There are still some principles that don't depend on this. Division of labor really does accelerate productivity, and so does expensive mechanization. Both contribute to centralization. On the other hand, computerization seems often to work the other direction. But there was no way for an economy that was just developing steam power to computerize.
But even before steam power, just by making use of larger labor forces that could divide the work of making things, a competitive advantage was gained. There was no way that I can see to avoid centralizing in that circumstance except by avoiding industrialization, and then you left yourself as a nation at a disadvantage to other countries that did industrialize.
A government agenda that was more egalitarian and less oriented to capitalist privilege might have steered the centralization into cooperatives rather than privately-owned companies, but that's still centralization.
Is that not merely a different method of enforcement?How about class action suits?
Right, but where it doesn't work is with fishing of migratory species that are caught on the open ocean. Some things are inherently commons and have to be regulated.There are many clear examples of private fisheries conservation.
If that's the case, why has it not been done? It seems to me that we have either anarchy or top-down regulation but no cooperative legally-assisted management such as you describe.This is an example I would have given myself. It seems to me that a lot of discussion of resource management gets hung up on the public/private distinction and there is a lot of ideological attachment to one or the other. It's also irrelevant, since the really important distinction is individual versus collective organization. Both are optimal in particular circumstances and not in others. Unfortunately, many people (including a lot of libertarians) conflate collective organization with state-run.
For example, there are a lot of cases in fisheries management where parceling up the sea as if it were farmland would either lead to overfishing (if the plots were too small) or privileged access (if the plots were too large). The better system involves defining when and where people can fish, having docks refuse to buy fish that are too young, etc. In other words, having rules founded in the common interests of all those accessing the resource may be more effective than individualized ownership. Such an agreement can be reached, and managed by, the fishermen themselves. A legal system is needed to help enforce their agreement but there is no need for a state agency and many reasons to fear that a government agency could stray from their common interest.
With respect to forestry, I wonder if the good results from privately owned timber land would have been possible if we did not also have the federal timber land that can be leased? What I mean is this: a timber company's long-term interests lie in sensible forest management, but its short-term profits are better served by rapacious clear-cutting. If the company owns acreage and also leases federal timber land, it can serve both interests, putting its main effort into cutting the federal land (since even the biggest companies have limited resources), while managing its own land for sustainable yield down the road. If all timber land was privately owned, would there be a competitive incentive to treat that land the way federal land is treated today?
I think there would. Consider an economy with five timber companies, each of which owns (for sake of argument) an equal size and quality of timber land, capable (if it were all cut at once) of yielding 100,000 tons of wood products per company (500,000 tons total). There is further timber land unowned by timber companies capable of yielding another million tons. Companies 2-5 practice sustainable forestry and bring a harvest of, let's say 1000 tons of timber the first year, cutting only 1% of their land. Company 1, on the other hand, practices unsustainable forestry by cutting 10% of its land, and brings 10,000 tons of timber to market. Company 1 has 2.5 times as much product to sell as all of its competitors combined.
Company 1 now has 10 times as much capital available as any of its competitors. It buys more land, and continues to practice unsustainable forrestry. Eventually, the demand for wood products is saturated, and Company 1 begins to lower its prices, making it unprofitable for companies 2-4 to continue in business. At some point in the long run, Company 1 is going to run out of timber to cut, because it's harvesting faster than the trees can grow, but it's likely to be the victorious last-company standing considerably before reaching that point -- unless companies 2-5 see the writing on the wall and begin doing the same thing company 1 is doing.
This is the kind of thing I mean by competition not necessarily working for the good of all. Sometimes it incentivizes very bad economic behavior. And that could be the reason why what you describe has not been implemented in the fishing industry.