Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Bob, I had to wade through an awful lot to find the meat of your post that needed a reply. As a result, I am snipping the overwhelming majority of what you wrote as simply not pertinent. It was an interesting read, though....

You are mixing two different subjects here. One is the study of "value systems and how they change." The other is the values questions themselves whose answers make up those values systems.

Noted. We might accept for the moment that science can be used to study value systems and how they change. The question seems to be whether science has a role in making values judgments? Did I restate the problem correctly? I invite you to clarify if not.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

We can observe "value systems and how they change" objectively; that's part of human behavior. But in doing so, we are not ourselves trying to answer the same questions that people do when they evolve their value systems. For example, we can observe that Americans now universally condemn slavery, whereas in the early 19th century the institution had many defenders. But that is not the same as saying, ourselves, whether slavery is right or wrong.

There is no scientific, empirical way to answer questions of right and wrong, because right and wrong are not things we can observe in the world. They are things we put in the world ourselves, by making value judgments, which are made from the heart and not from the head. No, the answers don't have to come from religion. But they absolutely cannot come from science.

Or, if you think they can, then answer the same question I posed to Matt earlier. What test can falsify the moral judgment "murder is wrong"?

Let's start with what science can do, which is to study inhibitions against murder which are both genetically hard wired and learned as part of a culture. I would recommend books like On Aggression and On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society as examples of empirical approaches on studying of how human societies attempt to control and contain the degree with which violence is used within a culture and in conflict with other cultures.

If we were to go very far, we would have to agree that those who have studied murder have achieved enough of a 'scientific consensus' for the information and theory to be reasonably valid. Of course, nothing in science is set in stone, but having this conversation with a denialist who claims we can't learn about murder by studying murder would be different from having this discussion with someone who has a different slant than the majority working in the field.

The leap seems to be that a scientist can reasonably study the phenomenon of murder but is not allowed to pronounce value judgments, to assert that a given murderer has committed an evil act. I'm not sure I want to make this leap, but let's take a stab at it.

One distinction might be the difference between killings sanctioned by society and those which are not. It is generally accepted that a soldier fighting a war or a police officer acting in the line of duty would not be called murderers, would not be considered evil. I'll leave this one aside. Some might want to debate the point, but I don't think these examples are those you are concerned with.

There are also subcultures that embrace murder. I shall mention the Mafia and Ku Klux Klan of the recent historical past as two examples. Murder in these cultures was an accepted part of doing business. Can science set up a reasonable objective set of criteria to differentiate between a murderous subculture and a normal one?

I believe yes. Is it somehow improper for a scientist to use the word 'evil' when describing the murderous subculture and those who embrace it? Such a judgement feels a bit untraditional. It doesn't fit the scientific value of impartiality to use the word 'evil' when one doesn't really have to. Still, I would think a well trained social scientist would have as much right to use the word within the context of his profession as a priest or philosopher. I would not cede to the priest or philosopher any superior place or right to make judgments as to which subcultures are outside the norm.

Then there are individuals who have no pretense of belonging to an unusual subculture. There are those murder for personal reasons rather than to achieve a group goal. This would include the person who can no longer tolerate his spouse, or who robs the local liquor store.

Most to all societies have laws and value sets which forbid such behavior. Most of the people, most of the time, respect the local values. The scientist might have a few extra tools to differentiate between a normal society and one with unusual pressures, be they economic, ethnic, or something similar. Still, if a priest or a philosopher can declare an individual or act evil, why cannot a scientist? Does the scientist's empirical understanding of the inhibitions against use of force disqualify him somehow? Does the ignorance of the philosopher or priest somehow make them special?

I don't think so.

Mind you, throwing around emotionally laden words might not be constructive. A century or so back it was fashionable for bigots and haters to use phoney science to attempt to prove this minority or that inferior. The Holocaust gave eugenics a bad name, and perhaps it is just as well that eugenics has a bad name. I have tended to accuse the Bush 43 administration of imprudent behavior more than I have accused them of immoral or evil behavior. This is not because I don't believe them immoral or evil. Moral arguments are just harder to pin down. Mankind in general with philosophers being no exception are good at creating moral justifications for their actions. "I was spreading democracy." "He had weapons of mass destruction." If invading countries is evil, then Bush 43 might be accused of working the 'two wrongs make a right' theory.

And such problems on such a very large scale might be impossible to balance. I'm certainly not going to claim that any science of morality is ready to stand a decisive judgement.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

The choice of either of those standards is however arbitrary. It does not make the external standard objectively true, rather, it simply means we are exercising our prerogative of making moral choices in that fashion, applying it directly to elevate the standard which then is used to determine specific codes of behavior, rather than applying it directly to the behavior. The choice remains ours, and remains non-objective. We are still making the choices, just doing so indirectly.

I was addressing the idea that moral judgments can be made objectively, given an external standard that is accepted as an axiom. Science also relies on axioms that are chosen to be believed (e.g. the principle of causality) and yet it is considered an objective way of knowing.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

I was addressing the idea that moral judgments can be made objectively, given an external standard that is accepted as an axiom. Science also relies on axioms that are chosen to be believed (e.g. the principle of causality) and yet it is considered an objective way of knowing.

Actually, science does not rely on the principle of causality. Scientific theories are unchanged if we assume causation, or if we do not but suppose we are observing only repeatable correlation. They are also unchanged whether we assume the objective existence of the material world, or not.

There are four assumptions necessary for science, which are:

1) The laws of nature are consistent;
2) They can be discovered through observation;
3) Natural processes can be modeled rationally and confirmed through more observation; and
4) Knowledge is always imperfect.

But these are not the sort of assumptions you were presenting w/r/t morality, because unless we assume these four things, we can't do science at all, whereas we may still make moral judgments without positing an external absolute authority.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Or, if you think they can, then answer the same question I posed to Matt earlier. What test can falsify the moral judgment "murder is wrong"?

There are tests for this purpose, but you'll need to accept the premise of ethical objectivism before that can begin to happen. At the certainty of repeating myself, the rules do not change when evaluating truth and value. As per Frege in his anti-psychologistic arguments, subjectivism with regard to truth entails that two people disagreeing over whether '2x2=4' face no contradiction in their disagreement. But this is wrong. Similarly, ethical subjectivism (I'm including non-cognitivism in this) entails that one person saying 'X is Good' and another saying 'X is Bad' faces no contradiction. But this only works if by 'X is Good' this person means something like 'I like X.' But this is not what we mean when we make value claims in our ordinary language usage, which take a syllogistic structure and thus may be evaluated as logically valid or invalid. (Consider something like -- 1. Murder is wrong. 2. Killing innocent people is murder. 3. Killing innocent people is wrong. -- This is obviously valid, but a translation into subjectivist-speak makes it invalid -- 1. I dislike murder. 2. Killing innocent people is murder. 3. I dislike killing innocent people. --). So what I'm trying to say is that value judgments must logically entail ethical objectivism. That doesn't prove killing innocents is murder, but it sets it up nicely.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

Noted. We might accept for the moment that science can be used to study value systems and how they change. The question seems to be whether science has a role in making values judgments? Did I restate the problem correctly? I invite you to clarify if not.

I would say that it is obvious that science has some role in value judgments, but it is a subsidiary or supporting role. That is, we may only make proper value judgments in full knowledge of pertinent facts, and science is our best tool for discovering objective facts. We must still, even with perfect knowledge of facts, make judgments on a non-rational basis, however, as far as core values are concerned.

Let's start with what science can do, which is to study inhibitions against murder which are both genetically hard wired and learned as part of a culture.

Actually, I don't think that's a good starting point, since here again we are veering off into anthropological or biological study. We are studying people making ethical decisions, which is not the same as studying ethics.

If we were to go very far, we would have to agree that those who have studied murder have achieved enough of a 'scientific consensus' for the information and theory to be reasonably valid.

The point is not that the theory is invalid but that it is a theory about the wrong thing. All of the observations and questions you raise in the rest of your post:

One distinction might be the difference between killings sanctioned by society and those which are not. . . . There are also subcultures that embrace murder. . . . Can science set up a reasonable objective set of criteria to differentiate between a murderous subculture and a normal one? . . . Then there are individuals who have no pretense of belonging to an unusual subculture. . . . Most to all societies have laws and value sets which forbid such behavior. . . .

These are all observations about people making ethical decisions. They are not, themselves, ethical decisions. They skirt around the periphery of the subject of ethics without actually addressing it.

Moral questions are outside the competence of science not because of the subject matter but because of the nature of the questions, and of the assertions in answer. Grammatically, "Murder is killing" and "murder is wrong" have the same structure, which makes them look like the same sort of sentence, but this is a linguistic illusion. "Murder is killing" is making a factual statement about murder; here, the grammatical construction is not misleading. But "murder is wrong" is not making a factual assertion; it is declaring an imperative: "Don't murder."

And it isn't the "ignorance" (or any other quality) of a priest or philosopher that makes him/her competent to make moral decisions while a scientist is not. A scientist, who is a human being, IS on that basisd competent (and obligated) to make moral choices. ScientISTS can, but SCIENCE cannot. A scientist (like anyone else) must use other tools for the purpose.

Here's a stab at a moral axiom.

Do unto others as you would have them do unto you, if you were the other person.

Now let's apply this to murder. I know as well as I can know anything that, right now, I do not wish to be killed. Putting myself in your shoes I believe that like me you don't wish to be killed either. I can go even further and collect empirical data. I can ask you "do you wish to be killed?" Let's assume that you answer that I am right, you do not wish to be killed.

I have now objectively determined that if I were you I would not wish to be killed by me. Therefore I should not kill you and if I did kill you that would be wrong.

I can apply this to any other person and myself and in the vast majority of cases I would objectively conclude that I should not kill any of them. After having made this determination for many cases I may generalize that killing other people is wrong because 1. I don't wish to be killed and 2. all of those I surveyed do not wish to be killed. I can go even further and reason that if I really wished to be killed, then I would kill myself, and the fact that I am alive pretty much indicates that I don't wish to be killed. The observation that the others are also alive means that they too do not wish to be killed.

Taking all this together I come up with a moral theory that killing another person is wrong unless the the other person really, really wants to be killed and cannot kill himself. To disprove the theory you need to find a person who truly wants to be killed, but hasn't taken any action to accomplish this even though he is perfectly able to do so, and lies about his desire to be killed. According to the theory such a person should not exist, so finding one such person would invalidate it.

As to the axiom, does it rise to the level of obvious experience like the principle of casuality? It is matter of definition of want that established that I prefer that which I want. I cannot prefer that things I don't want happen to me (as opposed to things I do want). Whether I am me or you doesn't change this definitional relationship. It is true fo all people.

The clear preference is for what is done to me relative to what I want to be the same as what is done to you relative to what you want. The preference is also for me to behave in accordance to this first preference.

I don't do unto you what I wouldn't want done to me if I was you, because that is what I want to do. To do otherwise, that is, to violate the golden rule, would be acting against yourself. To kill another is to kill yourself. To steal from another is to deprive yourself of your property and so on.

Originally Posted by Matt1989

Similarly, ethical subjectivism (I'm including non-cognitivism in this) entails that one person saying 'X is Good' and another saying 'X is Bad' faces no contradiction. But this only works if by 'X is Good' this person means something like 'I like X.'

I think it would be more accurately rendered as: "Don't do X." There is a contradiction between one person saying "Do X" and another saying "Don't do X," but this does not imply an error on either person's part, only a conflict of wills. Neither of them is making a factual assertion, so neither one can be right or wrong; the question is which one will prevail.

Consider something like -- 1. Murder is wrong. 2. Killing innocent people is murder. 3. Killing innocent people is wrong. -- This is obviously valid, but a translation into subjectivist-speak makes it invalid -- 1. I dislike murder. 2. Killing innocent people is murder. 3. I dislike killing innocent people.

Uh -- actually, that second syllogism DOES follow logically. What am I missing here?

Anyway, I don't think you've proven that moral judgments entail ethical objectivism.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

Here's a stab at a moral axiom.

Do unto others as you would have them do unto you, if you were the other person.

Now let's apply this to murder. I know as well as I can know anything that, right now, I do not wish to be killed. Putting myself in your shoes I believe that like me you don't wish to be killed either. I can go even further and collect empirical data. I can ask you "do you wish to be killed?" Let's assume that you answer that I am right, you do not wish to be killed.

I have now objectively determined that if I were you I would not wish to be killed by me.

So far, so good . . .

Therefore I should not kill you and if I did kill you that would be wrong.

This does not follow, unless you have previously made that Golden Rule moral judgment, and that in itself is not an objective judgment. Certainly one can determine with reasonable certainty that the other person does not want to be killed; one can know with rather better certainty that one does not want to be killed oneself; one can reason from this plus the Golden Rule that one should not kill the other person -- but why the Golden Rule itself? That's where we run into trouble when trying for an objective morality.

If we break it down to practicalities and say, "Following the Golden Rule and persuading other people to do so is what is most likely to keep me from getting killed myself," that only puts things one step back. Why do you not wish to be killed? There is no logical reason, you just don't.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Actually, science does not rely on the principle of causality. Scientific theories are unchanged if we assume causation, or if we do not but suppose we are observing only repeatable correlation. They are also unchanged whether we assume the objective existence of the material world, or not.

There are four assumptions necessary for science, which are:

1) The laws of nature are consistent;
2) They can be discovered through observation;
3) Natural processes can be modeled rationally and confirmed through more observation; and
4) Knowledge is always imperfect..

Point 2 is dependent on the principle of causality. To make a scientific observation, you have to make use of causality. Here's a real science example. A chemist and I are working on a modification to a chemical process. Several times the chemist has made Form E crystals. I have not made Form E crystals when I implement this modification. Neither the chemist not I or Omar either ever saw Form E crystals with the old process.

We would like to use the modified process because it will save money, but we don't want to get Form E crystals. The question our management asked is what is the cause of the Form E crystals. If we knew this then we should be able to determine conditions in whcih we don't make Form E crystals and still save the money.

Both the chemist and I have a hunch that water is involved. That is, more water increases the likelihood that you get Form E crystals. Both the chemist and I agree that if we did an experiment in which we ran the reaction, split it in two and then add water to one half just before crystallization, but not to the half, that the observations the results (what kind of crystals are obtained) would answer the question.

Now, how did we come up with this experiment? By employing the principle of casuality. Here is the principle:

1 "Causality postulates that there are laws by which the occurrence of an entity B of a certain class depends on the occurrence of an entity A of another class, where the word entity means any physical object, phenomenon, situation, or event. A is called the cause, B the effect.

2 "Antecedence postulates that the cause must be prior to, or at least simultaneous with, the effect.

3 "Contiguity postulates that cause and effect must be in spatial contact or connected by a chain of intermediate things in contact."

Principle 1 tells us that it is possible to discover a cause for Form E crystals. Without that there is no point to doing science in the first place. Principle 2 tells us that any potential cause must be present before the event is observed. Thus we can rule out things that occur after after the crystals form from our list of things to look at. Principle 3 says we should focus on what is happening inside the reactor and not next door or in California. This is very important, because the set of things that could be observed is very large, whereas the set of things that are relevant (that is in accordance with causality) is much more manageable.

Without causality scientific observation is not possible since all things at all times would have to be observed, which is impossible. It would be impossible to employ controls because you cannot control everything everywhere in every time. Empiricism would not work.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

So far, so good . . .



This does not follow, unless you have previously made that Golden Rule moral judgment, and that in itself is not an objective judgment. Certainly one can determine with reasonable certainty that the other person does not want to be killed; one can know with rather better certainty that one does not want to be killed oneself; one can reason from this plus the Golden Rule that one should not kill the other person

In this section what I wrote I assumed the golden rule as an axiom. I was giving an example of constructing a moral theory (i.e. do not murder or murder is wrong) by making use of the axiom.

...but why the Golden Rule itself? That's where we run into trouble when trying for an objective morality.

I deal with that later.

If we break it down to practicalities and say, "Following the Golden Rule and persuading other people to do so is what is most likely to keep me from getting killed myself,"...

Yes, that is the crux of the matter.

...that only puts things one step back. Why do you not wish to be killed? There is no logical reason, you just don't.

The normal boiling point of methanol is 65 C. Is it necessary to know why methanol boils at 65 C in order to believe that it does? Why can't you simply stick a thermometer in a pot of boiling methanol and read off the 65 C temperature? Or look up somebody else's measurement in the CRC handbook? Doesn't this boiling point have the status of something we can just accept without explanation?

Similarly, I directly observe that I do not wish to be killed. Why is it necessary to explain why I don't want to be killed? Why cannot I simply believe my own observation--and the observations of others--as I would for the boiling point? Doesn't the fact that I don't wish to be killed have the status of something we can just accept without explanation?

Originally Posted by Mikebert

The normal boiling point of methanol is 65 C. Is it necessary to know why methanol boils at 65 C in order to believe that it does?

No, but "methanol boils at 65 C" is a completely different sort of statement than "I don't wish to be murdered." "Why" questions are not even relevant to factual analysis (unless the facts in question involve motivations of living creatures), but they are the entire subject of all values discussion, including morality.

Similarly, I directly observe that I do not wish to be killed. Why is it necessary to explain why I don't want to be killed?

As long as you are prepared to reduce your core value statement to "There is no reason why, I just do," and hence abandon any effort at an objective morality -- which necessarily involves an explanation of preferences arising from characteristics of the things preferred/not preferred -- then it isn't necessary at all.

Regarding causality: There's a philosophical difference between true causality and consistent correlation. If we observe on all occasions that procedure A correlates with form E crystals while procedure B does not, then we need not make the metaphysical jump into saying that procedure A actually causes form E crystals. As long as the correlation is constant it makes no practical difference one way or the other, and in fact science does not deal with causality properly so called, only with regularities of correlation. We may assume causality for common-sense reasons and usually we do, but it's not necessary for purposes of science.

One final point about the Golden Rule: most systems of morality go beyond enlightened self-interest. If I were in a situation where I could murder an enemy and there was no chance anyone would ever know, then all the self-interested reasoning behind refraining from killing him would be invalid, even given the premise that I don't want to be killed myself.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

No, but "methanol boils at 65 C" is a completely different sort of statement than "I don't wish to be murdered."

Why? Both are empirical observations.

"Why" questions are not even relevant to factual analysis

Huh? Why does Carl get Form E crystals and I don't. Why doesn't Carl's filtration run ten times faster than mine? Both are quite relevant to factual analysis.

As long as you are prepared to reduce your core value statement to "There is no reason why, I just do," and hence abandon any effort at an objective morality

How does this follow?

-- which necessarily involves an explanation of preferences arising from characteristics of the things preferred/not preferred

Once again why is this so.

Regarding causality: There's a philosophical difference between true causality and consistent correlation. If we observe on all occasions that procedure A correlates with form E crystals while procedure B does not, then we need not make the metaphysical jump into saying that procedure A actually causes form E crystals.

This has nothing to do with what I was talking about. I wasn't talking about correlations, but experimentation. I'm not sure you understand what the principle of causality is about.

One final point about the Golden Rule: most systems of morality go beyond enlightened self-interest.

I never said they did not. I simpy proposed the golden rules as just one example of a moral axiom. We accept it because it comports with our observations of reality as we perceive it. I made no claim that it was comprehensive.

If I were in a situation where I could murder an enemy and there was no chance anyone would ever know, then all the self-interested reasoning behind refraining from killing him would be invalid, even given the premise that I don't want to be killed myself.

No, because you could be murdered by someone else in the position where he can murder you without anyone ever knowing.

Look, it is easy to kill someone and get away with it. Serial killers only get caught because their multiple killings form a pattern that is eventually detected. If they stopped after only a single victim, every serial killer would get away with it. Anyone who takes a few sensible precautions can kill a perfect stranger without facing a significant chance that anyone would ever know they did it. In a world where people routinely did this, you would face a high possibility of being killed.

So in a world in which there are many people to whom you are a stranger, you face a serious risk of being killed--unless these strangers refrain from killing you and you they. As it is in your interest not to be killed by random strangers, it is also in your interest not to kill random strangers yourself.

But if your logic were correct, then we would all be like serial killers. And indeed, we once were. If you look at humans organized at the band or tribal level, you can find cultures whose attitudes towards strangers are like that of a serial killer. That is, each stranger you meet is someone you might kill and vice versa. Such societies have horrendous murder rates among strangers, but since most of the people present at one time are not strangers, the population does not die off. But as population rises, it becomes impossible for everyone present to be well known to each other and murder rates go up, which destabilizes the society. Jane Goodall saw this with chimps. The band grew to a size where it was larger than the average band and it split into two. Violence then broke out between the two groups who were now strangers to each other until one group had been completely killed off.

Some human bands behave similarly. Others do not. Those that do not have apparently developed some way to prevent widespread murder of strangers. I suspect they discovered some sort of moral axiom that allows people to refrain from killing strangers in their midst (and being killed by strangers). These societies, when presented with conditions that allow for increase in numbers, can grow in size without killing each other off as Goodall's chimps did.

Such an axiom might not have been consciously adopted. It could have been a "cultural mutation" that appearred in some bands. Those bands that living in an eviornment that permitted an increase in numbers could now do so without collapsing in a frezny of bloodshed. Larger societies can dominate smaller societies, muscling out smaller groups from preferred locations, allowing them to grow still larger.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

I think it would be more accurately rendered as: "Don't do X." There is a contradiction between one person saying "Do X" and another saying "Don't do X," but this does not imply an error on either person's part, only a conflict of wills. Neither of them is making a factual assertion, so neither one can be right or wrong; the question is which one will prevail.

There isn't a logical contradiction between the statements. X cannot be good and bad at the same time, but two people may disagree on what they desire.

The problem is, much like, "I like/dislike X," "Don't do X" doesn't encompass what we mean when we say "X is Good or Bad." It's true that prescriptions and statements of desire are enclosed within what we mean when we use explicitly moral terms, but there is certainly an ethical component contained in our ordinary language.

Uh -- actually, that second syllogism DOES follow logically. What am I missing here?

Here's the syllogism:

1) I dislike murder.
2) Killing innocent people is murder.
3) I dislike killing innocent people.

Because this is merely a psychological analysis, it can't be valid. Perhaps this 'I' fellow doesn't think killing innocent people is murder, even if it is objectively true. (After all, people are wrong.) Or perhaps his attitude embraces contradiction, or whatever. The conclusion does not follow.

Anyway, I don't think you've proven that moral judgments entail ethical objectivism.

Me neither, because I don't think it can be realistically proven that by 'X is Good' we mean 'X is Good' (though I'm pretty damn sure that this is the case.) But if this can be established conclusively, then value subjectivism must entail ethical objectivism.

Originally Posted by Matt1989

Here's the syllogism:

1) I dislike murder.
2) Killing innocent people is murder.
3) I dislike killing innocent people.

Because this is merely a psychological analysis, it can't be valid.

Why not? The first statement is clear. The second statement establishes an identity, which allows one to substitute "killing innocent people" for "murder" in other statements, which is what was done in the third statement. It's perfectly valid in math, why not here?

Originally Posted by Mikebert

Why? Both are empirical observations.

No, only the first one. The second one is a subjective statement of intent or desire.

Huh? Why does Carl get Form E crystals and I don't.

That's actually a "how" question disguised as a "why."

How does this follow?

From the fact that no reason can be, or has been, presented to justify not wanting to be killed.

This has nothing to do with what I was talking about. I wasn't talking about correlations, but experimentation.

The correlation is between the action of the experimenter and the outcome of the experiment. We observe the correlation; that's what the experiment proves. Causation is normally assumed, but doesn't have to be.

Your description of the evolution of societal morals and how we no longer routinely murder strangers works well as an explanation of why the Golden Rule is good for society, but not for the individual. If I violate it, it doesn't follow that I'm wanting everyone to do so.

Originally Posted by Matt1989

There isn't a logical contradiction between the statements. X cannot be good and bad at the same time, but two people may disagree on what they desire.

But moral statements aren't simply statements of personal desire, they are imperatives, calls for everyone to do X or refrain from doing Y.

Here's the syllogism:

1) I dislike murder.
2) Killing innocent people is murder.
3) I dislike killing innocent people.

Because this is merely a psychological analysis, it can't be valid. Perhaps this 'I' fellow doesn't think killing innocent people is murder, even if it is objectively true.

You've premised in #2 that he does think killing innocent people is murder. (And by the way, that IS objectively true except under certain defined circumstances.)

Me neither, because I don't think it can be realistically proven that by 'X is Good' we mean 'X is Good' (though I'm pretty damn sure that this is the case.)

It would actually take more than that. It would take proving that "X is good" isn't a meaningless statement (in the sense meant by a logical positivist).

And actually, that's what I'm saying. People may sometimes mean that as a statement of objective fact, but when they do they're talking nonsense, and under that nonsense is the non-nonsense imperative, "Do X," which remains valid as an assertion of will even though "X is good," as statement of fact, is meaningless.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

But moral statements aren't simply statements of personal desire, they are imperatives, calls for everyone to do X or refrain from doing Y.

If there is no higher authority from which morality proceeds, then it is a matter of individual feelings, which no one would have a right to demand anyone else adhere to. If morality is merely a social construct derived from evolutionary convenience, then the same holds true. It is merely society's arbitrary opinion at a given time, subject to change, and no one can be fairly bound by it.

In other words, as I said, Nietzsche was right. All that remains is the survival of the fittest, achieved by any means necessary. In that way of thinking, Hitler was not wrong because of what he did, he was only wrong because he failed.


At the risk of going slightly off-topic:

When it comes to "evolutionary psychology", global warming, inborn, unchangeable sexual orientation and any number of other currently fashionable left wing pseudo-scientific ideological premises, I think of Monty Python:

"And that, my Lord, is how we know the Earth to be banana-shaped!"

"This new learning amazes me!"

Many like to bemoan the de-legitimization of science, pinning the blame on "right wing fundamentalist Christian ideologues". The reality is that science has been demeaned and de-legitimized by a combination of politicization and (convenient) sloppiness. Empiricism and the scientific method have been rejected in favor of junk science that exists solely to provide a false impression that the left's ideological desires are "scientifically based". It is the left that has damaged the reputation of science, by ignoring its standards and exaggerating its claims.

I apologize for making things "too hard", but my position is simple. If you are claiming to be speaking on the basis of science, PROVE it, or shut up. Evidence (particularly anecdotal evidence, or flimsy computer models) is not proof, and theory is not fact.

Unfortunately, there is more at stake than merely the reputation of science. Global Warming is a pretext for socialism and economic ruin, and genetic determinism is a pretext for eugenics. The "Progressive Movement" has learned nothing in the last 100 years. The massive, public, explicit exposition of their world view and its consequences in the form of Fascism, Nazism and Communism only managed to drive them underground and into public denial about their beliefs and aims. They think they still just haven't had a chance to do it right. All those concentration camps, Gulags and killing fields just whiff right by as if they never happened...it's onward and upward on the march to Utopia. And as always, the ends justify the means.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

No, only the first one. The second one is a subjective statement of intent or desire.

If I poll voters, record prices or record temperatures, they are all data. You are asserting that data involving people's desires is qualitatively different than other sorts of data. I don't buy it. It's seems to me to be an expression of bias on your part, akin to vitalism in the early 19th century.

The correlation is between the action of the experimenter and the outcome of the experiment. We observe the correlation; that's what the experiment proves. Causation is normally assumed, but doesn't have to be.

I don't understand this. Can you give some examples. Show a hypotetical case where the assumption is wrong and yet sceince can still be done.

Your description of the evolution of societal morals and how we no longer routinely murder strangers works well as an explanation of why the Golden Rule is good for society, but not for the individual. If I violate it, it doesn't follow that I'm wanting everyone to do so.

People frequently want things to be true that just ain't so. If you murder strangers you are asking for everyone to do it. Whether you want to believe this or not is irrelevant.

Originally Posted by JustPassingThrough

I apologize for making things "too hard", but my position is simple. If you are claiming to be speaking on the basis of science, PROVE it, or shut up. Evidence (particularly anecdotal evidence, or flimsy computer models) is not proof, and theory is not fact.

Haw. This from the guy who once pronounced:

"What's more, there is strong evidence that children raised in same-sex households suffer severe dysfunction more often than not."

I asked you several times to provide evidence, and you could not do it. So should I tell YOU to shut up now?

Here's another gem from that same time period:

"There is reason to fear Muslims. It is not based on ignorance and prejudice. It is legitimate."

Repetitive tirades about your cock-eyed ideas about progressives, spouted in the face of those like Bob, Brian, and me who have testified about our actual beliefs -- well, they show that either you're incapable of understanding what these beliefs represent, or you're just a liar and smear artist. I can't decide which.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

Why not? The first statement is clear. The second statement establishes an identity, which allows one to substitute "killing innocent people" for "murder" in other statements, which is what was done in the third statement. It's perfectly valid in math, why not here?

Well this isn't math; the first premise is a statement of desire, the second is something that has objective content.

Did you read the next sentence?

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

You've premised in #2 that he does think killing innocent people is murder. (And by the way, that IS objectively true except under certain defined circumstances.)

No I haven't. I wrote that "killing innocent people is murder." A translation into subjectivist-speak doesn't mean that he thinks killing innocent people is murder, because "killing innocent people is murder" is not a moral judgment. (I should be clear on that by murder I'm referring to an unlawful killing, not an immoral one, sorry. EDIT: I don't think it really makes a difference, but this should make it clearer.)

But moral statements aren't simply statements of personal desire, they are imperatives, calls for everyone to do X or refrain from doing Y.

Again, this doesn't capture all of what we mean when we make moral judgments.

It would actually take more than that. It would take proving that "X is good" isn't a meaningless statement (in the sense meant by a logical positivist).

On the contrary, I think that if we mean what we say, then there is objective content in our idea of good. But logical positivists are committed to denying the logical function that moral statements adopt in our ordinary language. It's all just feelings for them.

Originally Posted by JustPassingThrough

If there is no higher authority from which morality proceeds, then it is a matter of individual feelings, which no one would have a right to demand anyone else adhere to.

Divine command theory or bust!

Originally Posted by JustPassingThrough

If there is no higher authority from which morality proceeds, then it is a matter of individual feelings, which no one would have a right to demand anyone else adhere to. If morality is merely a social construct derived from evolutionary convenience, then the same holds true. It is merely society's arbitrary opinion at a given time, subject to change, and no one can be fairly bound by it.

Of course I have a right to demand adherence to my code of ethics; I have a right to demand anything I damned well please. And the only justification needed is my own ability to persuade agreement.

Yes, society's opinion is subject to change, and has changed over time. And a good thing, too, or we'd still be stoning adulterers, burning witches at the stake, and crucifying disobedient slaves.

At the risk of going slightly off-topic:

That's not slightly but totally off-topic. A global warming topic exists. Go there.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Of course I have a right to demand adherence to my code of ethics; I have a right to demand anything I damned well please. And the only justification needed is my own ability to persuade agreement.

In other words, the majority is always right? If there is no other source of morality, then by definition it is so. However, why stop at democracy when there are so many other tools of "persuasion" available?

Yes, society's opinion is subject to change, and has changed over time. And a good thing, too, or we'd still be stoning adulterers, burning witches at the stake, and crucifying disobedient slaves.

But if those actions had been supported by the majority, they would by definition have been right...right? And if the same things were going on today, and the majority supported it, it would be right...right?

That's not slightly but totally off-topic. A global warming topic exists. Go there.

Not sure about global warming, but the other topics I mentioned have been discussed here. At any rate, I suggest maybe we should all leave at this point, because we are clearly not discussing libertarianism or anarchism...

Originally Posted by JustPassingThrough

Not sure about global warming, but the other topics I mentioned have been discussed here. At any rate, I suggest maybe we should all leave at this point, because we are clearly not discussing libertarianism or anarchism...

It's related to natural law (that's how it all got started), or the rules governing how we should conduct ourselves, which is related to a libertarian discussion of rights.

Originally Posted by JustPassingThrough

In other words, the majority is always right?

No, I'm always right. The majority is right only when it agrees with me.

Seriously, everyone is entitled to make moral judgments, and the consensus of those judgments constitutes the public mores. We as individuals are at liberty to disagree with the consensus at any time and try to persuade it to change. Often, it does change. We have already discussed ways in which consensus morality has evolved.

However, why stop at democracy when there are so many other tools of "persuasion" available?

Because we judge that to be wrong. (If I thought you disagreed, I might offer a stronger argument, but I know you don't.)