Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

First, Roman auxilia should not be confused with reserve forces in present terminology. These were forces from outside of Italy proper who weren't organized as Legions. But these were still full-time soldiers.

Second, nearly 1% of the population were in arms constantly for 700 years. Comparing a brief peak period in Western history is inappropriate. Presently the number of soldiers in the West is maybe 0.5% of the whole population. This has been true for 60 years now. So, we can say that the Pax Romana maintained a larger standing army than the Pax Americana has. That alone disproves Toffler's blanket description of the agricultural age.

A while ago, Mikebert put together a data base of war casualties by year. Using his data, I put together the following chart using 4 year rolling averages which smooth out the curves to get rid of noise and make cyclical patterns stand out more.



Before 1600, armies weren't causing that many casualties. I see this as the tail end of the Agricultural Age military pattern. By later standards, not much going on. There were smaller armies with less effective weapons.

Between 1600 and 1900, there was as pretty a pattern as one would expect to see in support of theories of cyclical history. There is a nice war cycle there, which is in sync with economic cycles. My spin is that during this era, war was considered cost effective. If the economy was going good, someone would start a war over something. Debt and damage would eventually demand that the wars stop for a time. I would consider for the purpose of looking at war cycles, this period would be the heart of the Industrial Age. I would be interested in the average percentage of the population under arms during this period. We might compare it to antiquity. Still, would it be a fair comparison? Did the Romans have cyclical periods of arming and disarming? If we are trying to compare apples to apples, in all of human history is there another apple?

1914 through 1945.... That was something else. This is indeed an anomaly period. The Industrial Age pattern was blown away. I should perhaps plot the recent Bush Wars to see if any semblance of a pattern is reforming, but I expect not. At least, if there is going to be another pattern, it would be too soon to claim that one can see it clearly.

Anyway, taking your sample starting 60 years ago is no more a neutral sample than 1900 through 1945. The Pax Americana was/is a peace of nukes. The manpower requirements were not the same. Many nations had also figured out that war wasn't a fun game anymore. Most nations were spending a lot less on the military than they had previously.

I did find a few numbers for France during World War I. It seems that 19 percent of her population were under arms at some point during the war. Do you know off hand what the maximum mobilization of the Roman Empire might have been?

But I'm also not sure that percentage of the population serving as regulars is the number we are looking for at all. In the Anglo-American series of crises, the age of the musket militia was the time when universal male suffrage and rights emerged. I'm still of the opinion that there was some link between every man being armed and every man having rights and votes. The militias were generally not enough trained well enough to be decisive in conflict with regulars, but I believe the founding fathers sincere in their opinions that an armed people were a bulwark against tyranny. In a time when democracy was fairly new, the musket over every fireplace wasn't a negligible consideration.

The above chart also makes me consider where to put the end of the Industrial Age and the start of the hypothetical Third Wave. As the transforming technologies for the Industrial Age might have been gunpowder weapons, the printing press and the steam engine, the Third Wave might be shaped by weapons of mass destruction, computer network information exchange and renewable energy. When I look at the world wars on the above chart, I am seeing a transition spike. While the overall Third Wave pattern, if there is going to be a Third Wave pattern, would still be a work in progress, it seems possible that Hiroshima might be the point when the military aspects of the new pattern might be expected to start. Thus, taking the last 60 years as your sample of the Industrial Age might be questionable.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

This is very important, too, since it seems that not just Bob, but HM and Matt as well, seem to want to bundle legitimacy with moral right. I'm pretty sure I've done it myself in this thread. Ultimately, they're not linked

.

Originally Posted by Matt1989

Err, that's what legitimacy is, provided we're talking about the justice of the State per se. De jure, not de facto.

Umm.... Did I mention that both pragmatic and moral standards need to be part of the conversation? ™

Originally Posted by Matt1989

Err, that's what legitimacy is, provided we're talking about the justice of the State per se. De jure, not de facto.

Not necessarily. Legitimacy needs to be defined. In one sense it means only "in accord with the law." In that sense, Hitler's Nazi Germany was perfectly legitimate while the U.S. Constitution is not. In another sense, "legitimate" could conceivably mean "meeting moral standards," but that would be an unusual meaning.

We know where you're coming from, Matt; it's your position that all states are illegitimate so you are going to define legitimacy in such a way that that becomes true. Bob's position is more problematical. He seems to be taking a position that would render a great many of the world's current governments, including the People's Republic of China, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of Cuba, and a lot of countries in Africa and Latin America illegitimate. I don't really think that's the conclusion he wants to draw (although he can correct me on this if he does), but it's one that follows from his stated position.

In international relations, "legitimate" usually means that a government is recognized by other governments as representing the population of a certain territory. The other governments then establish embassies, conduct diplomacy, etc. with that government. In local, internal politics, "legitimate" means that a government is recognized and accepted by the people who live under it, or a critical mass of them anyway. Either of these seem to me to be the most useful definition (since I don't share your motivation of wanting to discredit the state in toto), and I note that the first generally follows from the second: that is, if the people support a government, normally it will endure well enough to gain recognition by other governments.

I have no desire to shut off talk of the moral qualities of this or that state, but I think we should separate that from the discussion of "legitimacy." I want to do this simply to avoid confusion. Particularly, I want to avoid the very Western confusion that leads people to believe that a government which is not democratic or does not respect human rights Western-style will not have the support of its people, and will be maintained only by force. That is simply not true. As Kurt pointed out, democracy does not result in the government having the consent of the governed -- that's inevitable, or the government is overthrown -- it merely makes changes in popular will, and hence changes in administration, neater and less bloody. Which is of course a good thing. But as I said earlier, Jefferson was only half right; government derives its powers, just or unjust, from the consent of the governed. "Just" is a moral quality; and so we can say that all governments derive their powers from the consent of the governed, whether or not we would judge them morally good. It's not our judgment that matters, but that of their own people.

Once we get that straight, discussion of the state's moral qualities, ones it has or ones it should, is fine with me.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

One problem I see is that rules apply to a community. In a small, poor, simple society such as Iceland or early Rhode Island, everyone can easily accept everyone else as part of an intuitive whole. The human instincts that encourage mercy, charity, sharing, restraint and other virtues among a community will kick in. If there is no attempt to build a sense of community, that all are part of a whole that follow the same rules, the instincts which enable the virtues would not necessarily manifest. Rather than neighbors, you might get Others. Rather than a community, you fall into the failed state mode, where it is so easy to resolve differences through force.

I can sympathize with an anarchist desire to reduce coercion. The problem with anarchist rhetoric as often expressed is how to get rid of the state without getting rid of a sense that we are all one, that we should interact through our virtues as well as through our vices. The notion of a social contract is more than a philosophical abstract. Man's natural limits checking our vices depend to a great degree on a feeling that one is dealing with One-Of-Us rather than The Enemy. If others are perceived of as Others, you can easily get ethnic cleansing, genocide, organized rape, political famine and similar undesirable behaviors. The instinctive taboos blocking aggression and greed do not apply to The Enemy.

So, the tricky question that the anarchists might have to answer in the century or two before The Anarchist Revolution is how to get rid of states while still having a sense of community and a common feeling that certain vices are taboo among all anyone is likely to encounter.

Isn't it obvious? The State is a stand-in for community awareness and cooperative problem-solving. It doesn't appear out of nowhere, and it's intrusiveness into our daily lives can only be had if we emotionally isolate ourselves from those around us. There are a number of powerful cultural forces that have contributed to this, but I don't think stuff like technology and complexity per se are particularly strong factors so much as the way we approach them. I actually think modern twists on patriarchy are the largest social factor, but it's important to see how the State's existence, in turn, suppresses that human tendency toward cooperative ventures.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

A while ago, Mikebert put together a data base of war casualties by year. Using his data, I put together the following chart using 4 year rolling averages which smooth out the curves to get rid of noise and make cyclical patterns stand out more.

Unfortunately, this chart needs to be scaled relative to the population of the combatant countries. If you did that, you'd find that the biggest spike in that period would be the 30 Years War, not WWII -- and that's a conflict that is difficult to label as part of the Industrial Age.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

Before 1600, armies weren't causing that many casualties. I see this as the tail end of the Agricultural Age military pattern. By later standards, not much going on. There were smaller armies with less effective weapons.

You're making the same error. Medieval Europe had an anomalous amount of military specialization. It's not a representative sample of pre-industrial warfare.

Also, the period 1618-1945 which you zero in on is not "industrial" it's the age of nation-states. Before that time Western civilization featured many military forces not directly tied to the state and after that time proxy war and mercenary units began to reappear.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

I would be interested in the average percentage of the population under arms during this period. We might compare it to antiquity. Still, would it be a fair comparison? Did the Romans have cyclical periods of arming and disarming?

The average measure would be more accurate. Peak periods don't work since (lacking modern banking) the capacity of the Roman state to go into debt to finance a surge in troop numbers was quite low. Peak Roman mobilization in any one year probably never went over 2%. But that's only double the average. In the age of nation states, increases in troop numbers of 5 or 10 times over peacetime were not unheard of and these cyclical troop levels were made possible by better transportation, communication and financing. If you did take an average, I doubt you'd be much over 1% for the nation-state period, with the last century of that period (~1850-1950) the only one likely to exceed that value.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

In the Anglo-American series of crises, the age of the musket militia was the time when universal male suffrage and rights emerged. I'm still of the opinion that there was some link between every man being armed and every man having rights and votes.

There is a correlation, but were guns the cause or were guns a manifestation of that change? The fact that the crossbow did not have this effect casts doubt on the theory of guns as the driving force behind this change. Rather the gun seems to have to come into prominence as a means of enforcing the new relationship between citizen and government.

What I'm saying is that Toffler's analysis is extremely superficial. He treats the agriculture/industry division as politically significant even though the nation-state arises well before notable industry and is clearly the more significant change. He also seems to think all agricultural societies were like medieval Europe.

Originally Posted by Matt1989

Isn't it obvious? The State is a stand-in for community awareness and cooperative problem-solving.

Of course! But that doesn't have the implications you are giving it. The state doesn't replace community awareness and cooperative problem-solving. Rather, it operates in lieu of those things in venues where they cannot operate. Community awareness and informal cooperative problem-solving only work in contexts where everyone knows everyone else. It still operates within families, in neighborhoods, among friends, in groups defined by a common interest, in churches, in many offices (although not all), in classes, and in many other contexts that are too small and familiar to require anything as complex and formal as a state.

Do you know everyone in the U.S.A.? In the state where you live? In the city where you live? Of course not, and so if any collective efforts on that scale are going to take place, they must be organized through the medium of a state. That's why every civilization has always had a state, and why no precivilized human society ever has had one.

It doesn't appear out of nowhere, and it's intrusiveness into our daily lives can only be had if we emotionally isolate ourselves from those around us.

That is simply untrue. It's untrue either that we DO emotionally isolate ourselves from those around us (unless you are defining "around us" purely in old-fashioned spatial terms), or that this is the reason the state arises. The state arises because our numbers grow too great for informal governing structures to work on such a large scale. They still work, and still exist, in smaller groups within the larger context.

There are a number of powerful cultural forces that have contributed to this, but I don't think stuff like technology and complexity per se are particularly strong factors so much as the way we approach them.

It is impossible to approach them any other way. Let's consider the key technologies that have led to the shift from the precivilized to the classical civilized paradigm and from that towards whatever the advanced paradigm ends up being (or at least towards where we are now which I believe to be a transition stage).

The key technology leading to the classical civilized paradigm was agriculture. The reason why agriculture led to this change is that it vastly increased food production per acre. Over time, this led to congregation of humans in larger groups. Bands (the unit of social organization in forager-hunter times) congregated together into tribes, and a pre-state formal governing structure evolved to deal with their disputes and implement collective decisions. Tribes settled in an area, bred more people due to the increased food supply, and eventually built a city. Without exception, the city always developed a form of governance that qualifies as a state.

It's not because people had a particular attitude towards the technology of agriculture (unless you include in that "we can have more kids because there's plenty of food"). It's that such a large number of people could not operate by informal means.

As the classical pattern of civilization consolidated, near-universal patterns of government arose: monarchy, hereditary warrior-landholder aristocracy, slavery or serfdom, state religion based around common religious ideas (Gods-over-man, man-over-woman, man-over-nature, some-men-over-others). Other technologies were developed without affecting this pattern (writing, the wheel, metal working, sailing). The only major exceptions to this pattern, such as Athenian democracy and the Roman Republic, emerged in situations where commerce became more important than agriculture as a source of wealth. Much later, another complex of technologies (the printing press, the scientific method, the steam engine, the assembly line) led to the industrial revolution, which boosted the importance of commerce over agriculture and led to a change in government type and the end of slavery, serfdom, and hereditary nobility (except in vestigial form in some countries).

It really has always followed the physical circumstances which have generally followed technology.

I actually think modern twists on patriarchy are the largest social factor,

What? Patriarchy goes back to the dawn of civilization, and is on the decline today.

but it's important to see how the State's existence, in turn, suppresses that human tendency toward cooperative ventures.

It does not. Not in the least. If anything, it encourages it by creating a safe venue for it to operate.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Particularly, I want to avoid the very Western confusion that leads people to believe that a government which is not democratic or does not respect human rights Western-style will not have the support of its people, and will be maintained only by force.

It is notable that both Bob and HM, who wish to maintain a sharp distinction between democracy and despotism, are also more supportive of interventionist foreign policy. The belief that Western countries are categorically different makes wars for "freedom" much more palatable. (And, not coincidentally, more likely to be disastrous quagmires.)

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

We know where you're coming from, Matt; it's your position that all states are illegitimate so you are going to define legitimacy in such a way that that becomes true. Bob's position is more problematical. He seems to be taking a position that would render a great many of the world's current governments, including the People's Republic of China, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of Cuba, and a lot of countries in Africa and Latin America illegitimate. I don't really think that's the conclusion he wants to draw (although he can correct me on this if he does), but it's one that follows from his stated position...

Once we get that straight, discussion of the state's moral qualities, ones it has or ones it should, is fine with me.

Have you been reading my recent posts on this subject?

I think we are using the word 'legitimate' in a technical sense here, rather than in a broad dictionary common sense use. I'm willing to use Brian's sense of the word 'legitimate,' saying a state that has effective monopoly on use of force and general recognition by other states would be legitimate. (That about right?)

I'm willing to use the words 'just' and 'unjust' to describe states that meet or fail to meet moral criteria. Respecting the Universal Declaration might be one such criteria. I am trying to stay fairly objective in saying states should honor international treaties that attempt to encourage moral behavior by states. The Universal Declaration is one such. I would listen if others were suggested.

Your list of states above might all count as unjust by that standard. I would propose that the United States and other nations might properly recognize such states formally, but could and should properly advocate changes through non-violent means to nudge such states towards something 'just.'

Should states use violence to promote justice? Very dangerous. I wouldn't take it off the table, but I certainly wouldn't want the US to get into the habit of using force to compel morality on a regular basis without careful careful consideration and examining all other means. On the other hand, if there is a genocide in progress, sitting on one's hands wouldn't be the intuitive first option.

Matt might propose that any state that levies taxes would be unjust. I would expect that lots of people might propose lots of criteria, and there will be little consensus in what might properly be considered 'justice'. There seems to be a moving target. What is acceptable in one century might not be the next. Lots of people will try to project the next century's standard, and they should not be lightly dismissed.

I would not be shocked if Matt is stubborn in rejecting Brian's use of the word 'legitimate.' From the world view and values of a person centered on philosophy and morality, a state that isn't 'just' simply couldn't possibly be 'legitimate'. When I put on my philosopher's hat, an immoral state being considered legitimate just does not compute. I find myself in abort, retry or ignore territory.

Fortunately, I generally don't keep my philosopher's hat on for long stretches at a time. I prefer to be able to observe and interact with the real world.

Hopefully, the thread does not bog down into a battle for the unique control of the definition of a word.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

It is notable that both Bob and HM, who wish to maintain a sharp distinction between democracy and despotism, are also more supportive of interventionist foreign policy. The belief that Western countries are categorically different makes wars for "freedom" much more palatable. (And, not coincidentally, more likely to be disastrous quagmires.)

I do distinguish between democracy and despotism, and do support interventionist foreign policy more than a lot of folk.

While each potential conflict is a special case, and no broad set of criteria should be set in stone or automatically let lose the dogs of war, I do not and have not been advocating wars for freedom. Changing cultures at gunpoint is a very difficult and expensive proposition. Early on I compared Iraqi Freedom to Reconstruction after the US Civil War. I did not anticipate a cakewalk, and still strongly question whether the changes we brought to Iraq were worth the deaths and displacement that resulted among the Iraqi people.

I do believe international intervention often appropriate should there be large scale crimes against humanity. I am concerned with failed states and warlord government. I would count genocide, ethnic cleansing, organized rape and political famine as plausible casus belli.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

That is simply untrue. It's untrue either that we DO emotionally isolate ourselves from those around us (unless you are defining "around us" purely in old-fashioned spatial terms), or that this is the reason the state arises. The state arises because our numbers grow too great for informal governing structures to work on such a large scale. They (community awareness and cooperative problem-solving) still work, and still exist, in smaller groups within the larger context.

Good post over all. Your over all theme that complex large societies require more formal mechanisms is a point I have been trying to make as well.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

The key technology leading to the classical civilized paradigm was agriculture. The reason why agriculture led to this change is that it vastly increased food production per acre. Over time, this led to congregation of humans in larger groups. Bands (the unit of social organization in forager-hunter times) congregated together into tribes, and a pre-state formal governing structure evolved to deal with their disputes and implement collective decisions. Tribes settled in an area, bred more people due to the increased food supply, and eventually built a city. Without exception, the city always developed a form of governance that qualifies as a state.

It's not because people had a particular attitude towards the technology of agriculture (unless you include in that "we can have more kids because there's plenty of food"). It's that such a large number of people could not operate by informal means.

As the classical pattern of civilization consolidated, near-universal patterns of government arose: monarchy, hereditary warrior-landholder aristocracy, slavery or serfdom, state religion based around common religious ideas (Gods-over-man, man-over-woman, man-over-nature, some-men-over-others). Other technologies were developed without affecting this pattern (writing, the wheel, metal working, sailing). The only major exceptions to this pattern, such as Athenian democracy and the Roman Republic, emerged in situations where commerce became more important than agriculture as a source of wealth. Much later, another complex of technologies (the printing press, the scientific method, the steam engine, the assembly line) led to the industrial revolution, which boosted the importance of commerce over agriculture and led to a change in government type and the end of slavery, serfdom, and hereditary nobility (except in vestigial form in some countries).

Brian

Over all, you have covered well the sort of broad changes described by Toffler (and Diamond) while hopefully avoiding most of the stuff Kurt is objecting to. I would agree the Greeks and Romans stand as an exception, outliers to the general pattern of antiquity. I would agree they eventually developed into outstanding trading cultures.

From my readings, they started out as warrior cultures. The tactics of the phalanx and the ethic of "come back with your shield or on it" were more than a little important. While their military prowess eventually led to opportunities for commerce, it was the citizen soldier that differentiated Greece and Rome from much of the rest of antiquity and led to their unusual governments.

I'm not going to try to prove this. It isn't particularly important to the current discussions, and I'm feeling kind of alone as someone interested in war in the liberal camp. You might want to pick up John Keegan's A History of Warfare if you wish to explore the perspective.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

Unfortunately, this chart needs to be scaled relative to the population of the combatant countries...

Good enough. I'll try to find an appropriate population curve and scale things in. If you could suggest a URL, let me know.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

The average measure would be more accurate. Peak periods don't work since (lacking modern banking) the capacity of the Roman state to go into debt to finance a surge in troop numbers was quite low. Peak Roman mobilization in any one year probably never went over 2%. But that's only double the average. In the age of nation states, increases in troop numbers of 5 or 10 times over peacetime were not unheard of and these cyclical troop levels were made possible by better transportation, communication and financing. If you did take an average, I doubt you'd be much over 1% for the nation-state period, with the last century of that period (~1850-1950) the only one likely to exceed that value.

I would still believe that the ability of a given type of culture to wage war would be better understood by examining wars, not peace. My broad contention is that better agriculture, industry, and I suppose banking allowed the support of larger and more effective armies. This ability to raise armies is not best measured during times when raising armies is not necessary.

2% during antiquity does feel right, though.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

There is a correlation (between an armed population and rights and votes for said population), but were guns the cause or were guns a manifestation of that change? The fact that the crossbow did not have this effect casts doubt on the theory of guns as the driving force behind this change. Rather the gun seems to have to come into prominence as a means of enforcing the new relationship between citizen and government.

I did a little digging into the supposed ban on crossbows.

Mounted knights armed with lances proved ineffective against formations of pikemen combined with crossbowmen whose weapons could penetrate most knight's armor. This led to the development of new cavalry tactics. Knights and mercenaries deployed in triangular formations, with the most heavily armored knights at the front. The knights would carry small, powerful all-metal crossbows of their own. Crossbows were eventually replaced in warfare by gunpowder weapons, although early guns had slower rates of fire and much worse accuracy than contemporary crossbows. Later, similar competing tactics would feature harquebusiers or musketeers in formation with pikemen, pitted against cavalry firing pistols or carbines.

Although it is an often-repeated belief that both Pope Urban II in 1097 and the Second Lateran Council under Pope Innocent II in 1139 banned the use of crossbows against Christians (There are no surviving acts of the council and very little can be surmised from the records and chronicles.)The sources are collected in Hefele, Histoire des conciles d'apres les documents originaux, trans. and continued by H. Leclerq 1907-52., 5/1, 721-722; but see also, Bernhardi Jahrbuecher der deutschen Geschichte, I Leipzig 1883, 154-160.,scholars who have closely examined the original sources believe that Urban II never made any such ban, and that the Second Lateran Council's prohibition (which has various possible translations) applied to ordinary bows as well as crossbows, and perhaps to all missile weapons in general.

It seems that the crossbow ban never really prevented the use of crossbows in battle. If it had been real, there would be more evidence of it than a few documents of dubious translation. The crossbow did not fade from use due to the supposed ban, but due to accuracy, rate of fire, training and financial considerations. Crossbows were clearly in regular use after the ban. The whole crossbow thing seems to be a bogus argument.

My contention is that the elites gave muskets to the People as it seemed necessary to do so to win battles. The possession of muskets gave the People leverage in demanding rights and votes. This perspective is echoed by the opinions of progressives writing at the time. The 2nd Amendment was praised by the founding fathers as being essential to protect the rest of the Bill of Rights. They believed a well regulated militia necessary to the security of a free state.

I am not sure I get your alternate sense of causality. The elites gave the People rights out of the goodness of their hearts, then gave them muskets to make sure they could keep these rights? OK. Sure. That's a strawman. Could you elaborate a bit more on what you really mean?

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

What I'm saying is that Toffler's analysis is extremely superficial. He treats the agriculture/industry division as politically significant even though the nation-state arises well before notable industry and is clearly the more significant change. He also seems to think all agricultural societies were like medieval Europe.

I actually like Diamond's description of the age of Guns Germs and Steel better than Toffler's. Diamond might make a more reasonable case that improving agriculture made surplus population available for populating cities than Toffler. I am not particularly dedicated to defending every nuance of Toffler.

However, civilization did change during that era. Brian just summarized the change in a way that doesn't reference Toffler and avoids his labels, but still makes the points about changing patterns of civilization that might be relevant to the current discussion. If you can accept Brian's summary, I'd be fairly content. I think we're getting off into an odd and not overly relevant side tangent.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Let's consider the key technologies that have led to the shift from the precivilized to the classical civilized paradigm and from that towards whatever the advanced paradigm ends up being (or at least towards where we are now which I believe to be a transition stage).

The key technology leading to the classical civilized paradigm was agriculture. The reason why agriculture led to this change is that it vastly increased food production per acre. Over time, this led to congregation of humans in larger groups. Bands (the unit of social organization in forager-hunter times) congregated together into tribes, and a pre-state formal governing structure evolved to deal with their disputes and implement collective decisions. Tribes settled in an area, bred more people due to the increased food supply, and eventually built a city. Without exception, the city always developed a form of governance that qualifies as a state.

It's not because people had a particular attitude towards the technology of agriculture (unless you include in that "we can have more kids because there's plenty of food"). It's that such a large number of people could not operate by informal means.

As the classical pattern of civilization consolidated, near-universal patterns of government arose: monarchy, hereditary warrior-landholder aristocracy, slavery or serfdom, state religion based around common religious ideas (Gods-over-man, man-over-woman, man-over-nature, some-men-over-others). Other technologies were developed without affecting this pattern (writing, the wheel, metal working, sailing). The only major exceptions to this pattern, such as Athenian democracy and the Roman Republic, emerged in situations where commerce became more important than agriculture as a source of wealth. Much later, another complex of technologies (the printing press, the scientific method, the steam engine, the assembly line) led to the industrial revolution, which boosted the importance of commerce over agriculture and led to a change in government type and the end of slavery, serfdom, and hereditary nobility (except in vestigial form in some countries).

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

From my readings, they started out as warrior cultures. The tactics of the phalanx and the ethic of "come back with your shield or on it" were more than a little important.

Sparta was a warrior culture. Sparta also conformed much more closely to the classical paradigm, with hereditary warrior-nobles and a population of Helots whose status was somewhere between serf and slave. In some periods Sparta had no king and that was the only significant deviation. Athens was not a warrior culture to the same degree at all. Neither were the other Greek cities.

it was the citizen soldier that differentiated Greece and Rome from much of the rest of antiquity and led to their unusual governments.

That wasn't really a difference. The warrior-nobility were never in any culture the majority of the military force. They were simply the elite fighters and the war leaders. That was true in Rome just as in Persia or Babylon. In all ancient armies, the bulk of the soldiery were commoners. The concept of "citizen" soldiers, as opposed to subject-soldiers, is dependent on the PRE-existence of a republic or constitutional monarchy of some kind where rights of citizenship exist. Rome under the Kings had no citizen-soldiers, while Rome under the Republic did. But that means the Republic was established BEFORE Rome had citizen-soldiers.

No, I'd say the difference lay in trade, and it happened when there were opportunities for commerce that outweighed the opportunities in agriculture. A nation with lots and lots of fertile land developed a classical monarchy. A nation with less fertile land but positioned on trade routes, land or maritime, was more likely to develop a republic. Go down the list of ancient nations and you can see this correlation perfectly: monarchies in Mesopotamia, Iran, Egypt, Syria, India, China; republics in Rome, Athens, Tyre, Sidon, Carthage. Note that the last four of those five could not be considered warrior cultures, but all of them were major trading economies.

This fits with the political transitions that accompanied the industrial revolution, too. This economic change amplified hugely the wealth available from manufacturing and hence from commerce. The interests of the mercantile/capitalist elite are not the same as those of the warrior/landowner elite, and lean towards a republic rather than a monarchy.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Sparta was a warrior culture. Sparta also conformed much more closely to the classical paradigm, with hereditary warrior-nobles and a population of Helots whose status was somewhere between serf and slave. In some periods Sparta had no king and that was the only significant deviation. Athens was not a warrior culture to the same degree at all. Neither were the other Greek cities...

You might want to pick up A History of Warfare. Keegan makes a significant distinction between various styles of fighting.

Primitive cultures (hunter gatherers) often fight almost at a ritual level. Differences are settled almost without bloodshed.

Horse archer nomad armies use herding skills. The same techniques that allow a horseman to herd sheep, horses or cattle are useful in shaping a battle. Given the mobility of a horse archer, if one is in a bad place where one might get hurt, the smart thing to do is to get out of there. The result is again battles with few casualties.

The phalanx.... Come back with your shield or on it... From Keegan's perspective, the Greeks developed a distinctly different approach to battle that had as much to do with a willingness to stand and take casualties as weapons, formations and tactics. Such warrior ethics were not unique to Greece or its heirs. Keegan suggests that the Zulu and Samurai later developed similar warrior ethics independently.

But he viewed the success of Alexander the Great not as not entirely due to the brilliance of one young general, but due to a distinctly different warrior culture cutting lose. Earlier attempts by the Persians to invade the underdog Greeks might also have failed due to similar differences. The European culture of war might have continued to play a role down through the ages up to and including Israel standing against its massed neighbors in 1948.

This is not intended to diminish your observations about trade. There is significance to much of what you say. Still, the ability to maintain a monopoly on the use of force is central and important. I wouldn't diminish too much the role of the warrior.

Bob:

You missed the point. What you were calling "Greek" was actually Spartan, not Greek generally. The phalanx, true, was adopted by other Greek cities. The saying "come back with your shield or on it" was NOT. Nor did that phrase go with phalanx-formation infantry. It was purely and solely a feature of Spartan society, and Sparta was the least "Greek" of the Greek cities in terms of governmental anomaly.

I am not attempting to "diminish the role of the warrior." I am merely saying that this role had NOTHING to do with whether a culture was governed by a monarchy or a republic. Obviously the phalanx was a superior infantry formation for the time and was instrumental in Alexander's victory over the Persians, but there is no reason whatever to think it had anything to do with Athenian democracy.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

Good enough. I'll try to find an appropriate population curve and scale things in. If you could suggest a URL, let me know.

Unfortunately, you'll have some trouble there since, for example, WWII involved most of the world while the Thirty Years War only involved central Europe.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

I would still believe that the ability of a given type of culture to wage war would be better understood by examining wars, not peace.

You need to look at both, since financing acutely affected the ability of nation-states to wage war. Thus, including peacetime numbers allows one to adequately account for rest time between conflicts.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

I did a little digging into the supposed ban on crossbows.

Go here for a different take. Still, I will concede that my earlier statement was way too strong. The ban was not particularly successful. It did, however, reflect the sentiment of the times -- that there was a right way and wrong way to make war including by whom and upon whom violence would be meted. Regardless, the crossbow failed to produce democracy and the gun supposedly did. The difference was not the weapons but "the fire in the minds of men" unleashed by printing.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

I am not sure I get the alternate sense of causality. The elites gave the People rights out of the goodness of their hearts, then gave them muskets to make sure they could keep these rights? OK. Sure. That's a strawman. Could you elaborate a bit more on what you really mean?

Armaments became more widely spread (relative to the medieval norm) because this was more effective in battle. However, the rise of militia systems (and later democratic institutions) occurred in order to give the newly armed lower classes a common bind with the state. As early as 1521, you have Machiavelli advocating militia systems in order to instill civic pride and provide a bulwark against tyranny. This was well before firearms became widespread in European armies.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

However, civilization did change during that era. Brian just summarized the change in a way that doesn't reference Toffler and avoids his labels, but still makes the points about changing patterns of civilization that might be relevant to the current discussion. If you can accept Brian's summary, I'd be fairly content. I think we're getting off into an odd and not overly relevant side tangent.

Yes, this is a bit of a tangent. I think Brian's summary is relatively accurate, although he is attempting to employ that description as a critique of anarchism. However, as pretty much everyone here agrees (and you even directly stated) totalitarianism appears to be an attempt to make an industrial society on an agricultural model. In fact, the entire nation-state period is marked by attempts to do that. Complexity does create a need for more rules, but how those rules are generated, enforced and adjudicated must decentralize otherwise the system locks up.

The Thirty Years War is notable, since it proved to be the death knell for religious conflict in the West. Because religion had broken down as a means of regulating conflict, the state fell into that role and became significantly more powerful. But this too eroded as the era of absolute monarchy lasted only 150 years before democratic republics became dominant. An attempt to regulate the changes wrought by industry drove the creation of the modern corporation and the regulatory and welfare states. This too is breaking down. The overall coercive nature of governance definitely dropped, and continues to do so despite occasional spikes.

The fact that people can't operate together informally beyond a small group doesn't mean that coercion can simply take its place. The people employing force don't have infinite knowledge either. So coercive social systems are just as unstable -- they just tend to fail in spectacular systemic ways.

PBS recently released an episode of Frontline, The Warning. It presents Alan Greenspan as a follower of Ayn Rand who favored free markets and opposed regulation. It also features Brooksly Born as head of the regulatory agency that was charged with regulating the derivatives market. The gist is that there was a near disaster ten years before the Housing Market collapse, that Born predicted both, and called and still calls for regulations that are still not happening.

The episode ends with Greenspan admitting that he was wrong in having faith in the ability of free markets to correct problems. Several of Greenspan's followers who blocked the regulation are shown to be on Obama's economic team. Born predicts that if nothing is done, another collapse will happen in time. If we are still in an 'On to Richmond' phase, and we need another catalyst to nudge us into a true Regeneracy, The Warning predicts that another catalyst is indeed likely.

This is not an evenly balanced presentation by any means. It is almost a liberals right libertarians wrong propaganda piece. (OK. Perhaps the word 'almost' could be removed in the above sentence.) Still, it presents a case against the notion that a free market can solve all economic problems in complex societies such as ours. It might be worth a watch.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

Go here for a different take. Still, I will concede that my earlier statement was way too strong. The ban was not particularly successful. It did, however, reflect the sentiment of the times -- that there was a right way and wrong way to make war including by whom and upon whom violence would be meted. Regardless, the crossbow failed to produce democracy and the gun supposedly did. The difference was not the weapons but "the fire in the minds of men" unleashed by printing.

There have been numerous attempts to ban various sorts of weapons. The Emperor of Japan suspended use of firearms for quite some time. The treaty banning gas during World War II was honored. (There is little good one can say about Hitler, but he was gassed during World War I, and did steer Germany away from weapons of mass destruction.) Lots of folks declared strategic bombing of cities immoral prior to World War II, but it happened anyway. Sometimes banning weapon systems works. Sometimes it doesn't.

But the ban on crossbows was way before the time frame we are talking about, and didn't really take hold.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

Yes, this is a bit of a tangent. I think Brian's summary is relatively accurate, although he is attempting to employ that description as a critique of anarchism. However, as pretty much everyone here agrees (and you even directly stated) totalitarianism appears to be an attempt to make an industrial society on an agricultural model. In fact, the entire nation-state period is marked by attempts to do that. Complexity does create a need for more rules, but how those rules are generated, enforced and adjudicated must decentralize otherwise the system locks up.

The Thirty Years War is notable, since it proved to be the death knell for religious conflict in the West. Because religion had broken down as a means of regulating conflict, the state fell into that role and became significantly more powerful. But this too eroded as the era of absolute monarchy lasted only 150 years before democratic republics became dominant. An attempt to regulate the changes wrought by industry drove the creation of the modern corporation and the regulatory and welfare states. This too is breaking down. The overall coercive nature of governance definitely dropped, and continues to do so despite occasional spikes.

The fact that people can't operate together informally beyond a small group doesn't mean that coercion can simply take its place. The people employing force don't have infinite knowledge either. So coercive social systems are just as unstable -- they just tend to fail in spectacular systemic ways.

I would say that the states of the Thirty Years War were more interested in use of force than in regulating the use of force. At that time, if one happened to be a King, war often appeared cost effective. Few in power saw reason to check their own use of power.

My own belief is that somewhere between the machine gun and the atom bomb, war became not cost effective. Oh, let's be blunt. War is a stupid way to seek out wealth and power at this point in history. Winning a war no longer likely to increase the power, wealth or status of even the winning side. However, human instincts and cultures of war make it very hard for some people to figure this out. The Neocons are just one example.

To me, looking at government excesses in coercion and use of force, the essential element is having ways for the People to be able to coerce the State. Human rights limit the powers of the state. Elections provide a means to remove those who abuse power. One needs a way to coerce those wielding the State's ability to coerce. Rights and votes are a start, but they have not proven sufficient.

Our current system of representative democracy is not working adequately. Churchill put it well. "Many forms of Government have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time."

I'm open to try other things. I'd like to try direct vote computer networked democracy, and say so from time to time, but it doesn't seem likely in the near future. I don't push it very hard or very often, but think it more likely to be tried and sooner tried than anarchy.

I may have another angle on how totalitarian governments tended to grow out of the agricultural kingdoms. Totalitarian governments and the older hereditary kingdoms shared a top down style of absolute power. The kings remembered as 'fill_in_the_blank The Great' were often the strong kings. Centralized power could achieve wonderful things with the right leader in the right circumstance. Thus, one had a culture, a set of values, that suggested strong man rule was the way to go.

Democracy requires a different mode of thinking. There is more a sense of balancing valid interests of opposing factions. Governments have three branches intended to check abuse by the other two. One needs multiple political parties to provide real choices. Rights limit governments. Elections limit governments. Labor checks management. The free press checks government.

If one lives in a well established democracy, it seems obvious to most that the balance of conflicting interests model works while the totalitarian single authority model is a disaster. When one asks why people supported Hitler and Stalin, one might want to think a bit on the histories of the people who supported them. The history of the time of kings was a time when strong kings brought good things.

Which is another reason I am dubious about spreading democracy at gunpoint. For democracy to work well, the culture has to acquire the values that make democracy work. This takes time. This takes generations. The process of acquiring the new values and stabilizing the new governments is often ugly.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

...War is a stupid way to seek out wealth and power at this point in history. Winning a war no longer likely to increase the power, wealth or status of even the winning side. However, human instincts and cultures of war make it very hard for some people to figure this out. ...
Democracy requires a different mode of thinking. ...Which is another reason I am dubious about spreading democracy at gunpoint. For democracy to work well, the culture has to acquire the values that make democracy work. This takes time. This takes generations. The process of acquiring the new values and stabilizing the new governments is often ugly.

I could not agree more with your doubt about spreading democracy at gunpoint. That is why I am opposed to the concept of nation building as a national strategy and why the Iraq war was so misguided. And the drift into nation building in Afghanistan was also a mistake.
I also agree that war is stupid, but we still need the capability to defend ourselves against stupid or irrational people.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

The fact that people can't operate together informally beyond a small group doesn't mean that coercion can simply take its place. The people employing force don't have infinite knowledge either. So coercive social systems are just as unstable -- they just tend to fail in spectacular systemic ways.

Informal cooperative systems are just as coercive as the state. Coercion is a constant. The suggestion you made in that post that it is somehow breaking down or becoming less than before is something I don't see at all. Perhaps you mean that the methods of coercion have become less crude over time, less physical and more monetary, and without the gruesome torture punishments of bygone epochs or, in many cases, without capital punishment at all? But that doesn't make things less coercive. What matters about a penalty is how effective it is at shaping behavior, not how gruesome and terrifying it is. Nor do I see social welfare systems breaking down. Why do you say that's happening?

Also, in regard to your last sentence above: informal control/cooperation systems aren't unstable on a large scale, they just plain don't work at all, period. On a large scale, no such systems exist or operate, as they depend on personal contact and people knowing each other. A formal state emerged (by stages) because of this. That states can become unstable is true, but they remain better on a large scale than informal systems because they exist.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Informal cooperative systems are just as coercive as the state. Coercion is a constant. The suggestion you made in that post that it is somehow breaking down or becoming less than before is something I don't see at all. Perhaps you mean that the methods of coercion have become less crude over time, less physical and more monetary, and without the gruesome torture punishments of bygone epochs or, in many cases, without capital punishment at all? But that doesn't make things less coercive. What matters about a penalty is how effective it is at shaping behavior, not how gruesome and terrifying it is. Nor do I see social welfare systems breaking down. Why do you say that's happening?

I agree with most of the above. Complex societies do require more formal forms of coercion.

I might also suggest that the more just a society is, the less gruesome and terrifying the coercion needs to be. Older societies with poor agriculture and industry were not just at all, and thus sometimes needed to be quite gruesome and terrifying.

Or is this being too generous to the old nobility? Informal communities such as Iceland and Rhode Island in their anarchist times had no better technologies than the larger societies, yet managed to get by without community sponsored terror. Then again, Iceland and Rhode Island, as poor as they were, were reasonably just.

Humans strive for status, territory, leadership and control of resources. It is in the genes. The behavior of the ruling classes throughout history reflects this. The question is not whether elite classes will attempt to use coercion in an attempt to maximize their status. The question is how the common man can secure control of coercive means to prevent the elite classes from going too far.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Informal cooperative systems are just as coercive as the state. Coercion is a constant.

The difference, of course, being that informal coercion is both voluntarily received and participatory. State coercion -- democratic forms and mythology notwithstanding -- is neither.

Also, in regard to your last sentence above: informal control/cooperation systems aren't unstable on a large scale, they just plain don't work at all, period. On a large scale, no such systems exist or operate...

Gzzrblfrgh Wakkwakk5 Prsstgfsk'k'k&

...oh, do you only understand what I'm saying when I do it in english? That is, when I use an informal system with reach wider than any existing (or past) formal system? One which is both voluntary and participatory, and which utterly lacks the standardized monopoly adjudication and enforcement systems without which you and Bob (among others) keep asserting no system with over a handful of participants can possibly exist? The one that, in addition to out-sizing, has out-lasted each and every type of formal system?
Too bad no such thing can possibly exist, huh...

Originally Posted by Justin '77

The difference, of course, being that informal coercion is both voluntarily received and participatory.

Voluntarily received by whom? We're talking about a group decision to kick someone out of the tribe to make it on his own or starve, or possibly to bonk him on the head and bury him. Or tie him up and burn him to death or feed him to wild dogs or something. Somehow I have serious doubts that the targets of these measures voluntarily received them.

...oh, do you only understand what I'm saying when I do it in english? That is, when I use an informal system with reach wider than any existing (or past) formal system?

We are using shorthand statements here because this thread has a fairly constant subject matter. Thus, when I say "informal system" or "formal system" I mean "informal/formal system of collective decision-making and order-keeping," which the English language is not.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

We are using shorthand statements here because this thread has a fairly constant subject matter. Thus, when I say "informal system" or "formal system" I mean "informal/formal system of collective decision-making and order-keeping," which the English language is not.

Oh yeah? I hate to break it to you, but grammar is pretty close to pure order, and associating particular sound-groups with particular concepts represents a pretty significant collective decision-making. And those are fundamentally all a language consists of.

It almost seems like you are trying to follow something like Bob's path wrt 'legitimacy' and redefine terms to a priori include and exclude as necessary to come up with your conclusion. We've 'known' each other for a while, and based on our past contacts, I doubt you'd do something like that on purpose.

Voluntarily received by whom? We're talking about a group decision to kick someone out of the tribe to make it on his own or starve, or possibly to bonk him on the head and bury him. Or tie him up and burn him to death or feed him to wild dogs or something. Somehow I have serious doubts that the targets of these measures voluntarily received them.

That was a sloppy word-choice on my part. I'll mull it over and clarify.

Originally Posted by Justin '77

Oh yeah? I hate to break it to you, but grammar is pretty close to pure order

Grammar has never deterred crime, never kept the peace, never resolved a dispute over property, and never organized a major construction project among large numbers of people. When you find an informal system that has done all of these things over a large scale, then you will actually be saying something. As it is, you are saying nothing.

That was a sloppy word-choice on my part. I'll mull it over and clarify.

Be my guest.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Grammar has never deterred crime, never kept the peace, never resolved a dispute over property, and never organized a major construction project among large numbers of people.

I defy you to find a single example of any of those things happening (on any scale) without the mutually-intelligible communication that grammar enables. In fact, without grammar, absolutely none of those things could ever happen.

Not that grammar automatically makes them happen (then again, not that any of the systems you are describing do, either). But still, you're defining around a conclusion.