Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Yes, he did, he just did it in a subtle fashion. Or, to be precise, he carried out a punishment, and explained why, and this implied a threat to do it again next time Jimmy made the same mistake.

We're not going to agree. Mr. Arkham omitted to inform Jimmy of the consequences of his choice until after the fact (so that Jimmy would make the inference on his own and thus learn a lesson), but that does not constitute a threat. Referencing Merriam-Webster again, a threat is an expression of intention [emphasis added] to inflict evil, injury, or harm. If Mr. Arkham had said "Jimmy, if you don't pick up your toys, I will put them somewhere you can't find them," then that would have constituted a threat.

Now, consider the resemblance of both the toys-as-reward and the food-pellets-as-reward scenarios, to the paycheck-as-reward that characterizes hired labor. The concentration of ownership of capital property means that most people don't have the opportunity any longer of being their own masters (as was true about the time of the Civil War -- the majority of men at that time were either small farmers or independent craftspersons). They are denied any ability to, as it were, hunt or forage for themselves, and must learn/run the mazes in order to get their food pellets.

Do you think that this system is coercive?

Yes, because it is built on privilege. Without massive state intervention on behalf of capital, capital would not enjoy such a disproportionate advantage over labor.

Originally Posted by Virgil K. Saari

When did crepundial cleansing become Standard Practice by Guardians of the very Ignorant?

The way we look at it, the point of tidiness is twofold: first, respect for other people who might want to use the space; second, in making one's own life easier by having things be easier to find when you are ready to use them again.

As such, we've tried to keep our kids not merely to end-of-the-day cleaning, but to tidying up after themselves immediately when they are done -- at least in more public spaces. Being a good example here is also critical (it drives Andi to distraction how I do the pans from making breakfast before I even eat, but I've caught Zack doing the same thing when he cooks, and both boys take care of their stuff after getting up from the table).

In their rooms, their space, we make no noise -- up to the point where sanitation might become a concern -- about whether things are left out overnight, for days, or for weeks. The flipside being that when Zack or Garret loses something in their bedroom-havoc, finding it is their problem.
Of course, we started them out when they were mobile but still pre-vocal under the same conditions. They key has been ensuring that the quantity of stuff in their rooms from which they can create havoc is not more than they can handle cleaning up. They've both grown up to be pretty good self-organizers.

(just another illustration, btw, of the fact that good qualities are the result of understanding and reason, not mindless obedience-from-fear)

Originally Posted by Matt1989

Natural rights are merely facts about what people ought to do in their relations with others.

(Emphasis added.)

There are no statements of fact containing the verb "ought." That is what I'm saying. Facts are objective, verifiable statements whose truth or falsehood can be determined beyond rational dispute. Value statements are never like that.

As a practical matter, recognizing that value judgments are non-cognitive (at root) does not equate to nihilism. (Value judgments may be what I call "core values" or "subordinate values." Core values are non-cognitive. Subordinate values may be reasoned deductively from core values.) One only sees it that way, if one denies the reality of subjective existence and of human will. But human will and the consequences thereof makes up a huge portion of our world. The fact that, in saying "murder is wrong," I am making an assertion of will rather than a statement of fact, doesn't make what I'm saying less real. It just makes it not a statement of fact. Rather, it's an attempt to persuade people to a certain course of action.

But let's get down to the core. If values statements are objective statements of fact, then their truth or falsehood should be ascertainable empirically or using scientific method. Can you provide a method of experiment or controlled observation which would falsify the statement "murder is wrong"?

Are you really going to argue, though, that something like slavery was ever justified?

Yes. All agrarian civilizations were founded on some form of coerced labor. Slavery per se was not necessary, but any agrarian culture that did not have that, had some form of serfdom (medieval Europe, medieval Japan). Our distant ancestors could not have organized their societies so as to exclude forced labor, or at least I can see no way to do that, and so this is not a valid moral expectation.

Slavery ceased to be an economic necessity as a result of the industrial revolution, which in America began in the 19th century, which is why slavery became a burning moral issue at that time.

Originally Posted by Arkham '80

We're not going to agree. Mr. Arkham omitted to inform Jimmy of the consequences of his choice until after the fact (so that Jimmy would make the inference on his own and thus learn a lesson), but that does not constitute a threat.

By itself, no. But he made certain that Jimmy understood that the same thing would happen again if he failed to pick up after himself, and that does constitute a threat. Even if he had said nothing at all, the threat would still have been intended, although it's less certain that it would have been communicated effectively.

If Mr. Arkham had said "Jimmy, if you don't pick up your toys, I will put them somewhere you can't find them," then that would have constituted a threat.

Although he didn't use those exact words, that's what he did.

Without massive state intervention on behalf of capital, capital would not enjoy such a disproportionate advantage over labor.

Ah! And here we go to the heart of libertarianism's economic proposals. We agree that capital enjoys a disproportionate advantage over labor. We agree that there has been massive state intervention on behalf of capital, and that this has (at minimum) amplified capital's advantage over labor. It seems to me that this leaves at least two unanswered questions.

1) Is it possible to build an industrial economy without massive state intervention on behalf of capital?

2) Is it possible to maintain an industrial economy without ongoing massive state intervention -- not necessarily on behalf of capital?

Originally Posted by Arkham '80

The little ones aren't being cheeky though. They really do want to know why.

Up to a point. Believe me, I am very, very conscious of the fact that they really want to know. I was that way myself. But when you get into a recursive loop - or something that can only be answered by resort to college-level metaphysics - it's clear we're both in over our heads.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

1) Is it possible to build an industrial economy without massive state intervention on behalf of capital?

2) Is it possible to maintain an industrial economy without ongoing massive state intervention -- not necessarily on behalf of capital?

And if the answer to both turns out to be no? Is the 'industrial economy' really the sole, exclusive True Path? Can prosperity and success for humanity not be achieved under any other models?

There's only so much tinkering you can do with your DVD player before you have to give up and accept that it just isn't going to mow your lawn.

Originally Posted by Justin '77

And if the answer to both turns out to be no? Is the 'industrial economy' really the sole, exclusive True Path? Can prosperity and success for humanity not be achieved under any other models?

Depends on what you mean by "prosperity and success." An agrarian civilization presents its own drawbacks: slavery or serfdom, hereditary nobility, absolute monarchy, state religion, subordination of women to men. Plus, it can't support as many people.

Or were you talking about going all the way back to hunter-gatherer? Or did you have something completely new in mind?

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Depends on what you mean by "prosperity and success." An agrarian civilization presents its own drawbacks: slavery or serfdom, hereditary nobility, absolute monarchy, state religion, subordination of women to men. Plus, it can't support as many people.

Or were you talking about going all the way back to hunter-gatherer?

Hope it's nice and cozy in your box over there, man...

Originally Posted by Justin '77

Hope it's nice and cozy in your box over there, man...

If you want to be a visionary, you have to communicate your visions. It's not on other people to read your mind.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

...



Yes. All agrarian civilizations were founded on some form of coerced labor. Slavery per se was not necessary, but any agrarian culture that did not have that, had some form of serfdom (medieval Europe, medieval Japan). Our distant ancestors could not have organized their societies so as to exclude forced labor, or at least I can see no way to do that, and so this is not a valid moral expectation.

Slavery ceased to be an economic necessity as a result of the industrial revolution, which in America began in the 19th century, which is why slavery became a burning moral issue at that time.

Yo. Ob. Sv.'s ancestors were yeoman for at least seven centuries. The Grand Duchy and its fellow Kingdom across the Bothnia had not feudalism and slavery which was slight disappeared with the Xian advance and I am not sure if the moral issue was one of very high temperature.

Taxes to the Church (RC>Lutheran) and the Grand Duchy/Crown were paid; but a patriarchical system of freeman (and freedman after several generations) farming their own land was the system and necessity of serfdom and/or slavery was never the case for Sweden or Finland.

Originally Posted by The Rani

Because you didn't ask.

I am asking now: what do you mean by "do much better"

And to see if I understand you correctly, are you are saying that because mothers, as women, cannot provide something their sons need and so they do "do much better" with their girls than their boys.

If not, what do you mean?

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

(Emphasis added.)

There are no statements of fact containing the verb "ought." That is what I'm saying. Facts are objective, verifiable statements whose truth or falsehood can be determined beyond rational dispute. Value statements are never like that.

As a practical matter, recognizing that value judgments are non-cognitive (at root) does not equate to nihilism. (Value judgments may be what I call "core values" or "subordinate values." Core values are non-cognitive. Subordinate values may be reasoned deductively from core values.) One only sees it that way, if one denies the reality of subjective existence and of human will. But human will and the consequences thereof makes up a huge portion of our world. The fact that, in saying "murder is wrong," I am making an assertion of will rather than a statement of fact, doesn't make what I'm saying less real. It just makes it not a statement of fact. Rather, it's an attempt to persuade people to a certain course of action.

But let's get down to the core. If values statements are objective statements of fact, then their truth or falsehood should be ascertainable empirically or using scientific method. Can you provide a method of experiment or controlled observation which would falsify the statement "murder is wrong"?

I have to ask "why?" The scientific method can't prove the existence of logic, but I can be pretty certain that logical structure is there. And if ethics are an expression of logical structure, then I'm pretty sure the scientific method is irrelevant here.

So regarding the impetus to separate value from fact, I would argue that virtually all facts have values inherent to them. A fact suggests other possibilities. My computer can be here or there. It may be broken, but then it wouldn't be a proper computer. The Aristotelian would look at a dog that has three legs and suggest that there is something wrong with that dog. It should have four legs, but it doesn't. So I would argue that facts suggest potentiality in addition to actuality. And if value and fact are not separated as is often supposed, then we should be interested in our potential as human beings.

(As a sidenote, I think the 'unnaturalness' of avoiding moral language is precisely because values are interwoven into the universe.)

Originally Posted by Matt1989

I have to ask "why?" The scientific method can't prove the existence of logic, but I can be pretty certain that logical structure is there. And if ethics are an expression of logical structure, then I'm pretty sure the scientific method is irrelevant here.

If the scientific method is irrelevant here (which I agree it is), then we are not dealing with questions of fact.

So regarding the impetus to separate value from fact, I would argue that virtually all facts have values inherent to them.

I disagree that the values are inherent to them. They are a function of human will w/r/t those facts.

The Aristotelian would look at a dog that has three legs and suggest that there is something wrong with that dog. It should have four legs, but it doesn't.

As a statement of fact, you can say:

"Most dogs have four legs. That one has three. It is a statistical abnormality."

Or:

"That dog has only three legs, and there is a scar where a fourth leg was obviously cut off. That dog has suffered a severe injury."

But to say that there is something wrong with the dog is not a statement of fact (unless by "wrong" you mean either that it is a statistical abnormality or has suffered an injury, without meaning a value judgment).

(As a sidenote, I think the 'unnaturalness' of avoiding moral language is precisely because values are interwoven into the universe.)

I would say rather, that this is because we instinctively and normally apply values to things in our world. Those values are not a part of our world in any objective sense, but rather a part of our interaction with it. In that sense, values are "natural." But not in the sense of their being "out there" to be discovered. Values remain assertions of will, not statements of fact.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

(Emphasis added.)

There are no statements of fact containing the verb "ought." That is what I'm saying. Facts are objective, verifiable statements whose truth or falsehood can be determined beyond rational dispute. Value statements are never like that.

As Hume stated, what one OUGHT to do can never be logically derived from what objectively IS.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

As a practical matter, recognizing that value judgments are non-cognitive (at root) does not equate to nihilism. (Value judgments may be what I call "core values" or "subordinate values." Core values are non-cognitive. Subordinate values may be reasoned deductively from core values.) One only sees it that way, if one denies the reality of subjective existence and of human will. But human will and the consequences thereof makes up a huge portion of our world. The fact that, in saying "murder is wrong," I am making an assertion of will rather than a statement of fact, doesn't make what I'm saying less real. It just makes it not a statement of fact. Rather, it's an attempt to persuade people to a certain course of action.

But let's get down to the core. If values statements are objective statements of fact, then their truth or falsehood should be ascertainable empirically or using scientific method. Can you provide a method of experiment or controlled observation which would falsify the statement "murder is wrong"?

I am also a non-cognitivist and I agree with you. I cannot logically explain why I think that, for example, people should be treated as ends unto themselves and never merely as means to an end (Kant tried and IMO failed), it just FEELS wrong to treat people as mere cogs and cannot WILL myself to do such a thing.

Originally Posted by Matt1989

So regarding the impetus to separate value from fact, I would argue that virtually all facts have values inherent to them. A fact suggests other possibilities. My computer can be here or there. It may be broken, but then it wouldn't be a proper computer. The Aristotelian would look at a dog that has three legs and suggest that there is something wrong with that dog. It should have four legs, but it doesn't. So I would argue that facts suggest potentiality in addition to actuality. And if value and fact are not separated as is often supposed, then we should be interested in our potential as human beings.

I don't like such Aristotelean Essentialism, I don't believe in essential natures, especially with regards to "human nature" given that I'm one of those "abnormal" humans ("That man has trouble getting social norms, understanding non-verbal signals, and has unusual sensory sensitivities, clearly there is something wrong with him and he needs to be fixed because humans should not be like that..." ).

Originally Posted by Mikebert

Of course not. But if you never knew your father, then there would be nothing to duplicate. Even if other men were present in your life, would the lack of a father mean you grow up to be an irresponsible adult?

I know one thing, after my father died, I became a very irresponsible teenager. Prior to his dealth, I was a very responsible teenager. Obviously, his departure from my life resulted in a negative impact on me. Now, I was raised to become a responsible adult by two committed parents for the bulk of my childhood. So, my brief period of irresponsible behavior, getting into trouble, I don't give a fuck attitude, was more or less a temporary departure from the track, so to speak.You know, I knew quite a few guys who were raised without a father in the home. In a way, it was the understanding, strong senses and strong feelings that my old man wasn't very happy with me or proud of me in regards to the present state that I was in which propelled me to drop what I was doing and get my ass back on the right track, so to speak.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

I am asking now: what do you mean by "do much better"

And to see if I understand you correctly, are you are saying that because mothers, as women, cannot provide something their sons need and so they do "do much better" with their girls than their boys.

If not, what do you mean?

Did your mommy provide you with and instill into you the same kind of things as your daddy?

Originally Posted by The Rani

Yeah, that's exactly what I'm talking about. And if that desire to please isn't there, no amount of reward/punishment will make a damned bit of difference.

Yeah, I knew that's what you were talking about or getting at, but I don't think there is one particular word in our language to describe it or explain it.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

I disagree that the values are inherent to them. They are a function of human will w/r/t those facts.

I would say rather, that this is because we instinctively and normally apply values to things in our world. Those values are not a part of our world in any objective sense, but rather a part of our interaction with it. In that sense, values are "natural." But not in the sense of their being "out there" to be discovered. Values remain assertions of will, not statements of fact.

Yes, the things we value are valuable to us, but not because we merely desire them; that would lead to an untenable infinite loop. It seems more realistic to suggest that we desire things because we find apparent value in them. The fact that it's relational doesn't imply that values are non-objective. On the contrary, I think one is committed to recognizing that agent-relative values are objective by engaging in discourse about them.

As a statement of fact, you can say:

"Most dogs have four legs. That one has three. It is a statistical abnormality."

Or:

"That dog has only three legs, and there is a scar where a fourth leg was obviously cut off. That dog has suffered a severe injury."

But to say that there is something wrong with the dog is not a statement of fact (unless by "wrong" you mean either that it is a statistical abnormality or has suffered an injury, without meaning a value judgment).

No, I mean a value judgment. As I stated, all statements of facts suppose different potentialities. If we are to look at the essential nature of a dog (by invariably appealing to teleology), then clearly, the missing leg hampers the dog to live a life qua dog. (Likewise, we would say there is something wrong with a three-legged dog that has grown a fourth leg.) As I said, values are embedded in language.

None of this says anything about morality (yet), but you don't need to be a rocket scientist to see where I'd be going.

Originally Posted by Odin

As Hume stated, what one OUGHT to do can never be logically derived from what objectively IS.

And Hume was wrong. It can't always be derived, but if the IS contains an OUGHT within it (refer to discussion about facts and values), it certainly may.

I am also a non-cognitivist and I agree with you. I cannot logically explain why I think that, for example, people should be treated as ends unto themselves and never merely as means to an end (Kant tried and IMO failed), it just FEELS wrong to treat people as mere cogs and cannot WILL myself to do such a thing.

Yet you cannot logically condemn total assholes, rapists, murderers, etc. If morality is a sham, then you have no good reason to play the game.

Most philosophers, up until the explosion in meta-ethics, ignored moral skepticism because there was no reason to assume skepticism as the default position. (That seems to be a modern development.) I still don't see any reason to assume that realists have the burden of proof. Everything in our lives, and that which is apparent to us (how else are we to interpret the world?), runs counter to it.

Originally Posted by Odin

I don't like such Aristotelean Essentialism, I don't believe in essential natures, especially with regards to "human nature" given that I'm one of those "abnormal" humans ("That man has trouble getting social norms, understanding non-verbal signals, and has unusual sensory sensitivities, clearly there is something wrong with him and he needs to be fixed because humans should not be like that..." ).

Don't B.S. me Odin. Only for humans does essentialism imply morality, and for humans, a happy life is not tied your discussion of abnormality.

Originally Posted by The Rani

Dude, I already explained it:

Not what you meant by do much better.

That was the question you keep dodging.

Why are you being so coy? It is so hard to just answer the question?

Originally Posted by Matt1989

Yes, the things we value are valuable to us, but not because we merely desire them; that would lead to an untenable infinite loop.

Matt, my feeling is that you are getting lost in language here. There's an essential illusion in the way that value statements can be constructed in English. "This is good beer" has the same grammatical construction as "this is dark beer," but they have very different ontic referents. "This is good beer" has exactly the same meaning as "I like this beer." It's not a statement of fact about the beer, but about the speaker.

You are presenting another verbal illusion above. "Yes, the things we value are valuable to us, but not because we merely desire them." Now your words are suggesting a cause-effect relationship, which does indeed lead to an infinite loop. But how about: "The things we value are valuable to us, which is another way of saying that we desire them."

I also choose to excise that word "merely." I don't think that belongs there, and I think this goes to the heart of the confusion. I'll explain momentarily.

It seems more realistic to suggest that we desire things because we find apparent value in them.

Again, I think you are presenting (and probably getting lost in) a linguistic illusion. There is neither a cause-effect relationship involved, nor an act of "finding" value in things. We do not "find" value in things. We value them. We do not desire things "because" we value them -- we desire them, and this is a slightly different inflection on valuing them, another way to say the same thing.

No, I mean a value judgment. As I stated, all statements of facts suppose different potentialities. If we are to look at the essential nature of a dog (by invariably appealing to teleology), then clearly, the missing leg hampers the dog to live a life qua dog.

Sure, but what is "wrong" with that? Ýou have an implied value judgment that the dog ought to be able to run as fast and far as other dogs. It is a fact that a three-legged dog can't do so, but it is your judgment that it should be able to.

Now, here's what I meant by the above re "merely." You said this to Odin:

Yet you cannot logically condemn total assholes, rapists, murderers, etc. If morality is a sham, then you have no good reason to play the game.

And this presents the false dilemma: either morality is objective, or morality is a sham. This implies that our own judgment, our own will, is empty of force, and must be supported by an outside authority in order to be valid.

And that is where I think you're wrong. The making of value judgments is NOT a rational activity, except in small part. My values are NOT supported by reason, any more than they are by God. They are supported, rather, by my will. I value what I do, because that is an expression of who I am, and there is no one to gainsay me, nor any authority by which I can be refuted. And of course, the same is true for you. Insofar as we are similar beings, it's likely that our core values will be similar, and that is where reasoning can come in; if I point out that there are consequences to doing something in a certain way, which you would agree are bad consequences, then I may be able to persuade you to change your mind. But I cannot persuade you to change your core values, if they happen to be different from mine.

We, as willing entities, are larger and more significant than you are allowing, Matt. Values are an act of will. They need no other support.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Matt, my feeling is that you are getting lost in language here. There's an essential illusion in the way that value statements can be constructed in English. "This is good beer" has the same grammatical construction as "this is dark beer," but they have very different ontic referents. "This is good beer" has exactly the same meaning as "I like this beer." It's not a statement of fact about the beer, but about the speaker.

You are presenting another verbal illusion above. "Yes, the things we value are valuable to us, but not because we merely desire them." Now your words are suggesting a cause-effect relationship, which does indeed lead to an infinite loop. But how about: "The things we value are valuable to us, which is another way of saying that we desire them."

But this does not adequately capture what we mean when we make value judgments like, "You ought not kill that person." It's more than a desire to not see X kill Y. I really mean that it's not good for X to kill Y, and that they should not do it.

The statement that 'values are merely expressions of desire' invariably asks then "why do you desire X?" or "why do you value X?" You may make reference to biological considerations, but that certainly implies determinism, as if there is no cognitive capacity to go through moral reasoning. That is not the case, so I think you're stuck with the same problem (or at least a very similar one) to the one I presented earlier.

Sure, but what is "wrong" with that? Ýou have an implied value judgment that the dog ought to be able to run as fast and far as other dogs. It is a fact that a three-legged dog can't do so, but it is your judgment that it should be able to.

Correct, from the teleological perspective of a dog's life. The fact that I'm making this judgment does not mean that this truth fails to exist independently of my judgment.

And this presents the false dilemma: either morality is objective, or morality is a sham.

For clarity, I'm arguing that either moral claims must be truth-apt, or that actual morality a sham. As for the rest, I don't think your equivocating of value to will fares any better than equating value to desire.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

And this presents the false dilemma: either morality is objective, or morality is a sham. This implies that our own judgment, our own will, is empty of force, and must be supported by an outside authority in order to be valid.

And that is where I think you're wrong. The making of value judgments is NOT a rational activity, except in small part. My values are NOT supported by reason, any more than they are by God. They are supported, rather, by my will. I value what I do, because that is an expression of who I am, and there is no one to gainsay me, nor any authority by which I can be refuted. And of course, the same is true for you. Insofar as we are similar beings, it's likely that our core values will be similar, and that is where reasoning can come in; if I point out that there are consequences to doing something in a certain way, which you would agree are bad consequences, then I may be able to persuade you to change your mind. But I cannot persuade you to change your core values, if they happen to be different from mine.

We, as willing entities, are larger and more significant than you are allowing, Matt. Values are an act of will. They need no other support.

I dunno man, I've made quite a few value judgements in my life. I've yet to make a value judgement that didn't require a fair to heavy amount of brain activity. I also found it necessary or atleast helpful at times to temporarily disconnect or tamper down my will during the judgement formation or finalization phases. Will has a way of getting in the way, screwing up, dismissing or shortening the brain time necessary to make good or solid value judgement.

Originally Posted by Matt1989

But this does not adequately capture what we mean when we make value judgments like, "You ought not kill that person." It's more than a desire to not see X kill Y.

Correct. It's also an assertion that X ought to agree. This is where moral statements differ from assertions of preference. If I say, "I like that beer," that doesn't necessarily mean I think you should. But if I say, "Killing is wrong," then I am also saying you should agree.

The statement that 'values are merely expressions of desire' invariably asks then "why do you desire X?" or "why do you value X?"

The answer is either, "I value X because X leads to Y, and I value Y," or else, "There is no reason. I just do." Everything comes down to that latter in the end.

You may make reference to biological considerations, but that certainly implies determinism, as if there is no cognitive capacity to go through moral reasoning. That is not the case

In the end, I believe it IS the case. You may recall I referred above to the difference between core and derivative values. Core values are the ones we hold for no reason; we just do. Derivative values are ones we hold because our core values logically lead to them. There is reasoning involved in arriving at derivative values, but not at core values. We hold core values for no reason. We just do.

Correct, from the teleological perspective of a dog's life. The fact that I'm making this judgment does not mean that this truth fails to exist independently of my judgment.

The truth does in this case exist independently of YOUR judgment, but it does not exist independently of JUDGMENT. Someone must make the judgment (even if it's the dog, on a non-verbal level) or the question doesn't even arise.

For clarity, I'm arguing that either moral claims must be truth-apt, or that actual morality a sham. As for the rest, I don't think your equivocating of value to will fares any better than equating value to desire.

I disagree with that dichotomy. Moral claims are not truth-apt, and morality is not a sham. As for your second sentence, perhaps it fares no better but it also fares no worse. You are still looking for an outside authority, a way to say "A is true because of B." But somethings are not due to anything else. They just are.