Originally Posted by Mikebert

If I poll voters, record prices or record temperatures, they are all data. You are asserting that data involving people's desires is qualitatively different than other sorts of data.

No, I'm saying that the assertion of a subjective opinion is qualitatively different from the collection of objective data about anything, including assertions of subjective opinions.

Show a hypotetical case where the assumption is wrong and yet sceince can still be done.

It's not that the assumption is wrong, but that it is meaningless and so neither wrong nor right. We may observe a consistent correlation between two events. If we do, assuming further that event A actually causes event B (over and above merely preceding it consistently) adds nothing operational, and cannot be verified.

If you murder strangers you are asking for everyone to do it.

Not if no one knows I'm doing it.

Morality normally means doing what is right even if it goes against personal selfish interest, enlightened or otherwise.

Originally Posted by The Rani

There is right, and then there is Right. You are right about right, but Right comes from somewhere else. All rights are just an attempt at Right, and the way I see it the more we evolve, the closer we get.

Are you sure you're not a Hindu?

Originally Posted by Matt1989

Well this isn't math; the first premise is a statement of desire, the second is something that has objective content.

That doesn't matter. A valid syllogism can include subjectives as long as the conclusion is also a subjective. For example:

1. I do not want to pay penalties on my taxes. (Subjective.)
2. If I pay my taxes late, I will have to pay a penalty. (Objective.)
3. Therefore, I do not want to pay my taxes late. (Subjective.)

No I haven't. I wrote that "killing innocent people is murder."

I was assuming that the same person was voicing all three parts of the syllogism. If that's not true, then clearly the person who doesn't like murder does not necessarily believe that.

On the contrary, I think that if we mean what we say, then there is objective content in our idea of good.

So are you saying that whenever we construct a statement in the grammatical form "A is B," automatically we have objective content? Is this content automatically real as well, or can it be fictitious or illusory?

Originally Posted by Matt1989

It's related to natural law (that's how it all got started), or the rules governing how we should conduct ourselves, which is related to a libertarian discussion of rights.

Exactly. The arguments against libertarianism from a liberal perspective are all practical rather than principled, because libertarianism and liberalism share the same principles. In fact libertarianism IS the liberalism of a former age. So the question of whether there are absolute and immutable rights which must be respected even when they no longer serve the ends of liberty, but rather the reverse, goes to the heart of the dispute.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

That doesn't matter. A valid syllogism can include subjectives as long as the conclusion is also a subjective. For example:

1. I do not want to pay penalties on my taxes. (Subjective.)
2. If I pay my taxes late, I will have to pay a penalty. (Objective.)
3. Therefore, I do not want to pay my taxes late. (Subjective.)

That isn't valid, Brian. It's an empirical claim, and may be evaluated through empirical means. (For one, perhaps this person feels like paying his taxes late, yet isn't happy with the penalty.)

So are you saying that whenever we construct a statement in the grammatical form "A is B," automatically we have objective content? Is this content automatically real as well, or can it be fictitious or illusory?

What I'm suggesting is that which assumes logical form is subject to truth analysis. The fact that we have an idea of a Martian does not mean Martians actually exist. But the Good is different, since it is potential.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Exactly. The arguments against libertarianism from a liberal perspective are all practical rather than principled, because libertarianism and liberalism share the same principles. In fact libertarianism IS the liberalism of a former age. So the question of whether there are absolute and immutable rights which must be respected even when they no longer serve the ends of liberty, but rather the reverse, goes to the heart of the dispute.

That's awfully convenient for the "liberal" perspective. The libertarian would regard such a question as incoherent, and that such rights are the very essence of liberty.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Object all you want, but it remains true. Science can only deal with what can be observed objectively and (preferably) measured. But some things CAN'T be observed objectively. You cannot -- ever -- look at something and objectively determine that it is good or bad. That's simply not an objective question of fact.

Different professions make different sorts of judgments working from different sorts of systems. The systems are generated from different sorts of tools.

The priest needs a system to determine if an action is a sin or not. His major tool might be holy writ.

A philosopher attempts to generate a system which can differentiate moral and immoral. His primary tool is reason.

An ordinary citizen sitting on a jury must decide guilt or innocence. His tools include evidence, testimony and instructions from the judge.

A scientist can study to determine if an action is considered normal to a society or not. He can also study whether a particular society is comparable to the general norms of societies. All societies set up norms of behavior. As indicated above, one society can have several different types of norms, and each type of norm can have many competing systems. Each society might reasonably have many religions, many schools of philosophy, and even many legal jurisdictions. One size does not fit all.

You seem to be suggesting that the question of sin or morality is essentially different than the question of whether a behavior is normal and acceptable in most human societies or a given human society. I do not see any distinction. The priest, philosopher, jurist or scientist are all judging if a behavior is acceptable or not. They are doing so from different perspectives, using different tools, and are seeking to achieve different aims.

But I personally prefer to set up my system of judgement in terms of what I can be observed empirically of human nature. I grew up Catholic. I was told God would torture me after death if I ate meat on a Friday. I took philosophy courses in college. They taught many consistent but conflicting approaches to morality, none of which can be uniquely proven. All one can do with philosophy is argue endlessly. When I attempt to understand and judge the merits of human behavior, I would read books on social science rather than holy writ or philosophical treatise.

You used murder as an example. I responded based on my understanding of human nature which is based more on On Killing than other works. I made a few distinctions. Is the killing in the line of duty by a soldier or police officer? Is the killing by a member of a subculture (such as the Mafia or KKK) which uses violence to achieve goals outside the main culture? These are two critical issues I believe relevant to discussions of The Theory on this board. I will not claim that there might not be other worthy distinctions that I didn't hit in my short response.

Let's apply those standards on murder to the recent killings at the Holocaust Museums. I would absolve the guard who shot the white supremacist. He was a police officer acting in the line of duty. I would not absolve the white supremacist. Thus, your challenge is answered. Criteria can be set up through empirical observation. These criteria can be used by anyone to make judgments.

This is of course a relatively superficial example of a clear crime. There are other problems that would be much more controversial. Still, if you would care to ask a moral question, I will let one person answer using holy writ, another using pure reason, and I would try to do a survey of widely different cultures to see how the problem has been handled, well and poorly, in different regions, at different technology levels and in different eras. What behaviors ought to be allowed? What happens if specific questionable behaviors are allowed? What level of punishment and enforcement might bring a problem behavior under control? These are serious questions which deserve serious study. Parroting an answer from an ancient tome or thinking up an answer of the top of one's head without examining the data do not seem reasonable practices.

I believe an argument based on empirical observation of human kind would be as worthy, more worthy, than the other approaches.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

Different professions make different sorts of judgments working from different sorts of systems. The systems are generated from different sorts of tools.

It's not just different professions, but different sorts of questions, that require different tools.

An ordinary citizen sitting on a jury must decide guilt or innocence. His tools include evidence, testimony and instructions from the judge.

Guilt or innocence is a factual question, and completely different for this reason from questions of morality. Ideally, it should be approached using scientific method, but for practical reasons that's not possible in court, so juries use a standard of evidence which is not as exacting as science. Still, they are observing evidence and evaluating it in terms of fact. Juries aren't supposed to decide whether the behavior in question, or the laws it allegedly violates, pass moral muster. They are simply supposed to determine fact.

You seem to be suggesting that the question of sin or morality is essentially different than the question of whether a behavior is normal and acceptable in most human societies or a given human society. I do not see any distinction. The priest, philosopher, jurist or scientist are all judging if a behavior is acceptable or not.

First of all, that's not true of the juror.

Secondly, the word "acceptable" means something different in the context of science than it does in the context of moral judgment, so although the same word is applicable, the priest, philosopher, and scientist are NOT trying to answer the same question. Put simply, the priest determines whether God finds a behavior acceptable, the scientist determines whether a society under study finds the behavior acceptable, and the philosopher determines whether he, personally finds the behavior acceptable (and whether others should).

There is a difference between studying the way societies make moral judgments, and making moral judgments oneself. The first is a study of objective facts, and therefore something for which science is competent. The second is not.

But I personally prefer to set up my system of judgement in terms of what I can be observed empirically of human nature.

How, exactly?

Let's apply those standards on murder to the recent killings at the Holocaust Museums. I would absolve the guard who shot the white supremacist. He was a police officer acting in the line of duty. I would not absolve the white supremacist. Thus, your challenge is answered. Criteria can be set up through empirical observation. These criteria can be used by anyone to make judgments.

No, you have not answered the challenge. You have presented your own personal judgments as to which killings should be condemned. You have not shown how those judgments could be falsified. I, personally, agree with you that the white supremacist's actions should be condemned. But how would you prove this? More to the point, how would you prove to the contrary, if in fact the contrary were objectively true? (As you may know, science proceeds more often by presenting a hypothesis and attempting to disprove it, than by proving affirmatives.)

It's easy to prove that such-and-such a society condemns murder while exonerating killing under circumstances not defined as murder, but that's not the same thing. How do you prove that societies making this sort of judgment are right? Or, if they're wrong, how do you prove that?

That's the challenge. Not only have you not met it, you haven't even tried, which makes me suspect you haven't understood it.

Originally Posted by Matt1989

That isn't valid, Brian. It's an empirical claim, and may be evaluated through empirical means. (For one, perhaps this person feels like paying his taxes late, yet isn't happy with the penalty.)

Strictly speaking, you're right, but only because I did a sloppy job of framing the syllogism. Let me rephrase:

1. I don't under any circumstances want to pay penalties on my taxes, ever, and this is more important than putting off paying my taxes.
2. If I pay my taxes late, I will have to pay a penalty.
3. Therefore, I don't want to pay my taxes late.

The point being that emotional declarations, and also moral imperatives, are not immune to logic, except for the core values. #1 is not open to logical refutation (as stated). But #3 is clearly a product of reasoning from the emotional preference stated in #1 and the factual statement in #2. Although these are not moral statements, the relationship between #1 and #3 is the same as between what I am calling core values and derivative values, and so this illustrates the role that logic plays in morality: not a final determiner, but not unimportant, either.

What I'm suggesting is that which assumes logical form is subject to truth analysis. The fact that we have an idea of a Martian does not mean Martians actually exist. But the Good is different, since it is potential.

Martians are also potential (although the potential is not very strong). I would say the Good is different, since it is not a statement of fact.

Suppose I were to say, "Hillary Rodham Clinton, the Secretary of State and former First Lady, is actually a Martian. Her blood is based on copper metabolism rather than iron, and she actually breathes through spiracles on her lower back, to which is attached a filter which renders our atmosphere non-poisonous." This is a falsifiable (and, I trust, false) statement. We could draw a blood sample from Ms. Clinton, or perform a strip-search to locate her alleged breathing filter.

But suppose I were instead to say, "Hillary Rodham Clinton is an evil person. She wants to turn the government of the United States over to a world government." Now, the second sentence is falsifiable, but the first is not; even if it is proven that Ms. Clinton does indeed want to turn the government of the U.S. over to a world government, how do we determine whether this (or anything else about her) is "evil"? Or, perhaps more pertinently, how do we prove objectively and finally that it is not? For that matter, if we prove that Ms. Clinton does NOT want to end U.S. sovereignty, does that prove that she is not "evil"? No, because it could be that NOT wanting to end U.S. sovereignty is "evil."

Now, among those who agree that wanting to end U.S. sovereignty is evil, proving that Ms. Clinton has this ambition would prove that she is indeed evil -- but the key, non-objective judgment has already been made before posing the question. All that remains, then, are questions of fact, and questions of fact are certainly truth-apt.

That's awfully convenient for the "liberal" perspective. The libertarian would regard such a question as incoherent, and that such rights are the very essence of liberty

No honest, thinking libertarian would regard the question as incoherent. It certainly is not. But yes, they would regard such rights as the very essence of liberty -- hence the importance of that question, and this discussion, for this thread. If rights are not fixed, but mutable, changing with circumstances, then it is possible that we may both establish new rights, and abolish old ones, with corresponding changes in government powers and restrictions on government.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Strictly speaking, you're right, but only because I did a sloppy job of framing the syllogism. Let me rephrase:

1. I don't under any circumstances want to pay penalties on my taxes, ever, and this is more important than putting off paying my taxes.
2. If I pay my taxes late, I will have to pay a penalty.
3. Therefore, I don't want to pay my taxes late.

The point being that emotional declarations, and also moral imperatives, are not immune to logic, except for the core values. #1 is not open to logical refutation (as stated). But #3 is clearly a product of reasoning from the emotional preference stated in #1 and the factual statement in #2. Although these are not moral statements, the relationship between #1 and #3 is the same as between what I am calling core values and derivative values, and so this illustrates the role that logic plays in morality: not a final determiner, but not unimportant, either.

This still isn't valid. The obvious remedy would be to transform #2 into, "If I pay my taxes late, I know I will have to pay a penalty." But still, is it required logically that 'I' doesn't want to pay his taxes late? Certainly not, just as people infer the wrong conclusion from preceding premises. Regardless, I'll put the core and derivative values in this form, trying to keep in line all that you are saying (correct if you would):

1) For X, "Don't do X!" (core value, emotional statement)
2) Killing innocents is X. (factual statement)
3) Therefore, "Don't kill innocents!" (derivative value, prescriptivism)

Get what I'm saying? This isn't valid. Nothing can possibly follow from "Don't do X!" since "Don't do X!" isn't even a logical assertion. It's along the lines of "X, Eww!" i.e. that which lacks logical sense. It's nothing like "All men are mortal." But I don't think "X is immoral" means "Don't do X."

But suppose I were instead to say, "Hillary Rodham Clinton is an evil person. She wants to turn the government of the United States over to a world government." Now, the second sentence is falsifiable, but the first is not; even if it is proven that Ms. Clinton does indeed want to turn the government of the U.S. over to a world government, how do we determine whether this (or anything else about her) is "evil"?

Well if we can establish that there is such a thing as evil (that's what we've been debating), then it's pretty clear that something like the Jewish Holocaust was evil, no? If the concept of evil exists, and it means what we think it means, then we're in pretty good shape I think...

Originally Posted by Matt1989

Get what I'm saying? This isn't valid. Nothing can possibly follow from "Don't do X!" since "Don't do X!" isn't even a logical assertion.

I'm getting a sense that our real disagreement amounts to a lack of respect on your part for human will, motivation, and passion. What you seem to be saying here is that all non-rational mental activities are completely chaotic and impossible to understand anyway, so there's no point in trying to apply logical rules to them.

"Don't do X" is a logical assertion, just not a factual one. We can apply the same rules to imperatives that we do to factual statements, in that they must be consistently applied in similar circumstances. To do otherwise is error, not an error of fact, but an error of falsehood to oneself.

There is a close relationship between imperatives (let's say for the moment imperatives applied to oneself) and factual statements. Neither one leads to action by itself. Imperatives assert, "do A in circumstance X," while factual statements assert, "The circumstance is X," so that only the combination of them results in A being done. In fact, "Do X" is an incomplete form of an assertion. It is always "Do X in circumstance Y," although often Y is unspecified because what is meant is "Do X NOW" -- that is, we are in circumstance Y, so do X.

Well if we can establish that there is such a thing as evil (that's what we've been debating), then it's pretty clear that something like the Jewish Holocaust was evil, no? If the concept of evil exists, and it means what we think it means, then we're in pretty good shape I think...

We are going to agree that the Holocaust was evil, but disagree about what that agreement entails. Where you see a statement of fact, I see a judgment from the will. I don't see it as an objective fact about the Holocaust that we can both perceive, but rather a congruence of values between you and me that leads us both to reject genocide. Really, if moral statements were statements of fact, then all moral disputes (over abortion, say, or homosexuality, or any other controversial subject) could be simply and finally resolved through an objective test. It's precisely because moral statements are NOT statements of fact that there is ongoing disagreement. Maybe not much about something as extreme as the Holocaust, but certainly about more marginal issues.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

I'm getting a sense that our real disagreement amounts to a lack of respect on your part for human will, motivation, and passion. What you seem to be saying here is that all non-rational mental activities are completely chaotic and impossible to understand anyway, so there's no point in trying to apply logical rules to them.

Not really. I'm suggesting that expressions of mental activities have no location in logical space. Trying to understand them is a matter of psychology, not philosophy.

We are going to agree that the Holocaust was evil, but disagree about what that agreement entails. Where you see a statement of fact, I see a judgment from the will. I don't see it as an objective fact about the Holocaust that we can both perceive, but rather a congruence of values between you and me that leads us both to reject genocide. Really, if moral statements were statements of fact, then all moral disputes (over abortion, say, or homosexuality, or any other controversial subject) could be simply and finally resolved through an objective test. It's precisely because moral statements are NOT statements of fact that there is ongoing disagreement. Maybe not much about something as extreme as the Holocaust, but certainly about more marginal issues.

Consensus is hard to come by in ethics. So what? It's a social or political science. Can the fourth turning theory be finally resolved through an 'objective test?' Can metaphysical or epistemological questions be resolved this way?

Originally Posted by Matt1989

Not really. I'm suggesting that expressions of mental activities have no location in logical space. Trying to understand them is a matter of psychology, not philosophy.

It could be either one. If you're studying the expression of mental activities as an aspect of human behavior, then that's psychology. But if you're considering them at face value in terms of their meaning, that's philosophy.

Consensus is hard to come by in ethics. So what? It's a social or political science. Can the fourth turning theory be finally resolved through an 'objective test?' Can metaphysical or epistemological questions be resolved this way?

Of those, the 4T theory is the only one that might be considered social science, and no, it's too broad to establish by a simple test. (As is the theory of relativity, or the theory of evolution, or really anything in science which is called a theory.) However, there are predictions that it makes which generate hypotheses which might be tested empirically. For example, we would expect more Millennial college grads to go into the sciences and government, as a percentage, with more Xers going into business and the arts. This prediction is quite falsifiable. If enough predictions which flow from the theory turn out not to be true, we will need to reconsider the theory itself. There are experiments that can be done in psychology; I did some of them myself when I was a psych major. It's a mistake to think that social sciences aren't science, although they are not as precise as physics and require statistical treatment.

Metaphysical and epistemological questions are obviously in the area of philosophy, not science. I would argue that these are not dealing with questions of objective fact, either. I could go into more detail but that's outside the thread topic.

Moral statements are non-falsifiable not because they are vague or indefinite (usually they're not), but because they are not statements of fact. It's possible to meaningfully agree or disagree with a moral statement, because one makes one's own moral judgments which may or may not concur with those made by someone else, and since the intent of moral statements is usually that they be universal rather than individual, they are not identical to statements of personal preference. But nor are they statements of fact.

To the point of this thread: Rights are not fixed. They are guarantees that we make to people within the context of a society, that certain things in their life will be protected. Exactly what things is very context- dependent. When classical liberalism (which we now call libertarianism) was developed in the Enlightenment, the "conservative" position championed such things as hereditary privilege. Limited government, free markets, and the assertion of equality regardless of birth, were counters to hereditary privilege and the governments that supported it. Today, especially in America, we have no titled nobility any longer, and some of the elements of classical liberalism have become either irelevant or actually counterproductive. They leave people at the mercy of our new elites, who are wealthy capitalists rather than lords and ladies. Other aspects are still relevant, but those are shared between libertarianism and modern liberalism.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

No, I'm saying that the assertion of a subjective opinion is qualitatively different from the collection of objective data about anything..

That seems a rather arbitrary distinction. Why do you hold this notion?

This is more for Matt. My understanding of logic is it deals with the truth value of statements. If I say I feel cold, this is a subjective opinion, but it still has a truth content.

Take the original statements:

1. I dislike murder
2. Murder is the killing of innocent people
3. I dislike the killing of innocent people

Let A denote "murder" and B denote "the killing of innocent people"

Then these statements are

1. I dislike A
2. A = B
3. I dislike B

How is this not valid for any choice of A and B such that the statements 1 and 2 are true?

Suppose A = dogs and B is Canis lupus familiaris. The statement is still true.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

This is more for Matt. My understanding of logic is it deals with the truth value of statements. If I say I feel cold, this is a subjective opinion, but it still has a truth content.

Take the original statements:

1. I dislike murder
2. Murder is the killing of innocent people
3. I dislike the killing of innocent people

The problem is that this is a psychological claim. Is there anything illogical about someone saying, "Although I dislike murder, and murder is the killing of innocent people, I actually DO like the killing of innocent people."? This is a very sick mind, no doubt, who can't see the contradiction in his views, but there is nothing that logically binds him to dislike killing innocent people from the preceding premises.

Unlike:

1. Murder is bad.
2. Murder is the killing of innocent people.
3. Killing innocent people is bad.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

That seems a rather arbitrary distinction. Why do you hold this notion?

It's the difference between observing and doing. I observe someone else's behavior, but I do my own. I feel my own feelings, and think my own thoughts, and these are categorically different from observing the feelings and thoughts of others (even to the extent the latter is possible).

Originally Posted by Matt1989

Is there anything illogical about someone saying, "Although I dislike murder, and murder is the killing of innocent people, I actually DO like the killing of innocent people."?

Yes, there is. You seem to think that emotions are completely immune to logic. That's just not so.

Originally Posted by Matt1989

Is there anything illogical about someone saying, "Although I dislike murder, and murder is the killing of innocent people, I actually DO like the killing of innocent people."?

Yes there is. If he is saying

I dislike A
A = B
I don't dislike B.

that is illogical.

But if he has a sick mind, then his mind cannot be expected to work properly and it is not surprising that what he says is illogical.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

It's the difference between observing and doing. I observe someone else's behavior, but I do my own. I feel my own feelings, and think my own thoughts, and these are categorically different from observing the feelings and thoughts of others (even to the extent the latter is possible).

And why is this relevant? Can you give some illustrative examples, because I just don't get where you are coming from.

I don't get where Matt is coming from either.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

And why is this relevant?

Because making a value judgment is doing, while observing value judgments being made is observing. They are two categorically different activities.

It's exactly like the difference between studying the physiology or psychology of being in love, and being in love. Or studying art history, and creating art. Or watching a track meet and running in it.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Yes, there is. You seem to think that emotions are completely immune to logic. That's just not so.

I never said that. I've said that reasoning via statements of subjective attitudes cannot take a logically valid form. Everyone's attitudes can only be evaluated by... gauging their attitudes.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

Yes there is. If he is saying

I dislike A
A = B
I don't dislike B.

that is illogical.

But if he has a sick mind, then his mind cannot be expected to work properly and it is not surprising that what he says is illogical.

The mere fact that he can actually dislike A and not dislike B (which you acknowledge is possible) shows that there is no logical validity. (This is related to Wittgenstein's point that illogical thought is impossible.)

Originally Posted by Mikebert

I don't get where Matt is coming from either.

Brian wasn't buying my arguments from earlier, so I decided to bulk up another area in order to give a good reason for objective ethics.

1) If 'Good' and 'Bad' (right/moral) have contradictory meanings in common language, then there is objective content to our conceptions of 'Good' and 'Bad.'
2) But the non-cognitivist argues that 'X is Good' means 'Do X!' or 'I like X!' or something along those lines.
3) But since it's quite likely true that moral judgments play a logical role in common discourse, then they can't be statements about subjective attitude, since subjective attitudes deny moral judgments their logical validity.
4) So there is objective content in our conceptions of 'Good' and 'Bad.'

So if we act in response to a judgment of value (a different point entirely, but one that was made earlier), and that the form of value judgments entails objectivity, then we cannot act without recognizing the existence of objective value.

Originally Posted by Matt1989

I never said that. I've said that reasoning via statements of subjective attitudes cannot take a logically valid form.

Amounts to the same thing. The only reason to believe that is because one believes that desires are immune to logic.

The mere fact that he can actually dislike A and not dislike B (which you acknowledge is possible) shows that there is no logical validity.

False. The only way that would be true, is if likes and dislikes that directly contradict each other in this way were a normal and common thing. We have already agreed that this hypothetical person is mentally abnormal.

1) If 'Good' and 'Bad' (right/moral) have contradictory meanings in common language, then there is objective content to our conceptions of 'Good' and 'Bad.'

Untrue. There are many completely subjective assertions which have contradictory meanings in common language. For example, "I am happy" and "I am sad," or "I love you" and "I hate you," or "I like that" and "I don't like that."

The remainder of your argument depends on this first premise and falls with it.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

False. The only way that would be true, is if likes and dislikes that directly contradict each other in this way were a normal and common thing. We have already agreed that this hypothetical person is mentally abnormal.

So logical conclusions are valid only if the subject in question meets certain psychological requirements? Doesn't this go against the word 'valid'?

Untrue. There are many completely subjective assertions which have contradictory meanings in common language. For example, "I am happy" and "I am sad," or "I love you" and "I hate you," or "I like that" and "I don't like that."

Um. There is objective content in our concepts of human emotion (That is, the same person cannot have an overall positive opinion of X and a negative overall opinion of X at the same time.). It's simply that what is true for you might not be not true for some. IOW, two people disagreeing over whether something is morally good face a contradiction; two people disagreeing over whether they like something face no contradiction:

If the realist is right, when I say 'killing innocents is Good,' and you say 'killing innocents is Bad,' then at least one of us is wrong because our positions are contradictory.

However, when I say 'I like killing innocents' and you say 'I dislike killing innocents,' then no one is necessarily wrong and our positions are not contradictory. It's just two statements of our attitudes toward an action.

The remainder of your argument depends on this first premise and falls with it.

Fortunately, there's nothing wrong with the first statement, which is really just an explanation of one facet of realism.

Originally Posted by Matt1989

I never said that. I've said that reasoning via statements of subjective attitudes cannot take a logically valid form. Everyone's attitudes can only be evaluated by... gauging their attitudes.

Except that you cannot gauge what you cannot observe. And the only thing you can observe about a person other than yourself is his actions. His values are completely opaque to you.

In fact, his motivations (that is, the context in which he applies his values) are ultimately inaccessible to an observer, too. So not only can you not observe another's values; all you can really do is guess at the possible contexts for the application of what might be his values.