Originally Posted by Mikebert

The original purpose of patents was to encourage innovation. But that is not their actual value. Patents serve the same role for industry as scientific publications do in academia. The "publish or perish" mandate in academia means that everything academic researchers do, if at all coherent, gets published. Much of what industrial research does never gets published. It exists in company files and eventually gets lost. Patents, by providing exclusive use of new methods for a period, provide an incentive for industry to publish really useful information. Sure, for 17 years nobody can use this information, but after the patent expires it now serves the same role as academic research. Since academic research is typically 10-20 years away from commercialization, while patents are commercialization-ready, expired parents are about as "fresh" as academic papers.

Without patents, know how developed decades ago would remain forever unknown. Technology would have to be reinvented over and over again.

To the extent that this is true, it only applies to a society (such as that of the 18th century when patents arose) where the cost of communication was high. Centralized repositories of knowledge make sense when data storage is complicated. This is no longer the case. One can now instantaneously transmit large amounts of information and storage is almost free. We now have a situation where, barring patents, as soon as one person describes an idea publicly, the idea is available to all.

You'll probably counter by asserting that trade secrets will arise blocking technological progress. But keeping a trade secret is very difficult, especially in the case of engineering ideas where they can be independently invented. It's obvious that patents are more effective than trade secrets at locking down knowledge, as evidenced by the fact that people very rarely rely on trade secrets in our present system. That, after all, is the benefit of holding a patent -- to profit by preventing other people from using knowledge.

Furthermore, the culture where engineering data is hoarded might be a side-effect of patent systems. Companies encourage closed information because of the desire to be first to patent something.


Also: you may have missed my reply to your questions about progressive taxation (post 1664).

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

Limited liability is not objectionable, so long as someone has liability.

That's precisely what's to be avoided: liability beyond the resources put into the corporation, on anyone's part. Of course, a really successful corporation will have assets far beyond those of any individual, so it ceases to be a problem from the perspective of anyone moved to sue, but the point is to allow people to invest without risking their entire futures.

Working as I do these days in the personal-lines insurance field (I used to work in commercial lines) has been an eye-opener as to just how ruinous liability can be. Not many people understand this. A really bad auto accident in which people are seriously injured can leave the person at fault ruined for life (even if he's not one of those injured). A judgment in the millions of dollars (which is definitely not unheard-of) can take all of a person's assets plus half their net income for up to 20 years. There's no escape through bankruptcy, or really through anything except suicide. As things stand now, a person investing in a corporate enterprise doesn't face a risk like that. He risks losing everything he invests, but he doesn't risk losing his livelihood for the rest of his life. That makes him less reluctant to invest.

If you increase the danger -- the personal danger -- of investment, you will reduce investment. It's unavoidable. If you remove limited liability, and make someone personally liable for non-criminal actions that cause harm (I add the qualifier because of course corporate law does not protect investors from criminal liability), then you will increase the personal danger of investing and you will therefore reduce investment. Which is why I asked: what would you do instead to encourage investment?

Size does have an effect on working conditions. There are limits to human empathy and once an organization gets big enough, its members will have difficulty respecting the needs and desires of other members who are "too far away" within the organization.

This relates once more to the difference between a state and pre-state, informal methods of governance. In a big organization, rules are put in place so that one is not dependent on human empathy. That's necessary in a civilized setting with respect to law and governance. It's also necessary in an employment setting when the company is large enough that the boss doesn't personally know everyone. (Of course, plenty of small business owners -- plenty of people generally, for that matter -- are deficient in the empathy department to start with, but that's a different discussion.)

If you have a strong labor movement and a sympathetic government, a big company's bigwigs still won't be naturally inclined to be generous to their employees, but that won't matter. They can be made to be, by law, by regulation, and by pressure of collective bargaining. And, as I said, they can afford to be, more so than a small company which is operating closer to the margin.

The prospects for an accommodating labor environment drop off as the company gets larger.

Demonstrably untrue. Look at the businesses with strong unions now, in which the workers are paid the most. All of them are big companies. Of course, there are also big companies (e.g. Wal-Mart) that are horrible, but then, for a long time we had no sympathetic government and in consequence we have a weakened labor movement. But the point is that the generous compensation plans in some big companies can't be adopted by small, struggling operations. You can't get blood from a stone. The wealth has to exist before it can be shared.

Unfortunately, the "factoring in" of those considerations can't really be done outside of a price system.

I disagree. The efficiency of a market economy should be recognized, but it's also important not to exaggerate it, and to understand why -- and hence, in what context -- market efficiency works.

A market economy is one in which multiple decision-makers operate independently to allocate resources. As long as one is responding to fixed, predictable stimuli, this is a highly inefficient way of doing things; you'd be much better off in that case with central planning. But a consumer economy is a chaotic simulus-set, changing unpredictably and composed of multiple independent vectors. A decentralized responder is the best way to deal with that, because, although bad and wasteful decisions will still be made, each such decision does less harm, and is more rapidly corrected by other decision-makers who observe the outcome.

What we need to recognize though is that there are economic factors other than consumer choices, and so there are contexts in which central planning actually works better than a free market. The key is to correctly determine when you are responding to chaos (in which case a free market is better), and when you are responding to fixed, predictable, universal factors (in which case you need planning). I believe that's why a mixed economy such as all advanced nations use today has performed better than either a hands-off free-market economy or full centrally-planned socialism.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Then you have a problem in that you have, by your actions, endorsed violating the law. Of course, if you're an anarchist and don't think the law should exist in the first place, that's different.

Are we talking about the same thing? The rule in indirect consequentialism is intended to be followed, presumably because following the rule produces good consequences. But it's possible to imagine scenarios where, even if the rule were mostly good, better consequences could be had by committing stealth violations of the rule; hence why I think rule consequentialism has to collapse into either act consequentialism or (if one were to decide that the rule must be followed because the rule is good in itself) into deontology.

As for virtue ethics, that's a type of consequentialism that focuses on the inner rather than the outer consequences; proper consequentialism would consider both.

I don't think this is correct, and that what you're describing sounds more like an enlightened egoism. The whole point of virtue is not to consider how certain actions affect our path to the good life, but to act in a fashion that is reflective of good character, living well, etc. It's worth noting that virtue ethics is almost always contrasted with consequentialist ethical theories.

On the other hand, when you have a moral philosophy that argues we should do things even if the consequences are horrible, that's when you have to buttress it with authoritarianism, because you're going against human instinct, normal behavior, and common sense.

Agreed, and I think that rules out strict deontology as an ethical theory, because there is no conceptual tension between horrible consequences and the categorical imperative (or whatever deontological principle one uses). Common sense would dictate that even if good consequences are not synonymous with justice, any moral theory where horrible consequences are to be expected as a result of following such a theory is highly problematic. However, this doesn't appear to apply to virtue ethics, where good consequences naturally flow as a result of appealing to various virtues. And it's impossible to talk about the relationship between divine command theory and 'good consequences' as if they were entirely independent without descending into incoherence.

I will say that utilitarianism, ethical hedonism, or any moral theory that attempts to pin down what good consequences look like (for the universe) will inevitably run into problems that cannot be reconciled with common sense.

Originally Posted by haymarket martyr

sorry Matt, but I

a- am not a kidnapper
b- am not a doctor who could pull off such an operation
c- do not know anybody in this situation

LOL!

Originally Posted by Matt1989

Are we talking about the same thing? The rule in indirect consequentialism is intended to be followed, presumably because following the rule produces good consequences. But it's possible to imagine scenarios where, even if the rule were mostly good, better consequences could be had by committing stealth violations of the rule; hence why I think rule consequentialism has to collapse into either act consequentialism or (if one were to decide that the rule must be followed because the rule is good in itself) into deontology.

I was only a philosophy major for two terms. There's a reason for that; I often find that philosophy majors have a difficult time conceiving of things except in terms of what others have written.

Quite honestly, I don't care if we're talking about the same thing or not. I try to understand what you mean by the terms you use, looking them up as necessary, so that we can have a conversation, but those terms do not necessarily describe what I'm talking about, nor do I feel any obligation that they do so. After all, you, no one else, introduced the term "consequentialism" into this discussion, along with those other terms. HM said only "it's the consequences," which sounds like it perhaps ought to be consequentialism on the surface, but perhaps it's not. I understood what he meant, though, and I explained what I meant, too. If that's what philosophy majors mean by "consequentialism," fine. If not, frankly I don't give a damn.

I don't think this is correct, and that what you're describing sounds more like an enlightened egoism. The whole point of virtue is not to consider how certain actions affect our path to the good life, but to act in a fashion that is reflective of good character

No, it's not enlightened egoism; if you're using "enlightened" in the mystical, spiritual sense (as in the enlightenment of the Buddha), then you're very close to what I meant but that's incompatible with egoism. I understand the idea of what an act means about the character of the actor, but I also understand -- as anyone who believes in that philosophy without this interpretation does not -- that every act changes the actor as well, and so, just as we cannot pinpoint the position of a particle when the photon by which we perceive it causes it to move, so we cannot say what an act means about character as if the character itself were unmoved by the act. On the other hand, we can meaningfully speak of actions that help to make us into virtuous people, and that is what I meant by "internal consequences."

If that's not what virtue ethics is, it's at least what virtue ethics would be if it were not self-contradicting nonsense.

It's worth noting that virtue ethics is almost always contrasted with consequentialist ethical theories.

I get the feeling that all of these ethical philosophies spend all their time looking outward and never bother looking within. I'm going to have a similar problem with "consequentialism" I think.

Common sense would dictate that even if good consequences are not synonymous with justice, any moral theory where horrible consequences are to be expected as a result of following such a theory is highly problematic.

Exactly what I'm saying. And that is the problem with your own moral theories which seem to mandate the dissolution of the state, an act with horrible consequences (if it could even be done, which I seriously doubt).

However, this doesn't appear to apply to virtue ethics, where good consequences naturally flow as a result of appealing to various virtues. And it's impossible to talk about the relationship between divine command theory and 'good consequences' as if they were entirely independent without descending into incoherence.

In both cases, we may observe that horrible consequences follow, and this invalidates -- not necessarily either virtue theory or divine command as a concept, but the specific claims being made.

I will say that utilitarianism, ethical hedonism, or any moral theory that attempts to pin down what good consequences look like (for the universe) will inevitably run into problems that cannot be reconciled with common sense.

Which is one reason why I have no interest in doing that except on a case by case basis. Another reason I quit being a philosophy major is that a lot of these people seemed to have serious difficulties understanding what any first-year science major can grok: that we can never know everything, that no matter how elegant our theories it is always possible (indeed, inevitable) that reality will one day throw us a curve ball, and that all our conceptions and descriptions and models are no more than approximations. As such, I see no need for an ethical philosophy to answer all moral questions a priori and in fact the attempt to do so is proof enough that one is wrong. Let it be a guideline for general thinking, and make use of our perceptive ability along with that general thinking to do the rest.

Allow me to clarify my comment why anarchism is not going anywhere anytime soon in the way of achievement or implementation: i said

IT IS THE CONSEQUENCES

I think I said this several times in fact. I am using the term 'consequences' in the normal, good old fashioned way to mean that "I don't like whats gonna happen if we light that candle here in the gunpowder storage room". Okay?

I do not have any knowledge about any fancy college stuff called consequentialism or anything else like that let alone intricate distinctions between stuff labeld as "act" or 'rule" or anything else like that. Thats way too highbrow academic for little old me.

Or maybe I should be more direct. I do not want anarchy to take over because some sociopathic jerk will then have even less controls on their behavior than they do now and it will be a whole lot easier for all the jerks to do crazy and evil stuff to other normally peaceful folks. I do not like the consequences of implementing anarchy.

Are we clear on that now? I can break it down even more if necessary.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

I was only a philosophy major for two terms. There's a reason for that; I often find that philosophy majors have a difficult time conceiving of things except in terms of what others have written.

Quite honestly, I don't care if we're talking about the same thing or not. I try to understand what you mean by the terms you use, looking them up as necessary, so that we can have a conversation, but those terms do not necessarily describe what I'm talking about, nor do I feel any obligation that they do so. After all, you, no one else, introduced the term "consequentialism" into this discussion, along with those other terms. HM said only "it's the consequences," which sounds like it perhaps ought to be consequentialism on the surface, but perhaps it's not. I understood what he meant, though, and I explained what I meant, too. If that's what philosophy majors mean by "consequentialism," fine. If not, frankly I don't give a damn.

Look Brian, if you're going to enter a discussion and say something that sounds an awful lot to me like rule (indirect) consequentialism (if you recall, the post was directed to haymarket--and I was trying to glean if his apparent dogma had any support backing it), a position held by a lot of people, then I think I have reason to bring the term up for further clarification. After all, "it's the consequences" becomes syntactically awkward. If you, in your statement about following rules, were referring to something that doesn't have a precise definition, then there's got to be some work done for the conversation to continue. If you're not interested in doing that for whatever reason, then the conversation is probably not worth having. But I think there's some good stuff worth responding to in your last couple posts that doesn't fall back on these old philosophical debates.

And I'm 99% sure that "it's the consequences" means "I'm a consequentialist."

No, it's not enlightened egoism; if you're using "enlightened" in the mystical, spiritual sense (as in the enlightenment of the Buddha), then you're very close to what I meant but that's incompatible with egoism.

I stuck enlightened in there in the last second, since people often take ethical egoism to mean a vulgar sort of selfishness (think Ayn Rand). But while egoism is selfishness, most egoist theories are about doing the right thing because it is good for you -- which actually is more like Rand's actual conception of egoism, despite the strawman (think Howard Roark).

On the other hand, we can meaningfully speak of actions that help to make us into virtuous people, and that is what I meant by "internal consequences."

If that's not what virtue ethics is, it's at least what virtue ethics would be if it were not self-contradicting nonsense.

I'm not sure there's a name for that, but if I understand virtue ethics correctly, it's certainly not that. And btw, you're being really uncharitable to an ethical theory that's survived more or less continually since Socrates, and actually has grown quite rapidly in numbers over the past few decades. And if you don't have virtue theory down, then I'm not sure on what basis you can call it "self-contradicting nonsense."

Exactly what I'm saying. And that is the problem with your own moral theories which seem to mandate the dissolution of the state, an act with horrible consequences (if it could even be done, which I seriously doubt).

OK this is good. I actually agree with you that if it could be established that statelessness necessarily leads to horrible consequences, then we would have good reason to believe that the anarchist's argument against the legitimacy of the State takes a wrong turn somewhere, because (empirically speaking) that which intuitively seems like justice almost always has good consequences. I also think there is a conceptual connection, but I won't go into that just yet.

So a good argument against the workability of anarchy is good reason to believe that the State is legitimate. The thing is, I'm not sure there's a good argument to be found.

At the same time, I have to repeat that I'm not a consequentialist, and I'm perfectly comfortable in talking about deontological libertarian principles like the importance of consent, rejection of the initiation of force, property rights, respecting others, etc. because I think they are important (nay, vital!) to an understanding of how human society should be organized, and forgetting about them is actually missing the point of liberty. Furthermore, if these libertarian principles are right, then anarchism must necessarily follow. So there are multiple ways, and I'm willing to discuss either.

Another reason I quit being a philosophy major is that a lot of these people seemed to have serious difficulties understanding what any first-year science major can grok: that we can never know everything, that no matter how elegant our theories it is always possible (indeed, inevitable) that reality will one day throw us a curve ball, and that all our conceptions and descriptions and models are no more than approximations. As such, I see no need for an ethical philosophy to answer all moral questions a priori and in fact the attempt to do so is proof enough that one is wrong. Let it be a guideline for general thinking, and make use of our perceptive ability along with that general thinking to do the rest.

It's funny that you say that, because the first-year science major has a lot in common with the first-year philosophy major. It's by the second year that most abandon the skepticism that they acquire from today's scientific world. After all, it's probably a waste of time to be a philosophy major if you're just going to say "we don't know" all the time, unless you're really interested in the history of intellectual thought. (Which I am, so double the fun!)

But philosophy is not science. It's way less humble and there are no generally agreed upon methods for going about it (which, IMO, enriches the whole thing!). But I think good a priorism can withstand these "curveballs" that reality throws at us, so I'm willing to continue.

Originally Posted by Matt1989

Look Brian, if you're going to enter a discussion and say something that sounds an awful lot to me like rule (indirect) consequentialism (if you recall, the post was directed to haymarket--and I was trying to glean if his apparent dogma had any support backing it), a position held by a lot of people, then I think I have reason to bring the term up for further clarification.

All right, you can say that. Nevertheless, I'm not going to be bound by labels. If you need clarification on something I've said, ask for it. I'll be happy to oblige, but I really don't like being pigeonholed.

If you, in your statement about following rules, were referring to something that doesn't have a precise definition, then there's got to be some work done for the conversation to continue.

I didn't say it doesn't have a precise definition. I only said that you shouldn't assume it necessarily fits into a preexisting category, and you especially shouldn't try to make it do so if it doesn't want to.

I stuck enlightened in there in the last second, since people often take ethical egoism to mean a vulgar sort of selfishness (think Ayn Rand). But while egoism is selfishness, most egoist theories are about doing the right thing because it is good for you -- which actually is more like Rand's actual conception of egoism, despite the strawman (think Howard Roark).

The problem with Ayn Rand's real idea of ethical egoism (as opposed to the strawman) is that it depends on a human trait which is in conflict with the existential foundation of that ethic. By which I mean: self-interest can lead to ethical behavior if and only if people are moved by empathy; people who are moved by empathy are conscious of blurred distinctions between themselves and others; but Rand's entire philosophy of the self, and one of the principles of objectivism, is that the individual is all and each individual is an atomic entity entirely separate from all other individuals. An individual who actually manifests this idea will behave in a common-meaning "selfish" way. Only an individual who denies this idea in practice will behave in a Rand's-meaning "selfish" way.

I'm not sure there's a name for that, but if I understand virtue ethics correctly, it's certainly not that. And btw, you're being really uncharitable to an ethical theory that's survived more or less continually since Socrates, and actually has grown quite rapidly in numbers over the past few decades. And if you don't have virtue theory down, then I'm not sure on what basis you can call it "self-contradicting nonsense."

I already explained this.

So a good argument against the workability of anarchy is good reason to believe that the State is legitimate. The thing is, I'm not sure there's a good argument to be found.

I presented one earlier in this thread that you have not answered yet. Should I repeat it?

It's funny that you say that, because the first-year science major has a lot in common with the first-year philosophy major.

Well, perhaps that's true now, but it certainly wasn't true in the 1970s.

It's by the second year that most abandon the skepticism that they acquire from today's scientific world. After all, it's probably a waste of time to be a philosophy major if you're just going to say "we don't know" all the time

Wasn't that exactly what Socrates did, though?

But I think good a priorism can withstand these "curveballs" that reality throws at us, so I'm willing to continue.

Well, that depends on whether what you're doing has any relevance to the real world. One can think of philosophy as a kind of verbal mathematics. (Except when it's mathematical mathematics of course.) The only rules that apply to mathematics in and of itself are that it be internally consistent and follow strict logical process. Mathematics can have great relevance to the observed world and be of huge scientific (and practical) utility, but it doesn't have to be; if it's not, if it's entirely a description of cloud-cuckoo-land, it can still be valid mathematics. However, when mathematics does claim to describe the observed world, then it is subject to empirical confirmation just like any other science, and even the most perfect and elegant mathematics can be, from a real-world perspective, simply wrong. And, like science, mathematics in its description of the observed world is always wrong, the only question being how wrong it is and what will eventually replace it. (It can still be internally consistent and thus "right" in a purely mathematical sense.)

A similar criterion can be applied to any philosophy which purports to describe anything about our real lives, which after all is most of them. And once we understand this, it undermines that certainty and arrogance which afflict an awful lot of philosophers. In philosophy as in science, as long as we're describing the real experienced or observed world, we can only approximate. Philosophy is not necessarily bound by the other assumptions underlying scientific method (since it's asking non-scientific questions, e.g. questions of value), but it is bound by that one.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

The War of 1812. Just a quibble.

Although George III was no longer a despot, and he acceded to Parliament, the Parliament was not democratically elected. Until 1832 the English Parliament included voting burgesses from so-called "rotten boroughs" that grossly distorted representation.

Originally Posted by haymarket martyr

from Fruitcake

What's wrong with small government?

What is "small government" exactly?

A government with a lack of social welfare.

Originally Posted by pbrower2a

First, you fail to recognize the limitations of your learning. The first step to wisdom is to know that one is ignorant. The second is to develop curiosity.

http://users.ox.ac.uk/~worc0337/gifs/dunce.gif

Originally Posted by pbrower2a

1. A social order that doesn't self-destruct in revolution. Liberal states don't have proletarian revolutions; states under control of people who recognize no responsibility to the poor and helpless have often had Commie revolutions.

2. No hunger. Liberal societies may compromise the free market, but they ensure that people don't starve for lack of food. Botswana endured the same drought as did Ethiopia in the 1970s -- and Botswana, with its democratically-elected government, prevented the mass hunger that an absolute monarchy, a military dictatorship, and a Commie regime failed to stop in Ethiopia.

The last famine in western Europe was in Holland in the winter of 1944-1945... under the Nazis. India, never a rich country, has never had a famine since independence.

3. Peace. There has never been a war between two electoral democracies in existence for at least five years. The only warlike activities between Britain and Finland in World War II was a British attack on German economic interests in Finland.

4. Intellectual progress.

5. No persecutions.

*waves a magic wand and makes pbrower2a a "benevolent dictator" of his own country*
Where's the money going to come from to fulfill these promises?

I asked Fruitcake

What is "small government" exactly?

the reply

Originally Posted by fruitcake

A government with a lack of social welfare.

And what is included in what you are calling "social welfare"? Not a definition or a link - but for you - what is that for you?

Originally Posted by pbrower2a

Although George III was no longer a despot, and he acceded to Parliament, the Parliament was not democratically elected. Until 1832 the English Parliament included voting burgesses from so-called "rotten boroughs" that grossly distorted representation.

By a very similar argument, the U.S. today is not a democracy, either, since the influence of campaign financing grossly distorts representation.

Originally Posted by fruitcake

A government with a lack of social welfare.

Which, of course, implies that the biggest property owners run things, and that everyone is at their mercy. Aristocrats and plutocrats at their best are enlightened, if capricious. At their worst they are horrible.

Originally Posted by Matt1989

Sure. I don't think anarchism is that strange of a claim: "We should abolish the State and replace it with a consensual order." I suspect many liberals would be tempted by a statement to that effect, provided that this takes place far into the future. (We could call this something like philosophical anarchism.)

I am dubious. Liberals generally see problems that need to be solved in the here and now. They see the State as one means by which problems can be solved. Consensus is fine. Difficult, but fine. I think it safe to say that most liberals would seek out ways to achieve consensus with minimal coercion. However, the democratic State is currently the best means we have for achieving consensus. Abolishing the primary means available to achieve consensus in order to achieve a better consensus is a strange claim... a very strange claim.

Too often I've seen conservatives describe how liberals think. When I see a post opening "Liberals think that..." I start bracing myself for the strawman attack. Thus, if I were to review how liberals think, I am already dubious about myself. We don't all think alike. Thus, going into detail on why liberals would reject your supposition about how liberals would accept your proposition is questionable.

But, what the hey. I'm more or less liberal. This would be my perspective at least.

There are various threats to the common man. These might include foreign invaders, the capitalist ruling class, major diseases, the cold laws of economics, criminals, terrorists, lions, tigers and bears. (Oh my.)

As individuals, common men cannot in general check these forces. Something is needed that can. 'Whatever' is created to check these forces has to be checked itself. The common man has to have some control over Whatever.

The State in the form of representative democracy would represent the state of the art in Whatever. The replacement Whatever would have to be as good or better at checking lions, tigers and bears as the State, while the people can still check Whatever as well as or better than they could check the State.

An argument that man is so basically good, that his nature is essentially angelic, that these forces do not need to be checked, is a non-starter. Any review of history shows lions, tigers and bears in plenty.

The unraveling Republicans made an argument that some functions performed by the State might better be performed by private organizations outside of the State. This is a plausible perspective. I think a lot of liberals would be willing to talk about such things, one function of government at a time. To the extent that the unraveling Republicans often represented the interests of the lions, tigers and bears, and that they wished to some degree for the lions, tigers and bears to prey more easily upon the common man, one might expect the common man to be very dubious about this approach.

In addition to providing adequate checks on the lions, tigers and bears, these new privatized splinter organizations would have to be checked themselves. There are many existing checks on the State. (Not enough, but many.) I would think something needs to exist to check the new privatized functions, with the degree and kind of checks depending on what functions they are supposed to be doing. I'd be curious as to what other than the State could provide such checks.

Now, I don't see that I'm saying anything new here. I'm just reprising at a broad level the statist or liberal perspective that we've been circling around for the entire thread. The broad answer from the anarchists is that they have no answer. There is no proposed and plausible 'Whatever' that would replace the State. Thus, there will be no basic change in the current situation in the foreseeable future.

So, no, I don't see that the typical liberal would think the anarchists would have anything to offer. Nothing. Nada. Zip. They would have no reason to accept your proposition, "We should abolish the State and replace it with a consensual order." I would think that the rejection of this proposition you have encountered here would be typical of the broad rejection of this proposition by the general public.

On the other hand, y'all seem to be having a good time playing word games with hypotheticals. Such things fall somewhere in the gap between harmless and mostly harmless. Knock yourselves out.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

By a very similar argument, the U.S. today is not a democracy, either, since the influence of campaign financing grossly distorts representation.

If we are setting a standard that democracies are not corrupt, would anyone care to suggest that there are no democracies? ™

Originally Posted by Matt1989

So a good argument against the workability of anarchy is good reason to believe that the State is legitimate. The thing is, I'm not sure there's a good argument to be found.

Perhaps you aren't listening?

Originally Posted by Matt1989

At the same time, I have to repeat that I'm not a consequentialist, and I'm perfectly comfortable in talking about deontological libertarian principles like the importance of consent, rejection of the initiation of force, property rights, respecting others, etc. because I think they are important (nay, vital!) to an understanding of how human society should be organized, and forgetting about them is actually missing the point of liberty. Furthermore, if these libertarian principles are right, then anarchism must necessarily follow. So there are multiple ways, and I'm willing to discuss either.

How does one define 'legitimate'? Your libertarian principles might be a basis for creating a sustainable culture. A set of values can be a basis for forming a group, selecting a leader, making up rules, and enforcing them over the scope of a given territory. However, there are many possible sets of principles. Cultures already exist where a wide variety of principles have been used to center a group around.

If one wanders into the territory of many a State, those people living there will be of the delusion that their State is legitimate. On what basis do you claim they are not? Again, I can see that anarchists can create an internally self consistent logical system. I do not see formal proofs that the anarchist systems are uniquely internally self consistent. I do not see a sufficient list of premises and confirming verifications based on observation of the real world that convinces me in the least that libertarian theory corresponds to how the real world works.

Philosophy is like that. There are lots of theories, doctrines and systems that purport to explain the real world. To my mind, philosophy does not have the tools to uniquely prove any of these theories, doctrines or systems. This is why I would prefer to deal with systems that are at base derived from observation of the real world. I would rather start with people like Toynbee, Aubrey, Lorentz, Toffler, Strauss and Howe. No matter how many ivory tower mind games philosophers might play, they cannot to my mind discredit patterns found in the real world.

This is why I believe a lot of folk are asking who named you to be God. You have not uniquely identified your system as legitimate to anywhere near the point of implying that other systems are not legitimate. You are rejecting other systems by the standard of your system, but not acknowledging that others are equally justified in rejecting your system by the standards of theirs.

Which is why this thread might well continue growing in length if not depth indefinitely.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

Perhaps you aren't listening?

Maybe not. Maybe haymarket's right, in which case, I'm a lost cause. But that doesn't mean that there is no debate to be had.

How does one define 'legitimate'?

When talking about a state's legitimacy, the anarchist/statist divide is over whether that state (or any state) has a right to govern.

If one wanders into the territory of many a State, those people living there will be of the delusion that their State is legitimate. On what basis do you claim they are not? Again, I can see that anarchists can create an internally self consistent logical system. I do not see formal proofs that the anarchist systems are uniquely internally self consistent. I do not see a sufficient list of premises and confirming verifications based on observation of the real world that convinces me in the least that libertarian theory corresponds to how the real world works.

Philosophy is like that. There are lots of theories, doctrines and systems that purport to explain the real world. To my mind, philosophy does not have the tools to uniquely prove any of these theories, doctrines or systems. This is why I would prefer to deal with systems that are at base derived from observation of the real world. I would rather start with people like Toynbee, Aubrey, Lorentz, Toffler, Strauss and Howe. No matter how many ivory tower mind games philosophers might play, they cannot to my mind discredit patterns found in the real world.

I'll be frank here: I think you're trapped in a scientific worldview, and can't help but think of philosophy as needing to correspond to observed phenomena, when philosophy usually deals with different kinds of questions. Truth be told, a lot of what is traditionally considered philosophy has been refuted or proved by science (as an example of the former, think of Locke's tabula rasa as being refuted by Chomsky's Universal Grammar), but those are instances when philosophy encroaches into plainly scientific territory. Philosophical discussions about something like human nature are largely dependent on scientific inquiry, but there are also some philosophical ideas at play there that I think are necessary to get the full picture. But there are plenty of things that clearly fall under the domain of philosophy that science can never say much about (e.g., logical principles, philosophical method, many conceptions of God, the mind-body problem, etc.) because these things are, by definition, outside the scope of observation. Maybe that's reason to do away with a lot of philosophy: Hume certainly thought that this was the case, but it's important to remember that these are philosophical issues.

Libertarian theory (and I'm talking about the non-aggression principle here) is a matter of ethics from which politics follows, so it does not have to "discredit patterns found in the real world"; all it has to do is make a claim about what all humans ought to not do. I presume that you have some reason for believing that the State should be governing individuals. Why? Unless you start talking about why something is good, justified, etc. then you'll be unable to articulate anything more than a philosophically meaningless preference for something. (One could indeed find common ground with a person, so your statements might be convincing, but you still haven't addressed the question of legitimacy, or political philosophy at all.) I would suggest that the inability to articulate why you prefer something is because simply talking about observed phenomena runs into a logical wall when trying to express something that is inherently philosophical. Explain the real world all you want (and we're all better for it!), but the State's justification cannot even be expressed without appeal to normativity, e.g., something along the lines of "consequences that I perceive to be good are actually good."

(One could say that they perceive the State to be justified because they think that the State produces consequences that they perceive to be good. But that's just a statement of belief; not actual justification.)

Or maybe you think justification theories are playing the wrong ballgame, and that the State is neither justified nor unjustified, and that we are asking the wrong questions, because when you get right down to it, human preference has no rational basis (or something to that effect -- I think there is something deeply wrong with this theory, but that's been discussed already in a conversation between myself and Brian). But if this is the case, the question as to whether we should have a state or not cannot be coherently answered because it's all preference, so any advocacy for either position is going to be intellectually bankrupt because there is no cognitive basis behind either.

tl;dr Philosophy is needed to coherently talk about whether we should have a state or not.

This is why I believe a lot of folk are asking who named you to be God. You have not uniquely identified your system as legitimate to anywhere near the point of implying that other systems are not legitimate. You are rejecting other systems by the standard of your system, but not acknowledging that others are equally justified in rejecting your system by the standards of theirs.

Which is why people who ask "who named you God?" are being foolish. You don't reject political systems by merely asserting another political system; or ethical systems through other ethical systems. I'm not saying "this is the way!" without any appeal to other standards -- that's haymarket's job (e.g., "It's the consequences. It's the consequences."), not mine. And if I don't fully explain why I believe a certain way, I'll usually preface my reasoning with "I think" (e.g. "because I think we have a right to not be aggressed against") to avoid coming off as excessively dogmatic. But if that preface is missing, as it was when I provoked Mike's response, it shouldn't be inferred that I mean "because I say so," or that I haven't thought things out. That's being tremendously uncharitable considering the amount of explicating that I've done on this thread alone.

Whew! This is my longest post in a while. Not sure how you do it Bob.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

All right, you can say that. Nevertheless, I'm not going to be bound by labels. If you need clarification on something I've said, ask for it. I'll be happy to oblige, but I really don't like being pigeonholed.

I didn't say it doesn't have a precise definition. I only said that you shouldn't assume it necessarily fits into a preexisting category, and you especially shouldn't try to make it do so if it doesn't want to.

All good.

The problem with Ayn Rand's real idea of ethical egoism (as opposed to the strawman) is that it depends on a human trait which is in conflict with the existential foundation of that ethic. By which I mean: self-interest can lead to ethical behavior if and only if people are moved by empathy; people who are moved by empathy are conscious of blurred distinctions between themselves and others; but Rand's entire philosophy of the self, and one of the principles of objectivism, is that the individual is all and each individual is an atomic entity entirely separate from all other individuals. An individual who actually manifests this idea will behave in a common-meaning "selfish" way. Only an individual who denies this idea in practice will behave in a Rand's-meaning "selfish" way.

I'm not an expert on Objectivism, so I don't know how they might respond, but even if your criticism is as damaging as you think, not all ethical egoists are convinced by the Randian conception of the "self" you present. (N.b. I'm not sure what Rand thinks the "self" is either.)

I already explained this.

Where?

I presented one earlier in this thread that you have not answered yet. Should I repeat it?

The one about miscreants? It's a very vague objection. Would you mind going into more detail? (If you do, that's cool. I need a mini-break from this discussion anyway.)

Well, perhaps that's true now, but it certainly wasn't true in the 1970s.

That's just my experience; it might not hold for the late 00s.

Wasn't that exactly what Socrates did, though?

Nah, Socrates was way too pedantic for that. His style was more of leading you to his conclusion by convincing you that you don't know shit.

Matt, I'm going to answer just two things from your last post to Bob, which I think go to the heart of our disagreement. It's too good an opportunity to pass up.

Originally Posted by Matt1989

I'll be frank here: I think you're trapped in a scientific worldview, and can't help but think of philosophy as needing to correspond to observed phenomena, when philosophy usually deals with different kinds of questions.

Philosophy does need to correspond to observed phenomena insofar as it concerns itself with the observed world. Granted, philosophy deals with questions outside the scope of science itself, but nonetheless they are questions in many cases -- including all of the ones discussed on this thread -- which make claims about the world we experience, and to that extent the observed nature of that world is pertinent.

Libertarian theory (and I'm talking about the non-aggression principle here) is a matter of ethics from which politics follows, so it does not have to "discredit patterns found in the real world"; all it has to do is make a claim about what all humans ought to not do.

You speak of this as if "what all humans ought not to do" is insulated somehow from factual reality. It is not. What ought to be is dependent on what is, and on what can be. It is never the case that what ought to be is also what cannot be. It is also never the case that what should not be is what must be. And so in order for libertarian ethics (or any other ethics) to constitute more than a meaningless emotional grunt, one must concern oneself with patterns found in the real world. One must indeed discredit those patterns AND suggest a workable alternative (assuming one believes they ought to change).

Let me give you a hypothetical example. There are religious sects (e.g. the Shakers) that believe all sexual intercourse to be wrong. Since the statement "this is wrong" is not a claim of fact, it cannot be disproven by methods of science. However, what science can do is to determine that, one, it isn't possible for everyone or even most people to give up sex, and two, if they did, the human race would cease to exist within a single generation. The only way to advocate celibacy as a moral imperative with logical consistency is therefore to accept that it is an ideal that applies only to a select few, and that most people need feel no shame or guilt in failing to live up to it as it does not apply to them. Otherwise, one is implicitly claiming that most people ought to do the impossible and that it would be a good thing if the human race were to perish, neither of which is consistent with Shaker beliefs.

Do you understand what I'm implying here? A moral assertion is not a claim of fact, but it is a claim about the real world. It is a valid response to such an assertion to point out either that people cannot follow it, or that if they did results would ensue which the person making the moral assertion would not like. Either of these is a claim about the real world which can be made on a scientific basis, and is enough to refute the moral assertion itself, even though that assertion cannot directly be refuted by scientific means.

The refutation of "A is right, B is wrong" need not take the form "No, A is wrong, B is right." (This is simply a butting of rhetorical heads, a pure conflict of wills without resolution.) Instead, it can take the form, "A implies C, which you find good. B implies D, which you don't. Therefore, you do not believe that A is wrong or that B is right, unless you simultaneously deny what is manifestly, factually true."

And that brings us back to anarchism. I have asserted something factual: that the state even at its worst suppresses more violence and oppression than it causes, by a large factor. In support of this assertion, I have presented the high level of individual violence in all precivilized, non-state-governed societies, and pointed out that the chance of a person (particularly a male) dying in such societies from any cause other than human violence was far, far lower -- i.e., the chance of dying by human violence was far, far higher -- than it was globally in 1942, a year of extraordinary state-sponsored violence, let alone any more normal year such as this one. (If you happened to be a German or Russian soldier fighting in Russia in that year, this might not be true, but globally it is.) There is no question that state-sponsored violence in 1942 far exceeded its occurrence in precivilized times (even if we fudge the concept of "state-sponsored" to include primitive war, which strictly speaking wasn't state-sponsored). But the level of violence overall was much, much greater in the primitive societies.

This observation is pertinent because your stated reason for supporting anarchy is that you object to aggression. But abolishing the state would result in a large net increase in aggression. Therefore, you cannot consistently approve of anarchy, except by denying that claim about factual reality. You may of course do that -- you may insist that I am factually incorrect, and that a stateless society would NOT result in an increase of individual aggression over what would be lost in state-sponsored aggression. (Such an assertion would however require much in the way of evidence, since it is both counter-intuitive and contrary to what historical evidence we have.) What you cannot do, though, is to claim that this observation about the real world, if true, does not invalidate your assertion.

The simple claim "aggression is wrong" is independent of that observation. (Although not of other factual observations which might be made.) The claim "the state is wrong because it is an aggressor" is not.

You don't reject political systems by merely asserting another political system; or ethical systems through other ethical systems.

On the contrary, either of those is a perfectly valid response. One can show that political system X has features and benefits A, which make it superior to politicaly system Y, and the same with ethical system Q over ethical system R. An absolute refutation of political system Y or ethical system R -- e.g., refuting a divine-authority system of morality by trying to prove that God does not exist -- is not necessary. It's enough to show that an alternative is better.

from Matt

Maybe not. Maybe haymarket's right, in which case, I'm a lost cause.

Did that mean old SOB call you a lost cause? You are young Matt. You have a lot of living to do in this world - and by that I mean living outside of a classroom or book in the real world where people discuss things outside of academic theories with fancy names and the arguments do not have pat answers. You will learn from practical experiences and learn from real people who will surprise you with their broad mindedness and openness and intelligence. You will learn from adversity and from pain the way everyone does and it will matter a whole lot more than some fancy book written by somebody dead for ages now. You have jobs ahead and a career and bills to pay and people to love and help and raise.

No Matt, you are not a lost cause.

Originally Posted by Matt1989

I'll be frank here: I think you're trapped in a scientific worldview, and can't help but think of philosophy as needing to correspond to observed phenomena, when philosophy usually deals with different kinds of questions. Truth be told, a lot of what is traditionally considered philosophy has been refuted or proved by science (as an example of the former, think of Locke's tabula rasa as being refuted by Chomsky's Universal Grammar), but those are instances when philosophy encroaches into plainly scientific territory....

I might be guilty of being locked in a scientific world view, but you might be giving special place to the philosophical world view. I'll ramble on here for a bit. This won't get back to anarchy until late, but I'll explore the science - philosophy clash a bit.

Philosophers might still on occasion do creative things with logic or mathematics that is helpful to scientists and engineers trying to solve real world problems. If so, more power to them. Similarly, moral and political philosophy can sometimes impinge on the real world as well.

However, I don't see philosophers as having any sort of special place. A president might give a speech from his bully pulpit. A priest might give a sermon on an evangelical cable TV channel. A scientist studying human and animal behavior might publish a book in ordinary language intended as a popular release. A conservative pundit might have a radio show, or a progressive pundit a blog. A philosophy professor might write in an academic journal.

All of them are attempting to promote their own world view. All of them might be trying to nudge the culture in a particular direction. Depending on their audience, they might use different tools of persuasion. The cleric might quote scripture. The politician might quote Churchill. The conservative pundit might use coded racist language. If I might propose a word that describes all of the above, it might be propaganda. They are all attempting to sell a set of values. They are all trying to alter the culture.

Now, some might claim that only a philosopher can talk about morality, about good and evil. Others might claim that only a priest can so speak. I don't see it. Propaganda is either effective or not effective. People with an interest in philosophy, religion or both might share a common world view that suggests that they and only they can arrive at Truth with regards to a certain area of interest. They might convince each other that what other groups say is of no import as they don't quote the correct holy text or derive their understanding using all the proper rituals.

I don't believe it. Your philosophical world view gives your philosophical world view a special place that might allegedly trump other world views. You might have bought into your world view to the point that you can't question this. You might not be able to consider questions of morality from the perspective of any world view other than your own. However, don't assume that others will agree to play only on your playing field, under your rules, with your bat and ball. They will be playing other games by other rules. Just because you are ahead on your own score card isn't apt to matter a lot to others.

I don't feel any particular need to revert into philosopher mode before diving into real world problems facing the world today. Most people don't.

Now, philosophers might still on occasion provide useful propaganda. They are quite capable of observing broad perspectives of how their culture perceives the world, and can sometimes describe the result with a logic and clarity that could effect how people think, act and vote. They have a role to play.

But it is the same role as the animal behaviorist writing his populist book, the priest preaching, or the conservative pundit ranting and provoking. Different tools. Different perspectives. Different agendas. Different audiences. Still, one key factor is how well the world view of the propagandist strikes a chord with a sizable audience. Another key factor, if change is being sought, if what the propagandist wants is somewhat different from how the audience usually thinks, is whether the change being proposed corresponds to the every day reality the audience lives in.

Now, I think I could throw out some values shared by many liberals. Let's avoid war. Most people ought to be able to find a job that provides a decent working wage. Criminal activity ought to be discouraged. I don't feel any particular need to prove these as good from first principles according to any rituals blessed by philosophy professors. These are shared values. A lot of people will accept them. They will be accepted blindly, in fact. The problem with values is not in proving them in any objective rational sense. The problem is getting people to examine their own values, to consider that their own particular way of looking at things might not be the ideal and only way.

Now, when I'm wearing my scientific engineering hat, I can look at anarchist theory, and ask if any useful stuff is there that helps me understand or manipulate the world. Frankly, the answer is no.

Wearing my liberal citizen hat, I would ask if anarchist theory can help improve my life, can inform me on how to vote, can convince me to join a protest or a revolution. Again, the answer is no.

Putting on my philosophy hat? Well, sure. Consensus is good. Coercion is bad. Man is a social creature that creates complex societies. How can one achieve consensus enough for a working civilization with a minimum of coercion? Is zero coercion a plausible goal? This is an interesting problem in abstract. Philosophers might lock themselves in ivory towers and argue about stuff like that indefinitely.

I'm not really interested in the question if the answer can't be applied to the real world. I don't particularly believe any answer that comes out of a vacuum chamber located at the top of an ivory tower would be meaningful in any relevant way.

Originally Posted by haymarket martyr

No Matt, you are not a lost cause.

Likely not. There is hope for Matt. (I shall not mention Fruitcake. I shall not mention Fruitcake...) ™

Originally Posted by Matt1989

Mike was objecting to the use of concepts like justice and rights,

I was objecting to your opinion being asserted as fact.

in effect saying that assertions about these concepts from a mere mortal have no basis in rational discussion.

Assertions of unsupported opinion as fact has no basis in rational discussion.

But even if it is all a matter of judgment, it would appear that certain principles are essential to coherently talk about political philosophy in the first place.

Yes, one could take a little more humble view and consider that one's conception of what is rightful is not the only reasonable one.

That is, if one is going to advocate for X over Y, then they need to have reasons for preferring X over Y.

Asserting one's preferences does not constitute reasons. You are an anarchist who chooses to believe that property is rightfully owned, and so taxation constitutes theft. Other anarchists have chosen to believe that property as theft.

Obviously anarchists can hold diametrically opposite views. I don't hold with either of these views, but then I am not an anarchist.

So if you want to make a coherent argument about why is is bad/wrong to tax the rich, it is best to seek some common ground.

Originally Posted by Matt1989

This is entirely irrelevant to the question of whether taxation is theft (taking someone's property without their consent).

Conception of property is very much relevant to this question.

In America, taxation is not the taking of property without consent. Property rights in America are not and have never been absolute. As a property owner you are still subject to the Law, even when on your property. When one acquires property in America, one tacitly consents to be bound by the laws of the jurisdiction within which the property lies. And that law includes taxation.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

You are an anarchist who chooses to believe that property is rightfully owned, and so taxation constitutes theft. Other anarchists have chosen to believe that property is theft.

Obviously anarchists can hold diametrically opposite views. I don't hold with either of these views, but then I am not an anarchist.

Proudhon also said that property was freedom. His point was that not everything we call property is justly possessed, nor is it all unjust either. All of the various radical property theories have as their basis the idea that present property titles cannot be taken at face value. A sense of justice precedes the assessment of property, not the reverse.

This does rule out the theory that property should be whatever society says it is. That may be true in actual practice, but that's only because the rules of society are informed by our sense of justice. That's why the aversion to philosophical introspection that some of the liberals here have expressed is poisonous to social development.