This is an interesting piece in presenting a rare articulate view of the entire process from inside the White House. It explains many things, such as why Baker-Hamilton was ignored. I still see whole article as spun, and giving too little credit to the critics. There was a great deal of good will in Iraq immediately after the statue fell. That moment was squandered in disbanding the Iraqi army in its entirety, and a too thorough de-baathification. No credit is given to the critics who said the initial troop level was too low in the beginning. There was just too little planning early. Thus, I see a good deal of washing in the above account.
But it leaves me wondering about the difference between "stay the course," NSVI, and the surge. The early approaches expected meaningful progress coming from the Iraqi government. The new approaches don't expect much. The early approaches attempted to transfer the security load to Iraqi forces. The new approaches don't??? Was there really a change in course, or just a lowering of expectations? What was the surge?
- An increase in American troop levels.
- A change in tactics from killing insurgents to protecting neighborhoods.
- After an internal Al Qaida in Iraq document leaked revealed the nature of its 'Controlled Chaos' strategy, other factions rejected AQiA, and started working with the Americans. US - Sunni cooperation increased significantly.
- After the destruction of the dome, there was a period of ethnic cleansing, where mixed neighborhoods were ethnically cleansed. About the time the surge was declared, the ethnic cleansing was essentially complete, leading to a reduction in violence.
- As the ethnic cleansing ended, shortly after the leak of the AQiI "Controlled Chaos" paper was released, the Shiite militias declared a cease fire.
The Feaver paper credits the troop level increase and change in tactics, and calls to stay the course. I believe the changes in tactics long overdue, but I'm not at all clear that troop counts and tactics were the decisive factors in reducing the violence.
The positive news is that both the Sunni and Shiite have significant elements that are rejecting AQiI and it's attempts to escalate violence. If AQiI blows up something, people are apt to blame AQiI rather than the opposite religious block. Both religious blocks now do have something approximating a 'moderate' faction that is attempting to deescalate, as well as extreme groups unwilling to cooperate with the Americans and Iraqi central government.
Three problems, at the very least, remain.
- The elected government in Iraq is not ready for a reasonable division of power yet.
- The elected officials in Iraq are blocking a new set of elections.
- Iraqi security forces, in spite of more than enough time to train to technical competence, are not competent.
I believe the last is because of a large divide between government policy and what the people want. The official government seems content with an indefinite US occupation, with all the foreign aid money that implies going to a great degree into politician's pockets. The people want the US gone. As long as the young Iraqi males making up the security forces don't believe in what they are fighting for, they aren't going to fight well.
Short term, we seem to be opening a new phase in the fighting, with the Shiite government forces taking on Al Sadr and the Shiite militias. I kind of expect the militias will be hard to suppress. We'll have to give them a Friedman Unit to see where the balance lies, and how the lies balance.
Long term, I half expect a democratic administration will work with Al Sadr and others of the 'Yankee go home' school, rather than trying to isolate them. The democrats will truly be working to get out of Iraq, while the Bush 43 gang wants US troops near the oil. I don't see Iraqi security forces becoming effective so long as they serve a government collaborating with permanent occupiers.
In an insurgent war, it's about what the people want, rather than tactics and boots on the ground, at least until you get to that 1 foreign soldier to 50 natives textbook ratio that we can no where near sustain. Short of that, you can't dislodge an insurgent force that the people support. Thus, the question is whether the Iraqi people really want to be occupied.