Originally Posted by Brian Rush

A civilized, state-governed society is in many respects an improvement over precivilized, stateless life even in the state's primitive stages. However well a band's informal justice system worked within the band itself (which surely varied from band to band), it didn't work worth a damn when members of one band encountered members of another. The normal system of "justice" in precivilized times was the personal vendetta or feud. The death toll was horrific, outstripping the violence of civilized times even when you factor in (as you should) the state-sponsored violence, especially civilized war, that ratcheted up in civilized times.

But there's no denying (and no desire to deny) that states have exhibited some degree of corruption from the beginning and still do -- too often they serve the interests of the privileged rather than of society as a whole. As it impacts anarchism (and libertarianism to a lesser degree), this gives rise to two questions:

1) Can civilization exist without a state?

2) Can the state be rendered incorrupt?

The answer to question 1 is, I would say, a clear and obvious "no." The answer to #2 is that corruption probably can't be completely eliminated but things can be improved a great deal.

What anarchists (and, to a lesser degree, libertarians) seem to me to have done, is to answer the second question in the negative, and because of this insist through wishful-thinking that the answer to the first MUST be in the affirmative. Unfortunately, it's not.

Good post. I would agree that the above reflects how I perceive the anarcho libertarian way of looking at things. I might not be as convinced as you that because we have yet to find a way to scale up informal systems that we never will find a way.

I can also agree that formal systems (rule of law) can be superior in some ways to informal systems (rule of men.) Still, I can't see a scale up in my life time. Even if we do find ways of scaling up some of the desirable aspects of informal systems, we are apt to do so in a way that keeps the benefits of the formal systems.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

Actually . . . I just read a later post where he specifically uses the word control, not social order or cooperation in general. That is sufficiently narrow to not be obviously false, and is probably the narrow sense in which Brian intended in the first place.

I missed that and was responding only to the overbroad assertment that was made about systems in all.

Of course, Brian's reduction to systems of social control only leaves open the question of exactly why such systems deserve to be treated as the unique, special cases that he wants them to. As systems, I can't see that there is a fundamental difference which would justify the conclusion that they would necessarily perform so very differently (and how! The assertion is that control systems would work in the exact opposite manner as other social systems.. that's a pretty significant 'special case').

Maybe, Brian, you could justify the exceptionalism you are claiming for those one kind of social systems?

Originally Posted by Justin '77

Of course, Brian's reduction to systems of social control only leaves open the question of exactly why such systems deserve to be treated as the unique, special cases that he wants them to.

Because of the significance of picked pockets and broken legs.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Because of the significance of picked pockets and broken legs.

I don't see that those are more significant than the ability to communicate. In fact it seems a reasonable point to make that, as social creatures, an inability to communicate would represent a significantly more serious blow than would a picked pocket.

Then again, I've spent goodly sized chunks of time in places where I was insufficiently-equipped to communicate (and also been robbed at gunpoint by people I could communicate with fairly well). So maybe the difference you perceive is merely the result of a failure of imagination?

Originally Posted by Justin '77

I don't see that those are more significant than the ability to communicate.

Then let me explain.

It's not as if the informal controls on language use actually work. The majority of English speakers don't follow the rules of grammar. I daresay nobody follows them perfectly all the time. But this doesn't really matter. It doesn't usually prevent communication, although it can make it a little harder. People speaking to me in bad English doesn't do me any significant harm: it neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg. I don't want to see a coercive system enforcing the rules of English use not because I think that people will follow the rules without it, but because I don't really care whether they do or not, certainly not enough to threaten them with punishment if they don't.

It's quite otherwise with those who wish to pick my pocket or break my leg, or otherwise do me significant harm. Those rules, I want to be obeyed more often than is the case with the rules of English, and therefore I want them enforced.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Then let me explain.

It's not as if the informal controls on language use actually work. The majority of English speakers don't follow the rules of grammar. I daresay nobody follows them perfectly all the time. But this doesn't really matter. It doesn't usually prevent communication, although it can make it a little harder.

I think maybe you misunderstand what I was saying when I referred to 'grammar' and 'rules'. In fact, the vast majority of English-speakers do not break any significant rules -- that is, the ones by which we make the words we speak group into coherently-communicable thoughts -- of grammar. You're just seeing the rules as being wholly consistent of and encapsulated by what you were taught in school. Those are, as formalizations, merely a reflection of the rules of the system itself. Actual grammar is what you learned in years 0-4 of your life (or in those years of your immersion in any language). You are taking a model of something for the thing itself. The issue is not 'bad' versus 'good' english, any more than the democratic system would be about punching holes in or writing names on a ballot.

People speaking to me in bad English doesn't do me any significant harm: it neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.

Again, being in a society without accord to rules of grammar (the things that make disconnected words into coherent communication) is significantly more dire for a person than a mere picking of pockets or breaking of legs. We're not talking about 'bad english'. The qualitative break is between 'coherent' and 'incoherent', not between 'good' and 'not as good'.

...I don't really care whether [people follow the rules of English] or not...

Again, understanding that the formalized model bears only a vague resemblance to the grammar of the language itself (and English is hardly unique on that count), the above statement is beyond ludicrous. A person -- a social creature -- can not survive without some sort of means of coherent communication.

You seem to be confirming my posited 'failure of imagination' explanation. I've been guilty of doing that myself from time to time; unfortunately, I can't recall how I got past it (if I actually did)...

Originally Posted by Justin '77

In fact, the vast majority of English-speakers do not break any significant rules -- that is, the ones by which we make the words we speak group into coherently-communicable thoughts -- of grammar.

Then you are redefining the "rules of grammer" in such a way as to preserve your assertion. Inconveniently perhaps, this redefinition also renders your assertion meaningless.

I'm done with you on this, Justin. What I said above holds. You are not stupid enough to believe that this line of thought actually reflects in any way whatsoever on the need for a state. Therefore, you do not believe it -- but you are still asserting it.

I don't like liars. We're done until you begin telling the truth.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Then you are redefining the "rules of grammar" in such a way as to preserve your assertion.

Yeah, right. link

Grammars evolve through usage and also due to separations of the human population. With the advent of written representations, formal rules about language usage tend to appear also. Formal grammars are codifications of usage that are developed by repeated documentation over time, and by observation as well. As the rules become established and developed, the prescriptive concept of grammatical correctness can arise. This often creates a discrepancy between contemporary usage and that which has been accepted, over time, as being correct. Linguists tend to believe that prescriptive grammars do not have any justification beyond their authors' aesthetic tastes...

The formal study of grammar is an important part of education for children from a young age through advanced learning, though the rules taught in schools are not a "grammar" in the sense most linguists use the term, as they are often prescriptive rather than descriptive.

So no. I'm not the one trying to create a nonstandard definition to fit my argument. And since the discussion is about rules in informal systems, grammar-as-descriptive which I'm using is the meaning actually consistent with our conversation.

But I can see this is bothering you (for some reason). We can drop it if you want.

Its GROUNDHOG DAY yet again and Sonny & Cher are singing "I Got You Babe" for the zillionth time.

When we get done with the weekly discussion about creative definitions can we have the weekly discussion about the FDA and drug regulation?

Originally Posted by Justin '77

Of course, Brian's reduction to systems of social control only leaves open the question of exactly why such systems deserve to be treated as the unique, special cases that he wants them to. As systems, I can't see that there is a fundamental difference which would justify the conclusion that they would necessarily perform so very differently (and how! The assertion is that control systems would work in the exact opposite manner as other social systems.. that's a pretty significant 'special case').

There are answers to this if one takes an evolutionary behavior perspective, if one accepts works like The Hunting Hypothesis, the Territorial Imperative, On Aggression and On Killing. Many pack hunter species have instinctive maximum sizes per pack. If there have been good years, and a pack gets too large, the alpha males often get angry at each other, the usual competition for alpha status gets out of hand, two rivals for alpha become unable to tolerate each other, and the pack splits in two.

It is suggested that humans have similar instincts. The squad size, the smallest unit of soldiers, does not go above 12 in any human army. Larger groups don't handle well. If groups have to get larger than that, one forms hierarchies of groups, with the leaders of the 'squads' reporting to higher authorities at platoon, company, battalion, regimental and other levels. It is suggested that the original hunting bands would consist of no more than 12 hunters, plus appropriate numbers of mates, children and elders.

One reason for this might be effective management of territories. One group can only cover so much ground. A larger group would have to travel more than would really be effective. Thus, it would be in the interests of the species if the size of the groups and the size of the territories is limited.

These factors would not apply to language. While it is important that packs have unique territories of adequate but manageable size, there is no reason each pack should have its own language. Thus, language groups were larger than hunting territories. Neighboring bands, so long as they respect each other's hunting territories, could reasonably communicate, trade, and exchange members to prevent too much inbreeding.

Folding all that into the current conversation, human social instincts work well with groups about the size of a hunting band, but start to break down with larger groups. Larger groups require some sort of formal structure.

The clearest I've seen this hunting pack phenomena manifest is in various martial arts schools. When you get too many black and brown belts in a given school, it is time for the community to split, for the style to open up another school. If you don't do it formally, it is apt to happen informally through squabbling and irritable behaviors.

Originally Posted by haymarket martyr

Its GROUNDHOG DAY yet again and Sonny & Cher are singing "I Got You Babe" for the zillionth time.

When we get done with the weekly discussion about creative definitions can we have the weekly discussion about the FDA and drug regulation?

The proper usage there would be it's, not its.

Are you off your meds again? ™

just lazy

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

I did note the crimson phrase when you used it in a prior post. It reminded me of a science fiction phrase, "any technology sufficiently advanced is indistinguishable from magic."

That, of course, is where I borrowed it from.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

Obviously, different states answer your three questions differently. The right to leave and return to one's own country is in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but the right to enter any country is not. A democracy typically has the legislative branch defining the crimes, with the executive branch enforcing and judicial branch judging. Messy. Definitely formal. Facing the council of elders across a hunting band's campfire might have its advantages and disadvantages. It would depend on the elders. Some think having rule of law rather than rule of men a good thing.

Are those answers for your three questions acceptable to you?

They're a good start.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

If you have a demand for justice, do you have a definition of what justice is, objective enough that a nation aspiring to be just has a target to shoot at? Obviously, defining what justice is would be a controversial work in progress. I think the authors of the Universal Declaration were taking a stab at it. Are the anarchists formal and unified enough to have a similar document? Like pornography, is it harder to define justice than to recognize injustice when you see it?

Justice is difficult to define, since although one can try to derive ultimate principles -- the fact is that our sense of morality is evolved, not learned. Culture doesn't teach us justice at all, it merely teaches the way in which justice has been applied in certain contexts familiar to that culture. Some of that information is, unfortunately, garbage.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

For me, one of the big problems with existing justice is ruling elites setting up the laws in a way to favor the ruling elites. Not a trivial problem.

This is also a non-trivial source of cultural garbage. For example, excessive loyalty to the abstraction called one's "nation" has been a motivation for violence to "defend" the nation.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

OK, but that gets back to the three questions I asked Matt quite a while back. One is "Do you advocate a society without coercion?" The answer to this determines what question is asked next. Since you have answered "No," the next question is, "What system do you advocate to apply coercion on a large scale so as to replace the state? And in what sense would whatever this system is, not BE a state?"

The answer there would depend on how you define "state." Is the decentralized polity envisioned by anarchists just a very sophisticated state? For certain definitions of the word state, yes.

I think most libertarians use Weber's definition. Although per wikipedia's article on the state, technically, many large complex societies have not been states by Weber's definition. For example, in medieval Europe, legislative and judicial functions were shared with the Church and executive functions were shared with nobles. In fact, not even most present-day states fully match Weber's description.

Take for example the WTO, which has pierced the wall of sovereignty for dozens of countries on matters of trade -- yet, since the WTO has powers of enforcement and coercion it could be construed as a government. It certainly seems to fill that role.

I think libertarians are drawn towards Weber's definition because they oppose the monopoly aspect. More specifically, while you can make an argument for laws against a particular offense needing an enforcer, and you can even make an argument that over some optimal area a natural monopoly might exist, what you can't justify is that said natural monopoly is identical in scope regardless of the offense in question. That is one of the crucial failings of the nation-state (especially ones lacking in federalism) -- that the optimal enforcement areas for different crimes are bundled together under a single organization.

Furthermore, regardless of internal organization, the boundary between two states can and will cut through the optimal enforcement area for certain offenses. In addition, the boundaries between jurisdictions do not adjust in a dynamic fashion primarily because the principle of free exit and entry from polities has only been applied to the entire package deal provided by particular states rather than piecemeal to the components of the package.

As you can see, the range of potential enforcement systems approaches infinity. The only systems that we can rule out as unstable are:

1) Conditions where groups are fighting over who will enforce a particular rule, and especially where groups are attempting to be monopoly enforcers.
2) Conditions where persons exempt themselves from enforcement of any kind.

Note, that both of the above conditions occur all the time even today. Having a Weberian state does not eliminate these conditions, as different bureaus will fight over who gets to regulate a particular activity and insiders will secure for themselves exceptions to the rules.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

You asserted that social welfare was breaking down, I asked why you believed that, and you responded with statements about the financial system.

Other than a statement about escalating costs, I don't think I pegged the welfare state as a driver of instability in the present system. Perhaps you misread something?

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

If that's true, then what is being advocated is not anarchy by definition.

I suppose. But it seems weird to argue that there aren't actually any anarchists despite any you may have met from time to time. All we've really demonstrated is that anarchism is a very strident form of liberalism.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Why not call for an improved version of the state which does a better job of administering justice?

Sure, and I do. I just think that the more you do that, the less recognizable as a state that system will be.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

But there's no denying (and no desire to deny) that states have exhibited some degree of corruption from the beginning and still do -- too often they serve the interests of the privileged rather than of society as a whole. As it impacts anarchism (and libertarianism to a lesser degree), this gives rise to two questions:

1) Can civilization exist without a state?

2) Can the state be rendered incorrupt?

The answer to question 1 is, I would say, a clear and obvious "no." The answer to #2 is that corruption probably can't be completely eliminated but things can be improved a great deal.

What anarchists (and, to a lesser degree, libertarians) seem to me to have done, is to answer the second question in the negative, and because of this insist through wishful-thinking that the answer to the first MUST be in the affirmative. Unfortunately, it's not.

The answer to 1) is "no" only for sufficiently broad definitions of "state" and the answer to 2) is "mostly" for those same definitions. If we're using the Weberian definition of the state than the answers are unequivocally yes and no respectively.

I can hardly keep up with this, though I do plan on making some responses to some older stuff in the near future, but I think Justin's point is a good one. People largely adhere to grammatical rules (that is, the extent until which a language is subject to real constraints on understanding...that is, more or less, a language) because of a combination of innate faculties, learned experiences, and the benefits that cooperation gives us. (Actually, IIRC, there is a small portion of a child's life, right after they learn things like agreement, where they do not adhere to grammatical rules on a consistent basis, usually pertaining to overuse of a rule (e.g. I have two foots).)

Language is a very human example of rules, order, structure, being imposed from the bottom-up. In and of itself, it is a pretty poor argument for anarchism, but it seems just as ridiculous to suggest that the broader discoveries regarding spontaneous (in the tacit sense) order isn't relevant to discussions about political theory, and anarchism in particular. And that's all I really think the discussion was meant to be about with regard to linguistics.

Originally Posted by Bob Butler 54

Any time you try to break human history into four basic categories, the result is going to be very generalized. (I generally add the hunter gatherer pattern as a preceding 'wave,' and am suspending judgement on how Toffler's "Information Age" develops. It is too soon to take that really seriously. The book already seems dated.) There will be exceptions and to any such pattern. History was a continuum. The major breaks remain useful, however.

Yes, there were highly militarized states in ancient days where a large number of males were citizen soldiers. The Roman Republic and the Greek city states stand as examples. They also illustrate the idea that if you arm a large fraction of the population, those armed get extra rights and privileges. However, as agriculture was still very manpower intensive, the idea "that every man be armed" did not come true to the extent that it did in the days of English muskets. Thus, the ideas of universal rights, of all having a right to bear arms and universal suffrage never made a full appearance in ancient days, let alone become really dominant.



Many technologies and other factors brought the age of Guns, Germs and Steel into full flower. Ocean going sailing ship are neglected in my opinion. The printing press was not a negligible factor, but I don't believe the distinction between crossbows and muskets was much of a turning point. Cannon were important, though, in giving national governments an advantage in the field against castle dwelling feudal lords.

At any rate, there remains a real distinction between an agricultural empire with hereditary privileged nobility and the modern industrial democracy. It is a difference in kind rather than emphasis. Many of the Anglo-American Crises from the Protestant Reformation through the US Civil War can be viewed as wars of transition between one style of society to the other. The period can and perhaps should be viewed as the Anglo Americans figuring out how industrial democracy ought to work. (Edit. Maybe the New Deal early half of the following crisis needs a mention in this too.)

I view Fascism and Communism as attempts to integrate technology into totalitarian cultures without rights and democracy. Thus, the world wars and Cold War have aspects of the same conflict of memes. Fundamentalist Islam with its preference for totalitarian government enforcing ancient religious values can also be viewed as yet another old style culture attempting to adapt to (or resist adapting to) newer technology.

This is not to say that all cultures will inevitably find the same answers as the Anglo-Americans did. Nor does it say that that they will necessarily transition with any less struggle and bloodshed than the Anglo-Americans went through. Values shifts are really really painful. The answers we found are visible enough, but it is not easy to see the utility of things that are alien to one's own values and traditions.

The more democratic Greek city states are an example in the ancient world of the "mass arming of citizens = Democracy" principle. Hoplite infantry destroyed the power of the traditional aristocracy in many city states. And the sailor-militia of Athens sustained it's democracy.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

Justice is difficult to define, since although one can try to derive ultimate principles -- the fact is that our sense of morality is evolved, not learned. Culture doesn't teach us justice at all, it merely teaches the way in which justice has been applied in certain contexts familiar to that culture. Some of that information is, unfortunately, garbage...

This (a state biased towards serving the elites rather than the people) is also a non-trivial source of cultural garbage. For example, excessive loyalty to the abstraction called one's "nation" has been a motivation for violence to "defend" the nation.

That loyalty to the group might be hard to get rid of. Aubrey called it the peer bond. One bonds with one's mates, strives for leadership, takes pride in the leader, takes pride in the group, stands by one's brothers. You hear about such things from military vets, biker gangs, marching bands, and whenever two or more of you will gather in His name. It might grow strongest in combat or other high risk situations where everyone has to watch everyone else's back. It is far more common that that, though.

The ability to bond together to do things as groups that individuals cannot do as individuals is part of being human. The more you can achieve with a group bond, the more loyalty and motivation to defend the group.

There seems to be a pattern among the anarchists to go for bottom up networked solutions, to dismiss having a loyalty to the whole. This isn't entirely off. Leaving individuals and small groups free to make a niche for themselves isn't entirely dumb.

But if one wants to have a common set of principles that leads to justice, that set of principles has to become part of group values. The existence of a large group sharing a vital set of values implies a very large community. You want to invoke bonding emotions, to build that sense of community such that all wish to honor the community's values and not hurt other members of the community.

You mention that scaling up from the small communities where anarchy has worked here and there is difficult. It will be. It will be especially hard using values that diss large communities. Communities share values. It will be hard to destroy loyalty to large communities and get shared values which define justice at the same time.

We statists, of course, will start with the already existing large communities currently practicing imperfect justice, and try to improve the justice.

Originally Posted by Odin

The more democratic Greek city states are an example in the ancient world of the "mass arming of citizens = Democracy" principle. Hoplite infantry destroyed the power of the traditional aristocracy in many city states. And the sailor-militia of Athens sustained it's democracy.

Yes. That's how I read the histories too, not that Greece has been a primary interest of mine. I read Athens as a sea power whose strong commercial success during her heyday was created and sustained by their dominating fleet. I read Sparta as being the most extreme example of a more inland hoplite city state, but she wasn't entirely unique.

I never thought I'd miss the militant Republicans defending the role of military fortunes in history...

Originally Posted by Matt1989

Language is a very human example of rules, order, structure, being imposed from the bottom-up. In and of itself, it is a pretty poor argument for anarchism, but it seems just as ridiculous to suggest that the broader discoveries regarding spontaneous (in the tacit sense) order isn't relevant to discussions about political theory, and anarchism in particular. And that's all I really think the discussion was meant to be about with regard to linguistics.

Yes. Language is a very human behavior, a very useful one, and doesn't require much in the way of formal enforcement.

But there are other factors that shape human culture. There are a bunch of bonds that bind the community... male-female, parent-child, peer, and tribal will do as a start. Effecting all of these bonds in different ways is dominance, a contest for status and authority that pushes for achievement, unity and power. Territory, aggression and greed help secure resources. Mercy and charity benefit the group as a whole and counter the harm that could be done by excessive competition. Fear and anger have their role as well in balancing the use of force and coercion.

A moralistic perspective might take these human drives, labeling some of them as 'good,' some of them as 'evil,' and thus try to encourage some at the expense of others. The ability to create and enforce moral systems might be considered human too. The basic underlying emotional drives create a structure of human behaviors at a genetic level. Community cultures refine the emotional urges at a meme level using reason, experience and culture as tools.

But a culture asserting that aggression is evil doesn't make aggression go away. Over much of human history and pre history, aggression was a cost effective means to secure resources and territory for the group. It had to be checked. Even highly militaristic cultures during the worst times of strife could not be too stupid about using force.

I would argue that as weapons became more deadly, aggression became less cost effective. It is now less desirable than ever. There is a greater need for strong cultural checks on aggression than has existed at any point in human history. Anarchy philosophy that puts lack of aggression and coercion at the top of their values system has at least that much right.

But in order to have a value system that checks the more violent human behaviors, on has to have a community that shares that value system. Cultural restraints apply much more to members of one's own group, to people one is bonded with, than to outsiders that are competing with one's own group for status, territory or resources. Racism is human too, and it isn't just skin pigmentation that can trigger hatred of one group by another. It is easy for humans to see the other as threat.

It is possible to build group bonds over a large scale. A marine seeing a stranger's semper fi tattoo wouldn't see a stranger. Respect for a flag, just a colored piece of cloth, can be powerful. Such things can say we are one, we will share with one another, and we will stand against the outsider, the other.

And that is why scaling up the informal cultural systems of anarchy will be awkward. Creating a united culture of shared values while not having states that bind the culture together will be difficult.

As technology improves, as more resources become available, as more resources become available, as education improves, as we get better at creating moral systems and governments alike, there has been less need for extreme and gruesome coercion. As medicine improves, as child mortality plummets, as agriculture is able to feed more and more people, as population increases, as the competition for territory and resources threatens to crash into malthusian limits, the modern failed state can result. The bonds with one's immediate community become dominant. The behavior towards others outside one's group becomes, well, evil.

The liberal might try to sing kumbaya, and build a feeling that we are all one, that all men shall be brothers.

The anarchist? I can see that the state has enabled many undesirable behaviors. I can see the need to change. Still, rather than simply destroying the state, they might need to replace it with something else that can unify people and encourage a shared system of values. It isn't just states that do this. Churches do it as well. That doesn't seem to be how the anarchists would be leaning, though.

Until a plausible anarchist community starts building that might spread their values, it seems more constructive to try to reform states than diminish them.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

Also, you didn't respond to the observation that Kennedy's cuts would have immediately tripled the amount of available status wealth, yet no bubble appeared.

Yes one did, the go-go years of the late sixties, when the concept of paying high prices for stocks with no earnings first appeared. But the rich were still relatively poor and lacked the wherewithal to bid up the entire market to bubble levels. So in the late sixties it was just small cap stocks. In the early 1970's it was the so-call nifty-fifty. After the first Reagan cuts investors became rich enough to launch a speculative boom in large cap stocks, but they lacked the resources to bid prices all the way to bubble levels. The market corrected sharply in 1987, and moderated afterward. it wasn't until the mid-1990's that they were rich enough to create true bubbles.

All of which were also present during the High. But those aren't the expenditures that grew (except education?). It was entitlements that grew enormously, and entitlements are not investments in the economic sense -- they are consumption.

My point was that most of the government spending during both periods was on consumption. And since the level of spending was about the same during both periods, government spending is unlikely to be the reason why growth during the high tax era was so much better than during the other periods.

It's the tax claim that I find dubious.

It is a fact that the good performance of the 1945-1973 era was associated with high taxes, balanced budgets and low interest rates. This good performance only occurred when all three of these factors were present. It was not present in the century before, and it disappeared within a couple of years after these factors ended.

On the other hand, low taxes with and without balanced budgets have been tried and neither gave fast growth. For both interest rates were high, which likely explains why growth was not fast. What has not been done was run an economy with low taxes, balanced budgets and low interest rates.

An attempt to do just that was made in the 1990's. In 1994 the economy came out of the "jobless recovery" of the early 1990's. The Fed cut rates twice in 1995 and a third time in Jan 1996, at which point they were at 5.25%. Growth in 1995 was 3.8% compared to 2.5% in 1994. Growth in 1996 was still better at 4.4%. Rates averaged 3.2% over the 1950's and 1960's, so there was long way to go to get to these rates.

No further rate cuts were made and in 1997 growth was again 4.4%. The next move was a rate increase (to 5.5%) in March 1997.

Inflationary pressures were cited as the reason for no additional cuts after Jan 1996. Inflation in Jan 1996 was 2.73%. In March 1997 it was 2.76%. Since 1995 inflation has run at 2.5%. Compare to 2.4% inflation over 1950-1970. Obviously inflation wasn't an issue.

In December 1996 Allen Greenspan gave his famous "Irrational Exuberance" speech. It is almost certain that the real reason the Fed stopped cutting after January 1996 was fear of a developing stock market bubble. That is, an asset bubble prevented a reprise of 1960's policy in the 1990's.

The question is, why was there no asset bubble in the 1960's?

The mid-1960's was in the midst of a secular bull market. Inflation was similar to 1990's levels and interest rates were far lower. Classical economic theory would argue for a much more extreme bubble in the 1960's than in the 1990's.

But there was no bubble, valuations stayed low. But why? There were low interest rates, low inflation, and strong economic growth.

The only answer I can think of was that there was no institutional infrastructure to generate a bubble. To get a bubble you need financial managers who understand the new rules of the speculative marketplace. You need new speculative investment products. You need corporate management attentive to the desires of Wall Street. And most of all you need liquidity. There things were not in place in the 1960's.

The reason is simple. When valuations are low, returns from simple investments are very profitable. A financial infrastructure designed to obtain high returns in a low-yield world is only needed after asset prices has risen to a point where yield is depressed. This never happened in the 1960's; dividend yields were more than twice the 1990's level.

Dividend yields were high because 1960's investors had insufficient resources to bid up the price sufficiently to depress dividend yield. The 1960's investor class had less money because of high taxation. They simply could not bid asset prices to levels where returns were depressed. Since ordinary investments gave good returns, there was no demand for speculative investment products.

In the 1990's (and since) the rich were so rich that they had bid stocks to levels were dividend yields were crappy. To get a decent return they needed alternative (speculative) investment products and they got them.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

Unfortunately, this chart needs to be scaled relative to the population of the combatant countries.

Of course its scaled relative to population. It would be meaningless if it were not.

If you did that, you'd find that the biggest spike in that period would be the 30 Years War, not WWII

Where did you get this notion?

Peak Roman mobilization in any one year probably never went over 2%.

Can you provide some support for your assertions of high military/ population ratios for ancient societies? This is not what I learned from my reading.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

The answer there would depend on how you define "state." Is the decentralized polity envisioned by anarchists just a very sophisticated state? For certain definitions of the word state, yes.

I think most libertarians use Weber's definition. Although per wikipedia's article on the state, technically, many large complex societies have not been states by Weber's definition. For example, in medieval Europe, legislative and judicial functions were shared with the Church and executive functions were shared with nobles. In fact, not even most present-day states fully match Weber's description.

Take for example the WTO, which has pierced the wall of sovereignty for dozens of countries on matters of trade -- yet, since the WTO has powers of enforcement and coercion it could be construed as a government. It certainly seems to fill that role.

I think libertarians are drawn towards Weber's definition because they oppose the monopoly aspect. More specifically, while you can make an argument for laws against a particular offense needing an enforcer, and you can even make an argument that over some optimal area a natural monopoly might exist, what you can't justify is that said natural monopoly is identical in scope regardless of the offense in question. That is one of the crucial failings of the nation-state (especially ones lacking in federalism) -- that the optimal enforcement areas for different crimes are bundled together under a single organization.

Furthermore, regardless of internal organization, the boundary between two states can and will cut through the optimal enforcement area for certain offenses. In addition, the boundaries between jurisdictions do not adjust in a dynamic fashion primarily because the principle of free exit and entry from polities has only been applied to the entire package deal provided by particular states rather than piecemeal to the components of the package.

As you can see, the range of potential enforcement systems approaches infinity. The only systems that we can rule out as unstable are:

1) Conditions where groups are fighting over who will enforce a particular rule, and especially where groups are attempting to be monopoly enforcers.
2) Conditions where persons exempt themselves from enforcement of any kind.

Note, that both of the above conditions occur all the time even today. Having a Weberian state does not eliminate these conditions, as different bureaus will fight over who gets to regulate a particular activity and insiders will secure for themselves exceptions to the rules.

I am reminded of a scene from a Jack Clancey novel. Picture the US Capitol Building on fire with the tail of a 747 airliner sticking out of one front of the House Chambers. President Jack Ryan is told that jurisdiction is a bit complicated. The Secret Service has jurisdiction on attempts on the President's life. The FBI handles terrorism. The FAA investigates plane crashes. What trumps? In this case, the President gives the lead to the FBI as they are big enough to handle it and have the messiest job, but makes sure the number two and three people on the case are from the other agencies. Because it is a novel, and Jack Ryan is Jack Ryan, it works.

But, yes, the problem of one enforcement agency getting control of each crime is non-trivial, and there are existing mechanisms that are supposed to handle it. The more usual case would be whether local, state or federal authorities get jurisdiction over a given crime. Again, there are rules, there have to be rules, but humans being humans, the borders on authority don't always get drawn cleanly. There shall be yelling and screaming.

My own preference would be to push things down to the most local level that makes sense. Let the town cops handle the bulk of the stuff. Still, the state cops would want to patrol highways, while the federals might properly get involved when the action crosses state lines. Some sorts of crime fighting involves fancy equipment that not every town can afford.

I can see police agencies at the local, county, state and federal levels helping one another. There are clearly times when larger and better equipped organizations will be useful in solving the crime and making the arrest. I'm not convinced that each level of government needs its own criminal code, though. Let the state legislatures write the laws, and the counties administer the front line courts. I'm not sure that murdering a federal officer or killing someone standing on federal land should be a different crime than if an ordinary person is killed on private land. Officially, the federal government is really short on police powers. At the extreme, perhaps federal agents might be expected to advise and consult, but might not actually have arresting authority?

The status quo is surely messy. Certainly, the more locally one does things, the closer one might get to an unattainable duplication of the council of elders sitting at the hunting band's campfire. On the other hand, I also remember Jim Crow. If there is a pattern of state or local authorities not defending rights defined at the federal level, it might be proper for the locals to get trodden upon.

But I don't know that all that complexity ought to cause us to throw away Weber's definition. Yes, we can throw around how the mess could be made less formal and more effective. I don't know that abstract philosophical discussion would be helped, though, by replacing Weber's fairly clean construction with a more convoluted restatement that reflects ugly reality.

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

Let's break down the point:
1) Language has rules that people largely follow despite a lack of formal enforcement
2) Most languages encompass far more speakers than could possibly ever know each other
3) Therefore it's not true that rules cannot bind large numbers of people without formal enforcement

You can say this same thing about lots of things people do. For example, walking:

1. Walking has rules that people largely follow despite a lack of formal enforcement.

2. The set of people who can walk encompasses far more walkers than could ever possibly know each other.

3. Therefore it's not true that rules cannot bind large numbers of people without formal enforcement

How do the rules of walking bind people?

Yes its true that when I walk I am going to use the same muscle groups in more or less the same way as you do. But that doesn't mean you and I have agreed to be controlled by a common set of rules for ambulation. Walking is something we both learned to do as infants and which we now do pretty much automatically. Language is the same sort of thing.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

How do the rules of walking bind people?

Walking is no more a social activity than is breathing or (to use Brian's example from earlier) digestion. We're not talking about systems in just plain organisms, but about systems in people -- that is to say, in social entities. So walking is different-in-kind from governing or language.

Originally Posted by Justin '77

Walking is no more a social activity than is breathing or (to use Brian's example from earlier) digestion. We're not talking about systems in just plain organisms, but about systems in people -- that is to say, in social entities. So walking is different-in-kind from governing or language.

I've been listing the sort of emotions and drives that I believe are relevant to to how human communities organize themselves. We have territory, status, aggression, mercy, greed, charity, with tribal, peer, male-female and parent-child bonding. These social and emotional drives shape how human groups operate, and are in part instinctive rather than purely learned. These are part of the human control / coordination system. They shape governance. For the sake of this post at least, I'll call the above in crimson "social instincts."

Now, at the moment we seem to be asking how language is different (or if it is different) from these social instincts. Are they different-in-kind? Does language shape governance? I'll include both informal and formal governance in the above questions.

One criteria where they are different is that language is a trait much more associated with humans than other animals. Yes, chimps have been taught to sign in a way that could easily be described as language. Still, language plays a much larger role in natural human culture than it does for other primates. That's a possible way in which language is different-in-kind, but does this shape governance? Is it important as to how humans organize their communities?

At first I wanted to find a way to say no, to say language is not a social instinct. Then again, something Brian said also feels right. Language is necessary for formal governance. Other animals have social instincts very similar to men. Other animals are aggressive, yet merciful. They defend territories, seek status, and select leaders. Other animals can organize themselves into communities with what we have been calling informal structure. Animals can create something that approximates the anarchy some here desire.

Animal societies influenced by the above social instincts found in man are not free of coercion. If one defends territories, bonds into groups and strives for leadership, you are going to get behaviors that should properly be described as coercion if one isn't tailoring a carefully crafted definition of the word.

But without language, you aren't going to get formal states. I'd suggest that reason, learned culture and perhaps symbol use might be other traits most associated with humans that might be required for formal states. Even these attributes might be found in limited ways in non-humans. Orca have wildly different learned group hunting techniques that might be considered cultural. Primates have been taught to learn symbols in the lab. While humans can use reason to solve problems better than most, it is a matter of sizable degree rather than kind.

At any rate, I don't expect anyone to suggest that animals other than man create formal states?

And thus, language might be different-in-kind as it is for the most part human while the social instincts can also be found in animals. It might not be different-in-kind in that it does significantly enable human formal governance.

***

The list of social instincts above in crimson are featured in works like The Hunting Hypothesis, The Territorial Imperative, On Aggression and On Killing. I'll note there are other emotions, many of which might be tied into the crimson list. Depending on whether one is bonded with the person one is interacting with, many emotions would operate in different ways.

The Plutchik's Wheel diagram below throws out a bunch of other drives, less important in many ways in shaping informal or formal government than the ones I've been mentioning, but they might also be considered social instincts. They help shape how people interact with one another.

I'll note that Plutchik missed things like mercy, greed, charity and territoriality. Slightly different stuff. To the degree that these deal with violence and resource allocation, however, they would be important to governance.