Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Correct. It's also an assertion that X ought to agree. This is where moral statements differ from assertions of preference. If I say, "I like that beer," that doesn't necessarily mean I think you should. But if I say, "Killing is wrong," then I am also saying you should agree.

It's a lot of things, but I specifically mentioned some that cannot be accounted for with the emotivist (and many non-cogs) thesis.

The answer is either, "I value X because X leads to Y, and I value Y," or else, "There is no reason. I just do." Everything comes down to that latter in the end.

In the end, I believe it IS the case. You may recall I referred above to the difference between core and derivative values. Core values are the ones we hold for no reason; we just do. Derivative values are ones we hold because our core values logically lead to them. There is reasoning involved in arriving at derivative values, but not at core values. We hold core values for no reason. We just do.

Can you explain more about what you mean by core and derivative values? Maybe give some examples...

Now, is it really likely that we desire something by not recognizing its apparent value (to us)? Can this desire be explained by saying "I just do," as if there is no cognitive content at all? When it comes down to it, are we really slaves to our gut impulses? This seems highly implausible.

The truth does in this case exist independently of YOUR judgment, but it does not exist independently of JUDGMENT. Someone must make the judgment (even if it's the dog, on a non-verbal level) or the question doesn't even arise.

Certainly truth about a proposition does not suddenly emerge when someone is inquiring about logical, mathematical, and scientific matters. '2+2 would equal 4' even if there were no humans around. What reason do we have to believe that when discussing function, the rules radically change? A perspective is required (this being a teleological one), but a rational agent? Not any more than straight logical propositions.

I disagree with that dichotomy. Moral claims are not truth-apt, and morality is not a sham. As for your second sentence, perhaps it fares no better but it also fares no worse. You are still looking for an outside authority, a way to say "A is true because of B." But somethings are not due to anything else. They just are.

My position is that A is true because it could not be untrue. If proposition A is true, it's true because it's logical, and illogic is impossible. So I could say murder is wrong because murder being anything but wrong is illogical. So 'A is true because of A,' but me simply saying "it's logical" isn't much of a good reason to believe it's actually logical. So I say (abbreviating here) something like committing murder (A) is not consistent with living to your idealized potential (B), and living a life well-lived is objectively good (I've already stated earlier why I believe a lack of objective values are implausible). So murder is objectively bad.

Originally Posted by The Rani

Is it so hard to understand the explanation? ...

You made a sweeping statement about the impossiblity of social equality between the sexes, and backed it up with a vague statement about boys and fathers and appeals to your credentials. When I followed up on your statement, rather than expand on what you said you issued dismissive statements. It seems, as usual, you have nothing substantive to say.

Originally Posted by K-I-A 67

Did your mommy provide you with and instill into you the same kind of things as your daddy?

No. But the reasons why fatherless boys often do worse than boys with fathers, may not reflect what the Rani was talking about.

I recall reading that boys raised by widowed single moms have better life outcomes than boys raised by other kinds of single moms. If what the Rani said is key, how the boys came to be fatherless shouldn't matter as both are deprived of interaction with their fathers

On the other hand, the role of the absent father is very different between the two sets of boys. Boys want to look up to their dads, because that is the adult male who is most like them and who they will likley resemble when they grow up. A living father who has nothing to do with his son is a shit. The boy is still going to look to his father, hoping he will change, defending him from others who say what the boy already knows. Given that he is the son of a shit, does that mean he too will grow up to be a shit like his dad? That's a tough load to carry.

The boy whose father is dead was not abandoned. He can still be considered as a good man, someone who the boy may do well to emulate. Even though he his not present, a deceased father can still exert an enormous impact on his son as an example and as a standard to which the son may compare himself.

You own example illustrates this. When you father died you were deprived of his presence, but not his example. You acted out in response to this deprivation. But in the end, you were able to right yourself. The path to manhood of which he was an exemplar was still intact.

Consider what might have happened if instead of dying, your father had run away with a floozy or gone to prison and had nothing to do with you afterward. Miight not your outcome have been different?

This explanation for why fatherless boys don't do as well has nothing to say about the possibility of social quality between the sexes.

Originally Posted by Matt1989

It's a lot of things, but I specifically mentioned some that cannot be accounted for with the emotivist (and many non-cogs) thesis.

Sure they can; one must merely state, "You are mistaken in believing this."

Can you explain more about what you mean by core and derivative values? Maybe give some examples...

What I mean by a derivative value is one where the "why?" question is answerable. For example, as a libertarian, you value a free market. Why? Because you value liberty. But why do you value liberty? Uh . . .

Even if you can answer that question, one can apply the same "why?" to whatever you answer, and eventually reach a point where you will be unable to provide a reason. (At leat, you will be unable to provide a non-circular reason that makes any sense.) Core values are from the heart. Derivative values are reasoned logically from core values.

Now, is it really likely that we desire something by not recognizing its apparent value (to us)? Can this desire be explained by saying "I just do," as if there is no cognitive content at all? When it comes down to it, are we really slaves to our gut impulses? This seems highly implausible.

The sentence in bold is a non-sequitur. It's not that we are "slaves to our gut impulses," but that desires and values are non-cognitive. We are not "slaves" to these impulses because we don't HAVE to obey them -- but in the end, reason is a servitor to passion; it functions to keep passion from betraying itself, but only passion provides motive to do anything.

Certainly truth about a proposition does not suddenly emerge when someone is inquiring about logical, mathematical, and scientific matters. '2+2 would equal 4' even if there were no humans around. What reason do we have to believe that when discussing function, the rules radically change? A perspective is required (this being a teleological one), but a rational agent? Not any more than straight logical propositions.

If a teleology is required, then there must be a person involved (or at least a sentient agent -- an animal, say). Unless, again, one wishes to introduce the idea of God. Absent that, the only purposes in the world are those of living things.

So I say (abbreviating here) something like committing murder (A) is not consistent with living to your idealized potential (B), and living a life well-lived is objectively good (I've already stated earlier why I believe a lack of objective values are implausible). So murder is objectively bad.

WHY is a life well-lived good? (Or, to avoid circularity, why is a life lived in a certain fashion, well-lived?)

I don't believe there's a logical answer to that, and if there is, then it will introduce another "why?" question.

BTW, you presented the essence of a rationalist epistemology, which depends on reasoning from self-evident, indisputable truths. I have always been an empiricist and a believer in scientific method when it comes to ascertaining fact. This may be the core of our disagreement. But in any of these three areas -- science, rationalism, or morality -- there is a barrier to logic, because logic always involves reasoning from one or more propositions to a conclusion. Eventually, one must say, "This truth is self-evident," or, "we observe this to be the case," or "I just feel that."

Originally Posted by Mikebert

You made a sweeping statement about the impossiblity of social equality between the sexes

Actually she didn't. Others read that into what she said.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

All agrarian civilizations were founded on some form of coerced labor. Slavery per se was not necessary, but any agrarian culture that did not have that, had some form of serfdom (medieval Europe, medieval Japan). Our distant ancestors could not have organized their societies so as to exclude forced labor, or at least I can see no way to do that, and so this is not a valid moral expectation.

Quite true once an agrarian culture became civilized, or at least a series of chiefdoms (proto-civilized?), but there is reason to believe that the earliest neolithic 'garden-plot' societies, still on a strictly tribal level, did not employ coerced labor (unless one considers the threat of starvation a form of coercion). The period I am speaking of would have run from roughly 8000 BCE or possibly 9000 BCE, to roughly 5000 BCE, possibly even 4000 BCE. (IOW, for three to five thousand years duration.) During this entire period, according to Wikipedia, global population remained stable at roughly 5 Million.

In more recent times, such societies would have been found among certain Native American peoples (in Canada, the US, Brazil, Paraguay, and other places, alongside more 'developed' peoples). I am thinking of the Iroquois, Huron, Pawnee, Pueblos, O'odham (aka Pima and Papago), Tarahumara, Guarani, Botocudo, etc.

Cnet says Ahoy! Pirate Party gets berth in European Parliament

Yes, there really are people off these forum who want fundamental changes to copyright laws. For discussion purposes... (I wouldn't want to run afoul of any copyright laws, would I?)

"Citizens have understood that it's time to pull the fist out of the pocket and that you can make a difference," Rick Falkvinge, leader and founder of the party, told the Swedish daily Svenska Dagbladet, after the result of the elections were revealed. "We don't accept to be bugged by the government. People start to understand that the government is not always good."

The Pirate Party is focused on three main goals: "to fundamentally reform copyright law, get rid of the patent system, and ensure that citizens' rights to privacy are respected."

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Sure they can; one must merely state, "You are mistaken in believing this."

OK. So, by saying my objection is mistaken, you deny that 'You ought not kill' can say (from a linguistic perspective) something to effect like, "It would be wrong for you to kill. You shouldn't do it."

Even if you can answer that question, one can apply the same "why?" to whatever you answer, and eventually reach a point where you will be unable to provide a reason. (At leat, you will be unable to provide a non-circular reason that makes any sense.) Core values are from the heart. Derivative values are reasoned logically from core values.

I can merely say that it's good (thus provoking a different set of "Why?s), or I can run down the chain and get to something that I believe can be logically defended -- I did so in the last post. Personally, I don't think this needs to be done in everyday speech, and merely appealing to things that are intuitively good works just as well in virtually all settings.

The sentence in bold is a non-sequitur. It's not that we are "slaves to our gut impulses," but that desires and values are non-cognitive. We are not "slaves" to these impulses because we don't HAVE to obey them -- but in the end, reason is a servitor to passion; it functions to keep passion from betraying itself, but only passion provides motive to do anything.

What does 'motive to do X' have to do with it? I make the simple claim that there is cognitive content in recognizing something as valuable, not necessarily pursuing that something.

If a teleology is required, then there must be a person involved (or at least a sentient agent -- an animal, say). Unless, again, one wishes to introduce the idea of God. Absent that, the only purposes in the world are those of living things.

Once again, what basis do you have for suggesting the rules regarding confirming teleological propositions are so different from mathematical ones?

WHY is a life well-lived good? (Or, to avoid circularity, why is a life lived in a certain fashion, well-lived?)

I don't believe there's a logical answer to that, and if there is, then it will introduce another "why?" question.

Isn't it obvious? A life well-lived is a life that is good for us (there is value in it). I don't think it can be made any clearer than that.

BTW, you presented the essence of a rationalist epistemology, which depends on reasoning from self-evident, indisputable truths. I have always been an empiricist and a believer in scientific method when it comes to ascertaining fact. This may be the core of our disagreement. But in any of these three areas -- science, rationalism, or morality -- there is a barrier to logic, because logic always involves reasoning from one or more propositions to a conclusion. Eventually, one must say, "This truth is self-evident," or, "we observe this to be the case," or "I just feel that."

I'm not a rationalist, not as you're phrasing it. It can be better called anti-psychologism.

Originally Posted by The Rani

No, I did say it, after Matt asked a question. Mikebert just got the order wrong.

EDIT:
Unless there is a difference between "gender equality" and "social equality between the sexes."

I think there is a difference. I understood you to be saying that there are genetic differences between the sexes, and so it's impossible to treat them completely the same. It's not impossible to achieve social equality, though, i.e. equality in social status.

Originally Posted by Matt1989

OK. So, by saying my objection is mistaken, you deny that 'You ought not kill' can say (from a linguistic perspective) something to effect like, "It would be wrong for you to kill. You shouldn't do it."

I don't deny that you can SAY it that way, but I claim this is an English grammatical aberration, a linguistic illusion.

I can merely say that it's good (thus provoking a different set of "Why?s), or I can run down the chain and get to something that I believe can be logically defended -- I did so in the last post.

If you simply assert "this is good," you are stating that it's a core value and "why" questions become irrelevant. If you give it logical support, you are implying that it's a derivative value, and the answer to a "why" question will be (ultimately) in terms of core values for which this is the case.

Personally, I don't think this needs to be done in everyday speech, and merely appealing to things that are intuitively good works just as well in virtually all settings.

I agree, and would add that this approach via everyday speech is also more honest and less self-deceiving.

What does motive have to do with it? I make the simple claim that there is cognitive content in recognizing something as valuable, not necessarily pursuing that something.

Again, this is a result of linguistic illusion. When we say that something is good, or (even more) that something is morally right, this implies intended or preferred action. Actually, any statement implies action of some sort, but the implications vary in function. One may translate any statement into an operational, and I find it useful to do this. For example:

"The earth is round" may be operationalized as "If you sit on a dock and watch a boat sailing out to sea, you will see the bottom of the boat disappear before the top does." Or: "If you shoot a gun/fire a rocket with very long range, the calculation of trajectory will be accurate only if you account for the earth's curvature." Or: "If you go into space in a spacecraft, and look at the earth from space, you will see that it is round like a ball." Any statement of fact, such as this, can be operationalized in this kind of experimental or observational fashion: look at A and you will observe B.

But what about values statements or moral statements? Those are a little more complicated, but always they come down to feeling statements or statements of intent or will. One cannot say: look at A and you will observe that A is right/wrong. One can, however, say: look at A. Do you not feel the same as I do, that A is right/wrong? Or: Look, A results in B. Do you not feel the same as I do, that B is good/bad? Then you must also agree that A is right/wrong.

Once again, what basis do you have for suggesting the rules regarding confirming teleological propositions are so different from mathematical ones?

They are completely different, just as both are different from scientific statements. Mathematics is based on reasoning from arbitrary assumptions called axioms. Change the axioms, and you can have a completely different mathematics that is still valid, and may sometimes fit observed reality better. Science is based on reasoning from empirical observation. Morality is based on reasoning from core values. Unlike mathematical axioms, core values are not arbitrary, and unlike empirical observation, they cannot be observed in the world. They emerge from the heart.

Isn't it obvious? A life well-lived is a life that is good for us (there is value in it). I don't think it can be made any clearer than that.

Well, that's a circular statement, and no, it's not obvious. It's not that I disagree with this assertion of core value, it's that I know there's no logical justification for it. Why do you prefer a life well-lived to a life poorly-lived? Why prefer anything to anything else? Why prefer? Only on the basis of feeling.

Now, most anyone is going to agree with something as vague as "live your life well," but may disagree about what that entails. Living long? Living healthy? Living productive? Living adventurously? Having lots of fun? Dying with the most toys? Having lots of notches in your bedpost? Traveling and seeing the world? Making a difference? Raising good children? Learning? You will find advocates and/or examples of all of these. Are they right? Are they wrong? In the end, there is no basis for an answer except a feeling or an assertion of will. You may show the consequences of (for example) living adventurously in terms of danger and the probability of a short life, but the person pursuing this lifestyle will simply answer, "I know, and I don't care. It's not like I'm going to live forever, no matter what."

But that's all on an individual basis. When we talk about morality, we're talking about a consensus value rather than an individual value. In that case, what we have is an ongoing discussion among members of a society, an evolving agreement as to what is right and what is wrong. Logic plays a part in this, but the reasoning is always from premises that are based on feeling and will.

I don't have much more to say without repeating myself.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

I agree, and would add that this approach via everyday speech is also more honest and less self-deceiving.

It's true that the intuitive approach would suggest something like, it's wrong for me to kill you because of what it does to you i.e. it hurts him; so that is bad. Aristotle has something to say about the value of friendship, so my guess is the right approach is a little bit of both. I actually do think our ordinary language actually encompasses more drawn out explanations, but that's not central to this debate.

Well, that's a circular statement, and no, it's not obvious. It's not that I disagree with this assertion of core value, it's that I know there's no logical justification for it. Why do you prefer a life well-lived to a life poorly-lived? Why prefer anything to anything else? Why prefer? Only on the basis of feeling.

You can't find a justification for it only because you're applying it through a scientific lens, which, as you know, makes justification impossible (that is, rather your point). Once again, we're back to the question as to whether values are imbued in (some) facts. I have my own problems with empiricism (and dogmatic rationalism as well, mind you), but I don't think refuting empiricism is of great importance here. While it's true that for right action to objectively exist, facts and values cannot be separated, but my position is that there is no good reason to reject that values are right there with facts. (Yes, I've tried to establish some metaphysical justification somewhere, but I'm not quite ready to ground ethics in metaphysics. I'm not sure if what I've laid works in convincing people [and there might be a few holes], but I don't really think it's necessary.) I think our lives contradict it, and the only way to adopt this view is to look at the world the wrong way.*

We can get into another debate about that, but I'm not interested at this moment. So I guess we'll just have to disagree.

*I think part of the problem is that, since the Enlightenment, teleological language in discussing facts has been replaced by a scientific one. (There are some exceptions though. Many scientists, including Darwin, have felt that a full explanatory account of something could not be given without reference to teleological facts, despite attempts to purge teleology from factual language.) It's no wonder than Aristotle's formulation of the is-ought problem comes to a different conclusion than Hume's.

EDIT: So I may get a better grip on your position, can you tell me what non-cognitive position you ascribe to? I'm seeing hints of emotivism and quasi-realism, or maybe you don't fit neatly into one category.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

I think there is a difference. I understood you to be saying that there are genetic differences between the sexes, and so it's impossible to treat them completely the same. It's not impossible to achieve social equality, though, i.e. equality in social status.

I didn't mean to imply a difference by my usage, but if we're going to create a difference, then I think the rest is sound.

This thread has changed course pretty dramatically since I last checked in. Interestingly enough, it has ended up providing a very strong argument for the existence of God, one which C.S. Lewis would approve of. Anyone debating this issue who has not read that book should give it a try, if for no other reason than that it covers the exact same territory being discussed here.

As for me, I've given very lengthy wind to my views on these issues here, and their derivation. I can sum it up pretty succinctly:

If you pursue these ultimate questions using only reason and empiricism, the conclusion is inescapable. If there is no God, Nietzsche was right. There is no such thing as right and wrong, only the imperative to evolve to a higher level. That mindset, which grips the modern left, starts with "altruistic" social engineering, progresses to genetic engineering, abortion and euthanasia, and ends in death camps.

Originally Posted by JustPassingThrough

If there is no God, Nietzsche was right. There is no such thing as right and wrong, only the imperative to evolve to a higher level.

First of all, that's a misstatement of Nietzsche. Secondly, it's not correct. There ARE right and wrong. We created them, and therefore they exist.

We are more important than you are acknowledging.

And thirdly, I've read quite a lot of C.S. Lewis, and he would detest that argument. "Believe this, not because it's true, but for some other reason." A line from The Screwtape Letters, if I recall correctly.

Edit: And fourth, the Nazis were not atheists.

Matt:

During the (brief) time that I was a philosophy major in college, I concentrated on epistemology. Partly that's due to course offerings at the time, and partly because I genuinely believe epistemology to be the root and core of all philosophy, from which everything else flows. We must know how to know before we can know anything else. I have never studied meta-ethics per se, and find now that I have arrived at positions which are difficult to classify because of what I see as errors in the classification system. My position is both subjectivist and non-cognitive, although subjectivism is supposed to be a cognitivist position.

One thing I realized in the course of pursuing epistemological questions is that there is more than one "right" way to know, depending on the subject matter. When we are dealing with objective facts, I'm a believer in the scientific method, but science is incompetent to answer questions of value, and it cannot deal with anything that's inherently subjective. Questions of value are very important questions! So there are crucial questions for which the scientific method is inappropriate, yet it remains supreme in its own area. And so more than one way of knowing is necessary.

Bearing in mind that "how we know" is the crucial question in philosophy, I would answer the three questions of meta-ethics as follows:

What is the meaning of moral terms or judgments?

This will be implied in my response to the other questions.

What is the nature of moral judgments?

Moral judgments are expressions of will. They are assertions that certain behaviors are desirable or not desirable on the part of oneself or of others.

How may moral judgments be supported or defended?

By appeal to shared core values. Although moral judgments are subjective and non-rational, they are not whims, and many core values are shared universally (or nearly so) among all human beings. One may reason from these core values, once they are recognized and agreed upon, to subsidiary values statements.

Where core values are not shared, there can be no persuasion that a moral judgment is right. Also, where one person believes in surrendering his right to make moral judgments to an outside authority (e.g. religious teachings), and another does not, or believes in a conflicting authority, there can be no agreement. Sometimes moral disagreements cannot, therefore, be resolved through discussion and must result in conflict.

Finally, when material circumstances change, it can happen that, although core values are not changed, their application in practical morality is. Two good examples: the institution of slavery and the subordination of women to men. Both of these values changed with the industrial revolution, which made slavery economically less useful and lowered the value of high birthrates.

In terms of practical politics and the way it relates to this thread, what I wish to defend is the idea that rights (which are a subset of moral judgments) are not fixed, but can change over time as circumstances change and societies evolve.

Edit: Probably the closest meta-ethical position to mine is universal prescriptivism:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_prescriptivism

Originally Posted by JustPassingThrough

As for me, I've given very lengthy wind to my views on these issues here, and their derivation. I can sum it up pretty succinctly:

If you pursue these ultimate questions using only reason and empiricism, the conclusion is inescapable. If there is no God, Nietzsche was right. There is no such thing as right and wrong, only the imperative to evolve to a higher level. That mindset, which grips the modern left, starts with "altruistic" social engineering, progresses to genetic engineering, abortion and euthanasia, and ends in death camps.

You have certainly given lengthy wind to the above view. I believe I could invoke the ad-nausium fallacy, that you seem to believe a convincing argument can be made simply by repeating your view.

Again, in the early 20th century, the political progressive movement, the religious social gospel movement, and the worker's labor movement to a great degree sought similar goals by similar means. The prohibitionists, suffragettes and American communists were not too far distant. Faith in God is not required to feel affinity for one's fellow being. (Any study of animal and human behavior will tell one this.) Religious belief is not required to tell right from wrong, good from evil.

You also persist in confusing the fascist and communist authoritarian governments with the progressive democratic movement in both its secular and religious incarnations. Stalin, Hitler and Mao are dead. None of them are running the modern Democratic party.

I see the immoral pro business Republicans of that era as being as guilty of social engineering as any other political organization. Their objective was wealth for the wealthy. To achieve that, they opposed safe working conditions, reasonable working hours, labor unions and all the other goals of the social gospel movement. For them, greed trumped morality.

This might be an over simplified view of the Republicans and robber barons. Carnegie might have been sincerely convinced that in paying his laborers the absolute minimum wage possible while building libraries he was performing social engineering in a positive way. Still, to me he was removing choice. The Republican Way involves forcing their morality on others rather than giving the People freedom to answer their own problems in their own ways. Issues like death with dignity, abortion and how to integrate genetic engineering in society are difficult.

The Republican answer has been to just say no. They have their own idea of social engineering, their own ideas on how God thinks, and they attempt to impose their morality on the entire population by government power.

My father died of a slow cardiovascular system failure. My mother repeated his wishes to the doctor of 'no extreme measures to prolong life.' I don't want arrogant religious fanatics or government officials imposing themselves in such situations.

Similarly, I wouldn't want a young woman in my family to have to run a gauntlet of religious fanatics should she need to seek reproductive advice or assistance. Looking at history, one sees close minded religious types opposing many advances in science. Genetic engineering seems to be the latest issue where the religious types seem to want to keep the genie in the bottle. Good luck with that. One important question is how many must die and how many must suffer before medicine is allowed to advance.

You have your own archaic basis for a personal definition of good and evil. This apparently doesn't include a desire to help those who are suffering, to show sympathy for those in difficult circumstance. Rules are more important than lives.

The true core of the Progressive Movement and its modern heirs would be the imperative to love and give aid to one's neighbor. The immoral religious Republicans seem to have a blind spot in that area. Yes, you have a reasonably consistent set of beliefs based on a traditional set of holy writ. No, it is not the only possible moral system. It is quite possible to point at the real world consequences and challenge the right's system based on the results of their actions.

By their fruits shall you know them.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

One thing I realized in the course of pursuing epistemological questions is that there is more than one "right" way to know, depending on the subject matter. When we are dealing with objective facts, I'm a believer in the scientific method, but science is incompetent to answer questions of value, and it cannot deal with anything that's inherently subjective. Questions of value are very important questions! So there are crucial questions for which the scientific method is inappropriate, yet it remains supreme in its own area. And so more than one way of knowing is necessary.

I tangled with similar issues. My interpretation was to say that Philosophy was the study of questions that cannot be answered through observation, experiment, or other tools of the scientific method. Science would be the study of problems that can be so addressed. Philosophy would thus be the birthplace of science. One major objective of the philosopher is to take one or more basic problem being studied and find a way to ask the question in a way that observation can answer it. Thus philosophy can give birth to science.

Thus, a philosopher sits in his study and reasons out that of course a heavy object will fall faster than a light one. A philosopher that carries a heavy object and a light one to the top of a tower and drops them to see what happens becomes a scientist and invents a new science.

Which is part of why I'm interested in S&H turning theory. They made predictions about how values change that might be tested through observation. They began to nudge things towards an observation based theory of values. I would move away from saying such and such a thing is true because such and such a holy book says so. I would look at history and examine cultures that believed in a given value, what caused that value to become part of the culture, then look for other cultures where said value faded.

Thus, I would object to a notion that certain fields are forever out of the realm of science, that they must remain in the provence of philosophy and religion. Such a limiting assumption would be self defeating. It limits the bounds of human knowledge. The challenge is how to ask questions that can be answered by observation or experiment. We are only beginning to be able to do this, and we are doing it poorly. We might never be able to do it well as cultures are far too large and clumsy to be put in a test tube for experimentation.

But I would still strive to ask questions that can be answered. Asking questions that cannot be answered isn't overly productive. In the early years of college I took philosophy courses. In the late years I switched to history.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

... there are genetic differences between the sexes, and so it's impossible to treat them completely the same.

This is true for any two people, save identical twins, and is completely unremarkable. This was not what Arkham and the Rani were talking about.

It is unfair that women have the opportunity to avoid parental responsibility through abortion while men do not. Arkham would allow men to shirk parental responsibilities.

It is unfair that very smart people can outcompete average people for many of the best-paying jobs. Would Arkham favor freeing the less intelligent from the responsibility of employment?

We could do this for any sort of difference between people. What makes gender special?

Originally Posted by Mikebert

This is true for any two people, save identical twins, and is completely unremarkable.

It is true for any two individuals. It is not true for any two sets of people. It is not, for example, true for the set of all people living in San Jose and the set of all people living in San Diego, on a statistically significant basis. It IS, however, true of the set of all males compared to the set of all females. That may be "completely unremarkable," but it is not without significance.

It is unfair that women have the opportunity to avoid parental responsibility through abortion while men do not. Arkham would allow men to shirk parental responsibilities.

Yes, I understood that was his position. It was not the Rani's; although she didn't say whether she agreed with him or not, it seems unlikely that she would. And also, as I made clear, I don't agree with him either.

But you're confusing a couple of things here. That women are not identical to men, and cannot be treated one hundred percent the same, does not imply that men can shirk their parental responsibilities, nor that we should give up on all efforts to eliminate social injustice in the form of sexism. Nor has anyone suggested that we should.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

Thus, a philosopher sits in his study and reasons out that of course a heavy object will fall faster than a light one. A philosopher that carries a heavy object and a light one to the top of a tower and drops them to see what happens becomes a scientist and invents a new science.

I would say that a scientist is also a philosopher, but within a certain specific compass of questions. (He, as a person -- but not as a scientist -- may also be a philosopher outside that range.) The question you posed above is a scientific question, that is, a question of objective fact. As such, the scientific method is the best approach we have. There are other questions, however, for which scientific method is quite literally useless. Among those are values questions. Values questions are very important and cannot simply be dismissed as meaningless or irrelevant (as logical positivists would do).

Thus, I would object to a notion that certain fields are forever out of the realm of science, that they must remain in the provence of philosophy and religion.

Object all you want, but it remains true. Science can only deal with what can be observed objectively and (preferably) measured. But some things CAN'T be observed objectively. You cannot -- ever -- look at something and objectively determine that it is good or bad. That's simply not an objective question of fact.

Such a limiting assumption would be self defeating. It limits the bounds of human knowledge.

No, it simply limits the bounds of science. That's not the same thing. We have more than that one arrow in our quiver.

The challenge is how to ask questions that can be answered by observation or experiment.

When it comes to values questions, that "challenge" is unanswerable, and therefore meaningless.

Asking questions that cannot be answered isn't overly productive.

Neither is trying to answer questions using the wrong method for those quesions.

........and so it goes.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Object all you want, but it remains true. Science can only deal with what can be observed objectively and (preferably) measured. But some things CAN'T be observed objectively. You cannot -- ever -- look at something and objectively determine that it is good or bad. That's simply not an objective question of fact.

I had variations on this discussion with various philosophy professors back in my college days. I was the engineering student in the land of the abstract thinkers. I tried to anchor in empirical truth, while many others favored logic.

Classic logic starts with a bunch of assumptions and tries to deduce conclusions. I cared a great deal about the nature of the assumptions. The phrase 'garbage in garbage out' was already in vogue among us computer types. I had noted that many a philosophy paper started with assumptions that were little more than thinly veiled cultural biases.

One reading assignment on the theme of duty cemented this. There were three readings from three philosophers. The American focused on how he owed everything to his family, and thus he owed duty to his family. The Frenchman focused on how he owed everything to God, and thus he owed duty to God. The German focused on how he owed everything to the Fatherland, thus he owed duty to the Fatherland. My paper focused on the commonalities, on how all three felt that which gives is owed duty, but how each philosopher focused on different things given having different importance.

After that reading, I started looking for and finding similar cultural biases in most any philosophical reading about values, morality and politics. The papers became less about logic, and more about emotional arguments in favor of various cultural biases.

This led me to look into the nature of cultural biases. How is it that many folks sharing a common environment think certain things important while others living somewhere else have other opinions?

And as I've said many time, S&H to me is a theory of how values change. People living in areas where the society and economics are working well will tend to be conservative. Those living amidst crowds and new technology will encounter problems and want to solve them. When the problems become large enough, the values shift. Add the generational stereotypes and one can put a rhythm on the struggle. A world view is in part a set of things which a given group of people think important. A culture is in part a set of solutions to problems. World views, cultures and values change when new things become important, when new problems need to be solved.

This, to me, is the study of values through observation. Like any study of human behavior, this is soft science, not easily subjected to experiment or statistical analysis. If a science it is, it is a new science. We are still in the bumbling around early phases of it. Even on this site, I hardly expect everyone to agree with me on the nature of values shift.

And thus, I will dissent if JPT claims good and evil can only be found through religion, or when you assert values will remain forever in the realm of philosophy. Value systems and how they change can and should be studied empirically. One should look at the real world, see how solving problems causes value sets to come into existence, and see how changing environments and technology unsurprisingly lead to constantly evolving world views, cultures and values.

I see in both the religious and philosophical perspective on values a dangerous assumption of permanence and universality. If a given set of values works for a given believer or philosopher, the temptation is to assume the related world view, culture and values ought to be universal. I would reject any such association with universal absolute values. People adapt to circumstance, as do cultures. If one does not anchor one's values in the real world, and note that the real world is diverse and ever changing, one might easily get stuck in rigid thought patterns.

Thus, I shall keep working S&H Turning Theory as an empirical perspective on how values change. It proposes hypotheses that are being tested by history. What is important is how well it passes said tests. The Theory is certainly not a hard science such as physics. Nothing involving human behavior is. Still, to me it seems advantageous to slant the questions asked and issues discussed to questions that can be answered through observation. To the degree that people make assertions that cannot be tested meaningfully through observation of the real world, we are nowhere.

Bob, I had to wade through an awful lot to find the meat of your post that needed a reply. As a result, I am snipping the overwhelming majority of what you wrote as simply not pertinent. It was an interesting read, though.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

And thus, I will dissent if JPT claims good and evil can only be found through religion, or when you assert values will remain forever in the realm of philosophy. Value systems and how they change can and should be studied empirically.

There we go.

You are mixing two different subjects here. One is the study of "value systems and how they change." The other is the values questions themselves whose answers make up those values systems.

We can observe "value systems and how they change" objectively; that's part of human behavior. But in doing so, we are not ourselves trying to answer the same questions that people do when they evolve their value systems. For example, we can observe that Americans now universally condemn slavery, whereas in the early 19th century the institution had many defenders. But that is not the same as saying, ourselves, whether slavery is right or wrong.

There is no scientific, empirical way to answer questions of right and wrong, because right and wrong are not things we can observe in the world. They are things we put in the world ourselves, by making value judgments, which are made from the heart and not from the head. No, the answers don't have to come from religion. But they absolutely cannot come from science.

Or, if you think they can, then answer the same question I posed to Matt earlier. What test can falsify the moral judgment "murder is wrong"?

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

IObject all you want, but it remains true. Science can only deal with what can be observed objectively and (preferably) measured. But some things CAN'T be observed objectively. You cannot -- ever -- look at something and objectively determine that it is good or bad. That's simply not an objective question of fact.

I agree that science is not the way to moral reasoning. But moral questions can be answered objectively (at least in principle) by use of an external reference. Consider this thought experiment.

A powerful entity comes down to earth, we can call it God, and lays down a set of prescriptions to be followed by his chosen people. The chosen people are defined as those who simply accept God's code as the definition of what is good. God then kills everyone else. Under such a regime, determining what is right and wrong can be determined by consulting the Law. For example murder is objectively wrong because the Law says Do no murder.

This is an unrealistic example, but let us consdier something a little more realistic. An individual develops a large following of people who choose to model their behavior after his. Scribes record numerous details about this person's life, and after he is dead, his life serves as an exemplar of what is right. That is, good becomes "what would this person do". Of coruse there is disagrrement about what the person would do, and sinc ehe is dead nobody can ask him. But since the question is about behavior, it could, in principle be answered and that answer would then define what is good.

The choice of either of those standards is however arbitrary. It does not make the external standard objectively true, rather, it simply means we are exercising our prerogative of making moral choices in that fashion, applying it directly to elevate the standard which then is used to determine specific codes of behavior, rather than applying it directly to the behavior. The choice remains ours, and remains non-objective. We are still making the choices, just doing so indirectly.