Originally Posted by Mikebert

http://www.historyplace.com/unitedst...ndex-1945.html
Note the absence of activity after 1956. 50,000 troops sent in 1957 would have won the day....

I also note that the Russians became more aggressive in the Cold War around 1960. I assume this was to bait Kennedy as I know of nothing dramatic happening in Russia or China at that time. Is that Kennedy's fault for being Kennedy?

After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Kennedy needed to appear strong. Hence he could hardly ignore the deteriorating situation in Vietnam as Eisenhower had seen fit to do). There was an upcoming election that could be lost by apparent Democratic weakness against Communism, and so Kennedy had to take a hard line on Vietnam.

Hmm, maybe, but it was still "advisors and mliitary aid". It was somewhat expensive, but damned few Americans died in the Kennedy years; I don't get why Vietnam was so much more important in 1961-63 than eleventy-seven other places around the world. I note another important fact: Kennedy was assassinated twenty days after Diem. I did not realize just how close those two events were. Without Diem we had no regime to defend. Kennedy's post-Diem foreign policy decisions are another mystery of history.

Here's an important question: How did Johnson come to believe that Vietnam was "the central battle of the Cold War", as Bush came to believe Iraq was? Was it solely because it was headline-riffic? Bear in mind that the midgame of the Cold War was indeed memetic; it mattered a lot at the time who the world THOUGHT was winning. It was not until the 1970's that it became clear the war would be decided by economics -- i.e., ironically, by an actual point of contention between the two superpowers...

In any event, they were convinced that all of Southeast Asia would go Red if they did not draw a line in the sand. The Khmer Rouge did indeed take over Cambodia, Laos went red, and Myanmar is still a socialist militocracy. But Thailand held, and Malaysia, and Singapore, and Indonesia; and they all became capitalist successes, especially Singapore and Malaysia. It is not clear to me why it was thought that better lines of defense could not be established.

Most importantly, however, China became a third power midway through the conflict. Did Vietnam make Nixon's visit to China possible? If so, the Vietnam War must be counted as a smashing success, splitting the Communist bloc and permitting Deng to initiate capitalist reforms that isolated the Russian Empire even within the "Second World".

Originally Posted by catfishncod

I also note that the Russians became more aggressive in the Cold War around 1960. I assume this was to bait Kennedy as I know of nothing dramatic happening in Russia or China at that time. Is that Kennedy's fault for being Kennedy?



Hmm, maybe, but it was still "advisors and mliitary aid". It was somewhat expensive, but damned few Americans died in the Kennedy years; I don't get why Vietnam was so much more important in 1961-63 than eleventy-seven other places around the world. I note another important fact: Kennedy was assassinated twenty days after Diem. I did not realize just how close those two events were. Without Diem we had no regime to defend. Kennedy's post-Diem foreign policy decisions are another mystery of history.

Here's an important question: How did Johnson come to believe that Vietnam was "the central battle of the Cold War", as Bush came to believe Iraq was? Was it solely because it was headline-riffic? Bear in mind that the midgame of the Cold War was indeed memetic; it mattered a lot at the time who the world THOUGHT was winning. It was not until the 1970's that it became clear the war would be decided by economics -- i.e., ironically, by an actual point of contention between the two superpowers...

In any event, they were convinced that all of Southeast Asia would go Red if they did not draw a line in the sand. The Khmer Rouge did indeed take over Cambodia, Laos went red, and Myanmar is still a socialist militocracy. But Thailand held, and Malaysia, and Singapore, and Indonesia; and they all became capitalist successes, especially Singapore and Malaysia. It is not clear to me why it was thought that better lines of defense could not be established.

Most importantly, however, China became a third power midway through the conflict. Did Vietnam make Nixon's visit to China possible? If so, the Vietnam War must be counted as a smashing success, splitting the Communist bloc and permitting Deng to initiate capitalist reforms that isolated the Russian Empire even within the "Second World".

Your use of the term Russian Empire to refer to the Soviet Union is wrong. There has been no Russian Empire since March 1917. It should be restored, to its original boundaries of course.

As for 1960, didn't the Sino-Soviet split happen at about that time.

Originally Posted by catfishncod

Bull. Sadr is a bought-and-paid-for agent of Iran, and the so-called Mahdi Army is the Iraqi Hezbollah.

You have provided no rationale for this belief.

This is in contrast to SCIRI -- the al-Sistani organization -- who really WERE Shi'ite nationalists, and therefore refused to take orders from Iran.

What orders are you referring to? My understanding is Iraqi Shia clergy have a different view of the relationship between clergy and government than the dominant Iranian Shia clergy. Just because there is this difference of opinion does not mean that a SCIRI dominant government will not be much more friendly to Iran than the old Baathist government or a US-installed regime.

Unless you think Sadr will double-cross the Iranians if-and-when he controls Iraqi Shiastan?

This doesn't make sense. What makes you think Sadr is interested in Shiastan? It was SCIRI and the Kurds that were interested in a federalized Iraq in which they and the Kurds would rule the oil-containing pieces of Iraq. The SCIRI would have been happy with a divided Iraq with themselves in charge of Sumer, the Kurds in Kurdistan, the Sunnis in Anbar and the center of the country a warzone.

The Sunnis were opposed because their piece has no oil. Sadr's main base of power is in Baghdad, which would be in the warzone, so they too were opposed to federalization. For obvious reasons, the Sunnis and Sadr have always stood for a strong central government, with the oil riches shared throughout all of Iraq.

The Iranian-backed SCIRI had the strongest hand initially. They won the first round of elections and made a serious try at a federalized state. The Americans, entranced by neocon visons of Iraqi republicans dancing in their heads, only belated came to their senses and demanded Sunni participation in the government. The Iranians very nearly won that round. But SCIRI was still the dominant faction in the government.

Al Qaeda's goals are the same as as SCIRI's. They want a divided Iraq. THis is why from the very start they targeted Shia Iraqis as well as Americans, while the Iraqi insurgents focused on Americans. They want a war between the Shia and Sunni in central Iraq, which would keep the violence level high after the Americans leave and require their presence in Iraq. This is fine with SCIRI because al Qaeda cannot operate effectively in Sumer. Baghdad can go to hell.

This is NOT fine with the Sadrists, many of whom either live in Baghdad or have relatives there. Thus the goals of al Qaeda conflict with the Sunnis and the Sadrists, but not with SCIRI. A SCIRI government has a place for al Qaeda (with the Sunnis in Anbar) a Sadrist government does not.

All sides have realized that only two things are keeping the Americans in Iraq. These are:

1) The continued operations of al-Qaeda in Iraq territory
2) The fear of "civil war", with blame attached to America

This is nonsense. What is keeping the US in Iraq is that leaving = losing and the American government doesn't want to lose.

Al-Qaeda is being fought. This pleases all parties. They are enemies of civilization; they consider themselves at war with everyone who is not indistinguishable from al-Qaeda, and do not obey even the most minimal laws of war. I am reporting simple facts -- as Totten and Yon will attest -- when I say that no barbarity or atrocity is beyond Qaedists. Everyone is better off if al-Qaeda is driven off.

Al Qaeda is the American bugaboo. They are overwhelmingly outnumbered. Should the Iraqi Sunni insurgents turn on them completely (which they which as soon as they have a good reason to) al Qaeda in Iraq will be wiped out.

As a result, all parties are now cooperating with the US in anti-Qaeda operations.

If all parties were cooperating with the US then we wouldn't be taking so many casualties from these parties would we?

Originally Posted by catfishncod

I also note that the Russians became more aggressive in the Cold War around 1960.

Huh? The Russians were far, far more aggressive in the late 1940's than they ever were again. The reason, of course was that, until 1953, the USSR had an absolute dictator who was a paranoid nutcase. This was never to happen again.

I assume this was to bait Kennedy as I know of nothing dramatic happening in Russia or China at that time.

I assume you are talking about the Cuban missile crisis? This was simple tit for tat on the part of the Russians and it worked. The US installed nuclear missiles in Turkey, which as you know bordered the USSR. The Russkies decided to install missiles in Cuba, which is just 90 miles from the US. When the US found out, there were some stern worlds, sabers were rattled and then the two side compromise by agreeing to withdraw both the Cuban and the Turkish missiles. Since saber rattling sometimes leads to unintended war, and a nuclear war would be the last war, a hotline was installed between the White House and the Kremlin so that the next time something like this were to happen the two leaders could work it out without the glare of publicity forcing them in positions they don't want and which could lead to war.

Hmm, maybe, but it was still "advisors and mliitary aid".

No it wasn't. Kennedy sent the first US forces to actually fight in Vietnam, a step Eisenhower would never had taken.

It was somewhat expensive, but damned few Americans died in the Kennedy years; I don't get why Vietnam was so much more important in 1961-63 than eleventy-seven other places around the world.

The US was already involved in Vietnam. To not get involved further would be to "cut and run", a concept that has been used effectively by Republicans against Democrats for many decades. On the other hand, Republicans "cut and run" all the time (e.g. 1983 Lebanon) and pay no political prices. This is why Nixon in 1963 could have abandoned the Vietnam project after Ap Bac and not suffer political consequences, while Kennedy had to double down.

Here's an important question: How did Johnson come to believe that Vietnam was "the central battle of the Cold War", as Bush came to believe Iraq was?

Johnson believed no such thing. He inherited a war. The US had never lost a war in its history. He was going to be damned if America was going to lose one on his watch. Once again, I must stress, it was politically impossible for a Democrat to "declare victory and leave", doing this would successfully be branded by Republicans as a defeat. On the other hand, the Republicans did just this with Nixon's "peace with honor" plan. You may not know, but in 1968, Nixon was the peace candidate. He promised to end the war and had a "secret plan" to do just that. Humphrey as the sitting vice president had to run on a pro-war basis. If the Democrats were opposed to continuing the war, then why hadn't they ended it?

Was it solely because it was headline-riffic? Bear in mind that the midgame of the Cold War was indeed memetic; it mattered a lot at the time who the world THOUGHT was winning.

This is nonsense. The Cold War simply meant there were permanent enemies, like al Qaeda is today. Russia was of course the enemy (they are the Klingons in Star Trek classic). Red China was different. It was mysterious, nobody from here had ever gone there I believed as a child. While the Russians were more powerful and evil, they were still men, while the Red Chinese were aliens to my mind.

It was not until the 1970's that it became clear the war would be decided by economics -- i.e., ironically, by an actual point of contention between the two superpowers...

Bullshit. The nature of the conflict was always perfectly clear to knowledgeable observers. What you do not realize was that after WW II, big money was spend on national defense and foreign policy,and that the US was the #1 power. What this means is domestic politics controlled US foreign policy then (and still does). For weak countries, a realist school is the only viable school. Brazil simply cannot invade an Asian country and so their foreign policy simply cannot entertain this idea, even if it would be a great platform for a victorious political campaign. American CAN invade a variety of Asian countries and so American politicians can (and do) entertain ideas like this and use it politically.

In any event, they were convinced that all of Southeast Asia would go Red if they did not draw a line in the sand.

The domino theory is the equivalent of the of the "Saddam will give WMDs to terrorists" theory. It is a justification for the Vietnam War, not a reason.

The Khmer Rouge did indeed take over Cambodia, Laos went red,

Yes, after the US military involvement the region had brought them into play. In the same way al Qaeda now has a major presence in Iraq because he US invaded that country.

In countries where the US military involvement did not extend (like Thailand or Turkey) the communist insurgents/al Qaeda did not penetrate.

TANNING
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This was an in the Macclesfield Times (U.K.)

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

True, but the population of North Vietnam counted in that conflict. I haven't a reference, but when LBJ committed to major ground forces, the Pentagon gave him a manpower requirement assuming the enemy continued to fight 2GW, and a higher level assuming they switched to insurgent tactics. LBJ sent in the 2GW force, and never authorized the increase when the enemy switched tactics. The point being, is that the White House had been warned of required troop levels before both quagmires.

LBJ seems to have assumed the VC would be too stupid to switch tactics. Bush 43 had supreme faith in his high tech 3GW army, and thought the rule of thumb obsolete. Both kept trying altered tactics rather than stepping back and asking whether they were ready to commit enough force to win.

All I said was that Johnson's force level was sufficiently large to meet the rule given by catfishncod. The Viet Cong insurgency was destroyed, so the force levels sent did accomplish the original counterinsurgency mission.

But it was too late. By the time this happened the regular army of North Vietnam (with massive backing from the USSR) was fully engaged in the conflict; the war had become a Great Power proxy war and would require a level of effort consistent with a great Power war to win. The US simply had too little at stake in Vietnam to go that far. It's the same reason Britain did not intervene in the US Civil War. It would have required a Great Power War effort (like that used against Napoleon) to prevail in what for them would be a colonial war. It just wasn't worth it.

Chris Seamens, these are your fellow soldiers talking. You will not get the dodge of "Wally is just posting links" on this one.


For non-commercial use, etc:

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/19/op...in&oref=slogin

August 19, 2007
Op-Ed Contributors
The War as We Saw It
By BUDDHIKA JAYAMAHA, WESLEY D. SMITH, JEREMY ROEBUCK, OMAR MORA, EDWARD SANDMEIER, YANCE T. GRAY and JEREMY A. MURPHY

Baghdad

VIEWED from Iraq at the tail end of a 15-month deployment, the political debate in Washington is indeed surreal. Counterinsurgency is, by definition, a competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents for the control and support of a population. To believe that Americans, with an occupying force that long ago outlived its reluctant welcome, can win over a recalcitrant local population and win this counterinsurgency is far-fetched. As responsible infantrymen and noncommissioned officers with the 82nd Airborne Division soon heading back home, we are skeptical of recent press coverage portraying the conflict as increasingly manageable and feel it has neglected the mounting civil, political and social unrest we see every day. (Obviously, these are our personal views and should not be seen as official within our chain of command.)

The claim that we are increasingly in control of the battlefields in Iraq is an assessment arrived at through a flawed, American-centered framework. Yes, we are militarily superior, but our successes are offset by failures elsewhere. What soldiers call the “battle space” remains the same, with changes only at the margins. It is crowded with actors who do not fit neatly into boxes: Sunni extremists, Al Qaeda terrorists, Shiite militiamen, criminals and armed tribes. This situation is made more complex by the questionable loyalties and Janus-faced role of the Iraqi police and Iraqi Army, which have been trained and armed at United States taxpayers’ expense.

A few nights ago, for example, we witnessed the death of one American soldier and the critical wounding of two others when a lethal armor-piercing explosive was detonated between an Iraqi Army checkpoint and a police one. Local Iraqis readily testified to American investigators that Iraqi police and Army officers escorted the triggermen and helped plant the bomb. These civilians highlighted their own predicament: had they informed the Americans of the bomb before the incident, the Iraqi Army, the police or the local Shiite militia would have killed their families.

As many grunts will tell you, this is a near-routine event. Reports that a majority of Iraqi Army commanders are now reliable partners can be considered only misleading rhetoric. The truth is that battalion commanders, even if well meaning, have little to no influence over the thousands of obstinate men under them, in an incoherent chain of command, who are really loyal only to their militias.

Similarly, Sunnis, who have been underrepresented in the new Iraqi armed forces, now find themselves forming militias, sometimes with our tacit support. Sunnis recognize that the best guarantee they may have against Shiite militias and the Shiite-dominated government is to form their own armed bands. We arm them to aid in our fight against Al Qaeda.

However, while creating proxies is essential in winning a counterinsurgency, it requires that the proxies are loyal to the center that we claim to support. Armed Sunni tribes have indeed become effective surrogates, but the enduring question is where their loyalties would lie in our absence. The Iraqi government finds itself working at cross purposes with us on this issue because it is justifiably fearful that Sunni militias will turn on it should the Americans leave.

In short, we operate in a bewildering context of determined enemies and questionable allies, one where the balance of forces on the ground remains entirely unclear. (In the course of writing this article, this fact became all too clear: one of us, Staff Sergeant Murphy, an Army Ranger and reconnaissance team leader, was shot in the head during a “time-sensitive target acquisition mission” on Aug. 12; he is expected to survive and is being flown to a military hospital in the United States.) While we have the will and the resources to fight in this context, we are effectively hamstrung because realities on the ground require measures we will always refuse — namely, the widespread use of lethal and brutal force.

Given the situation, it is important not to assess security from an American-centered perspective. The ability of, say, American observers to safely walk down the streets of formerly violent towns is not a resounding indicator of security. What matters is the experience of the local citizenry and the future of our counterinsurgency. When we take this view, we see that a vast majority of Iraqis feel increasingly insecure and view us as an occupation force that has failed to produce normalcy after four years and is increasingly unlikely to do so as we continue to arm each warring side.

Coupling our military strategy to an insistence that the Iraqis meet political benchmarks for reconciliation is also unhelpful. The morass in the government has fueled impatience and confusion while providing no semblance of security to average Iraqis. Leaders are far from arriving at a lasting political settlement. This should not be surprising, since a lasting political solution will not be possible while the military situation remains in constant flux.

The Iraqi government is run by the main coalition partners of the Shiite-dominated United Iraqi Alliance, with Kurds as minority members. The Shiite clerical establishment formed the alliance to make sure its people did not succumb to the same mistake as in 1920: rebelling against the occupying Western force (then the British) and losing what they believed was their inherent right to rule Iraq as the majority. The qualified and reluctant welcome we received from the Shiites since the invasion has to be seen in that historical context. They saw in us something useful for the moment.

Now that moment is passing, as the Shiites have achieved what they believe is rightfully theirs. Their next task is to figure out how best to consolidate the gains, because reconciliation without consolidation risks losing it all. Washington’s insistence that the Iraqis correct the three gravest mistakes we made — de-Baathification, the dismantling of the Iraqi Army and the creation of a loose federalist system of government — places us at cross purposes with the government we have committed to support.

Political reconciliation in Iraq will occur, but not at our insistence or in ways that meet our benchmarks. It will happen on Iraqi terms when the reality on the battlefield is congruent with that in the political sphere. There will be no magnanimous solutions that please every party the way we expect, and there will be winners and losers. The choice we have left is to decide which side we will take. Trying to please every party in the conflict — as we do now — will only ensure we are hated by all in the long run.

At the same time, the most important front in the counterinsurgency, improving basic social and economic conditions, is the one on which we have failed most miserably. Two million Iraqis are in refugee camps in bordering countries. Close to two million more are internally displaced and now fill many urban slums. Cities lack regular electricity, telephone services and sanitation. “Lucky” Iraqis live in gated communities barricaded with concrete blast walls that provide them with a sense of communal claustrophobia rather than any sense of security we would consider normal.

In a lawless environment where men with guns rule the streets, engaging in the banalities of life has become a death-defying act. Four years into our occupation, we have failed on every promise, while we have substituted Baath Party tyranny with a tyranny of Islamist, militia and criminal violence. When the primary preoccupation of average Iraqis is when and how they are likely to be killed, we can hardly feel smug as we hand out care packages. As an Iraqi man told us a few days ago with deep resignation, “We need security, not free food.”

In the end, we need to recognize that our presence may have released Iraqis from the grip of a tyrant, but that it has also robbed them of their self-respect. They will soon realize that the best way to regain dignity is to call us what we are — an army of occupation — and force our withdrawal.

Until that happens, it would be prudent for us to increasingly let Iraqis take center stage in all matters, to come up with a nuanced policy in which we assist them from the margins but let them resolve their differences as they see fit. This suggestion is not meant to be defeatist, but rather to highlight our pursuit of incompatible policies to absurd ends without recognizing the incongruities.

We need not talk about our morale. As committed soldiers, we will see this mission through.

Buddhika Jayamaha is an Army specialist. Wesley D. Smith is a sergeant. Jeremy Roebuck is a sergeant. Omar Mora is a sergeant. Edward Sandmeier is a sergeant. Yance T. Gray is a staff sergeant. Jeremy A. Murphy is a staff sergeant.

Originally Posted by Semo '75

Sure I will, 'cause you are still just posting a link.

Even with the full content posted, he still dodges the question. He won't speak to what his fellow Airborne comrades have to say.

Originally Posted by Pink Splice

Originally Posted by U.S. Army Guys

We need not talk about our morale. As committed soldiers, we will see this mission through.

As I understand, Hillary Clinton confessed in a debate this past weekend that we'll be in Iraq for a very long time.

Ergo, all Democrats have managed to do, with all their "surge has already failed" blah blah, is solidfy their position as America's whining McGovernite anti-military, soft-on-terrorism Party.

Originally Posted by Semo '75

They're not here, so I wouldn't be talking to them. Why I have to address what other people say at your command escapes me.

(shakes head)

Be careful what you wish for, Chris.

Originally Posted by The Rani

Yeah, pretty much all the dudes agreed that it would take some time to get all the troops out. Joe Biden was even talking about nation-building. Blech.

Just curious, do any of you feel like we made a mess in Iraq? If the answer to that question is yes, then you have to support cleaning it up as much as humanly possible, or your mothers will be having a very stern word with you.

Originally Posted by sean '90

Just curious, do any of you feel like we made a mess in Iraq? If the answer to that question is yes, then you have to support cleaning it up as much as humanly possible, or your mothers will be having a very stern word with you.

Sir,

We weren't shopping at the Pottery Barn if that's what you would imply with your inquisitions. We were dropping by Ye Olde Eurasian Recycling Centre looking for a bargin to put up on the Mantle of Romantic Idealism over the Woodrow Wilson fireplace with its Trotskyite fire grate. We found shards and rubbish and some still think the super glue of borrowed money and the duct tape of Commercial Republican sons can remake the shattered Meso-pot-amia into a sound vessel.

We found a mess in Eurasia as we have done for centuries as we took a Tour recommended by our Ivy Leagued proctors. It was (and will be) largely an Eurasian mess before, during, and after our latest visit to that Old Curiosity Shop. I don't think the Eurasians are incapable of moral agency or lacking in natural resources to set things in an order they would themselves prefer in a pattern of Eurasian tradition if they would wish to do so; as they don't wish to exercise their moral capacity or tap their resources to become Commercial Republicans, it is time to say farewell to Eurasia (and the other continents in turn).

The aged parent reserves her stern words for my faulty actions rather than my intentions even though she was, is, and will be a Progressive sort of Person.

Yo. Ob. Sv.
VKS

Just curious, do any of you feel like we made a mess in Iraq?

Oh, you mean a mess of what a dictator had pretty much made an acceptably clean-like Saari barn?

Yeah, we have. The Saari dictator barn was much preferable to the Kifflie brigades than the present-day attempt at evil anti-Hugo Chavez democracy. Representative Democracy, like Dubya, sucks, dude. You know that.

Yo. Ob. Sv.
MSL

Originally Posted by sean '90

Just curious, do any of you feel like we made a mess in Iraq? If the answer to that question is yes, then you have to support cleaning it up as much as humanly possible...

America doesn't have to do anything. Besides, assuming America did make a mess in Iraq, it was unintentional. Why would America be able to clean it up? It's entirely possible that any attempts at cleaning might lead to a bigger mess.

Originally Posted by sean '90

Just curious, do any of you feel like we made a mess in Iraq? If the answer to that question is yes, then you have to support cleaning it up as much as humanly possible, or your mothers will be having a very stern word with you.

In abstract, yes, we owed them a chance at something approximating normalcy. Unfortunately, many of them perceive our presence as abnormal, and are striving to create abnormalcy until we go away. At some point, one might conclude that normalcy won't happen while we are there. At that point, the best one might humanly do is get out of the way of what the culture really wants (as if they know what they want.)

My mother is just as uncertain and troubled as myself.

Originally Posted by sean '90

As for 1960, didn't the Sino-Soviet split happen at about that time.

It happened in stages. Mao started off believing flowery Marxist rhetoric that Alle Menschen werden Brueder and thus all Communist governments would work together in perfect harmony. Gradually this was worn down by the realities of the world. First China stopped taking Soviet orders (1960-1), then Soviet help (1964-5), then they worked on being an independent power (1967-70), then they achieved the flipping of the US and UN (1971-73), and finally (under Deng) became a somewhat capitalist society (1978). This took over twenty years.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

You have provided no rationale for this belief.

Ayatollah Khomenei's picture was prominently displayed around Sadr City promptly after the fall of Baghdad, in contrast to many areas in the Najaf-Karbala area where Sistani's hung during his greatest period of influence ('03-'05). Sadr launched attacks on the Shi'a establishment in '04 despite the massive popularity of the latter, attacks for which his own religious patron chastised him. High ranking members of the Madhi Army are either Iranians themselves or known to be friendly to the Ayatollah government.

Both movements accept money and supplies from Iran -- which would rather either a Sadrist or a SCIRI government to any government with non-Shi'ite elements -- but when push came to shove, the Iranians in the past cheered the Sadrists over the SCIRIs in their sermons. That was the deciding point for me.

I will agree with you that Sadr has recently started to grow his own backbone, which is why there are now direct Iranian agents in Iraq.

What orders are you referring to? My understanding is Iraqi Shia clergy have a different view of the relationship between clergy and government than the dominant Iranian Shia clergy. Just because there is this difference of opinion does not mean that a SCIRI dominant government will not be much more friendly to Iran than the old Baathist government or a US-installed regime.

But that's the point; Iran wants Iraq to be set up exactly as Iran is, because a SCIRI-style Iraq would be a threat to the power of the Guardian Council. If rural, conservative Iranians saw an alternative form of Islamic Republic -- one that worked better -- that could flip the conservatives to the reformist side and a revolution would become imminent. And since Iraq contains pilgrimage sites that rural Iranians want to visit, the ayatollahs can't prevent people from visiting. Therefore SCIRI, despite being friendly in the cultural, religious, and diplomatic senses, is a threat to the Islamic Republic. Sadr is young and ambitious, and therefore willing to accept and implement the principles of the Iranian-style government with rule by the Ayatollahs.

Moreover, there's friendly and then there's friendly. France was defined as "friendly" for purposes of the Cold War even when it withdrew from NATO and was busy building its own arms. The question is not whether SCIRI will be a mortal enemy of Iran -- we all know it won't be -- but whether SCIRI will be an ally of Iran in its aggression in Lebanon, Palestine, etc. My read is no, because SCIRI knows Iraq needs to rebuild worse than it needs to attack Saudis or Joos.

I count anybody who is not active in spreading war as at least neutral, however friendly they are. Only Sith deal in absolutes. The question is whether SCIRI or Sadr would be more likely to spread trouble.

Al Qaeda's goals are the same as as SCIRI's. They want a divided Iraq.

But does SCIRI actively want to go attacking Sunnis? My read was that SCIRI wanted a Shiastan so that Shiastan could be for the Shias, whereas the Sadrists were happy to go ethnically cleanse. Maybe that ethnic cleansing was for the purpose of making a united Iraq possible (that was also Saddam's line when asked about HIS genocides) but it's not helpful for ANY settlement.

[Al-Qaeda] want a war between the Shia and Sunni in central Iraq...

Right. They don't care what structures anyone else throws up, because they intend to wipe them all out and install the Islamic State of Iraq in their place. What I don't understand is why you think SCIRI wants Baghdad go to hell when so many Shi'ites live there.

A SCIRI government has a place for al Qaeda (with the Sunnis in Anbar)

Not as long as they keep attacking Shi'ite shrines, they don't... and several such shrines are in Anbar and can't be moved.

This is nonsense. What is keeping the US in Iraq is that leaving = losing and the American government doesn't want to lose.

Leaving = losing? So we lost in Japan, did we?

Al Qaeda is the American bugaboo. They are overwhelmingly outnumbered. Should the Iraqi Sunni insurgents turn on them completely (which they which as soon as they have a good reason to) al Qaeda in Iraq will be wiped out.

The Sunnis already have turned on them, and they are being wiped out. Once that's done there are no enemies anymore, only power struggles within Iraq that are not our business. That's why neocons are playing up the Iran connections -- the Sith want the occupation to become a proxy war against Iran. FWIW Iran probably is interfering, but we shouldn't be taking it as an invitation to stay and uselessly shadow box with them. Iraq is going to have some Iranian influence for the same reason that Mexico has American influence -- they're neighbors and Iran is bigger.

If all parties were cooperating with the US then we wouldn't be taking so many casualties from these parties would we?

To some degree, thinking of anyone in Iraq as part of a unit is incorrect. Sadrists are allying with the US in one sector and simultaneously shooting us in another. It's all based on tactical decisions made by individuals on the spot. Unit cohesion is not a traditional Iraqi trait. Nor is political cohesion.

*Elements* of all parties (except for al-Qaeda) are cooperating in *anti-Qaeda* operations. They are not cooperating otherwise. Generalizing wildly, most parties in Iraq want (1) Qaeda gone, (2) Americans gone, (3) themselves in charge, in that temporal and priority order.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

All I said was that Johnson's force level was sufficiently large to meet the rule given by catfishncod. The Viet Cong insurgency was destroyed, so the force levels sent did accomplish the original counterinsurgency mission. But it was too late. By the time this happened the regular army of North Vietnam (with massive backing from the USSR) was fully engaged in the conflict; the war had become a Great Power proxy war.

Precisely. Vietnam did not fall to the Viet Cong, but to a massive tank invasion backed, not by China, but by the USSR. While this was a propaganda and territorial victory for the Soviets, it cost the Soviets more dearly in material terms than it did America. By '75, the USSR couldn't afford to keep throwing massive resources into its military, but did so anyway.

As I said before, it all depends on what you think the war aims were. Were we there to prevent Vietnam going Red? Then we lost. Were we there to safeguard Vietnamese? We did a pretty crappy job of that. Were we there to enact our principles and honor? Both took massive trauma. Were we there to defeat the Soviet Union? They achieved Pyrrhic victory, so it was a tactical loss and a strategic victory.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

Huh? The Russians were far, far more aggressive in the late 1940's than they ever were again.

I agree; I meant relative to 1958.

I assume you are talking about the Cuban missile crisis?

Among other things.

No it wasn't. Kennedy sent the first US forces to actually fight in Vietnam, a step Eisenhower would never had taken.

This I did not know. I stand corrected.

America was already involved in Vietnam.

But this argument cuts directly against your former one, where Eisenhower did not want to send troops.

To not get involved further would be to "cut and run", a concept that has been used effectively by Republicans against Democrats for many decades.

Why is this so effective? I really, really don't get it. Does it come from the 1950-era fear of Communist infiltration? A distate for Wilsonianism?

On the other hand, Republicans "cut and run" all the time (e.g. 1983 Lebanon) and pay no political prices.

Likewise; why (up to now) have Republicans always forgiven their people for cutting their losses?

You may not know, but in 1968, Nixon was the peace candidate.

I did know that. Yet he also won in 1972, when he had clearly broken all those promises. The "secret plan" was a lie and quickly revealed as such.

Your argument basically boils down to "Democrats will always attack because they are perceived as weak on national defense." And I wonder why this is seen as a Law of Nature.

The domino theory is the equivalent of the of the "Saddam will give WMDs to terrorists" theory. It is a justification for the Vietnam War, not a reason.

So Kennedy and Johnson acted for the same reasons as Bush -- to prove their capabilities via the sideshow stage of Asian land war management?

It's a theory that would tie in well with the Founders' arguments against standing armies: that the temptation to use them is just too great...

Bear in mind that I am agreeing with you on your key point: American domestic politics causes America to take larger damage on military adventures than the adventures themselves cause. I'm just confused on how much actual analysis went into determining Cold War policy, and whether states are always basing their foreign policies on picayune provincial delusions like "Democrats are wimps and Republicans are responsible on national defense". Certainly Russia's was and is; Russian expansionism is based on Russian paranoia and belief in safety through appearance of strength. Witness Putin's orders to start flying bombers again -- it makes Russians feel good to think they are still fighting the Cold War.

Originally Posted by catfishncod

...it makes Russians feel good to think they are still fighting the Cold War.

Unbelievable how fucked-up your POV is. Not much has worried Russians more than this whole 'return-to-the-Cold-War' crap. After all, their opponent is the only country, ever to have actually used nuclear bombs (and those, on civilians).

The high point of Putin's actions isn't a 'wishing-for-the-Cold-War' delusion (pretty much the province solely of American neoconservative 'thinkers'), but rather 'our-country-isn't-just-going-to-roll-over-for-the-hegemon'. As pretty much anyone here would say, it's unbelievably fucked-up that things are coming to this, but Russia can't not react to America's increasingly belligerent -- and let's not forget, after all, just exactly who in the last couple years invaded two countries (and is working really hard towards adding a third and now fourth to that list) -- stance toward it.
What feels good is standing up to a would-be tyrant. Better, of course, to simply get along together like civilized people, but that's a decision that requires the cooperation of all sides. So in Russia, they take what comfort they can from the way they react to the situation that is handed them.
And hope that the 800-ton gorilla isn't really as evil or insane as it is starting to seem...

Originally Posted by The Rani

Do you think that the Democrats are "faking it" when they talk about how we will need to stay there for many more months to ensure a smooth transition?

Not to butt in here, but Hillary just changed her mind again, and now insists that the U.S. should cut and run from Iraq asap.

I guess it just depends on what audience she's talking to.

Originally Posted by Justin '77

Unbelievable how fucked-up your POV is. Not much has worried Russians more than this whole 'return-to-the-Cold-War' crap. After all, their opponent is the only country, ever to have actually used nuclear bombs (and those, on civilians).

Of course, you're right. How silly of me. And of course we were the first, last, and only country in that war to attack civilians, and clearly we were committing the worst war crimes. Only a thousand years of isolationism or exile will ever absolve Americans of those two bombs. Except then everyone will wonder why we're isolating ourselves. Perhaps so that we can formulate nefarious plots without the rest of the world watching?

Perhaps we should just deploy our military to the Southwest instead and raze Tucson and San Diego to rid ourselves of the terrible cross-border violence problem, then launch missiles at Tijuana. It's not like other countries do scary things, after all.

Only for the next eighteen months will America be this dangerous. There's no way we're going to elect another damned bunch of ignorant cowboys. And if we do, well, maybe we deserve to be everyone's enemy, because our government will clearly be dysfunctional.

On a more serious note: America will be paying for electing George W. Bush and Dick Cheney for the rest of our lives. Literally. People will be using this in 2060 as a argument in trade negotiations. Because, UNLIKE AMERICA, a lot of places hold grudges for generations after the war is over.

What feels good is standing up to a would-be tyrant.

Great. Have any ideas on convincing Congress to impeach Darth Cheney?

Like the British in 1900, Americans today really truly can't process being considered tyrannical. It's the last thing they would ever really believe -- especially the 15% or so that really do act in ways that lead to tyranny.

Originally Posted by Semo '75

Sure I will, 'cause you are still just posting a link.

And you have just proved that you are reading all my links.

Originally Posted by zilch

Not to butt in here, but Hillary just changed her mind again, and now insists that the U.S. should cut and run from Iraq asap.

I guess it just depends on what audience she's talking to.

Borrow some books from Chris Seamens, so you can throw them at the screen. Reading them is optional...

Originally Posted by Semo '75

Ummm... No?



Like I said, I stopped trying to make sense of what you write. This is a good example of why.

And a response in less than twenty minutes...

JMHO, guys, but the baiting game is getting kind of old.

Originally Posted by catfishncod

Only for the next eighteen months will America be this dangerous. There's no way we're going to elect another damned bunch of ignorant cowboys.

Thank you for the excellent example of magical thinking.

Look at the field, for goodness' sake. Eighteen months from now, America is going to give the world another chance to see just how f-cked up it is. How do you think it looks when the country where the people have ostensibly the most direction over their leadership continues to put warmongering psychos in charge?