Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

You seem to be echoing a perspective on rights shared by the Enlightenment philosophers, Founding Fathers and First Congress. Rights are not invented by men or enacted by governments. If anyone created them, it was God. They always existed. However, using reason, humans can deduce a well known and finite collection of rights. Those who do not agree with their reasoning, using a modern terminology, got dissed.

Indeed. But few Enlightenment philosophers believed that God created rights per se; they are woven into the fabric of reality; the relationship to God is more indirect then.

I see rights as being ideas, and fit the 'meme' concept. Ideas are thought up by men and women. Good ideas are shared and put into practice. Bad ideas don't spread. Obsolete ideas fade and are forgotten.

OK. But what about good ideas (or good recognition of rights) that don't catch on because there are (powerful) players that do not want these ideas to be recognized as correct?

The notion that all government employees will on Cold Turkey day not report to work, and this will happen without elections and legislation?

Umm... Sure. Right.

I don't think anybody's ever suggested that as a worthwhile possibility.

Matt - a question for you .... you are a bright young man with strong opinions..... if some reliable polling group took a survey of the American public, what percentage of people do you think actually understand what natural rights are and their difference between legal rights or Constitutional rights?

And I mean a real survey of real average people not a survey on libertarian posting boards.

Originally Posted by haymarket martyr

Matt - a question for you .... you are a bright young man with strong opinions..... if some reliable polling group took a survey of the American public, what percentage of people do you think actually understand what natural rights are and their difference between legal rights or Constitutional rights?

And I mean a real survey of real average people not a survey on libertarian posting boards.

Thanks, and it depends on the question. If it were asked, "What's the difference between natural and legal rights?" I'd bet most people would get close to the mark. If it were simply asked, "What's a natural right?" I'd imagine that most people wouldn't be able to articulate the right answer.

But I don't think this is too important; it's only really relevant for those who are interested in the philosophical "why?" I also would assert that most people have a good intuitive understanding of what natural rights are, and can spot a good amount of rights-violations when they see them. I do think, however, that the correct conception of what our natural rights should be is colored, usually negatively, by the institutions that surround us and are imbued in our daily lives. Hence (part of) the importance of breaking free of these corrosive influences.

Originally Posted by Matt1989

OK, but the violence itself would not be aggressive, provided it is proportional (or less than) the initial act.

It's the threat of violence that's aggressive. Aggression doesn't require that actual physical violence be done. For example, suppose a robber aims a gun at you and demands your wallet. Has the robber physically hurt you? Not yet! But he has threatened to do so, and that threat constitutes aggression.

Private property is a threat of violence, and hence aggression, that is institutionalized in our culture, so that it is implied in law and does not have to be overtly made except to small children who have not internalized it yet, and to would-be thieves. The actual carrying out of violence in response to theft is not the aggression. It's the original making of the threat that is aggressive.

Whether it constitutes a threat depends on how you view threats

How about in accordance with the plain meaning of the English word "threat"? That is, the communication of an intent to cause bodily harm or some other consequence, often conditioned on some demand made to the person or persons being threatened. If this description is met, then you have a threat. "Give me your wallet or I'll shoot you" is a threat. "Get off my property or I'll call the police" is a threat. "Pay your bill or I'll take you to court" is a threat. Are these morally equivalent? No, or at least I don't think they are, but they are all threats, because the plain meaning of the word is morally neutral.

I'm not sure how this makes the concept of "initiation of force" useless as a moral principle, unless we view a "threat" of non-aggressive violence as being an initiation of force itself.

For a threat of violence to be "non-aggressive," it must be defensive -- that is, a threat meant to deter some hostile action. But that's not the case with property.

The confusion arises if one thinks of property as pre-existing its social/cultural/legal assignment to its owners, in which the threat is incorporated. But you said it yourself: prior to that assignment, property is either owned in common or unowned. In neither case is it owned by a particular person. Until its ownership is defined, taking and using the property cannot be seen as an act of aggression. Therefore, the threat which defines ownership is an act of aggression, not one of defense.

This is what makes the concept of "initiation of force" morally useless. There is an enormous category of aggressive force -- the definition of ownership -- which those who assert this principle would defend.

Originally Posted by Me

But both rights and laws comes down to something simple. "If you do such-and-such a vile thing to me and mine, we are going to do something about it. We will by assorted means strive to prevent you from doing it again."

Originally Posted by Matt1989

OK. But what about good ideas (or good recognition of rights) that don't catch on because there are (powerful) players that do not want these ideas to be recognized as correct?

This would depend on how many people embrace the idea and how strongly.

I do see Crises and Awakenings as times when new ideas and new rights are declared, or extended to a group of people who did not have them before. The Declaration of Independence, Gettysburg Address, Four Freedoms speech and I Have a Dream speech might stand as examples of major documents invoking rights. These might stand as examples. I would anticipate new values declared in an awakening, a spiral of violence is possible in the late unraveling, leading to conflict and transformation in the crisis.

It is quite common that the establishment (powerful players) will have things set up to their advantage, making a lot of people upset that rights are being trodden upon. Sometimes violence is necessary. Sometimes due process under democracy might suffice. There are other alternatives including non-violence, civil disobedience, persistent repetition of propaganda and other.

I'm a boomer, of course. I remember the 1960s. A bunch of people have to get very angry and very loud before the Establishment gives, before democracy forces an entrenched ruling elite to shift policy. The younger generations do not seem to appreciate the idealism and intensity required to achieve change. There is lots of boomer bashing going on on this forum and elsewhere.

But without said idealism and intensity, without a lot of people willing to really push for their ideas and ideals, nothing much happens.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

How about in accordance with the plain meaning of the English word "threat"? That is, the communication of an intent to cause bodily harm or some other consequence, often conditioned on some demand made to the person or persons being threatened. If this description is met, then you have a threat. "Give me your wallet or I'll shoot you" is a threat. "Get off my property or I'll call the police" is a threat. "Pay your bill or I'll take you to court" is a threat. Are these morally equivalent? No, or at least I don't think they are, but they are all threats, because the plain meaning of the word is morally neutral.

Thanks for this -- it clarifies why typical libertarian terminology about aggression is confusing.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

For a threat of violence to be "non-aggressive," it must be defensive -- that is, a threat meant to deter some hostile action. But that's not the case with property.

Sure it is. If I'm growing crops for food, pulling up the shoots without my permission is absolutely a hostile action -- just as much as taking food directly out of my hand. There is definitely a moral basis for (some of the things we call) property.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

Sure it is. If I'm growing crops for food, pulling up the shoots without my permission is absolutely a hostile action -- just as much as taking food directly out of my hand.

AFTER the property has been defined as yours, yes. But not BEFORE it's defined as yours. And the definition of it as belonging to some individual is itself an act of aggression. It's the threat of punishment if anyone except the designated owner makes use of the goods. A threat is aggression, as I pointed out above, and the definition of property includes a threat.

There is definitely a moral basis for (some of the things we call) property.

I'm not disputing that, I'm just saying that this moral basis cannot be the "initiation of force" principle. The assertion of property ownership IS initiation of force -- so if there's a moral justification of it, then initiation of force is not always wrong.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

It's the threat of violence that's aggressive. Aggression doesn't require that actual physical violence be done. For example, suppose a robber aims a gun at you and demands your wallet. Has the robber physically hurt you? Not yet! But he has threatened to do so, and that threat constitutes aggression.

Private property is a threat of violence, and hence aggression, that is institutionalized in our culture, so that it is implied in law and does not have to be overtly made except to small children who have not internalized it yet, and to would-be thieves. The actual carrying out of violence in response to theft is not the aggression. It's the original making of the threat that is aggressive.

How about in accordance with the plain meaning of the English word "threat"? That is, the communication of an intent to cause bodily harm or some other consequence, often conditioned on some demand made to the person or persons being threatened. If this description is met, then you have a threat. "Give me your wallet or I'll shoot you" is a threat. "Get off my property or I'll call the police" is a threat. "Pay your bill or I'll take you to court" is a threat. Are these morally equivalent? No, or at least I don't think they are, but they are all threats, because the plain meaning of the word is morally neutral.

For a threat of violence to be "non-aggressive," it must be defensive -- that is, a threat meant to deter some hostile action. But that's not the case with property.

OK, let me clarify. Suppose I seriously assert something like "If you attempt to shoot me, then I will attempt to knock you out." Does this assertion constitute aggression? Well, I don't think so, and the intuitive response appears to be 'no.' It's a conditional, and the first criteria must be satisfied if it is to be put in play. I am not threatening you with violence per se; I'm threatening you with violence if you first use violence against me. What's the difference, then, between "If you don't give me your wallet, then I will shoot you" and the above statement? Well, in the first, the condition (attempting to shoot someone) is indeed an act of violence, and in the second, the condition (failing to give the robber one's wallet) is not. That is, a threat, if it could be called that in all cases, only constitutes aggression if the implied physical violence itself would be an initiatory case of violence.

So I think that if property is originally unowned, then the "threat" must be defensive, as property itself is not an act of violence. If it's a threat, then it's implying retaliatory violence.

Originally Posted by Matt1989

OK, let me clarify. Suppose I seriously assert something like "If you attempt to shoot me, then I will attempt to knock you out." Does this assertion constitute aggression?

That depends. Do you have any reason to believe that the person you're talking to intends to shoot you, or might be tempted to do so? If yes, then the aggression is on his part. If not -- does paranoid belligerence count as aggression? I would say so.

So I think that if property is originally unowned, then the "threat" must be defensive, as property itself is not an act of violence. If it's a threat, then it's implying retaliatory violence.

No, not if property is originally unowned. The only way that could be true is if property is NEITHER originally unowned, NOR originally in common ownership, but in the rightful possession of its individual, private owners from the beginning -- and that's not the case.

I'm going to answer the question you raised earlier and say that property is originally unowned. But consider what that means. It means that it belongs to nobody, that it is free for anyone's use who wants to use it. Consider a fruit tree in a field back in precivilized times. Nobody owns that tree, it's just there, and animals who eat fruit (such as humans) can come along and pluck fruit from the tree any time they want and eat it. Now a band of humans moves into the area, and claims that unowned fruit tree. (It's now communal rather than private property, but the principle is the same.) How do they do this? By posting guards on the tree and scaring away or killing any animals that try to take the fruit, including other humans. Thus property is defined through an act of aggression. It's only after this that anything that might be called "defense" of the property comes into play. If the property is already owned, then someone trying to take it without authorization is a "thief," and penalties threatened for this "theft" are retaliatory. But if the property is NOT owned already, then claiming it in the first place is aggression, not retaliation.

So if we are going to defend property rights, then we cannot condemn all initiatory force. The aggression that creates private (or communal) property in the first place is something we must condone, or property cannot exist.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

AFTER the property has been defined as yours, yes. But not BEFORE it's defined as yours.

I'm not assuming any "defining" has occurred. There's no need to do that. In the example I gave, I had been growing crops -- expending labor in a given area. Reasonable people would agree that interfering with that activity, once begun, is an act of aggression. I don't need to have a land title or put up fences in order for that moral truth to be clear.

I didn't need to threaten anyone to establish that property. I just needed to engage in labor. No threat is necessary, either. What if I'm a pacifist? Is the product of my labor not mine simply because I won't retaliate if you try to take it? (This may be a poor strategy, but our moral sense sides with the pacifist. The crop vandal is the aggressor.)

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

I'm not disputing that, I'm just saying that this moral basis cannot be the "initiation of force" principle. The assertion of property ownership IS initiation of force -- so if there's a moral justification of it, then initiation of force is not always wrong.

The "initiation of force" concept is an attempt to clarify our moral sense of how ownership emerges. We don't see a moral requirement to "ask permission" before making use of the natural world to meet our needs. Rather, people should do whatever they like until their patterns of behavior come into conflict. At the point of conflict, they either agree to cooperate or one of the parties engages in aggression. All that the "initiation of force" principle does is highlight people who are unwilling to cooperate as villains.

(None of the above should be construed as an endorsement of any particular aspect of modern property law as "automatically" moral or non-aggressive. Rather, the point of having a theory of property is to be able to assess the moral standing of current property titles.)

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

I'm not assuming any "defining" has occurred. There's no need to do that. In the example I gave, I had been growing crops -- expending labor in a given area. Reasonable people would agree that interfering with that activity, once begun, is an act of aggression. I don't need to have a land title or put up fences in order for that moral truth to be clear.

On the contrary, yes, you do! You are not entitled to work land, or grow crops on land, that doesn't belong to you. If it belongs to someone else, then you are trespassing by doing that. If it doesn't belong to anyone, then you must claim it in order to be entitled to crops grown on the land, no matter who does the work.

I didn't need to threaten anyone to establish that property. I just needed to engage in labor.

Yes, you did have to threaten someone! Look, either you said (or implied), "This land is mine," or you didn't. If you did, then implicit in that is, "Use this land without my permission and you will be punished," which is a threat. If you did not claim the land, then you are not asserting ownership either of the land itself or of its produce. You may think that the mere fact that you are working the land entitles you to it, but neither law nor custom supports you in this, and there's no guarantee others will agree. If they don't, then you must defend your ownership, which means you must threaten consequences to anyone who challenges it.

What if I'm a pacifist? Is the product of my labor not mine simply because I won't retaliate if you try to take it? (This may be a poor strategy, but our moral sense sides with the pacifist. The crop vandal is the aggressor.)

Only if we agree that the pacifist owns the land. This is subject to the reasoning above. Either the land is owned by someone else already, in which case the pacifist is trespassing, or it's owned by nobody, in which case the title needs to be clarified and merely planting crops on it does not amount to a valid claim of ownership -- unless, of course, there's an agreed-upon public rule to that effect. And in that case, the threat is issued, not by the individual, but by the community on the individual's behalf. Nevertheless, it's still a threat.

The "initiation of force" concept is an attempt to clarify our moral sense of how ownership emerges. We don't see a moral requirement to "ask permission" before making use of the natural world to meet our needs.

It's not a matter of asking permission. Of whom would you ask it?

Look, unowned land is not a real-world feature at this time. Back when it was, though, there was no universally agreed rule that whoever wanted to use natural resources could do so or that property would be defined by this first use. The wilderness was lawless until law was imposed on it, and the imposition was made by threat of violence. A band of humans would move into an area and claim it as their hunting/foraging ground (this was before farming of course). They would certainly have to defend it (violently) against animals, and quite possibly against other human bands as well. When humans switched to farming and became protocivilized, eventually (although not immediately) they switched from communal to private ownership, and the land went, not to whoever first used it, but according to the community's ruling. Later still, as the increased population permitted by farming resulted in wars for territory, war leaders became owners of large, slave-worked tracts of land, and thus the first elite class arose. That is the real-history origin of private property, not some pipe-dream of settlers claiming land by first planting it.

Property implies exclusive right to use. "This is mine" implies "this is not yours." There are only two ways in which this can occur. Either unowned property is seized by someone who forbids anyone else to use it under threat of force, or else it changes hands according to rules evolved to avoid conflicts of force and peacefully resolve conflicts -- and yet even then, if you follow the changes of ownership back to the beginning, eventually you come to a seizure under threat of force by someone.

All that the "initiation of force" principle does is highlight people who are unwilling to cooperate as villains.

Then we are all villains or descendants of villains.

(None of the above should be construed as an endorsement of any particular aspect of modern property law as "automatically" moral or non-aggressive. Rather, the point of having a theory of property is to be able to assess the moral standing of current property titles.)

I understand that, but for the reasons outlined above, "initiation of force" will not do the job. In the end, there's no way to have a division of property that is natural, self-evidently right, and devoid of the need for human judgment.

To clarify, Kurt:

I guess you could argue that if everyone -- literally everyone, without exception -- agreed to some rule about first-ownership, e.g. productive use, then there might be no need for a threat of violence in order to establish ownership. But that's not a real-world possibility. There will always be those who either disagree that this is a proper way to establish ownership, or else not care and be out only for their own gain and screw what's right. In the end, in order to establish exclusive use and forbid anyone but the "rightful" owner to use property without authorization, a threat of force must be made, either by the owner, or by the community on the owner's behalf.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

How do they do this? By posting guards on the tree and scaring away or killing any animals that try to take the fruit, including other humans. Thus property is defined through an act of aggression.

Well this seems slightly different than the definition of property, and more to do with how property is communally recognized (of course, there are other, less scary methods). I think the best way to look at this would be to simply judge the acknowledgment itself. The act of existing on unowned land certainly isn't aggressive, and neither is mixing one's labor with the land (IMO, a just method of determining who owns what), and community recognition of private property doesn't seem to be an initiation of force against other individuals. So it must be the claim.

(But yes, preventing freedom of movement via threats on currently unowned land does appear to aggressive. But I don't think that's the right way to approach the issue of whether private property itself is aggressive, since the distinction of aggressive and defensive rests on whether ownership has been established justly.)

It's only after this that anything that might be called "defense" of the property comes into play. If the property is already owned, then someone trying to take it without authorization is a "thief," and penalties threatened for this "theft" are retaliatory. But if the property is NOT owned already, then claiming it in the first place is aggression, not retaliation.

Why? If I make a claim to own some property, then the threat of violence follows from the fact that the land is indeed owned. But this threat presumes that the conditional (I own X) has been satisfied. It's not a question of time per se, but one of conditions having been fulfilled.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

On the contrary, yes, you do! You are not entitled to work land, or grow crops on land, that doesn't belong to you. If it belongs to someone else, then you are trespassing by doing that. If it doesn't belong to anyone, then you must claim it in order to be entitled to crops grown on the land, no matter who does the work.

No claim is needed. Only the labor is necessary. We're discussing initial appropriation and you're trying to argue that this initial act is always an arbitrary assertion of force. Yet, it is quite plain that people can take actions that affect the natural world without harm to others. This should, reasonably, bar others from interfering with them. I don't have to "claim" this, unless simple human survival is somehow controversial for you.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Yes, you did have to threaten someone! Look, either you said (or implied), "This land is mine," or you didn't.

I didn't have to say anything. I did something (tilled the soil). That act was not aggression by any reasonable definition of the word. To take the product of that labor or threaten to do so, however, is aggression.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Only if we agree that the pacifist owns the land.

We can only disagree on that if you think it is acceptable to harm the pacifist. Since you don't, and no reasonable person would -- then that moral observation is the basis of what we call ownership.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Either the land is owned by someone else already, in which case the pacifist is trespassing, or it's owned by nobody, in which case the title needs to be clarified and merely planting crops on it does not amount to a valid claim of ownership -- unless, of course, there's an agreed-upon public rule to that effect.

A basic sense of fairness is an evolved characteristic of the human species, not an agreement. An agreed-upon public rule is simply a recognition and refinement of that.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

It's not a matter of asking permission. Of whom would you ask it?

No one, obviously. Thus, it is reasonable to be able to appropriate the natural world through one's labor. Why should I cooperate with other people once they have appropriated something? Because I would want the same.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Look, unowned land is not a real-world feature at this time.

Actually, by the property theory I have just stated above, the vast majority of land on Earth is still unowned. A lot of it is claimed, but that's different.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

A band of humans would move into an area and claim it as their hunting/foraging ground (this was before farming of course). They would certainly have to defend it (violently) against animals, and quite possibly against other human bands as well.

The key word there is defend. You clearly recognize who is in the right.

You might ask about a condition of acute scarcity, where the land simply cannot sustain the additional population of another band. Let's say the band of newcomers cannot find another source of food. In this case, the newcomers will either starve or fight. In practice, they will fight every time. Neither decision is particularly moral. From an evolutionary standpoint, bands who chose to fight in such circumstances had some chance of passing on their genes. Those that didn't, had none. Thus, humans will tend to fight if they think that's their only remaining option.

As technology has developed, human beings are less frequently placed in situations where a scarcity problem can only be resolved by violence. However, the concept that use of a resource trumps the mere desire for that resource has been around forever and forms the basis of all peaceful resource management.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

When humans switched to farming and became protocivilized, eventually (although not immediately) they switched from communal to private ownership, and the land went, not to whoever first used it, but according to the community's ruling.

It typically went to whoever was currently using it, which was the obvious ruling.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Later still, as the increased population permitted by farming resulted in wars for territory, war leaders became owners of large, slave-worked tracts of land, and thus the first elite class arose. That is the real-history origin of private property, not some pipe-dream of settlers claiming land by first planting it.

At no point was I describing history (or specifically talking about land). My intent was not to bolster current property claims in a broad fashion, but to demonstrate that property requires no root injustice. Sometimes in the fight over scarce resources, the newcomer won. The emergence of institutions that are inherently unfair is a product of their occasional victories. If society automatically turned out for the best, we wouldn't have politics at all.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Then we are all villains or descendants of villains.

Very likely. But just because our ancestors were brutal savages, doesn't mean we have to be.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

I understand that, but for the reasons outlined above, "initiation of force" will not do the job. In the end, there's no way to have a division of property that is natural, self-evidently right, and devoid of the need for human judgment.

Well, obviously not. Human judgment will always be required. The point is to discuss on what basis we should make those judgments.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

But that's not a real-world possibility. There will always be those who either disagree that this is a proper way to establish ownership, or else not care and be out only for their own gain and screw what's right.

The existence of outlaws does not invalidate law. The existence of the insane does not mean there is no such thing as sanity. Yet somehow, the existence of thieves invalidates ownership . . . Reasonable people all have a general sense of how things come to be owned. Specifics vary and special circumstances abound, but it's not like the whole idea of possessions came out nowhere with no moral basis.

Now, I do think you have good cause to question the choice of terminology that many libertarians take on this issue. I agree that some of the usage is at odds with the vernacular and thus is confusing. I'm happy to refer to simple "fairness" or "justice" or "non-aggression" rather than "non-initiation of force."

Originally Posted by Matt1989

Well this seems slightly different than the definition of property, and more to do with how property is communally recognized (of course, there are other, less scary methods).

Actually, there aren't, if you are starting from a lawless, everything-is-unowned beginning. What I described is exactly how property began in the first place: land was claimed by bands of humans who defended it against rival claimants. Those other, less scary methods are only possible in a climate of law, which was enacted precisely to provide less scary methods of resolving conflicts over property.

I think the best way to look at this would be to simply judge the acknowledgment itself. The act of existing on unowned land certainly isn't aggressive

Well, that's only true if there's nobody else who wants that unowned land. If there is, then squatting on the land is an aggressive move.

and neither is mixing one's labor with the land (IMO, a just method of determining who owns what), and community recognition of private property doesn't seem to be an initiation of force against other individuals.

Consider how that (or a different) principle would be implemented in practice. Let's say that you're a member of a primitive band of humans, but not so primitive as the band in my first example. (Land in a precivilized setting is communally owned by the band, so individual ownership isn't in question.) Let's say your group has been farming for a while and has decided to divide the land into private lots instead of owning it collectively. So the village gets together to decide how to do that.

You argue that the land should go to those who currently are working it; if you're putting in the effort to plow and plant the fields, then you should own them. Someone else (probably a lazy slacker ) argues that the land should instead be divided into equal lots by family. A third person argues that bigger families should have more land than small ones because of having more mouths to feed. After a lot of discussion, the village makes a decision according to whatever governing method it uses. Let's say it's done democratically and so everyone votes. Let's further say that your suggestion prevails: the land is to go to whoever is working it.

Is there a consensus? Has everyone agreed to this? No. So what happens is that the village majority rules that certain lands are to go to certain people by virtue of the fact that they are working it. Boundary lines are drawn, and ownership is assigned. And the village threatens penalties if anyone violates these rights of ownership by using land that doesn't belong to them.

Land which was formally owned communally by the village (and individually by no one) is now assigned to private ownership. Part and parcel of that assignation is that a threat of force is exerted against anyone violating the new ownership rights. Without that threat of force, no effective decision can be made.

Now, this is a bit more lawful and orderly than the claim of a hunting ground by a precvilized band. But all that really means is that the threat of force is formalized and not as crude.

(But yes, preventing freedom of movement via threats on currently unowned land does appear to aggressive. But I don't think that's the right way to approach the issue of whether private property itself is aggressive, since the distinction of aggressive and defensive rests on whether ownership has been established justly.)

Ah, but as I've said before, there is no such thing as objective justice. Justice is what the community decides, according to principles that most members of it agree to. And such principles are only partly idealistic; they also arise out of the practical results of applying them. So I may have my opinion of whether ownership has been established justly, and it may not agree with yours. Who's to say which is right and which is wrong? The fact is, in the example above there are arguments that could be made in favor of any of the methods asserted: ownership by labor-mixing, equal ownership, or ownership by family size. None of these is self-evidently right or wrong. It depends on what the purpose is, as well as on what theoretical ideals people hold.

Why? If I make a claim to own some property, then the threat of violence follows from the fact that the land is indeed owned. But this threat presumes that the conditional (I own X) has been satisfied. It's not a question of time per se, but one of conditions having been fulfilled.

Well, I was using the words before and after in a causative not a temporal sense. You only own X when either a) you are able to defend X yourself from all rivals for ownership, or b) you receive community approval of your ownership, whereupon the community defends your title from all rivals (so you don't have to defend it yourself). It's entirely a social thing. There is no objective way to say "Yes, you own X," other than this. And so it always comes down to a threat of force. The community may have principles according to which it decides ownership (indeed all communities do), but a threat of force backs up all of those principles, without which they would have no being.

I know you have a problem with this sort of "might makes right" thinking, but in the end it's unavoidable. Might does make right, and if we choose to enshrine some other, less brutal principle, then it is our might -- the might of the community -- which empowers that other principle to replace mere unenlightened force. In other words, "might makes right" can only be overthrown by a stronger might in service to a better right.

Kurt:

It's clear that we are talking past each other. You are talking about what should be. I am talking about what is. There is no greater proof of this than the following:

Actually, by the property theory I have just stated above, the vast majority of land on Earth is still unowned. A lot of it is claimed, but that's different.

Now, I am inclined to think in operational terms, by which there is no such thing as objective right and wrong and never can be. So the only objective, operational meaning I can give to the above-quoted passage is:

"Actually, by the property theory I have just stated above, I will not recognize the right of ownership of the vast majority of land on Earth. A lot of the land on the planet is claimed, but that's different than my recognizing the claim."

I must rephrase your statement in this fashion, because the only other meaning I can give it is to suppose there is an objective "rightful owner" of property separate from law and community consensus, and I know that there is no such thing. What, after all, is the practical consequence of the fact that your theory of property does not validate a particular person's claim of ownership? At law, none whatever. In practice, none whatever. The only difference -- and to be quite blunt, it is not a very significant difference -- lies in your own opinion.

Similarly, you are asserting that violence exerted to enforce a person's claim to property is defensive violence, provided that their claim of ownership is valid according to your theory of property. But that is not a statement of fact, because your theory of property is itself not a statement of fact, but rather an assertion of your will: a claim by you of the way things ought to be, not a factual assertion of what they actually are. Now this is enough to assert that the violence (or threat of violence) is morally justified, since that is itself only an assertion of will. But to claim that it is defensive is a claim of fact -- and this depends on your theory of property itself being a factual truth, which it is not. Like all moral statements, it is neither true nor false, in terms of fact, but only in terms of whether it accurately expresses your will.

The right of ownership of property, like all rights, does not preexist our recognition of it. To claim otherwise is to employ a linguistic confusion. The fact of the matter is that property is unowned until claimed, and when you say that it is owned because your theory of property says that it is, all you are really saying is that we ought to recognize it. This, whether I agree with you or not, does not change the material facts, and in terms of those material facts the property is not owned, which makes a claim of ownership an act of aggression.

Now, I do think you have good cause to question the choice of terminology that many libertarians take on this issue. I agree that some of the usage is at odds with the vernacular and thus is confusing. I'm happy to refer to simple "fairness" or "justice" or "non-aggression" rather than "non-initiation of force."

"Fairness" or "justice" is fine -- these are moral terms, assertions of will. But "non-aggression" is an assertion of objective fact, and is incorrect.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Ah, but as I've said before, there is no such thing as objective justice. Justice is what the community decides, according to principles that most members of it agree to. And such principles are only partly idealistic; they also arise out of the practical results of applying them. So I may have my opinion of whether ownership has been established justly, and it may not agree with yours. Who's to say which is right and which is wrong? The fact is, in the example above there are arguments that could be made in favor of any of the methods asserted: ownership by labor-mixing, equal ownership, or ownership by family size. None of these is self-evidently right or wrong. It depends on what the purpose is, as well as on what theoretical ideals people hold.

Well, I was using the words before and after in a causative not a temporal sense. You only own X when either a) you are able to defend X yourself from all rivals for ownership, or b) you receive community approval of your ownership, whereupon the community defends your title from all rivals (so you don't have to defend it yourself). It's entirely a social thing. There is no objective way to say "Yes, you own X," other than this. And so it always comes down to a threat of force. The community may have principles according to which it decides ownership (indeed all communities do), but a threat of force backs up all of those principles, without which they would have no being.

I know you have a problem with this sort of "might makes right" thinking, but in the end it's unavoidable. Might does make right, and if we choose to enshrine some other, less brutal principle, then it is our might -- the might of the community -- which empowers that other principle to replace mere unenlightened force. In other words, "might makes right" can only be overthrown by a stronger might in service to a better right.

OK. I see how you may find non-aggression's scope to be too narrow to serve as a principle for libertarianism if there is no objective ethics. But I think if there were such a thing as a libertarian natural law, and you were in fact mistaken, many (if not all) of these acts that you consider to be "aggressive" would actually be defensive.

Originally Posted by Matt1989

OK. I see how you may find non-aggression's scope to be too narrow to serve as a principle for libertarianism if there is no objective ethics. But I think if there were such a thing as a libertarian natural law, and you were in fact mistaken, many (if not all) of these acts that you consider to be "aggressive" would actually be defensive.

No, I don't think they would be. The problem here, as I implied in my last response to Kurt, is that when you refer to "aggression" or "defense" you are making, not moral statements, but factual ones. "Aggressive" violence is approximately the same thing as "initiatory" violence, in the sense of "he started it." "Defensive" violence is in response to aggression.

That the claiming of property is an aggressive move by this understanding is a demonstrable fact. It does not follow, however, from this fact that this particular bit of aggression is morally wrong. That's a separate question, not one of fact but one of will, or of values.

And that's really my point: that whether an act of violence is aggressive or defensive doesn't suffice by itself to tell us whether it is right or wrong.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

No, I don't think they would be. The problem here, as I implied in my last response to Kurt, is that when you refer to "aggression" or "defense" you are making, not moral statements, but factual ones. "

Correct. But the question as to whether something like property is aggression is reliant on whether one's claim to such property is objectively just; that is, whether a person is the rightful owner of such property. As I stated, if ownership can be made legitimate (via natural law), then property itself cannot be considered aggressive because you can define ownership without resorting to might, provided that property is originally unowned.

Originally Posted by Matt1989

Correct. But the question as to whether something like property is aggression is reliant on whether one's claim to such property is objectively just; that is, whether a person is the rightful owner of such property.

In the sequence of events I'm talking about, at the very beginning and foundation of the institution of property, nobody is the rightful owner. Ownership is first established by an aggressive assertion, then sanctioned (or amended) after the fact by social judgment. Subsequent changes of hands are then governed by rules of ownership, and the phrase "rightful owner" acquires meaning. But that's not how property began. It's a mistake to apply value judgments that are properly given to ownership under a rule of law, to assertions of ownership in the lawless beginning.

As I stated, if ownership can be made legitimate (via natural law), then property itself cannot be considered aggressive because you can define ownership without resorting to might, provided that property is originally unowned.

No such concept as a "natural law of property" can ever be proven objectively, since it is not a claim of fact, and in the absence of such proof it cannot serve the purpose you are requiring of it. What you are talking about is a "right of property" that exists independent of human social judgment. That is impossible. It is not nature, but our own collective will, that defines rights -- including property rights.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Ah, but as I've said before, there is no such thing as objective justice. Justice is what the community decides, according to principles that most members of it agree to. And such principles are only partly idealistic; they also arise out of the practical results of applying them.

This is contradictory. If the community decisions are impacted by practical results then there must be some means by which they are evaluating those results -- which would be, in the end, a sense of justice.

This does allow for a variety of property systems, to be sure. But it doesn't allow for their complete absence or for ones that are nonsensical.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

It's clear that we are talking past each other. You are talking about what should be. I am talking about what is.

Of course -- we don't need to have a theory about property as it is. All you need for that is to observe it.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

I must rephrase your statement in this fashion, because the only other meaning I can give it is to suppose there is an objective "rightful owner" of property separate from law and community consensus, and I know that there is no such thing. What, after all, is the practical consequence of the fact that your theory of property does not validate a particular person's claim of ownership?

Well, obviously, should a particular understanding of property take hold, the result will be the invalidation of that property -- by your own argument. However, even in your "purely social" theory of property, there has to be some means by which people in society judge the rightness of any particular property claim. That framework for judgment is a theory of property.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

This is contradictory. If the community decisions are impacted by practical results then there must be some means by which they are evaluating those results -- which would be, in the end, a sense of justice.

You're presenting a false dilemma: either a situation in which values are dictated by material facts, or one in which they are wholly independent of them. Neither is the case. Rather, values are an interaction between subjective determinations as to the good, and objective observation of results of actions. The results are what they are, objectively, but we judge whether that outcome is good or bad based on subjective criteria. There is (as you acknowledged yourself) room for more than one concept of property. There is also room for differing subjective judgments given an identical set of facts. One may observe the outcome of a particular set of rules to be (for example) vast disparities of wealth, but while you're on record as finding this unacceptable, there are plenty of people who argue in favor of it. The disparity of wealth itself is an objective fact, but whether this is good or bad is a matter of subjective judgment.

Of course -- we don't need to have a theory about property as it is. All you need for that is to observe it.

I disagree. It's useful to have a theory of property as it is, under different circumstances, just as it's useful to have a theory of evolution or of gravity. Theories are very important in science, and science is entirely objective, not concerned with what should be at all. So just because one is dealing with what is, doesn't mean one does not need theories.

In fact, I would say that what you're presenting is not a theory so much as a value judgment. What I've presented is a theory: it's a model for how property can come to exist as a social institution, and how it is upheld. Namely, that it originates as individual assertion of force applied to seize control of goods and deny their use to others, and evolves from this through social interaction into a collective assertion of force dividing up goods for the purposes of avoiding violent conflict, ensuring general sufficiency, enacting a concept of "fairness," creating or protecting privileged status, and/or diverting resources for collective projects. (Yes, I realize that some of these goals are contradictory. That's never stopped any society in history, though. They just find compromises whenever there is conflict between goals.) And from this into a rule of written law.

I contend that this describes any set of property rules whatsoever, including ones that go by the principles you've outlined. If a society decides to enact an "added labor" rule of property, then it is still doing so in the manner described above: a collective assertion of force, with that particular concept of fairness elevated above other considerations. The "added labor" rule, if it were the law, would exist and have force as a judgment of society, not a law of nature. The law of nature is simply that might makes right, but that those who possess the might may choose to abide by a more enlightened concept of right, and put their might in service to that concept. And this frequently happens, and in fact is arguably the whole point of law.

Which brings us back to the original point I was making: Even if a society accepts your "added labor" concept of property and moves to enforce it, this is still an initiation of force, still aggression on the part of the society against lawless individual desires. Because that concept does not exist as an objective fact of nature, only as an outcome of society's judgment, and only when that judgment is enforced.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

You're presenting a false dilemma: either a situation in which values are dictated by material facts, or one in which they are wholly independent of them.

No, I'm just denying the existence of wholly subjective assessments. Your argument is dependent on using some degree of subjectivity to undermine the entire case for principled rules of property.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Neither is the case. Rather, values are an interaction between subjective determinations as to the good, and objective observation of results of actions. The results are what they are, objectively, but we judge whether that outcome is good or bad based on subjective criteria.

The criteria are not wholly subjective. They are frequently implied by the nature of the thing being evaluated. If one property arrangement leads to starvation and another prosperity, which one is optimal? Is it really subjective to reject starvation as an outcome? At that point you're entertaining "good" options that are obviously bad for the observer.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

There is also room for differing subjective judgments given an identical set of facts. One may observe the outcome of a particular set of rules to be (for example) vast disparities of wealth, but while you're on record as finding this unacceptable, there are plenty of people who argue in favor of it. The disparity of wealth itself is an objective fact, but whether this is good or bad is a matter of subjective judgment.

How would one demonstrate that this judgment is correct -- or any judgment for that matter? By reference to objective reality. You obviously consider this a valid technique since you use it yourself so frequently. You do this in order to show the objective underpinnings of your own judgment.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

I disagree. It's useful to have a theory of property as it is, under different circumstances, just as it's useful to have a theory of evolution or of gravity.

I was simply saying that I don't need a theory to know what is and is not property in the present. I can just check with the relevant legal organization for that.

To assess whether those things should be property, requires a theory of property. Your theory of property includes all possibilities and excludes nothing. This is OK, if all you want is historical explanation. But, consider that you have absolutely no basis for opposing, say, slavery. If slavery is deemed OK by a "collective assertion" then that is acceptable.

I'm not denying that a society that believes slavery is OK will have slaves. That would be a ridiculous thing to deny. However, it seems like there are some criteria other than "wouldn't it be nice"* by which a society would reject slavery. If so, there are objective influences on moral judgments and thus, one can, in fact, come up with optimal rules of property and (very likely) determine that some current property titles are unjust.


*Technically, even this criteria would require some means of assessing "niceness."

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

The criteria are not wholly subjective. They are frequently implied by the nature of the thing being evaluated. If one property arrangement leads to starvation and another prosperity, which one is optimal? Is it really subjective to reject starvation as an outcome?

Yes, strange as that may sound, because no option results in the starvation of everyone. Some options maximize the accumulation of the private wealth of the privileged few, while increasing the hardship, suffering, and hunger of those at the bottom. Others do not, but are more nearly egalitarian. Which is better, of those two examples? I'm reasonably sure you and I would come to an agreement in answer to that question, but if we included, say, Fruitcake in our discussion we would have a different opinion expressed.

How would one demonstrate that this judgment is correct -- or any judgment for that matter? By reference to objective reality. You obviously consider this a valid technique since you use it yourself so frequently.

No, in this case that's no good, because there can be complete agreement about the objective facts, but disagreement as to judgment about them. See above.

I do consider reference to objective reality to be the best approach when what one is trying to answer is an objective question of fact, but at other times subjectivity is also required.

I was simply saying that I don't need a theory to know what is and is not property in the present. I can just check with the relevant legal organization for that.

But that's not all I was talking about. I was also talking about how the institution of private property came to exist in the first place, and thus constructing an argument about what property consists of, at root.

To assess whether those things should be property, requires a theory of property.

As a matter of proper terminology, and I realize this is picking nits, I'm going to suggest we use the term "value schema" or possibly "ethic" -- actually that might be better -- of property, rather than "theory."

Your theory of property includes all possibilities and excludes nothing. This is OK, if all you want is historical explanation. But, consider that you have absolutely no basis for opposing, say, slavery. If slavery is deemed OK by a "collective assertion" then that is acceptable.

Well, I was presenting a theory, not an ethic, but here again you are presenting a false dilemma: either ethical statements are objective claims of fact, or I am not allowed to object to a collective judgment of the community if I happen to disagree with it. But consider that since ethical statements aren't objective claims of fact, there is nothing to say that I'm not allowed to do that. Collective judgments are the result of the interaction of individual judgments, and so depend on individual judgments being made, including in disagreement, so not only am I allowed to disagree, I would say I'm required to express my disagreements as an act of responsible citizenship.

I'm not denying that a society that believes slavery is OK will have slaves. That would be a ridiculous thing to deny. However, it seems like there are some criteria other than "wouldn't it be nice"* by which a society would reject slavery.

It's more complex than "wouldn't it be nice," of course, but it does in the end come down to a subjective judgment that it's better to protect people from the suffering and loss of dignity that comes from being enslaved, than to allow people the privilege of profiting from slave labor. As with all such arguments, there were those at the time who disagreed.

If so, there are objective influences on moral judgments and thus, one can, in fact, come up with optimal rules of property and (very likely) determine that some current property titles are unjust.

There are of course objective influences on moral judgments, but they do not determine absolutely. I cannot present those objective factors to someone like Fruitcake and convince him that huge disparities of wealth are any problem, because he doesn't disagree with me that they exist, and that is the only objective fact that applies (other than some economic consequences of wealth disparity which he seems not to understand, but it's not certain whether that would convince him, either).