I see a values shift around 1940, as Morrow was broadcasting the London Blitz live, and Churchill was making his famous speeches. I think this shift was as important as the economic shift that got FDR elected. While it is easy to take it for granted with hindsight, for the 'containment' values to have stuck, victory in World War II had to follow. As late as Iwo Jima and the Battle of the Bulge, the issue was not truly settled in the hearts of America. Still, agreed, there was no election or two party divide over the shift in military values. The People followed FDR, and the Republicans bought in. The importance of the values shift is no less.
I believe you are using the 'GC' descriptor unusually. Most at the site will identify a single leader per civilization per crisis. I think I understand what you are saying, and can more or less agree with your reading of history, but you are abusing the technobabble a bit.
By Agricultural Age religious values, yes. If S&H are semi divine, and their writings considered inspired text, no argument. Let the secret police threaten to torture any who disagree with the official interpretation of holy writ. By Industrial Age values, they have proposed a theory, and the theory is either a good one or a bad one in depending on how well it fits the facts.
S&H have good reasons to keep their theory simple. I look at the long period between crises during that era and am dubious about keeping a strict four generation structure. Too much time. Too many generations. My own feeling is that some crises (not the War of the Roses) are driven in part by the speed of technological change. When changing technology results in changing economics, but traditional political and religious values obstruct necessary adjustments, you get a crisis. I have no problem saying the rate of technological advance is a factor in triggering crises, rather than putting total commitment to the generation mechanism. I would rather discuss which factor was stronger in which eras than simply accept an argument of divine inspiration. If the the English Civil War waddles, swims and quacks like a duck, I would change the theory to fit the data rather than ignore the data to keep the theory simple.
Here I may be guilty of taking one of my own intuitive generalizations for granted. If a 3T / 4T conservative leader seeks a military solution to a problem set, and explicitly excludes the possibility of addressing underlying issues that are clearly vital to the onrushing crisis, I just sort of assume said leader is going to fail. Such a leader is far more likely to end up in the Hoover - Buchanan trash can, rather than on a Lincoln - FDR pedestal.
When you speak informally and intuitively, you tend to agree that Bush 43's policies won't hold. At other points you seem to want me to write my generalizations into firm black and white testable hypotheses which can be disproved with a single counter example. Sorry, I won't be able to satisfy your quest for a deterministic theory of psychohistory as clean as crisp as in Asimov's Foundation series. I am not Hari Seldon. I will just remain highly dubious about many things, including conservative leaders seeking military solutions while disregarding underlying issues.
Yes, there were successful 'conservative' leaders that successfully led through crises or better yet prevented full blown traumatic crises from developing. Queen Victoria and Bismarck are the classic examples. However, they did not attempt 'On to Richmond' military solutions while explicitly avoiding addressing underlying issues. Quite the contrary. They attacked the underlying issues while striving hard to avoid violent confrontation. There is a distinct difference between the Buchanan and Hoover school of conservative and the Queen Victoria and Bismarck school.
Two answers. These are global issues. They have to be solved. I am dubious about them being solved without a healthy degree of global cooperation. Ignoring problems during a 4T isn't really an option.
Second, the values coming out of the last crisis push the United States to contain threats and be the world's policemen. These values are dated. They were correct when fascism and communism were healthy and vibrant. I do not believe them correct in the long term. FDR's containment values will very likely be significantly blunted over the course of this crisis. Still, the instinct to try to fix things is key and core to current US values. Even if said values are somewhere between dated and stupid, we are apt to require total failure of the old values before policy is changed.
I'm looking at nuclear weapons, the difficulties in suppressing 2GW insurgency, and proxy war as the default way of dealing with meddling major powers attempting to establish zones of influence. I'm looking at the US experience in Vietnam, the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, and the US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. If it takes roughly one soldier to occupy for every 50 people in the native population, an 'On to Richmond' military solution to a global problem is highly questionable. We can't put that many boots on the ground. Septimus Severus and Diocletian faced different scales, technologies, tactics, economics, religions and politics.
Yes, it is not clear to me that Obama or the hypothetical Clinton 44 are intending to significantly shift US policy from the path set by Bush 43. It is therefore equally not clear to me that Obama or Hillary will start solving crisis problems rather than mark time while they get worse. It is also not clear that if Obama or Hillary sew up the Democratic nomination during the early winter primaries while still ignoring the general publics desire to end the war, that a third party candidacy couldn't rise. Lots of time for it.
I am not at all ready to anoint the 2008 winner as automatic Grey Champion.