would have won the day. Eisenhower didn't do it. It's not like Vietnam was a new problem; our involvement was a long-standing affair--Eisenhower simply chose not to escalate. It was one thing to back the French financially, and to provide money, arms and advisors to our guy Diem. But direct intervention? Didn't happen.

The stated national interest was the domino theory, which I had thought there was bipartisan agreement on in The Year Of Our Lord 1960.

Supporting data please?

Now, whether Nixon would have acted differently or not,[/quote]
Since Nixon was never elected we cannot know what he would have done for sure. I have assumed that he would have continued Eisenhower's policies. You have to remember that the Republican party had been a stalwart isolationist party when middle-aged Republican in 1960 were young. In 1960 they were not the War Party they are today.

Now the later actions of Johnson, or rather McNamara, and Nixon can be traced more soundly to internal Washington squabbles. But in 1960 the domino theory was thought sound, and no real dissent existed. Or so I thought.

After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Kennedy needed to appear strong. Hence he could hardly ignore the deteriorating situation in Vietnam as Eisenhower had seen fit to do). There was an upcoming election that could be lost by apparent Democratic weakness against Communism, and so Kennedy had to take a hard line on Vietnam.

Bull. Sadr is a bought-and-paid-for agent of Iran, and the so-called Mahdi Army is the Iraqi Hezbollah. This is in contrast to SCIRI -- the al-Sistani organization -- who really WERE Shi'ite nationalists, and therefore refused to take orders from Iran.

SCIRI was founded in Iran under the auspices of the Iranian government, see Wiki article:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme...lution_in_Iraq

Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq was founded in 1982 during the Iran-Iraq war after the leading Islamist insurgent group, Islamic Dawa Party, was severely weakened by a government crackdown following Dawa's unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. The Iranian government arranged for the formation of SCIRI, which was based in Tehran and under the leadership of Mohammad-Baqir al-Hakim. Hakim, living in exile in Iran, was the son of Ayatollah Mohsen-Hakim and a member of one of the leading Shi'a clerical families in Iraq. "He declared the primary aim of the council to be the overthrow of the Ba'ath and the establishment of an Islamic government in Iraq. Iranian officials referred to Hakim as the leader of Iraq's future Islamic state

More later

Originally Posted by Mikebert

The stated casus belli were different. But why did Kennedy want to get the US involved in a pissant little country like Vietnam in the first place? Eiseonhower was prepared to write them off in '57. Nixon wold never have gotten involved in that mess. So there wasn't any compelling national interest reason for getting involved in that war. The actual casus belli was entirely about Washington politics.


Of course, because the war was about Washington politics.

The big question is whether this is true for the current war, in which case it would share a critical feature with Vietnam that explains why both wars have been CF's.


According to this report by Michael Totten (who briefly posted here some years back) the Army is riddled with Sadr's people. This survey suggests nationalism is on the rise in Iraq.

Sadr is a nationalist. He's a Shiite, but he opposed the Americans like the Sunnis (and has cooperated with them in the past). Yet he has extensive contacts with Iran and has established a stronghold in Basra, which is the chief city of "Sumer" the Shia domininated southland.

The rise of Sadr and the rise in nationalism suugests to me the possibility that the Shia and Sunnis could reach a compromise agreement were the Americans to leave (I think this is Sadr's strategy--he wants to be the compromise). You may recall my belief that the Sunnis would turn on al Qaeda in a "night of the long knives" just as soon as AQ was no longer useful to their cause. The events in Anbar, with non-AQ Sunni insurgents cooperating with the Americans to take AQ down pretty much makes my case. I suspect they sense the Americans and getting ready to depart and they figure it makes sense to use American firepower to clean up AQ before they go.


I think what we might see in Iraq is an Arab Iraqi state under Sadr. The Kurds will proably remain nominally part of Iraq, but otherwise independent. From what I've read, Sadr's relationship with the Iranians is as good as SCIRI. Their backing would make Sadr a major player in Shiite circles. On the other hand, he has been anti-American from the beginning and a big supporter of a unified Iraq, both of which are Sunni positions.

The other Shia parties are seen as American and/or Iranian patsies. Sadr might be able to portray himself as his own man.

Now a Sadr government would be Islamic, allied with Iran and anti-American, but it would not be allied al Qaeda. In fact, it would likely be an enemy of AQ. It's not what we want, but it might be the best we can get.

I think I could get used to this, but I'd still prefer Iraq to be a monarchy. Do y'all think if the above post were to happen, and then the monarchy to be restored under His Majesty King Ra'ad I of Iraq, that His Majesty would declare al-Sadr to be Prime Minister. Well, it could happen.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

SCIRI was founded in Iran under the auspices of the Iranian government, see Wiki article:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme...lution_in_Iraq

This I knew; the name itself implied that it was intended to be the Ayatollahs of Iraq, and ultimately their allies / toadies. al-Sistani, being of Iranian birth (Sistan is in Iran), was expected to help mastermind this fealty. But when the time came in 2003, the Iraqi Ayatollahs refused to take orders. It was a few months later that Muqtada al-Sadr popped up -- he hadn't been on the radar screens before that, except as his father's heir. In the normal course of things he should still be studying ilm and fiqh; he's a madrassa dropout who was caretaking his father's charities until the war came to Baghdad.

I'll have to study the Eisenhower matter later...

Originally Posted by Mikebert

The population of South Vietnam was about 15 million in 1965. Application of your rule would call for 300,000 troops. The US had 400,000 troops in Vietnam in 1966. As far as I can tell, LBJ did not violate this particular rule.

True, but the population of North Vietnam counted in that conflict. I haven't a reference, but when LBJ committed to major ground forces, the Pentagon gave him a manpower requirement assuming the enemy continued to fight 2GW, and a higher level assuming they switched to insurgent tactics. LBJ sent in the 2GW force, and never authorized the increase when the enemy switched tactics. The point being, is that the White House had been warned of required troop levels before both quagmires.

LBJ seems to have assumed the VC would be too stupid to switch tactics. Bush 43 had supreme faith in his high tech 3GW army, and thought the rule of thumb obsolete. Both kept trying altered tactics rather than stepping back and asking whether they were ready to commit enough force to win.